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The relative abilities of dummy variable regression and log-linear models to locate significant relationships in systems of dichotomous variables are compared. On logical grounds log-linear models are superior to regression since the data more readily meet the assumptions of the former. Two illustrative examples suggest that the methods converge in their findings when the range in proportions of the dependent dichotomy is between .25 and. 75, but may differ on which effects are significant when proportions are more extreme. Substantive differences under the two methods are likely to be small, however.

Estimating multiple equation hybrid models with endogenous dummy regressors is burdensome if the number of dummies and equations is large. Therefore, after clarifying model structure and identification issues the paper presents a generalization of the Amemiya principle. The new estimator reduces the computational costs and is flexible with regard to different types of variables. Furthermore, it is consistent and asymptotically normal distributed.

This article explores the statistical properties as well as the substantial interpretation of coefficients arrived at by usual regression procedures when the de pendent variable is a dichotomy. Some practical advice is offered on how this traditional technique can be used as a proxy to the more refined approach suggested by Grizzle, Starmer, and Koch.

This paper examines the association between economic development and two measures of public spending on education, namely the 'national effort' (total spending as a percentage of GDP) and 'budget share' (total spending as a percentage of total government spending). Using data for a large sample of countries from 1989 to 2015, we illustrate a novel application of Wagner's law. We compare mean levels of national effort and budget share measures for economically and politically distinct groups of countries. We find that the signs of the associations between the level of economic development and the two education spending measures differ. This implies that richer countries have larger public sectors than do poorer countries, consistent with Wagner's Law. The findings are summarized in the form of three inequality propositions about the national effort, budget share and size of government for richer versus poorer countries. In addition, for comparable levels of economic development, democratic countries tend to spend more on education than is the case for their non-democratic counterparts.

This paper draws an empirical reassessment of the finance-growth nexus by performing a panel data econometric analysis for all 28 European Union countries over 27 years from 1990 to 2016. Since the mid-1980s, the financial system has experienced a strong liberalisation and deregulation by preventing its beneficial effects on the real economy. This phenomenon, typically called financialisation, points to a negative view of finance and contradicts the well-entrenched hypothesis on the finance-growth nexus. We estimate both linear and non-linear growth models by incorporating seven proxies of finance (money supply, domestic credit, financial value added, short-term interest rate, long-term interest rate, stock market volume traded and stock market capitalisation) and five control variables (the lagged growth rate of the real per capita gross domestic product, the inflation rate, the general government consumption, the degree of trade openness and the education level of the population). Our results show that finance has impaired economic growth in the EU countries, both in the pre-crisis period and in the crisis and post-crisis periods. The enormous growth of domestic credit and of the financial value added have been restraining the economic growth of the EU countries since 1990 and particularly up until the Great Recession. This implies the need to reduce the prominence of finance, i.e. so-called de-financialisation, in the coming years in order to avoid the potential new 'secular stagnation' in the current age of financialisation. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

This paper draws an empirical reassessment of the finance-growth nexus by performing a panel data econometric analysis for all 28 European Union countries over 27 years from 1990 to 2016. Since the mid-1980s, the financial system has experienced a strong liberalisation and deregulation by preventing its beneficial effects on the real economy. This phenomenon, typically called financialisation, points to a negative view of finance and contradicts the well-entrenched hypothesis on the finance-growth nexus. We estimate both linear and non-linear growth models by incorporating seven proxies of finance (money supply, domestic credit, financial value added, short-term interest rate, long-term interest rate, stock market volume traded and stock market capitalisation) and five control variables (the lagged growth rate of the real per capita gross domestic product, the inflation rate, the general government consumption, the degree of trade openness and the education level of the population). Our results show that finance has impaired economic growth in the EU countries, both in the pre-crisis period and in the crisis and post-crisis periods. The enormous growth of domestic credit and of the financial value added have been restraining the economic growth of the EU countries since 1990 and particularly up until the Great Recession. This implies the need to reduce the prominence of finance, i.e. so-called de-financialisation, in the coming years in order to avoid the potential new 'secular stagnation' in the current age of financialisation. ; FCT

This paper draws an empirical reassessment of the finance-growth nexus by performing a panel data econometric analysis for all 28 European Union countries over 27 years from 1990 to 2016. Since the mid-1980s, the financial system has experienced a strong liberalisation and deregulation by preventing its beneficial effects on the real economy. This phenomenon, typically called financialisation, points to a negative view of finance and contradicts the well-entrenched hypothesis on the finance-growth nexus. We estimate both linear and non-linear growth models by incorporating seven proxies of finance (money supply, domestic credit, financial value added, short-term interest rate, long-term interest rate, stock market volume traded and stock market capitalisation) and five control variables (the lagged growth rate of the real per capita gross domestic product, the inflation rate, the general government consumption, the degree of trade openness and the education level of the population). Our results show that finance has impaired economic growth in the EU countries, both in the pre-crisis period and in the crisis and post-crisis periods. The enormous growth of domestic credit and of the financial value added have been restraining the economic growth of the EU countries since 1990 and particularly up until the Great Recession. This implies the need to reduce the prominence of finance, i.e. so-called de-financialisation, in the coming years in order to avoid the potential new 'secular stagnation' in the current age of financialisation. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

This paper employs a panel data econometric approach in order to empirically ascertain the role of the phenomenon of financialisation in the deceleration of labour productivity in the European Union (EU) countries from 1980 to 2019. During that time, the EU countries suffered a huge structural transformation based on Reaganomics and Thatcherism and their financial systems have experienced strong liberalisation and deregulation, which have contributed to poor evolution of labour productivity and have revived fears around a new 'secular stagnation' in the era of financialisation. Grounded in post-Keynesian literature, the slowdown of labour productivity in the majority of developed economies in the last decades cannot be separated from the phenomenon of financialisation, which has occurred through four different channels, namely the weak economic performance, the decline in the labour income share, the increase in personal income inequality, and strengthening of the degree of financialisation. Our findings confirm that lagged labour productivity, economic performance, and labour income share have a positive impact on labour productivity in the EU countries, while personal income inequality and the degree of financialisation impact it negatively. Our findings also reveal that labour productivity in the EU countries in the last decades would have grown more if there had been a stronger economic performance, a smaller decline (or even a rise) of the labour income share, a smaller increase (or even a decrease) of personal income inequality, and a weakening of the degree of financialisation.