Suchergebnisse

AbstractProgress in the debate over rational deterrence has always depended on the ability of scholars to identify a body of evidence that would be appropriate for testing a wide range of propositions derived from the theory. Notwithstanding the tremendous amount of time and energy spent on producing a suitable list of cases, and several noteworthy surveys of the literature, cumulative knowledge about deterrence, both as a theory and as a strategy, remains elusive. It still is unclear whether decision makers have acted according to the logic derived from standard applications of the theory. Moreover, the most prominent testing strategy, originally designed by Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, and later criticized and revised by Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, continues to be plagued by ongoing disputes over methods and case listings. Although debates over the accuracy of historical accounts are constructive, lingering divisions over coding of deterrence successes and failures have become counterproductive, primarily because each side has produced evidence to support their interpretation of events. Very little effort, by comparison, has been directed towards (a) developing alternative testing strategies that lie outside thesuccess/failureframework, or (b) looking at a wider range of propositions derived from the theory. This analysis attempts the task, analyzing in the aggregate 28 cases of superpower rivalry.

There is no consensus among scholars on how to test hypotheses about deterrence systematically. The disputes are sometimes rooted in differences about theory or sources of data, but they are magnified by methodological confusion, especially over concepts and operational definitions that produce perverse empirical results. Serious theoretical errors include inadequate appreciation of the role of uncertainty in deterrence as well as selection biases that undermine empirical tests. Rigorous examination of our previous work in light of recent criticism discloses very robust findings on the conditions for deterrence success and failure.

This book offers a broader theory of nuclear deterrence and examines the way nuclear and conventional deterrence interact with non-military factors in a series of historical case studies. The existing body of literature largely leans toward the analytical primacy of nuclear deterrence and it is often implicitly assumed that nuclear weapons are so important that, when they are present, other factors need not be studied. This book addresses this omission. It develops a research framework that incorporates the military aspects of deterrence, both nuclear and conventional, together with various perceptual factors, international circumstances, domestic politics, and norms. This framework is then used to re-examine five historical crises that brought two nuclear countries to the brink of war: the hostile asymmetric nuclear relations between the United States and China in the early 1960s; between the Soviet Union and China in the late 1960s; between Israel and Iraq in 1977-1981; between the United States and North Korea in 1992-1994; and, finally, between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The main empirical findings challenge the common expectation that the threat of nuclear retaliation represents the ultimate deterrent. In fact, it can be said, with a high degree of confidence, that it was rather the threat of conventional retaliation that acted as a major stabilizer. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, cold war studies, deterrence theory, security studies and IR in general.

1. Toward a broader theory of deterrence -- 2. The United States and China, 1959-1966 -- 3. The Soviet Union and China, 1969 -- 4. Israel and Iraq, 1977-1981 -- 5. The United States and North Korea, 1992-1994 -- 6. The United States and Soviet Union, 1962 -- 7. Putting the pieces together.