Suchergebnisse

Recently several countries have implemented explicit deposit insurance systems. In most countries the adoption of an explicit deposit insurance system followed a banking crisis. This paper examines the impact of demographic, social, and political factors on the presence of an explicit deposit insurance system in a country. Moreover, for a subset of countries with explicit deposit insurance system we try to identify demographic, political, economic, and financial factors that affect the level of deposit insurance coverage. The findings suggest that life expectancy and political rights are related to whether an explicit deposit insurance system is in place or not. For countries with explicit deposit insurance systems the level of income, the importance of the banking sector within the financial system, and the development of domestic banking sector have a significant impact on the level of deposit insurance coverage level. The level of income, deposit money bank assets to GDP ratio, bank overhead costs to total assets ratio, presence of co-insurance, and type of administration are statistically significant in explaining differences in the level of coverage among countries.

"Countries around the world differ substantially in the relative importance of their banks and capital markets in providing investment financing. This paper examines one potential explanation for the cross-country differences in the importance of banks and capital market financing of investment. It is our contention that much of the variation across countries in the depth and breadth of capital markets can be explained by a combination of the existence of deposit insurance and the extent to which a country's banking system is state owned. We provide both an equilibrium model predicting and empirical evidence showing that countries with explicit deposit insurance and a high degree of state-owned bank assets have smaller equity markets, a lower number of publicly traded firms and a smaller amount of bank credit to the private sector. Finally, our results suggest that the effects of deposit guarantees are more important than the origins of national legal systems"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

This paper aims to assess the effect of deposit insurance on the risk-taking behaviour of banks. As shown in the theoretical literature, deposit insurance may induce moral hazard and incentivize banks to take on more risk. In this paper we provide an experimental setup in which we exploit an increase in the coverage limit of deposit insurance in the U. S. in order to identify the difference in risk taking by banks that were affected and banks that were not. This difference comes from the fact that state chartered savings banks in Massachusetts had unlimited deposit insurance coverage at the time when it was increased for all other banks in the US. Given that all banks in the sample are subject to the same regulatory and supervisory requirements, and that they are similar in other characteristics, we can isolate the effect of such increase in deposit insurance. We find, contrary to the literature, that this increase in deposit insurance did not increase bank risk-taking. ; ADEMU is funded by European Union's Horizon 2020 Program under grant agreement N 649396 (ADEMU).

The European Banking Union embarked as a highly ambitious project of the European Union as a response to the signifi cant fl aws and weaknesses in the original architecture of the European Monetary Union that became apparent during the economic crisis. However, the establishment of a single European banking system has stumbled upon the creation of a common deposit insurance scheme that could safeguard depositors and create a more stable fi nancial framework in the euro area. The European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) was fi rstly introduced by the European Commission in 2015. As a bold proposal that comprises wide risk mutualization among the euro area member states, it has spurred a vivid discussion in the European public speech and many proposals have been made since then altering its original planning in an effort to tackle the moral hazard concerns that have risen. The present article, after discussing the reasons that keep obstructing EDIS, presents these suggestions that move around, primarily, the role of the national deposit guarantee schemes. However, as highlighted in the article, before moving to any alterations on the structure and role of a proposed common deposit insurance scheme, signifi cant risk minimization on behalf of the national banking systems, must precede by limiting the sovereign exposures of banks and the size of the Non-Performing Loans. Such steps of risk minimization are critical for addressing concerns and the political unwillingness demonstrated by several European countries in moving forward towards deeper integration.