Suchergebnisse

In 1970 Belgium established three Communities: the French, Flemish and German-speaking Communities. It was then in 1980 that three regions were set up: Walloon, Flemish and Brussels. Further amendments to the Constitution were made on 7 and 15 July 1988, as well as a special law of 8 August 1988 amending the original law of 8 August 1980. It is essential to say that most of the changes and principles governing the organisation and functioning of both the three Communities and the three regions date back to 1970 and 1980. The international nature of the Community's role in 1970 is significant. In 1980, an Arbitration Court was provided for by the Constitution and established to settle conflicts between the laws and decrees of the Communities and the Regions. The Federal State is characterised by two features: autonomy and co-operation. In 1988, the Arbitration Court continued the work of constitutional justice and verifies the conformity of laws or decrees with the provisions of international law and in particular European law. ; En 1970 la Belgique a instauré trois Communautés : les Communautés française, flamande et germanophone. Puis c'est en 1980 que se sont mises en place trois Régions : wallonne, flamande et bruxelloise. De nouveaux amendements à la Constitution ont été faits le 7 et le 15 juillet 1988, ainsi qu'une loi spéciale du 8 août 1988 qui est venue modifier la loi originale du 8 août 1980. Il est indispensable de dire que l'essentiel des changements et des principes d'organisation et de fonctionnement des trois Communautés aussi bien que des trois Régions datent de 1970 et de 1980. Le caractère international du rôle que les Communautés ont joué en 1970 est significatif. En 1980, une Cour d'arbitrage a été prévue par la Constitution et créée afin de régler les conflits entre les lois et les décrets des Communautés et des Régions. L'Etat fédéral se caractérise par deux traits : l'autonomie et la co-opération. En 1988 la Cour d'arbitrage poursuit l'oeuvre de justice constitutionnelle et vérifie la ...

The impact of EU membership on the UK constitution has been profound. In the Miller (Article 50) case, the Supreme Court described the effect of the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA) – the means by which EU membership was given effect within the UK – as being unprecedented in constitutional terms. Not only did it provide for a new source of law, and a new constitutional process for making law in the UK, it also fundamentally changed the UK's system of government and the way in which we think about the location and exercise of public power.

The Crimean crisis and the struggle with Russia over Ukraine's territorial integrity mean a limited return to an East-West confrontation in Europe, the likes of which have not been seen since the end of Cold War and the integration of the post-communist states in a new, pan-European system and a global economic, financial, and communication order that is growing ever more deeply and tightly integrated. The Kremlin, which seeks a new, imperial Russian hegemony in the post-Soviet space - now within the regulatory framework of a 'Eurasian Union' - felt strategically threatened by the EU-oriented 'Maidan-revolution' in Ukraine. Moscow responded by illegally annexing the Crimea - the base of its Black Sea Fleet and a symbol of Russian national greatness - and by destabilizing Ukraine so as to prevent its integration in the West and bind it to Russia permanently. Adapted from the source document.

Summary
This article critically discusses the application of EU law before the Slovenian Constitutional Court. This Court is the highest guardian of the rule of law and human rights in the Constitution of Slovenia. It has arguably been the most open Slovenian state supervisory institution to influence foreign, comparative, and international laws and practices. As this article illustrates, after Slovenia acceded to the EU in May 2004, but in particular over the past years, the Slovenian Constitutional Court has increased references to EU law. On several occasions, EU law was also a critical factor in deciding and reasoning the cases. Even though the Slovenian Constitutional Court often not only refers in its decisions to EU law but also bases its decisions on it, there rest some uncertainties regarding the application of the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the EU and direct references to the Court of Justice of the EU through preliminary questions remain few and far between. The article mentions the potential constitutional reforms in Slovenia, namely introducing a selective jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, which could be problematic without comprehensive changes in the Slovenian judicial system as it might not only far further limit the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, but it could also undermine the correct application of EU law in the Slovenian legal order. In conclusion, this article points out some aspects of the future adjudication of the Slovenian Constitutional Court when applying EU law that need to be further elaborated or reconsidered.

"Constitutional Law" published on by Oxford University Press.

Virtually all constitutional scholars agree, and the Supreme Court has uniformly held, that our entire system of constitutional democracy is premised in important part on the dictate of judicial review, i.e., the power of the judiciary to exercise the final say as to the meaning of the countermajoritarian Constitution's provisions. Absent judicial review, the fundamental speed bumps to tyranny that the Framers so carefully inserted into our political structure would be rendered all but useless at best and a fraud on the electorate at worst. Yet puzzlingly, most of the very same scholars and judges assume that the very political branches that the Constitution is designed to restrain will fully control the remedies to be issued. Thus, all the political branches need to do to avoid constitutional control is deny the courts any power to enforce their decisions. Such a logically inconsistent dichotomy indirectly destroys the essence of the judicial review process that is so central to American constitutional democracy. Yet neither constitutional scholars nor the Supreme Court have recognized either the serious logical flaw or the potentially grave practical dangers in vesting in the very branches sought to be controlled by the Constitution the final power to determine the scope—indeed, the existence—of remedies to enforce constitutional dictates. This Article explains the inherent theoretical and practical link between constitutional review and constitutional remedies, demonstrating that full control of constitutional remedies belongs in the judiciary, not the political branches. It then explains how judicial inference of constitutional remedies in the face of textual silence on the issue can be justified by principled theories of textual interpretation, highlights the inadequacy of scholarly work in this area, and answers potential counterarguments. Finally, it applies this theory of constitutional remedies to the Supreme Court's implied remedies jurisprudence.

Integrationsdebatten in westlichen Ländern über den Umgang mit muslimischen Mitgliedern der Gesellschaft enthalten oftmals soziale, politische und rechtliche Aspekte, welche bereits im islamischen Minderheitenkonzept, dem sogenannten dhimma-Konzept, Geltung gefunden haben.In den Anfängen des Islams entwickelt, zielt dieses System darauf ab islamische Werte einer mehrheitlich muslimischen Gemeinschaft zu bewahren und anerkannten religiösen Minderheiten in beschränktem Maße ein Recht auf religiöse Autonomie zu gewähren. Angesichts der Tatsache, dass Fragmente des dhimma-Konzeptes nach wie vor in einigen Staaten angewandt werden, beschäftigt sich diese Diplomarbeit mit der Vereinbarkeit und den Hauptunterschieden zwischen islamischem und internationalem Minderheitenschutz. Geltende Normen und Schutzmechanismen auf internationaler sowie auf europäischer Ebene werden erörtert und mögliche Defizite aufgezeigt. Gleichermaßen wird die historische, soziale und politische Entwicklung des dhimma-Konzepts dargestellt. Islamische Initiativen zur Errichtung von regionalen Schutzmechanismen werden mit bestehenden Standards auf internationaler Ebene verglichen und die Vereinbarkeit von Sharia und Menschenrechten thematisiert. Das Vermächtnis des Osmanischen Reiches, der Einfluss von ausländischen Mächten, islamisches Recht und internationale Standards, all dies hat Einfluss auf die aktuelle Situation von religiösen Minderheiten in muslimisch geprägten Staaten. Am Beispiel von Ägypten, dem Libanon und der Türkei soll die Rolle des dhimma-Konzepts in islamischen Staaten behandelt sowie deren Bemühen, aus den verschiedenen religiösen, ethnischen und sozialen Gesellschaftsschichten eine nationale Identität zu formen, dargestellt werden. Schlussfolgernd wird festgehalten, dass Unvereinbarkeiten zwischen islamischem Recht und internationalen Standards im Minderheitenschutz unter anderem auf verfassungsrechtlichen Unzulänglichkeiten und auf religiös motivierter Politik beruhen. ; Contemporary discussions in western countries about how to integrate religious minorities, especially with Muslim minorities and their own tradition encompass social, political as well as legal aspects. The same aspects are also valid when describing the Islamic minority protection system, the so called dhimma concept. Developed in the early period of Islam, this concept attempts to preserve Islamic values of a majority Muslim polity by imposing necessary limits on the religious way of life of recognized minority communities. Given that remnants of the dhimma concept are still to be encountered in today's modern Nations, this paper tries to outline the compatibilities and main discrepancies between Islamic law and international standards relevant for the protection of religious minorities. Consequently, norms and regulations of international and European law in the field of minority protection will be described with possible shortcomings pointed out. The historical, social and political development of the dhimma concept enshrined in Islamic law, efforts of Islamic organizations to set up their own human rights mechanisms and the controversial question whether norms of the Sharia are compatible with human rights standards, will be focused on likewise. The legacy of the Ottoman Empire, the influence of external players, Islamic law and international obligations, all these factors contribute to the current situation of minority groups in Muslim countries. By evaluating the historical development and legal framework of Egypt, Lebanon and Turkey as examples, the impact dhimma norms still have within modern Islamic societies and the struggle of each of these countries to develop a national identity out of different religious, ethnic and social classes will be addressed.The paper concludes that incompatibilities between Islamic law and international standards in the field of minority protection are merely due to constitutional omissions and sectarian politics. ; vorgelegt von Kerstin Wonisch ; Graz, Univ., Dipl.-Arb., 2014 ; (VLID)370629

The study reveals the theoretical and public legal foundations of constitutional mobilization and mobilization constitutionalism, distinguishes between the categories of "constitutional changes" and "constitutional modernization". The mobilization of various subjects of constitutional law with powers of authority, professional knowledge and ordinary citizens is an important trend in modern democratic states when carrying out constitutional changes. The author of the article believes that in comparative constitutionalism a new area of research on public legal and constitutional politics is emerging, which reflects the process of involving various subjects of constitutional law in constitutional mobilization and constitutional changes.

Did late eighteenth-century Americans understand the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution to provide individuals a right of exemption from civil laws to which they had religious objections? Claims of exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause have prompted some of the Supreme Court's most prominent free exercise decisions, and therefore this historical inquiry about a right of exemption may have implications for our constitutional jurisprudence. Even if the Court does not adopt late eighteenth-century ideas about the free exercise of religion, we may, nonetheless, find that the history of such ideas can contribute to our contemporary analysis. The historical evidence concerning religious liberty in eighteenth-century America is remarkably rich and consequently can reveal analytical difficulties and solutions to which we should be attentive when formulating our modern constitutional law.