Suchergebnisse

The impact of EU membership on the UK constitution has been profound. In the Miller (Article 50) case, the Supreme Court described the effect of the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA) – the means by which EU membership was given effect within the UK – as being unprecedented in constitutional terms. Not only did it provide for a new source of law, and a new constitutional process for making law in the UK, it also fundamentally changed the UK's system of government and the way in which we think about the location and exercise of public power.

The Crimean crisis and the struggle with Russia over Ukraine's territorial integrity mean a limited return to an East-West confrontation in Europe, the likes of which have not been seen since the end of Cold War and the integration of the post-communist states in a new, pan-European system and a global economic, financial, and communication order that is growing ever more deeply and tightly integrated. The Kremlin, which seeks a new, imperial Russian hegemony in the post-Soviet space - now within the regulatory framework of a 'Eurasian Union' - felt strategically threatened by the EU-oriented 'Maidan-revolution' in Ukraine. Moscow responded by illegally annexing the Crimea - the base of its Black Sea Fleet and a symbol of Russian national greatness - and by destabilizing Ukraine so as to prevent its integration in the West and bind it to Russia permanently. Adapted from the source document.

Summary
This article critically discusses the application of EU law before the Slovenian Constitutional Court. This Court is the highest guardian of the rule of law and human rights in the Constitution of Slovenia. It has arguably been the most open Slovenian state supervisory institution to influence foreign, comparative, and international laws and practices. As this article illustrates, after Slovenia acceded to the EU in May 2004, but in particular over the past years, the Slovenian Constitutional Court has increased references to EU law. On several occasions, EU law was also a critical factor in deciding and reasoning the cases. Even though the Slovenian Constitutional Court often not only refers in its decisions to EU law but also bases its decisions on it, there rest some uncertainties regarding the application of the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the EU and direct references to the Court of Justice of the EU through preliminary questions remain few and far between. The article mentions the potential constitutional reforms in Slovenia, namely introducing a selective jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, which could be problematic without comprehensive changes in the Slovenian judicial system as it might not only far further limit the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, but it could also undermine the correct application of EU law in the Slovenian legal order. In conclusion, this article points out some aspects of the future adjudication of the Slovenian Constitutional Court when applying EU law that need to be further elaborated or reconsidered.

"Constitutional Law" published on by Oxford University Press.

Many of us take for granted the idea that the right to religious freedom should be protected in a free, democratic polity. This book challenges whether the protection and privilege of religious belief and identity should be prioritized over any other right. By studying the effects of constitutional promises of religious freedom and establishment clauses, Frank B. Cross sets the stage for a set of empirical questions that examine the consequences of such protections. Although the case for broader protection is often made as a theoretical matter, constitutions generally protect freedom of religion. Allowing people full choice in religious beliefs or freedom of conscience is central to their autonomy. Freedom of religion is thus potentially a very valuable aspect of society, at least so long as it respects the freedom of individuals to be irreligious. This book tests these associations and finds that constitutions provide national religious protection, especially when the legal system is more sophisticated

Virtually all constitutional scholars agree, and the Supreme Court has uniformly held, that our entire system of constitutional democracy is premised in important part on the dictate of judicial review, i.e., the power of the judiciary to exercise the final say as to the meaning of the countermajoritarian Constitution's provisions. Absent judicial review, the fundamental speed bumps to tyranny that the Framers so carefully inserted into our political structure would be rendered all but useless at best and a fraud on the electorate at worst. Yet puzzlingly, most of the very same scholars and judges assume that the very political branches that the Constitution is designed to restrain will fully control the remedies to be issued. Thus, all the political branches need to do to avoid constitutional control is deny the courts any power to enforce their decisions. Such a logically inconsistent dichotomy indirectly destroys the essence of the judicial review process that is so central to American constitutional democracy. Yet neither constitutional scholars nor the Supreme Court have recognized either the serious logical flaw or the potentially grave practical dangers in vesting in the very branches sought to be controlled by the Constitution the final power to determine the scope—indeed, the existence—of remedies to enforce constitutional dictates. This Article explains the inherent theoretical and practical link between constitutional review and constitutional remedies, demonstrating that full control of constitutional remedies belongs in the judiciary, not the political branches. It then explains how judicial inference of constitutional remedies in the face of textual silence on the issue can be justified by principled theories of textual interpretation, highlights the inadequacy of scholarly work in this area, and answers potential counterarguments. Finally, it applies this theory of constitutional remedies to the Supreme Court's implied remedies jurisprudence.

Integrationsdebatten in westlichen Ländern über den Umgang mit muslimischen Mitgliedern der Gesellschaft enthalten oftmals soziale, politische und rechtliche Aspekte, welche bereits im islamischen Minderheitenkonzept, dem sogenannten dhimma-Konzept, Geltung gefunden haben.In den Anfängen des Islams entwickelt, zielt dieses System darauf ab islamische Werte einer mehrheitlich muslimischen Gemeinschaft zu bewahren und anerkannten religiösen Minderheiten in beschränktem Maße ein Recht auf religiöse Autonomie zu gewähren. Angesichts der Tatsache, dass Fragmente des dhimma-Konzeptes nach wie vor in einigen Staaten angewandt werden, beschäftigt sich diese Diplomarbeit mit der Vereinbarkeit und den Hauptunterschieden zwischen islamischem und internationalem Minderheitenschutz. Geltende Normen und Schutzmechanismen auf internationaler sowie auf europäischer Ebene werden erörtert und mögliche Defizite aufgezeigt. Gleichermaßen wird die historische, soziale und politische Entwicklung des dhimma-Konzepts dargestellt. Islamische Initiativen zur Errichtung von regionalen Schutzmechanismen werden mit bestehenden Standards auf internationaler Ebene verglichen und die Vereinbarkeit von Sharia und Menschenrechten thematisiert. Das Vermächtnis des Osmanischen Reiches, der Einfluss von ausländischen Mächten, islamisches Recht und internationale Standards, all dies hat Einfluss auf die aktuelle Situation von religiösen Minderheiten in muslimisch geprägten Staaten. Am Beispiel von Ägypten, dem Libanon und der Türkei soll die Rolle des dhimma-Konzepts in islamischen Staaten behandelt sowie deren Bemühen, aus den verschiedenen religiösen, ethnischen und sozialen Gesellschaftsschichten eine nationale Identität zu formen, dargestellt werden. Schlussfolgernd wird festgehalten, dass Unvereinbarkeiten zwischen islamischem Recht und internationalen Standards im Minderheitenschutz unter anderem auf verfassungsrechtlichen Unzulänglichkeiten und auf religiös motivierter Politik beruhen. ; Contemporary discussions in western countries about how to integrate religious minorities, especially with Muslim minorities and their own tradition encompass social, political as well as legal aspects. The same aspects are also valid when describing the Islamic minority protection system, the so called dhimma concept. Developed in the early period of Islam, this concept attempts to preserve Islamic values of a majority Muslim polity by imposing necessary limits on the religious way of life of recognized minority communities. Given that remnants of the dhimma concept are still to be encountered in today's modern Nations, this paper tries to outline the compatibilities and main discrepancies between Islamic law and international standards relevant for the protection of religious minorities. Consequently, norms and regulations of international and European law in the field of minority protection will be described with possible shortcomings pointed out. The historical, social and political development of the dhimma concept enshrined in Islamic law, efforts of Islamic organizations to set up their own human rights mechanisms and the controversial question whether norms of the Sharia are compatible with human rights standards, will be focused on likewise. The legacy of the Ottoman Empire, the influence of external players, Islamic law and international obligations, all these factors contribute to the current situation of minority groups in Muslim countries. By evaluating the historical development and legal framework of Egypt, Lebanon and Turkey as examples, the impact dhimma norms still have within modern Islamic societies and the struggle of each of these countries to develop a national identity out of different religious, ethnic and social classes will be addressed.The paper concludes that incompatibilities between Islamic law and international standards in the field of minority protection are merely due to constitutional omissions and sectarian politics. ; vorgelegt von Kerstin Wonisch ; Graz, Univ., Dipl.-Arb., 2014 ; (VLID)370629