Suchergebnisse

Draft submitted to International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Montreal, Canada, March 2011 ; Forthcoming in Roger Cliff, Phillip C. Saunders, and Scott W. Harold, eds., Cross- Strait Relations: New Opportunities and Challenges for Taiwan's Security, RAND (2011) ; This paper looks to assess the impact on Taiwan, and secondarily the United States, of China's increased military capabilities as they pertain to the Taiwan Straits. The paper conducts analysis of the triangular relationships and considers the perceptual basis of power and the use of tacit and implied threats. A notional sketch of this author's views is laid out explicitly as this shapes the bulk of the analysis and conclusions drawn below. Then a set of stylized goals is laid out for China and Taiwan with regard to future development on the unification/independence issue. (U.S. goals are also briefly discussed.) The bulk of the paper looks at how successful each of the three has been in achieving those goals in the context of the evolving military balance. While the types of data used vary substantially across each three, the conclusions all emphasize the challenges in relying primarily on power to assess the development of politics in the region. The paper concludes that the substantial military capability enhancements by the PRC have not led to commensurate gains in coercive outcomes. There appears to be some degree of deterrence success in stemming a further move towards independence within the Taiwanese body politic. However, there is no sign of significant compellent success in pushing it toward reunification. The U.S. role in this is central, as it too if affected by that balance and it too can influence policy in Taiwan. Indeed, perhaps the critically important element is that military coercive power has complex effects on a democracy. More generally, projecting influence from power is not straightforward.

Based on an in-depth, qualitative case study about a conflict between governmental authorities from the United States and Switzerland over the regulation of Swiss banks, we introduce indirect compellence as a novel triadic and indirect mechanism through which coercion leads to institutional change. Hostage-taking being a prototypical example, indirect compellence is typified by a coercive actor who takes a third party hostage to gain influence over a targeted actor. In our case, it meant that U.S. authorities (coercers) compelled Swiss policy makers (targets) to erode the famed Swiss banking secrecy rules by threatening the targets to otherwise enforce U.S. law extraterritorially against Swiss banks and bankers (hostages). Our constructivist and target-centered perspective explains this type of coercive pressure in detail, and it also suggests that targeted policy makers judge and respond to it contingent on their political ideologies. Our study contributes to research on power and influence in institutional environments and to research on global business regulation and transnational governance. Most generally, it also expands scholarly understanding of triadic relationships. In contrast to Simmelian perspectives' focus on triads in which the third party is in a powerful brokerage position and frequently benefits as a tertius gaudens, our study suggests that the third party can also become a rather powerless tertius miserabilis who suffers rather than benefits from others' conflict.

Can International Criminal Court (ICC) interventions in ongoing conflicts help curtail war crimes and civilian abuses that are being actively perpetrated? The court has increasingly intervened in such cases, partly with the intention of using its prosecutorial power to stop ongoing abuses. Yet, while much has been said about the court's potential for deterrence, little attention has been devoted to its compellent effects. Drawing on insights from the literature on coercive diplomacy, strategic bargaining, and civilian victimization, this article clarifies and critically assesses the logic of ICC compellence in cases of ongoing civilian violence. I argue that some forms of ICC intervention have compellent potential but are inherently limited. Specifically, I show why threats of prosecution, rather than actual indictments, are far more likely to be effective at curtailing violence, but also how their effective application is highly constrained by the court's own core normative principles, rules, and structures. While some see the main problem as weak enforcement—something that can be remedied with greater political will—there is a more fundamental impediment: to compel effectively, the court must carefully coordinate its actions with other states' diplomatic and military efforts or allow itself to be used strategically by states pursuing diplomatic and military measures to curtail violence—positions that are incompatible with the court's statutory obligations and its very ethos as an independent and impartial nonstate judicial institution.

A close reading of Russia's nuclear statements and actions during the first seven months of its war against Ukraine reveals a threefold approach. Moscow is walking a fine line between a well-crafted and successful deterrence strategy to prevent foreign military intervention; a more modest and rather unsuccessful attempt at dissuading foreign aid to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia; and incremental nuclear coercion against Kyiv that spurred Western deterrence messaging in response. This analysis reveals a careful Russian approach, suggesting that cost-benefit calculations are likely to continue to render nuclear escalation unlikely. However, nuclear use cannot be fully discounted, particularly if war-related developments severely imperil the sur­vival of Russia's regime. (author's abstract)