Suchergebnisse

Purpose
– The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how information technology (IT) governance supports the process of enterprise risk management (ERM). In particular, the paper illustrates how the Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) framework helps a company reach its objectives by integrating and supporting the Enterprise Risk Management by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO ERM) framework.


Design/methodology/approach
– This paper explains how the integration between the two frameworks (COSO ERM and COBIT 5) can represent, for any organization, a good way to achieve the objectives of internal control and risk management and, more generally, corporate governance.


Findings
– The paper identifies some gaps in the COSO ERM and illustrates how the COBIT framework facilitates the implementation of an adequate system of internal control.


Originality/value
– The originality of the work presented here is in analyzing the COBIT 5 together with the COSO ERM framework. This paper highlights that is not enough to apply only an internal control framework for achieving the risk management and internal control system objectives. An IT governance framework, such as COBIT 5 is proposed as a tool that support risk management in order to develop an adequate system of internal control.

"Die Annahme der positiven Wirkung einer "guten" Corporate Governance
auf den Unternehmenserfolg ist ein Grund für die große Aufmerksamkeit für dieses
Themengebiet. In diesem Beitrag wird der Stand der Forschung zur Erfolgswirkung der Corporate
Governance aufgearbeitet. Als Ergebnis lässt sich weder ein eindeutig positiver noch ein
eindeutig negativer Effekt feststellen. Als Gründe für die Uneinheitlichkeit der Befunde werden
methodische Probleme, eine unangemessene theoretische Basis, die Vernachlässigung
institutioneller Komplementaritäten sowie persönlicher Merkmale und Entscheidungsprozesse
diskutiert. Eine weitere Ursache wird in der Überschätzung der Bedeutung struktureller Merkmale
der Corporate Governance vermutet. In ausdifferenzierten und entwickelten Systemen
sind die Unterschiede zu gering, um sich deutlich auf den Unternehmenserfolg auszuwirken." (Autorenreferat)

The authors analyze the impact of corporate governance institutions, ownership structures and external capital market constraints on company returns on investment by using a sample of more than 19,000 companies from 61 countries across the world. They show that (1) of these three sets of institutions, the origin of a country's legal system proves to be the most important. Companies in countries with English-origin legal systems earn returns on investment that are at least as large as the cost of capital. (2) Differences in investment performance related to a country's legal system dominate differences related to ownership structure. (3) Strong external capital markets improve the investment performance of companies." (author's abstract)

The impact of the economic downturn and the increase in financial scandals emerging from major corporations has generated a growing interest in governance issues and has emphasized the need for companies to be transparent in their dealings with shareholders and the markets. Although the issues in Asia are fundamentally similar to those in the rest of the world, there are some crucial differences in the way in which Asian corporations acknowledge and confront these issues and in the political and legal frameworks under which they operate. Using examples of good and bad governance, Roche analyzes if the Asian approach to governance issues is unique. Business and finance students, as well as executives with an interest in Asian business or corporate governance will find this an authoritative and insightful guide to this complex and important topic.

AbstractManuscript TypeReviewResearch Question/IssueWe survey the literature on corporate governance in banks in the US and international settings. We discuss how the specialness of banks, deposit insurance, high bank leverage, and bank regulation interact with bank governance. We evaluate bank governance from three perspectives: (1) maximizing bank equity value, (2) maximizing total enterprise value, and (3) maximizing social objectives. Our survey includes evidence on how bank governance differs from that of manufacturing firms. We also survey studies on managerial incentives in banks and their implications for bank performance and risk taking before and during the 2007–2008 financial crisis.Research Findings/InsightsThe high leverage (usually above 90 percent) of banking institutions gives rise to a trade‐off between strengthening equity governance and maximizing enterprise value. Aligning managers very closely with shareholders can give rise to strong incentives for risk shifting to the detriment of firm value. The bank risk choices might also go against the societal objectives of a stable financial system.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsWe provide a framework for the optimal design of bank governance and bank regulation, considering the objectives of both depositors and society‐at‐large in addition to those of bank shareholders. This framework could be especially important in determining risk choices by banks and the effects of such on the stability of the financial system.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsOur analysis of the literature surveyed has policy implications for bank regulation, top‐management compensation in banks, and directives for design of governance in banks. We discuss implications for direct regulation of banks and regulation of bank governance. The findings surveyed provide guidance for board independence, board size, board composition, and incentive features in top‐management compensation.

AbstractResearch Question/IssueThis study analyzes the diffusion of internationally recognized governance standards in public corporate governance codes. Local, state, and federal governments issue very different codes for their state‐owned enterprises, which reflect governments' understanding of corporate governance.Research Findings/InsightsDeveloping and applying a comprehensive measurement framework with 150 criteria to 60 public corporate governance codes in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, the study shows that the diffusion varies considerably between codes and regulatory fields (e.g., directors, auditing). Governments react very differently to similar governance challenges and show varying degrees of willingness to regulate the corporate governance of their state‐owned enterprises.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsThis study enhances the understanding of the diffusion of governance standards in the under‐researched context of government ownership. The findings imply the need for comprehensive measurement approaches to gain a nuanced theoretical understanding on the diffusion and underlying mechanisms. Future research could use the measurement framework or single regulatory fields to generate data to investigate different theoretical questions regarding many areas of corporate governance. Derived from the findings and neo‐institutional theory, the study develops propositions about potential drivers of diffusion differences, offering avenues for advancing future theory‐building.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThis study develops a comprehensive measurement framework to quantify the diffusion of governance standards in public corporate governance codes in international comparisons. Governments, standard‐setters, and other actors (e.g., directors, auditors) could use it for condensed overviews, implementing or revising codes, and reflecting on governance practices. Overall, data show a severe need to improve the quality of public corporate governance codes.

Not since the passage of the Securities and Exchange Commission Act of 1934 have matters of corporate governance received such concentrated attention. According to the Encyclopaedia of Corporate Governance, the subject has ''succeeded in attracting a good deal of public interest because of its apparent importance for the economic health of corporations and society in general

Corporate governance has become an important issue for Chinese and Indian firms as they increasingly interact with regulators and investors from developed markets. For instance, tapping into global capital markets to raise funds to finance their domestic and international growth requires firms from China and India to demonstrate strong corporate governance credentials, so that investors do not discount their stock (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). The swift action of Chinese and Indian authorities in response to recent corporate scandals – such as the one at Satyam Computers – reveals that even governments in emerging countries such as China and India see the need to promote good corporate governance to ensure the inflow of capital and the outflow of products. Furthermore, understanding corporate governance standards and issues in China and India is also important to executives of foreign multinationals doing business in these two countries.

"Das Thema 'Corporate Governance' bezeichnet einen Strang der ökonomischen Governance-Forschung. Hier geht es um Governance-Probleme auf der Mikroebene des einzelnen Unternehmens - also um das Steuern und Koodinieren mit dem Ziel des Managements von Interdependenzen zwischen verschiedenen am Unternehmensgeschehen beteiligten Akteurgruppen. Der Beitrag erläutert einleitend den Begriff der Corporate Governance und sodann die verschiedenen Corporate-Governance-Modelle in westlichen Industrieländern. In einem weiteren Abschnitt werden die prominentesten Analyseperspektiven der Corporate-Governance-Forschung vorgestellt. Das darauffolgende Kapitel widmet sich dem Wandel der Corporative Governance seit den 1980er Jahren. Ein Ausblick auf künftige Forschungsperspektiven schließt den Beitrag ab." (Autorenreferat)

This paper attempts to investigate the effect of corporate governance and shareholder monitoring mechanisms on cost of debt of Malaysian listed firms. We assess the quality of corporate governance using comprehensive corporate governance index, which consists of 139 items in six broad categories. We classify shareholder monitoring mechanisms into concentrated ownership, family, insider and government ownerships. Using panel sample from 2003 to 2007, regression results show that high corporate governance quality and concentrated ownership lower firm cost of debt. Debt issuers consider board structure and procedures, board compensation practices, accountability and audit, transparency and social and environmental activities as integral components of a good corporate governance framework.