Suchergebnisse

This article focuses on peace-building efforts in Myanmar implemented under the Nation Wide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2013. It assesses the ways in which the recently elected government led by the National League for Democracy (NLD) has dealt with the NCA, and highlights opportunities and challenges. I argue that while the NLD government and Myanmar military remain crucial to the success of peace efforts, implementation of the NCA is impossible without the support of the eight current NCA signatories, in particularly the Karen National Union (KNU). Neglecting the importance of these actors not only provides an incomplete picture of ongoing peace-building efforts, but could also undermine efforts to promote national reconciliation that have thus far focused exclusively on the Myanmar government and the military. These signs of life emanating from the NCA signatories, however, have increasingly been undermined by an official failure to implement the agreement and to adhere to the agreed process and by ongoing hostilities between the military and four of the country's ethnic armed groups. (Crit As Stud/GIGA)

War — Trading with the Enemy — Contracts — Statutory Law and Common Law — Intercourse for Recognized Religious Purposes — Strict Condition ratione temporis.United Nations — Charter of — Objects of — Peaceful Settlement of Disputes — War between Members of the United Nations — General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon — Termination of War — Absence of Peace — Trading with the Enemy — Contracts.

According to the author, the termination of the state of cease-fire and establishment of a new peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula leave no room for further delay, in view of the great urgency of their requirement. He points out that the US military forces stationed in South Korea have systematically undermined the Korean Armistice Agreement and armistice mechanism. The author criticizes US policies on the Korean Peninsula and discusses the need for a new peace arrangement in this region. (DÜI-Sen)

Includes bibliographical references. ; v. 2. Policy-forming documents American Expeditionary Forces. -- v. 4-8. Military operations of the American Expeditionary Forces. -- v. 10. The armistice agreement and related documents. -- v. 11. American occupation of Germany. -- v. 12-15. Reports of the Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F., staff sections and services. v. 16-17. Bulletins, G.H.Q., A.E.F. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Agreement between parties in the ethnic conflict to terminate hostile military activities.

The article analyzes the British re-evaluation of the Levant situation after the collapse of France and the Franco-German-Italian armistice agreement in June 1940. The Turkish factor gained prominence in Britain's strategy to obviate a German or Italian occupation of the Levant. However with the minimization of the German military threat to the Levant, the British gradually dropped Turkey from the political agenda of the Levant. (DÜI-Asd)

Korea: Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission: The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC), established under the terms of the Korean Armistice Agreement, submitted two reports to the eighth session of the General Assembly: an interim report covering NNRC's operations from September 10 to December 23, 1953, and a final report covering the period up to February 21, 1954. The United Nations Command (UNC) also submitted a report on the operation of NNRC.

THE COLLAPSE OF METROPOLITAN FRANCE IN JUNE 1940 GAVE RISE TO AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION THROUGHOUT THE OVERSEA TERRITORIES OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE. ALTHOUGH THEY WERE NOT PHYSICALLY CONQUERED BY EITHER GERMANY OR ITALY, THESE TERRITORIES WERE INCLUDED IN THE FRANCOGERMAN-ITALIAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT OF 22 JUNE 1940. IN PRACTICE, IT WAS LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATIONS IN THE VARIOUS TERRITORIES TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE: WHETHER TO ABIDE BY THE ARMISTICE AND REMAIN LOYAL TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, OR TO DEFY THE ARMISTICE AND CARRY ON WITH THE WAR. AFTER SOME DAYS OF HESITATION, THE FRENCH IN THE LEVANT OPTED FOR THE FIRST POSSIBILITY, AND SWORE ALLEGIANCE TO THE NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT. IN THIS ARTICLE, THE AUTHOR EXAMINES THE HISTORICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THIS DECISION RELATIVE TO THE IMPERATIVES OF THE WAR EFFORT.

The study refers to the approaches of the Transylvanian issue expressed by the Swede Gustav Bolinder in a "Svensk Tidskrift" article, volume XXXI, no. 9 of 1944. The Armistice Agreement between Romania and the United Nations, signed on September 12/13, 1944, admitted that Transylvania or most of this province to be reassigned to Romania. Suddenly, the Transylvanian issue had become one of the headlines in the world. Gustaf Bolinder, who had traveled in Romania in 1943, supported the Romanian rights in a book and press articles, both in Swedish (the article referred to in this paper dates from Autumn 1944). Another Swede, namely Arvid Fredborg, wrote comments that mostly criticized Bolinder's approaches. Bolinder's views and Fredborg's comments were dispatched by the USA Legation in Sweden to the State Department, in Washington DC, and studied by the author at the Central National Historical Archives of Romania, within the USA Microfilm Collection. As the Armistice Agreement between Hungary and the United Nations, signed on January 20, 1945, forbade any Hungarian claims on Transylvania only two choices remained: an independent Transylvania, an unrealizable project according to the United Nations but present in the international media, or its reintegration into Romania. The author considers that Bolinder's synthesis mastered, among non-Romanians and non-Hungarians, the truth about Transylvanian interethnic relations at the end of World War II.

War — In general — Non-hostile relations between belligerents — Armistice — Occupation of territory after — Relationship between occupying authority and local authority — Whether local authority agent of Occupant — Contract entered into by local authority under direction of Occupant — Whether binding on occupied State — The law of Italy.War — On land — Occupation of enemy territory — Nature and effects of — Sovereignty of Occupant and of occupied State — Occupation and armistice agreement — Contract entered into by authorities of occupied State under directions from Occupant — Whether local authority is agent of Occupant — Whether contract obligations bind occupied State — Place of performance of contract — Effect on contract of subsequent cession of territory — Position of Italian authorities during Allied occupation — The law of Italy.

At the end of hostilities Hungary was a defeated and conquered country. In point of time she was the last of the Axis satellites to conclude an armistice agreement with the three major Allies (January 20, 1945). Unlike the military developments in Rumania and Bulgaria, the Hungarian Army had not turned against the Germans — a fact which did not improve Hungary's international position in the Armistice period. The country was isolated, with neither diplomatic representatives abroad nor friends among the victorious states. She was occupied by Russian troops, and until September, 1947 lived under the strict rule of the Russiandominated Allied Control Commission, a fact which greatly reduced Hungarian sovereignty, both in internal and foreign affairs. The terms of the armistice were extremely harsh. American endeavors in Moscow, aiming at more generous armistice treaties, had failed. Moreover, the Russians were unwilling to provide explicitly for equal participation of the three Allied governments in the work of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary in the period following the termination of hostilities against Germany.