Suchergebnisse

This paper proposes a set of fiscal indicators to assess rollover risks using the conceptual framework developed by Cottarelli (2011). These indicators provide early warning signals about the manifestation of these risks, giving policymakers the opportunity to adjust policies before extreme fiscal stress events. Two aggregate indices are calculated: an index of fiscal vulnerability and an index of fiscal stress. Results show that both indices are elevated for advanced economies, reflecting unfavorable medium-term debt dynamics and aging-related spending pressures. In emerging economies, solven

The aim of this note is to present and analyze subnational fiscal trends in Russia in the context of overall slowing economic growth and falling oil prices over the last few years. In particular, in 2015, GDP fell by 3.7 percent. Despite efforts to cut expenditures, the federal deficit increased to 2.4 percent of GDP. Subnational governments were also affected by the economic slowdown. Aggregate subnational revenues declined, in real terms, by 6 percent between 2014 and 2015. Revenues from taxes (including shares of federal taxes) fell by 4 percent while federal transfers fell by 13 percent. Nevertheless, the aggregate fiscal performance of subnational governments actually improved over this period. The nadir of subnational government finances occurred in 2013, when the consolidated subnational deficit reached 0.9 percent of GDP. Since then, it has shrunk. In 2015, the deficit was equal to only 0.2 percent of GDP. This was largely achieved by drastic cuts in spending. Spending in the social and infrastructure sectors both fell by 9 percent in real terms between 2014 and 2015. This note examines the fiscal prospects of subnational governments in Russia, focusing particularly on the nature of these spending cuts and whether they are sustainable over the medium term.

The aim of this note is to present and analyze subnational fiscal trends in Russia in the context of overall slowing economic growth and falling oil prices over the last few years. In particular, in 2015, GDP fell by 3.7 percent. Despite efforts to cut expenditures, the federal deficit increased to 2.4 percent of GDP. Subnational governments were also affected by the economic slowdown. Aggregate subnational revenues declined, in real terms, by 6 percent between 2014 and 2015. Revenues from taxes (including shares of federal taxes) fell by 4 percent while federal transfers fell by 13 percent. Nevertheless, the aggregate fiscal performance of subnational governments actually improved over this period. The nadir of subnational government finances occurred in 2013, when the consolidated subnational deficit reached 0.9 percent of GDP. Since then, it has shrunk. In 2015, the deficit was equal to only 0.2 percent of GDP. This was largely achieved by drastic cuts in spending. Spending in the social and infrastructure sectors both fell by 9 percent in real terms between 2014 and 2015. This note examines the fiscal prospects of subnational governments in Russia, focusing particularly on the nature of these spending cuts and whether they are sustainable over the medium term.

Asymmetries in fiscal policies cannot be captured by linear time series models. In order to examine the asymmetry responses of output in different phases of the business cycle, Markov Regime Switching (MRS) model is an alternative technique that is used to achieve the objective. The main objective of this study is to empirically explore the effects of fiscal shocks (spending and taxes) on Pakistan's overall economic activity GDP while utilizing Markov Switching MS-VAR model. The model is characterized to allow for the variation in mean, coefficients and in error variances. The study results show that the effect of shocks and the size of multiplier varies across regimes confirming the asymmetric behavior of fiscal policy transmission mechanism. Moreover, the impact of positive spending shock has a stronger effect on output in the recession as compared to boom. One surprising result of the study is that the tax shock increases the output both in recession and boom. Lastly, spending and revenue behave a-cyclically.
JEL Classification Codes: C11; C32; E62

We show that in the EU there were diverse causes for the sovereign debt crisis. Yet, fiscal austerity was hastily imposed assuming that the multiplier would be weak and fiscal consolidation could quickly be achieved. Yet, it turned out that fiscal consolidation is state dependent: It is substantially more contractionary if undertaken during a recession than during an expansion. There is no single multiplier for all times. The fiscal multiplier is regime dependent and depends on the economic environment and business cycle regimes. The size of the multiplier and the success of debt stabilization depend on financial stress, credit spreads, the vulnerability of the banking system, monetary policy actions, the state of internal and external demand, exchange rates and other factors. Empirical studies are reviewed that have used regime change models and Multi-Regime VARs (MRVARs) to estimate and evaluate state dependent fiscal and monetary policies. We show that consolidation policies in certain regimes can be strongly contractionary, a finding replicated in a dynamic model using a new solution method. Furthermore, not only are the contractionary impacts of aggregate fiscal policy (public expenditure and revenue) to be considered, but also the composition of fiscal consolidations affecting health, education, infrastructure and public consumption, as well as distributional impacts of consolidation policies.

One of the biggest challenges for various theoreticians and practitians worldwide in the last few years has been the current economic crisis. They are faced with a challanging and resposible task of creating measures of economic politics which will minimize the negative effects of global crisis, make exit strategies and stimulate economic development in certain areas in the longterm. From a number of analyses and descriptions of this problem one general, quite homogeneous perception was formed: how and why did the crisis occur and what needs to be changed in the system to reduce the risk of such fractures to the smallest possible amount in the future. In contrast to this, there are still no recipes in theory and practice for a safe and painless way out of crisis. It was initially assumed that the financial injections, combined with new experience, create adequate environment for efficient activity of the invisible hand. However, it has become clear that the strong interventions of the state through a variety of economic policy measures are inevitable, and that in times of crisis most commonly used measures are regulatory, monetary and fiscal.

[Highlights] Fully-fledged federations assign fiscal policy stabilisation largely to the federal level, based on a relatively large budget. In the euro area, a large federal budget is unrealistic at the current level of political and societal integration, and fiscal stabilisation will continue to rely mainly on national policies. For aggregate fiscal policy to become more stabilising with respect to the economic cycle, while achieving long-term sustainability, it is necessary (i) to avoid imposing self-defeating fiscal adjustments on crisis countries by making sovereign debt restructuring a real possibility (which involves strengthening the banking sector and extending the remit of the European Stability Mechanism); (ii) to task the planned independent European Fiscal Board with delineating exceptional times during which fiscal coordination is needed on top of monetary policy; (iii) to make national fiscal policies more stabilising by allowing incremental investment and unemployment spending to be shifted from bad to good times based on national adjustment accounts. We also recommend a move towards a European unemployment (re-)insurance scheme targeted at 'large' shocks, with varying contributions from countries and a minimum set of labour-market harmonisation criteria, which in any case are desirable for the functioning of monetary union.