The ways in which child soldiers are used in modern conflicts has become ever more sophisticated and prominent, with shifting capabilities and a focus on generational warfare, compared to when I faced them during my command of the UNAMIR mission in Rwanda twenty-six years ago. To confront this challenges, we need to keep our focus on the fact that the recruitment and use of children as weapons of war is the worst thing that we can do to children. We need to focus on the significance of bringing an end to the era of the expectation that children should participate in conflict. If we want to stop the use of warfare, we need to start developing a worldview where adults do not think that children should be involved in war. There needs to be no wavering in our view that use of child soldiers is the worst aspect of modern war. Children are a weapons system that have no place on the battlefield or in the world's security apparatus. How is it possible that we are prepared to let children be used as weapons when we are horrified by the use of biological and nuclear weapons?The Vancouver Principles are a critical part of meeting this challenge, and as we enter a new decade they are the culmination of the work of the international community that began in 1996 with Graça Machel's report on the impact of armed conflict on children. The VPs build on all the work that we have been doing at the Dallaire Initiative, and the work of the international community expressed in the Optional Protocol, the Paris Principles, Security Council Resolutions, and the initiatives to protect children and civilians. The VPs provide a higher level of strategic guidance that link all of these efforts to rally states to take action, and the immense amount of work that went into creating the Implementation Guidance is absolutely critical to this endeavour. It is one thing to set up the Principles, but another to turn them into practice guidance on how they can be carried out. We now need to shift our focus onto turning the guidelines into training guidelines and the development of new capabilities for our forces. With this in mind, the articles in this issue of Allons-y provide an important complement to the Principles and the Implementation Guidance, and will be of great use to policymakers, academics, and security sector actors working on this issue.In our work over the past several years, we have seen how hungry the security sector have been for something tangible to base their training on and upgrade and professionalize their forces on to confront the challenge posed by child soldiers. They see problem in peacekeeping of using force against children, and want to reduce casualties on their side and become more effective. With the Vancouver Principles we have taken the work of the Dallaire Initiative global, and we need to ensure that we use this tool effectively. To do so, we need to develop a central secretariat to help states take the Principles and the guidance and operationalize them into capabilities for their forces, and work with the UN to make sure that states have the required knowledge to do so. We also need to start thinking regionally to have more effective, coordinated, and rapid implementation of the Principles. The Dallaire Initiative has started this with our regional office for East Africa in Rwanda. Further work is needed to develop regional capabilities in Latin America, in the Middle East, and in South and East Asia. From our headquarters in Canada we can then assist with capacity building and strategy. With this direction, over the next decade we need to have this operational capability within every troop and police contributing country, and have every contingent going to UN missions qualified in this capability. This global engagement will aid in the reform and modernization of peacekeeping in order to end the use of children as weapons of war.In an era where human rights came to the fore in the 1970s through the 2000s, with our abilities to document, communicate about, and punish international crimes, it has not resonated enough with people that using children for adult work is wrong, and the use of child soldiers is the worst form of it. You cannot just look at a child as someone in need of food and education, but as a future adult. If we nurture children in war, then we normalize war for the future. It is illogical to want to prevent and end war without addressing the role that child soldiers can play in perpetuating conflict. In a practical sense, we have not been able to connect this in people's heads, only in the law. To eliminate a major instrument of war, we have to make the use of child soldiers unthinkable. ; Lgén (à la retraite) Roméo DallaireLa façon dont les enfants soldats sont utilisés dans les conflits modernes est devenue de plus en plus complexe et notable, avec ses capacités changeantes et son accent mis sur la guerre intergénérationnelle, par rapport à la situation dans laquelle je me trouvais lorsque je commandais la MINUAR au Rwanda il y a vingt-six ans. Pour faire face à ce défi, nous ne devons pas perdre de vue le fait que le recrutement et l'utilisation d'enfants comme armes de guerre sont la pire chose que nous puissions faire aux enfants. Nous devons nous concentrer sur l'importance de mettre un terme à l'époque où l'on attendait des enfants qu'ils participent aux conflits. Si nous voulons mettre fin au recours à la guerre, nous devons commencer à développer une vision du monde dans laquelle les adultes ne pensent pas que les enfants devraient être impliqués dans la guerre. Nous ne devons pas hésiter à dire qu'à notre avis, l'utilisation d'enfants soldats est le pire aspect de la guerre moderne. Les enfants sont un système d'armes qui n'a pas sa place sur le champ de bataille ou dans l'appareil de sécurité mondial. Comment se peut-il que nous soyons prêts à laisser des enfants être utilisés comme des armes alors que nous sommes horrifiés par le recours aux armes biologiques et nucléaires ?Les Principes de Vancouver sont un outil essentiel pour relever ce défi ; à l'aube d'une nouvelle décennie, ils sont le point culminant du travail de la communauté internationale qui a commencé en 1996 avec le rapport de Graça Machel sur l'impact des conflits armés sur les enfants. Les Principes de Vancouver s'appuient sur tout le travail que nous avons accompli dans le cadre de l'Initiative Dallaire, ainsi que sur le travail de la communauté internationale exprimé dans le Protocole facultatif, les Principes de Paris, les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité et les initiatives visant à protéger les enfants et les civils. Les Principes de Vancouver apportent un niveau supérieur d'orientation stratégique qui relie tous ces efforts pour rallier les États à l'action, et l'immense travail qui a été accompli pour créer les Lignes directrices de mise en œuvre est un aspect absolument essentiel de cette entreprise. C'est une chose que d'établir des principes, mais c'en est une autre que de les transformer en conseils pratiques sur la manière de les mettre en œuvre. Nous devons maintenant tourner notre attention vers la transformation de ces lignes directrices en directives de formation et vers le développement de nouvelles capacités pour nos forces. Dans cette optique, les articles de ce numéro d'Allons-y constituent un complément important aux Principes et aux Lignes directrices de mise en œuvre, et seront d'une grande utilité pour les responsables politiques, les universitaires et les intervenants du secteur de la sécurité qui travaillent sur cette question.Au cours de nos travaux de ces dernières années, nous avons pu constater à quel point le secteur de la sécurité avait besoin de quelque chose de tangible sur lequel fonder sa formation et sur lequel améliorer et professionnaliser ses forces pour faire face au défi posé par les enfants soldats. Ses intervenants considèrent que l'utilisation de la force contre les enfants pose problème dans le cadre du maintien de la paix, et souhaitent réduire le nombre de victimes de leur côté et devenir plus efficaces. Grâce aux Principes de Vancouver, nous avons mondialisé le travail de l'Initiative Dallaire, et il nous incombe de veiller à utiliser cet outil efficacement. Pour ce faire, nous devons mettre en place un secrétariat central pour aider les États à concrétiser les Principes et les lignes directrices en capacités pour leurs forces, et travailler avec les Nations Unies pour s'assurer que les États disposent des connaissances nécessaires pour ce faire. Nous devons également commencer à envisager les choses selon une perspective régionale afin d'obtenir une mise en œuvre plus efficace, coordonnée et rapide des Principes. L'Initiative Dallaire a lancé ce processus grâce à son bureau régional pour l'Afrique de l'Est au Rwanda. Des travaux supplémentaires sont nécessaires pour développer les capacités régionales en Amérique latine, au Moyen-Orient et en Asie du Sud et de l'Est. Depuis notre siège au Canada, nous pourrons alors contribuer au renforcement des capacités et aux stratégies. En ce sens, au cours de la prochaine décennie, nous devons disposer de cette capacité opérationnelle au sein de chaque pays contributeur en soldats et policiers, et faire en sorte que chaque contingent participant à des missions des Nations Unies soit qualifié à l'égard de cette capacité. Cet engagement mondial contribuera à la réforme et à la modernisation du maintien de la paix afin de mettre fin à l'utilisation des enfants comme armes de guerre.À une époque où les droits de l'homme sont passés au premier plan entre les années 1970 et 2000, par suite de nos capacités de documenter, de communiquer et de punir les crimes internationaux, les gens n'ont pas suffisamment compris que le recours à des enfants pour accomplir un travail d'adulte est une erreur, et que l'utilisation d'enfants soldats en est la pire forme. Vous ne pouvez pas simplement considérer un enfant comme quelqu'un qui a besoin de nourriture et d'instruction ; il faut également le voir comme un futur adulte. Si nous éduquons des enfants à la guerre, alors nous banalisons la guerre pour l'avenir. Il n'est pas logique de vouloir prévenir et faire cesser la guerre sans aborder le rôle que les enfants soldats peuvent jouer dans la perpétuation des conflits. Du point de vue pratique, nous n'avons pas été capables de faire ce lien dans la tête des gens, seulement dans la loi. Pour éliminer un instrument de guerre majeur, nous devons rendre l'utilisation des enfants soldats impensable.
"An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile - hoping it will eat him last"Winston Churchill Desde que –afortunadamente- Winston L. Spencer-Churchill tomó como tarea personal oponerse a la expansión nazi, el concepto de apaciguamiento ("appeasement") se transformó en anatema en la política internacional. De ahí en más, apaciguar supuso nada menos que ceder ante el mal, en los 1930s y 40s encarnado en Adolf Hitler y su aparato estatal. Los apaciguadores fueron aquellos inocentes –o irresponsables- que creyeron limitados los objetivos de política exterior de Hitler. Los acuerdos de Múnich de 1938, símbolo del apaciguamiento al Tercer Reich, son un ejemplo de historia viva: desde la mitad del siglo XX en adelante los usos y abusos de la categoría analítica "apaciguador o apaciguamiento" –directamente vinculados al fracaso de Múnich- han sido empleados para categorizar los más diversos fenómenos de la escena internacional.El profesor de historia en la Universidad de Yale, Paul Kennedy –conocido particularmente por su magistral The Rise and Fall of The Great Powers- ha escrito un importante artículo en The National Interest sobre el "appeasement" y su papel en la política internacional. Bajo el provocador título "A Time to Appease," Kennedy hace una reseña histórica del concepto, para luego esbozar una serie de hipótesis sobre su relevancia en el sistema internacional actual -explícitamente pensando en el futuro. Siendo uno de los historiadores vivos más importantes, la sección que discute los orígenes históricos es la más fuerte e interesante. Las conclusiones, por otro lado, son un tanto vagas, pero dan para la reflexión. Kennedy parte de la premisa de que la Historia ha condenado a la noción de apaciguamiento al campo de lo políticamente peyorativo, para luego vincular tal condición a la política internacional de todos los días: "…talk of someone being an Appeaser brings us to a much darker meaning, that which involves cowardice, abandoning one's friends and allies, failing to recognize evil in the world—a fool, then—or recognizing evil but then trying to buy it off—a knave. Nothing so alarms a president or prime minister in the Western world than to be accused of pursuing policies of appeasement."Tan certera es la apreciación del inglés, como equivocado el espíritu que mueve tales apreciaciones. Como ya he señalado en otro trabajo: el apaciguamiento es una estrategia de política exterior neutral, sin un resultado predeterminado, y que no se puede separar de la interacción siempre particular entre los estados involucrados. Las consecuencias del apaciguamiento británico -y en cierta medida francés- hacia Alemania en los años treinta ha manchado para siempre el nombre de este dispositivo político. Pero en concreto, su éxito o su fracaso dependen de las intenciones de quien es apaciguado. Robert Powell ilustra el punto: "Had German demands been limited, appeasement might very well have averted an unnecessary war. As it turned out, those ambitions were not limited, and Britain and France declared war on Germany."(1)Kennedy recurre a un ejemplo histórico escasamente comentado para refutar la expandida idea de que apaciguar es un error per se: las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y Gran Bretaña en los albores del siglo XX. "Even as the great powers entered the twentieth century," comenta el historiador, "one of the most exceptional acts of appeasement, and repeated conciliation, was occurring—yet it is something that very few American pundits on appeasement today seem to know anything about. It was Great Britain's decision to make a series of significant territorial and political concessions to the rising American Republic." El dilema que vivió Gran Bretaña en los 1900s es un problema recurrente para las grandes potencias en proceso de declive relativo. A diferencia de lo que suelen pensar algunas corrientes teóricas demasiado encorsetadas –a las que un enfoque histórico à la Kennedy les haría mucho bien- una potencia en descenso no sólo tiene que vérselas con un contendiente en ascenso, sino que se ve obligada a hacer malabares entre varios estados que ascienden relativamente, mientras trata de sortear la aparición in crescendo de asuntos complejos por todo el globo -ante los cuales tiene cada vez menos capacidad para hacerles frente. Inmersa en la confusión del descenso relativo –pero pronunciado- Gran Bretaña tomó la decisión consciente de apaciguar a Estados Unidos, mientras se iba perfilando antagónicamente ante la Alemania Imperial de Guillermo. Estrategia digna de un Metternich o un Bismarck. El ejemplo derriba el mito, instalado por el comentario despistado y ahistórico de las relaciones internacionales, de una relación especial entre Gran Bretaña y Estados Unidos determinada de antemano. El vínculo particular que se generó entre las otrora colonias norteamericanas y Londres fue, más allá de variables culturales que lo facilitaron, una obra de ingeniería diplomática. El siglo XIX había estado plagado de situaciones tensas entre los dos países (e.g. el apoyo, aún si fue un tímido apoyo, de Gran Bretaña a la Confederación en la Guerra Civil estadounidense, entre otros). El verdadero cambio de rumbo fue el resultado de la nueva política de apaciguamiento británica, que luego resultaría en la alineación cuasi-incondicional del siglo XX. (2)Volviendo a Kennedy: "In this case, appeasement worked, and arguably played a massive role in helping to bring the United States to an official pro-British stance as the two great wars of the twentieth century approached."Eliminar automáticamente al apaciguamiento del menú de opciones de política exterior, solamente porque una iniciativa particular no funcionó (i.e. Múnich), es una postura miope y amateur. Más aún, refleja una manera de hacer política guiada por las emociones –siempre una de las peores influencias para llevar adelante una política exterior exitosa. La observación del sistema internacional sin recurrir a la historia desemboca en análisis desprovistos de pilares, y por tanto superficiales. Pero el uso apresurado y facilista de la historia puede terminar en tomas de decisión tan alejadas de la realidad como las que están faltas de ella. La historia es dinámica y cambiante -los Griegos lo llamaban flux-; una circunstancia del pasado no puede ser aplicada in totum para explicar otras que se presentan en coyunturas y contextos disímiles. Existen entonces apaciguamientos buenos y malos. La tarea del estadista es saber cuándo se está apaciguando inútil y peligrosamente a un Hitler, y cuando se apacigua efectivamente a un estado con intenciones limitadas –por ejemplo, Estados Unidos a comienzos del siglo XX. Desafortunadamente, como señala Kennedy: "Certainty about such matters only comes, I suspect, with hindsight; and there we are all wise, because we know what happened." Pero esto no es nuevo en la política internacional; esfera que está plagada de incertidumbre. Los motivos de terceros estados son siempre inciertos, y por ende, todas las estrategias diplomáticas –no sólo el apaciguamiento- corren el riesgo de no funcionar como se esperaba. Alejándonos un poco del debate histórico, las implicancias del entendimiento y el uso del concepto de apaciguar son profundos en la política internacional contemporánea y futura. Habiéndose banalizado hasta el paroxismo el ejemplo de Múnich, disímiles regímenes han sido vistos como resurrecciones del Tercer Reich: la URSS, el comunismo vietnamita, China, el Irán de Ahmadinejad, inter alia. Todos regímenes con facetas terribles, pero no por eso con objetivos ilimitados de política exterior.¿Dónde ve Kennedy la relevancia del uso y abuso del concepto en el mundo contemporáneo? Según él, apaciguar, entendido como una herramienta de política exterior neutral, es un dispositivo necesario en la política internacional. Particularmente para la administración del orden en los períodos de descenso de la potencia dominante. Ergo, Estados Unidos debería, en su visión, aceptar la posibilidad de que eventualmente tendrá que comenzar a usufructuar selectivamente de tal dispositivo. Esto no quiere decir que Washington deba ceder en todo y hacia todos de aquí en más. Sino que en algunas ocasiones, empezaría a hacerse necesario dejar escenarios que no afectan directamente la seguridad estadounidense (se puede pensar en Irak y Afganistán), y elaborar estrategias macro que permitan ceder en algunas cosas ante el ascenso de China: "This privileged nation [the U.S.] —one is tempted to say, overprivileged nation—possesses around 4.6 percent of the world's population, produces about a fifth of world product, and is, amazingly, willing to spend over 40 percent of all the globe's defense expenditures. At some time in the future, sooner or later, there is going to be what economists call a 'convergence,' that is, we are going to have to trim our sails and no longer try to bestride the world like a colossus. As we do so, we shall make a concession here, a concession there, though hopefully it will be disguised in the form of policies such as 'power sharing' and 'mutual compromise,' and the dreadful 'A' word will not appear."La preocupación subyacente en el planteo de Kennedy es que la estigmatización del concepto, por las consecuencias políticas que podría generar a un líder el ser clasificado de "apaciguador," limita seriamente la consideración de mismo como una opción más de política exterior. El argumento es lógicamente impecable. Pero tiene un problema, o mejor dicho, una sutileza temporal. Para cuando Gran Bretaña comenzó su política de apaciguamiento hacia Estados Unidos, la capacidad de poder estadounidense ya era superior a la británica en todos los aspectos. A su vez, la capacidad de la Royal Navy de cubrir el globo había disminuido sensiblemente. La posición actual de Estados Unidos es por cierto disímil.(3)El timing es aquí importante. La otra cara de la moneda puede ser tan nociva como la que presenta Kennedy: el apaciguamiento extendido como resultado de una errónea comprensión de la real estructura de poder en el sistema internacional puede generar potencias revisionistas y contribuir a la inestabilidad internacional.Sin embargo, a mediano y largo plazo, el análisis de Kennedy debe ser tomado muy en serio. Apaciguar y otorgar concesiones va a tener que estar cada vez más en el menú de opciones estadounidense (siempre junto a otras como el Soft Power o la fuerza militar). Según Kennedy: "It is not a crime, or a moral failing, to recognize where and when it may be best to withdraw from a battlefield and to reduce a commitment." La sabiduría del liderazgo estadounidense va a estar en saber discernir qué situaciones y qué actores pueden ser apaciguados, y qué otros deben ser contenidos. Esperemos que estén a la altura de la situación.(1) Powell, Robert, "Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement," American Political Science Review, 90, p. 746.(2) Sobre las rispideces del siglo XIX y el giro diplomático véase: Bourne, Kenneth,Britain and the Balance of Power in North America: 1815-1908,Berkeley,University of California Press, 1967.(3) En la conclusión de su libro The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Paul Kennedy había caído en el mismo error, argumentando de manera apresurada que Estados Unidos estaba sobre-expandido y que su descenso ante la URSS era un escenario esperable (irónicamente el libro fue publicado 1987, dos años antes de la caída del Muro de Berlín). *Profesor Universidad ORT.Maestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (Tesista)
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On September 19 and 20, the armed forces of Azerbaijan advanced on Nagorno-Karabakh, ending, within 24 hours, a so-called "frozen" conflict, the origins of which hearken back to 1988.[1] The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over this mountainous territory in 1992–94, and the subsequent stalemate, punctuated by several flashes of violence, led to over 30,000 casualties on both sides and the forced internal migration of over a million Azerbaijanis. The recent flight of over 100,000 ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh into Armenia has put additional stress on that country. While such conflicts rarely end quickly and neatly—it will take decades to tie up loose threads—there are already some lessons we can learn from the conflict.Lessons from the ConflictMultilateral efforts to resolve conflict are important. They conveyed to the leaders of the conflicting parties that the world and regional powers were watching and would hold them accountable. A negotiated resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was added to various governments' foreign policy goals. Regular visits to the conflicting parties served to discourage or delay any military planning. The groups of leaders and officials from the conflicting parties in Nagorno-Karabakh were relatively small and challenged with many issues at the same time, so whenever they had to deal with special negotiators from the U.S., Russia, France, and other countries, they had to put down what they were doing at the time.Michael Keays (far right) in Stepanakert/Khankendi, with U.S., Russian, and French peace process negotiators, September 1998.Image CreditThe interest and involvement of several countries in the region ensured that the conflict would not fade away and be forgotten; this is a feature of human behavior often referred to as "compassion fatigue." Consider the fact that, as of this article's publication, over 50 conflicts are currently active in the world—and that number doesn't consider non-state conflicts. Counting those, the number is well over 80. Most of these are in Africa, and coverage of them in the mainstream media is rare.[2] In the U.S., what should have been an obscure conflict occasionally received press coverage so that Americans beyond just the Armenian diaspora knew about it. Public interest tends to have an impact on whether governments make an issue a priority or not."Frozen" conflicts can flash at any moment. This is true especially if mediators are distracted. Back in the late 1990s, there was a view that someday, Azerbaijan would probably retake the Nagorno-Karabakh region by force with a modern, appropriately sized army purchased with oil money. This concern was allayed by the sense that the conflict would have to be resolved before oil from the region could get out to Western markets, something that seemed distant. That sense of distance fell apart when the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was opened in 2006.[3] Once the oil started flowing, Azerbaijan's financial situation improved, and, not surprisingly, the country started working on building up its military capabilities. Seventeen years later, it found itself in a position to try to retake Nagorno-Karabakh militarily. It helped that it not only had the means but had the space, in the sense that Russia and the U.S. were focused on Russia's brutal war against Ukraine. What was considered by many experts a "frozen" conflict suddenly became hot, and then ended even more suddenly. The military resolution of the situation also reminds us that seemingly endless conflicts can actually end. Nagorno-Karabakh has gone the way of Tamil Tiger-occupied Sri Lanka, a conflict which also appeared irresolvable until 2009.[4]Money talks, and who your friends are matters. Azerbaijan slowly built up its army with the intent of taking back Armenian-occupied areas surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh and the region itself. Azerbaijan's defense spending grew dramatically starting in 2004, from $144 million in 2003 to $1.2 billion in 2008. In January 2009, Azerbaijan claimed it would increase its defense spending to $2.3 billion. It could do that because its economy was growing at an unprecedented rate. Smart spending is as important as being able to outspend your opponent. While Azerbaijan's armed forces decreased in terms of personnel from 2007 to 2019, its quality increased significantly, primarily due to assistance received from Turkey and Israel, but also the U.S. Azerbaijan Armed Forces 2007[5] 2019[6]Army: 85,000 56,000Air Force: 8,000 8,500Navy: 2,000 2,500Total personnel: 95,000 67,000In a war of attrition, numbers are significant, but in this case, the capabilities edge on the Azerbaijan side—largely due to training, military exercises, and technological force multipliers—proved to be the winning factor, even as it was on the offense and had to fight uphill. Turkey has been heavily involved in the modernization of Azerbaijan's military since 1992, and it started providing Azerbaijan more robust professional military education and access to joint training and exercises in 2010.[7] Israel also played a key role in Azerbaijan's military modernization. In 2012, Azerbaijan purchased $1.6 billion worth of weapons from Israeli Aerospace Industries, an additional $5 billion worth of weapons in 2016, and another $127 million worth of weapons in 2017.[8] Most of the purchases consisted of unmanned aircraft and satellite technology to improve battlespace awareness for the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. All of this proved critical to Azerbaijan's victories on the battlefield in the fall of 2020, and then its retaking of Nagorno-Karabakh in September of this year. This also revealed the substantial weakness of Nagorno-Karabakh's defense forces and Armenia's political and logistical ties. Russia, Iran, and the worldwide Armenian diaspora—Armenia's allies and supporters and, through it, supporters of Nagorno-Karabakh—proved incapable of defending those trying to tear the region away from Azerbaijan. The wealth and generosity of your allies matter, and in this case, Azerbaijan had the better, more capable allies. President Ilham Aliyev has demonstrated that he is not as weak as observers once worried he was after the 2003 death of his father, Heydar Aliyev. Azerbaijan's security and negotiating position are much improved now.Occupying another country's land is costly and usually ends badly. Armenia had external support from its wealthy and politically influential diasporas located in the U.S. and France, among other places. These communities did a lot to keep up the dream of an independent so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic ("Artsakh," according to Armenians) alive—even at one point by financing the construction of an impressive highway linking Yerevan with Stepanakert/Khankendi—but enthusiasm, the leveraging of sympathetic politicians in important countries, and money to build roads and churches rarely change the conditions on the ground that matter in warfare. In fact, these factors can intensify the desire of refugees and internally displaced people to return to their homeland, and push for the chance to do so. Immediate LessonsBeyond the key takeaways above, we should consider three more ideas as we reflect on Azerbaijan's recent military operation in its Nagorno-Karabakh region.First, this is an opportunity for the U.S. and allies to reach out to Armenia to help it to process what just happened and support the displaced. Russia and its peacekeepers standing between the Azerbaijanis and the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians clearly failed to stop Azerbaijan's offensive. Russia and Iran are increasingly becoming pariah states, given their aggression against Ukraine and Israel, respectively. They are on self-defeating trajectories. Armenia should be encouraged to further orient itself westward.Second, the inaction of Russia's peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijani forces advanced might suggest to outside observers that Russia is distracted and stretched to the limits by Ukraine. In other words, Russia's ongoing occupation of parts of Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) and its troops in Transnistria without the government of Moldova's consent, while long-standing, might be worth pushing against, as Russia may not be as strong as we have long believed. At least it could be perceived that way after what just transpired in Azerbaijan. This bears further analysis. In the meantime, if the U.S. and other Western countries have not yet done so, they might consider cautioning the Moldovans and Georgians not to test Russian resolve, given Mr. Putin's likely, unpredictable, and escalatory reaction to a testing of perceived Russian vulnerability. And the U.S. and others should keep an eye on Transnistria and the occupied territories Russia has been expanding in Georgia. Several recent and upcoming events concerning Moldova could provoke incidents, including the November 5 local elections, the potential parliamentary approval of Moldova's National Security Strategy (which lists Russia as its main external threat), the EU's decision about whether formal accession talks with Moldova can begin, and the renewal or expiration of the OSCE mandate in Moldova by the end of the year. It is worth remembering that Moldova is neither a member of NATO nor the EU and is not far from the Ukrainian port city of Odesa. Russia has been repeatedly targeting Odesa with missiles and drones, possibly as part of a larger effort to take Ukraine's entire Black Sea coast and link Russia up with Transnistria to Ukraine's west.Third, if the U.S. and its allies and partners have not yet done so, they should make it clear to Azerbaijan that they will be watching them in the post-conflict period. As the saying goes, they should "trust but verify." They should also warn Azerbaijan not to take military action to establish a land bridge between Azerbaijan proper and the exclave of Nakhchevan, an act which would require the seizure of Armenian territory.Michael C. Keays is a senior diplomatic fellow at the Kennan Institute of the Wilson Center. While the author is on detail from the State Department to the Kennan Institute, the views are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. government or the Wilson Center.[1] Vladimir Solovyov, "Azerbaijani Control of Nagorno-Karabakh Will Not Stop Conflict in the South Caucasus," Carnegie Politika, September 28, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90655[2] Anna Marie Obermeier and Siri Aas Rustad, Conflict Trends: A Global Overview, 1946–2022 (Oslo, Norway: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2023), https://reliefweb.int/report/world/conflict-trends-global-overview-1946-2022#:~:text=Despite%20the%20increase%20in%20battle,in%2038%20conflict%2Daffected%20countries[3] bp Azerbaijan (website), "Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline," https://www.bp.com/en_az/azerbaijan/home/who-we-are/operationsprojects/pipelines/btc.html[4] Jayshree Bajoria, "The Sri Lankan Conflict," Council on Foreign Relations, updated May 18, 2009, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/sri-lankan-conflict[5] GlobalSecurity.org (website), "Azerbaijan—Introduction," https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/azerbaijan/intro.htm[6] Edward J. Erickson, "The 44-Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh: Turkish Drone Success or Operational Art?" Military Review, August 2021, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2021-OLE/Erickson/[7] Haldun Yalçınkaya, "Turkey's Overlooked Role in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War," GMF (German Marshall Fund), January 21, 2021, https://www.gmfus.org/news/turkeys-overlooked-role-second-nagorno-karabakh-war[8] Erickson, "The 44-Day War."
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Beginning Aug. 6, the Ukrainian military launched a surprise, cross-border offensive against Russia in the eastern Kursk region, seemingly flipping the script on the war's current trajectory. Kyiv claims its units have pushed more than 20 miles into Russian territory, taking over 74 settlements and towns encompassing some 400 square miles, as well as over 100 Russian prisoners of war.For its part, Moscow has acknowledged the incursion but as of Wednesday said its military has stabilized the border and is actively fighting to wrest control over those contested areas. Meanwhile, the fog of war has settled in and there is no official confirmation on the number of casualties or actual territorial gains by Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin has denounced the incursion as a "large-scale provocation." For its part the Ukraine Foreign Ministry is saying this isn't about holding territory but stopping long-range missile strikes by Russia into Ukraine from the Kursk region by creating a "buffer zone" there. So many questions remain about the Ukrainian strategy, the Russian response and what long term impact this may have — or not — on the overall war, including the potential for future negotiations, the effect on morale on both sides, and whether this emboldens Ukraine's supporters, including the U.S., to help re-energize what was looking like a foundering war effort on the Ukrainian side.So we put the following question to a well-rounded group of foreign policy experts: "What is the likely impact of current Ukrainian military incursions into the Russian Kursk region on the broader Ukraine War?"Jasen J. Castillo, Monica Duffy Toft, Ivan Eland, Mark Episkopos, Lyle Goldstein, John Mearsheimer, Sumantra Maitra, Rajan Menon, Peter Rutland, Stephen WaltJasen J. Castillo, Co-Director, Albritton Center for Grand Strategy, George H.W. Bush School of Government, Texas A&M UniversityOnce again, Ukraine's armed forces have demonstrated their tremendous will to fight, something Russia discounted when they invaded in 2022. Nevertheless, the military objective of this offensive remains unclear. In the short term, this is a public relations boost for Ukraine and a morale blow to Russia. The Kursk gamble might also reduce pressure on Ukraine's defenses as Russia moves forces to stop the incursion. My worry is that in the longer term, Ukraine, which is facing dangerous shortfalls in manpower and equipment, will deplete elite units that would have been needed elsewhere. In a war of attrition, manpower and equipment are essential. Ukraine's attack reminds me of Germany's audacious Western offensive in 1944 that surprised the Allies, made gains, and ended with a defeat at the Battle of the Bulge, which then wasted manpower and equipment it needed months later on the Eastern Front.Monica Duffy Toft, Professor of International Politics and Director of the Center for Strategic Studies at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.The likely impact of Ukraine's military incursion into Russia is going to affect two axes of interest; one material, and one psychological.On the material axis, Ukraine may be able to temporarily degrade Russia's ability to launch missile attacks against Ukrainian targets, the most sensitive of which involve the deliberate and systematic harm of Ukraine's noncombatants. But in material terms, not much can be expected in terms of lasting impact. Ukraine will be forced to retreat from Russia, and its surviving troops and equipment will be redistributed, after rest and refit, to other critical areas of Ukraine's front with Russia.It is on the psychological axis we can expect the most impact. Already, Russian President Vladimir Putin's legitimacy as a "great leader" was damaged in the opening weeks of the war. This latest incursion is worse, because no Russian leader can afford to preside over the loss of Russian territory, even temporarily, and survive with reputation intact.That said, Putin has unprecedented control over what Russians learn about the war. The psychological impact will be most felt by Ukraine and its allies. It will alleviate attention fatigue in the global sphere. It also reminds Western donors that Ukraine can fight and win, so the ongoing sacrifice of sending weapons and ammunition will not be wasted.Ivan Eland, Director of the Independent Institute's Center on Peace & Liberty.Although Ukraine has insisted that its intent is not to hold captured land in Russia, one might then ask what purpose the incursion serves. It may have been designed to shock Russian leader Vladimir Putin about Russia's vulnerability, but prior raids or attacks on Russia and Crimea have already so demonstrated.Conducting offensive operations is usually much more costly in personnel and equipment than being on defense, so is it worth it for Ukraine to divert forces from already thin defense lines to go on a risky offensive with only nebulous benefits? Russia's offensive is already making headway, and because Russia outnumbers and outguns Ukraine, it may not need to denude its attack forces in Ukraine to defend Russian territory. Ukraine indeed may desire to occupy Russian territory to eventually trade Ukrainian-occupied Russian territory for Russian-occupied Ukrainian land in any truce negotiations, but Ukraine risks being surrounded by superior forces.Mark Episkopos, Eurasia Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and Adjunct Professor of History at Marymount UniversityThe Kursk incursion seems to have been premised on the assumption that Ukraine can exploit Russia's thinly manned border defenses to seize large swathes of land — including the Kursk nuclear power plant — in the first 48-72 hours, presenting Moscow with a fait accompli that can be used as a bargaining chip to quickly force a ceasefire and potentially even set the stage for peace talks on Ukraine's terms. But Russia appears to have thwarted the AFU's attempts to significantly expand its initial beachhead, and Ukraine lacks the long-term capacity to hold even the modest territory that it is currently contesting.Efforts to keep open the Kursk pocket are unlikely to yield any strategic benefits for Ukraine and will demand a massive sustained investment of troops and equipment that may weaken Ukrainian defenses, inadvertently creating opportunities for Russian forces along the lines of contact in Ukraine's Donbas region.Lyle Goldstein, Director of Asia Development, Defense Priorities, and visiting Professor at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown UniversityKyiv's brazen offensive into Russia's Kursk region illustrates that Ukraine still has significant combat capability, as well as some measure of fighting pluck. No doubt the operation has served its primary end to embarrass the Kremlin and so dramatically alter the conventional narrative on the war. Still, legitimate questions can be asked regarding the wisdom of the new offensive. Casualties for the attacking side are inevitably high, especially in circumstances when Russia retains a substantial firepower advantage. This may, in turn, create grave weaknesses on other part of the battle line that Russian forces could exploit. Most informed American strategists had been counseling Ukraine in 2024 to stay on the defensive to preserve its forces and thus adopt a "long war" strategy. Nor is it clear that such a symbolic gambit will make a peace easier to negotiate. Finally, this is yet another step in the inadvisable direction of general escalation.John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago, and non-resident fellow at the Quincy InstituteUkraine's invasion (of Kursk) was a major strategic blunder, which will accelerate its defeat. The key determinant of success in a war of attrition is the casualty-exchange ratio, not capturing territory, which Western commentators obsess over. The casualty-exchange ratio in the Kursk offensive decisively favors Russia for two reasons. First, it has caused relatively few Russian casualties because Ukraine's army effectively overran undefended territory. Second, once alerted to the attack, Moscow quickly brought massive airpower to bear against the advancing Ukrainian troops, who were in the open and easy to strike. Unsurprisingly, the attacking forces lost many soldiers and a huge proportion of their equipment. To make matters worse, Kyiv removed top-notch combat units from the front lines in eastern Ukraine — where they are desperately needed — and made them part of the Kursk strike force. This move is tilting the already lopsided casualty-exchange ratio on that critically important front further in Russia's favor. It is no wonder — given what a foolish idea the Kursk incursion is — that the Russians were caught by surprise.Sumantra Maitra, Director of research and outreach, the American Ideas Institute, author of "Sources of Russian Aggression"If Ukraine taking the war to Russia was to bring Russia to negotiate from a position of weakness, it will fail, simply because Ukrainians don't have the manpower to sustain this push and subsequent occupation. It is a good PR victory for Ukrainian backers in the West, and it shows how catastrophically backward, incompetent, and Soviet, Russian strategic thinking still is, but the Russian advantage in numbers will remain.What it also might do is harden the Russian position, embolden the hardliners in the Russian government, and dissuade Putin from pushing for any negotiations for peace, especially after a new administration is elected in the U.S. Which, maybe, was the actual aim of the Ukrainian government, or whoever is advising them. In scuttling that particular process, Ukraine has been successful.Rajan Menon, non-resident senior fellow at Defense Priorities and the Anne and Bernard Spitzer Chair Emeritus in International Relations at the Powell School, City College of New York/City University of New York.Ukraine's Kursk gambit has been widely praised — appropriately. But its enduring success remains uncertain. Whether Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi seeks to retain Russian territory to trade in future negotiations; to divert Russian forces from the Donetsk battlefields, where they have been advancing; or to make Russians feel some of the pain Ukrainians have since 2022, his ability to achieve one or more of these goals remains uncertain.Once Russia mounts a persistent counterattack, will Ukraine muster the logistical capabilities, troop numbers, firepower, and air defenses required to sustain its soldiers in Kursk? Will Russia be forced to redeploy forces from Donetsk (so far it has used reserves and troops from the Kharkiv and Kupiansk fronts)? Or will Russia foil Ukraine's Kursk offensive, transforming the current euphoria into a blame-game in which Ukraine's leaders are attacked for dispatching to Kursk troops that were badly needed elsewhere? It's too early to tell.Peter Rutland, professor of government and the Colin and Nancy Campbell Chair for Global Issues and Democratic Thought at Wesleyan UniversityThe Ukrainian incursion is the most significant challenge to face Putin since the Wagner mutiny of June 2023. It highlights one of the central claims of Evgeny Prigozhin — the corruption and incompetence of the Russian army's commanders, who did not foresee the attack, and who have been slow to expel the Ukrainian invaders. It refutes some of the central themes in Kremlin propaganda — that Russia is winning the war, that Putin is protecting Russians from a hostile world. It has also called the bluff on Putin's threats to use nuclear weapons in the event of escalation of the fighting onto Russian territory. Irrespective of the military costs and benefits of the raid, there is no doubt that it has been a political coup for Kyiv.Stephen Walt, Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs, Yale UniversityThe Ukrainian incursion into Russia is a sideshow intended to bolster Ukrainian morale and give the West confidence to keep backing Kyiv, but it will not affect the outcome of the war. Ukrainian forces have reportedly seized about 1000 square kilometers of poorly defended Russian territory. Russia's total land mass is more than 17 million square kilometers, which means that Ukraine now "controls" 0.00588% of Russia. By comparison, Russian forces currently occupy roughly 20 percent of Ukraine and the failed Ukrainian offensive last summer shows how difficult it will be for Ukraine to retake these areas. The incursion may be a minor embarrassment for Putin (as well as additional evidence that Russia is far too weak to invade the rest of Europe), but Ukraine's fate will be determined by what happens in Ukraine, and not by this operation.
According to the United Nations Population Fund, in October 2011 the world population reached 7 billion people, 3456.8 millions of whom are women.In the U.S.A, the total population is 313.1 million in 2011. Of those, 158.5 million are women, which means a little bit more than a half. In this country the people eligible to vote in 2008 reached more than 218 million, 55% of whom are women.The numbers are similar in Switzerland. With a total population of 7.7 million people, the country has 3.9 million of women – again, just a little bit more than the half –, and 54% of the Swiss eligible to vote are women (2010).However, the current representation of women in politics around the world does not reflect the population data. At parliamentary level worldwide, the percentage of women who occupies seats as deputies or senators is 19.2% and 17.8% respectively. These means that even though the historical representation of women in politics has been rising, the number of males representatives still is overwhelmingly higher.For reference only, the minimum percentage that is consider necessary for a fair and considerable representation of ideas that can influence the decision making is about 30%.In January 1918 the 19th Amendment of the USA Constitution was included in the political agenda for the discussion of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The president of USA, Woodrow Wilson, recognizing the woman's support to their country during the war, urged the politicians to vote in favor of the amendment. The Representatives passed the amendment on May 1919, and the Senate did the same on June. Thereafter, the approval was in hands of each state. More than twenty states ratified it within six months. Thirty six were needed to include the amendment into the Constitution, and Tennessee turned out to be the one which had the final decision. After a very close vote, just one of the legislators changed his opinion and the woman's right to vote was approved. Literally, the 19th amendment says: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." With those two simple lines, the activist women of the USA, who had been fighting for their right to vote for more than seven decades, finally achieved their goal and the history of American women in politics change forever.On the other hand, Switzerland is the last European country that allowed its women to vote at national level. Many say that it was due to the decisions take longer to be taken in a direct democracy. But there, it took too long.The Swiss society can be consider as patriarchal, conservative, traditional and with marked streaks sexist, which is exemplifiedin the traditional perception of the woman's role as restricted to 'kinder, kirche und kuche' ('children, church and kitchen'), still valid specially in German-speaking regions.However, the active feminist movements exist since long time ago, and they fight not only for the woman's right to vote, but also for legal equality and the empowerment of women in all aspects.By 1962, with the intention to sign the European Convention of Human Rights, the government of Switzerland asked for an exception about the legal equality of genders – specifically for the women's right to vote -. Against this, the associations pro the female suffrage protested, and the commotion forced the authorities to review that posture. So, a referendum was decided by the government in 1968, and the public consultation took place in February 1971. Finally, the results were different. More than six hundred thousand (about 66%) Swiss men said YES to the women's right to vote, so since then all Swiss women are allowed to vote at national level.Furthermore, on October 31 of the same year, there was a parliamentary election in Switzerland, and eleven women were elected to be part of it.The United States of American and Switzerland differs in many aspects, such as size, population, traditions and history. However, both have also some things in common. They both took too long to allow their women to vote, granting with that a better political equality.Their political regime is pretty similar, both are democratic countries. In the process of getting the female suffrage the USA parliament, as well as the Swiss, played a key role since the decision of including the issue into the constitutional order should, in the first instance, be approved by the legislature. But after the parliament passed it, the next step was different within the two countries. USA led the final decision to the local governments, while in Switzerland was the people who had to finish the process. This means that in the European country the men citizens had the final word instead of the parliamentarians, who should represent the interest of all citizens, men and women. There is then, a social matter. Switzerland is a multicultural country with a big percentage of foreigners among its residents, four official languages, and a rich history of immigration. Nevertheless, the Swiss society is mostly conservative and traditional, in particular its regions of German´s descendants and residents, not so the French or Italians. The facts speak by themselves: in the referendum of 1959, only three cantons voted for allow the Swiss women to vote, all three were 'French'; while in the 'German' canton call Appenzell Innerrhoden, the amount of No votes was about 95%. Another point that can be considered as a difference within the two countries concerning the female struggle, are their leaders. Both, the American and the Swiss movement, had notorious female leaders. They were all active politicians and were deeply committed to the cause, which contributes to the organization of the movements and also to the well development of the activities.However, the American female leaders, although they were largely convinced of the injustice of gender inequality, none of them had high-level education. The abolitionist Elizabeth Cady Stanton was a writer, but she never took college studies. Lucretia Mott was a school teacher; and Susan B. Anthony just dedicated her entire life to the fight for women's rights. Except for Stanton (she was a lawyer's daughter), they didn't came from high educated families. Meanwhile, the most famous leader of the Swiss movement for women's right to vote, Josi Meier had a different background. Her real name was Josephine Johanna Meier, but was also known as the 'Grand Old Lady'. She died in 2006 at the age of eighty. Meier, who also came from a poor family, graduated as a lawyer in 1952, but had been defending women's right for a long time. When the right to vote for women was finally awarded in 1971, she became one of the members of the Lucerne cantonal parliament, and some month later she was among the eleven women elected as parliamentary representatives. Moreover, Meier took place in the Senate some years later and in 1991 became the first woman ever to be the Senate's speaker.It is worth comparing also the opposition that the movements had to face in both countries. The resistance to the women's right to vote, in USA as in Switzerland, had the objective of stop the progressive movements, defended the traditional order of the society and, as Nicole Herz (1992) describes, "'Antis' had to re-define the scope of woman's sphere and put government back into the male's sphere". Furthermore, the opposition in USA and in Switzerland used to use the same arguments to fight against the change. The religious beliefs were common among the opposition movements. The 'God word' and the biblical commandments that assure women were made to be men's support, good wives and exemplary mothers, dedicated to their homes and children, were some of the weapons of the anti-suffragist. Coming from conservative education, they believed that 'women belong to the kitchen' and there they must remain. Political issues were thought to be rude and complicated so only men should handle it, women would lose their femininity if they involved in politics. Other of the arguments was that the basis of the family, and therefore of society, was the women's homemakers, so if women get their right to vote, then they would had less time to do it and the families would lose their foundations, so the society would derail.Finally, there is one last fact that both, USA and Switzerland, had in common. It was the influence of an external factor into their government decision of do something about the right to vote for women. In the USA it was the World War I. In Switzerland, the Cold War.During the First World War (1914 – 1918) the American women began to be part of the work force of the country while the men went to fight in the battlefield. Doing this, women helped to sustain the USA economy developing their labor in traditional male occupations. After that, they used it as a weapon and strong argument for their struggle for suffrage right. If they were strong enough to work as men, their opinion should also be important enough in politics as men's. The men and the government must recognized it, and they had not any strong argument against the women's claim anymore. On the other hand, the Swiss government was afraid about the national security during the Cold War. Given the geopolitical situation and the small size of Switzerland, the Communist could saw it as a strategic war point. For that reason, the government thought in expand and strengthen its military force, including women into it. Again, the Swiss women, as the Americans, argued that the demand of their labor force should be compensated by granting the right that they had been fighting for. Moreover, in Switzerland there was also another factor that there was not in USA. The integration with the European region, materialized in the signing of the European Convention of Human Rights, needed the government to catch up its settings, so the legal equality should be guaranteed. The willing of being part of the region in such a difficult time as the Cold War, pushed the Swiss government to move forward in the woman's right to vote issue.The United States of America, as well as Switzerland, witnessed the long struggle for the female right to vote but, what are the current results of it? How much equality have today those countries in political terms? Have their women real participation in politics nowadays?According to the Interparliamentary Union ranking, in 2010 Switzerland was positioned as the 26th country with more women in parliamentary, while USA was in the 70th position with only 89 women among 532 legislators. Although some researchers suggest that the American women are more likely to participate in elections by making use of their right to vote than men; the USA politics still have a lot to improve in order to eliminate the gender gap in political area. On its part, Switzerland has less inequality in politics, but still is not absolutely equal. The Swiss Executive Branch is comprised of seven members, all with equal decision power, and one of them is named, by rotation, Federal President. The first woman elected as President was Ruth Dreifuss, who took place of the position in 1999.In 2010 for the first time, three women were occupying high political positions in the Swiss government simultaneously. Moreover, in September 22 of the same year, after one more woman was elected as minister, the Executive was composed by four women and three men, marking the first time ever that the Swiss government has a female majority. To sum up, unlike USA, which has never had a woman as President; Switzerland seems to be more progressive when it comes to high positions in politics nowadays. *Estudiante de la Licenciatura en Estudios Internacionales.FACS - Universidad ORT Uruguay
2006/2007 ; I sistemi di difesa nazionale delle Potenze militarmente più evolute, grazie alla dotazione tecnologica che li connota, sono caratterizzati da una stretta relazione tra potere militare terrestre e capacità di controllo dei sistemi in orbita. Settori come quelli delle telecomunicazioni, dell'osservazione terrestre, della navigazione, della sorveglianza e dell'"early warning" rivelano quanto sia marcata la valenza strategica della componente spaziale per gli assetti militari odierni. Alla luce dei queste considerazioni, ma anche ipotizzando un futuro possibile sfruttamento a fini economici del cosmo, nonché constatando la rilevanza di attività commerciali con base nello spazio per lo svolgimento di attività cruciali per la vita quotidiana, come le comunicazioni o la sicurezza ambientale, è evidente l'interesse riservato dagli Stati alle problematiche inerenti la sicurezza nello spazio ed i rapporti di forza che interessano il controllo dello stesso. La materia è di estrema sensibilità, soprattutto alla luce del fatto che l'utilizzo del cosmo a fini militari e civili è, ad oggi, caratterizzato dall'assenza di un accordo generale sul piano giuridico: mancano quindi gli strumenti normativi per dirimere eventuali controversie tra i Paesi coinvolti nelle attività spaziali. La disciplina vigente a livello internazionale non permette, ad oggi, di definire un quadro preciso dei diritti e dei doveri in capo ai soggetti statuali ed alle entità che operano nello spazio e manca un impianto sanzionatorio condiviso. Non si è nemmeno pervenuti ad una definizione puntuale di cosa si intenda per "attività spaziale". Del resto, proprio gli Stati maggiormente coinvolti nella corsa allo spazio, con particolare riferimento agli Stati Uniti, non hanno mai incoraggiato l'introduzione di una disciplina più restrittiva in questo settore. La corsa per il predominio dello spazio è stata giustificata da una certa letteratura facendo ricorso ad un'analogia con il regime giuridico che disciplina le acque extraterritoriali, che non ricadono sotto la sovranità di alcuno Stato e possono essere utilizzate a fini militari. L'indicazione data da questi autori, peraltro ampiamente recepita in seno all'Amministrazione statunitense, detta orientamenti strategici che perseguono una logica di difesa preventiva, anche mediante l'impiego di assetti da "guerra totale". L'analogia tra la navigazione nelle acque extraterritoriali e l'uso militare dello Spazio si presenta nondimeno controversa e suscita contestazioni, soprattutto in ordine al fatto che scelte di politica spaziale mirate a stabilire il predominio di una Nazione sulle altre possano esporre i Paesi in posizione dominante al rischio di ritorsioni da parte di altre entità, statuali e non, ostili o potenzialmente tali, in grado di sviluppare ed utilizzare armi antisatellite con l'intento di spezzare il loro monopolio. Sorgono inoltre interrogativi circa la compatibilità dell'uso militare dello spazio con il diritto spaziale vigente, secondo cui lo spazio extra-terrestre rappresenta invece un patrimonio di pubblico dominio, utilizzabile per «scopi pacifici», a fini di bene comune. Aspetto cruciale di questa dinamica è la contrapposizione tra Paesi fautori di un'ottica unipolarista, quali gli Stati Uniti, per cui lo spazio costituisce il fondamento della "full spectrum dominance" (basata su deterrenza, controllo e capacità di proiezione unilaterale nel battlefield a tutti i livelli) e Paesi votati invece ad una forte egemonia regionale, come Cina e Russia, che puntano al multipolarismo. Episodi come quello che nel gennaio 2007 ha visto protagonista proprio la Cina, che ha dimostrato di poter lanciare e guidare un veicolo anti-satellitare (ASAT) contro un proprio satellite meteorologico situato alla stessa altezza dei satelliti spia americani, abbattendolo, evidenziano come la lotta per l'egemonia possa trovare nella dimensione spaziale un fattore di vulnerabilità incredibilmente sensibile in assenza di forme di controllo condivise. I fattori di minaccia di questo tipo potrebbero moltiplicarsi se la proliferazione di tecnologia antisatellite interessasse anche la cerchia degli Stati "canaglia" o addirittura gruppi eversivi, magari finanziati e supportati sul piano tecnico proprio da Stati ostili all'Occidente. Un altro fronte di rischio potrebbe essere rappresentato dall'enorme quantità di detriti spaziali, letali per i delicati sistemi orbitanti, che si verrebbero a creare in conseguenza di eventuali attacchi finalizzati alla distruzione di dispositivi nemici. Sebbene lo spazio sia, come evidenziato in premessa, già militarizzato nella misura in cui viene utilizzato a scopi di supporto dell'apparato bellico, nessun Paese vi ha al momento ancora introdotto armamenti. Varcare questa soglia significherebbe, infatti, provocare un probabile scontro per il predominio dello spazio, situazione che il sistema giuridico attuale non sarebbe pronto a gestire. Per la Comunità Internazionale, inoltre, lo sviluppo di antagonismi di questo tipo rappresenterebbe un forte fattore di destabilizzazione, ragion per cui da più parti viene auspicata l'introduzione di una regolamentazione più ampia che limiti la corsa agli armamenti nel cosmo. Alla luce di queste considerazioni, il presente lavoro intende delineare un quadro delle prospettive inerenti l'utilizzo dello spazio a fini strategici e di difesa da parte degli Stati dotati di tecnologia sufficiente per poter intraprendere il lancio e la gestione operativa di apparati a livello extra-atmosferico. In apertura di trattazione si è provveduto a tracciare, attingendo a nozioni della geopolitica classica, una sinossi di alcuni contributi risultati significativi nell'orientare le strategie spaziali degli ultimi anni, fino ad arrivare al concetto di "astropolitica", intraprendendone una lettura critica alla luce delle recenti posizioni assunte in tema di strategia spaziale da parte dei diversi attori coinvolti. Contestualmente è stata affrontata la disanima degli aspetti giuridici salienti del regime internazionale in vigore nel settore di interesse. Nel secondo capitolo, sono stati introdotti alcuni cenni relativi ad aspetti funzionali, quali ad esempio alcune nozioni di meccanica orbitale, utili a capire le problematiche connesse al lancio ed all'operatività dei sistemi spaziali ed a valutarne l'incidenza sulle politiche dei diversi attori. Per lo stesso motivo, si è ritenuto opportuno inserire una semplice descrizione delle principali caratteristiche tecnico-funzionali degli assetti impiegati per le attività spaziali militari e civili e dei relativi sistemi di supporto terrestre. Nel terzo capitolo, è stato stilato un quadro dei possibili sviluppi nel settore aerospaziale, considerandone in prospettiva le evoluzioni sia con riguardo al gruppo dei Paesi già affermati in questo campo, sia ai Paesi emergenti. Questa parte dell'elaborato è stata redatta tramite un'intensa attività di indagine tesa a raccogliere ed archiviare informazioni tratte da riviste specializzate di settore e da manualistica istituzionale qualificata, al fine di definire un punto di situazione quanto più possibile aggiornato sulle scelte operative e sulle strategie recentemente intraprese dagli operatori del comparto. Gli argomenti che presentano i riscontri più significativi riguardano: - le recenti evoluzioni degli assetti aerospaziali statunitensi, caratterizzati, negli ultimi anni, da un progressivo shift di competenze dalla NASA al Pentagono, per quanto attiene le attività in orbite terrestri, e dal delicato passaggio del dopo-Shuttle, che potrebbe esporre l'Amministrazione statunitense a forme di cooperazione prolungata con Paesi concorrenti nel settore dei lanci, come la Russia; - la crescente autonomia spaziale rivendicata dall'Europa allo scopo di acquisire maggiore indipendenza strategica dagli Stati Uniti. Caso emblematico in questo contesto è lo sviluppo, da parte europea, del sistema di navigazione satellitare Galileo, dotato di funzionalità sostitutive del GPS Navstar statunitense. Il progetto, finanziato da Agenzia Spaziale Europea ed Unione Europea, fortemente voluto soprattutto da parte francese, inizialmente è partito in sordina, come sistema a vocazione civile, per poi assumere una connotazione militare solo una volta superato l'impatto dell'opposizione statunitense, che non ha mancato di sollevare questioni sui rischi e sulla presunta inopportunità della sovrapposizione dei due sistemi. Il programma Galileo non rappresenta solo il mezzo mediante il quale l'Europa cerca di emanciparsi dalla dipendenza strategica degli USA, ma costituiste, nel contempo, un'opportunità per stabilire rapporti di cooperazione internazionale con Paesi avanzati sotto il profilo tecnico-militare spaziale, come la Cina, che partecipa al progetto, ma che a sua volta mira in prospettiva a dotarsi di un proprio sistema di navigazione satellitare, come del resto la Russia. E' evidente come la collaborazione con detti Paesi da parte europea rappresenti un fattore di criticità per gli Stati Uniti, che, comunque, a loro volta intrattengono, pragmaticamente, programmi comuni con i russi nell'ambito di specifici progetti, soprattutto in relazione al mantenimento della Stazione Spaziale Internazionale. Si consideri che il vettore-capsula russo Sojuz è al momento l'unico veicolo per voli umani disponibile oltre al cinese Shenzhou, mentre gli USA stanno sviluppando le future capsule Orion, sostitutive dello Shuttle, i cui primi voli con equipaggio sono però in programma solo a partire dal 2015; - lo stato dei programmi spaziali italiani e la componente spaziale degli assetti di difesa nazionale. L'Italia, dal canto suo, potrebbe beneficiare degli sviluppi che emergono in ambito europeo, soprattutto grazie a sinergie possibili tra la propria industria nazionale e partner europei in settori strategici, come quello del telerilevamento e dell'osservazione terrestre. Positivi passi in questo senso sono già stati fatti grazie al consorzio del sistema nazionale Cosmo-Skymed con la costellazione satellitare francese Plèiades. Importanti prospettive in questo settore si potrebbero aprire anche grazie al progetto "GMES - Global Monitoring for Environment and Security", un'iniziativa sviluppata in ambito spaziale europeo che mira a incrementare le capacità dell'informazione geospaziale a supporto della politica ambientale e della sicurezza. Il comparto spaziale italiano potrebbe inoltre beneficiare dei progressi nello sviluppo di lanciatori di piccole dimensioni, in particolare con riferimento al sistema "Vega", che potrebbe inserirsi con successo nella fascia dei lanci satellitari commerciali da 1.500 Kg in orbita bassa; - i programmi spaziali presenti e futuri di Cina e Russia: 1) la prima risulta proiettata verso un programma spaziale ambizioso, che prevede anche la realizzazione di una stazione spaziale per il 2015 ed un fitto programma di attività nei settori a valenza strategica, quali quelli dell'osservazione terrestre, delle telecomunicazioni, della navigazione satellitare, della meteorologia, dei veicoli spaziali riutilizzabili, nonché dell'esplorazione lunare, presumibilmente prodromica ad un possibile sfruttamento economico delle ricche risorse presenti sul satellite terrestre; 2) la seconda, erede dell'infrastruttura spaziale, di gran parte della tecnologia e delle risorse umane che avevano determinato i successi dell'Unione Sovietica, è impegnata nel rivendicare un ruolo di primo piano in settori cruciali per l'attività spaziale come quello dei lanciatori e dei vettori per le missioni con equipaggio. A questo proposito, va ricordato che i vettori russi Proton ed in particolare la già citata Sojuz, mantengono una solida posizione nel mercato dei lanci spaziali, anche in ragione della loro affidabilità e dei loro costi relativamente contenuti rispetto ad altri sistemi, aspetti che rendono attraente la cooperazione con i russi anche per gli Stati Uniti e l'Europa; - recenti sviluppi nell'industria spaziale di Paesi emergenti come India, Brasile, Giappone, ma anche Iran, Corea del Sud, Corea del Nord e Pakistan. Da ultimo, alla luce di queste finali considerazioni, non si è trascurato di trattare l'importante ruolo assunto in tale contesto dalle diverse industrie aerospaziali nazionali, delineando un quadro dei principali accordi di cooperazione internazionale ed evidenziando sinergie operative e possibili aree di competizione. Particolare attenzione è stata dedicata anche ai possibili sviluppi per le rispettive strategie spaziali a fronte delle opportunità che si aprirebbero nel caso diventassero attuabili forme di sfruttamento economico delle risorse presenti nello spazio. Nel contesto che emerge dall'analisi tracciata, appare evidente come l'implementazione dei programmi spaziali nazionali non possa prescindere dallo sviluppo di forme di cooperazione internazionale, se non risultando penalizzata dall'isolamento. Accade così che nel settore spaziale, per necessità, anche gli interessi di potenze tradizionalmente contrapposte si coalizzino attorno a specifici programmi. La complessa dinamica che ne deriva interessa i rapporti tra Europa e USA, tra USA e Russia, tra Cina e Russia, tra Europa e Cina ed altri ancora: tutti questi Paesi sono impegnati a unire le rispettive forze evitando però di inimicarsi le altre potenze, in una delicata partita diplomatica ed economica, che costituisce forse il lato più interessante e curioso da osservare sul fronte delle scelte strategiche che animano i rispettivi programmi spaziali. ; XX Ciclo
After two difficult weeks of bad press during which President Obama was accused of rashness (for his quick trip to Copenhagen in an unsuccessful bid on behalf of Chicago before the International Olympic Committee) and of dithering (for taking too long to decide on a new strategy for Afghanistan), on Friday October 9th Americans woke up to the news that their President had won the Nobel Peace Prize. With a mixture of surprise and exhilaration, he addressed the media and tried to be graceful in accepting it while at the same time pre-empting the inevitable criticism that would follow. He made it clear that he "did not view this as a recognition of his own accomplishments but rather as an affirmation of American leadership on behalf of the aspirations held by people in all nation. as a means to give momentum to a set of causes…as a call to action…for all nations to confront the common challenges of the 21st century". The reactions in the United States were mixed, but in general, they were the reverse image of those in Europe, where Obama is still widely admired and idealized. Surprise, outrage and skepticism were the three main responses by the American public. On the Right there was outrage because the prize came so early into his presidency, and at a time when his lack of achievements is starting to haunt the administration and has become the object of comedy sketches, from Jon Stewart's Daily Show to Saturday Night Live. Moderates were pleasantly surprised, even if somewhat puzzled, and immediately fretted that the prize would have more negative than positive consequences in the domestic realm. Indeed, recognition by the rest of the world makes even his supporters a little uncomfortable, and it is used as ammunition against the President by those who accuse him of being too apologetic to foreign powers. Skeptics on the Left felt that it was a strange choice because the country under his leadership is still involved in two wars, and about to escalate one of them. To this there is the added perception by many in his own party that he is doing little on the human rights front, especially with respect to Iran, where several protesters are about to be executed while diplomatic talks on the nuclear issue continue. It would be ludicrous to think that the Nobel Peace Prize is awarded only to those who succeed. In that case, it would only be awarded once every a hundred years. Instead, the prize is meant as a reward and an encouragement to leaders who fight for peace. When German Chancellor Willy Brandt was awarded the prize in 1971, he had just launched his "Ostpolitik" and he had made headlines when he visited Warsaw to sign the Warsaw Treaty and spontaneously knelt at the steps of the memorial to the Warsaw ghetto uprising against the Nazis. His acts did not per se bring an end to Cold War confrontation but it can be argued that Brandt started a process that culminated with détente and more concretely, with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which established a framework of cooperation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries and gradually became a manifesto for the dissident movement against Communism in the Eastern bloc. Later, and as part of the same process, the Nobel Peace Prize would be awarded to Lech Walesa in 1983 for his leadership in the union movement against the Polish Communist regime, and finally to Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990. Their combined efforts finally led to the fall of Communism, and proved that peace, in the words of Nobel Peace prize awardee Oscar Arias, "has no finishing line, no deadline, no fixed definition of achievement…it is a never ending process, the work of many decisions by many people in many countries…" In only nine months of his presidency, Obama has changed the international climate of confrontation and preemptive aggression established by Bush, who alienated even our national allies. He has restored the principles of the New World Order envisioned by Bush's father: one based on international law and diplomacy, consensus-building and on progressive nuclear disarmament. It is this renewal of promises by the US to abide by international treaties, to use dialog instead of confrontation and to cooperate with the rest of the world through the United Nations that the Oslo Nobel Committee was rewarding. But as Eugene Robinson of the Washington Post has observed, if Obama were to find a cure for cancer, his critics would "blame him for putting some hard-working, red-blooded American oncologists out of work". In sum, his critics cannot have it both ways: they derided Obama for his unsuccessful trip to Copenhagen and made fun of his excessive self-confidence and his belief that by his actions alone he can improve American standing in the world. On the other hand, when Oslo honored him with the Nobel Prize, a sign that he is trusted and admired because of his approach to doing exactly that, they use this as proof that he cannot be trusted because foreigners like him too much!Almost a century ago, another US President found himself in a similar situation: admired by the rest of the world but shunned at home, Woodrow Wilson, who had led the way to peace at the end of World War I through the Versailles Treaty and the creation of the League of Nations (based on his famous Fourteen Points), received the 1919 Nobel Peace Prize at the end of his Presidency but after public opinion had already turned against him. Afflicted by a stroke and embittered by his battles with Congress, he never had a chance to see his work come to fruition: the Republican Senate voted against the United States' membership in the League. The consequences of this mistake are well-known: the United States turned inward, became isolationist and protectionist, only to find itself mired in the Great Depression by 1930. A weakened League was unable to stop the rising fascist states, and another world war followed. Later in the conflict the United States had to come out of its isolationism to defend Europe and establish peace. Wilson had died in 1924, but in many ways his vision of multilateralism and war prevention survived in the signing of the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, this time under the leadership of the United States. Peace is even more elusive today, in a global world of unstable states and violent non-state actors, of deep resentments and irreconcilable views and values. It would be ludicrous to think that the US can bring about peace by itself or for that matter, to solve any of the problems that confront it without the cooperation of others. From global warming to transnational crime to terrorism, the only relatively acceptable solutions can be found through diplomacy and multilateral action. It is in this light that the Nobel Peace Prize Committee's intention has to be interpreted. For the first time in eight years, the United States is led by a President who understands that the complexity of post-modern conflict and the depth of the challenges faced can only be managed (not solved) by states acting in concert.The intricacy of global politics today is further enhanced by the immense and unprecedented political awareness of the masses everywhere. This new reality of massive political awakening is especially destabilizing in the early stages of national consciousness, during which emotions and feelings related to identity, ethnicity and geography are greatly intensified and thus become destabilizing. It is this climate of resentment, fragmentation and political awakening that the West has to confront not only in the battlefield (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq) but also at home, where immigration has altered the national face of states and where the North-South conflict has to be confronted every day. This changing geopolitical context, together with economic realities, is affecting the US place in the world and is resulting in the relative weakening of the West in general and of America in particular. Increasingly, the West is going to need the cooperation of a China that is "rising peacefully" and a still-belligerent Russia to settle most problems in the Middle East and Central Asia. As the United States and the West come to terms with their loss of power, as Europe still struggles to speak in one voice, as their military resources are tied down for the long term in areas where the political awakening is particularly virulent, it is ludicrous to expect peace with capital letters. In the best case scenario, these will be challenges that will require serious negotiations and tough diplomacy in order to be managed, and those should include the rising powers and even some unsavory interlocutors like Iran (which can be a partner in Iraq and Afghanistan) and the Taliban (some elements of which can be brought into local agreements and peeled away from Al Qaeda). Obama should use the encouragement of the Nobel Peace Prize to move these negotiations forward, without ultimatums, without immediate deadlines, with the guiding purpose of accommodation and de-escalation, of managing conflict more than forever solving it.On the home front, Obama publicly refused to celebrate the passing of the Baucus health-care reform bill yesterday, although this is a major stride towards the final legislative product. By a vote of 14 to 9, with only one Republican voting in favor, the Senate Finance Committee cleared the way for a full vote on the Senate floor once it is merged with the version from another committee that was approved a month ago. Senator Olympia Snowe, the only Republican to vote for it, said she was responding to "the call of History, and that consequences of inaction dictate the urgency of Congress" to act. Once it passes the Senate, it will be merged with the House bill and become law. This puts Obama in a very good position to succeed in health care reform before the end of the year, but he underplayed the achievement, saying it was just one more step and there still remained a long way to go. He did, however, thank Senator Snowe for her "political courage and seriousness of purpose."Finally, on November 3rd, all eyes will be on the state of Virginia. Virginians will be voting for governor in a close race in which Bob McDonnell, the Republican candidate has been consistently ahead in the polls. Because Northern Virginia is so close to Washington, not only geographically but also culturally and politically, it is deemed the most important race for governor in the country. After eight years of excellent leadership under two Democratic governors, Mark Warner and Tim Kaine, (there is no re-election for governor in the state of Virginia), the electorate seems ready for a change, even as political pundits are portraying the race as a poll on the President himself. That is why, at the end of this month Obama will be campaigning for Creigh Deeds, the Democratic candidate for Governor of Virginia. It is another political gamble by the hyperkinetic president and one he should reconsider for at least two reasons. First, Virginians are a tough lot and usually prefer to balance the party ticket of state and federal government. Indeed, according to Larry Sabato of the Center for Politics at the University of Virginia, for the last eight consecutive elections, Virginians have voted for governor the nominee of the party opposite to the one that held the White House. That means they will vote for Republican candidate Mc Donnell and Obama's candidate will lose. Second, until this last election when Obama won the state, Virginians had voted Republican in nearly every presidential election since 1952. It was thanks to the youth vote that he won, and those voters are the least likely to come out and vote in the election for governor. The older crowds that vote religiously in every election are more likely to vote Republican this time. For Obama to campaign for Deeds is then a repeat of the Copenhagen Olympic bid effect.Passing the health care bill and achieving a Democratic win in at least some of the governor races would represent incredible boosts for the President that he will need as his support numbers dwindle, especially if he makes the unpopular decision of sending more troops to Afghanistan. By the time all those questions are settled, the Copenhagen Olympics and the Oslo Peace Prize will be distant memories. But then, he will have to go back and address Copenhagen II, namely, climate change. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
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On Saturday, April 20, the US House of Representatives passed a $95 billion package providing support to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan. The majority of this package, some $60.84 billion, is to address the war in Ukraine. This package was first introduced back in October, but has been stalled in recent months. From here, the package moves to the Senate where it is expected to pass unhindered and it will then go to the president's office for signature. In the following compilation of expert quick takes, a diverse group of experts closely following Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the security environment of Europe provide their analysis and reactions. Rt Hon Baroness Catherine Ashton LG GCMG, Distinguished Fellow The decision by Congress to send much needed support to Ukraine will be greeted with immense relief, foremost in Ukraine, followed closely by Europe. This is an important moment. First, it reinforces the US commitment to help Ukraine to defeat the Russian invasion; Second it tells Europe that the US remains its reliable partner. These signals matter, not just for the future of Ukraine but also to Europe where concerns about what Russia might do next remain high. And to Russia, this says the US is to be reckoned with in its determination to see the values of sovereignty, self determination and freedom upheld. Klaus Larres, Fellow, Global Europe ProgramFinally, the US House of Representatives has passed the delayed bill for supplementary aid for Ukraine. The package is worth $60.8 billion and is sorely needed in Ukraine. In the last few months Russia has made significant battleground gains. The Russian forces have gradually shifted the eastern frontline and managed to capture additional slivers of Ukrainian territory. The badly stretched Ukrainian forces were put on the defensive, lacking ammunition and anti-missile systems as well as personnel to push back the Russians.Although the European Union and individual European countries, not least Germany and the UK, have recently provided substantial additional military and financial aid to Ukraine, the absence of supplementary US aid was badly felt at the Ukrainian frontline. Especially the missile defense systems to shoot down Russian drones which have recently attacked the Ukrainian energy grid and many civilian targets with a new ferocity, were sorely needed.The US $60.8 billion supplementary aid bill will now also have to be passed by the US Senate. But Senate leaders have indicated that this will happen within a matter of hours and President Biden is expected to sign the bill into law shortly thereafter. The US Department of Defense has said for months that the weapons systems, the ammunition, and other aid has been assembled and is ready to be shipped out to Ukraine immediately. In all likelihood, the new US aid will arrive in Ukraine early next week. The new US aid will make a significant difference and will help Ukraine to defend itself and push back the invading Russian forces.Michael Flaherty, Public Policy Fellow, Kennan InstituteRestarting lethal support from the US to Ukraine is critical for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). However, the long-term impact of additional support will depend on the predictability of it continuing. Over the past 7 months, Ukraine has lost the ground initiative due in large part to resupply delays from its allies. During that time, Russia has maintained a steady supply of munitions from its allies and transitioned from static defense to resuming offensive operations.It remains unclear whether the AFU can regain the initiative quickly. One outcome is certain though. If the $60 billion appropriation from the US Congress is not routinely renewed, this weekend's legislative action will simply be a band-aid for the Ukrainian war effort. Military planners cannot conduct offensive operations and extend lines of support into Russian occupied territory without stable, predictable resupply.Given this, if support to the AFU continues to be a source of contentious politics, Ukrainian sovereignty will remain at risk. Without broad agreement among governing parties in the US and Europe that Ukraine's survival is a critical collective security priority, Russian political warfare will find cracks to exploit. Preparing the next round of legislative support for Ukraine should begin now. Another 7-month delay in logistical support from the US or Europe will likely cost Ukraine the war.While this seems dire, it is important to explain the time factor of war and the impact of delay to the publics in NATO member states. Citizens in the US and Europe should clearly understand that without military support, Russian troops will reoccupy Ukrainian towns and continue committing war crimes against Ukrainian citizens without consequence. It is a well-documented pattern. However, it is equally important to highlight that even with logistical delays, the AFU has continued to weaken Russian aerospace and naval forces and threaten Russian supply lines. A resumption of robust military support from the US and European countries members will help Ukrainian ground forces regain the physical and psychological edge necessary to take back the ground initiative.Since Russian troops will not likely leave Ukrainian territory through negotiation, it is critical to continue giving Ukrainian troops the means to remove Russians by force.Robin Quinville, Director, Global Europe ProgramBurden-sharing is a long-standing theme of US policy with our transatlantic partners. US pressure increased over the past ten years, after NATO codified 2% of GDP as the Alliance's defense spending standard in 2014. We have pressed Allies to contribute more to capabilities and readiness. We have asked countries with the most capable militaries to join or support action beyond NATO's borders. We have also asked transatlantic partners to contribute to reconstruction efforts following military action.That's why it isn't surprising Europeans have paid close attention as Congress debated Ukraine funding. Europe's threat perception changed fundamentally with Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Europe – both individual countries and the European Union -- has stepped up both military aid and vital financial assistance to keep Ukraine's government functioning. Much of it is multi-year funding Ukrainians can count on. But for the past several months, Europeans have questioned whether Ukraine – and Europe – can count on the US commitment to burden-sharing.European concern was highly visible at the Munich Security Conference. Then, the question was when the US would pass the funding package. But as weeks passed, the bigger question became whether the US would continue funding. Would the US continue to share the burden?Europeans will welcome (with considerable relief) Congress's decision to move funding forward. Delay has hampered Ukraine's military planning (as our Global Fellow Jack Watling outlines), just as debate in Europe and the US over provision of specific military equipment hampered earlier Ukrainian efforts in the fight. European assistance to Ukraine was structured to complement US efforts, as Europe ramps up its defense production over the course of the year. In July, NATO's Washington Summit will face – again – the question of what the Alliance is prepared to do for Ukraine. Allies will come prepared to show they are taking burden-sharing seriously (especially NATO's 2% threshold). But Allies will also be wondering how solid the US commitment to burden-sharing is when it comes to European defense, given the difficulty of getting funding for Ukraine's existential fight.Jason C. Moyer, Program Associate, Global Europe ProgramAhead of the NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs meeting in early April, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg proposed codifying long-term support for Ukraine over a 5-year period using a special €100 billion fund. This proposal was met with mixed results–proponents saw this as a way of protecting support for Kyiv from the 'winds of political change' while others, notably the US, saw this as an overreach and a potential escalation by deepening NATO's role in an active warzone. As this year's uncertainty over future military support for Ukraine has demonstrated, it might be time to consider institutionalizing aid for Ukraine at the NATO level. Dubbed the "Mission for Ukraine" proposal, Stoltenberg's plan, should it be approved, would ramp up NATO's direct involvement in supporting Ukraine. Support from Ukraine is organized and delivered by NATO member states–not the defensive military alliance itself. This was by design to avoid entangling the alliance in providing lethal aid to Ukraine. The proposal would also give the alliance control of the US-led Ramstein weapons support group and was the main source of contention with US decisionmakers. However, the US should welcome Europe stepping up to do more via NATO. The US share of this €100 billion fund would be significantly less than the $60 billion passed by Congress. Notionally the fund would be financed based on NATO's shared budget, meaning the US would only need to contribute about €16 billion (about $17 billion). As US support stalled, Europe has filled the gap and has now surpassed US assistance. The EU institutions and its member states have committed more than double the US financial support of Ukraine over a longer timespan (€155 billion through 2027 compared to €67.7 billion from the US). Even with the supplemental, the EU and its member states are still contributing more than the United States to Ukraine.This special fund proposed by NATO is not a done deal nor are the details finalized. The proposal will be ironed out in the months ahead and presented at the Washington Summit in July, where all 32 allies will need to agree to it. However, this proposal demonstrates that reliable and predictable support for Ukraine is essential for their victory and represents an investment in continued US and European security. Suzanne Loftus, Global Fellow, Kennan InstituteA bill with much-needed aid to Ukraine has passed in Congress after months of political battles that left the Ukrainian army at a battlefield disadvantage. Now, Ukraine will better be able to hold down its defense lines amidst Russian offensive operations.While a positive development, the difficulty in passing this bill suggests continued challenges of this nature on the horizon. This necessitates two urgent policy shifts:One, Europeans need to invest heavily in their own defense as Americans seem preoccupied with matters other than European security. This is fundamental both to secure long-term support for Ukraine and for European security amidst Russia's massive investments into its military. The second is to re-strategize how this war is communicated to the American public to garner continued support for Ukraine. Without American aid, Russia will conquer more land and force Ukraine to capitulate. This will lead to a stronger Russia in terms of land, resources and military power. Without efforts to defeat Russia in Ukraine, the West will face a strong adversary on Europe's doorstep that considers itself at war with the West. An emboldened Russia may bring a host of new challenges to the European continent. In addition, it is important to convey that providing Ukraine with needed weapons is a direct investment into the American defense industry and does not negatively affect the average American's economic well-being nor does it directly impact our border security.While the new aid package is a positive development, American aid needs to be secured for the long-haul to create an effective deterrent in Ukraine that ensures an eventual and impactful Russian setback and prevents a repeat invasion. This may be the only way to end the war, as negotiations do not appear to be a serious possibility given the incompatibility of each side's demands. Peter B. Zwack, Global Fellow, Kennan InstituteMore than anything else passing this funding bill provided a major morale boost to the Ukrainians - from soldiers, to population, to government. It also injected some hope and buttresses Ukraine's extraordinary will to fight – critical intangibles that one cannot put a quantity or dollar sign against – within an increasingly worn down Ukrainian defense and society.It also provides immediate practical military capability such as artillery rounds and air defense across the breadth of the battle space from trenchlines to defending cities and infrastructure that of which the currently overmatched Ukrainians are desperately short. It buys time for the added influx of even more advanced weaponry including advanced fighter planes and Long Range missiles in the near-mid future. It also reduces the risk of this aid being subsumed by what looks to be a bitter US 2024 Presidential election.There will be bitter fighting over the year ahead and the Ukrainians have lost over a half year to reconstitute and refurbish as implacable Russia has rapidly been doing as it perseveres in its grinding war of attrition … but better late than never. Most importantly the Ukrainians know we and the free-minded world still tangibly have their back.This was also crucial to show our allies who could also waver in that we are still "all in" with support to Ukraine and other threatened democracies such as Israel and Taiwan.Passing this bill and the actions of our allies bill serves notice to the relentlessly revanchist Putin regime and their growing 21st century "axis" of China, Iran and North Korea that the unified free-minded world will not be divided and will stand up to aggression early which was the great failure of the late 1930s leading to grisly WWII in Europe and then the Pacific.And finally, this moment presents a philosophical point for all of us, especially younger generations more distant from the bloody 20th century … namely "who are we, and what do we stand for?" Can we stay the course? Forestalled for now, I still fear imagining a few years from now a debate about "Who lost Ukraine'' and stinging questions about whether did the West and its global allies do all it realistically could to support a free-minded nation within our civilization fighting for its existential life thereby deterring a mortifying a 21st century Neville Chamberlin moment.
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On Saturday, April 20, the US House of Representatives passed a $95 billion package providing support to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan. The majority of this package, some $60.84 billion, is to address the war in Ukraine. This package was first introduced back in October, but has been stalled in recent months. From here, the package moves to the Senate where it is expected to pass unhindered and it will then go to the president's office for signature. In the following compilation of expert quick takes, a diverse group of experts closely following Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the security environment of Europe provide their analysis and reactions. Rt Hon Baroness Catherine Ashton LG GCMG, Distinguished Fellow The decision by Congress to send much needed support to Ukraine will be greeted with immense relief, foremost in Ukraine, followed closely by Europe. This is an important moment. First, it reinforces the US commitment to help Ukraine to defeat the Russian invasion; Second it tells Europe that the US remains its reliable partner. These signals matter, not just for the future of Ukraine but also to Europe where concerns about what Russia might do next remain high. And to Russia, this says the US is to be reckoned with in its determination to see the values of sovereignty, self determination and freedom upheld. Klaus Larres, Fellow, Global Europe ProgramFinally, the US House of Representatives has passed the delayed bill for supplementary aid for Ukraine. The package is worth $60.8 billion and is sorely needed in Ukraine. In the last few months Russia has made significant battleground gains. The Russian forces have gradually shifted the eastern frontline and managed to capture additional slivers of Ukrainian territory. The badly stretched Ukrainian forces were put on the defensive, lacking ammunition and anti-missile systems as well as personnel to push back the Russians.Although the European Union and individual European countries, not least Germany and the UK, have recently provided substantial additional military and financial aid to Ukraine, the absence of supplementary US aid was badly felt at the Ukrainian frontline. Especially the missile defense systems to shoot down Russian drones which have recently attacked the Ukrainian energy grid and many civilian targets with a new ferocity, were sorely needed.The US $60.8 billion supplementary aid bill will now also have to be passed by the US Senate. But Senate leaders have indicated that this will happen within a matter of hours and President Biden is expected to sign the bill into law shortly thereafter. The US Department of Defense has said for months that the weapons systems, the ammunition, and other aid has been assembled and is ready to be shipped out to Ukraine immediately. In all likelihood, the new US aid will arrive in Ukraine early next week. The new US aid will make a significant difference and will help Ukraine to defend itself and push back the invading Russian forces.Michael Flaherty, Public Policy Fellow, Kennan InstituteRestarting lethal support from the US to Ukraine is critical for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). However, the long-term impact of additional support will depend on the predictability of it continuing. Over the past 7 months, Ukraine has lost the ground initiative due in large part to resupply delays from its allies. During that time, Russia has maintained a steady supply of munitions from its allies and transitioned from static defense to resuming offensive operations.It remains unclear whether the AFU can regain the initiative quickly. One outcome is certain though. If the $60 billion appropriation from the US Congress is not routinely renewed, this weekend's legislative action will simply be a band-aid for the Ukrainian war effort. Military planners cannot conduct offensive operations and extend lines of support into Russian occupied territory without stable, predictable resupply.Given this, if support to the AFU continues to be a source of contentious politics, Ukrainian sovereignty will remain at risk. Without broad agreement among governing parties in the US and Europe that Ukraine's survival is a critical collective security priority, Russian political warfare will find cracks to exploit. Preparing the next round of legislative support for Ukraine should begin now. Another 7-month delay in logistical support from the US or Europe will likely cost Ukraine the war.While this seems dire, it is important to explain the time factor of war and the impact of delay to the publics in NATO member states. Citizens in the US and Europe should clearly understand that without military support, Russian troops will reoccupy Ukrainian towns and continue committing war crimes against Ukrainian citizens without consequence. It is a well-documented pattern. However, it is equally important to highlight that even with logistical delays, the AFU has continued to weaken Russian aerospace and naval forces and threaten Russian supply lines. A resumption of robust military support from the US and European countries members will help Ukrainian ground forces regain the physical and psychological edge necessary to take back the ground initiative.Since Russian troops will not likely leave Ukrainian territory through negotiation, it is critical to continue giving Ukrainian troops the means to remove Russians by force.Robin Quinville, Director, Global Europe ProgramBurden-sharing is a long-standing theme of US policy with our transatlantic partners. US pressure increased over the past ten years, after NATO codified 2% of GDP as the Alliance's defense spending standard in 2014. We have pressed Allies to contribute more to capabilities and readiness. We have asked countries with the most capable militaries to join or support action beyond NATO's borders. We have also asked transatlantic partners to contribute to reconstruction efforts following military action.That's why it isn't surprising Europeans have paid close attention as Congress debated Ukraine funding. Europe's threat perception changed fundamentally with Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Europe – both individual countries and the European Union -- has stepped up both military aid and vital financial assistance to keep Ukraine's government functioning. Much of it is multi-year funding Ukrainians can count on. But for the past several months, Europeans have questioned whether Ukraine – and Europe – can count on the US commitment to burden-sharing.European concern was highly visible at the Munich Security Conference. Then, the question was when the US would pass the funding package. But as weeks passed, the bigger question became whether the US would continue funding. Would the US continue to share the burden?Europeans will welcome (with considerable relief) Congress's decision to move funding forward. Delay has hampered Ukraine's military planning (as our Global Fellow Jack Watling outlines), just as debate in Europe and the US over provision of specific military equipment hampered earlier Ukrainian efforts in the fight. European assistance to Ukraine was structured to complement US efforts, as Europe ramps up its defense production over the course of the year. In July, NATO's Washington Summit will face – again – the question of what the Alliance is prepared to do for Ukraine. Allies will come prepared to show they are taking burden-sharing seriously (especially NATO's 2% threshold). But Allies will also be wondering how solid the US commitment to burden-sharing is when it comes to European defense, given the difficulty of getting funding for Ukraine's existential fight.Jason C. Moyer, Program Associate, Global Europe ProgramAhead of the NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs meeting in early April, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg proposed codifying long-term support for Ukraine over a 5-year period using a special €100 billion fund. This proposal was met with mixed results–proponents saw this as a way of protecting support for Kyiv from the 'winds of political change' while others, notably the US, saw this as an overreach and a potential escalation by deepening NATO's role in an active warzone. As this year's uncertainty over future military support for Ukraine has demonstrated, it might be time to consider institutionalizing aid for Ukraine at the NATO level. Dubbed the "Mission for Ukraine" proposal, Stoltenberg's plan, should it be approved, would ramp up NATO's direct involvement in supporting Ukraine. Support from Ukraine is organized and delivered by NATO member states–not the defensive military alliance itself. This was by design to avoid entangling the alliance in providing lethal aid to Ukraine. The proposal would also give the alliance control of the US-led Ramstein weapons support group and was the main source of contention with US decisionmakers. However, the US should welcome Europe stepping up to do more via NATO. The US share of this €100 billion fund would be significantly less than the $60 billion passed by Congress. Notionally the fund would be financed based on NATO's shared budget, meaning the US would only need to contribute about €16 billion (about $17 billion). As US support stalled, Europe has filled the gap and has now surpassed US assistance. The EU institutions and its member states have committed more than double the US financial support of Ukraine over a longer timespan (€155 billion through 2027 compared to €67.7 billion from the US). Even with the supplemental, the EU and its member states are still contributing more than the United States to Ukraine.This special fund proposed by NATO is not a done deal nor are the details finalized. The proposal will be ironed out in the months ahead and presented at the Washington Summit in July, where all 32 allies will need to agree to it. However, this proposal demonstrates that reliable and predictable support for Ukraine is essential for their victory and represents an investment in continued US and European security. Suzanne Loftus, Global Fellow, Kennan InstituteA bill with much-needed aid to Ukraine has passed in Congress after months of political battles that left the Ukrainian army at a battlefield disadvantage. Now, Ukraine will better be able to hold down its defense lines amidst Russian offensive operations.While a positive development, the difficulty in passing this bill suggests continued challenges of this nature on the horizon. This necessitates two urgent policy shifts:One, Europeans need to invest heavily in their own defense as Americans seem preoccupied with matters other than European security. This is fundamental both to secure long-term support for Ukraine and for European security amidst Russia's massive investments into its military. The second is to re-strategize how this war is communicated to the American public to garner continued support for Ukraine. Without American aid, Russia will conquer more land and force Ukraine to capitulate. This will lead to a stronger Russia in terms of land, resources and military power. Without efforts to defeat Russia in Ukraine, the West will face a strong adversary on Europe's doorstep that considers itself at war with the West. An emboldened Russia may bring a host of new challenges to the European continent. In addition, it is important to convey that providing Ukraine with needed weapons is a direct investment into the American defense industry and does not negatively affect the average American's economic well-being nor does it directly impact our border security.While the new aid package is a positive development, American aid needs to be secured for the long-haul to create an effective deterrent in Ukraine that ensures an eventual and impactful Russian setback and prevents a repeat invasion. This may be the only way to end the war, as negotiations do not appear to be a serious possibility given the incompatibility of each side's demands. Peter B. Zwack, Global Fellow, Kennan InstituteMore than anything else passing this funding bill provided a major morale boost to the Ukrainians - from soldiers, to population, to government. It also injected some hope and buttresses Ukraine's extraordinary will to fight – critical intangibles that one cannot put a quantity or dollar sign against – within an increasingly worn down Ukrainian defense and society.It also provides immediate practical military capability such as artillery rounds and air defense across the breadth of the battle space from trenchlines to defending cities and infrastructure that of which the currently overmatched Ukrainians are desperately short. It buys time for the added influx of even more advanced weaponry including advanced fighter planes and Long Range missiles in the near-mid future. It also reduces the risk of this aid being subsumed by what looks to be a bitter US 2024 Presidential election.There will be bitter fighting over the year ahead and the Ukrainians have lost over a half year to reconstitute and refurbish as implacable Russia has rapidly been doing as it perseveres in its grinding war of attrition … but better late than never. Most importantly the Ukrainians know we and the free-minded world still tangibly have their back.This was also crucial to show our allies who could also waver in that we are still "all in" with support to Ukraine and other threatened democracies such as Israel and Taiwan.Passing this bill and the actions of our allies bill serves notice to the relentlessly revanchist Putin regime and their growing 21st century "axis" of China, Iran and North Korea that the unified free-minded world will not be divided and will stand up to aggression early which was the great failure of the late 1930s leading to grisly WWII in Europe and then the Pacific.And finally, this moment presents a philosophical point for all of us, especially younger generations more distant from the bloody 20th century … namely "who are we, and what do we stand for?" Can we stay the course? Forestalled for now, I still fear imagining a few years from now a debate about "Who lost Ukraine'' and stinging questions about whether did the West and its global allies do all it realistically could to support a free-minded nation within our civilization fighting for its existential life thereby deterring a mortifying a 21st century Neville Chamberlin moment.
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On a picturesque beach in central Gaza, a mile north of the now-flattened Al-Shati refugee camp, long black pipes snake through hills of white sand before disappearing underground. An image released by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) shows dozens of soldiers laying pipelines and what appear to be mobile pumping stations that are to take water from the Mediterranean Sea and hose it into underground tunnels. The plan, according to various reports, is to flood the vast network of underground shafts and tunnels Hamas has reportedly built and used to carry out its operations. "I won't talk about specifics, but they include explosives to destroy and other means to prevent Hamas operatives from using the tunnels to harm our soldiers," said IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi. "[Any] means which give us an advantage over the enemy that [uses the tunnels], deprives it of this asset, is a means that we are evaluating using. This is a good idea…"While Israel is already test-running its flood strategy, it's not the first time Hamas's tunnels have been subjected to sabotage by seawater. In 2013, neighboring Egypt began flooding Hamas-controlled tunnels that were allegedly being used to smuggle goods between the country's Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. For more than two years, water from the Mediterranean was flushed into the tunnel system, wreaking havoc on Gaza's environment. Groundwater supplies were quickly polluted with salt brine and, as a result, the dirt became saturated and unstable, causing the ground to collapse and killing numerous people. Once fertile agricultural fields were transformed into salinated pits of mud, and clean drinking water, already in short supply in Gaza, was further degraded.Israel's current strategy to drown Hamas's tunnels will no doubt cause similar, irreparable damage. "It is important to keep in mind," warns Juliane Schillinger, a researcher at the University of Twente in the Netherlands, "that we are not just talking about water with a high salt content here — seawater along the Mediterranean coast is also polluted with untreated wastewater, which is continuously discharged into the Mediterranean from Gaza's dysfunctional sewage system."This, of course, appears to be part of a broader Israeli objective — not just to dismantle Hamas's military capabilities but to further degrade and destroy Gaza's imperiled aquifers (already polluted with sewage that's leaked from dilapidated pipes). Israeli officials have openly admitted their goal is to ensure that Gaza will be an unlivable place once they end their merciless military campaign."We are fighting human animals, and we are acting accordingly," Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said shortly after the Hamas attack of October 7th. "We will eliminate everything — they will regret it."And Israel is now keeping its promise.As if its indiscriminate bombing, which has already damaged or destroyed up to 70% of all homes in Gaza, weren't enough, filling those tunnels with polluted water will ensure that some of the remaining residential buildings will suffer structural problems, too. And if the ground is weak and insecure, Palestinians will have trouble rebuilding.Flooding tunnels with polluted groundwater "will cause an accumulation of salt and the collapse of the soil, leading to the demolition of thousands of Palestinian homes in the densely populated strip," says Abdel-Rahman al-Tamimi, director of the Palestinian Hydrologists Group, the largest NGO monitoring pollution in the Palestinian territories. His conclusion couldn't be more stunning: "The Gaza Strip will become a depopulated area, and it will take about 100 years to get rid of the environmental effects of this war."In other words, as al-Tamimi points out, Israel is now "killing the environment." And in many ways, it all started with the destruction of Palestine's lush olive groves.Olives No MoreDuring an average year, Gaza once produced more than 5,000 tons of olive oil from more than 40,000 trees. The fall harvest in October and November was long a celebratory season for thousands of Palestinians. Families and friends sang, shared meals, and gathered in the groves to celebrate under ancient trees, which symbolized "peace, hope, and sustenance." It was an important tradition, a deep connection both to the land and to a vital economic resource. Last year, olive crops accounted for more than 10% of the Gazan economy, a total of $30 million.Of course, since October 7th, harvesting has ceased. Israel's scorched earth tactics have instead ensured the destruction of countless olive groves. Satellite images released in early December affirm that 22% of Gaza's agricultural land, including countless olive orchards, has been completely destroyed."We are heartbroken over our crops, which we cannot reach," explains Ahmed Qudeih, a farmer from Khuza, a town in the Southern Gaza Strip. "We can't irrigate or observe our land or take care of it. After every devastating war, we pay thousands of shekels to ensure the quality of our crops and to make our soil suitable again for agriculture."Israel's relentless military thrashing of Gaza has taken an unfathomable toll on human life (more than 22,000 dead, including significant numbers of women and children, and thousands more bodies believed to be buried under the rubble and so uncountable). And consider this latest round of horror just a particularly grim continuation of a 75-year campaign to eviscerate the Palestinian cultural heritage. Since 1967, Israel has uprooted more than 800,000 native Palestinian olive trees, sometimes to make way for new illegal Jewish settlements in the West Bank; in other instances, out of alleged security concerns, or from pure, visceral Zionist rage.Wild groves of olive trees have been harvested by inhabitants of the region for thousands of years, dating back to the Chalcolithic period in the Levant (4,300-3,300 BCE), and the razing of such groves has had calamitous environmental consequences. "[The] removal of trees is directly linked to irreversible climate change, soil erosion, and a reduction in crops," according to a 2023 Yale Review of International Studies report. "The perennial, woody bark acts as a carbon sink … [an] olive tree absorbs 11 kg of CO2 per liter of olive oil produced."Besides providing a harvestable crop and cultural value, olive groves are vital to Palestine's ecosystem. Numerous bird species, including the Eurasian Jay, Green Finch, Hooded Crow, Masked Shrike, Palestine Sunbird, and Sardinian Warbler rely on the biodiversity provided by Palestine's wild trees, six species of which are often found in native olive groves: the Aleppo pine, almond, olive, Palestine buckhorn, piny hawthorne, and fig.As Simon Awad and Omar Attum wrote in a 2017 issue of the Jordan Journal of Natural History:"[Olive] groves in Palestine could be considered cultural landscapes or be designated as globally important agricultural systems because of the combination of their biodiversity, cultural, and economic values. The biodiversity value of historic olive groves has been recognized in other parts of the Mediterranean, with some proposing these areas should receive protection because they are habitat used by some rare and threatened species and are important in maintaining regional biodiversity."An ancient, native olive tree should be considered a testament to the very existence of Palestinians and their struggle for freedom. With its thick spiraling trunk, the olive tree stands as a cautionary tale to Israel, not because of the fruit it bears, but because of the stories its roots hold of a scarred landscape and a battered people that have been callously and relentlessly besieged for more than 75 years.White Phosphorus and Bombs, Bombs, and More BombsWhile contaminating aquifers and uprooting olive groves, Israel is now also poisoning Gaza from above. Numerous videos analyzed by Amnesty International and confirmed by the Washington Post display footage of flares and plumes of white phosphorus raining down on densely populated urban areas. First used on World War I battlefields to provide cover for troop movements, white phosphorus is known to be toxic and dangerous to human health. Dropping it on urban environments is now considered illegal under international law, and Gaza is one of the most densely populated places on earth. "Any time that white phosphorus is used in crowded civilian areas, it poses a high risk of excruciating burns and lifelong suffering," says Lama Fakih, director for the Middle East and North Africa at Human Rights Watch (HRW).While white phosphorus is highly toxic to humans, significant concentrations of it also have deleterious effects on plants and animals. It can disrupt soil composition, making it too acidic to grow crops. And that's just one part of the mountain of munitions Israel has fired at Gaza over the past three months. The war (if you can call such an asymmetrical assault a "war") has been the deadliest and most destructive in recent memory, by some estimates at least as bad as the Allied bombing of Germany during World War II, which annihilated 60 German cities and killed an estimated half-million people.Like the Allied forces of World War II, Israel is killing indiscriminately. Of the 29,000 air-to-surface munitions fired, 40% have been unguided bombs dropped on crowded residential areas. The U.N. estimates that, as of late December, 70% of all schools in Gaza, many of which served as shelters for Palestinians fleeing Israel's onslaught, had been severely damaged. Hundreds of mosques and churches have also been struck and 70% of Gaza's 36 hospitals have been hit and are no longer functioning.A War That Exceeds All Predictions"Gaza is one of the most intense civilian punishment campaigns in history," claims Robert Pape, a historian at the University of Chicago. "It now sits comfortably in the top quartile of the most devastating bombing campaigns ever."It's still difficult to grasp the toll being inflicted, day by day, week by week, not just on Gaza's infrastructure and civilian life but on its environment as well. Each building that explodes leaves a lingering cloud of toxic dust and climate-warming vapors. "In conflict-affected areas, the detonation of explosives can release significant amounts of greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, and particulate matter," says Dr. Erum Zahir, a chemistry professor at the University of Karachi.Dust from the collapsed World Trade Center towers on 9/11 ravaged first responders. A 2020 study found that rescuers were "41 percent more likely to develop leukemia than other individuals." Some 10,000 New Yorkers suffered short-term health ailments following the attack, and it took a year for air quality in Lower Manhattan to return to pre-9/11 levels.While it's impossible to analyze all of the impacts of Israel's nonstop bombing, it's safe to assume that the ongoing leveling of Gaza will have far worse effects than 9/11 had on New York City. Nasreen Tamimi, head of the Palestinian Environmental Quality Authority, believes that an environmental assessment of Gaza now would "exceed all predictions."Central to the dilemma that faced Palestinians in Gaza, even before October 7th, was access to clean drinking water and it's only been horrifically exacerbated by Israel's nonstop bombardment. A 2019 report by UNICEF noted that "96 percent of water from Gaza's sole aquifer is unfit for human consumption."Intermittent electricity, a direct result of Israel's blockade, has also damaged Gaza's sanitation facilities, leading to increased groundwater contamination, which has, in turn, led to various infections and massive outbreaks of preventable waterborne diseases. According to HRW, Israel is using a lack of food and drinking water as a tool of warfare, which many international observers argue is a form of collective punishment — a war crime of the first order. Israeli forces have intentionally destroyed farmland and bombed water and sanitation facilities in what certainly seems like an effort to make Gaza all too literally unlivable."I have to walk three kilometers to get one gallon [of water]," 30-year-old Marwan told HRW. Along with hundreds of thousands of other Gazans, Marwan fled to the south with his pregnant wife and two children in early November. "And there is no food. If we are able to find food, it is canned food. Not all of us are eating well."In the south of Gaza, near the overcrowded city of Khan Younis, raw sewage flows through the streets as sanitation services have ceased operation. In the southern town of Rafah, where so many Gazans have fled, conditions are beyond dire. Makeshift U.N. hospitals are overwhelmed, food and water are in short supply, and starvation is significantly on the rise. In late December, the World Health Organization (WHO) documented more than 100,000 cases of diarrhea and 150,000 respiratory infections in a Gazan population of about 2.3 million. And those numbers are likely massive undercounts and will undoubtedly increase as Israel's offensive drags on, having already displaced 1.9 million people, or more than 85% of the population, half of whom are now facing starvation, according to the U.N."For over two months, Israel has been depriving Gaza's population of food and water, a policy spurred on or endorsed by high-ranking Israeli officials and reflecting an intent to starve civilians as a method of warfare," reports Omar Shakir of Human Rights Watch.Rarely, if ever, have the perpetrators of mass murder (reportedly now afraid of South Africa's filing at the International Court of Justice in the Hague, accusing Israel of genocide) so plainly laid out their cruel intentions. As Israeli President Isaac Herzog put it in a callous attempt to justify the atrocities now being faced by Palestinian civilians, "It's an entire nation out there that is responsible [for October 7th]. This rhetoric about civilians not aware, not involved, it's absolutely not true. They could've risen up, they could have fought against that evil regime."The violence inflicted on Palestinians by an Israel backed so strikingly by President Biden and his foreign policy team is unlike anything we had previously witnessed in more or less real-time in the media and on social media. Gaza, its people, and the lands that have sustained them for centuries are being desecrated and transformed into an all too unlivable hellscape, the impact of which will be felt — it's a guarantee — for generations to come.This article has been republished with permission from TomDispatch.
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At the United Nations (UN) 4th Global Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, Hillary Clinton, who was then the United States' First Lady and would later become Secretary of State and one of the first women to run for the office of US President, passionately declared that "human rights are women's rights.... And women's rights are human rights, once and for all".[1] This powerful message, delivered in the background of an emerging post-Cold War world order, held a strong promise for change, envisaging a new global agenda for gender equality and women's human rights. The Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action, signed by 189 countries and endorsed by numerous NGOs from different parts of the world, established an important link between women, conflict resolution and peace. The Declaration was based on the principle that: "Local, national, regional and global peace is attainable and is inextricably linked with the advancement of women, who are a fundamental force for leadership, conflict resolution and the promotion of lasting peace at all levels".[2] This conviction would especially resonate with delegates coming from countries in conflict or on the verge of it, and those who had long played an active role in fighting for peace and human rights. Amongst them were also ten women delegates representing Kosovo's "parallel institutions"/government-in-exile and civil society, who directly contributed to the Beijing Platform for Action.Kosovo women's political activism on the rise In 1989, Kosovo's autonomy was revoked on the initiative of Slobodan Milošević, known as the "Butcher of the Balkans" and Serbian Communist leader who would later become the first European head of state prosecuted for genocide and war crimes in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. In the aftermath of that decision, women activists and politicians in Kosovo played an active role in raising awareness against the systematic oppression of the Kosovo Albanians and the atrocities committed against the civilian population by Milošević's state apparatus. Their activism would stretch beyond the borders of Kosovo: they would engage in public actions and lobbying campaigns seeking peaceful resolution of all conflicts in the former Yugoslav region and beyond. Their mobilisation also aimed to fight the discrimination and Serbian cultural racism against Albanian women.[3] Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Serbian media would portray Albanian women of Kosovo "as washing machines or breeders of 'mice'", while their babies were labelled as "biological bombs".[4] Women in Kosovo took to the streets "at times as mothers, sisters, daughters, many other times as oppressed Albanian citizens and activists of women's human rights".[5] According to Nita Luci and Linda Gusia, "being visible was not just about claiming public space but also demonstrated to the international community a new emancipated nation where women take to the streets and be active citizens".[6] In March 1998, when war was looming over Kosovo, around twelve thousand women with loaves of bread gathered in Pristina. They marched towards the villages in the Drenica regions where whole populations were being kept under siege by the Serb military forces. The Prekaz massacre had taken place a few days before, carried out by the so-called "Special Anti-Terrorism Unit of Serbia", laying bare the brutality and ruthlessness of the Yugoslav and Serbian forces towards Albanians. The marching women chanted "Bread for [the women and the families in] Drenica", aiming to convey a message to the international community about the atrocities committed against the civilian population in Kosovo by the Serb regime.[7] They were stopped by the Serb police, yet their resistance was only reinforced. As part of the International Women in Black movement, they would even protest in the streets of Belgrade against the Milošević regime. The 1990s activism of women would have an immense impact on the fight for peace and human rights in Kosovo, paving the way for the next generation of women activists who would follow. They also fought the prejudices crafted by Serbian politicians against Albanian people in general and Albanian women more specifically.The continuous fight for participation and representation As the case of Kosovo in the 1990s highlights, women's participation in conflict prevention and resolution can improve outcomes before, during and after conflict.[8] This is of course the responsibility of the parties involved in such processes, from the national institutions and domestic political actors to the international mediators who facilitate and/or mediate these processes. Indeed, since 2000, the Security Council has adopted 10 resolutions on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) which, amongst other things, call for women's participation in peace processes. Yet more often than not, women are excluded from the formal peace processes. In the case of Kosovo, the fight of women for representation and participation has been a long one. There have been successes and setbacks which have showcased the complex interplay between national and international actors. As it was observed, "the explicit or implicit neglecting of the gender dimension found in international and national institutions towards gender mainstreaming and towards practical compromises with the local women's movement has proved to be a significant factor hindering the achievement of major inputs in certain fields, such as in the peacebuilding dimension and the status negotiation".[9] During the war, the bodies of tens of thousands of women became battlefields, targets of conflict-related sexual violence used as a weapon of war and instruments of systematic ethnic cleansing by Serbia.[10] Yet this topic was not tabled at any of the negotiation processes. Despite such gendered violence and women's mobilisation for peace during the conflict, in the talks on the Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, the Rambouillet Accords (1999), there were no women signatories, no women mediators, no women witnesses, and women made up only 3 per cent of negotiating teams.[11] Against this backdrop, women activists mobilised to find venues for making their voices heard and ensure their presence.[12] They would send letters to Martti Ahtisaari, the UN Special Envoy for the Kosovo Future Status Process, and even organise a number of meetings with him articulating their demands and expectations.[13] Later in 2011, a new process of negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia started under EU facilitation. This time, the technical process of the negotiations was led by a woman in her capacity as the Deputy Prime Minister, Edita Tahiri, and women were part of the negotiation teams, even though in much lower numbers than their male counterparts.[14] The question lingered: Was this enough?Lessons learned Based on the dismal data concerning women's participation in these peace processes, the question is: How can we ensure greater participation of women in formal negotiation processes? How can we ensure that these processes integrate a gender perspective? By looking at the experience of peace processes between Kosovo and Serbia, a few important lessons can be identified. First, there is a number of actors who determine the extent to which gender participation and incorporation of a gender perspective in peace processes are ensured. These include, at the national level, in the countries or parties participating in the talks, the negotiating teams, government institutions, opposition parties, civil society and media, among others; and at the international level, the parties directly involved in the negotiation process, such as the facilitator or mediator and others international actors supporting the process. Their influence is largely determined by their power of decision-making and/or their power to determine the course and the outcome of the negotiating process. Second, despite the forward-looking international framework that calls for greater gender representation, the design and goals of the very peace process (what the negotiations aim to achieve) determine to a large degree the set of topics and issues that become part of the conversation. In the case of the EU-facilitated Kosovo–Serbia dialogue, for example, for any topic to become a part of the negotiation, preliminary consent of both parties was – and still is – required. The Kosovo institutions in different stages of this process attempted to integrate topics which dealt with issues related to war reparation or dealing with the past – topics which were articulated by women's groups as priorities;[15] yet consent by the other side (namely, Serbia) and at times even from the mediator were not there. Third, the importance of women's participation and integration of a gender perspective is underestimated, if not disregarded. Relatedly, there is a lack of understanding that having more women in the process does not per se mean that the process has a gender lens.[16] To be sure, other factors – such as the period and the circumstances or conditions under which the peace negotiation takes place – also play an important role.The way forward The emergence of women in Kosovo politics has been a long, painful process. Yet the legacy and the path paved by Kosovo's women through their political activism during the war and the following post-war years, whether as part of political parties or civil society, has never faded. Newer and older generation of women activists alike continue to leave their mark and make their voices heard, and initiatives take place highlighting the importance of the Women, Peace and Security agenda and women's role in peace processes, including those of the Mediterranean Women Mediators Network – of which Kosovo women are part. It is well known that peace processes are imperfect; yet, as research has widely shown,[17] there is a significant correlation between the positive and sustainable outcome of peace negotiations and women's participation in them.[18] For all deficiencies and constraints of peace processes, the experience of Kosovo is a solid testimony to how important ensuring inclusiveness through greater participation of women and the gender agenda is.Jeta Krasniqi is a consultant serving as an Expert Advisor to the Kosovo Government on the EU-facilitated negotiation process between Kosovo and Serbia. Mrs. Krasniqi is also the deputy chair of the Governmental Commission for the Verification and Recognition of Conflict-related sexual violence victims during the War. She is a member of the Mediterranean Women Mediators Network (MWMN). This article is part of a research project produced within the framework of Kosovo Research and Analysis Fellowship, supported by the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society. This commentary is published with the support of the Mediterranean Women Mediators Network (MWMN), an initiative launched by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and implemented by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and Women in International Security (WIIS) Italy. The views expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Network or the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.[1] Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks to the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 5 September 1995, https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/exhibits/show/womens-rights/wr-hr-keynote.[2] United Nations, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Beijing, 4-15 September 1995, point 18, https://www.unwomen.org/en/node/1901.[3] Nicole Farnsworth, History is Herstory Too. The History of Women in Civil Society in Kosovo, 1980–2004, Pristina, Kosovar Gender Studies Centre, 2008.[4] Majlinda Behrami, José Carpintero Molina and Nicole Farnsworth, A Seat at the Table. Women's Contributions to and Expectations from Peacebuilding Processes in Kosovo, Pristina, Kosovo Women's Network, 2021, p. 24, https://womensnetwork.org/?p=3349595.[5] Elife Krasniqi, "Same Goal, Different Paths, Different Class: Women's Feminist Political Engagements in Kosovo from the Mid-1970s until the Mid-1990s", in Comparative Southeast European Studies, Vol. 69, No. 2-3 (2021), p. 313-334 at p. 329, https://doi.org/10.1515/soeu-2021-0014.[6] Nita Luci and Linda Gusia, "'Our Men Will Not Have Amnesia': Civic Engagement, Emancipation, and Transformations of the Gendered Public in Kosovo", in Sabrina P. Ramet, Albert Simkus and Ola Listhaug (eds), Civic and Uncivic Values in Kosovo. History, Politics, and Value Transformation, Budapest/New York, CEU Press, 2015, p. 199-220 at p. 206, DOI 10.1515/9789633860748-012.[7] Serbeze Haxhiaj, "Bread for Drenica: When Kosovo Women Marched to Break a Serbian Siege", in Balkan Transitional Justice, 15 March 2023, https://balkaninsight.com/?p=1026541.[8] Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) website: Women's Participation in Peace Processes, https://www.cfr.org/womens-participation-in-peace-processes.[9] Ana Villellas Ariño and Gema Redondo de la Morena, "An Approach to the Kosovo Post-War Rehabilitation Process from a Gender Perspective", in Quaderns de Construcció de Pau, January 2008, p. 21, https://escolapau.uab.cat/img/qcp/qcp02i.pdf.[10] Human Rights Watch, Kosovo: Rape as a Weapon of "Ethnic Cleansing", March 2000, https://www.hrw.org/node/257328.[11] Pablo Castillo Diaz et al., Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence, UN Women, October 2012, p. 4, https://www.un.org/shestandsforpeace/node/1379.[12] Nicole Farnsworth, History is Herstory Too, cit.[13] For more details please see: Kosovo Women's Network, Letter to Mr. Marti Ahtisaari, UN Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo, 8 March 2006, https://womensnetwork.org/?p=3334512; and Regional Women's Lobby in South East Europe (RWLSEE), Chronology of RWLSEE Key Meetings & Activities, 27 September 2020, https://rwlsee.org/?p=2696.[14] Based on an analysis covering the period 2011–2017, the Kosovo negotiations team had 90 members out of which only 14 were women. For more details see: Balkans Policy Research Group (BPRG), "The Brussels Dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. Achievements and Challenges", in BPRG Policy Reports, September 2020, p. 104, https://dialogue-info.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/BPRG_DIALOGU-I-BRUKSELIT_ENG.pdf.[15] For more please check: Majlinda Behrami, José Carpintero Molina and Nicole Farnsworth, A Seat at the Table, cit.[16] "Women should be included at all levels in negotiations to formulate and implement peace agreements, and […] the provisions of peace agreement should de designed with the particular status and situation of women in mind and, where appropriate, include special provisions for women." Christine Bell, "Women and Peace Processes, Negotiations, and Agreements: Operational Opportunities and Challenges", in NOREF Policy Briefs, March 2013, p. 1, https://noref.no/insights/publications/themes/gender-and-inclusivity/Women-and-peace-processes-negotiations-and-agreements-operational-opportunities-and-challenges.[17] Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, "Gender Empowerment and United Nations Peacebuilding", in Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 46, No. 4 (July 2009), p. 505-523, DOI 10.1177/0022343309334576. For more information please see: CFR website: Women's Participation in Peace Processes, https://www.cfr.org/womens-participation-in-peace-processes.[18] Thania Paffenholz et al., Making Women Count - Not Just Counting Women: Assessing Women's Inclusion and Influence on Peace Negotiations, Geneva, Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative and UN Women, April 2016, https://www.inclusivepeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/report-making-women-count-en.pdf.