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Autonomous cyber weapons have made their way onto the battlefield, raising the question of whether commanders can be held criminally responsible under command responsibility when war crimes are committed. The doctrine of command responsibility has a long history in international criminal law and comprises three core elements: the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship, the commander's knowledge of the crime, and the commander's failure to prevent or repress the subordinate's criminal actions. This article unpacks the content of these elements and applies them to autonomous cyber weapons by treating them as being analogous to soldiers since they operate within an organized system of command and control. The article goes on to address the important question of whether autonomous cyber weapons as subordinates can commit crimes and then examines the element of causality for the purposes of command responsibility. This article also explains the nature of command responsibility and offers conclusions as to its utility in establishing accountability when war crimes are committed by autonomous cyber weapons.

Sonderwirtschaftszonen gelten als ein etabliertes Instrument zur Förderung der sozialen und wirtschaftlichen "Entwicklung" und neuerdings auch zur sog. Aktivierung und Integration von Geflüchteten. In diesem Beitrag setzen wir uns kritisch mit einem vermeintlichen Paradebeispiel des Nexus "Entwicklung" und "Geflüchtetenintegration" auseinander: dem 'Jordan Compact', ein 2016 verabschiedetes bilaterales Abkommen zwischen Jordanien und der Europäischen Union. Wir knüpfen in der Darstellung einerseits an Weltsystemansätze an, unterstreichen andererseits aber die Notwendigkeit einer raumtheoretischen Aktualisierung. Denn ungleiche Entwicklung, so diskutieren wir mit Blick auf die globalen Produktionsnetzwerke der Bekleidungsindustrie und die Arbeits- und Lebensbedingungen in den jordanischen Sonderwirtschaftszonen, muss systematisch als glokal verfasste in den Blick genommen werden. Multiskalare sozialräumliche Fragmentierung der Arbeits- und Reproduktionsbedingungen ist hiernach konstitutiv für die gegenwärtige neoliberale Globalisierung.

The article contributes to our understanding of how trade is politicized and how civil society activists manage the tensions between multiple collective action frames in a complex political context. When viewed alongside the Brexit referendum and Trump's US Presidency, it is easy to see the 2013–2016 campaign against a European Union–US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership as a further example of an apparently growing populist 'nationalism.' Yet, in the European context—where campaigning was most visible—there was in fact extensive reliance on, and re-iteration of, a transnational 'European' frame, with antecedents in the 1999–2006 campaign against General Agreement on Trade in Services negotiations. As the article argues, transnational campaigning operates within a nexus of multiple, and sometimes conflicting, geographic frames. In both campaigns discussed here, activists typically engaged with the wider public via the national context and, sometimes, with allusions to 'national autonomy.' However, their activism was dependent upon a frame espousing 'transnational solidarity.' Developed over time, this structured their transnational relations with other groups and more full-time activists.

The decision of African leaders on the creation of an African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in 2018 was not merely a political decision with economic implications. It has significant and complex ethical dimensions too. This, not only concerning a possible trade-off between economic growth and well-being, employment, the depletion of natural resources and related ecological and gender problems. AfCFTA will also impact on growing xenophobia, nationalism and populism, the likely outcome of growing capital and labour mobility.

Die Entscheidung der afrikanischen Staats- und Regierungschefs zur Schaffung einer Pan-Afrikanischen Freihandelszone (AfCFTA) im Jahr 2018 war nicht nur eine politische Entscheidung mit wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen. Sie hat auch bedeutende ethische Dimensionen. Dies betrifft nicht nur einen möglichen Kompromiß zwischen Wirtschaftswachstum und Wohlergehen, Beschäftigung, Erschöpfung der natürlichen Ressourcen und damit verbundenen ökologischen und geschlechtsspezifischen Problemen. Die AfCFTA wird sich auch auf die Ausbreitung von Fremdenfeindlichkeit, Nationalismus und Populismus auswirken, die sich wahrscheinlich aus der Zunahme der Kapital- und Arbeitskräftemobilität ergibt.

What kind of foreign policy do populists execute once in power? Based on the existing literature, we conceptualize populism as a set of ideas whose two core elements are anti-elitism and antipluralism. From this we develop a set of hypotheses regarding both substantive aspects of foreign policy as well as foreign policy-making processes of populist leaders in government. An analysis of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's foreign policy record serves as a first plausibility probe of our hypotheses. We find that our concept of populism carries most explanatory value in the procedural aspects of foreign policy making as well as in its communication, less so in those aspects relating to the goals or substance of foreign policy. Whereas foreign policy under Modi's populist leadership is highly centralized and personalized, the traditional foreign policy establishment, including most notably the Ministry of External Affairs, has lost some of its previous authority. Engaging the Indian diaspora abroad emerged as another characteristic of populist foreign policy making. By contrast, the case of India does not confirm our hypothesis regarding a preference of bilateralism over multilateralism, nor does populism necessarily preclude investing in global public goods.