Suchergebnisse

Afrika ist nicht mehr die Arena für die ideologischen Schaukämpfe der Supermächte. Die seit dem Beginn der Entkolonialisierung Afrikas diskutierte Frage nach dem künftigen Weg der afrikanischen Länder, ob er sozialistisch oder kapitalistisch werden solle, hat an Bedeutung verloren. In zunehmendem Maße geht es jetzt darum, welche Formen einer Mischung von markt- und planwirtschaftlichen Elementen sinnvoll und möglich ist, um den dringlichsten ökologischen und ökonomischen Problemen zu begegnen. Aber auch die weltweit in ein neues Stadium gekommene Frage nach der Demokratiebewegung hat die afrikanischen Länder erreicht. (DÜI-Sen)

The long-anticipated move by leftist MP Sahra Wagenknecht to form a new left-populist party opens the prospect of a more active debate within Germany on the policy course taken by the now highly unpopular coalition of Social Democrats, Greens and liberal Free Democrats (FDP).The potential appeal of this new party will depend largely on whether voters agree that the policy of supporting Ukraine is responsible for Germany's economic downturn.Party ConfigurationThe German political scene has evolved in recent decades away from the alternation in power of the center right Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the center left Social Democrats (SPD), often with the FDP in coalition with one or the other of these, to present a spectrum of parties including the center left Green party, the far-left Die Linke (the Left) party and the right-wing nationalist Alternative for Germany (AfD).With the lone exception of AfD, these parties all broadly support Ukraine's war effort, until Ukraine itself is ready to seek a negotiated settlement. CDU/CSU support now stands at 29.4%. The AfD comes second with 21.2%. Support for the three governing parties together has fallen to 35.6%. The AfD's spectacular rise in polls seems to many analysts to suggest a generalized dissatisfaction with the status quo, and not necessarily the sudden conversion of many Germans to far-right extremist views. Wagenknecht has called this a "representation gap," one that her party would seek to exploit. The long-anticipated announcement on October 23 of the launch of a new party led by Die Linke MP Sahra Wagenknecht makes the course of German politics much less predictable. Even more than the AfD, the new party foregrounds its opposition to the prevailing stance on the war in Ukraine. Antiwar politics and the "representation gap"A majority of Die Linke's Bundestag delegation has backed tough sanctions against Russia, while still opposing weapons exports to Ukraine. Tensions within the parliamentary delegation grew as Wagenknecht, in public and in the Bundestag, assailed the sanctions policy and called for the opening of negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. The party has hovered since the last election just below the 5% threshold of support needed to win representation in the Bundestag. The breaking away of Wagenknecht and her nine colleagues from the Die Linke faction reduces that party to a parliamentary group, rather than a faction, affecting its funding and other prerogatives in the Bundestag.Wagenknecht and the nine other Die Linke MPs who have joined her effort to form the new party have provisionally named it the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance. They plan to have the party officially formed and ready to contest the European Parliament elections of June 2024 and three state elections in Saxony, Thuringia, and Brandenburg (all in the former East Germany) later next year. This timing seems well chosen: European Parliament elections are typically favorable to smaller parties, and many voters in the eastern states are, for various reasons, favorable to the Wagenknecht initiative. A snap poll reported on October 31 found that 14% of voters could imagine themselves voting for the new party. This would immediately place it in fourth place, behind the CDU/CSU, AfD, and the SPD, and ahead of the Green party. The new party's impact would be felt mostly on the AfD, but would attract support from all parties other than the Greens and Die Linke itself. Wagenknecht's stated aim is to fill a "representation gap," which means her party will seek to represent those German voters who do not support further arming of Ukraine and who favor efforts to settle the conflict through diplomacy. Evidence of the existence of this gap is the spectacular rise of AfD which began just after Russia's invasion in February of 2022 (when AfD support stood at 9.5%) and more recent polls placing AfD support above 20% since mid 2023. As of March of this year, about 30% of Germans found the arming of Ukraine to have been excessive, and a small majority — 52% — said diplomatic efforts to end the conflict had not been adequate. More recently, a majority (52%) opposed providing Taurus missiles to Ukraine.Wagenknecht's anti-war popularityWagenknecht has been an MP since 2009 and was co-leader of Die Linke in the Bundestag from 2015 to 2019. Born in East Germany, she became active after 1989 in the post-communist Party of Democratic Socialism, initially heading its leftmost, avowedly communist wing. The PDS merged with disaffected leftists of the west German SPD in 2007 and became Die Linke, which for some time enjoyed some electoral success, including in western Germany. Former SPD leader and finance minister, Oskar Lafontaine, was co-founder of Die Linke and is Wagenknecht's husband.Because of her frequent appearances on political talk shows, Wagenknecht is fairly well known to the German public. Often the lone dissenter against the prevailing posture on Ukraine, her arguments are always persuasive, articulate and above all dispassionate. She is a controversial figure, but one that remains among the most popular German politicians. A recent poll showed her finishing third behind Defense Minister Pistorius and CSU leader Markus Söder in national approval ratings.Ukraine War positions: AfD and WagenknechtAlthough AfD's published program states that there can be no viable security order in Europe that excludes Russia, this issue is not often emphasized in their appeal to voters. By contrast, Sahra Wagenknecht's notoriety is entirely wedded to her very public antiwar stance. In February 2023, Wagenknecht joined Alice Schwarzer, a leading anti-war activist and editor of the feminist journal EMMA, to put forward a Manifest für Frieden (Manifesto for Peace) and inviting signatures online.The antiwar demonstration in Berlin on February 25, led by Wagenknecht and Schwarzer, attracted participation by about 10,000 people, but did not produce the momentum that the organizers might have hoped for.Wagenknecht has called herself a "conservative leftist," faulting Die Linke with having built its support base among younger, urban progressive voters while allegedly neglecting voters of the working class. This dispute has taken the form of a contest between an identity vs a class basis of leftist politics. Wagenknecht argues for the refocus of the left on defense of the interests of the German working class. She has sounded some caution about what she sees as excessive openness to flows of migrants.What does it mean?The launch of organizational efforts to form Wagenknecht's new party opens the prospect of a more active debate within Germany on the policy course taken by the weak governing coalition. Wagenknecht has stated that she and her party will not cooperate with AfD. The AfD made a very strong showing in recent state elections in the prosperous western states of Hesse and Bavaria, suggesting that its own potential is not confined to eastern Germany. By filling a tempting "gap" in German politics, the Wagenknecht alliance could endeavor to to curb the rise of AfD.

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Armed conflict and violence seldom erupt overnight, even when their visible effects seem to take many off-guard. More likely, they stem from deep-rooted, entrenched fault lines that may not always be obvious or visible because they go back decades—if not longer. Effectively mitigating the eruption or recurrence of conflict requires identifying, analyzing, and tackling the root causes of fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV)—not just what happens but why it happens.

Structural factors of FCV are systemic characteristics that underpin a country's economic, political, institutional, security, and societal evolution. They range from historical legacies and narratives to norms and values and include geography, subnational disparities, demographic trends, and many more. They may be simmering beneath the surface, deemed latent, as if no longer relevant or even self-evident, to the extent that one may not assess their full ramifications in the current context.

In the Lake Chad region, where armed conflict has been fueled by deep-rooted fragility and grievances, some groups, such as the "montagnards" from the Mandara Mountains and the Buduma, have been historically disenfranchised and still face regular barriers to representation in decision-making processes and development dividends. Geography is another important structural factor. As shown in the Lake Chad regional RRA with the exception of the capital N'Djamena, the Lake Chad region is remotely located which has fostered a sentiment of political isolation coupled with economic marginalization.

Past instances of armed conflict generate historical legacies, even when a generation or more has elapsed since violent events. Trauma, often inter-generational and collective, heals through acknowledging wrongdoings and reparative justice. In addition to direct survivors and families of victims, their descendants and the community at large can connect with the memory of violent events and how remnants of discrimination and stigmatization may still be perceived, long after these historical occurrences. Historical legacies shape a memory and group identity. It further contributes to a narrative where an individual's access to opportunities may be interpreted through the lens of whether they belong to the group of former perpetrators or survivors.

While underlying, persistent patterns of exclusion and a sense of injustice feed into strong local feelings, collective narratives, and psyche about significant elements of a society, structural factors of FCV do not necessarily determine the trajectory of a region, country, or locality. They are instead constitutive to the history and fabric of a context and, as such, shape a core part of its specificity. Think of rhizome more than direct causality.

There are many examples of this. For instance, territorial imbalances greatly contribute to inequalities and grievances. Analysts point out a crisis of pastoralism at the heart of nomadic herders' grievances in the Sahel, as well as zero-sum tendencies that prevent wider inclusion. Regional inequalities, between coastal and landlocked Saharan and Sahelian provinces, have various ramifications, such as on economic diversification, identity formation, and center-periphery relations.

Another example is the way in which governance systems inherited from colonial times have contributed to perpetuating contested and/or exclusionary patterns in settings affected by FCV. Guiding questions that may be helpful to unpack these connections include: To what extent did a colonial administration influence central or federal trajectories and power-sharing? Did independence occur as a result of a peaceful negotiation or from violent guerrilla warfare which institutionalized top-down, one-party "winner take all" mindsets? Did major milestones include and benefit all or only a few?

The recently completed Guinea Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRA) outlined the country's experimentation with different forms of governance, such as socialism. The country's exposure to various models has deeply influenced Guineans' yearning for equality and their low acceptance of economic stratification, which can still be perceived today.

How can we adjust our lens not just to the last unconstitutional change of government but to review core features that have defined a country's entire post-independence period? We cannot address the root causes of FCV unless we understand why events happen. This not only helps to mitigate their impact more effectively but also to prevent their recurrence in the future. Capturing structural factors of FCV entails augmenting a standard stakeholder mapping or conflict analysis with a recognition of these complex, intertwined connections, and the role of people's perceptions in fueling deep-rooted grievances. In line with the World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence, it requires attention to the following:

Mobilizing various disciplines to understand a society, its constitutive forces, and pressure points. Armed conflict and violence rarely arise simply because of economic failures and asymmetries. Rather, they stem out of power dynamics as well as actual and perceived exclusion factors. To measure them, one should understand that the structure of the economy, the country's history, geography, culture, and social divisions, set entrenched patterns and require thinking outside the realm of traditional disciplines.
Valuing people's perceptions as much as objective measures of wellbeing and development. As the 2018 Pathways for Peace report demonstrated, inequalities and perceptions of exclusions between groups matter just as much, and often more, than inequalities between rich and poor. Perception and subjectivity play a critical role in shaping people's sentiments and appraisal of inequalities and exclusion. As such, it is often not only about what happened, but how it was perceived, interpreted, digested, and narrated by the people who experienced it. Therefore, one key challenge for practitioners is often one of data. Simply put, do we have the right data to dig deeper and wider
Accepting the compounding and dynamic aspects of conflict and risks. Structural factors of FCV are mostly static but they are not relegated to the past. The extent to which these simmering attributes interact with the present makes them "living" and ever-present in the backdrop of fragile and conflict-affected situations.
This web of connections between past and present, structural, and more acute experiences of state formation and contestations, illustrates that societies are not frozen in time—they live, breathe, and evolve. They also remember. In addition to spatial, social, cultural, and economic features, structural factors of FCV influence path dependency—a historically-influenced course from which sets a rigid route—and behavioral patterns that unfold and repeat through time. They resist change and sometimes build up over time, like the sediment of a riverbed. If we don't integrate them into a risk-informed approach and engagement, we, as development practitioners, miss critical depth and breadth, two essential parameters to effectively diagnose and tackle the root causes of FCV.









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Farah Abdessamad
Consultant, Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Group
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Catherine Defontaine
Senior Operations Officer - Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Group
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Dave


October 04, 2023

Very insightful article.






Catherine


October 27, 2023

Thank you!

Daniel Raisbeck


Less than a year ago, I wrote of the almost certain regret that awaited the prosperous, urban, multiple‐​degree‐​holding types who voted for Gustavo Petro, Colombia's Chavista president. They thought they had supported a Nordic‐​style social democrat—failing to notice that they had helped to elect a tropical socialist who, given his past as a guerrilla group member and Hugo Chávez supporter, was also a potential autocrat. Caveat emptor (or rather suffragator) indeed. But I never thought that voter's remorse would set in so quickly. Or so extremely.
According to poll data from June 1, 2023, only 26 percent of Colombian citizens approved of Petro's performance as president. And this was before the scandal that shook the country's political scene last Sunday evening, when Semana magazine released a series of WhatsApp audio files sent by Armando Benedetti, Petro's former ambassador in Caracas, to Laura Sarabia, the president's former chief of staff.
Among the least bombastic revelations is Benedetti's claim that Alfonso Prada, Petro's former interior minister, "stole the whole ministry with his wife." This implies massive levels of corruption around Petro, who came to power with an anti‐​corruption agenda (quite cynically given his disreputable political alliances). Prada proceeded to sue Benedetti for libel.
Petro's dwindling number of supporters may dismiss this as a politician's petty slander against a rival in the cabinet. Far more concerning for them—and for Petro—is Benedetti's matter‐​of‐​fact assertion to Sarabia that he himself obtained COP $15 billion (around USD $3.58 million at today's exchange rate) for Petro's 2022 presidential campaign, during which he served as the former candidate's right‐​hand‐​man and main political handler. Petro's campaign did not officially report any donation nearly as large. Its declared funds consisted mostly a series of bank loans, which were meant to be paid with the "reimbursement" sum that the Colombian state guarantees to candidates for each vote received in an election.
In many countries, an insider's admission of how millions of undeclared dollars flowed into the president's campaign coffers would bring down the government. Alas, Colombia is not one of them. This is not due to a lack of unashamedly corrupt presidents; as I wrote recently in The Wall Street Journal, the opposite has been the case. Rather, since the 1950's, the Colombian elite's idiosyncratic approach to presidential corruption has followed the maxim, attributed to journalist Hernando Santos (1922–1999), that the trouble with overthrowing a president is that he may fall upon those doing the toppling.
Already in Petro's case, the three‐​member House of Representatives commission created to investigate Benedetti's statements includes two members of the president's own party. The enquiry will be a charade, which is a pity since the source of the undeclared campaign money is as important as the sum itself. In an interview, Benedetti told Semana that the money "did not come from entrepreneurs," meaning the legal business community. Suspicion has fallen on the Marxist guerrilla groups and other drug trafficking organizations, but also on the Venezuelan regime of Nicolás Maduro. Anonymous, the hacker group, claims that Maduro financed "part of the campaign of the current president of Colombia," but has not published evidence hitherto.
What is certain is that, in regional terms, the Maduro regime has been the principal beneficiary of Petro's election. To begin with, Colombia recognized Maduro's presidency after a three‐​and‐​a‐​half‐​year hiatus, and Petro himself has met Maduro four times since his inauguration. His government, which opposes any future hydrocarbon exploration in Colombia despite dwindling reserves, has promoted the idea of importing Venezuelan natural gas.
While Petro wages a political war against Colombia's key petroleum industry—crude oil has been the country's main legal export for decades—he lobbied President Joe Biden to end American sanctions against the Maduro regime. This would imply renewed Venezuelan oil exports to the U.S. market (even if socialism devastated Venezuela's oil industry well beyond immediate or even medium term repair). Petro's "shoot yourself in the foot / prosper‐​thy‐​neighbor" policy is devoid of any rationality. Unless, of course, Colombia's increasingly authoritarian president is somehow subject to the Venezuelan tyrant.
Petro's eco‐​fanatical crusade against the hydrocarbon industry is but one example of how his government is bent on destroying the few areas of the Colombian economy that are functional. Other examples include his plans to put the state in charge of centralized funding for the healthcare and pension systems, both of which are efficient—although certainly not perfect—thanks to private sector involvement and some degree of consumer choice. Where things are already problematic, Petro's policies would make them worse. For instance, he wants to make a rigid, overregulated labor market even less flexible and more hostile to businesses.
Then there is the matter of rising insecurity, an old problem that, until recently, appeared mostly solved, only to resurface dangerously in the last year. Under Petro, illegal armed groups have expanded their power as they launch constant, deadly attacks against the armed forces and police. It all brings to mind the dark era of the late 1990's, when Colombia was on the verge of becoming a failed state as it came under siege from the FARC guerrillas, which are still up in arms despite the much‐​touted "peace" agreement of 2016.
Usually, a crisis in government breeds economic instability. Under Colombia's current government, however, the opposite has been the case. Since the Benedetti scandal broke, the peso rallied to reach its highest value against the dollar since mid‐​2022, when Petro was about to win the presidential election. In October, two months after he took office, the peso reached an all‐​time low against the dollar. Amid the current political turmoil, forward‐​looking markets are anticipating the failure of Petro's legislative initiatives in health care, pensions, and labor law. Which is to say, there is speculation that Colombia's institutional framework has already survived Petro's statist onslaught. The weaker his position, the thinking goes, the less likely it is that non‐​leftist parties will lend him their support, which he needs to obtain congressional majorities.
I fear, however, that markets may be getting ahead of themselves. The Colombian congress is minimally ideological and highly transactional. There is still a good chance that, issue by issue, Petro's government can negotiate just enough votes to have his "reforms" approved, in which case only the courts will stand in the way of his agenda.
Not that Petro is respectful of any check or balance. This week, he propounded the theory that, since he was elected, his government represents "the will of the people," meaning that any opposition to his political project—including from the news media—is part of an illegitimate, "soft coup." The onslaught, in other words, is far from over.
In my view, the worst part about Petro's election victory is that, at this time last year, Colombia was in need of radical reforms. Above all, a chronically sluggish economy required budget discipline, public spending cuts, drastic debt reduction, a strong currency (ideally through dollarization), far lower taxes, labor market deregulation, subsoil privatization, school choice, and an end to non‐​tariff barriers. By electing Petro, however, voters decided to do precisely the opposite on all fronts. As warned, most already regret it.

Im Text wird eine lange und erfolgreiche Tradition der rechtshistorischen und -theoretischen Osteuropa-Forschung im Max-Planck-Institut für europäische Rechtsgeschichte in Frankfurt am Main dargestellt. Bereits in einem der größten Vorhaben des Instituts wurde Osteuropa gebührend vertreten. Es handelt sich um ab 1973 herausgegebene Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren europäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte. Auf den Zusammenbruch des Sozialismus hat das Institut, im Jahr 1994, mit dem Großprojekt Normdurchsetzung in den osteuropäischen Nachkriegsgesellschaften (1944-1989) reagiert. In seinem Fokus waren die langfristigen geschichtlichen Prozesse von 1944 bis 1989, die jene neue Modernisierungswelle nach 1990 erschwert haben. Durch die Fokussierung auf die Normdurchsetzung hat man versucht, die bis dahin auf die Gesetzgebung und die Gesetzen-Geschichte fokussierte rechtshistorische Forschung in Osteuropa zu überwinden und die weiteren Rechtsakteure – insbesondere die Gerichte und Richter – stärker zu berücksichtigen. Mit drei Bänden ist Osteuropa in den Forschungsergebnissen des Projektes Das Europa der Diktatur: Wirtschaftskontrolle und Recht vertreten. Osteuropa ist auch im Projekt Juristische Zeitschriften in Europa sowie im Buch Juristen: ein biographisches Lexikon; von der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert vertreten. Auf die große Runde der Osterweiterung der Europäischen Union 2004 hat das Institut mit dem mehrjährigen, internationalen Grossprojekt Rechtskulturen des modernen Osteuropa. Traditionen und Transfers reagiert. Begründet schien die Vermutung, dass das Paradigma organischen Wachstums des Rechts im Falle Osteuropas durch die Beobachtung von Sprüngen und Transfers, Aufoktroyierungen und Vermischungen, schnellen Änderungen und Synthesen zu ersetzen war. Im Ergebnis ist eine solide Grundlage für eine Vergewisserung über rechtskulturelle Identitäten und Differenzen von West und Ost entstanden. 2006 wurde ein kleineres Folgeprojekt, Koexistenz und Konflikt: Die Rechtsordnungen Südosteuropas im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, geplant. Es ist nicht so umfangreich realisiert worden, als ursprünglich gedacht wurde. Deswegen sind aber gewisse Themen noch immer für die Forschung herausfordernd. Seit 2014 arbeitet man an einem Handbuch mit dem Titel Außergerichtliche und gerichtliche Konfliktlösung. Handbuch zur Geschichte der Konfliktlösung. Es sollen auch Beiträge aus Osteuropa veröffentlicht werden. Für die ältesten Epochen der osteuropäischen Rechtsgeschichte wichtig ist die bereits Jahrzehnte laufende Erforschung des byzantinischen Rechts. Rückblickend kann man feststellen, dass Ost-Europa sehr davon profitiert hat, dass das Max-Planck-Institut für europäische Rechtsgeschichte von Anfang an als ein Gegengewicht zur traditionellen europäischen Rechtsgeschichte begriffen wurde. Das heißt, die Rechtsgeschichte nicht als ausschließlich oder vorwiegend nationale bzw. staatliche Geschichte zu verstehen. ; Tekst prikazuje dugu i uspješnu tradiciju pravnopovijesnog i teorijskopravnog istraživanja istočne Europe u Max-Planck-Institutu za europsku pravnu povijest u Frankfurtu na Majni. Istočna je Europa odgovarajuće bila zastupljena već u jednom od najvećih pothvata Instituta, u Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren europäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte (Priručnik vrela i literature novije europske povijesti privatnog prava), izdavanom od 1973. Na slom socijalizma Institut je 1994. godine reagirao velikim projektom Normdurchsetzung in den osteuropäischen Nachkriegsgesellschaften (1944-1989) (Provedba normi u istočnoeuropskim poslijeratnim društvima /1944-1989/). U njegovom su žarištu bili dugoročni povijesni procesi od 1944. bis 1989. godine, koji su otežavali onaj val moderniziranja nakon 1990. Fokusiranjem na provedbu normi pokušano je prevladati ono do tada na zakonodavstvo i povijest zakona fokusirano historjskopravno istraživanje i istočnoj Europi te snažnije uzeti u obzir daljnje prane aktere, posebice sudove i sudce. Trima tomovima istočna Europa je zastupljena u istraživačkim rezultatima projekta Das Europa der Diktatur: Wirtschaftskontrolle und Recht (Europa diktature: kontrola gospodarstva i pravo). Zastupljena je i u projektu Juristische Zeitschriften in Europa (Pravnički časopisi u Europi), kao i u leksikonu Juristen: ein biographisches Lexikon; von der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert (Pravnici: biografski leksikon; od antike do 20. stoljeća). Na veliku rundu istočnog proširenja Europske unije Institut je 2004. odgovorio višegodišnjim, međunarodnim velikim projektom Rechtskulturen des modernen Osteuropa. Traditionen und Transfers (Pravne kulture moderne istočne Europe. Tradicije i transferi). Utemeljenim se je činilo naslućivanje, Utemeljenom se činila pretpostavka da paradigma organskog rasta prava u slučaju istočne Europe treba biti nadomještena promatranjem skokova i transfera, oktroiranja i miješanja, brzih promjena i sinteza. Kao rezultat nastao je solidan temelj za upoznavanje pravnokulturnih identiteta i razlika između istoka i zapada. 2006. planiran je, kao nastavak, manji projekt Koexistenz und Konflikt: Die Rechtsordnungen Südosteuropas im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Koegzistencija i konflikt: pravni poredci jugoistočne Europe u 19. i 20. stoljeću). Nije realiziran u onom obujmu u kojem je početno planiran. Ali zbog toga su neke njegove teme i dalje izazov za istraživanje. Od 2014. nastaje priručnik Außergerichtliche und gerichtliche Konfliktlösung. Handbuch zur Geschichte der Konfliktlösung (Izvansudsko i sudsko rješavanje konflikata. Priručnik za povijest rješavanja konflikata) u kojem će biti objavljeni i prilozi iz istočne Europe. Za najstarije epohe istočnoeuropske pravne povijesti važno je već desetljećima trajuće istraživanje bizantskog prava. Ako se osvrne unatrag, može se reći da je istočna Europa veoma profitirala od toga, da je Max-Planck-Institut für europäische Rechtsgeschichte od svog početka bio pojmljen kao protuteža tradicionalnoj europskoj pravnoj povijesti. A to znači, pravnu povijest više ne shvaćati kao isključivo ili pretežno nacionalnu odnosno državnu povijest. ; This text shows the long and successful tradition of legal historical and theoretical Eastern European research in the Max-Planck-Institute for European legal history in Frankfurt am Main. Eastern Europe had already been appropriately represented in one of the Institute's largest undertakings in the Source and Literature of the newer European History of Private Law Handbook (Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren europäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte) published since 1973. With the fall of socialism, the Institute in 1994 reacted with a significant project entitled Implementation of Norms in Eastern European post war societies 1944/1989. (Normdurchsetzung in den osteuropäischen Nachkriegsgesellschaften 1994/ 1989). Its core comprised long term historical processes from 1944 to 1989 which hindered the wave of modernisation after 1990. By focusing on the implementation of norms, an attempt was made to overrule on what till then in legislation and legal history legal Eastern European research had focused and to more strongly take into consideration further legal participants, in particular courts and judges. Eastern Europe is represented in three volumes in the research results of the project entitled European Dictatorship: control of the economy and law (Das Europa der Diktatur: Wirtschaftskontrolle und Recht). It is also represented in the project entitled Lawyers: biographical lexicon from ancient times to the 20th century – legal journals in Europe (Juristische Zeitschriften in Europa), At the big round of Eastern expansion of the European Union, the Institute in 2004 responded many a several year long, international significant project entitled Legal Cultures of modern Eastern Europe, Traditions and Transfers (Rechtskulturen des modernen Osteuropa. Traditionen und Transfers). Pre-sentiment seemed to be founded, what was founded seemed to be the presumption that the paradigm of organic growth of law in the case of Eastern Europe should be replaced by observing leaps and transfers, impositions and interference, fast changes and syntheses. A substantial foundation for becoming acquainted with legal cultural identities and differences between the East and the West occurred as a result. In 2006 a smaller project entitled Coexistence and Conflict: legal organisation of South Eastern Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries (Koexistenz und Konflikt: Die Rechtsordnungen Südosteuropas im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert) was planned, as a continuation. It was not carried out to the extent it was planned initially. However, because of this, some of its topics are still a research challenge. Since 2014, the handbook entitled Extra-court and Court Solutions for resolving Conflict (Außergerichtliche und gerichtliche Konfliktlösung. Handbuch zur Geschichte der Konfliktlösung) has been published in which contributions from Eastern Europe will be published. For the oldest epoch of Eastern European legal history, the decade long research into Byzantine law is most important. If we refer backwards, it can be said that Eastern Europe profited greatly from this, that the Max-Planck-Institute for European legal history from its very inception was defined as an anti-thesis to traditional European legal history. That means, legal history is no longer considered as exclusively or mostly national or state history.

El objetivo general de la tesis es el estudio y puesta a disposición de la comunidad científica de la obra de Federico Rodríguez, dentro del más amplio de reconstruir la doctrina española en la materia. Esta debe quedar enmarcada dentro de los cambios en el estilo de vida europeo de los últimos dos siglos. En cuanto a la metodología, hemos estudiado el pensamiento político y económico de la época, pues la Política social resulta ser una mediación entre lo político y lo económico. Después hemos hecho el traslado de estas ideas a la realidad española, para estudiar la obra del catedrático hasta hoy más relevante de la historia académica de la disciplina. Todo ello, con una revisión bibliográfica profusa en la primera parte y exhaustiva en la segunda. La aparición de la Política social responde a las circunstancias de una época o zeitgeist. Como cualquier otra disciplina social, se puede estudiar a posteriori, entendiendo el acontecer humano inserto en la «razón histórica». Cuatro son los elementos más relevantes que dan carácter a esta época. El Estado social, forma política que asume novedosamente responsabilidades respecto al bienestar económico y moral de los ciudadanos. Su instrumento fundamental será el derecho. La aparición de la Economía política, que constituye un nuevo marco económico público, cambiando la orientación de la economía, hasta ahora circunscrita al ámbito privado familiar. Las revoluciones sociales europeas, fundamentalmente la de 1848, instalan la idea de que el orden establecido no es natural e inamovible, sino manipulable. Las revoluciones ya no serán políticas, sino sociales, pues toda la estructura social es injusta y hay que rehacerla desde sus fundamentos. El industrialismo produce una abundancia material desconocida hasta entonces y una pauperización de la nueva clase obrera que ha venido a nutrir las fábricas. Todos ello genera la idea de que es posible resolver los conflictos humanos de forma definitiva a través de un orden positivo racional. No se advierte que el problema no es técnico, sino ontológico. Federico Rodríguez desarrolla su obra cuando circunstancias se dan en España con la fuerza con que antes se habían dado en otros países. Tres son las influencias más destacables en su obra: la Socialpolitik germánica; la Doctrina social católica; y el marxismo. Rodrígeuz se dará como misión el establecimiento de un estatuto científico para la disciplina Política social, de gran prestigio como actividad estatal, pero abandonada en los universidades. Su modelo es la Socialpolitik, encabezada por Gustav Schmoller en Alemania, donde está ampliamente asentado el trabajo intelectual en la materia. Para este, la Política social es una corrección ética de la economía liberal, que ha producido diversos trastornos en el orden social. La Doctrina social católica, como la Socialpolitik, ofrecen una visión ecléctica de la solución de los problemas sociales. Ni socialismo, ni liberalismo a ultranza. El magisterio católico aportará una visión humanista, fijando el centro y criterio rector del análisis y solución de la cuestión social en el hombre. Por último, el marxismo le parece acertado en el análisis del conflicto entre las clases, pero equivocado en las soluciones. La Política social resulta ser para Rodríguez una disciplina académica y una actividad práctica para afrontar los problemas sociales. Fundamentalmente, consiste en una rectificación ética de la economía, teniendo como centro el ser humano. Para ello habrá que reformar tres instituciones sociales: la propiedad, el trabajo (respecto a la relación de salariado), y la empresa. El agente impulsor principal ha de ser el Estado, pero prevaleciendo siempre el principio de subsidiariedad. En este asunto no es útil ningún tipo de totalitarismo, estatal o empresarial, sino cierto equilibrio de fuerzas. ABSTRACT: The overall aim of the thesis is to study and made available to the scientific community the work of Federico Rodriguez, within the broader analysis of Spanish doctrine on the matter. This should be framed within the changes in the European way of life of the last two centuries. About methodology, we have studied the political and economic thinking of the time, as Social Policy is a mediation between the political and the economic. After we have made the transfer of these ideas to the Spanish reality, to study the work of the most relevant Professor in the academic history of the discipline till today. All this, with a profuse literature review in the first half and exhaustive in the second. Social Policy emerged inside the circumstances of an age or zeitgeist. Like any other social discipline it can be studied retrospectively, inserting human events into the "historical reason." Four are the most important elements that give character to this epoch. The political form Social State, which innovatively assumes some responsibilities of economic and moral welfare of the citizens. Its fundamental instrument is the law. The emergence of Political Economy gives a new public economic framework, changing the orientation of the economy, so far confined to the domestic environment. European social revolutions, mainly the one of 1848, installed the idea that the established order is not natural and fixed, but manipulable. Revolutions are no longer political, but social, because the whole social structure is unfair and it must be remade from its foundations. Industrialism produces a hitherto unknown material wealth and the impoverishment of the new working class that has come to work in factories. All this creates the idea that it is possible to solve human conflicts permanently through a positive rational order. It does not realized that the problem is not technical but ontological. Federico Rodriguez developed his work when all these circumstances arise in Spain with the force that had previously been given in other countries. Three are the most significant influences on his work: the German Socialpolitik; Catholic Social Doctrine; and Marxism. Rodríguez mission was to establish a scientific status for Social Policy as discipline, highly valued as a State activity, but abandoned in the universities. His model is the Socialpolitik, headed by Gustav von Schmoller in Germany, where it is widely seated the intellectual work on the matter. For this one, Social policy means an ethical correction of liberal economics, which has produced various disorders in the social order. Catholic social doctrine, as Socialpolitik, offers an eclectic vision of solving social problems too. Neither socialism nor liberalism at any cost. The Catholic social teaching provides a humanistic vision. It sets the center and criterion governing the analysis and solution of the social question at the human being. Finally, Marxism seems successful in analyzing the conflict between classes, but wrong in solutions. To Rodríguez, Social policy is to be an academic discipline and a practical activity to address social problems. Fundamentally, implies an ethical rectification of the economy, centered on human development. For this, three social institutions must be reformed: property, work (regarding the salary labor relationship) and enterprise. The main driver agent must be the State, but always prevailing the principle of subsidiarity. To this issue no totalitarianism, public or private, is useful, but a balance of forces.

yönetim yapısı ve bu yönetim yapısı çerçevesinde yerel yönetimlerinin değerlendirilmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Böyle bir incelemeye geçilmeden önce hem demokrasi hem de yerel yönetimler açısından zengin tarihi tecrübesi bulunan Türkiye'nin yerel yönetim sistemi incelenmekte, sonrasında ise Türkmenistan'ın genel yönetim yapısı ve yerel yönetimleri anlatılmakta ve bu bilgiler ı?ığında Türkmenistan ile Türkiye'nin yerel yönetim sisteminin kar?ıla?tırılması yapılmaktadır. Böyle bir kar?ıla?tırma, hem genel yönetim hem de yerel yönetimler olarak her iki ülkenin farklılıklarını ve benzerliklerini ortaya koymakta, her iki ülkenin yerel yönetimler konusundaki tecrübesi aydınlatılmakta ve demokrasinin önemli kurumlarından olan yerel yönetimlerin daha da geli?tirilmesi açısından her iki ülkenin birbirlerinin tecrübelerinden faydalanabilmesinin yolu aranmaktadır. Günümüzde birçok ülkenin yönetimi, merkezden yönetim ve yerinden yönetim ilkelerine göre düzenlenmektedir. Kamu hizmetlerinin tek bir merkezden v yönetilmesine merkezden yönetim denirken yerinden yönetim ise kamu hizmetlerinin merkez hiyerar?isi dı?ındaki kamu tüzel ki?iliklerince görülmesidir. Devletler merkezden yönetimle kamu hizmetlerini görmede yeterli olamamalarından dolayı tarihsel geli?im içerisinde yerel bazdaki hizmetleri görmek ve yerel halkın mü?terek ihtiyaçlarını gidermeye yönelik, merkezi idare te?kilatından ayrı olarak ama yine de merkezi idare tarafından denetlenen kamu tüzel kurulu?ları kurma yoluna gitmi?lerdir. Dolayısıyla zaman içerisinde devletler hem merkezden yönetim te?kilatına hem de yerinden yönetim te?kilatına sahip olmu?lardır. Yani yönetim sistemleri karma yönetim sistemine dönü?mü? ve böyle bir karma yönetim sistemi de günümüzde birçok ülke tarafından benimsenmi?tir. Türkiye'nin yerel yönetim kurumlarını il özel idareleri, belediyeler ve köy yönetimleri olu?turmaktadır. Büyük yerle?im yerleri içinde özel yönetimler getirilebilmekte ve büyük?ehir belediyeleri böyle bir düzenlemenin sonucudurlar. Türkiye'de bu mahalli idare kurumlarının her biri için ayrı kanun kabul edilmi?tir ve bu kanunlarda kurulu?ları, görevleri, organları, te?kilatları ve diğer açılardan düzenlenmi?lerdir. Türkmenistan'ın Anayasasında öngörülen ba?lıca yerel yönetim kurulu?u belediyelerdir. Türkmenistan'ın Anayasasının 16. maddesine göre Türkmenistan'ın mülki yönetim bölümleri illerden, il statüsünde olan ?ehirlerden, ilçelerden, ilçe statüsünde olan ?ehirlerden, ilçedeki ?ehirlerden, kasabalar ve genge?liklerden olu?maktadır. ?ller, il statüsü olan ?ehir, ilçeler, ilçe statüsü olan ?ehirler düzeyinde mahalli hizmetler yetki geni?liği ilkesine göre kurulan valilikler tarafından yerine getirilir. Belediyeler; ilçedeki ?ehirler, kasabalar ve genge?liklerde kurulur. Genge?likler bir veya birkaç köyün birle?mesinden olu?ur. Türkiye'deki il özel idarelerine benzer ve yerinden yönetim ilkesine göre kurulan herhangi bir kurulu? Türkmenistan'da bulunmamaktadır. Türkmenistan'da köy yönetimleri için de ayrı bir kanun düzenlenmemi?tir. Dolayısıyla Türkmenistan'ın yerel yönetim sistemi belediyelerden olu?ur. Büyük yerle?im yerleri için özel yönetim ?ekli olan büyük ?ehir belediyeciliği de Türkmenistan'da bulunmaz. Büyük?ehir belediyeciliğine benzer olan ?ehir valilikleri bulunur. Nüfusu otuz binin üzerinde olan ?ehirlere ilçe statüsü verilir ve bu ?ehirlerin valilikleri bulunur. Türkmenistan'da belediyeler genge?liklerde, nüfusları iki binin üzerinde olankasabalarda ve nüfusları sekiz binin üzerinde olan ilçedeki ?ehirlerde kurulurlar ve sınırları da bu mülki bölümlerin sınırlarından olu?ur. Türkmenistan'da belediye ba?kanları hem merkezi hükümetin temsilcisi hem de yerel yönetim kurulu?u olan belediyenin ba?ıdır. Merkezi hükümetin temsilcisi olmasından dolayı valiye kar?ı sorumludur. Belediye ba?kanı, belediye meclisi üyeleri arasından belediye meclisi tarafından seçilir. Türkiye'deki gibi doğrudan halk tarafından seçilmemektedir. ; In this study it is aimed to analyze general administrative structure and the local governments within the general administrative structure of Turkmenistan, one of the CIS countries, which have gained independence after collapsing of USSR and which are in transition period from the remnants of socialism and totalitarianism to democracy. Before such an analysis, the local governments in Turkey which has rich historical experience of democracy and local governments are studied, and then Turkmenistan?s general administrative structure and local governments are discussed and in the light of these discussions local governments of Turkey and Turkmenistan are compared. Such a comparison gives differences and similarities of countries from the standpoint of general administration and local governments and the local government experience of both countries are enlightened and the way of benefiting from both countries? local government experience from the standpoint of improving local governments as one of the important institutions of democracy is sought. In our days many countries are governed with principles of centralization and decentralization. In centralization public services are governed from one center and in decentralization the public services are rendered by public corporations out of the viii center hierarchy. States have established public corporations separate from central government organization hierarchy, but nevertheless controlled by the central government in order to render local services and to meet local needs of local people within the historical development due to the insufficiency of the centralization for rendering public services. Therefore the states had both central and local government organizations within time. Namely, government systems have been transformed into mixed system of government and such a mixed system of government is adopted by many countries. Turkey?s local government institutions are special provincial administrations, municipalities and village administrations. Special administrations can be established for large settlement places and metropolitan municipalities are the result of such arrangements. In Turkey a separate law was passed for each of these local government forms, and their foundation, duties, organs, organizations and other issues related with them are subject to these laws. The main local government form foreseen in the Constitution of Turkmenistan is municipalities. In accordance with 16th Article of the Constitution of Turkmenistan the civilian administration divisions are consisted of provinces, cities with status of provinces, counties, cities with status of counties, cities in counties, towns and gengeshliks. Local services in the level of provinces, cities with status of counties, counties are rendered by governorships established based on the rule of delegation of authorities. Municipalities are established in the cities in counties, towns and gengeshliks. Gengeshliks are formed by the union of one or more villages. There aren?t any institutions like special provincial administrations in Turkey and which are established based on decentralization. Moreover, there is no special act passed for village administrations in Turkmenistan. Therefore, the local government system of Turkmenistan is mainly consisted of municipalities. Special government forms like metropolitan municipalities also do not exist in Turkmenistan. Instead, there exist city governorships similar to metropolitan municipalities. Cities with population more than thirty thousand people gain the county status and such cities are governed by city governorships. Municipalities in Turkmenistan are established in gengeshliks, towns with population more than two thousand people and in cities within counties and their boundaries are the boundaries of related civil administration divisions. In Turkmenistan mayors are representatives of the central government and the also the head of the municipality, the local government. Mayors are responsible to governor by their duty as representatives of central government. Mayor is elected by municipal council among the members of the municipal council. They are not elected by the people directly like in Turkey.

We provide to readers the 11th volume of the "Czech-Polish-Slovak Studies in Andragogy and Social Gerontology" series. We are delighted to announce that the presented study is the result of the work of scientists from seven countries: Austria, China, Ghana, Hungary, Japan, Poland, and Russia. This international collection of texts is part of the global discourse on the determinants of adult education and the functioning of people in late adulthood. The 11th volume is a collection of research results that show both the positive and negative dimensions of ageing through the prism of research experience from various geographical and cultural areas.
The researchers invited to the presented volume tried to illustrate the issues assigned to the following topics: ageing with dignity; retirement age; assumptions and conditions resulting from living in the home; the relationship between challenges concerning life expectancy and needs; care and ageing services; and foundations and potential changes in pension systems. The research results presented in this volume have a common denominator, which is caring for the quality of life of the older people regardless of their place of residence. Thus, the study "Between Successful and Unsuccessful Ageing: Selected Aspects and Contexts" brings new insights from scientists who scrupulously characterize the complexity of processes that affect the positive and negative conditions of functioning in old age, which is a mosaic of various nuances.
Inviting readers to familiarize themselves with the content of the monograph, we would like to thank the reviewers who contributed to the improvement of the quality of the texts and open new fields for participation in further joint publishing projects.

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