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The article is devoted to the critical analysis of the concept of ideology developed by Slavoj Žižek, the modern Slovenian philosopher. The author reveals the possibilities and limitations of Žižek's approach to understanding the phenomenon of ideology and considers the initial presumptions and methodological assumptions that this approach is based upon. The article shows that despite the indisputable originality, Žižek's theory is not devoid of contradictions, and the interpretation of ideology as an illusion and mystification, which is justified within the framework of Marxist political philosophy, loses its foundations in the context of the post-structuralist methodology. According to I.Demin's conclusion, Žižek's philosophical and political thinking falls prey to the scheme that Peter Sloterdijk defined as "mutual tracking of ideologies". Criticism of ideology here implies criticism of one ideo logy from the standpoint of another, or criticism of "bad" ideology from the standpoint of "good" ideology. The "criticizing" ideology is not clearly articulated, but implicitly assumed. The fact that the "critic" of ideology prefers not to reveal his own bias constitutes an integral part of the strategy of ideological criticism, as opposed to scientific criticism. Ideology as the principle that structures social reality obtains an allencompassing character in Žižek's interpretation, since it underlies all human actions and human thinking. However, if there is no way to separate ideology from scientific knowledge, to distinguish between ideology, philosophy and religion, it turns out that ideology is everything and nothing at the same time. With this interpretation, "ideology" becomes an unoperationalizable concept for Social and Political Sciences, and therefore useless. At the same time, a number of the provisions formulated by Žižek (on ideological "fastening", on the role of the enemy figure in the ideological discourse, etc.) may be in high demand in the course of developing an adequate methodological strate gy for studying the phenomenon of ideology, which distances itself from both "naïve" objectivist doctrines and the extremes of the political anti-essentialism and anti-universalism.

The article examines the relationship between the traditional group relations (intrafamily, clan, etc.) in the Arab society, which provide access to the political rent, and the processes of socio-political modernization and the building of civil institutions. The Arab governments usually explain the inefficiency or "deviations" in the work of such institutions by national characteristics, adherence to the idea of nation-building, etc., but never by the desire to preserve power and assets of the traditional elites that are based on group loyalty. One of the most common ways of accessing power in order to acquire and redistribute tangible and intangible benefits in the Arab world is Wasta, or a system of connections, based on group loyalty and client-patronage relationships. Loyalty to one's group that almost everyone belongs to by birth or due to certain life circumstances ensures the interests of the individual in the broadest sense. Wasta's network and group ties, based on the principles that are at odds with those that the civil society is built upon, impede the development and modernization of social and political institutions. While researchers have studied Wasta relations as such rather structurally, both at the micro-level (from the social network point of view) and at the macro-level (from the institutional point of view), the attempts to build a holistic model that considers Wasta simultaneously from both viewpoints have not yet been crowned with success. The article proposes the conceptualization of Wasta as social capital, which makes it possible to represent this type of relationship as one actor's "investment" and the other actor's "loan". One can also use this holistic model in the analysis of other informal ties inherent in other cultures but also based on group loyalty and client-patronage relationships and provide fertile soil for maintaining conservative order.

The article is devoted to the study of the phenomenon of meri tocracy, which arouses considerable interest today both in political journalism and academia. The article shows that meritocracy has largely become the ideo logy of modern neoliberal elites, and therefore often serves as a cover for the actual plutocracy. Although the framework of cognitive capitalism witnesses a certain movement towards meritocratic principles of the formation of elites, it simultaneously prepares ground for the emergence of a kind of "trap of meritocracy", when, for a number of reasons, the layer of "educated and talented" turns into a hereditary caste. At the same time, according to the author, the future hardly belongs to meritocrats, no matter how well they fit into the realities of the high-tech economy. New developments in artificial intelligence are jeopardizing many forms of intellectual work, leading to a cut-throat competition for a decreasing number of high-paying jobs. In turn, the bourgeois world of labor is being replaced by a post-capitalist world of idleness and creativity as the production of intangible goods. The rapid development of social media makes emotional and social intelligence, as well as the ability to achieve popularity and influence through media activities, increasingly important. In other words, modern technology makes life difficult for cognitive elites, while opening up enormous opportunities for very different social groups. In this regard, the author puts forward a hypothesis according to which popularity will become a key criterion for the formation of elites in the foreseeable future rather than merit. Postcapitalist personocracy will gradually replace bourgeois meritocracy, which, however, does not exclude the possibility of the preservation of the myth of meritocracy, implying that those who can skillfully attract attention will be assigned various merits.

The article presents a factual analysis of the origin and formation of the "party of power" in Russia. The work demonstrates that at all stages the Russian "party of power" was designed and controlled by the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation. The research carried out by the author shows that Russia's "party of power" does not meet the criteria that would allow to qualify this political party as dominant, in any of its "incarnations". This fully applies to the United Russia party that does not exert a significant impact on the appointments to the political and administrative positions and does not have any effect on the decisions that determine the state's policy. The dominance of the United Russia party in the electoral field is ensured primarily by the electoral corruption, as well as by the fact that its "electoral machine" is represented by the system of public authorities at all levels, from federal to local. In turn, the dominance of this party in the State Duma and the rigid and strictly hierarchical administrative structure that it built in the lower chamber of the Russian Parliament allows the Presidential Administration to control the legislative process and parliamentary activity in general. According to the author's conclusion, the "party of power" is an externally controlled political organization of a party type that protects the interests of Russia's ruling nomenklatura and implements its goals in the processes of the formation of public authorities through electoral procedures, as well as in the course of the legislative and parliamentary activity. Not only does such an organization fail to meet the criteria of the dominant party, but it also fails to fully correspond to the concept of a political party per se.

The problem of the sustainability of the political system is one of the most pressing issues in Political Science. The wave of social and political upheavals that took place in the 21st century in various countries requires studying the factors that determine the ability of modern political systems to maintain their essential features in case of undesirable conditions. Today it is already obvious that the sustainability of the political system, mechanisms and principles of its functioning depends not only and, perhaps, not as much on the socio-economic sphere, the development of democratic institutions or the presence/absence of a destructive external influence, as it is often assumed. Rather, intra-systemic characteristics play a key role. The multidimensionality of the manifestation and the multifactorial nature of the formation of stable political systems not only determine the possibility of a huge number of definitions of sustainability, but also give rise to considerable difficulties in measuring it. The authors analyze the political system of Kazakhstan using the sustainability index that they developed earlier. The study shows that throughout most of the post-Soviet history of the country, the level of the sustainability of its political system was above average, and now Kazakhstan already surpasses Russia and Ukraine in this parameter and is approaching Belarus. Moreover, if the existing trends continue, the sustainability of the political system of Kazakhstan in the short term will only increase. According to the authors' conclusion, this trend is hard to reverse unless there is a force majeure in the global economy or new military and political threats emerge, which the republic will not be able to tackle without resorting to the help of allies.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the concept of supreme power, which, according to the author, is undeservedly neglec ted by the modern Political Science. Despite the high importance of this concept, its definition is lacking in dictionaries, as well as most textbooks and reviews. Legal Science and State Studies have known this concept at least since the 16th century. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, due to the works of such scientists as Boris Chicherin, Alexander Alekseev, Nikolay Korkunov, Georg Jellinek, Lev Tikhomirov, Petr Kazansky the academic consensus was formed that supreme power can be defined as legally unlimited, complete and unconditional power in the state. At the beginning of the 21st century, the interest in this category has revived, which resulted, in particular, in the previous concepts becoming relevant again. After having critically analyzed the existing ideas of the Russian researchers on this topic, the author comes to the conclusion that elaboration of the relevant theory of the supreme power that lives up to the modern level of knowledge, requires interdisciplinary approach and combined effort from lawyers, political scientists, historians, and sociologists. Having convincingly demonstrated that today this task is still far from being complete, he focuses on a number of key problems for the development of such a theory and outlines possible directions for finding their solution. According to his conclusion, the category "supreme power" has a significant heuristic potential, and its "return" to political, as well as constitutional and legal, science would enrich their methodological tools. In particular, its application to the analysis of political systems makes it possible to discern behind the facade of the constitutional separation of powers not only who governs (i.e., exercises this or that authority granted by the constitution), but also who rules i.e., has the right to make final decisions on key issues of political life.

AbstractThe mechanics of claims focusses predominantly on the claim to life. The claim to life is rooted in the autonomy principle, just like other specific claims. Still, the mechanics of claims does not have a systematic place for the fundamental negation of the status as an autonomous being as such. It is, however, the proctiction of the status as such, which is at the center of the protection of human dignity in German constitutional law. Looked at it from this perspective, the protection of human dignity as the protection of the status of an autonomous human being, appears to be a blind spot of the mechanics of claims. The comment attempts to show, how this blindspot leads to inconsistencies in the mechanics of claims, and how they might be ameliorated if human dignity is considered as an absolute right independent of the claims to life.

AbstractThe COVID-19 pandemic has raised many intriguing questions both in the EU and globally, from the critical task of safeguarding lives to technical legal issues about competences to regulate health as well as the boundaries of emergency laws. This paper is interested in the connection between non-domination theory and the EU's constitutional structure in the context of emergency laws. A key theme of the paper is that risk and emergencies are nothing new in an EU context, but concepts used by the legislator in a wide range of policy areas which give rise to a number of constitutional challenges. The paper sketches out the main characteristics of non-domination and republication theory and addresses the question of how and why the notion of non-domination may be useful for understanding the EU constitutionalism venture in the framework of risk and emergency laws.

AbstractThe obligation to provide reasons (e.g. in Art. 296 TFEU) may appear rather a simple and straightforward, but in actual practice—as the mutually antagonistic Weiss rulings of the CJEU and the German Bundesverfassungsgericht ("BVG") amply demonstrate—is fraught with constitutional complication. On the one side, there lies the concern with a deeply intrusive form of judicial review which substitutes judicially determined "good" reasons for those of the reviewee decisionmaker—legislatures, administrative agencies, or, as in Weiss, the European Central Bank (ECB). On the other side lies the concern with judicial abdication in the face of technical expertise, uncertainty and complexity, turning the reason-giving requirement into a mere façade thereby placing democratic accountability in the modern administrative state beyond law's remit. Either way, normatively and conceptually, we seem left with a half-way house only. Drawing on the recent US administrative law discourse—the neo-Fullerian concept of an "internal morality of law" (Sunstein / Vermeule) and democratic experimentalism (Sabel / Kessler)—this paper explores the concept of process review as tertium datur. Process review responds to concerns over the rule of law and administrative discretion through indirect, procedural safeguards, by imposing requirements of reasoned justification, rather than through wholesale invalidation or aggressive substantive review.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the so called impossibility theorem, according to which democracy, state sovereignty and globalization are mutually exclusive and cannot function to the full extent when present simultaneously. This theorem, elaborated in 2011 by Dani Rodrik, a famous economist from Harvard University, poses a fundamental problem about the prospects of the global scalability of political institutions of the nation-state. Is it in principle possible to globalize executive, legislative and judicial branches of power, civil society, and democracy, or is it necessary to limit globalization in order to preserve democracy and nation-state? Rodrik's conclusions, in essence, make one give up hopes to create global democratic order against the background of global capitalism. On the basis of the Stanford School of Sociological Institutionalism and the reconstruction of the historical materialism by Jürgen Habermas, the author refutes Rodrik's theorem. The author's analysis shows that not only is it possible to build democratic order at the global level, but also that it already exists in the form of the world culture that includes such norms as electoral democracy, nation-state, civil society and other institutions of Modernity. The world culture reproduces fundamental social values, playing the role of social integration for the humanity, while global capitalism provides for its material reproduction, playing the role of system integration. However, since globalization is a more dynamic process than the development of the world culture, between material and ideational universalism arises a gap, which in its turn is fraught with various kinds of political and economic crises.

In the 1990s, after the collapse of the USSR, was established the Russian polity, which continues to exist to this day. In this paper polity is understood as a macro-social community, united by a certain political order i.e., by a stable set of institutions and actors, as well as normative standards for organizing their interactions, both formal and informal. Establishment is understood as a series of events that establish these most fundamental frameworks for political action, as well as a repertoire of its scenarios, behavioral stereotypes, strategies, and tactics. The negative myth about the nineties, which has dominated the Russian public discourse in the recent years, describes the 1990s as a time of catastrophe and degradation. It certainly has its reasons, but this myth almost completely ignores the fact that the same decade was also a time of creation. Thus, the current state of Russia cannot be understood without paying attention to the circumstances of its establishment. The article describes some of the key features of the modern Russian polity that emerged in the 1990s — the "main takeaway" of the constituent era. They are the following: the electoral legitimacy of the supreme political power; non-partisan presidency; capitalism as the economic foundation of the political order; federalism as a principle of territorial organization of political space; freedom of association; freedom of religion; open borders. This list is not exhaustive: there are other elements of the design of the Russian polity that can claim the status of constitutive ones. However, a radical change in all these institutions together or in any one of them individually would mean another re-establishment of the political community as a whole.

The article attempts to examine the era of the 1990s through the prism of communication in the system "center — regions". The author interprets the epoch itself as a special, chaotic state of affairs. The political structures and instruments inherited by the new Russia from the Soviet times did not disappear, but lost their foundation (which corresponded to the model of Russian power described by Yuri Pivovarov), transformed into the mode of an autonomous drift along unauthorized trajectories. The new foundation ("the path of civilized countries") came into conflict with the structures and instruments themselves. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the rejection of that foundation deprived the political center of its legitimacy, since it was perceived and legitimized as a driver of the transition from socialism into the world of "civilized countries". The article shows that it was the space of dialogue (bargaining) between the center and the regions that combined the principles of the Russian power and a new legitimizing foundation stemming from the "civilized countries" The author identifies three stages of such a dialogue. During the first stage, there was no adaptation, and the dialogue ended with a violent confrontation. As a result, two parallel realities emerged — the reality of legal norms and declarations and the reality of survival. The second stage, labeled by the author as "taming Europe", witnessed democratic procedures uniting with the practices of the Russian power and recreation of the distributive economy at the regional level. At the same time, the dual legitimacy of the regional rulers — from the regional community and from the federal center — bound the country's territory much stronger than enforcement agencies or future "spiritual staples". The last stage, which is usually considered to take place after the 1990s, is associated with the transfer of practices that have developed in the regions to the center. However, according to the author's conclusion, this is not the end of the constituent era and the formation of the polity, but a continuation of the quest.

Abstract
There is a perennial ambiguity in the rule-of-law preposition: it predicates that the law shall rule, but which law? This legal loophole has led to a diverse array of interpretations of the concept. Of these, two appear particularly adverse to what the rule of law should primarily be—the rulership of the law—yet still remain dominant. On the one hand, the rule of law is intended to be the vehicle to deliver above-the-law goods such as human rights or other individual entitlements like property, and to forever shield them against any other force, including the law. On the other hand, the rule of law is believed to be a tool at the rulers' disposal, who make use of the law but are not bound by it, for either legal or practical reasons. In both cases, a pre-legal setting for society allocates rulership to something but not the law, against the very essence of the ideal: an authoritative legal practice for the sake of regulating the present society. As such, the rule of law has to meet certain requirements of craftsmanship, like conditions in law-making and law-enforcement, and sources, which are to be democratically underpinned.