Suchergebnisse

Duverger's law postulates that single-member plurality electoral systems lead to two-party systems. Existing scholarship regards India as an exception to this law at national level, but not at district level. This study tests the latter hypothesis through analysis of a comprehensive dataset covering Indian parliamentary elections in the period 1952—2004. The results show that a large number of Indian districts do not conform to the Duvergerian norm of two-party competition, and that there is no consistent movement towards the Duvergerian equilibrium. Furthermore, inter-region and inter-state variations in the size of district-level party systems make it difficult to generalize about the application of Duverger's law to the Indian case. The study concludes that a narrow focus on electoral rules is inadequate, and that a more comprehensive set of explanatory variables is needed to explain the size of the Indian party system even at the district level.

Party identification, the psychological bond between citizens and a political party, is one of the central variables in understanding political behavior. This article argues that such party ties are also a measure of party system institutionalization from the standpoint of the public. We apply Converse's model of partisan learning to 36 nations surveyed as part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. We find that electoral experience and parental socialization are strong sources of partisanship, but the third-wave democracies also display evidence of latent socialization carried over from the old regime. The results suggest that party identities can develop in new democracies if the party system creates the conditions to develop these bonds.

Political parties play a pivotal role by mobilizing citizens to participate in the political process. This may be particularly important in new democracies, where party attachments are weak and voter turnout is low. Using data drawn from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), we examine citizens' reported contact with political parties during a national campaign across a range of democracies. We find that rates of reported contact are lower in new democracies and that on average citizens appear to be less engaged in the political process. Nevertheless, parties in new democracies appear to be more likely to target citizens than in old democracies. Their efforts lead them to be just as successful at stimulating political participation.

There has been little scholarly attention paid to the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) despite the fact that it represents an influential faction within the Democratic Party. As a result, questions remain about the institutional character of the DLC, particularly with respect to its ideological structure and coherence. This represents a missed opportunity to examine the formation, operation and success (or failure) of ideological factions. The present article begins to address this oversight by examining the ideology of members of the House New Democrat Coalition. After a brief conceptual and historical description of the DLC, I offer an explanation of the Third Way, the DLC's guiding philosophy. Having established a set of expectations about DLC members, I then examine the ideological make-up of New Democrats in the 106th House of Representatives. Using ADA, National Journal and DW-NOMINATE scores, I attempt to determine whether New Democrats are ideologically distinct from their more traditional (i.e. liberal) colleagues. The results indicate that they are, though the differences may be confined to economic issues. And while ideological moderation helps explain membership in the House New Democrat Coalition, electoral vulnerability also plays a role.

Using the Harmel and Janda model of external shocks and party change, this article explores the reaction of the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) to its unprecedented exile in opposition after 1994, focusing on the period before the 1998 parliamentary election. As an office-seeker par excellence forced into an alien environment, the CDA provides an ideal test-case for investigating how a party adapts in such circumstances. The article argues that various dimensions of party change can be identified following 1994, but that in contrast to developments in party leadership, internal factional balance, strategy and organization, programmatic change was less extensive. It is argued that the explanation for this lies in the nature of the Dutch party system, the history of the CDA and the party's secondary yet still important goal of ideology.

This is a comprehensive study of the special legislation on political parties around the world. In a survey conducted in late 2003, 39 party laws (PLs) identified among the world's states were subjected to a systematic content analysis which confirmed the hypothesis that PLs regulate political parties differently depending on the democratic status of the respective countries. In non-democratic states, regimes tend to use PLs to restrict the freedom of their opponents, while in newly democratized states, democratic regimes use the law to counteract lingering anti-democratic tendencies. In some stable democracies, the PL is primarily a prerequisite for regulation of public party subsidies and political finance. The article concludes with some reflections on PLs in established democratic states.

Unless they have been content to remain defiantly on the oppositional fringe, or transform themselves into supporters of market economics, few of Europe's communist parties, west or east, have found it easy to adapt to the collapse of `actually existing socialism'. This is especially true of those that have not played down their past. This article looks at one exception, the Cypriot party, AKEL, which has managed to modernize policy, improve its electoral position, and play an important role in government at the same time as maintaining its communist subculture and symbols. It demonstrates, in keeping with Panebianco's `genetic' approach, how the party's origins and development, as well as leadership skill and the special circumstances of a small, divided island, have contributed to the organizational and ideological flexibility that help explain its relative success. It finishes by asking whether this success can continue in the long term.

The article provides a systematic test of the consequences of electoral rules for the format of party systems and the frequency of single-party majority cabinets. The test is based on Lijphart's 1994 dataset (extended to 1 November 2002), but excludes some of his cases and introduces an additional indicator of number of parties. Thanks to these changes in research design, the variance explained by multivariate regression is much higher than Lijphart's results, especially in respect of elective parties. However, the post-1990 data reflect a decline in the predictive power of the main independent variable (`effective' threshold). In explaining this decline, the author argues that account should be taken of a previously neglected factor, i.e. the growing destructuration of Western parties and party systems since the late 1980s. Indeed, entering an indicator of such a process into regressions (total net volatility) compensates for all the threshold's lost explanatory power, thus suggesting that structural consolidation is a crucial condition for the operation of electoral systems.

The context of support for a range of minor parties in the United Kingdom is identified using ward-level aggregate data from the 2004 European elections in London. Four parties in particular, namely Respect, Green, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the British National Party (BNP), which collectively obtained 3 in 10 of all European votes cast in London and performed well at the subsequent general election in 2005, are considered. Bivariate and multivariate analyses, employing socio-economic and political variables, show that for each of the four parties there is an identifiable and reasonably welldefined ward-level context of support. Regression models help to explain around three-quarters of variance in vote support. Strong similarities are found in the context of support for the anti-European Union UKIP and the far-right, anti-immigrant BNP. Close study of the geography of support shows that while the spread of votes for minor parties is fairly homogeneous across some boroughs, in others there is a fair degree of heterogeneity.