Suchergebnisse

Developing a diagnostic and action framework for donor-assisted governance reform in conflict-affected countries and fragile states was the objective of a program implemented by the World Bank's Social Development Department (SDV) and funded by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The first phase of the program developed lessons and outcomes based upon a review of international experience of governance reform in fragile and conflict-affected states. A major objective was to identify specific approaches and activities that will be most effective in strengthening institutions, promoting transparency and accountability, and enhancing capacity at local and national levels. This phase also derived lessons on the utility and shortcomings of governance-related diagnostic tools in designing and evaluating country strategies and programs in fragile states. A key issue concerns methodology. What type of analytical method provides a more useful assessment: country-specific analyses of the political economy, indicators designed for purposes of cross-country comparison, indices that rank state fragility, or some combination of diagnostic tools? The second phase of the program also was in two parts. Cote d'Ivoire's poverty reduction strategy process was used as an entry point for an initiative that facilitated process and method-oriented exercises for local stakeholders on the how rather than the what of policy development in an effort to build governance capacity. One result is a model that may serve for future engagement in other fragile and conflict-affected countries. The second part of this phase is an ongoing effort to work with local partners in the Central African Republic and Chad to identify strategies that could strengthen access to justice at the local level. Activities include assessing the strengths and weaknesses of formal and informal justice systems and mapping community-based practices and informal justice systems, including some under the aegis of NGOs, as well as identifying possible linkages to state justice systems. The paper will first examine the concepts of state fragility and governance in terms of donor engagement. Part two will discuss the lessons (opportunities and constraints), diagnostic tools and entry points for governance reform. Part three will offer conclusions.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

Foreword by Professor Stathis Kalyvas, Oxford -- SECTION A: Technologies of Violence in Africa -- 1. Systemic and Epistemic Violence in Africa; Patricia Pinky Ndlovu: Chair of Sociology and Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Professor and Chair of Epistemologies of the Global South with Emphasis on Africa and Vice-Dean of Research in the "Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence" -- 2. Theoretical underpinnings of violence in Africa; Clive Tendai Zimunya: Lecturer of Philosophy and Obert Bernard Mlambo, Associate Professor of Classical Studies and History -- 3. Technologies of Violence in Africa; Obert Bernard Mlambo, Associate Professor of Classical Studies and History and Wesley Mwatwara, Historian -- 4. Of Exile as Violence in Lewis Nkosi's Thought; Tendayi Sithole, Department of Political Sciences -- 5. Africa and violence: the metamorphosis and the participation of Child soldiers in conflict zones; Toyin Cotties Adetiba, Department of Political and International Studies -- 6. Structural violence and resource curse in Angola -- 7. Violence against nature in Africa: a historical assessment; Marlino Eugénio Mubai, History, Environmental and Political Ecology -- SECTION B: The State and Violence in Africa -- 8. Understanding Electoral Violence in Africa; Matlosa Khabele, African Union Commission Director for Political Affairs -- 9. Understanding violence from an interpersonal perspective: The case of Zimbabwe and state sponsored violence; Chenai G. Matshaka, Centre for Mediation in Africa and Ruth Murambadoro, the Centre for Feminist Research -- 10. 'Dirge to Slit Bodies': EndSARS, Police Brutality and Nigerian Dystopia in Jumoke Verissimo and James Yéku's Soro Soke: When Poetry Speaks Up; Ayokunmi O. Ojebode, the Institute for Name-Studies (INS) -- 11. The Silent Violence in Africa- Manifestations of Political Violence; Annie Barbara Chikwanha, Politics and International Relations -- 12. Beyond ethnicity: Reflections on the history and politics of violence in Uganda; Evarist Ngabirano, the Makerere Institute of Social Research (MISR) -- 13. Ungoverned Space and National Security in Nigeria; Arinze Ngwube, Department of Political Science -- 14. Bound to violence? Interrogating violence in Francophone African literatures; G. Ncube, Stellenbosch University -- SECTION C: Children, Youth and Violence -- 15. Child Soldiers, Conflict and Cultures of Violence in Contemporary Africa, c.1980-2000s; Stacey Hynd, African History and Co-Director of the Centre for Imperial & Global History -- 16. Youth, Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons and Conflicts in 21st Century Africa; Babayo Sule, Department of Political Science and Ibrahim Kawuley, Department of Political Science -- 17. Youth, Violence and Political Accumulation: Urban militias in Harare; Simbarashe Gukurume, Sociology and Social Anthropology and Godfrey Maringira, Sol Plaatje University -- 18. "Even the Holy Book Recommends it"? Corporal Punishment, the Bible and Sacred Violence in Southern Africa; Ezra Chitando, Phenomenology and History of Religion -- 19. "Even the Holy Book Recommends it"? Corporal Punishment, the Bible and Sacred Violence in Southern Africa; Ezra Chitando, Phenomenology and History of Religion -- SECTION D: Violence, Memory and the Law in Africa -- 20. Discourses on Political Violence and State Legitimation in Official Commissions of Inquiry in Africa; Claire-Anne Lester, Stellenbosch University (Legal Sociology, Political Transitions, Transitional Justice); 21. Remembrance as a confrontation of violence? A religio-ethical consideration of the role of memory in a Zimbabwe established and ruled by violence; Collium Banda, Theology; 22. Geographies of Violence and Informalization: The Case of Mathare Slums in Nairobi, Kenya; Maurice Omollo, Maasai Mara Universit and Solomon Waliaula, Maasai Mara University -- 23. Piracy and Violence off the Coast of Nigeria: A Theoretical Analysis; Kalu Kingsley, the Cultural Heritage Preservation Research Institute -- 24. Incest as Dismissal: Anthropology and Clinics of Silence; Parfait D. Akana, Sociologist & Anthropologist -- 25. Violence and post-coloniality in contemporary Zimbabwean literature: the works of Chenjerai Hove; Oliver Nyambi, University of the Free State -- SECTION E: Religion and Cultural Violence in Africa -- 26. In God's Name: Drivers of Violent Extremism in the Northeast Nigeria; Jacinta Chiamaka Nwaka, Peace and Conflict History -- 27. The Epistemic Scaffolding of Religious Violence; Kizito Kiyimba, SJ -- 28. Life transforming Intercultural Pastoral Care and Counseling with transgender and intersex communities in Botswana; Tshenolo Madigele: Theology Lecturer and Oabona Sepora: Institute of Development Management -IDM -- 29. Enchanted Worldviews and Violence Against Persons with Albinism in Sub-Saharan Africa; Francis Benyah, The Study of Religions -- 30. Violence against persons with albinism in Malawi; Jones Hamburu Mawerenga, Systematic Theology, Christian Ethics, and African Theology -- SECTION F: Gender and Violence in Africa; 31. Sexual Violence Against Girls and Women in African Conflict; Veronica Fynn Bruey, Legal Studies -- 32. Persisting inequalities: An intersectional view of climate change, gender and violence; Mary Nyasimi, Inclusive Climate Change Adaptation for a Sustainable Africa and Veronica Nonhlanhla Jakarasi -- 33. Violence against Women in Egypt: A Closer Look at Female Genital Mutilation and Intimate Partner Violence; Yasmin Khodary -- 34. Gender based violence in Ghana:experiences of persons with disabilities in two selected areas; Mantey Efua Esaaba, Social Work -- 35. African Diaspora Women Perpetuating Violence Against Men in the United Kingdom; Nomatter Sande -- 36. Adolescent Boys, Young Men and Mental Health in Southern Africa; Mutsawashe Chitando: Public Health, Health Economics Unit and Division -- SECTION G: Preventing Violent Conflict in Africa -- 37. Developing a Framework for Ending Violence in Africa; David Kaulemu, Philosophy -- 38. Confronting dysfunctional military violence in Africa's electoral spaces: A call for specialised civilian oversight institutions; James Tsabora, Law in the Faculty of Law -- 39. Managing electoral violence through constructive use of social media: Transforming and empowering vulnerable urban youth in Kenya; Joyce W. Gikandi: Christine W. Njuguna, Joan Kabaria- Muriithi, Lucy Kathuri-Ogola -- 40. Managing Conflict in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities for the African Union;Victor H Mlambo: University of Johannesburg School of Public Management, Governance and Public Policy, Ernest Toochi Aniche, Department of Political Science, and Mandla Mfundo Masuku, School of Built Environment and Development Studies -- 41. Through the Afrocentricity Lens: Terror and Insurgency and Implications for Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Reference from Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique; Daniel N. Mlambo, Tshwane University of Technology -- 42. Insurgency in Mozambique: Incorporating NATO's Article 5 to the Region's Quest for Collective Defence;Victor H Mlambo: University of Johannesburg School of Public Management, Governance and Public Policy, and Mfundo Mandla Masuku: School of Built Environment and Development Studies, and Daniel N. Mlambo: Department of Public Management.

The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) learned with immense shock and sadness of the passing on of Professor Samir Amin on Sunday, 12th August 2018. Subsequently, Prof. Samir Amin's body was interned at Père Lachaise in Paris on 1st September 2018 at a site provided by the French Communist Party. The Council was represented at the burial by Prof. Fatow Sow and Dr. Cherif Sy; two members of the CODESRIA community who have worked with Samir Amin for a while.
For CODESRIA, this marks nothing less than the end of an era in the history of African social research given the many pioneering roles the late Professor Amin played as a scholar, teacher, mentor, friend, and revolutionary. Samir was many things to us as a Council; for the younger members of the community, it meant much more to be in his company at the numerous CODESRIA meeting he attended. A model for three generations of African and, indeed, radical scholars globally, Samir was that giant Baobab tree whose grandeur of intellect and spirit made him a worthy role model. While serving as Director of the United Nations African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP), he hosted the initial scaffolding of the CODESRIA at IDEP, brought together and nurtured new talent that laid the foundations which launched Council on a path of growth and resilience to what it is to-date. As the final note on his reflections contained in this Bulletin illustrates, while serving as CODESRIA's founding Executive Secretary, Samir worked very closely with Abdalla Bujra and later Thandika Mkandawire, to shape the initial years of CODESRIA's intellectual identity and trajectory.
After CODESRIA relocated from the premises of IDEP to a new home in the Fann Residence part of Dakar, Samir Amin remained engaged with Council and its community of scholars, participating actively and effectively in all its activities. This 15th General Assembly of CODESRIA is perhaps the first Assembly without Samir Amin presence. In all previous General Assemblies, Samir has been a notable presence even giving the Cheikh Anta Diop Lecture at the 10 Assembly in Kampala, Uganda. It is at the General Assembly that many young academics interacted with Samir, often for the first time and indeed experiencing the awe of his presence. Though Samir is absent at the current Assembly, there is no doubt that his intellectual and revolutionary spirit is definitely present just as the thoughts and ideas that he shared so generously and to the very end will continue to inspire reflection and debate.
Samir Amin's intellectual journey was a long and illustrious one. It was a journey marked by commitments that distinguished him as a scholar of unparalleled convictions. He died still an unapologetic socialist academic or, as the title of his memoir reads, 'an independent Marxist' whose work was driven by an unshakeable conviction to confront and oppose totalizing economic orthodoxies. He treated this confrontation and opposition as a prelude to social transformation. He was steadfast in his belief that the world must shift away from capitalism and strive to build new 'post-capitalist' societies. He described capitalism as a small bracket in the long history of human civilization. His works identify and record the multiple crises of capitalism, a system he described as senile and obsolete. In its place, Samir Amin formulated a political alternative that he envisioned would proceed by i) socializing the ownership of monopolies, ii). definancializing the management of the economy and iii) deglobalising international relations [cited in Campbell, 2015: 286]. For him, these three directions provided the basis of an active politics of dismantling capitalism; a politics he committed his skill and energy mobilizing for. Even as he grew older, he mustered fresh bursts of energy to continue the struggle and to the very last days when he was in Dakar, he was apart of the team of scholar/ activists gathered together by International ENDA Third World Network to draft the Alternative Report on Africa (Dakar, 2018). CODESRIA was apart of this process and the Report will by shared at this General Assembly.
Many of Samir Amin's writings make the point repeatedly on the urgent necessity to dismantle the 'obsolete system' known as capitalism. However, none was as emphatic in rethinking the underlying cultural underpinning of the 'obsolete system' like Eurocentricism. In that engaging publication, he provided a rggesounding critique of world history as is centered around Eurocentric modernity and invites us to understand modernity as an incomplete process that, to survive its current crises, will need 'economic, social and political reconstruction of all societies in the world.' Embedded in this argument is a long held position about the importance of the Bandung moment (1955) as a moment of an alternative globalization based on Afro-Asian solidarity. It is from this perspective that one understands why Samir Amin emphasized the importance of China [see tribute by Sit Tsui and Yan Xiaohui in this bulletin]. Afro-Asian solidarity was the basis upon which Samir Amin located his alternative politics which also defined his towering global outlook and presence.
There is no doubt that Samir Amin's intellectual presence was defined by depth of knowledge, complexity of thought and fidelity to Marxist organising principles. There is no way of summarizing the corpus of work he produced, the revolutionary engagements he undertook and the transformative potential that led him to remain steadfast even when many others were only too happy to find a good reason to backtrack and conform. His work is enormous in volume but also in the depth of its knowledge and relevance to society. He provoked and joined debates across the globe but more importantly with comrades in Latin America and Asia, those of the dependency and underdevelopment school but also later from a South-South perspective. In CODESRIA's flagship journal Africa Development alone, Samir Amin published twenty articles. A biodata document he shared with the Council has 24 books in English and 41 in French. He is published in English, French, Arabic, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish to name but these few languages. In all these publications and in the various languages, Samir Amin articulated his belief in alternatives, and as indicated above, this belief remained strong even to the last month of his life on earth.
Born to an Egyptian father and French mother on 3rd September 1931 in Cairo, Egypt, Samir Amin's convictions owe much to the context of his childhood all the way from Port Said in northern Egypt to Cairo where he schooled. He spent his early life in Egypt where he attended his formative schooling before proceeding to France to pursue higher education at Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris ("Sciences Po"). Here, he earned a diploma in 1952 and later a PhD in 1957 at the Sorbonne. Samir later earned another diploma in mathematical statistics from L'institut national de la statistique et des etudes economiques. He had always been interested in radical thought and action from early on, noting in an interview that he already considered himself a communist in Secondary School. Even though he and his cohort did not know what communism really meant in their early childhood, they assumed it meant "equality between human beings and between nations, and it meant that this has been done by the Russian revolution." It is not surprising that with this pedigree, Samir Amin focused in his graduate research on "The origins of underdevelopment – capitalist accumulation on a world scale" and emphasized in his work that underdevelopment in the periphery was, in large measure, due to the working of the capitalist system. He consequently underscored the need to search for socialist alternatives to liberal globalisation.
Samir Amin returned to Cairo in 1957, worked briefly in Gamal Abdel Nasser's Institute for Economic Management (1957–1960) before heading to work as an adviser in the Ministry of Planning in Mali (1960- 1963). Subsequently, Samir Amin's intellectual life became largely internationalist in orientation, and anchored principally on the question of accumulation as key to understanding underdevelopment. He maintained the sojourn between France where he took up a Professorship in 1966 and Dakar, Senegal his adopted home where he worked for ten years, from 1970 to 1980 at IDEP. Later in 1980, he founded the Third World Forum, originally hosted at the CODESRIA Secretariat, and lent his considerable weight to the institutionalisation of ENDA and the World Forum for Alternatives. His support for revolutionary politics is marked not just in the books and papers he published but also in the lecture circuit where he spoke to audiences about the undeniable relevance of radical politics.
Samir Amin's thinking was in large measure defined by the solidarity built around the Bandung Confer- ence of 1955. This remained a critical touchstone in his work in which non-western civilisations and his- tories played an important role. Bandung, for him, inaugurated a different pattern of globalisation, the one he called 'negotiated globalisation.' Though not asufficientbasisforcomplete"de-linking"from'ob- solescent capitalism', Samir Amin saw in Afro-Asian solidarity possibilities and pathways to that delinking; the process, as he explained, by which you submit "ex- ternal relations to the needs of internal progressive so- cial changes and targets." The notion of 'delinking' oc- cupied a major place in Samir Amin's thinking and is positioned in contrast to 'adjustment' that was the pre- ferred approach of the Bretton Woods Institutions. As Mamdani shows elsewhere in this Bulletin, there are major problematic elements of this notion that Samir Amin continued to grapple with. But ultimately, Samir Amin noted that delinking is in fact a process that, de- pending on the societies implementing it, can be used to install graduated level of autonomous development instead of countries in the periphery remaining locked into and merely adjusting to the trends set by a funda- mentally unequal capitalist system.
In Samir Amin, we found the true meaning of praxis; a thinker who insisted that his work has immediate relevance to society. His departure deprives us of the practical energy he brought to our meetings and debates; and denies radical thinkers a model around whom they found the compass that enabled them to navigate the treacherous, indeed murderous, waters of capitalism. We however are lucky to have lived in his company, to have learned from his fountain of knowledge and to have shared in the passion of his convictions. The Council plans to invigorate the value of his legacy by celebrating him during this 15th General Assembly but also beyond the confines of the Assembly.
Thus, this edition of the Bulletin contains two intertwined sets of essays; all organised around Samir Amin. In the one instance, we have a selection of messages in his memory. One the other, we have a selection of essays he authored. Separately, we will re-publish all the essays he published in Africa Development in a special issue of the journal to provide them in one collection for posterity. But whichever way, and as his own reflection in the essay published in this volume and his memoirs show, CODESRIA is an inheritance that Samir Amin bequeathed the African social science community. As such, it is fitting that the Bulletin designed for the 15th CODESRIA General Assembly is also a Bulletin that publishes essays in his honour.
The choice of theme for the General Assembly predates the passing on of Samir Amin. But the theme itself is one that was dear to Samir Amin. It is our pleasure therefore to present the essays contained here as essays that shed light on a life lived fully but also that open up a space to explore the unfulfilled promises of globalisation. We hope that at the end of it, this will be a fitting study in honour of our departed icon but also a commentary on the key issues the 15th General Assembly explored.

What are the determinants of redistributive preferences where capitalism meets post-socialism? To examine the sources of conflicting preference combinations of tolerating the income gap and demanding redistributive policies in transitional economies as suggested in previous research, we conduct an online experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,500 Chinese citizens. We find that Chinese citizens exhibit strong support for real-stake inequality-reducing policies and the government's duty to regulate income distribution. Surprisingly, priming the "unmeritocratic component" of the income generating process in either becoming rich or staying poor makes them significantly less supportive of redistributive policies targeted explicitly at taxing the rich and government duties in regulating the income gap. This effect is mainly driven by those who self-reported to have relatively low economic pressure. We conjecture that such "libertarian" fairness views, and the strong demand for government intervention to "redistribute," could both originate from extreme poverty aversion and wealth aspiration. Wealth aspiration drives a desire for property ownership, making it more likely to justify any means in acquiring property; meanwhile, poverty aversion calls for strong government intervention in lifting the poor up. We argue that such a mechanism could be most saliently exemplified in a post-socialist economic regime with sustained high growth rates and high social mobility.

The discussion on corruption in law and economics approach is mainly run under the veil of Public choice theory and principal-agent model. This theory sees agents, politicians and bureaucrats, as rational self-maximisers who disregard public goals and as such should be monitored and sanctioned accordingly by the principal. In this context the policy makers should create incentive mechanism which imposes obstacles to corrupt behaviour. Based on this approach the anti-corruption policies created repression-prevention-transparency model. The dominant aspect of this model presents deterrence since variety of international convention insists on criminalisation of various acts of power abuse. Based on this model, countries around the world adopted anti-corruption strategies as part of their legal rules. Nevertheless, the recent researches on the effects of this move show non impressive results. The argument that "one size does not fit all" is one of the main raised by the critics. The explanation for this claim, according to criticizers, comes from the fact that not all countries are the same because their institutional setting varies. The dominant approach asks for overreliance on the criminal justice system, judiciary and police, taking for granted their impartiality and effectiveness. However, this situation is more exception than the rule in many countries around the world. The main problem of this approach according to some researcher lays in the fact that in these countries institution do not function because, even though people condemn corruption, they engage in it because they lack trust in other citizens and think that all the others are doing the same. This is identified as collective action problem as opposed to the principal-agent model. Among the countries which experience problems of corruption, even though they follow the dominant anti-corruption trends, are transitional, post-socialist countries. To this group belong the countries which are emerging from centrally planned to an open market economy. After the state's collapse international financial institutions took the leading advisory role and promoted the immediate implantation of the ideas grounded in the neoclassical economy. However, the results of this approach revealed important shortcomings, of which increased corruption was one. This outcome amplified the voices of institutional economists who from the beginning argued for gradualist approach towards the institutional change. Their claims pointed out that the change of formal institutions is not difficult to achieve. It is enough to change the written laws according to the requirements. However, the informal institutions are those which stay for a long time in people as "mental models" and they could not be changed overnight. These claims demand a deeper analysis of the social systems and their mechanisms before engaging in a design of any reform policy. Following these claims, the conclusion might be that any sound anti-corruption policy implemented in post-socialist countries should take into account their idiosyncrasies which are the results of the previous regime. The closer look to socialism provides an interesting description in terms of its institutional setting, mentality of the individuals and their interrelation. If this idiosyncrasy is taken into account the suggestion in this thesis is that in the cases of corruption combat in public administration in post-socialist countries, instead of dominant anti-corruption scheme repression-prevention-transparency, corruption combat should be improved through the implementation of a new one, structure-conduct-performance. This scheme in its first element, the structure, includes the type of public administration which should be implemented because it curbs corruption the best way. Analysis provided a view which puts the Neo Weberian State as the first best and Weberian administration as the second best solution. The second element, the conduct, should be treated according to the Responsive Regulation theory. Based on it an anti-corruption pyramid if implemented might provide the optimal results. This pyramid aims to coordinate human's preferences, propensity to corruption based in cultural specificities and transparency and accountability, and to put constraints on unwanted behaviour by imposing administrative and criminal sanctions. Regarding relevant cultural aspects pyramid addresses: universalism and particularism, individualism and collectivism, and power distance. The imposition of sanctions is further regulated by disciplinary anti-corruption pyramid and criminal anti-corruption pyramid whose implementation is based on the type of the corrupt act in question: if it is "legal" then the former pyramid should be applied and if it is "illegal" the latter one. Finally, if the first two elements are implemented the anti-corruption performance should be improved. This new "pyramid approach", suggested to post-socialist countries, asks public administration itself to engage in corruption combat, leaving criminal justice system as the ultimate weapon, used only for the very harmful misdeeds. With this self-control mechanism, administration should be able to build internal coherence and strength. There is no doubt that corruption harms societies in many ways and that policy makers should promote zero tolerance to corruption. However in the case of transitional countries instead of the first best, for a while the second best solution should be applied which is suggested by the anti-corruption pyramid(s). Going one step back does not necessarily mean failure but rather taking a run at faster improvement.

This essay considers the admissibility of a comprehensive model to interpret the interaction between illegal armed groups, government authorities, dominant coalitions, entrepreneurs and criminal groups in the context of the Colombian conflict. It analyses a case documented by the Colombian press, which provides evidence of the way a dominant power coalition has gained control for almost thirty years of the local and depar- tmental governments in an important area of the country by means of fluid interactions with specialized agents in charge of administrating controlled violence to further and protect the coalition's interests. Using abductive reasoning, it attempts to reconstruct the logic of the inte- ractions that may lead to scenarios like these in present day Colombia –in which for all practical purposes, control of the provision of justice as well as regulatory and government functions has been privatised– and then integrates a relational analytical framework. In conclusion, it suggests that the present situation in Colombia could be assimilated to societies that have transited from authoritarian to democratic regimes, and therefore, that the country should prepare to widen the scope of the present transitional jus- tice approach, in order to overcome the violent state of its conflict at present. ; Este artículo considera la admisibilidad de un modelo comprehensivo para interpretar la interac- ción entre grupos armados ilegales, autoridades, coaliciones dominantes, empresarios y grupos de delincuentes en el contexto del conflicto colombiano. Analiza un caso documentado que presenta evidencia de la manera como una coalición de poder controla los gobiernos locales y departamental de una importante zona de Colombia desde hace más de 30 años ininterrumpidos. La base para hacerlo descansa sobre un flujo de intercambios fluidos con agentes especializados en administrar violencia controlada para adelantar y proteger sus intereses. Utilizando razonamiento abductivo, el artículo reconstruye la lógica de interacción que podría conducir a escenarios como este en la Colombia de hoy –en los que en la práctica se ha privatizado el control de las funciones de regulación, provisión de justicia y gobierno– para luego integrar un marco de análisis relacional preliminar. En conclusión, sugiere que la situación actual de la sociedad colombiana podría asimilarse a la de sociedades que han transitado de regímenes autoritarios a democráticos, y por consiguiente, que el país debería aprestarse a integrar una justicia transicional más amplia que el actual para superar el estado violento en que se encuentra su conflicto en el presente.

This essay considers the admissibility of a comprehensive model to interpret the interaction between illegal armed groups, government authorities, dominant coalitions, entrepreneurs and criminal groups in the context of the Colombian conflict. It analyses a case documented by the Colombian press, which provides evidence of the way a dominant power coalition has gained control for almost thirty years of the local and depar- tmental governments in an important area of the country by means of fluid interactions with specialized agents in charge of administrating controlled violence to further and protect the coalition's interests. Using abductive reasoning, it attempts to reconstruct the logic of the inte- ractions that may lead to scenarios like these in present day Colombia –in which for all practical purposes, control of the provision of justice as well as regulatory and government functions has been privatised– and then integrates a relational analytical framework. In conclusion, it suggests that the present situation in Colombia could be assimilated to societies that have transited from authoritarian to democratic regimes, and therefore, that the country should prepare to widen the scope of the present transitional jus- tice approach, in order to overcome the violent state of its conflict at present. ; Este artículo considera la admisibilidad de un modelo comprehensivo para interpretar la interac- ción entre grupos armados ilegales, autoridades, coaliciones dominantes, empresarios y grupos de delincuentes en el contexto del conflicto colombiano. Analiza un caso documentado que presenta evidencia de la manera como una coalición de poder controla los gobiernos locales y departamental de una importante zona de Colombia desde hace más de 30 años ininterrumpidos. La base para hacerlo descansa sobre un flujo de intercambios fluidos con agentes especializados en administrar violencia controlada para adelantar y proteger sus intereses. Utilizando razonamiento abductivo, el artículo reconstruye la lógica de interacción que podría conducir a escenarios como este en la Colombia de hoy –en los que en la práctica se ha privatizado el control de las funciones de regulación, provisión de justicia y gobierno– para luego integrar un marco de análisis relacional preliminar. En conclusión, sugiere que la situación actual de la sociedad colombiana podría asimilarse a la de sociedades que han transitado de regímenes autoritarios a democráticos, y por consiguiente, que el país debería aprestarse a integrar una justicia transicional más amplia que el actual para superar el estado violento en que se encuentra su conflicto en el presente.