Suchergebnisse

Задача: Целью написания настоящей статьи является раскрытие отличительных особенностей органов прокуратуры от контрольно-надзорных органов исполнительной власти через призму универсального и всеобъемлющего характера прокурорского надзора. Проблеме выделения органов прокуратуры среди иных контрольно-надзорных органов посвящено немало работ (Буянский С.Г., Мельников Н.В., Рохлин В.И., Скуратов Ю.И., Смирнов А.Ф. и др.), однако в настоящей статье в качестве главной отличительной особенности рассматривается универсальный и всеобъемлющий характер полномочий анализируемого государственного института. Вопросам организации прокурорского надзора в соответствующих странах посвящены труды иностранных исследователей: Номейлера М., Фумиюми Ватанабе, Ли Ван Кана и др. Модель: В качестве предмета исследования выбраны положения Конституции РФ, Федерального закона от 17.01.1992 N 2202-1 "О прокуратуре Российской Федерации" и других нормативно-правовых актов, в том числе, относящихся к дореволюционному и советскому периоду развития российской государственности. Универсальный и всеобъемлющий характер прокурорского надзора показан через призму различных исторических периодов и действовавших в эти периоды правовых актов, регулирующих правовой статус прокуратуры. С этой целью в основу исследования положены исторически-правовой и сравнительно-правовой методы. Выводы: В результате проведенного исследования выявлена закономерность между широтой закрепленных за органами прокуратуры полномочий и состоянием законности и правопорядка в обществе. Установлено, что прокурорский надзор имел универсальный и всеобъемлющий характер в различные, но не во все периоды времени. При этом сокращение полномочий прокуратуры или наличие крена в сторону какого-либо одного из направлений ее деятельности неизбежно приводило к ухудшению состояния законности в обществе. Высказано предположение об особом положении, которое занимает прокуратура в системе государственных органов, что позволяет ей, не входя ни в одну ветвь власти, иметь рычаги воздействия на все из них, на все сферы жизни общества. Практическое значение: Научная работа может быть использована в последующем с целью обоснования расширения полномочий прокуратуры, закрепления за ней новых направлений деятельности. Социальные последствия: Исторический опыт показывает, что в случае сохранения и развития универсального и всеобъемлющего характера полномочий органов прокуратуры это положительным образом отразится на состоянии законности и правопорядка в обществе. Ценность: Настоящая работа ориентирована на широкий круг общественности, призвана обратить внимание представителей законодательной власти на необходимость сохранения и расширения компетенции прокуратуры. Новизна работы заключается в том, что универсальный и всеобъемлющий характер прокурорского надзора рассматривается в его исторической динамике и закладывается в основу различия прокуратуры и исполнительных органов контроля (надзора). ; Objectives: the aim of this article is to disclose some distinctive features of prosecution from regulatory authorities through the notion of the universal and comprehensive nature of the Prosecutor's supervision. The problem of selection of Procuracy authorities among other regulatory authorities is mentioned in many papers (by Buyansky S.G., Melnikov N.V., Rokhlin V.I., Skuratov Y.I., Smirnov A.F., etc.) But in this article the main distinctive feature is considered to be the universal and comprehensive nature of the authority of the State. The problems of organization of the Prosecutor's supervision are mentioned in the works of foreign researchers: Nomejler M., Fumijumi Vatanabe, Lee Van Kan et al. Model: as a subject of study we selected the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Federal Law No. 2202-1 dated on January, 11 1992 "On the Procuracy of the Russian Federation" and other laws and regulations, including those relating to the pre-revolutionary and Soviet period of development of Russia. The universal and comprehensive nature of the Prosecutor's supervision is shown through different historical periods and acts regulating the legal status of the Procuracy of these times. With this aim the research is based on historical and comparative law methods. Conclusions: the study identified a pattern between the strengths of Procuracy's power and the state of law and order in society. The study found that the Prosecutor's supervision had the universal and comprehensive nature in many, but not all periods. The limiting of the power of the Procuracy or its move in any of the directions of its activities would inevitably lead to a deterioration of the rule of law in society. We suggested on a special position of the Procuracy in the system of State authorities that lets it, without entering any branch of the Government, have the leverage on all of them, on all areas of society. Practical value: This scientific work could be used in further study with the aim of justifying the expansion of the authority of the Procuracy and the establishment of its new spheres of authority. Social consequences: The historical experience shows that preservation and development of the universal and comprehensive nature of the powers of the Procuracy has a positive impact on the state of the law and order in society. Value: The paper is focused on a wide range of publicity. It is intended to draw the attention of legislators to the need of maintaining and enhancing the competence of the Procuracy. The novelty of the paper lies in the fact that the universal and comprehensive nature of the Prosecutor's supervision is observed through historical dynamics and is laid in the basis for differences in the Procuracy and Executive control (supervision).

Concrete, steel, artificial light, complete technological automation, near-complete sensory deprivation, and total isolation - these are the basic conditions of supermaximum security prisons in the United States. "Supermax" prisoners remain alone twenty-three to twenty-four hours a day, under fluorescent lights that are never turned off. Meals arrive through a small slot in an automated cell door. Prisoners have little to no human contact for months, years, or even decades at a time, save brief interactions with correctional officers, who place hand, ankle, and waist cuffs on each prisoner before removing him from his cell. Prisoners only leave their cells four or five times per week, for showers or for brief, solitary exercise periods in "dog runs" - concrete pens with roofs at least partially open to natural light. In sum, supermax prisons across the United States detain thousands in long-term solitary confinement, under conditions of extreme sensory deprivation. They are prisons within prisons, confining the prisoners correctional administrators deem a threat to the general prison population.Arizona opened the first supermax, in 1986, and California opened the second, in 1989. Over the subsequent ten years, almost every state, along with the federal prison system, either built a supermax or retrofitted an existing facility to create a supermax unit. This dissertation examines the birth of the supermax in Arizona and California, and the spread of the institutional innovation across the United States. The research presented here draws on three major categories of data: archival materials, including legal decisions and case files, local news reporting, and legislative records; oral history interviews with more than thirty key informants, including correctional administrators, legal professionals, architects, and former prisoners; and quantitative data maintained by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. This is the first study specifically focused on unearthing the administrative and political processes that underwrote the supermax.The dissertation begins with an overview of the idea of solitary confinement and the term "supermax," leading to a working definition of supermaxes as institutions that are: bounded in time, administratively overseen, characterized by extremely restrictive conditions, and large in both scale of beds and durations of confinement. Chapter Two uses this definition to create a working list of supermax institutions in the United States. Chapter Three frames supermaxes as a product of mass incarceration, and introduces the core region (the Sunbelt) and core case study (California) on which the dissertation will focus. Chapters Four through Six document how and why correctional administrators decided to build California's first supermax, Pelican Bay State Prison. These chapters trace how socio-political changes in the 1970s - including structural changes to sentencing laws; race-based social organizing, both in and out of prison; and increasing judicial attention to prisons - paved the way for the supermax innovation in the 1980s. Chapter Four argues that critical power shifts between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government left a power vacuum, which correctional administrators quickly filled, in part through building supermaxes. Chapter Five describes the legislative process that nominally underwrote the supermax, and argues that California legislators ceded both planning and moral authority to state correctional administrators. Chapter Six describes the processes of architectural design and technological innovation that created the physical supermaxes themselves.Chapters Seven though Nine explore the implications of the administrative origins of the supermax. These chapters document how the institution has never had a clearly articulated purpose (Chapter Seven), and how it has been operated in contradiction to its articulated goals (Chapters Eight and Nine). Chapter Eight shows that supermaxes have detained prisoners for decades longer than intended, and have disproportionately impacted minority prisoners. Chapter Nine argues that courts have largely deferred to correctional administrators' claims about the necessity of the supermax, even though little empirical evidence exists to support these claims. Together, these chapters demonstrate that correctional bureaucrats not only made the initial supermax design decisions in California, but also progressively concentrated their power over supermax prisoners through hyper-automated buildings and internal prison classification procedures.Chapter Ten further explores the relationship between supermaxes and the federal judiciary, arguing that federal court decisions setting minimum conditions and standards for prisons in the 1970s and 1980s shaped the supermax innovation that followed. The conformity of supermaxes to these minimum constitutional standards has rendered the institutions resistant to legal challenges. The Conclusion discusses the implications of recent supermax-related trends, including prisoner protests about conditions of confinement, and state-based movements to reduce supermax populations. In sum, because supermaxes manifest, both physically and legally, the outer limits of non-death penalty punishment policy, they are critical for understanding both U.S. prison expansion, and the impacts of U.S. tough-on-crime policies.

Clark Neily


Last Thursday, the Supreme Court struck down President Biden's student loan forgiveness program, finding that it was not plausibly authorized by statute and that the State of Missouri had standing to challenge the program via a state‐​created loan‐​servicing entity that would lose tens of millions of dollars in fees if the program took effect. This post will explain why Cato filed its own, now‐​moot challenge to the loan forgiveness program, followed by some thoughts on the increasingly pernicious role of "avoidance doctrines" such as standing, ripeness, and mootness in public‐​policy litigation.
The great miltitary strategist Sun Tzu famously said that the acme of skill in war is to subdue the enemy without fighting. For government lawyers, the acme of skill is to shield unlawful policies from judicial review by persuading courts that there is some procedural bar against challenging them. Last week, the Supreme Court rebuffed the Biden administration's attempt to employ that precise stratagem to forestall a judicial determination as to whether the president has the power to forgive nearly half‐​a‐​trillion dollars worth of student loans without express congressional authorization. Surprising no one, the Court's answer to the substantive question was a resounding "no." But constructing a legal challenge that would ensure the judiciary reached the merits of that question was a dicey proposition. Why? One word: standing.
In brief, standing is a court‐​created rule that says only certain people can challenge a given policy in court. To have standing, the would‐​be plaintiff must have suffered a concrete injury that was caused by the policy at issue and can be fixed (or "redressed") by the courts. Thus, for example, I do not have standing to challenge the Justice Department's sweetheart plea deal with Hunter Biden, both because I've not been personally injured by it (mere outrage is insufficient) and because there's really nothing the courts can do about DOJ's propensity for coddling VIPs.
Like so many judge‐​made legal rules, however, standing is both amorphous and prone to abuse. It's amorphous because it lacks clear doctrinal parameters and can be easily enlarged or constricted as a matter of judicial whim. And of course that makes it prone to abuse, since judges can simply declare that a given plaintiff either does or does not have standing depending on whether they do or don't want to reach the merits of the case at hand. To be clear, not all standing inquiries represent such an exercise in procedural roulette, but an increasing number of them do—particularly as poliymakers become more conscious of their ability to defeat judicial review through strategic legerdemain.
Thus, the key question in the loan‐​forgiveness case was not so much the legality of the program itself, but instead whether the Biden administration and its lawyers could persuade the judiciary that the executive branch can expend nearly half‐​a‐​trillion dollars in unappropriated funds without causing a sufficiently concrete injury to confer standing on any individual or entity affected by that program. As we learned last Thursday, the answer is no. But boy, was it close.
Without delving too much deeper into federal standing doctrine, the basic problem here was that the Supreme Court has generally rejected the concept of "taxpayer standing"—that is, the idea that any given person who pays taxes can sue the government simply because it is (arguably) spending that revenue unlawfully. Accordingly, when President Biden announced his intent to forgive student loans without express congressional authorization, there was a scramble among people and groups who opposed that policy to identify a concrete and individualized theory of standing that might pass muster with a judiciary that tends to be more comfortable rubber‐​stamping challenged government programs than striking them down—especially when they involve things like the proper scope of federal power, economic regulations, property rights, or tax policy.
As noted, Missouri and a handful of other states led with the theory that a blanket student loan forgiveness policy would deprive them of fees generated by their respective loan‐​servicing entities. Another suit was filed by two college graduates from Texas who challenged the Department of Education's failure to follow proper administrative procedures, which they said might have resulted in better debt‐​forgiveness terms for each of them.
At the time, it was unclear whether either of those standing arguments would prove viable, and additional complaints were filed by other groups, each asserting a different theory of standing. This included a lawsuit brought on Cato's behalf by the New Civil Liberties Alliance, which alleged that Biden's blanket loan forgiveness program would prejudice non‐​profit employers like Cato, for whom Congress had created a more targeted policy called the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program that was designed to give non‐​profits a recruiting edge by providing loan‐​forgiveness to their employees after ten years. Whether legitimate or illegitimate from a policy perspective, the advantage conferred on charitable employers by that program would be eliminated by across‐​the‐​board debt forgiveness, which represents a cognizable injury that is redressable by the courts—et voila: standing.
As it turns out, the Supreme Court held unanimously that the two Texans lacked standing to challenge Biden's loan forgivness program while ruling 6–3 that the states (or at least one of them, which is all that mattered) did have standing. Bottom line, it was a close call, and it was fortunate that Cato and others were waiting in the wings with their own unique—and potentially more persuasive—standing theories. But those other cases, including Cato's, are now moot in light of the Court's decision to find standing in the states' challenge and strike down Biden's loan forgiveness scheme.
In retrospect, the half‐​dozen lawsuits filed against that program may seem like overkill. But as a colleague at my first law firm used to say of a judge in one of his cases, "You never know on any given day what's going to get his attention: Will it be the red rubber ball, the shiny metal object, or the baby rattle? So you bring 'em all." And so it is when seeking to overcome the slew of avoidance doctrines routinely deployed in public‐​policy litigation by government lawyers like ink from a fleeing squid. If standing, ripeness, and mootness can fairly be compared to a game of craps—and they can—then it makes sense for both sides to get as many chips on the table as possible.
If that sounds like hyperbole, consider the following examples, which represent merely the barest hint of the jaw‐​dropping bad faith with which avoidance doctrines are asserted by government lawyers and employed by judges to make potentially troublesome cases go away:
Cato v. SEC (DC Cir. 2022). This case involved a First Amendment challenge to the SEC's policy of imposing a lifetime gag order on defendants in civil enforcement actions as a condition of settlement. Cato sued on behalf of an author who wrote a memoir about being caught up in that process that it was unlawful for him to publish due to the gag order. As a would‐​be publisher of that work, Cato asserted the well‐​established theory of third‐​party standing, but the DC Circuit held that the "redressability" requirement for standing was not met on the premise that all of the challenged gag orders had been incorporated into judicially enforceable consent decress around the country that judges in DC were powerless to disturb. Besides being incorrect on the law, that holding was based on a demonstrably false factual premise: Contrary to the DC Circuit's completely baseless assertion—that was supported nowhere in the pleadings or the record because it was false—all gag orders (including the very one at issue in this case) had not been incorporated into judicially enforceable consent decrees—a fact that Cato pointed out repeatedly throughout the litigation and again in its petition for rehearing, which the DC Circuit ignored.
Parker v. Heller (DC Cir. 2007). Another example of standing gamesmanship from the DC Circuit arose in the Second Amendment challenge to the District of Columbia's gun laws brought on behalf of six DC residents by me, former Cato board chair Bob Levy, and Alan Gura. In blatant and acknowledged disregard for Supreme Court precedent, the DC Circuit invoked its special law of standing for guns and held that five of the six plaintiffs lacked standing because they had not yet violated the law and received a specific threat of prosecution—actions that are never required in any other setting to establish standing. Only Dick Heller was ultimately found to have standing because he had made an entirely futile attempt to register a handgun in DC and was denied—an act that the DC Circuit risibly (but correctly, as a matter of circuit precedent) held supplied an alternative basis for standing.
Alvarez v. Smith (2009) and NY State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. City of New York (2020). These are both examples of "strategic case mooting," a common practice whereby government lawyers will vigorously defend an unconstitutional policy in the lower courts and then moot the case if it looks like the challengers might win on appeal and thereby establish favorable precedent. Alvarez was a challenge to Illinois' unconstitutional civil forfeiture procedure, which the state defended below but then mooted when the case got to the Supreme Court by returning the plaintiffs' unlawfully seized vehicles. NY State Rifle & Pistol involved a challenge to a New York City ordinance that severly constrained people's ability to move a lawfully registered pistol from one location to another (e.g., from an apartment in Manhattan to a cabin in upstate New York), which the City defended vigorously in the lower courts but then repealed immediately after the Supreme Court granted certiorari, in a transparent (and ultimately successful) effort to derail the case. So much for all the assertions the government made in the lower courts about the supposed importance of the law, the momentous safety issues involved, etc.—all of which turned out to be cynical, disingenuous prattling.
As suggested above, the list could go on almost indefinitely. But the takeaway is this: When it comes to the willingness of government lawyers and judges (a wildly disproportionate number of whom were themselves courtroom advocates for government before taking the bench) to employ standing, ripeness, mootness, and other "avoidance doctrines" in order to derail challenges to plausible allegations of unlawful government action, there is no bottom.
And that's why Cato joined the fray over President Biden's unlawful student loan forgiveness scheme—not because there was ever any doubt about the merits; but instead to help make it as difficult as possible for the judiciary to sweep that unlawful power grab under the rug with the handy‐​dandy standing‐​broom.

This paper focuses on recent theoretical developments in political economy and what role they might play in explaining and reforming individual country and global distortions in food and agricultural markets. Four groups of forces are isolated: political governance structures emphasizing the role of democratic mechanisms; the design of polycentric structures for assigned governmental authority for setting policy instruments; market structure and other socioeconomic characteristics; and the role of sector mobility and asset diversification. Each of these forces are distilled and data sources are reviewed that will allow econometric specifications that have both explanatory and policy reform implications.

In the article international experience and domestic practice of customs-tariff regulation are researched. It is noted that the customs-tariff regulation of foreign economic activity is an economic method of regulation of international trade, which is used in Ukraine with the use of such instruments: customs tariff, classification of goods in accordance with the commodity nomenclature of foreign economic activity, determination of the country of origin of goods, its customs value, as well as application of the system customs privileges and preferences. It is noted that the implementation of tariff and customs regulation is a complex and systematic process involving not only the actors of the functioning of all branches of state power ‒ the legislative, executive and judicial, but also the direct participants of international economic relations ‒ the enterprise. It is stressed that the creation of optimal conditions for competition is possible only in the case of resolving the main contradiction of tariff and tariff regulation: on the one hand, it should contribute to the development of competition, the solution by importing the problem of monopolization of the market by monopoly enterprises, that is, the realization of an offensive function; on the other ‒ to ensure the protection of the national producer from excessive foreign competition, that is, the implementation of a protective function. The authors of the study noted that in practice the tariff method of regulating trade consists in the application of customs duties on goods imported or, at least, when exported from the country. In Ukraine, import and export duties, seasonal and special types of duties are applied. Special duties include special, anti-dumping, countervailing duty and additional import duty. Special types of duties (except for collection) are used according to the results of investigations and are aimed at protecting the national producer. The international practice of customs and tariff regulation is analyzed, namely, the bases of the current US trade policy, which is named «Donald Trump Tariff Policy», are generalized. It is noted that modern approaches to the regulation of trade should be based on compliance with international obligations and predictability of the trade policy of the state as a reliable trading partner. ; В статье исследовано международный опыт и отечественную практику таможенно-тарифного регулирования. Отмечено, что таможенно-тарифное регулирование внешнеэкономической деятельности является экономическим методом регулирования международной торговли, который применяется в Украине с использованием таких инструментов: таможенного тарифа, классификации товаров в соответствии с товарной номенклатурой внешнеэкономической деятельности, определение страны происхождения товара, его таможенной стоимости, а также применение системы таможенных льгот и преференций. Замечено, что осуществление таможенно-тарифного регулирования ‒ это сложный и системный процесс, в котором принимают участие не только субъекты функционирования всех ветвей государственной власти ‒ законодательной, исполнительной и судебной, но и непосредственные участники международных экономических отношений ‒ предприятия. Отмечено, что создание оптимальных условий для конкуренции возможно только в случае решения главной противоречия таможенно-тарифного регулирования: с одной стороны, оно должно способствовать развитию конкуренции, решению благодаря импорту проблемы монополизации рынка предприятиями-монополистами, то есть реализации наступательной функции; с другой ‒ обеспечить защиту национального товаропроизводителя от иностранной конкуренции, то есть выполнение защитной функции. Авторами исследования отмечено, что на практике тарифный метод регулирования торговли заключается в применении пошлины на товары при ввозе или, реже, при вывозе из страны. В Украине применяются ввозные и вывозные пошлины, сезонные и особые виды пошлины. К особым видам пошлины относятся специальная, антидемпинговая, компенсационная пошлины и дополнительный импортный сбор. Особые виды пошлины (кроме сбора) применяются по результатам расследований и направлены на защиту национального производителя. Проанализировано международную практику применения таможенно-тарифного регулирования, а именно, обобщенно основы современной торговой политики США, которая получила название «Тарифная политика Дональда Трампа». Отмечено, что современные подходы к регулированию торговли должны основываться на соблюдении международных обязательств и предсказуемости торговой политики государства как надежного торгового партнера. ; У статті досліджено міжнародний досвід та вітчизняну практику митно-тарифного регулювання. Зазначено, що митно-тарифне регулювання зовнішньоекономічної діяльності є економічним методом регулювання міжнародної торгівлі, який застосовується в Україні з використанням таких інструментів: митного тарифу, класифікації товарів відповідно до товарної номенклатури зовнішньоекономічної діяльності, визначення країни походження товару, його митної вартості, а також застосування системи митних пільг та преференцій. Зауважено, що здійснення митно-тарифного регулювання – це складний і системний процес, у якому беруть участь не тільки суб'єкти функціонування усіх гілок державної влади – законодавчої, виконавчої і судової, але й безпосередні учасники міжнародних економічних відносин – підприємства. Наголошено, що створення оптимальних умов для конкуренції можливе тільки у разі вирішення головної суперечності митно-тарифного регулювання: з одного боку, воно повинно сприяти розвитку конкуренції, розв'язанню завдяки імпорту проблеми монополізації ринку підприємствами-монополістами, тобто реалізації наступальної функції; з іншого ‒ забезпечити захист національного товаровиробника від непосильної іноземної конкуренції, тобто виконання захисної функції. Авторами дослідження відмічено, що на практиці тарифний метод регулювання торгівлі полягає в застосуванні мита на товари при ввезенні або, рідше, при вивезенні з країни. В Україні застосовуються ввізне і вивізне мито, сезонне та особливі види мита. До особливих видів мита відносяться спеціальне, антидемпінгове, компенсаційне мита та додатковий імпортний збір. Особливі види мита (крім збору) застосовуються за результатами розслідувань і спрямовані на захист національного виробника. Проаналізовано міжнародну практику застування митно-тарифного регулювання, а саме, узагальнено основи сучасної торговельної політики США, яка отримала назву «Тарифна політика Дональда Трампа». Зазначено, що сучасні підходи до регулювання торгівлі мають ґрунтуватися на дотриманні міжнароднихзобов'язань і передбачуваності торгової політики держави як надійного торгового партнера.

In performing certain tasks of providing troops (forces) with weapons, military equipment, other material and technical means, specialists of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine draw up orders for coverage combat losses and projected costs. At the same time, the nomenclature of arms and military equipment and material and technical means, which are needed in the first place, their number and the like, is not always determined.It is proposed to consider possible ways to resolve the issue of effective resource support for the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine through a toolbox of economic opportunities for economic sectors. This is the subject of the article.To effectively solve the problems of state defense, it is considered appropriate to consider the existing economic potential as a broader range of enterprises, which are proposed to be called the defense sector of the national economy (DSNE).By DSNE it is proposed to understand a specific part of the state economy. The DSNE includes a set of central executive bodies, other state and non-state governing bodies, local self-government bodies, research and development institutions, enterprises of various branches of the economy, all of which are involved in labor resources of the corresponding qualifications, covered by unified management. They solve the problems of the development, production, modernization and disposal of military products, material support and the provision of services in the interests of defense, ensuring the functioning of the economy as a whole and the life of the population.It is proposed to consider the level of ability to produce, in a closed cycle, a certain range of defense products, provide certain services and perform the required work as an indicator of the effectiveness (quality) of the DSNE's mobilization capabilities. Quantitatively, the indicator of the effectiveness (quality) of the mobilization capabilities of the DSNEcan be defined as the volume of products, services and work that are carried out in a closed cycle to the amount of all products and services necessary for the defense of the state . ; При выполнении определенных задач по обеспечению войск (сил) вооружением, военной техникой, другими материально-техническими средствами, специалисты Министерства обороны Украины, Генерального штаба Вооруженных Сил Украины составляют заказы на покрытие боевых потерь и расходов, которые прогнозируются. При этом не всегда определяется номенклатура ВВТ и МТС, которые нужны в первую очередь, их количество и тому подобное.Предлагается рассмотреть возможные пути решения вопроса эффективного ресурсного обеспечения потребностей Вооруженных Сил Украины через инструментарий экономических возможностей отраслей экономики. Именно этому вопросу и посвящена статья.Для эффективного решения задач обороны государства имеющимся экономическим потенциалом считается целесообразным рассматривать более широкий круг предприятий, которые предлагается называть оборонным сектором национальной экономики (ОСНЭ).Под ОСНЭ предлагается понимать специфическую часть экономики государства. В ОСНЭ входят охваченные единым руководством совокупность центральных органов исполнительной власти, других государственных и негосударственных органов управления, органов местного самоуправления, научно-исследовательских, опытно-конструкторских учреждений, предприятий отраслей экономики различных форм собственности, на которые задействованы трудовые ресурсы соответствующей квалификации. Они решают задачи разработки, производства, модернизации и утилизации продукции военного назначения, материального обеспечения и предоставления услуг в интересах обороны, обеспечение функционирования экономики в целом и жизнедеятельности населения.Показателем эффективности (качества) мобилизационных возможностей ОСНЭ предлагается считать уровень способности производить им по замкнутому циклу определенную номенклатуру оборонной продукции, оказывать определенные услуги и выполнять требуемые работы. Количественно показатель эффективности (качества) мобилизационных возможностей ОСНЭ можно определить как объем продукции, услуг и работ, которые осуществляются по замкнутому циклу к количеству всей продукции и услуг, необходимых для обороны государства ; При виконанні визначених завдань стосовно забезпечення військ (сил) озброєнням, військовою технікою (ОВТ), іншими матеріально-технічними засобами (МТЗ), фахівці Міністерства оборони України (МО України), Генерального штабу Збройних Сил України (ГШ ЗС України) складають замовлення на покриття бойових втрат і витрат, які прогнозуються. При цьому не завжди визначається яка номенклатура ОВТ та МТЗ потрібна в першу чергу, в якій кількості тощо. Без певних даних залишається не визначеним коли можна очікувати їх надходжень.Пропонується розглянути можливі шляхи вирішення питання ефективного ресурсного забезпечення потреб Збройних Сил України через інструментарій економічних спроможностей галузей економіки. Саме цьому питанню і присвячена стаття.Для ефективного вирішення завдань оборони держави наявним економічним потенціалом вважається за доцільне розглядати більш широке коло підприємств, яке пропонується називати оборонним сектором національної економіки (ОСНЕ).Під ОСНЕ пропонується розуміти специфічну частину економіки держави, до якої належать охоплені єдиним керівництвом сукупність центральних органів виконавчої влади, інших державних та недержавного органів управління, органів місцевого самоврядування, науково-дослідних, дослідно-конструкторських закладів, підприємств галузей національної економіки різних форм власності на яких задіяні трудові ресурси відповідної кваліфікації, та які вирішують завдання розроблення, виробництва, модернізації і утилізації продукції військового призначення, матеріального забезпечення та надання послуг в інтересах оборони, забезпечують функціонування економіки в цілому та життєдіяльність населення.Показником ефективності (якості) мобілізаційних спроможностей ОСНЕ пропонується вважати рівень здатності виробляти ним за замкнутим циклом певну номенклатуру оборонної продукції, надання певних послуг та робіт. Кількісно показник ефективності (якості) мобілізаційних спроможностей ОСНЕ можна визначити як обсяг продукції, послуг та робіт, які здійснюються за замкнутим циклом до кількості всієї продукції та послуг , що потрібні для оборони держави ="Content" ObjectID="_1642589485"> , що потрібні для оборони держави

In performing certain tasks of providing troops (forces) with weapons, military equipment, other material and technical means, specialists of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine draw up orders for coverage combat losses and projected costs. At the same time, the nomenclature of arms and military equipment and material and technical means, which are needed in the first place, their number and the like, is not always determined.It is proposed to consider possible ways to resolve the issue of effective resource support for the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine through a toolbox of economic opportunities for economic sectors. This is the subject of the article.To effectively solve the problems of state defense, it is considered appropriate to consider the existing economic potential as a broader range of enterprises, which are proposed to be called the defense sector of the national economy (DSNE).By DSNE it is proposed to understand a specific part of the state economy. The DSNE includes a set of central executive bodies, other state and non-state governing bodies, local self-government bodies, research and development institutions, enterprises of various branches of the economy, all of which are involved in labor resources of the corresponding qualifications, covered by unified management. They solve the problems of the development, production, modernization and disposal of military products, material support and the provision of services in the interests of defense, ensuring the functioning of the economy as a whole and the life of the population.It is proposed to consider the level of ability to produce, in a closed cycle, a certain range of defense products, provide certain services and perform the required work as an indicator of the effectiveness (quality) of the DSNE's mobilization capabilities. Quantitatively, the indicator of the effectiveness (quality) of the mobilization capabilities of the DSNEcan be defined as the volume of products, services and work that are carried out in a closed cycle to the amount of all products and services necessary for the defense of the state . ; При выполнении определенных задач по обеспечению войск (сил) вооружением, военной техникой, другими материально-техническими средствами, специалисты Министерства обороны Украины, Генерального штаба Вооруженных Сил Украины составляют заказы на покрытие боевых потерь и расходов, которые прогнозируются. При этом не всегда определяется номенклатура ВВТ и МТС, которые нужны в первую очередь, их количество и тому подобное.Предлагается рассмотреть возможные пути решения вопроса эффективного ресурсного обеспечения потребностей Вооруженных Сил Украины через инструментарий экономических возможностей отраслей экономики. Именно этому вопросу и посвящена статья.Для эффективного решения задач обороны государства имеющимся экономическим потенциалом считается целесообразным рассматривать более широкий круг предприятий, которые предлагается называть оборонным сектором национальной экономики (ОСНЭ).Под ОСНЭ предлагается понимать специфическую часть экономики государства. В ОСНЭ входят охваченные единым руководством совокупность центральных органов исполнительной власти, других государственных и негосударственных органов управления, органов местного самоуправления, научно-исследовательских, опытно-конструкторских учреждений, предприятий отраслей экономики различных форм собственности, на которые задействованы трудовые ресурсы соответствующей квалификации. Они решают задачи разработки, производства, модернизации и утилизации продукции военного назначения, материального обеспечения и предоставления услуг в интересах обороны, обеспечение функционирования экономики в целом и жизнедеятельности населения.Показателем эффективности (качества) мобилизационных возможностей ОСНЭ предлагается считать уровень способности производить им по замкнутому циклу определенную номенклатуру оборонной продукции, оказывать определенные услуги и выполнять требуемые работы. Количественно показатель эффективности (качества) мобилизационных возможностей ОСНЭ можно определить как объем продукции, услуг и работ, которые осуществляются по замкнутому циклу к количеству всей продукции и услуг, необходимых для обороны государства ; При виконанні визначених завдань стосовно забезпечення військ (сил) озброєнням, військовою технікою (ОВТ), іншими матеріально-технічними засобами (МТЗ), фахівці Міністерства оборони України (МО України), Генерального штабу Збройних Сил України (ГШ ЗС України) складають замовлення на покриття бойових втрат і витрат, які прогнозуються. При цьому не завжди визначається яка номенклатура ОВТ та МТЗ потрібна в першу чергу, в якій кількості тощо. Без певних даних залишається не визначеним коли можна очікувати їх надходжень.Пропонується розглянути можливі шляхи вирішення питання ефективного ресурсного забезпечення потреб Збройних Сил України через інструментарій економічних спроможностей галузей економіки. Саме цьому питанню і присвячена стаття.Для ефективного вирішення завдань оборони держави наявним економічним потенціалом вважається за доцільне розглядати більш широке коло підприємств, яке пропонується називати оборонним сектором національної економіки (ОСНЕ).Під ОСНЕ пропонується розуміти специфічну частину економіки держави, до якої належать охоплені єдиним керівництвом сукупність центральних органів виконавчої влади, інших державних та недержавного органів управління, органів місцевого самоврядування, науково-дослідних, дослідно-конструкторських закладів, підприємств галузей національної економіки різних форм власності на яких задіяні трудові ресурси відповідної кваліфікації, та які вирішують завдання розроблення, виробництва, модернізації і утилізації продукції військового призначення, матеріального забезпечення та надання послуг в інтересах оборони, забезпечують функціонування економіки в цілому та життєдіяльність населення.Показником ефективності (якості) мобілізаційних спроможностей ОСНЕ пропонується вважати рівень здатності виробляти ним за замкнутим циклом певну номенклатуру оборонної продукції, надання певних послуг та робіт. Кількісно показник ефективності (якості) мобілізаційних спроможностей ОСНЕ можна визначити як обсяг продукції, послуг та робіт, які здійснюються за замкнутим циклом до кількості всієї продукції та послуг , що потрібні для оборони держави ="Content" ObjectID="_1642589485"> , що потрібні для оборони держави

In article internal political development of Ukraine which happened for more than quarter of the century of modern history is investigated and also the main directions of foreign policy of the country are analyzed. For the period which has passed from the moment of the collapse of the USSR in 1991 political development of Ukraine was followed by the conflicts, cardinal changes of the constitution. Bitter struggle went between executive and legislative branches of the power which sought to strengthen the positions due to redistribution of powers. Besides, heated debates went between supporters of the unitary device of Ukraine and adherents of federalization. The last saw a guarantee of maintaining territorial integrity of the country and a way of achievement of political stability in transition to the federal beginnings. This problem was especially relevant for the Ukrainian state which owing to historical development and formation of the modern territory, has inherited interregional contradictions. It was especially accurately shown during the periods of political events of 2004 and 2014, having fully reflected the available problems connected with fight of regional elite. Despite political shocks, the Ukrainian elite of the western and east regions supported unitary development of Ukraine, seeing in it a possibility of receiving complete control over the state institutes and financial flows. Ignoring of opportunities of the federal device was shown in 2014 when tough rejection of the radical nationalist parties which have carried out a coup in Kiev has caused a wave of protest performances in southeast regions. The subsequent political struggle between Kiev and regions of the East of Ukraine has developed into armed conflict. However, despite it, the official Ukrainian authorities haven't changed the negative attitude to a possibility of federalization of the state. It is difficult and contradictory the foreign policy of Ukraine which generally carried a westernized course was formed. Despite the short periods of rapprochement with Russia that strengthened criticism from opposition forces, the Ukrainian power adhered to a pro-European course, considering him as a guarantee of independent development and creation of a counterbalance of Russia. Similar approach has affected foreign policy priorities of Ukraine which expanded cooperation with the countries taking a hard line in relation to Russia. Finally, strengthening of the anti-Russian rhetoric from official Kiev has led to cooling of the Russian-Ukrainian relations which have ceased to have character of strategic partnership, and then and has led to tough opposition of two countries. In recent years the attention of the Ukrainian policy is directed to strengthening of the relations with the European countries. This vector has amplified after change of the power in Ukraine in 2014 when the Ukrainian authorities have headed for expansion of cooperation with the EU, of the USA and began to make efforts for rapprochement with NATO. ; В статье исследуется внутриполитическое развитие Украины, которое происходило за более чем четверть века современной истории, а также анализируются основные направления внешней политики страны. За период, который прошел с момента распада СССР в 1991 году, политическое развитие Украины сопровождалось конфликтами, кардинальными изменениями конституции. Острая борьба шла между исполнительной и законодательной ветвями власти, которые стремились усилить свои позиции за счет перераспределения полномочий. Кроме того, острые дискуссии шли между сторонниками унитарного устройства Украины и приверженцами федерализации. Последние видели в переходе к федеративным началам гарантию сохранения территориальной целостности страны и пути достижения политической стабильности. Данная проблема была особенно актуальной для украинского государства, которое в силу исторического развития и формирования современной территории, унаследовало межрегиональные противоречия. Это особенно четко проявилось в периоды политических событий 2004 и 2014 годов, в полной мере отразив имеющиеся проблемы, связанные с борьбой региональных элит. Несмотря на политические потрясения, украинские элиты западных и восточных регионов выступали за унитарное развитие Украины, видя в этом возможность получения полного контроля над государственными институтами и финансовыми потоками. Игнорирование возможностей федеративного устройства проявилось в 2014 году, когда жесткое неприятие радикальных националистических партий, осуществивших государственный переворот в Киеве, вызвало волну протестных выступлений в юго-восточных регионах. Последующая политическая борьба между Киевом и регионами востока Украины переросла в вооруженный конфликт. Впрочем, несмотря на это, официальные украинские власти не изменили своего негативного отношения к возможности федерализации государства. Сложно и противоречиво формировалась внешняя политика Украины, которая в основном носила прозападный курс. Несмотря на непродолжительные периоды сближения с Россией, что усиливало критику со стороны оппозиционных сил, украинская власть придерживалась проевропейского курса, рассматривая его в качестве гарантии независимого развития и создания противовеса России. Подобный подход сказался на внешнеполитических приоритетах Украины, которая расширяла сотрудничество со странами, занимающими жесткую позицию по отношению к России. В конечном итоге, усиление антироссийской риторики со стороны официального Киева привело к охлаждению российско-украинских отношений, которые перестали носить характер стратегического партнерства, а затем и привело к жесткому противостоянию двух стран. В последние годы внимание украинской политики направлено на укрепление отношений с европейскими странами. Этот вектор усилился после смены власти на Украине в 2014 году, когда украинские власти взяли курс на расширение сотрудничества с ЕС, США и стали прилагать усилия для сближения с НАТО.

In article internal political development of Ukraine which happened for more than quarter of the century of modern history is investigated and also the main directions of foreign policy of the country are analyzed. For the period which has passed from the moment of the collapse of the USSR in 1991 political development of Ukraine was followed by the conflicts, cardinal changes of the constitution. Bitter struggle went between executive and legislative branches of the power which sought to strengthen the positions due to redistribution of powers. Besides, heated debates went between supporters of the unitary device of Ukraine and adherents of federalization. The last saw a guarantee of maintaining territorial integrity of the country and a way of achievement of political stability in transition to the federal beginnings. This problem was especially relevant for the Ukrainian state which owing to historical development and formation of the modern territory, has inherited interregional contradictions. It was especially accurately shown during the periods of political events of 2004 and 2014, having fully reflected the available problems connected with fight of regional elite. Despite political shocks, the Ukrainian elite of the western and east regions supported unitary development of Ukraine, seeing in it a possibility of receiving complete control over the state institutes and financial flows. Ignoring of opportunities of the federal device was shown in 2014 when tough rejection of the radical nationalist parties which have carried out a coup in Kiev has caused a wave of protest performances in southeast regions. The subsequent political struggle between Kiev and regions of the East of Ukraine has developed into armed conflict. However, despite it, the official Ukrainian authorities haven't changed the negative attitude to a possibility of federalization of the state. It is difficult and contradictory the foreign policy of Ukraine which generally carried a westernized course was formed. Despite the short periods of rapprochement with Russia that strengthened criticism from opposition forces, the Ukrainian power adhered to a pro-European course, considering him as a guarantee of independent development and creation of a counterbalance of Russia. Similar approach has affected foreign policy priorities of Ukraine which expanded cooperation with the countries taking a hard line in relation to Russia. Finally, strengthening of the anti-Russian rhetoric from official Kiev has led to cooling of the Russian-Ukrainian relations which have ceased to have character of strategic partnership, and then and has led to tough opposition of two countries. In recent years the attention of the Ukrainian policy is directed to strengthening of the relations with the European countries. This vector has amplified after change of the power in Ukraine in 2014 when the Ukrainian authorities have headed for expansion of cooperation with the EU, of the USA and began to make efforts for rapprochement with NATO. ; В статье исследуется внутриполитическое развитие Украины, которое происходило за более чем четверть века современной истории, а также анализируются основные направления внешней политики страны. За период, который прошел с момента распада СССР в 1991 году, политическое развитие Украины сопровождалось конфликтами, кардинальными изменениями конституции. Острая борьба шла между исполнительной и законодательной ветвями власти, которые стремились усилить свои позиции за счет перераспределения полномочий. Кроме того, острые дискуссии шли между сторонниками унитарного устройства Украины и приверженцами федерализации. Последние видели в переходе к федеративным началам гарантию сохранения территориальной целостности страны и пути достижения политической стабильности. Данная проблема была особенно актуальной для украинского государства, которое в силу исторического развития и формирования современной территории, унаследовало межрегиональные противоречия. Это особенно четко проявилось в периоды политических событий 2004 и 2014 годов, в полной мере отразив имеющиеся проблемы, связанные с борьбой региональных элит. Несмотря на политические потрясения, украинские элиты западных и восточных регионов выступали за унитарное развитие Украины, видя в этом возможность получения полного контроля над государственными институтами и финансовыми потоками. Игнорирование возможностей федеративного устройства проявилось в 2014 году, когда жесткое неприятие радикальных националистических партий, осуществивших государственный переворот в Киеве, вызвало волну протестных выступлений в юго-восточных регионах. Последующая политическая борьба между Киевом и регионами востока Украины переросла в вооруженный конфликт. Впрочем, несмотря на это, официальные украинские власти не изменили своего негативного отношения к возможности федерализации государства. Сложно и противоречиво формировалась внешняя политика Украины, которая в основном носила прозападный курс. Несмотря на непродолжительные периоды сближения с Россией, что усиливало критику со стороны оппозиционных сил, украинская власть придерживалась проевропейского курса, рассматривая его в качестве гарантии независимого развития и создания противовеса России. Подобный подход сказался на внешнеполитических приоритетах Украины, которая расширяла сотрудничество со странами, занимающими жесткую позицию по отношению к России. В конечном итоге, усиление антироссийской риторики со стороны официального Киева привело к охлаждению российско-украинских отношений, которые перестали носить характер стратегического партнерства, а затем и привело к жесткому противостоянию двух стран. В последние годы внимание украинской политики направлено на укрепление отношений с европейскими странами. Этот вектор усилился после смены власти на Украине в 2014 году, когда украинские власти взяли курс на расширение сотрудничества с ЕС, США и стали прилагать усилия для сближения с НАТО.

Under international law, there is no single legal body with the power to generate norms that are binding on all subjects without their consent. There is no centralized executive authority entrusted with implementation, while international adjudicating bodies have no compulsory or comprehensive jurisdiction. Apart from the absence of a centralized law-making and law-enforcement authority, most publicists insist that with the exception of jus cogens, there is no a priori hierarchy of sources under international law. This state of play is of particular relevance when one assesses the role of international adjudicating bodies as they settle disputes between states. International case law, like the writings of publicists, is not a formal source of international law but, rather, provides 'evidence' of the applicable norms in the circumstances. Decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international adjudicating bodies are binding only upon the parties to the dispute. Nevertheless, by taking as an example the conservation of living marine resources beyond national jurisdiction, this article attempts to demonstrate that the contribution made by the ICJ and other international tribunals to the development of international law may be more significant, especially when one considers the scenario referred to earlier. This article will examine various judgments of the ICJ and other international tribunals and assess their role and relevance in the development of the international regulation of living marine resources occurring beyond national jurisdiction. The way states interpret the freedom of access over living resources on the high seas determines the manner in which they exercise regulatory and enforcement jurisdiction over them as well as the kind of conservation measures states obligate their nationals to take when fishing in marine areas beyond national jurisdiction. Bodies adjudicating international disputes over the exploitation of living marine resources have considered various legal issues in this field of international law, the following being among the most common. First, states tend to disagree on how they interpret the legal implications of freedom of fishing and the obligation to take conservation measures as a qualification to it. The article will examine those fisheries cases that have discussed to what extent the flag state's freedom of access over living marine resources on the high seas is subject to the rights, duties, and interests of coastal states and of other flag state participants in the same fishery. Second, another contentious legal issue relates to the interpretation of the exclusive enforcement jurisdiction of the flag state and to whether international law allows other states any right to act against states that either fail to adopt conservation measures on the high seas or that choose less stringent ones than those agreed upon via international co-operation agreements. This legal question revolves around the abuse of the flag state's exclusive enforcement jurisdiction on the high seas. It affects both coastal states that have painstakingly developed a conservation plan for their exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or their exclusive fishing zone (EFZ) as well as states that are participants in the same high seas fishery and that have negotiated conservation measures via a co-operation agreement. In the first case, the coastal state expects flag states to exercise compatible conservation measures when their nationals fish on the high seas, and, in the second case, flag states, whose nationals are participating in a fishery, find it particularly frustrating and counter productive when another flag state who is not a party to the conservation agreement reached via co-operation takes no action against its fishing vessels that violate the conservation measures established in the agreement or else adopt inferior ones. Third, another question that often arises in international fisheries disputes relates to the legal status of living marine resources occurring beyond national jurisdiction and whether international law obligates all states to ensure the conservation of living marine resources on the high seas whether they are harvestable or not. The debate surrounding the legal status of these resources also questions whether the obligation to take conservation measures on the high seas is vested in the international community at large as an erga omnes obligation. The cohort of rules regulating the conservation of marine living resources on the high seas has developed on an ad hoc basis, as a reaction to the historical and political developments that have occurred throughout the centuries. As it has become more and more specialized, this branch of international law has suffered from fragmentation, which has led to ambiguity and uncertainty when states have sought to interpret and apply applicable norms. The decisions of international adjudicating bodies provide the judges with an opportunity to identify what is the position of international law from the myriad of norms that have accumulated over time. This article will attempt to examine various international cases that have discussed the position of international law in fisheries disputes. Occasionally, it will also refer to some other landmark cases that have treated an entirely different subject matter whenever the legal arguments made by the judges therein may elucidate the interpretation of applicable international norms relating to the legal questions listed earlier. ; peer-reviewed

Problem setting. In the conditions of transition from command-administrative to market economy, decentralization reform of public administration, new priorities in connection with the European integration course of Ukraine, models of the state youth employment policy at the regional level have changed significantly. Trends of job cuts, increase in both open and hidden youth unemployment, as well as the level of young people's outflow abroad call for development of new approaches and methods of relevant public policy. This necessitates the study of the processes of forming and implementing state youth employment policy at the regional level in Ukraine during its independence.Recent research and publications analysis. The greatest attention of scientists has been drawn to the issues of organizational and legal support of the state youth employment policy (A. Batiuk, Ye. Borodin, M. Dolishnii, I. Piron, I. Khokhriakova, I. Shkindiuk). The application of active methods of state policy/regulation of youth employment has become the subject of research by D. Krasivskyi, S. Bandur, O. Kovenska. Analysis of the dynamics of youth employment in regions and cities in the scientific works of economists (L. Golubovska, I. Zaiukov, E. Libanova, P. Rossokhatskyi, L. Semenova) allowed identifying the results of state youth employment policy at the regional level.Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. At the same time, today there are no comprehensive works exploring the change of approaches to the formation and implementation of state youth employment policy at the regional level in Ukraine in 1991 – 2020.Paper main body. The main directions of the state youth employment policy at the regional level in Ukraine at the beginning of its independence were determined by the Soviet approaches laid down in the government resolution "On the Establishment of the State Employment Service in the Ukrainian SSR" and the law "On Employment of the Population" adopted in 1990 – 1991. At the regional level, public authorities created institutions: to promote youth employment – regional and district employment centers; social services for young people; to provide social protection and adaptation of the young generation under market conditions – regional branches of the Fund of social adaptation of youth of Ukraine. In order to promote youth employment, the authorities have been developing annual and long-term territorial employment programs since 1991.Since the 1992 Declaration on General Principles of State Youth Policy in Ukraine, the provision of youth employment has been proclaimed one of the main directions of state youth policy. The youth age in Ukraine, enshrined in law, was changed several times. In 1993 – 1998, it was 15 – 28 years of age (Law of Ukraine "On Promotion of Social Formation and Development of Youth in Ukraine"). In the period of December 1998 – March 2004, the Law of Ukraine "On Youth and Children's Public Organizations" defined youth as the age group of the population from 14 to 28 years. Since March 2004 to present day, citizens aged 14 to 35 have been referred to as young people. Attempts made in 2013 to limit the age of young people to 28 were rejected in 2016.In the conditions of transition from administrative methods of the state youth employment policy at the regional level to market ones, in 1997 the model of youth employment due to cooperation of local executive bodies, associations of employers and trade unions was established. The application of active methods of social policy in the field of youth employment (2000) marked a shift from a paternalistic model of state youth employment policy at the regional level to a market model. Functioning of youth labor centers (2001), economic incentives for employers to create first jobs for young people; as well as educational institutions' training young people in specialties and professions of high demand in the labor market, aimed at pursuing a marketing policy for their graduates (2004); the establishment of career centers and units to promote the employment of students and graduates of higher educational institutions on the basis of these institutions (2008) testified to the fact that the state policy of youth employment at the regional level was at the intersection of the domains of youth, education and regional social policies.After the so-called optimization of the system of central executive bodies in 2010, the Ministry of Education and Science, Youth and Sports of Ukraine was created by merging of the two ministries. However, the ministry did not have the function of youth employment among its powers. A gradual decline in the functioning of youth labor centers was observed. The mechanism of paying compensation to employers (50% of the amount of the accrued single contribution (since 2012)) for creation of additional jobs to employ the unemployed youth appeared to be an ineffective incentive for employers (the compensation was less than the subsidy established in 2004). The announced internship of students acquired the form of a formal procedure.The decentralization reform of public administration; the resumed functioning of youth labor centers in the regions (2016); creation of youth centers – new institutions (in communal and private ownership); promotion of youth employment part-time employment, and youth entrepreneurship (2017); involvement of young people to addressing employment issues have had a positive impact on the implementation of youth employment policy at the regional level. In 2018, for the first time since Ukraine gained its independence, the rate of youth employment exceeded by 1,3% the average employment rate of the country's able-bodied population. Therefore, in the conditions of decentralization of public administration, the state youth employment policy at the regional level has proved effective.Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. The study of the process of formation and implementation of state youth employment policy at the regional level in Ukraine during 1991 – 2020 allowed identifying 4 periods of change in approaches and methods. At the first stage (1991 – 2000), in Ukraine there existed a paternalistic model of state youth employment policy at the regional level, resulting from the Soviet approaches: the use of public procurement, administrative methods, the state allocation of young professionals. The application of active methods of social policy in the field of youth employment since 2001, the emergence of new institutions set to address the problem of youth employment in the regions, that is, youth labor centers testified to the start of using a market model of state youth employment policy at the regional level. The third period – 2010 – 2016 – was characterized by the removal of youth employment from the domain ofyouth and educational policies, the ruining of the network of youth labor centers, reduction in the effectiveness of state youth employment policy at the regional level in Ukraine. The period from 2016 to present day has been marked by a positive impact of decentralization reform on the effectiveness of state youth employment policy at the regional level; the focus of regional employment programs on supporting flexible forms of youth employment; formation of a model for the implementation of youth policy in the context of decentralization; effective involvement of young people in the formation and implementation of youth employment policy at the regional level. ; Досліджено особливості формування та проведення державної політики зайнятості молоді на регіональному рівні в Україні у 1991 – 2020 рр. Висвітлено трансформацію підходів до політики зайнятості молоді на регіональному рівні від радянських до ринкових, а також моделей політики зайнятості молоді на регіональному рівні від патерналістської до ринкової, у межах соціального діалогу, до моделі відповідної політики в умовах децентралізації. Обґрунтовано, що працевлаштування молоді перебуває у предметній сфері молодіжної, освітньої, регіональної соціальної політик. Визначено 4 періоди у формуванні та проведенні державної політики зайнятості молоді на регіональному рівні в Україні: 1) кін. 1990 – 1991 – 2000 рр. – патерналістська модель; 2) 2001 – 2010 рр. – ринкова модель; 3) 2010 – 2016 рр. – занепад регіональних структур відповідної політики; 4) 2016 р. – до тепер – модель реалізації відповідної політики в умовах децентралізації.

Problem setting. In the conditions of transition from command-administrative to market economy, decentralization reform of public administration, new priorities in connection with the European integration course of Ukraine, models of the state youth employment policy at the regional level have changed significantly. Trends of job cuts, increase in both open and hidden youth unemployment, as well as the level of young people's outflow abroad call for development of new approaches and methods of relevant public policy. This necessitates the study of the processes of forming and implementing state youth employment policy at the regional level in Ukraine during its independence.Recent research and publications analysis. The greatest attention of scientists has been drawn to the issues of organizational and legal support of the state youth employment policy (A. Batiuk, Ye. Borodin, M. Dolishnii, I. Piron, I. Khokhriakova, I. Shkindiuk). The application of active methods of state policy/regulation of youth employment has become the subject of research by D. Krasivskyi, S. Bandur, O. Kovenska. Analysis of the dynamics of youth employment in regions and cities in the scientific works of economists (L. Golubovska, I. Zaiukov, E. Libanova, P. Rossokhatskyi, L. Semenova) allowed identifying the results of state youth employment policy at the regional level.Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. At the same time, today there are no comprehensive works exploring the change of approaches to the formation and implementation of state youth employment policy at the regional level in Ukraine in 1991 – 2020.Paper main body. The main directions of the state youth employment policy at the regional level in Ukraine at the beginning of its independence were determined by the Soviet approaches laid down in the government resolution "On the Establishment of the State Employment Service in the Ukrainian SSR" and the law "On Employment of the Population" adopted in 1990 – 1991. At the regional level, public authorities created institutions: to promote youth employment – regional and district employment centers; social services for young people; to provide social protection and adaptation of the young generation under market conditions – regional branches of the Fund of social adaptation of youth of Ukraine. In order to promote youth employment, the authorities have been developing annual and long-term territorial employment programs since 1991.Since the 1992 Declaration on General Principles of State Youth Policy in Ukraine, the provision of youth employment has been proclaimed one of the main directions of state youth policy. The youth age in Ukraine, enshrined in law, was changed several times. In 1993 – 1998, it was 15 – 28 years of age (Law of Ukraine "On Promotion of Social Formation and Development of Youth in Ukraine"). In the period of December 1998 – March 2004, the Law of Ukraine "On Youth and Children's Public Organizations" defined youth as the age group of the population from 14 to 28 years. Since March 2004 to present day, citizens aged 14 to 35 have been referred to as young people. Attempts made in 2013 to limit the age of young people to 28 were rejected in 2016.In the conditions of transition from administrative methods of the state youth employment policy at the regional level to market ones, in 1997 the model of youth employment due to cooperation of local executive bodies, associations of employers and trade unions was established. The application of active methods of social policy in the field of youth employment (2000) marked a shift from a paternalistic model of state youth employment policy at the regional level to a market model. Functioning of youth labor centers (2001), economic incentives for employers to create first jobs for young people; as well as educational institutions' training young people in specialties and professions of high demand in the labor market, aimed at pursuing a marketing policy for their graduates (2004); the establishment of career centers and units to promote the employment of students and graduates of higher educational institutions on the basis of these institutions (2008) testified to the fact that the state policy of youth employment at the regional level was at the intersection of the domains of youth, education and regional social policies.After the so-called optimization of the system of central executive bodies in 2010, the Ministry of Education and Science, Youth and Sports of Ukraine was created by merging of the two ministries. However, the ministry did not have the function of youth employment among its powers. A gradual decline in the functioning of youth labor centers was observed. The mechanism of paying compensation to employers (50% of the amount of the accrued single contribution (since 2012)) for creation of additional jobs to employ the unemployed youth appeared to be an ineffective incentive for employers (the compensation was less than the subsidy established in 2004). The announced internship of students acquired the form of a formal procedure.The decentralization reform of public administration; the resumed functioning of youth labor centers in the regions (2016); creation of youth centers – new institutions (in communal and private ownership); promotion of youth employment part-time employment, and youth entrepreneurship (2017); involvement of young people to addressing employment issues have had a positive impact on the implementation of youth employment policy at the regional level. In 2018, for the first time since Ukraine gained its independence, the rate of youth employment exceeded by 1,3% the average employment rate of the country's able-bodied population. Therefore, in the conditions of decentralization of public administration, the state youth employment policy at the regional level has proved effective.Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. The study of the process of formation and implementation of state youth employment policy at the regional level in Ukraine during 1991 – 2020 allowed identifying 4 periods of change in approaches and methods. At the first stage (1991 – 2000), in Ukraine there existed a paternalistic model of state youth employment policy at the regional level, resulting from the Soviet approaches: the use of public procurement, administrative methods, the state allocation of young professionals. The application of active methods of social policy in the field of youth employment since 2001, the emergence of new institutions set to address the problem of youth employment in the regions, that is, youth labor centers testified to the start of using a market model of state youth employment policy at the regional level. The third period – 2010 – 2016 – was characterized by the removal of youth employment from the domain ofyouth and educational policies, the ruining of the network of youth labor centers, reduction in the effectiveness of state youth employment policy at the regional level in Ukraine. The period from 2016 to present day has been marked by a positive impact of decentralization reform on the effectiveness of state youth employment policy at the regional level; the focus of regional employment programs on supporting flexible forms of youth employment; formation of a model for the implementation of youth policy in the context of decentralization; effective involvement of young people in the formation and implementation of youth employment policy at the regional level. ; Досліджено особливості формування та проведення державної політики зайнятості молоді на регіональному рівні в Україні у 1991 – 2020 рр. Висвітлено трансформацію підходів до політики зайнятості молоді на регіональному рівні від радянських до ринкових, а також моделей політики зайнятості молоді на регіональному рівні від патерналістської до ринкової, у межах соціального діалогу, до моделі відповідної політики в умовах децентралізації. Обґрунтовано, що працевлаштування молоді перебуває у предметній сфері молодіжної, освітньої, регіональної соціальної політик. Визначено 4 періоди у формуванні та проведенні державної політики зайнятості молоді на регіональному рівні в Україні: 1) кін. 1990 – 1991 – 2000 рр. – патерналістська модель; 2) 2001 – 2010 рр. – ринкова модель; 3) 2010 – 2016 рр. – занепад регіональних структур відповідної політики; 4) 2016 р. – до тепер – модель реалізації відповідної політики в умовах децентралізації.

The article highlights the peculiarities of the legal regulation formation of land relations in Galicia as part of the Austrian Empire (late XVIII ‒ early XIX centuries). It is argued that the legal framework for the regulation of land relations in Austria (since 1867 ‒ Austria-Hungary) was laid for a long time on the basis of customary and codified civil law, taking into account the experience of individual European countries (France, England, German states). A kind of legal eclecticism was designed to take full account of public, but this often led to the emergence of certain contradictions and conflicts in Austrian law. It is described that Galicia, annexed to the Habsburg monarchy as a result of the first partition of the Rzeczpospolita in 1772, was an agrarian region with a rather low crop culture and a whole set of unresolved problems in the field of agrarian relations. And although the annexed crown land ‒ the Austrian-created Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria (Königreich Galizien und Lodomerien) ‒ was territorially the largest within the Habsburg Empire (total area was more than 83 thousand km2 with a population of 2.5 million people), its economic weight in the state was insignificant. In the economic system of the empire, Galicia was seen as a potential supplier of bread for the whole state. It is shown that the first steps of the Austrian authorities in Galicia in the field of agriculture can be called the introduction of basic order in order to implement more efficient management. The situation with the settlement of land relations in Galicia turned out to be much more complicated, where there was a significant agrarian overpopulation ‒ significantly more than in other regions of Europe at that time.It is found that between 1785 and 1788 the first general land census was compiled in Austria – the land cadastre, known as the Josephine Metric (named after Emperor Joseph II). The introduction of such a cadastre was determined by the need to obtain information about land as a source of wealth and taxation. The Austrian cadastre was a detailed census and assessment of available land. As a result of the measurement, a protocol of land measurements was drawn up, where land plots were indicated with the establishment of their number, size (in yards), area and yield. Important in terms of reforming land relations in Galicia was the "Urban Patent", issued on February 10, 1789 by Emperor Joseph II. All peasant duties were to be set in proportion to the amount of land in use.It is established that after the abolition of the serfdom of peasants in Galicia and cadastral reform, a number of other orders and patents were adopted, which regulated the sphere of land relations. The innovations concerned the responsibility of lords for restricting and violating the rights of peasants, additional duties, settlement of serfdom on bad days (a situation when a peasant could work serfdom days in the field on rainy days instead of bad weather). The authorities abolished the patrimonial judging of the lords against the peasants and introduced the positions of special judges – justices, who were to deal with the court cases of the peasants. However, the landlords continued to pay for their activities and they acted as their de facto proxies.It is noted that the Austrian reforms in the field of agriculture and land relations in the late XVIII ‒ early XIX centuries guaranteed peasant land ownership and protected it from encroachment by landlords. They clearly outlined the framework of the peasant economy, the peasant community itself and defined their place in the structure and functioning of the state until the mid-nineteenth century. Another change in the legal regulation of agrarian relations in Galicia took place after the "Spring of Nations" revolution. In March 1848, a revolution began in the Austrian Empire, the participants of which sought the proclamation of civil rights and freedoms, the elimination of the remnants of the Middle Ages. Influenced by popular demands and the political situation, Emperor Ferdinand I made concessions and on April 25, 1848, signed the first constitution for the whole empire. The constitution retained the monarchical-constitutional order, but introduced limited democratic rights and freedoms of citizens, declaring the division of power into three branches – executive, legislative and judicial. Under the conditions of the revolution and the signing of the first Austrian constitution in 1848, peasant movements intensified in Galicia, whose representatives, among other things, raised the issue of regulating land relations. ; Висвітлено особливості становлення правового регулювання земельних відносин у Галичині в складі Австрійської імперії (наприкінці XVIII – початку ХІХ століть). Зазначено, що австрійські реформи у сфері сільського господарства і земельних правовідносин наприкінці XVIII – початку ХІХ століть гарантували селянське землеволодіння і захистили його від посягань поміщиків. Вони чітко окреслили межі селянського господарства, самої селянської громади та визначили їх місце у структурі та функціонуванні держави аж до середини ХІХ століття. Чергові зміни у правовому регулюванні аграрних відносин у Гали­чині відбулися після революції "весни народів". У березні 1848 року в Австрійській імперії розпочалася революція, учасники якої домагалися проголошення громадянських прав і свобод, ліквідації пережитків ще епохи Середньовіччя. Під впливом народних вимог і політичної кон'юнктури імператор Фердинанд І пішов на поступки і 25 квітня 1848 року підписав першу конституцію для всієї імперії. Конституція залишала монархічно-консти­туційні порядки, однак впроваджувала обмежені демократичні права і свободи громадян, декларуючи розподіл влади на три гілки – виконавчу, законодавчу і судову. В умовах революції та підписання першої австрійської конституції 1848 року у Галичині активізува­лися селянські рухи, представники яких з-поміж іншого порушували питання регулювання земельних відносин.

Актуальность и цели. В правовом государстве главная роль в разрешении коллизий, возникающих в обществе, причем не только между членами этого общества, но и гражданином, с одной стороны, и государством, его органами и должностными лицами - с другой, отводится суду. Большинство действующих в настоящий момент конституций и уставов субъектов Федерации содержат двухэлементную систему конституционных (уставных) норм, регулирующих вопросы организации и деятельности судебной власти. Первая группа норм содержится в первых разделах (главах), характеризующих основы конституционного (уставного) строя соответствующего субъекта, применительно к определению институционального элемента принципа разделения властей, в форме провозглашения осуществления государственной власти ее законодательной, исполнительной и судебной ветвями. Вторая группа норм конкретизирует и детализирует этот конституционный принцип: подавляющее число конституций (уставов) содержит соответствующие разделы (главы), посвященные регулированию судебной власти. Содержание и объем этих разделов существенно различаются. Материалы и методы. Реализация исследовательских задач была достигнута путем анализа законодательных актов Российской Федерации и Пензенской области. Проанализированы нормативные акты субъектов Российской Федерации - Пензенской области, Республик Бурятия, Саха (Якутия). В работе были использованы научные статьи известных ученых-юристов и практиков. Результаты. Исходя из критерия полноты и комплексности регулирования данных вопросов, можно выделить относительно самостоятельные группы конституций (уставов). Первая группа включает в себя основные законы субъектов Федерации, в которых содержится достаточно подробное регулирование (Воронежская, Ивановская области и др.). Конституции и уставы второй группы могут быть определены как более лаконичные. В конституционные тексты этой группы включены две-три, иногда одна (Тамбовская область) незначительные по объему статьи, содержание которых в целом можно охарактеризовать как бланкетное. Особенность этих двух групп конституционных актов заключается в том, что соответствующие конституции и уставы объединяют в одном разделе (главе) правовые нормы, регулирующие не только вопросы организации и деятельности судебной власти, но и прокуратуры, адвокатуры, нотариата, а также организации и деятельности иных государственных и общественных институтов, осуществляющих в той или иной степени защиту прав и свобод человека. Выводы. В тех субъектах, где еще нет конституционных (уставных) судов, например в Пензенской области, по нашему мнению, их создание необходимо. Конституционный (уставный) суд, осуществляя конституционный (уставный) контроль, толкование основного закона, обеспечивает не только верховенство и непосредственное действие конституции (устава), но и единство, стабильность конституционной законности и фактически участвует в процессе нормотворчества. Нередко также он наполняет конкретным содержанием довольно абстрактные конституционные формулы. Мировая юстиция в нашей стране официально входит в систему судов общей юрисдикции, и эта очевидность укрепляется, если юрисдикцию рассматривать дихотомно: общая она либо специализированная. Но вполне возможен и иной подход, хотя и не столь очевидный, но как минимум имеющий право на существование, о чем также указано в статье. ; Background. In the constitutional state the main role in the resolution of conflicts arising in the society, and not only between the members of this society, but also between a citizen, on the one hand, and the state, its bodies and officials on the other, is given to the court. Most of the existing constitutions and charters of subjects of the Russian Federation contain a two-element system of constitutional (charter) regulations governing the organization and functioning of judicial authority. The first group of regulations is contained in the first sections (chapters) describing the foundations of the constitutional order of the corresponding subject, in relation to the definition of the institutional element of the principle of separation of powers, in the form of the proclamation of the exercise of public powers by the legislative, executive and judicial branches. The second group of standards specifies and itemizees this constitutional principle: the overwhelming majority of constitutions (charters) contains the relevant sections (chapters) devoted to the judicial authority. The content and scope of these sections are significantly different. Materials and methods. Realization of the research tasks was achieved through the analysis of the legislative acts of the Russian Federation and the Penza region, and normative acts of Penza region, the republics of Buryatia, Sakha (Yakutia). The author used scientific articles by renowned scholars and practitioners. Results. Based on the criterion of completeness and comprehensiveness of the regulation of these issues, it is possible to allocate relatively independent groups of constitutions (statutes). The first group includes the basic laws of subjects of the Federation, which contains a fairly detailed regulation (Voronezh, Ivanovo region, etc.). The second group of the constitutions and statutes can be defined as more concise. The constitutional texts of this group include 2-3 (sometimes one Tambov region) minor articles, the content of which can generally be described as a blanket one. The peculiarity of these two groups of constitutional acts is that the relevant constitutions and statutes combine legal norma in one section (chapter) that regulate the organization and functioning of the judicial system as well as the public prosecutor's office, lawyers, notaries, including the organization and tactivities of other state and public institutions engaged to a certain extent in protection of rights and freedoms. Conclusions. In those subjects, where there are no constitutional (charter) courts, for example in the Penza region, in the author's opinion, their creation is necessary. The Constitutional (Charter) court, through constitutional (statutory) monitoring, interpretation of the basic law, provides not only the supremacy and direct action of the Constitution (Charter), but also the unity, the stability of the constitutional legality and actually participates in the rulemaking process. Often it also fills quite abstract constitutional formulas with particular content. Justice of peace in Russia is officially included into the system of courts of General jurisdiction, and this evidence is strengthened if the jurisdiction is considered in a dichotomic way: General or specialized. But the different approach is also possible, although not so obvious, but at least having the right to exist, as it has been also mentioned in the article.

Dottorato di ricerca in Storia d'Europa: società, politica e istituzioni (19.-20. secolo) ; L'unificazione politica e legislativa del Regno d'Italia coinvolse anche l'ordinamento giudiziario. La magistratura che dipendeva per le nomine e la carriera dal Governo centrale e in modo specifico dal Ministro della giustizia, venne inquadrata da subito come un ramo della pubblica amministrazione direttamente dipendente dal Re. La questione dell'indipendenza del potere giudiziario dall'esecutivo e quella dell'autonomia, intesa come sistema di autogoverno, furono i temi centrali del dibattito parlamentare. L'ordinamento giudiziario del 1865, infatti, concedeva ai giudici l'inamovibilità di grado ma non di sede e ai pretori soltanto dopo i tre anni di attività. Per limitare il potere dell'esecutivo fu costituita dal ministro Villa nel 1880 la Commissione consultiva per le nomine, promozioni e tramutamenti dei magistrati che però esprimeva dei meri pareri consultivi di cui il guardasigilli poteva anche non tener conto. Soltanto più tardi, nel 1907, con la legge n. 511 del ministro Orlando fu istituito il Consiglio Superiore della magistratura, un corpo consultivo permanente e parzialmente elettivo a cui vennero attribuite una serie di competenze relative alla nomina e alla carriera dei giudici. Anche il concorso pubblico, come unico mezzo per l'ingresso in magistratura, istituito da Zanardelli nel 1890 e negli anni rivisitato e modificato, venne considerato un mezzo per sottrarre il potere giudiziario al controllo governativo eliminando la nomina politica dei giudici. Zanardelli tentò anche di ridisegnare con la legge 30 marzo 1890, n. 6702 le circoscrizioni giudiziarie ereditate dal passato riducendo il numero delle preture per aumentare, con le risorse economiche ricavate, lo stipendio dei giudici ritenuto esiguo soprattutto nei primi anni della carriera. La sistemazione delle preture, di cui si occuparono anche Ronchetti e Orlando, incontrò sempre una forte opposizione locale più per ragioni di prestigio che di giustizia; il Governo affrontò la medesima resistenza anche per la costituzione della Corte di cassazione di Roma che si concluse soltanto nel 1923. Nel 1875 vennero istituite a Roma due sezioni penali con lo scopo di agevolare il lavoro delle altre quattro Corti regionali con sede a Torino, Milano, Napoli e Palermo. La Corte di Roma assunse la cognizione di tutti i giudizi penali e ridusse le Corti regionali a corti supreme di nome e non di fatto lasciando loro le sole competenze civili. Negli anni successivi si continuò ancora discutere circa l'unicità della Corte ed il ruolo che avrebbe dovuto assumere, se tribunale di terza istanza o tribunale garante della uniforme interpretazione della legge. Intanto si andò consolidando anche la struttura del Ministero della giustizia, al cui interno il guardasigilli, coadiuvato dal segretario, dal direttore generale e dal gabinetto trovavano spazio una serie di uffici ripartiti in divisioni, ai quali tra la fine dell'ottocento e l'inizio del novecento se ne aggiunsero dei nuovi tra cui la Commissione consultiva, l'ufficio legislativo, il casellario centrale. A questi venivano frequentemente destinati magistrati in qualità di applicati o in missione a svantaggio del personale di ruolo che costantemente veniva ridotto. ; The political and legislative unification of the Kingdom of Italy also involved the judiciary. The judiciary that depended on appointments and career from the central government and specifically by the Minister of Justice, was framed from the start as a branch of government directly employed by the King. The question of independence of the judiciary from the executive and that of autonomy, understood as a system of self-government, were the central themes of parliamentary debate. The judicial system in 1865, in fact, granted the tenure of judges but not able to seat and lower court judges only after three years of operation. To limit the power of government was established by the Minister Villa in 1880, the Advisory Commission on appointments, promotions and transmutation of judges. It expressed mere advisory opinions which the Keeper could not even take into account. Only later, in 1907, with Law No 511, the Minister Orlando instituted the Superior Council of Magistracy, a permanent and partially elected consultative body which was attributed a range of skills relating to the appointment and careers of judges. Even the competitive examination, as the only means for entry into the judiciary, established by Zanardelli in 1890 and revisited and amended over the years, was seen as a way to subtract the judiciary to government control by eliminating the political appointment of judges. Zanardelli also tried to reform with the Law of 30 March 1890, No 6702 the judicial districts by reducing the number of the Courts to increase, with the economic resources derived, the salaries of judges considered modest especially in the early years of his career. The Ministers Ronchetti and Orlando have addressed the issue of the Courts and this problem always met strong local opposition for reasons of prestige than of justice. The government has addressed the same resistance also for the establishment of the Court of Cassation in Rome that ended only in 1923. The two penal sections were established in Rome in 1875 with the aim of facilitating the work of four other regional courts in Turin, Milan, Naples and Palermo. The Court of Rome, assumed the full knowledge of all criminal trials, and reduced regional supreme courts in civil courts. In the following years the Parliament continued to discuss its uniqueness and the role that would take: court of third instance court or the guarantor of a uniform interpretation of the law. The Ministry of Justice consolidated its structure: there were the Minister, the secretary, the director and the cabinet. The offices were divided into departments. There were also the special offices: the legislative office, the Advisory Commission, and the criminal records bureau where the judges worked as applied to detriment of staff which was constantly being reduced.