The theoretical case for industrial policy is a strong one. The market failures that industrial policies target in markets for credit, labor, products, and knowledge have long been at the core of what development economists study. The conventional case against industrial policy rests on practical difficulties with its implementation. Even though the issues could in principle be settled by empirical evidence, the evidence to date remains uninformative. Moreover, the conceptual difficulties involved in statistical inference in this area are so great that it is hard to see how statistical evidence could ever yield a convincing verdict. A review of industrial policy in three non-Asian settings El Salvador, Uruguay, and South Africa highlights the extensive amount of industrial policy that is already being carried out and frames the need for industrial policy in the specific circumstances of individual countries. The traditional informational and bureaucratic constraints on the exercise of industrial policy are not givens; they can be molded and rendered less binding through appropriate institutional design. Three key design attributes that industrial policy must possess are embeddedness, carrots-and-sticks, and accountability.
La presente tesi non è solo l'esito di una ricerca su un precetto giuridico controverso, ma è anche la narrazione di un processo personale di scoperta, che a partire dallo studio di una specifica norma ha fatto emergere la complessità delle interazioni nell'ambito delle politiche in materia penale, economica, e finanziaria. Partendo da un approccio microsociologico focalizzato sull'analisi di una determinata norma penale, il reato di riciclaggio,1 la ricerca ha dovuto confrontarsi con temi di interesse macrosociologico, al fine di inserire l'analisi della legge all'interno di un contesto più ampio di politiche nazionali, europee e internazionali, di attori e di governance transnazionale. Per mantenere la scientificità dell'elaborato ho omesso di esprimere opinioni personali sui temi, talvolta di carattere fortemente politico, e ho cercato, invece, di presentare aspetti critici e discussioni aperte fornendo una visione completa e imparziale delle contrastanti argomentazioni in modo da lasciare il lettore libero di trarre le proprie conclusioni. Il riciclaggio di denaro sporco è il processo tramite cui a proventi di reati viene data un'apparenza di essere stati guadagnati in modo illecito. È un reato tipico della cosiddetta 'zona grigia', poiché avviene al confine tra la sfera della legalità e quella dell'illegalità. Nel momento in cui profitti realizzati illecitamente si mescolano ai flussi di denaro lecito è molto difficile discernere ciò che ha un'origine legale da ciò che è stato guadagnato illegalmente. Il reato di riciclaggio di denaro sporco è stato introdotto proprio per affrontare questa difficoltà ed impedire che le strutture legittime dell'economia e della finanza globale venissero abusate da trasgressori al fine di ripulire i proventi di reato. Infatti i flussi di denaro sporco utilizzano spesso gli stessi canali usati per le transazioni lecite; la loro riuscita dipende dalla cooperazione di professionisti quali avvocati commerciali, agenti finanziari, commercialisti, la cui reputazione è raramente sospetta. Data questa promiscuità spesso la gravità del fenomeno è sottovalutata dal pubblico che non ha gli strumenti per riconoscerne la pericolosità, anche a causa dell'assenza di vittime dirette. Dall'altra parte le stime sulla quantità di proventi di reato riciclati a livello mondiale (che oscillano tra il 2,5 % e il 5,5 % del PIL globale) richiamano l'attenzione su quella che Dalla Chiesa definisce la mitologia del volume dell'economia criminale,2 e una parte della letteratura descrive il riciclaggio come il lato oscuro della globalizzazione,3 e come uno dei maggiori problemi dell'era moderna.4 Con questa ricerca ho voluto mettere in discussione l'efficacia del reato di riciclaggio nel far fronte al fenomeno dell'infiltrazione dei flussi di denaro sporco nell'economia lecita. Sebbene la pratica di nascondere i proventi di reato in modo da evitare la persecuzione giudiziaria risalga probabilmente a molto tempo addietro, il concetto giuridico di riciclaggio è relativamente recente ed è stato introdotto nei codici penali nella maggior parte del mondo a partire dalla fine degli anni 80.5 Nel frattempo un gran numero di autori si è scagliato contro la scarsa efficacia delle legislazione anti-riciclaggio6, nonostante le innumerevoli novità introdotte e i cospicui ammendamenti che hanno in larga parte espanso il campo di applicazione della normativa. La decisione di scegliere il contesto tedesco come caso di studio deriva dal fatto che il paese è considerato avere un rischio particolarmente alto di riciclaggio di denaro sporco. Secondo il rapporto emesso dal 2010 dal GAFI (Groupe d'Action Financière), dal FMI (Fondo Monetario Internazionale) e dall'OCSE (Organizzazione per la Cooperazione e lo Sviluppo economico)7 ci sono alcuni fattori che rendono la Germania propensa ad essere usata al fine di riciclaggio di denaro sporco: il volume del sistema economico-finanziario, la locazione strategica al centro dell'Unione Europea con forti legami internazionali, l'uso diffuso di denaro contante,8 l'apertura delle frontiere, la vastità del settore informale, l'importante ruolo a livello di economia globale, e il coinvolgimento nei flussi di denaro transfrontalieri. Anche i media, a partire soprattutto dalla pubblicazione del citato rapporto, hanno attirato l'attenzione del pubblico sul fenomeno, descrivendo la Germania come "paradiso" o "Eldorado" per i riciclatori. Alcuni recenti scandali hanno visto coinvolte prominenti banche tedesche, come la Deutsche Bank, la Commerybank e l'Hyopovereinsbank, contro cui procure straniere hanno sollevato l'accusa di riciclaggio di denaro sporco.9 La legislazione in atto, ed in particolare l'articolo 261 del codice penale tedesco, non sembra essere sufficientemente efficace per contrastare il fenomeno, nonostante gli abbondanti emendamenti e il continuo processo di aggiornamento e di espansione del campo di applicazione della norma. Al fine di spiegare questa per lo meno apparente incapacità della norma di fare fronte al fenomeno del riciclaggio, ho costruito l'ipotesi di ricerca sulla base delle teorie sociologico-giuridiche relative all'efficacia del diritto, alle funzioni manifeste e latenti delle norme e quindi alle intenzioni espresse e non dal legislatore, all'efficacia simbolica del diritto e di singole legislazioni e all'impatto, inteso come comprensivo degli effetti indesiderati o collaterali. L'ipotesi di ricerca è che la norma esplichi una funzione simbolica di allineamento dell'ordinamento nazionale a quello europeo e transnazionale, di compromesso tra gli interessi politici in gioco, e di creazione di consenso pubblico verso il legislatore per essersi occupato della questione. Si ipotizza che il legislatore abbia quindi consapevolmente accettato o addirittura scelto di formulare una norma strumentalmente poco efficace, ma simbolicamente capace di raggiungere i suoi obiettivi latenti. Si solleva inoltre l'ipotesi che la norma sia stata appositamente approvata con lo scopo di non modificare lo status quo delle relazioni e strutture economiche, e di permettere quindi l'ingresso di capitali sporchi nel paese, sulla base del motto pecunia non olet. La suddetta ipotesi viene parzialmente smentita dai risultati della ricerca empirica. La ricostruzione del processo di produzione legislativa mette in risalto l'esistenza di svariati e contrastanti interessi e della forte pressione esercitata dagli organismi internazionali per l'introduzione e lo sviluppo del reato di riciclaggio, e conferma, quindi, l'argomentazione che la norma sia stata approvata in un contesto di pressione politica esterna e di necessità di trovare un compromesso tra diverse parti politiche. Anche l'analisi degli aspetti problematici dell'articolo 261 del codice penale tedesco messi in risalto dalla dottrina supporta l'ipotesi della simbolicità della norma. Il fatto che il legislatore abbia formulato un reato così complesso crea evidenti problemi di integrazione dello stesso all'interno del sistema penale tedesco, e quindi di accettazione da parte degli studiosi e potenzialmente da parte degli operatori del diritto. Inoltre, la scelta di costruire un reato così complesso riflette la necessità di venire a compromesso con opposti interessi, ma potrebbe essere anche essere interpretata come un disinteresse al raggiungimento di un'efficacia materiale. La ricerca empirica sull'implementazione dell'articolo 261, invece, smentisce l'idea che la norma abbia un'efficacia puramente simbolica. Infatti il numero di condanne, di investigazioni, ed in generale l'uso ricorrente della legge riscontrato nelle statistiche criminali provano che essa conduca ad effetti strumentali, oltre che simbolici. Inoltre, nella prospettiva di alcuni degli operatori del diritto e degli esperti intervistati, l'articolo 261 è percepito come una norma particolarmente efficiente, sia in relazione alle quote di chiarimento, che come strumento di demarcazione tra comportamenti leciti e illeciti, in un contesto di deregolamentazione del settore finanziario. Da un'analisi piè ravvicinata delle statistiche e di altri rapporti emessi da enti internazionali e nazionali emerge però un quadro non così univoco: La norma sembra colpire più le vittime dei network criminali che operano a livello transnazionale che gli autori, perché spesso i colpevoli sono coinvolti in transazioni sospette in cambio di guadagni monetari. Le cospicue indagini finanziarie non riescono a raggiungere coloro che operano dietro gli esecutori dei reati minori, ed infatti la maggior parte di esse si concludono senza una condanna per riciclaggio. Questo a fronte di un volume di denaro sporco circolante nel paese che rimane allarmante, secondo alcuni degli studi analizzati. Se da una parte i risultati dell'applicazione della norma, sebbene strumentali, non possono considerarsi soddisfacenti, perché non sono riusciti ad evitare l'ingresso di capitali illeciti nell'economia nazionale, dall'altra parte sembra che l'esistenza di interessi profondamente contrastanti in gioco renda quasi impossibile la formulazione di un reato piè efficace. La tesi è composta da cinque capitoli, un'introduzione e una conclusione. Nel primo capitolo espongo le teorie sociologiche adottate per la valutazione di efficacia della norma e il metodo della ricerca. Inizialmente richiamo concetti di efficacia forniti da discipline affini alla sociologia del diritto - tra cui per esempio il concetto di efficienza e di efficienza indipendente rispetto allo scopo (zielunhabhängige Effizienz) riferito agli apparati amministrativi - che torneranno utili per l'interpretazione dei risultati delle interviste. Successivamente procedo con una panoramica sulle definizioni di efficacia del diritto fornite in sociologia del diritto, sulla ci base adotto una nozione "elastica" -riprendendola da Ferrari- di efficacia di una norma che guarda alle funzioni della norma e alle intenzioni del legislatore, in una prospettiva "intenzionalistica": "la corrispondenza fra un disegno politico di utilizzo di uno strumento normativo e i suoi effetti". Tale nozione, oltre a prestarsi ad un'analisi critica del diritto, fornisce indicazioni utili per l'analisi empirica dell'efficacia della legge in questione. In particolare ritengo utile considerare le seguenti variabili: le intenzioni latenti e manifeste del legislatore, gli scopi diretti e ed indiretti, l'eventuale efficacia simbolica del diritto, l'implementazione, la ricezione della norma nel senso di accettazione nel sistema giuridico e di interpretazione e percezione da parte degli operatori giuridici. Nella seconda parte si evidenzia il rilievo di tali variabili con riferimento specifico al diritto penale. In conclusione, sulla base delle riflessioni teoriche, formulo l'ipotesi sull'efficacia simbolica del reato di riciclaggio nell'ordinamento tedesco, che verrà poi verificata nei capitoli successivi. Nello specifico, presumendo che il reato di riciclaggio, introdotto come strumento fondamentale della lotta alla criminalità organizzata, così com'è formulato non adempie agli scopi dichiarati, nonostante gli innumerevoli emendamenti finalizzati proprio ad aumentarne l'efficacia, ipotizzo un'efficacia simbolica della norma, introdotta per offrire un'immagine di efficienza al pubblico (elettori). Inoltre sollevo l'ipotesi che la norma sia stata emanata appositamente inefficace per neutralizzarne le aspirazioni di punizione delle condotte illecite tipiche dei colletti bianchi, in una lettura moderna del conflitto sociale che avviene tramite l'emanazione di norme, con la volontà di decriminalizzare secondariamente comportamenti tipici delle classi forti. Nel secondo capitolo analizzo il processo legislativo a livello internazionale, europeo e nazionale. Il processo che ha portato alla creazione del reato di riciclaggio a livello internazionale viene ricostruito tramite dichiarazioni di intenti degli attori partecipanti, opinioni pubblicate, trascrizioni dei dibattiti parlamentari. Una particolare attenzione è posta sulle diverse intenzioni degli attori che hanno partecipato alla formulazione del reato. Il processo legislativo che ha portato alla formulazione dell'attuale legislazione anti-riciclaggio è un processo complesso, in cui diversi attori partecipanti hanno contribuito con differenti aspettative e dunque attribuendo diverse funzioni alla criminalizzazione del riciclaggio. Al fine di permettere svariate interpretazioni del dettato normativo in modo da soddisfare i differenti bisogni, e con lo scopo di trovare un compromesso tra gli interessi divergenti, il reato di riciclaggio è stato formulato in modo vago. Mentre alcuni Stati (ad esempio la Francia) inizialmente sostenevano l'introduzione del reato con lo scopo di combattere i paradisi fiscali e rafforzare la lotta all'evasione fiscale, altri Stati, come la Svizzera, hanno accettato di firmare l'accordo internazionale sulla criminalizzazione del riciclaggio solo a condizione che l'evasione fiscale non fosse inserito nella lista dei reati antecedenti. Con la nascita del GAFI la policy viene usata allo scopo di difendere l'integrità del sistema finanziario dall'infiltrazione di capitale illecito e dal 2001 si aggiunge la funzione di lotta al finanziamento del terrorismo. Tramite la soft law emanata dal GAFI per la prevenzione del riciclaggio, si trasferiscono compiti solitamente pubblici al settore privato: banche e istituti finanziari devono segnalare alla polizia ogni transazione sospetta, devono raccogliere e mantenere informazioni sui clienti e verificare le identità dei clienti. L'Unione Europea finora ha emanato quattro direttive nell'ambito del riciclaggio, l'ultima risale al 20 maggio 2015. Inizialmente la CE non aveva competenza in ambito penale, perciò la materia riciclaggio fu assorbita nella sfera economica (DG Economia e industria). La funzione dichiarata dal legislatore è la protezione del mercato interno, con particolare riguardo al fatto che i criminali possano sfruttare la libera circolazione dei capitali e l'eliminazione delle frontiere. Le direttive esprimono anche la volontà di impedire agli stati membri di emanare regolamentazioni che possano bloccare il libero mercato al fine di difendere le proprie economie dall'infiltrazione di capitale illecito. Emerge dunque un ulteriore conflitto di interessi. Nella seconda parte ricostruisco il processo legislativo e le evoluzioni interne alla Germania fino al momento della scrittura e fornisco il quadro del sistema repressivo e di prevenzione anti-riciclaggio. L'articolo 261 StGB è stato introdotto con legge Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des illegalen Rauschgifthandels und anderer Erscheinungsformen der Organisierten Kriminalität, quindi nell'ambito della lotta alla criminalità organizzata. Il dibattito parlamentare rileva che la norma è il frutto di un compromesso sotto diversi aspetti, non ultimo il fatto che è stata emanata del 1992, a pochi anni dalla riunificazione, e che quindi è parte del processo di negoziazione per la formazione di un diritto penale adattabile alle due culture giuridiche. Il legislatore tedesco evidenzia alcune funzioni della norma: la lotta al consumo di eroina e al traffico di stupefacenti, la diffusione e la pericolosità della mafia alla luce dei fatti recenti italiani, la volontà di proteggere l'amministrazione della giustizia e di isolare i criminali puntando alla criminalizzazione dei cosiddetti gate-keepers. Nel terzo capitolo individuo alcuni dei problemi sollevati dalla dottrina tedesca sul piano teorico con riferimento alla criminalizzazione del reato di riciclaggio nel contesto del sistema penale tedesco. Uno dei temi più discussi è relativo al bene giuridico protetto. La dottrina non ha ancora trovato un accordo su quale interesse sia protetto dall'articolo 261 StGB, le ipotesi sono: gli interessi dei reati antecedenti, l'amministrazione della giustizia, il sistema finanziario e la sicurezza. La vaghezza del dettato normativo non aiuta a trovare un interpretazione dottrinale univoca. La questione del bene giuridico protetto, lungi dall'essere una mera questione teorica, risente delle diverse funzioni attribuite alla norma dagli attori partecipanti al processo legislativo. Finora la giurisprudenza, che pur è intervenuta a chiarire altre questioni relative alla norma, non è intervenuta sul tema. Un altro tema su cui il dibattito è ancora aperto è il fatto di aver previsto al comma 5 l'ipotesi di colpa lieve, in controtendenza rispetto al legislatore europeo. Questo, secondo alcuni studiosi porta all'assurdo per cui anche il panettiere Tizio che vende del pane ad un evasore fiscale Caio potendo aver riconosciuto che Caio fosse un evasore, si rende colpevole di riciclaggio. La questione del livello di mens rea richiesto per una condanna per riciclaggio era sorta anche durante il dibattito parlamentare e l'introduzione del comma 5 è stato sostenuto da un emendamento della SPD che avrebbe voluto criminalizzare anche l'ipotesi di colpa lievissima. Questo, secondo la CDU avrebbe messo un freno al mercato e alle transazioni, poiché avrebbe costituito una minaccia per chiunque avesse intrapreso operazioni economiche. Essendo la funzione della norma incerta, la dottrina si divide tra chi sostiene che questa vasta criminalizzazione faccia perdere il senso del reato che sarebbe invece colpire i criminali che agiscono con intento, e chi invece sostiene che la norma abbia lo scopo di impedire qualsiasi infiltrazione di denaro illecito e quindi richieda una responsabilizzazione di tutti colori i quali prendano parte in operazioni finanziarie o economiche. Ancora una volta l'indeterminatezza del precetto legislativo è di ostacolo ad un'interpretazione univoca. Il quarto capitolo offre un'analisi qualitativa delle statistiche officiali sull'implementazione della legge dal 1992 ad oggi da parte delle istanze repressive e di prevenzione. Tra i dati analizzati i più rilevanti sono per esempio il numero di segnalazioni di transazioni sospette ricevuto dalle procure, il numero delle investigazioni condotte, il numero di condanne effettivamente inflitte ed eseguite e per quale delle ipotesi di riciclaggio, il volume di denaro confiscato. Essendo tali numeri indici del funzionamento del sistema penale e non del fenomeno del riciclaggio per sé, in conclusione si confrontano tali statistiche con le stime sul volume di flussi illeciti in Germania. Tale analisi, non potendo dare conto del numero dei reati evitati, sulla base dell'efficacia deterrente della norma, non intende esaurire il giudizio di efficacia della legislazione. Tra i risultati più rilevanti vi sono il fatto che il 60% delle persone condannate vengono condannate per l'ipotesi di colpa lieve, che solitamente consiste in casi in cui una persona poco abbiente ha accettato di far usare il proprio conto a terzi per operazioni sospette in cambio di un guadagno. Nel 5% dei casi le condanne sono inflitte per le ipotesi aggravate di commissione da membro di un'associazione criminale o in forma commerciale. Nel 90% dei casi le transazioni sospette segnalate alle procure portano a una chiusura dei procedimenti per mancanza di indizi che possano sostenere un rinvio a giudizio. La norma sembra colpire delinquenti minori e non grandi gruppi criminali, né altri delinquenti più potenti. Si ipotizza inoltre che l'incapacità di sostenere un rinvio a giudizio nonostante le informazioni acquisite e le indagini preliminari riduce la capacità deterrente della norma e permette, invece, ai criminali di conoscere le modalità di funzionamento del sistema repressivo e agire di conseguenza. Inoltre, le transazioni sospette sono segnalate nel circa 90% dei casi sa parte di istituti di credito, mentre gli altri enti obbligati dalla legislazione non sembrano partecipare attivamente al processo preventivo, in particolare il settore forense e immobiliare e del gioco d'azzardo. Sulla base di questi dati si ipotizza un effetto spill-over, ossia un trasferimento di illegalità dai settori più controllati a quelli meno controllati. I rapporti pubblicati dalla polizia, invece, considerano l'articolo 261 StGB come una norma con una delle più alte quote di chiarimento (ca 90%), quota calcolata sul numero di casi chiariti dal sistema penale, a prescindere dalle modalità di chiarimento. Per quanto riguardo il volume di denaro riciclato, il capitolo richiama alcune delle stime pubblicate da diversi enti, tra cui il Fondo Monetario Internazionale, il GAFI e la polizia criminale federale. Essendo il fenomeno del riciclaggio un campo in cui la cifra oscura è stimata essere molto alta, tali dati non possono essere presi come misura obiettiva del fenomeno. Infine il capitolo si conclude richiamando alcune analisi del tipo costi-benefici per misurare l'efficacia delle politiche anti-riciclaggio o alcune delle sue norme, condotte da enti terzi. Tali analisi sembrano concordare nel considerare i costi di implementazione della politica più alti rispetto ai benefici conseguenti. Nel quinto capitolo, infine, vengono discussi i risultati della ricerca empirica con gli operatori giuridici e con alcuni osservatori privilegiati, in modo da fornire una prospettiva interna sul funzionamento della norma. Tramite le interviste condotte si mettono in luce aspetti della prassi giuridica non fotografati dalle statistiche, allo scopo di offrire un'immagine dell'impatto della legge quanto più vicina possibile alla realtà. La ricerca empirica si avvale di interviste con operatori del diritto e con osservatori privilegiati che siedono in posizioni ministeriali rilevanti nella lotta al riciclaggio. La metodologia adottata è di tipo qualitativo, è stato fatto uso di interviste semi-strutturate a operatori del diritto e a osservatori privilegiati. Il capitolo presenta le percezioni degli intervistati su quattro temi principalmente: la dimensione del fenomeno del riciclaggio, l'adeguatezza tecnica della legislazione, i conflitti di interesse intrinseci alla legge e sorti dall'applicazione della norma e l'efficacia delle legge. A fronte di un rapporto emesso da quattro ONG nel novembre 2013, sulla base di statistiche prodotte dall'UNODC e dal Fondo Monetario Internazionale, e immediatamente riprese dai media, che descrive il paese come "Eldorado" per i riciclatori,10 le interviste sono dirette a cogliere l'opinione dei rispondenti sulle dimensioni del fenomeno del riciclaggio in Germania. Un intervistato ritiene inaccettabile desumere dal PIL tedesco il volume di affari del crimine organizzato nel paese, e obietta che non si possa, sulla base del giro d'affari del centro finanziario di Francoforte, definire lo stesso come centro di riciclaggio di denaro sporco. Un altro intervistato, dichiara, al contrario, che sicuramente il fatto che la Germania abbia un'economia stabile ed un settore bancario affidabile attiri coloro che vogliano investire proventi illeciti, neppure quest'ultimo possiede, però, dati affidabili sulla quantità di denaro riciclato. Il riciclaggio, come altri fenomeni legati alla criminalità organizzata, è una fattispecie che per definizione sfugge alle autorità e ai confini nazionali. Lo scopo dello stesso è nascondere proventi di reato e sottrarli in questo modo al sistema repressivo, questo è sicuramente un elemento che rende complessa, se non impossibile, la sua quantificazione. D'altra parte, osservano i soggetti intervistati autori del Rapporto del 2013, l'incapacità di fornire statistiche rilevanti dopo più di 20 anni di lotta al riciclaggio, sembra essere un sintomo di una carente volontà politica nel contrastare efficacemente il fenomeno. Secondo gli osservatori privilegiati se la Germania fosse davvero un paradiso per i riciclatori, ciò non sarebbe collegabile ad un deficit legislativo, dato l'impegno del governo nella lotta al riciclaggio, negando, quindi, l'accusa rivolta dai media per cui i criminali sceglierebbero il paese tedesco ai fini di riciclaggio di denaro sporco sulla base delle lacune normative. Agli intervistati è stato chiesto di evidenziare aspetti positivi e problematici della legislazione. Tra i più rilevanti vi sono: la necessità di bilanciare il bisogno di punire la condotta di riciclaggio e rispettare i principi fondamentali del sistema giuridico, il disinteresse da parte degli istituti finanziari nell'indagare l'origine del capitale investito dai clienti, anche in caso di sospetto di provenienza criminale, a causa della possibile conseguente perdita di reputazione nell'ipotesi di apertura di investigazioni da parte delle autorità sul cliente sospetto. Vi è poi una difficoltà materiale nel condurre indagini finanziarie, che spesso, conducono a condotte illecite commesse all'estero; sul punto si osserva che le condotte di riciclaggio, intese come operazioni atte ad ostacolare la provenienza delittuosa, non avvengono su territorio tedesco, bensì all'estero, il denaro che entra in Germania, è, quindi, già "pulito". Inoltre, l'articolo 261 è stato introdotto nel sistema tedesco come trasposizione di una direttiva Europea e non rifletteva una necessità interna dello Stato; la formulazione così vaga, infatti, si presta più per il sistema giuridico degli Stati Uniti, in cui non vige l'obbligo dell'azione penale, mentre in Germania, dove i pubblici ministeri hanno l'obbligo di azione penale, tale norma porta ad iniziare numerose indagini senza avere la capacità di proseguirle. In generale, gli intervistati rappresentanti dei Ministeri rilevano la forte pressione subita da parte del GAFI e dell'Unione Europea per l'emanazione della legge anti-riciclaggio e concordano nel dire che se la norma fosse stata creata sulla base di una necessità e di un dibattito nazionale sarebbe stata scritta diversamente. C'è chi individua nel sistema penale le cause di inefficacia dell'articolo 261, nello specifico, la limitata possibilità di effettuare intercettazioni telefoniche, le restrizioni in materia di inversione dell'onere probatorio, e lo scarso utilizzo della confisca dei proventi di reato a causa del disinteresse da parte delle procure (gestite a livello di Bundesländer) nell'investire risorse in tal senso dato che i beni confiscati non resterebbero in mano al Bundesland ma verrebbero raccolti in un fondo federale e poi spartiti. Si osserva una generale mancanza di risorse pubbliche che porta ad una carenza di personale coinvolto nelle investigazioni e, quindi, ad una incapacità di far fronte ai processi in corso in modo efficace. Per questo motivo, i pm non hanno la capacità di indagare più a fondo casi di riciclaggio all'apparenza semplici, ma che potrebbero portare alla luce organizzazioni criminali operanti nell'ombra. Alla totalità degli intervistati è stata chiesta un'opinione sull'efficacia della legge. L'articolo 261 del codice penale tedesco è stato definito da un soggetto "una legge scritta in modo indecente, che produce risultati banali sul piano delle statistiche criminali, soprattutto con riferimento alle condanne per riciclaggio in grossi casi di criminalità economica". Il reato è così difficile da provare in giudizio, che risulta facile, per la difesa, sfruttare le lacune legislative per evitare una condanna per riciclaggio. I rappresentanti dei Ministeri confermano che la lettera dell'articolo 261 crea confusioni e che quindi l'accusa, pur trovandosi di fronte ad un caso di riciclaggio spesso preferisca perseguire i delitti presupposto. Questo non è, però, un sintomo di inefficacia, dato che l'effettività a cui mira il Ministero dell'interno non è data dal numero di condanne per riciclaggio, ma dal numero di casi risolti, e quindi dal numero di condanne in generale, a prescindere dall'imputazione. D'opinione opposta un altro intervistato che ritiene che l'articolo 261 non abbia alcuna capacità deterrente nei confronti della criminalità organizzata, "la norma ricorre così raramente nella prassi giudiziaria che di fatto non rappresenta una "minaccia" per i potenziali criminali". I soggetti intervistati esprimono più soddisfazione a riguardo della legislazione di prevenzione (GWG); in particolare, con riferimento alle piccole e medie imprese, per le quali è difficile riconoscere tra i partner commerciali coloro i quali investono denaro di provenienza illecita, la possibilità di affidarsi alle autorità investigative, in caso di sospetto è fondamentale. Un avvocato specializzato in compliance per società, descrive la norma preventiva come molto efficace e severa, tanto che è impossibile per le aziende, specialmente per quelle di medie o piccole dimensioni, adempiere a tutti gli obblighi prescritti dalla norma, ma, egli osserva, l'efficacia del sistema sta proprio nel fatto che le autorità di controllo, consapevoli dell'elevata rigorosità della legge, chiudono un occhio di fronte a lievi inadempienze. Una legge meno severa e un controllo più fiscale non otterrebbero la stessa efficacia, perché la norma non avrebbe lo stesso potenziale deterrente. L'efficacia all'interno delle amministrazioni responsabili per la lotta al riciclaggio è interpretata come efficienza dell'apparato, per questo motivo, non ci sono verifiche sull'efficacia degli strumenti giuridici sulla base degli scopi dichiarati, quanto piuttosto sulla correttezza del funzionamento dell'amministrazione e sulle possibilità di migliorarlo; il punto è capire come migliorare, non se il sistema sia efficace o no. Agli intervistati è stata chiesta un'opinione sull'eventuale efficacia simbolica della legislazione. La maggioranza delle risposte è stata negativa, gli sforzi compiuti da parte dello Stato -e quindi delle procure, della autorità competenti e della polizia- nel contrastare il riciclaggio e la criminalità economica non possono essere considerati simbolici. Alcuni intervistati ritengono assolutamente necessaria e strumentale – e quindi non simbolica- l'esistenza del reato nel codice penale come demarcazione di illegalità di tali condotte e come strumento atto a contrastare la criminalità economica perché mette in chiaro entro quali limiti le società possano perseguire profitti in modo legittimo. Di opinione diversa, invece, gli avvocati penalisti i quali si sono detti favorevoli a tale definizione sulla base dello scarso numero di condanne e soprattutto sulla mancata previsione da parte del Governo di mezzi adeguati per l'implementazione della legislazione. Lo stesso è osservato dal terzo settore, il quale sostiene che, a fronte di una legge complessa, oggetto di svariati emendamenti nel corso degli anni, non c'è stato un sufficiente impegno sul versante dell'implementazione; il coinvolgimento del GAFI e dell'OECD nella lotta al riciclaggio è percepito come un modo per creare posti di lavoro e nuove figure professionali, più che un'arena dove discutere efficaci strumenti di lotta ai reati economici. Altri elementi interessanti riscontrabili nelle interviste sono i conflitti di interessi che emergono dall'applicazione delle leggi anti-riciclaggio. Tra essi, vi è il dibattito tra il Ministero dell'Interno e quello di Giustizia in riferimento all'adeguatezza dello strumento penalistico nel contrastare la criminalità economica, dibattito già affrontato dalla dottrina, a cui, però finora, non è stata data una risposta univoca. Da una parte il Ministero dell'Interno auspica un intervento giuridico più deciso, che, per esempio, ricomprenda il reato di riciclaggio nella responsabilità penale degli enti (non ancora esistente in Germania) e sollecita una svolta politica generale in tema di criminalità economica dalla deregolazione del mercato finanziario all'intervento dello Stato in ambito economico ai fini di chiarire i comportamenti leciti e quelli illeciti. Dall'altra parte, il Ministero della Giustizia considera erroneo il ricorso al diritto penale ai fini di risolvere problemi di tipo economico o finanziario e cerca di frenare la tendenza moderna alla proliferazione penale, a favore di un intervento di tipo preventivo-sociale. A tal proposito, si osserva che agli incontri del GAFI a cui partecipano i rappresentanti dei Ministeri di Giustizia, coloro che provino a richiamare l'attenzione sulla necessità di rispettare i principi fondamentali costituzionali e di limitare l'intervento penale a tutela dei cittadini, vengano tacciati di non voler combattere la criminalità organizzata in modo efficace. In conclusione riapro la prospettiva a livello globale ed inserisco il reato di riciclaggio in una riflessione più ampia sulla governace finanziaria. In una prospettiva storica di analisi delle politiche economiche recenti si osserva come vi sia stata una tendenza a deregolare il mercato per mano delle istanze tradizionali pubbliche, e al contempo un aumento di strumenti transnazionali di cosiddetta soft-law che si sono fatti portatori di interessi particolari. Finché questa conflittualità non verrà risolta sarà impossibile impedire il riciclaggio di denaro sporco. Con particolare riferimento al contesto europeo, si prende atto che è stato molto più facile chiudere le frontiere per le persone fisiche e non a quelle giuridiche o ai capitali. ; This paper aims to question the sociolegal1 effectiveness of the money laundering offence.2 The literature that assesses the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering system is abundant. While most of it does not question the regime's goals this paper takes a step back and critically looks at the law-making process. In addition, while most studies have assessed the effectiveness of anti-money laundering law by looking at statistical outcomes, this paper takes a step forward and tries to explain those statistics by looking at legal praxis and at indirect effects. The significance of the research derives from the insertion of the analysis on money laundering offence in a broader political, economic and historical context. The methodology adopted is qualitative, with the intended purpose of underlining the complexity of the issue tackled, rather than reducing it through a quantitative approach. While most of the existing literature has quantitatively assessed the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering regimes on the basis of statistical data and other quantitative indexes and has tried to reduce the complexity of the issue by measuring it numerically, this research adopts a qualitative methodology, which instead highlights the entanglement and the different perspectives on the question. Money laundering is the process of giving profits originated illegally an appearance of having been made lawfully.3 Due to the tightening of economic criminal policies that limit the possibility of integrating ill-gotten gains in the legitimate economy, offenders have developed more and more complex methods and subterfuges to launder proceeds of crime, so the rise of a proper 'money laundering industry' (industria del riciclaggio) is mentioned.4 The total volume of money laundered is estimated to amount to between 2,5 and 5, 5 % of the world GDP.5 Due to the borderline nature of money laundering, which happens between the so-called 'legitimate economy' and the 'dirty economy', and thus involves different actors such as banks, the financial sector, certain professions and businesses, offenders, victims and law enforcement agencies, the legal response needs to compromise with all the various economic, political, social and financial interests at play. Furthermore, where legitimate business intermingles with illegal business and legitimate funds with illicit funds, it is very difficult to distinguish what is legal from what is not. The criminalisation of money laundering was specifically supposed to tackle this fine line. The goal of this research is to assess whether the choice of criminalising money laundering has been effective to tackle this fine line. In order to assess the impact of the domestic implementation of the existing legal framework, the research uses a case study that specifically questions the effectiveness of the money laundering offence in the German national criminal legal system. The interest in the German case derives from the fact that, according to the IMF, the OECD and the FATF, Germany might have 'a higher risk profile for large scale money laundering than many other countries'.6 There are some factors identified as enablers of money laundering activities, such as the large economy and financial centre, the strategical location in the middle of Europe, with strong international links, the substantial proceeds of the crime environment involving organised crime operating in most profit generating criminal spheres, the open borders, the large informal sector and a high use of cash, the large and sophisticated economy and financial sector, the important role in world trade, and finally the involvement in large volumes of cross-border trade and financial flows. The media have kept on reporting the fact that Germany is an ideal country, or even a paradise for money launderers.7 According to most recent media reports, corruption is increasing in Germany along with money laundering and organised crime,8 and illicit financial flows are estimated to amount to 50 Billion Euros annually.9 Renowned banks such as Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, and Hypovereinsbank have been the focus of recent scandals due to their involvement in large tax evasion and money laundering schemes, investigated mostly by US law enforcement agencies.10 The legal framework has been considered as not being sufficient to tackle the estimated volume of money laundering. In 2007 and 2010 the European Commission initiated two proceedings against the German government for having contravened the European treaty by not having effectively transposed into national law the European framework to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing.11 In response to this wave of criticism, some important changes have been made.12 With specific regards to penal law, the legislature has amplified the scope of the money laundering offence and the sphere of criminal liability in order to improve the effectiveness of the existing legislation.13 Yet the continual expansion process has raised legal challenges that could constitute an obstacle for the effective enforcement of the measure. With regards to international legislation, scholars have often criticized the ineffectiveness of the anti-money laundering regime to not be able to achieve its goals and thus to be only appearance of public action. 14 While there is theoretical support for the perception that policies have contributed to a decrease in the incidence of money laundering, there is no evidence that this goal has actually been achieved.15 The official discourse describes the regime as a crucial tool to prevent and combat money laundering, and lawmakers have been focusing on expanding the reach of anti-money laundering laws. This work however takes a critical approach towards the existing legal framework and presents the view that questioning the effectiveness of the money laundering offence is essential before expanding the scope of the existing legal framework.16 On the background of the reflections based on the sociolegal framework that sets the definition of legal effectiveness with specific respect to criminal law, and on the critical literature on the inadequateness of the international anti-money laundering system to eliminate the targeted activity recalled in the introduction, the hypothesis underlying the case study is the following: Article 261 Gcc may be an example of a symbolic legislation, whose latent functions prevail on its declared functions. In particular, it is hypothesised that the law is an example of a 'compromise-law' that satisfy all parties taking part in the law-making process, thanks to the vagueness of the wording that allows a broad range of possible interpretations, and also thanks to the actual ineffectiveness, which pleases those who were contrary to the introduction of the provision. It is here necessary to recall the considerations on the 'legislator' being an heterogeneous group of parties not only constituted of members of the Parliament but often also by external actors, who can influence more or less transparently the law making-process. While the manifested function of tackling money laundering has in fact remained in the background, the thesis hypothesises that other latent goals have been pursued. It is further hypothesised that the 'law inaction' is part of a process of decriminalisation that intentionally grants impunity to a certain group of actors, in this case those laundering money, while giving the appearance that the practice is not accepted by law by labelling it as criminal. By using the concept of function, the study focuses on eventual conflicting interests emerging throughout the policy-making process and/or being displayed through the implementation of the provisions. In order to verify these hypotheses the research proceeds with a case study that aims at empirically assessing the sociolegal effectiveness of Article 261 Gcc. In particular, by applying the 'elastic' definition of effectiveness, the following chapters analyse the law-making process, the level of acceptance by legal scholars, the implementation, and the opinions of legal experts and professionals. The methodology adopted is qualitative. The research consists of a case study that includes a documental research, a qualitative analysis of statistical data and the conduction of interviews with privileged observers and legal actors. The study is a macro-sociological assessment of the effectiveness of a criminal legislation through the analysis of the motives that have triggered lawmakers to enact the current legal framework and the practical effects of the 'law in action'17 and of the 'law inaction'.18 Thanks to the use of sociological conceptual tools, as the ones of function, symbolic effectiveness, power, labelling, and legal culture, the research critically approaches the legal framework. In addition, the sociolegal perspective allows us to take into account the multidisciplinary nature of the phenomenon of money laundering and of its countermeasures and the diverse conflicting interests at play. The work has been conducted by a single person and not by a team of researchers; this has imposed a limit on the interviewing sample and the impossibility of undertaking, along with the qualitative analysis of the provision, a qualitative analysis of the jurisprudence and a quantitative analysis of the case law. In addition, criminal provisions have a deterrent purpose, yet in certain cases it is almost impossible to quantify the deterrence effect of those provisions, as in the case of the money laundering offence, and this represents a shortcoming of the current research. Official numbers are highly problematic, this element, despite impeding an objective quantification of the phenomenon, can represent a partial result for the qualitative analysis, because it highlights the complexity of the matter. The anti-money laundering regime is constantly evolving, and this would require continuously updating the assessment, instead the research provides a picture of the current situation. Yet the work offers the reader an instrument to critically interpret also possible changes in the wording of the money laundering offence that may be made following the publication of this work. The outcomes of the critical study on the reasons and effects of the current legislation can be used as a starting point for further research; the methodology set for the empirical analysis can be applied to assess the effectiveness of following developments. The structure of the thesis is the following: The first chapter presents the theoretical sociolegal framework and provides an operational definition of the concept of effectiveness that directs the empirical research. At the end the chapter describes the methodology of the qualitative research. Chapter two traces the genesis of the money laundering offence, as well on an internal, European and domestic level. The chapter analyses legislative intents, parliamentarian debates and other external contributions as declarations of intents and opinions through a desktop-study. The third chapter is dedicated to the doctrinal debate about the money laundering offence regulated in the German penal code. In particular the chapter highlights the controversial issues that have emerged through the abundant legal scholarship production, which might affect the effectiveness of the money laundering offence. Chapters four and chapter five present the empirical research. The fourth chapter analyses the quantitative data of the implementation of the money laundering offence from a qualitative perspective. The last chapter presents the results of the interviews. The main outcomes of the research are that the interests expressed more or less manifestly from the actors taking part in the initial phase of the creation of the anti-money laundering regime were strongly conflicting with each other. One representative example is the question whether to use the policy also to tackle large scale tax evasion or to leave proceeds deriving from fiscal crimes outside of the regime. Very different justifications were given for the criminalisation of money laundering at different stages. Often the declared motives did not correspond to the real goals of the actors taking part in the law-making process. The rhetoric connected to the seriousness of the drug issue was the manifest function of the new criminalisation of money laundering. However, other latent goals, for instance, the desire of financial institutions to clean their reputation and gain customs confidentiality or the interest of some governments to curb tax evasion were already present during this initial phase. Another controversial issue concerns the fact national states have adopted anti-money laundering measures under the pressure of the FATF, which is led by most industrialised countries.19 Despite lacking democratic legitimation, the FATF has imposed worldwide a brand new regime of criminalisation, prevention and enforcement. The legal framework has been used to address ever-new challenges, and this expansion process has been coupled by a rhetoric that scholars have defined the securitisation rhetoric.20 The most recent function manifestly attributed to the anti-money laundering legal framework, that is, in short, the protection of the soundness of the financial system. Especially in times of financial insecurity, the tendency of hardening laws against economic crimes increases. Having previously deregulated the financial system to enhance economic liberties, legislatures resort to criminal law to control illegality in the economy. As a response to the European financial crisis of 2007-2011, legislatures, instead of rethinking the approach towards the protection of the global finance, called for a tightening of economic crimes regulations. The European discourse on money laundering has mostly been related to the destabilisation of the market, the abuse of capitals' movement liberty, the disintegration of the internal economy. But, why was the EU so keen on imposing a common standard for the criminalisation of money laundering, without even enjoying competence in penal matters? The introduction of a common anti-money laundering control policy served to a latent function, namely to the purposes of the creation of the 'Single Market', by way of avoiding that Member States would have adopted measures inconsistent with the completion of the Internal Market, while taking action to protect their own national economies from money laundering.21 This was done by avoiding that domestic regulations implemented for protecting national economies from the infiltration of ill-gotten capital could have hampered the freedom of movement of capital within the European borders. The tension emerges, also in the wording of the most recent EU money laundering Directives, due to lack of Community action against money laundering could lead Member States, for the purpose of protecting their financial systems, to adopt measures which could be inconsistent with completion of the single market.22 There are thus conflicting interests between the claim for regulation to avoid the infiltration of illicit capital, and the demand for deregulation to foster the free market. The European legislature, however, did not declare completely this intention and justified, instead, the imposition of anti-money laundering rules given the threats posed by money laundering to the financial system and thus to society. According to this critical approach, the criminalisation of money laundering turns out to be more of a political tool aimed at achieving governance within the EU, while being presented to the public as an essential intervention to guarantee security and well-being. Once again, thus, the declared goals of the lawmakers did not correspond with the real intentions. It is especially in the interest of a research on the law's effectiveness to unveil functions that were undeclared, in order to evaluate the outcomes in a more critical way. Also from the analysis of the national law-making process emerged divergent opinions and expectations relating to the criminalisation of money laundering. The Parliamentarians debate that took place with regard to the introduction of the money laundering offence and other instruments to tackle drug-trafficking shows that the discussion was deeply embedded in the political-historical context. Given that Germany was just reunified after a period of two dictatorial regimes, the hearing gives the impression that lawmakers felt the responsibility of creating a new legal system against such historical background. In order to balance the very different legal cultures, the divergent approaches had to be compromised. The introduction of a new crime was particularly delicate due to the discriminatory and arbitrary use of criminal labels by the previous dictatorial regimes. Therefore, delegates would not easily give up on fundamental rights for the cause of persecuting criminals. The legislation can be seen as an attempt to balance the need to adopt more effective measures to tackle crime and the necessity of respecting the rule of law and creating a 'militant democracy'. Yet, given the external pressure of the FATF, the EU and of the media, the text was less of a compromise and rather a ratification of 'internationally' accepted standards. The rule of law was not the only issue emerged in the initial phase of the political debate. Controversial opinions were raised also with regard to the questions of the mens rea and the interest protected by the new criminal provision: Certain political parties supported the broadest criminal liability to ensure an effective prosecution of money laundering, other parties were worried that a widespread liability would have been cumbersome for the economic system. Moreover, along with the expansion of the international criminal legal framework to fight against money laundering, also the scope of Article 261 Gcc was extended to include ever-new predicate offences. From the analysis of the doctrinal debate, it emerged that legal scholars have revealed technical hindrances that hinder the provision's legitimacy and thus hamper a positive integration of the act in the criminal legal system. In addition, given that most controversial issues are caused by the wording of the offence, the chapter seems to uphold the idea of an intentional potential decriminalisation of money launderers. The wording of Article 261 Gcc has the potential of frustrating some of the intentions expressed by the legislature in occasion of the adoption of the provision. While the vague formulation of the money laundering offence was thought to tackle ever-new emergencies and has been justified by legislatures as necessary to ensure a more effective fight against money laundering, it has also raised issues that, far from being purely dogmatic, have undermined the acceptance of such law. If law makers have designed the offence in a broad way to allow the criminalisation of conducts that could not have been prosecuted by the existing offences before, the large discretion left to prosecutors, has resulted in a cumbersome element for the prosecution of money laundering. In addition, criminalising the reckless conduct without envisaging a specific criminal liability for security positions has widened the scope of the offence to the point that the law has missed its function of isolating criminals by criminalising gate-keepers' activities. In addition it emerged that there are some open questions with regard to the wording of the offence, for example the question of the interests protected by Article 261 Gcc. On one side a state intervention is considered necessary to contain the impact of economic misbehaviours to protect citizens, on the other side it is important to limit the resort to criminal law only for safeguarding individual or collective situations and not for defending an existing economic structure. The economic system may, in fact, not be considered as a collective interest that needs protection. Also, safeguards provided by penal law need to be substantial and not symbolic, because they urge to change a given situation of inequality, where criminals can profit from illegal practices while legitimate economic actors undergo unfair competition. From the doctrinal analysis it has instead emerged that the legislator seemed to be more interested in drafting a symbolic legislation that can be hardly integrated in the legal system and that raise strong challenges. Lawmakers have been focusing on expanding the reach of anti-money laundering in order to improve its effectiveness, yet without providing legitimacy for such expansion. One of the most meaningful fact observed in the qualitative analysis of statistical data is that organised crime and 'gross money laundering' are not persecuted through Article 261 Gcc. This fact can be inferred by the low number of convictions pursuant to Article 261 (4),23 by the low number of money laundering proceedings categorised as organised crime and by the low number of investigations in the field of money laundering, tax crimes and economic crimes recorded by public prosecutors offices in 2013, where more than one person was involved (18 %). Yet, this does not mean that the criminal justice system does not act against them, but rather that it uses other tools to achieve the goal. While the low conviction rate for serious money laundering cases could be also a symptom of a high degree of deterrence of the provision, it seems that law enforcement uses the money laundering charge as a fallback for authorities who are unable to acquire sufficient evidence in a preliminary phase for the predicate crime and necessitate further information otherwise not accessible. The charge of money laundering allows investigators to access the vast amount of information recorded pursuant to the GwG, which would not be otherwise accessible. Yet, after the investigative phase, prosecutors seem to prefer to modify the charge and opt for indictment for predicate offences instead. The law seems to be effective to the extent that it facilitates the initial investigations, while it does not serve directly the function of punishing money launderers. Besides having a substantial nature, the provisions seem to have a procedural function. It can be inferred that prosecutors find particularly difficult to bring evidence against organised money launderers also due to the fact that professional offenders do not leave traces. From the scarce use of Article 261 Gcc for tackling organised criminality, it can be inferred that the measure is not serving for one of the purposes declared by the legislature when introducing the offence. In addition, it can be hypothesised that other measures may be more suitable to tackle 'gross money laundering'. Given the high number of STRs filed and the low number of money laundering charges and of convictions deriving from the STRs since the introduction of the laws, it can be assumed that the system has been anyway maintained because it still provides some sort of benefits. It can be hypothesised that one benefit is the number of information provided to law enforcement agencies. This amount of recorded information is helpful not only to support further indictments, but also to increase the personnel awareness about the ever-changing money laundering techniques and schemes. Again the effect of the 'law in action' differs in respect to the declared legislative intentions, which justified the criminalisation of money laundering with the necessity of tackling organised crime's economic power. By spelling out this function, the assessment on the effectiveness of the law - as the possibility of collecting information - can be positive. Yet, this effect could be considered a social cost rather than a benefit. On a theoretical side, many scholars see the recording of personal information by private actors as an infringement of the right to privacy.24 On a more practical side such mechanism imposes significant costs on the designated businesses and professions that are in charge of collecting the data.25 When compared to the effective outcomes of the preventive regulations, in terms of law enforcement results, this aspect does not seem to win a cost-benefit analysis, as showed in the quoted researches. If one considers the advantages in terms of information collected, the policy may be considered worth the burden imposed, instead. However, the fact that the laws would have an effective impact on the long run on the fight against money laundering and organised crime may be seen as a diminished deterrence effect, because perpetrators would have the time to adapt to the new laws and find new ways of circumventing them. A collateral effect of the long-run effectiveness of the policy hypothesised on the basis of the outcomes of the research on the implementation is the fact that perpetrators could take advantage of the initiated but not completed cases, by acquiring knowledge about law enforcement strategies and thus develop subterfuges to elude them. On the contrary, it seems that the legislature is always running after to cope with the offenders' ever-new strategies. In fact, regulations about a new sector are updated when there is evidence that there is a risk of money laundering in that specific sector. Yet, offenders might have already moved their laundering activities to another sector. On the assumption that the inclusion of the reckless conduct would have potentially criminalised daily activities, a focus was posed on the number of convictions related to Article 261 (5) Gcc26 to verify the target of the criminal provision. Since 2005 a high number of convictions have been actually referring to reckless money laundering. This shows that the offence is used to punish primarily 'petty money laundering'. This fact can also be inferred from the relevant number of money laundering cases to the detriment of senior citizens, signalled by the FIU in the recent years. Also the fact that a significant number of STRs is filed in relation to the 'financial agents' phenomenon' is a symptom that the preventive mechanism targets more 'small fishes' rather than big perpetrators. Individuals convicted for the reckless conduct may be even victims of a fraud perpetrated by criminal networks. However, the criminal network acting behind the offender remains undetected. If on the one side it cannot be claimed that such offenders, given the lower degree of culpability should not be punished at all, on the other side this effect of the law involves a change of paradigm. The money laundering offence was initially introduced with the goal of tackling serious crimes. The observed effect, however, changes the function and the nature of the law, so that Article 261 Gcc could be considered rather a 'blue collar crime' more than a 'white collar crime'. From the analysis on the quality of STRs filed to the FIU, it can be inferred that certain designated professions and businesses are very reluctant in filing STRs, despite their notably exposure to money laundering risks. The list of designated professions and businesses has been amplified over the years exactly with the goal of facing this transfer of crime from one area to the other. Yet some professionals, such as legal advisors, do not report them, although they possess the capacity of recognising illicit transactions. The fact that some sectors do not actively participate in the effort of preventing money laundering, by allowing criminal proceedings to enter the legitimate economy, may lead to a general ineffectiveness of the system, because it can significantly hinder the capacity of the whole anti-money laundering system to respond to the ability of offenders to move their field of activity there where the law is lax. The provision does generate some instrumental effects by punishing offenders and by triggering a cooperation directed at signalling suspicious transactions between the obliged entities and law enforcement. However, some of the effects do not seem to completely fulfil the legislature's declared goals. For example the chapter seems to prove wrong the legislature's expectation of tackling the grey area by punishing gate-keepers or the attributed function of eliminating organised and serious crime. Given the high costs of implementation highlighted by the cost-benefits analyses, the rather low outcomes seem to be insufficient to fulfil the legislature's goals. Since it is sufficient that without latent functions it would be impossible to explain the adoption and maintenance of a legal act,27 it can be concluded that the intents declared by lawmakers do not satisfy the reasons why the provision was introduced. This opens up the hypothesis that Article 261 Gcc is an example of a symbolic legislation, which has been enacted with the purpose of compromising a complex parliamentarian debate. The analysis of the law-making process has revealed the existence of different expectations attributed to the introduction of Article 261 Gcc. Expectations that were conflicting with each other had to be negotiated and were compromised through the formulation of a vague offence that allowed different interpretations. Yet, the implementation of the law has led to the re-emersion of some of the conflicting situations. In addition, given that the policy regulates a complex and multifaceted issue new conflicts have emerged through its enforcement. The effects triggered by the norm can be indeed perceived positively or negatively by the different actors involved. In particular five principal conflicting situations have surfaced from the interviews. The first issue is the role played by external actors in the law-making process and the constant influence exercised by those actors in the process of updating the policy. The imposition of a US American approach to money laundering control through the role of the FATF has also been highlighted in the second chapter. Specifically, some scholars see the development of a global prohibition regime fostered by the US in the diffusion of anti-money laundering law. According to this literature, the powerful state creates an international regime focussed on achieving its own goals through global acceptance triggered by the securitisation rhetoric and compliance processes imposed through the menace of exclusion by international business relations. The second conflict that emanates from the words of the respondents is the one of the demand for criminal law to face financial misbehaviours and the necessity of limiting the tendency of expanding criminal law on the background of a situation of financial instability. Given the previous deregulation of the market, policy makers need to control and sanction economic abuse in order to protect fair competition and law-abiding individuals. On the other hand, the state needs to respect fundamental principles, such as the rule of law and the principle of ultima ratio that imposes a restriction of the use of criminal law in situations in which no other measures are suitable. This conflict has already been raised along the formulation of the money laundering offence with regards to the question of the interests protected by the law. Despite the legislator tying to limit the scope of the offence by attributing to Article 261 Gcc the protection of the administration of justice and of the interests protected by the predicate offences, this explanation was not considered suitable to the peculiarity of the offence. Indeed, shortly after the enactment, legal scholarship and the judiciary entered in a vivid debate in order to identify more suitable interests protected by the law, among them the financial and economic system under different perspectives. However, as chapter three shows, no solution could be found. In fact, the question concerning the suitability of criminal law to tackle illicit financial flows is perceived in the current research as still unsolved. The matter does not only concern money laundering control. On the contrary, it is a fairly widespread issue that has recently emerged due to the tendency of hardening economic crimes on the background of a situation of financial instability. The third conflict can be summarised as the following: on the one hand the policy being required to interfere with the personal sphere of suspected money launderers; on the other hand private institutions being interested in protecting their relations with loyal and trusted customers. Therefore, they are reluctant to give law enforcement the possibility to interfere too much in their business. The interest manifested by the private sector involved in the prevention of money laundering seems thus to collide with the legislative intent of preventing the infiltration of dirty money by way of preventing gate-keepers to help money launderers. The clash emerges at a micro-economic level and is triggered by the fact that the anti-money laundering policy demands an active participation by private sector in the detection of suspects. Private actors, are not appropriate to bear the burden of detecting offenders, moreover they need to protect the relationships with customers by avoiding unnecessary interferences. At the same time, the privatisation of crime control is questionable also from a governance point of view. It seems therefore that the public interest in persecuting crimes through having access to personal information from the private sector only marginally collides with the interest of protecting the right to privacy. Businesses and professions are predominantly interested in not interfering with their clients and in not bearing the burden of detecting offenders. The issue was also addressed during the national Parliamentarian debate, with regards to the degree of mens rea required for money laundering criminal liability. Making everybody taking part in economic or financial activities actively participating in the monitoring of the economic system under the threat of criminal liability for negligent money laundering was considered harmful for the business market. The same debate has been picked up by legal scholarship too. Yet, it seems that, despite the law being the result of negotiations, the question is still open. The fourth issue consists of discording opinions with regards to the opportunity of including tax evasion as predicate offence for money laundering. On one hand there is the interest of tackling tax evasion through the anti-money laundering regime, on the hand the concern of keeping the two phenomena distinct in order to avoid an overrating of money laundering. Since the genesis of the anti-money laundering policy, some actors taking part in the international law-making process, opposed the labelling of 'black money', naming money deriving from tax violations, as 'dirty money', indicating all proceeds of crime typically committed by organised crime. This distinction was based on the perception that tax-related offences were less serious and less harmful than capital flight and were advocated by financial centres in order to maintain a good reputation while still granting peculiar financial services, such as bank secrecy. This issue is a good example of the labelling theory, to the extent that it shows how a practice that was firstly not considered criminal enough to amount to a predicate offence for money laundering, has become part of the scope of the anti-money laundering regime on the basis of a political decision of labelling it as such. Respondents of the current research show to have different perceptions of the degree of the seriousness of tax laws violations and thus about the appropriateness and necessity of tackling them under the umbrella of the anti-money laundering policy. Again, the matter, which seemed to have been resolved through the negotiations on an international and European level, is still being debated at national level. The last two contrasting interests are the necessity of regulating the flows of money and the free movements of capitals in a neoliberal economy. The question is intrinsic in the nature of money laundering, which is a phenomenon that happens at the interface between legality and illegality. Regulations that facilitate the licit exchange of goods, capitals and services do also facilitate the flow of ill-gotten gains; there are thus conflicting interests between the public interest of persecuting crime and the claims for less regulation in a free market economy. From the interviews surfaced that not only opinions on the effectiveness of the law differ, but the very concept of effectiveness is perceived differently among the interview partners. Perceptions about how effective the anti- money laundering policy is appear to be similar among respondents belonging to the same experts' group. In particular, given the fact that the policy triggers many preliminary investigations, investigators work on a daily basis with the provision. This led to their opinion on the implementation of the legislation being rather positive. Positive opinions have common ground: they assert that the policy is not a simple one to implement, however, they believe that the legal practice has found its way through. On the contrary, defence attorneys specialised in economic crimes do not receive a significant amount of clients suspected for money laundering. For this reason they tend to have a rather negative opinion on the policy's effectiveness, also driven by the perception that the policy is not able to achieve the indirect goals. The diverse concepts of effectiveness provided by disciplines close to the sociology of law and the different definitions of effectiveness given by sociologists of law turn out to be useful here. Particularly the notions of 'efficiency' and of 'efficiency regardless of the goals' are proved very useful to interpret the respondents' opinions. Efficiency, is according to the administrative legal approach, the optimal relation between the goals achieved and the instruments used. A subcategory of this concept is the efficiency calculated through a cost-benefit analysis, of which some examples have been presented in the fourth chapter, which defines efficiency as the functioning of a legal order without assessing the goals achieved. This type of analysis focuses on the correctness of the operating system since the purpose of the system is its own existence. It refers to a whole legal order rather than to a specific single provision. Given that the anti-money laundering policy constitutes a legal order, due to the diverse regulations involved and the competent authorities created in order to achieve the goals of the policy, this notion can be applied. In the field of administrative legal theories, the first chapter has focussed on the approach that considers the (in)effectiveness of a law depending on its (failing) enforcement. A high degree of compliance of the anti-money laundering legislation might correspond to a high level of effectiveness of the policy with respect to its direct function, but at the same time to a rather low level of effectiveness with regards to its indirect purposes. The way to evaluate the degree of effectiveness is therefore also different. While compliance with legal provisions is calculated through a quantitative assessment of the processes in force and of the functioning of the system, the achievement of the indirect functions is measured on the impact of the policy. Interview partners have different perceptions about the indirect functions of the legislation too. This reflects, once again, the fact that the policy was a result of a compromise between different expectations and that the legislator was not able to limit the scope of its application to a particular goal. The different expectations and intents, which already emerged in the doctrinal debate about the legally protected interests, appears again in the different perceptions of the interviewees. The respondents were asked about the legislation's effectiveness with regards to one of the indirect functions, namely the capacity to deter organised crime. The legislator enacted the money laundering offence in the context of the fight against drug trafficking and other forms of organised crime, thus Article 261 Gcc's expressed rationale is the prevention and repression of organised crime. Finally, a relevant outcome regards the respondents' opinions on article 261 Gcc's latent symbolic function. Some of them agree with this. Others strongly oppose the hypothesis. They argue instead that the policy has instrumental effects on their daily practice, which cannot be defined as purely symbolic. According to most respondents, the law cannot be defined as symbolic, because it has led to instrumental effects. In the first place information gathered thanks to the GwG is used to start preliminary investigations under Article 261 Gcc. Secondly, the structure enacted to comply with the anti-money laundering policy is attainable and is visible and cannot be denied. Thirdly, the law is considered necessary because it labels a deviant behaviour. In particular, despite the fact that investigations do not lead to a conviction for money laundering they allow investigators to collect information in support of criminal cases for the predicate offences or to start a preliminary investigation for a predicate offence. In this sense, the function of the 'law in action', despite being questionable, is objectively instrumental. However, the fact that the law serves the purpose of tackling predicate offences through the support of investigations does not exclude the hypothesis that the law was enacted to pursue latent functions too. According to the sociologist Aubert, it is not necessary that the latent goal is the only one that plays a role, but it is necessary that the other purposes would not explain the analysed phenomenon completely. Indeed, in the opinions of those who exclude the symbolic function, yet the results achieved through compliance do not legitimate the burden imposed by the legislation. In other words, it seems that they recognise that the purpose of compliance cannot completely explain the policy makers' motivation, which re-opens the doors for the hypothesis of the existence of latent functions. In fact, such a demanding policy cannot be accepted for the sole purpose of re-enforcing the action of the criminal justice system in tackling predicate offences. On the other hand, compliance with the policy in terms of building of a structure and of expertise does not automatically mean fulfilling the policy's purpose. Particularly the creation of new professionalism, has been interpreted by scholars as a sign given to the public that the policy has produced certain effects. In conclusion, on the background of the research's outcome, the paper tries to reply to the question: (How) can the effectiveness of the money laundering offence be improved? While technical hindrances can (and perhaps) will be removed through legal reforms, 28 the inherent political economic and financial conflicting interests that impede a higher level of effectiveness are more difficult to solve. In contemporary industrialised economies there is a complicated and sometimes shifting boundary between legitimate and illegitimate transactions. This is particularly exacerbated in the context of financial capitalism, which 'subordinates the capitalist productive process to the circulation of money and monetary assets and hence to the accumulation of money profits'. Since the very beginning, determining the boundary between an area defined as 'criminal' and the space of 'legality' has been controversial. In fact, money has a neutral nature, pecunia non olet, making profit, irrespective of the monies' origin, is a very strong interest for both private and public entities, which collides with the one of eliminating illicit financial flows. In other words criminal policy goals diverge from purely economic interests. While one can assume the justice and correctness of the current financial system, and thus describes money laundering as harmful because it interferes with the existing economic order, one can also assume that the capitalist system leads per se to injustice and inequality, and that money laundering is actually embedded in this profit-oriented system and represents just the darker side of the capitalist economy. A compromised viewpoint is the one that describes money laundering as an accepted collateral effect of the capitalist system, that is to say 'a certain amount of illicit financial flows may be considered an acceptable price to pay for a market where free mobility of capital is guaranteed'. In other words, money laundering is intrinsic in or at least exacerbated by the capitalist system.
An international cooperative effort has been focused on the need to reduce financial fragility and systemic risks in global financial markets. Work is proceeding in three different areas: enhancing financial market transparency, improving the international financial architecture, and strengthening financial systems. Strengthening financial systems (the focus of this paper) means cooperating to promote principles and sound practices for financial stability through development of well-functioning financial systems and market discipline. Financial sector reform and development is much more than setting rules, articulating standards, approving legislation, and creating new institutions. All are important but ultimately behavior must be changed if there is to be meaningful and lasting financial reform. For that reason, this paper emphasizes the role of incentives to induce appropriate behavior. Developing countries have made important progress toward improved financial supervision in the past few years. Reforming financial sectors is a lengthy and complex process of institution building and incentive reorientation, whose success requires full ownership of, and participation in, the process by society and its government.
This report discusses selected issues regarding accountability in public services. The introduction discusses the accountability framework that will be used for the report. Chapter 1 assesses South Africa's progress on service access and quality, and summarizes recent policy initiatives. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 describe the international and South African experience with mechanisms that seek to improve accountability - public sector reform, citizen report cards, and others - and posits hypotheses to be explored in the following chapters. Chapter 5 applies the World Bank's accountability framework to a participatory assessment of services in six municipalities in South Africa. Chapters 6 and 7 apply the framework to the education and water and sanitation sectors. Chapter 8 explains why community-driven development does not factor in any main South African development programs. Chapter 9 explains the continuing learning practices pioneered in the manufacturing sector and addresses how these practices might be used by the South African government to effect change. Chapter 10 summarizes the conclusions, translates these into main hypotheses to be tested in future work, and formulates a number of policy recommendations for public debate.
This paper summarizes the key findings of an 'After Action Review' (AAR) that reflects a decade of experience in designing and implementing ten HIV/AIDS projects in the Caribbean, financed by the World Bank. The objective is to identify what worked (and what didn't) in the project approach, design and implementation, distilling useful lessons for other projects in small states.
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NDI President Derek Mitchell and NDI Board Chairman Secretary Madeleine Albright talk about her new book Hell and Other Destinations, and her experiences as Secretary of State. She reflects on U.S. foreign policy, democratic trends, and her hopes for the future.
This podcast was recorded May 27, 2020, prior to demonstrations in support of racial equality across the United States.
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Derek Mitchell: Hello. Welcome to DemWorks. My name is Derek Mitchell, president of the National Democratic Institute. We indeed are honored to once again to have Secretary Albright join us. Madam Secretary first, thank you again very much for doing this. Do you want to share some opening thoughts? I want to turn it over to you. Perhaps some things that have happened since we last got together about a month back. Secretary Albright: Terrific. Thank you very much, Derek. Two important meetings I've participated in the past weeks. What was very interesting, it was the ... First was a virtual hearing convened by the house foreign affairs committee. They couldn't have testimony, so this was a briefing, and I did it alongside Derek and Dan Twining from IRI, and the subject was authoritarianism, disinformation and good governance during COVID-19. And this was the first time that the committee had done this kind of a hearing, And I think it's a very important signal that they chose to focus on the subject of democracy. And I think that it's a great tribute to NDI that we were the first organization asked to debrief the committee. What is very, I think, positive is that leaders in Congress, both Republicans and Democrats recognize that good governance is critical to responding to the pandemic. And they know that NDI therefore has a key role to play in helping the world overcome the challenge and others like it. DM: We discussed it at that last town hall, featuring our chairman about how she was on the cusp of releasing a new memoir about her life. This one being about her very eventful life after leaving her job as the first woman vice secretary of state. Hell and Other Destinations was released in mid April. During my time in doors last month, I read her book and it really is funny, a funny and fascinating read. So my intention today is to open up another conversation with our chairman and do so first by asking some questions based on themes from her life that she discusses in her book. You said in your book that everyone should write a memoir. Why do you say that? And do you, or did you, have you kept a journal yourself? SA: Well let me say this. I have thought, because basically I come from an academic background that when one looks at what happened in a certain period of history, it's very important to read people's memoirs. Now what I have found as I've analyzed memoirs, and I have, is that people write it from a different perspective. And so it's important because often we disagree on the context or what we did or what our role was. But I think it is interesting to kind of have the memoirs and it's really worth the doing. And I think especially people that have been in public positions, but everybody, I think in terms of ... So let me just say, I have tried over the years to keep a journal. And I haven't really, because at a certain stage I was made much ... Obviously when I was young and had met a lot of people, I thought, "Isn't this great. I have to write about it." And then it always kind of stops after one month. Then, I did actually not keep a journal when I was in the government, because as we know ... I don't know if you remember, everything was being subpoenaed. But I had a lot of scratchy notes. And then what happened as I was writing Madam Secretary initially, was that when I found the schedule it was like the Rosetta Stone, because I could identify what the scratchy notes actually has something to do with. But embarrassingly, my mind would wander, and all of a sudden in the middle of my scratchy notes it was say, "Buy yogurt." And so I was multitasking even then, but I didn't keep a journal. And in many ways I wish I did, but there are so many records of the kinds of things that we all did together that I think my memoirs have been fairly complete. DM: I felt one of the most poignant chapters in the book was the story about how you discovered your maternal grandmother's journal. It was about five or six years ago while you're going through your father's artifacts. And it turned out your grandmother had been killed in the Holocaust in 1942, and the journal, you have excerpts with the journal in the back of the book and it was written as a kind of dialogue she had ... She wanted to have with your mother and maybe with you while you're all in England. It also reads like kind of a lonely mother who wanted to connect with an absent family alone and isolated and Czechoslovakia, as things happened around her. Dangerous world was swirling in 1942 ... Well, really it started in 42 for her in that journal. Can you talk a bit about the experience of discovering this journal, and through it your grandmother, so late and what it meant to you? Because we're also being isolated with things swirling out our doors, but also just what it meant to you to discover this and discover your grandmother so late. SA: Well, thank you for asking that. And I ... Just for people that don't know my story, I was raised a Catholic, married and Episcopalian, and found out I was Jewish. So I can have my religious discussions sitting in a corner. But basically, I did not know about my Jewish background until 1996. And I had gotten a letter from somebody that had the names of the villages and my grandparents' names and dates right, and that was just as I was being vetted to be secretary of state, and the White House lawyer asked all the questions about taxes and nannies and stuff, but then he said, "We always ask this question of everybody. Is there anything you'd like to tell us that we didn't ask you?" And I said, "Well, it's perfectly possible I'm of Jewish background." And they said, "So what? The president is not antisemitic." And it was only later when I was already an office that I was visited by some reporters who started giving me this disgusting index cards. These Nazis were very good record keepers and they had names of my relatives that have been sent to concentration camps. So to get to the journal part of it is my parents, we left Czechoslovakia in March, 1939, or escaped frankly. My father was in the Czechoslovak diplomatic service, and we escaped to England. And they ... When I think about all the things that happened, I find it harder and harder to get my head around it. My parents were in their 30s, they left their families behind and went to England, where they were isolated in many different ways. We came back and I won't go through the whole story, but my father died in 1997 and he had lots of papers, and then my mother moved to Washington and she brought all his stuff with her. And when she died, all of a sudden all of it got transferred to me. And I had some hesitation in looking at anything, frankly, because of how the memories, but then what happened is when I became a public official diplomatic security moved into in my garage and were around all the time and there were all these boxes. And they said, "You've got to put these in storage." So I put all these boxes into storage and I didn't look at them, and it wasn't until 2015 that I had to find something and I went to the storage and I start poking through the boxes. And all of a sudden, there's this old envelope, and inside it is a diary. A journal. And it kind of blows my mind. I look at it, obviously it's a ... And it's from my grandmother, and it is something that she wrote to ... They were letters to my mother describing what was going on. And it was kind of an interesting mixture of just day to day kind of things. "I did this, I washed my hair and I went shopping." And then all of a sudden it began to say things like, "They're talking about Aryans and non Aryans. I've never heard that distinction," she says. And goes through the kinds of things that the Jews in the town we're not able to shop in a variety of places. Oh, they had to give up all their warm clothes to the Nazi soldiers, and ... Just stunning. And in the middle it would say things, "How was it [Mudlanka 00:08:45]?" Which was me. "She's so cute." And it just was unbelievable. And it was really like a message in a bottle where all of a sudden it's hearing from a previous generation in terms of their hopes and their wishes. And obviously in the most incredibly complex time. And the other thing I try to figure out, how my mother even got this and I've tried to put together what the path of it was and how stunned she must've been when it showed up. And so I have translated it, and it is in the book. But it's really very meaningful and it has hope in it, which I think is such an important part. And one of my messages just generally is that we can't control everything around us. We can only control our behavior. And I think that that's something that also came through in my grandmother's journal. DM: It also is you talked about the various identities you have in a way as a Catholic Episcopalian Jew, in terms of heritage. And that issue of identity is a big one that we work with at NDI. And there's a big question for nations nowadays, given your past and your family, that of your family, how has the question of identity shaped you? SA: Well, I have definitely been a lot of different things. As a child, we spent the war in England then went back to Czechoslovakia briefly, and then my father was made ambassador to Yugoslavia. I think some of you've heard me tell this. The little girl in the national costume that gave flowers at the airport, that's what I did for a living. My father didn't want me going to school with communists, so I had a governess. And then I got ahead of myself, and as people know in Europe, you have to be a certain age to get into the next level. So my parents sent me to school in Switzerland, where I was finally told how I should spell my name, because my mother used to pronounce it [Mudlan 00:00:10:44]. And so anyway, I have the French spelling and I learned to speak French. And then we come to the United States. And so I was recently asked to describe myself in six words, and it is, worried optimist, problem-solver, and grateful American. And I think those are my identities and I'm grateful to be an American, but I'm also grateful for the background that I've had in terms of trying to understand how other people see themselves. I do think identity is important. I think we all want to know who we are. We may get surprised, but it's worth it knowing. What I don't like, and this is what troubles me and I wrote about this in my previous book on fascism is when my identity hates your identity, because that then is obviously very divisive. And it's one thing to be proud of your identity, it's another, hyper nationalism, which we're seeing that is undercutting everything. And we know that the virus knows no borders. So there are an awful lot of paradoxes that are going on now in terms of wanting to know who you are, but not thinking that you're better than everybody else. And my, as I describe, authoritarian leaders and fascists, I begin with Mussolini. It's a matter of the leader identifying himself. And by the way, they're all his, with one group at the expense of another and makes them scapegoats. And that's why I'm very troubled by the divisions that are being exacerbated now. DM: There's individual identity and there's national identity. And the national identity, as you say, that's most pernicious is an exclusive identity, rather than an inclusive identity, which is what we're all about. We're all about an inclusive identity. We're all treated equally. And these authoritarians are about identifying those exclusive identities, us and them, that tear countries apart and create the instability and insecurity that results. So this is a key part of what we do, I think absolutely. During the writing process, we you able to identify the moment in your life when you knew what your life purpose was? At what point did you know what Mark you wanted to leave in this world? SA: And it's a hard question to answer, because I do think that one of the things that was a motivating factor for me growing up was that I was, and am, a grateful American, and wanted to give back in some form. I also ... My father had, obviously, a great influence on me. So did my mother, and my father kept saying that Americans are taking democracy for granted. We had just left the country of our birth twice. Once because of the Nazis and then because of the communists. And the fragility of democracy. And so I looked at trying to figure out, in looking back, what were the different methods that I thought I could use to give back to America? By the way, it never occurred to me that I would be secretary of state. There's some people who think I planned that. Never. But I do think that I wanted to have some kind of a role where I was able to talk about the necessity of supporting democracy. And I got fascinated by the UN because that's what brought us to America. And so kind of looking at institutional structures, but it never, never occurred to me. Nor did it occur to me, frankly, that I would be able to have a post secretary of state life, where I was able to put together the various things that I was interested in. What I tried to do always is to make whatever I was doing next more interesting than what I'd done before. Not easy if you've been secretary of state, but the reason I wanted to write this book was to show how the various things that I got involved in related to each other and how I learned from one thing to another. My greatest talent, frankly, is dot connection, of trying to figure out how one thing relates to another. I do want to talk about one specific moment that's so stands out. My favorite thing to do is to give naturalization certificates at the ceremonies. And so the first time I did it was July 4th, 2000 at Monticello, and I'm handing out a certificate and I hear this man. He goes away and he says, "Can you believe I'm a refugee, and I just got my naturalization certificate from the secretary of state?" And I go up to him and I say, "Can you believe that a refugee is secretary of state?" And I so believe in what America stands for and what we can do to be helpful to others, which is why I say that at this moment, the statue of Liberty is weeping. DM: Our research in Ukraine has uncovered historical memory as a significant target of Russian information attacks. Ukrainians appear to be vulnerable to attacks that speak to evoke nostalgia for the economic stability of the Soviet period. These attacks exploit an actual democratic challenge for Ukraine, which is an economy that is not working for all citizens. In the US, what vulnerabilities do you worry similar information attacks could seek to exploit. SA: I do think that I have been ... I love history. When I teach at Georgetown, I always try to put everything into historical context. And I have to say what I was just doing before we started this discussion was watching a program about a project in the United States about slavery. And there's ... The New York Times was doing something called 16 19, and there were some very strong arguments on Morning Joe this morning about this, between those who recollect history differently, or are trying to use it in particular ways for political movement, which we do. And I think people do that in terms of understanding what their history means. And then one of the people there said, "History is to be argued about," which I find interesting because you kind of think, "Okay, well, we know what history is." But it goes back to your first question, Derek, about writing memoirs. Because people have different ideas of their history. I think the question is, do you have a society where you can dispute the history? And the Ukrainian one is clearly unbelievably complicated, in terms of that a modern Russia comes out of Ukraine, and that that relationship and Ukraine itself is a complicated country in terms of East and West and religion, and the aspect of communism that gave people a certain sense of understanding what the system was. They might not have gotten the kinds of things ... Not everybody just wants the freedom to talk. Some of them want to be able to what their history is about. Are they going to have retirement? What group do they belong to? Can they send their kids to school? And I found this in a lot of research that I did about central and Eastern Europe at the time, right after the fall of the wall. What is it that the people thought that they ... What was communism and what were the possibilities of democracy? And I do think that Ukraine is one of the more complex countries, and the fact that it has been invaded, and the fact that the economic situation is something that is being pushed by the Russian hacking and the way that they operate, and their way of trying to divide us and divide Ukrainians from each other. DM: Rebuilding a United Europe was one of the success stories of the second part of the 20th century. The last few years have seen the foundations of Europe shake with Brexit and the rise of authoritarian populace. How do we ensure that the European project continues as a liberal democratic one? SA: I think that it is something that I ... I keep going back, trying to figure out what went wrong. Why did this happen? And I think partially we didn't appreciate enough the problems of societies that had been under communism for 50 years, and that it was much ... We spent a lot of time, I think, with a lot of the wonderful dissidents and intellectuals, and didn't think enough about how it affected the people that had had jobs. I mentioned that a little bit. And I think that also there are the issues now of this identity and the hyper nationalism, and that has been created to some extent in Europe, by the differences in the economic lives of, initially, Northern and Southern Europe, and trying to figure out why some were doing better than others, which then did lead to the fact that there were some leaders like Orban and the Poles that started blaming the other. And that was the most evident in many ways in why Brexit happened. So these are big trends. I happen to believe in a European Union, but I think that as a structure, it also needs some fixing in terms of how it works with the different economic situations in the central and eastern European countries. DM: In your book, you speak about how you dealt with misogyny as you progressed in your career. Can you share what helped to keep you steadfast in fighting this prejudice? SA: I think that what is interesting ... And I often say that I went to college sometime between the invention of the iPad and the discovery of fire, but here it was a women's college. And basically we were told by our commencement speaker to get married and raise children. And I think that what I've been trying to do is to understand why women, why we're so hard on ... Tough on each other in terms of being very judgmental or finding our own inadequacies and other women. And so I have been very much for having ... Creating groups of women that can support each other. And that is why I think it is so important, the kind of things that NDI is doing, in terms of working with women, to make sure that they are participants in society, run for office, and are respected. And I'd love talking about the fact now that the countries that are doing best on dealing with the coronavirus are ones that are run by women. New Zealand, Taiwan, Finland, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Iceland. And I think trying to make clear what the characteristics are of women that make that possible in terms of multitasking, of caring, not setting their children against each other, but you have to keep ... I do think that what is important is for women to support each other, and so that you're not the only woman in the room. DM: Sometimes moments of crisis and trial like this pandemic lead to better things. What are your hopes in that regard? And also what is the significance of today's pin? SA: My hope, this is where my optimism comes from, our young people. I love learning from my students, and students that are particularly interested in foreign policy and diplomacy. Many of whom have traveled and they speak different languages and they certainly are tech literate. And I think that they question ... I think the important part for all of us as a democracy organization is to make sure that they participate, that they do vote, that they are interested in the institutional structures in the countries where they are. But that is definitely what gives me hope. And not ... And I think it's very important, and I say this wherever I can, that democracy is not a spectator sport. It is something that the people need to be involved in. They need to be informed. They need to be respected. And I think the other part that I often talk about, and this is so true of NDI activities, is to spend time with people with whom you disagree and try to figure out where they're coming from, and understand what their needs are, and have a dialogue with civil society, and then understand the various institutions that are important. But definitely what makes me hopeful, our young people. DM: On this issue of hopes of how moments of crisis and trial can lead to better things, I do think that's a very important question. I really hope that moments of trial by fire are sometimes very important, to set priorities to remember what's important, and to tell you how precarious things always are. I think we can get kind of complacent about things, as we are as a country, or we as individuals, that everything is going to be simply easy. I'm sure it's not easy for any of us. I'm sure many people have gone through lots of trials in their lives, as we all have. But crises can be moments where we focus on how ... Okay, we take stock of where our priorities are, and what kind of choices we want to make, which is what Madame Secretary said. Not just ... Crisis don't just happen to you, you also have a choice in how you respond to that crisis, both individually and as a collective, as a country, as a unit. So I do think it's an opportunity and I'm certainly seeing that NDI of having better communication and doing more to force change, even potentially in culture because of this moment that's quite different than we've ever experienced. So we should be thinking in those terms. What are the things that we can do to take advantage of this moment, even when there's a lot of stress and anxiety? To take advantage of the opportunity as well. And that's my hope for all of us at NDI, again, as an organization and individually, that we can do that. And I think we can come out better on the back end if we go through it together on those terms. SA: One of my heroes was Harry Truman. He was my first American president. We came to the United States, November 11th, 1948. He is the one that understood, to a great extent, America's role in the world, a democracy. And understand linking domestic to foreign policy. But I think there's so many other people that I have admired. I admire the first president of Czechoslovakia, Tomáš Masaryk, who married an American. And the first Czechoslovak constitution was modeled on the American one with one difference. It had a women's rights in it in 1918. And so I think that one can have more than one hero, and I think it's important to point them out and to understand that people have gone through very difficult periods before. And I do think that what is important is to really be proud of things that we can do, and the thing that I personally am proudest of, because it put things together and how I used representing the United States was what we were able to do to end ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. And going there with President Clinton made a big difference cause they kept saying, "We were just there. We are so grateful to the United States." DM: Well Madam Secretary, let me just close the book conversation with a quote from the book that I saw that I just want to share with everybody that you say at the end. I think it's in the acknowledgements at the end. The central theme of this book is about how people of all descriptions can work together for common goals against the background of accelerating history. It is about trying to make sense of the world we have while attempting to contribute to something better. Madam Secretary and everybody out there, stay safe, be well. Thank you all. Have a good day, and we'll talk again soon. SA: Thank you so much for everything that you do. Thank you. DM: Please visit our website at www.ndi.org. Thanks very much.
NDI Board Chairman Secretary Madeleine Albright
Derek Mitchell & Secretary Madeleine Albright on her past and democracy's future
Democracy (General), Podcast Listen Secretary Albright Madeleine AlbrightCountries: All Regions
From the introduction: 'Brazil is rich: rich in natural resources, rich in fertile soil, and rich in people". Although the country still shows deficits in different areas, the Brazilian market has attracted large investors and companies especially in the past decade. The country's potential has been the focus of many analysts and researchers by renowned economic institutes. After years of high inflation and slow growth – especially in the eighties and early nineties – Brazil was able to recover and get back into game with the other global players. From a historic perspective it is to say that the country has gone through large transition periods in the last century. Emerging from being a major coffee exporter until the early 20th century, Brazil now belongs to one of the most industrialized countries in Latin America. Although it is the largest country in the region in terms of population figures and geographical size, its GDP share in Latin America or annual growth rate offer a different conclusion. Nevertheless, the consulting market in Brazil has been growing, in particular during the last ten years. Many European and North American consulting companies have invested into the country, built branch offices and bought local firms. Although the market is still very young, its future potential has clearly been discovered. When thinking of Brazil, the words that tend to enter people's minds are positive sounding ones such as Samba, Carneval and beautiful beaches which radiate joy and energy. On the other side issues like criminality, poverty and high social inequality are often associated with Brazil as well. Either way, it is almost certain that one will have heard of Brazil. The country manifested itself in the mind of people and has made front page news more than once. Objective, relevance and research questions: The objective of the thesis is neither to conduct a market evaluation nor to point out the importance and future relevance of Brazil in the world economy. In fact this work is an empirical study on a market entry strategy which can serve as a reference for management consulting companies that want to enter the Brazilian consulting market. Furthermore, the work attempts to deliver a comprehensive picture of this market, with the intention of elaborating on whether it is wise to invest in Brazil, or whether there may be another – more suitable – Latin American country. Yet, the focus lies on the framework for strategy formulation and the proposals that will be made thereupon. In order to accomplish this, both a classical and an empirical approach were chosen whose outcomes will be compared to one another in the last chapter. LEAN Management is a booming term in the consulting business. Everybody wants to learn the 'LEAN-Thinking" and apply the method to his/her own company. Since the late 1990s LEAN Management is experiencing an upward trend and the word has spread all over the globe to reach Brazil. Consequently, there is a growing demand for LEAN in this country, as evidenced by the number of consulting companies already present in the market and the excellent prospects it shows. The aim of the thesis is to propose which geographical regions and economic sectors in Brazil may yield attractive prospects for management consulting companies. The information is then used to formulate a market entry strategy for LEAN Consulting in the Brazilian market. In addition, proposals will be made and future scenarios presented to the reader which are augmented by emprircal findings. Based on the introduction and the objective of the topic – giving a perspective of the situation in Brazil – the following two research questions are being raised. Is the LEAN market in Brazil a suitable market for a LEAN consulting company to invest in? Which recommendations for an entry strategy can be given when entering the Brazilian LEAN market? Out of these research questions, a sub-question is derived. Can Brazil serve as an entry port to Latin America for LEAN consulting businesses? The analysis of these questions will be conducted through a theoretical as well as an empirical approach. Structure of the topic: After having presented the objective and relevance of the topic as well as the research questions, the author will introduce the structure of the thesis. Accordingly, to strengthen the arguments that will be highlighted in the conclusion, the thesis is divided into three parts. The first part consists of theoretical results selected from secondary research. Based on the theory, an empirical study is conducted, involving a group of experts who will elaborate on their personal experiences and opinions with regards to the topic. The empirical findings deduced from the study are compared with the theoretical results in order to verify, if there exist a consensus among theory and empiricism. This comparison is then used to build up the third part of the thesis – the conclusion. Methodology: In order to create a solid basis for the strategy formulation chapters two and three provide a brief overview of the economic situation in Brazil – in a Latin American context – from the earliest settlement in the 14th century until today. Furthermore, an evaluation of the market, its productivity and its growth potential, completes the picture. Recent political changes have brought an upwind into the descending system. Since the implementation of the Real Plan in 1994 the country has experienced low inflation, trade liberalization, substantial privatization, increases in import penetration and the expansion of FDI. Thus, Brazil has reason to hope for future in prosperity. The information drawn for this section consists of secondary research, covering literature as well as various online resources and online libraries, to provide an adequate framework. The literature is primarily in English and partly in German or Portuguese language. The term LEAN Consulting is explained in detail in chapter four, in order to understand the impact and relevance of the term in this context. The literature for this part is provided by a consulting company that is working according to the LEAN principles. It consists entirely of secondary research with books and magazines as main sources. The LEAN Consulting market in Brazil has a special importance for the topic and the sources are given by the same consulting company. After having applied the theoretical framework of the thesis, chapter five provides the framework for the strategy formulation. The basis to this approach is the Five-Forces-Model by Michael E. Porter. Since the topic – market entry strategy – is a rather practical issue, the main part consists of empirical findings deducted from a Delphi Study. It is based on expert interviews that were held with a group of initially nine experts from the consulting business in two stages. In the first stage, these experts were confronted with two questionnaires – consisting of open and closed questions – which they had to answer based on their personal experience and opinion. The questionnaire in the second round was based on the summarized answers of the first one, raising new thoughts to the topic. The questionnaires were submitted in German, since all of the participants were either native German speakers or had sufficient knowledge of the German language to understand the questions. The aim of this Delphi Study was to gain opinions and experiences that can neither be found in books nor in any other relevant literature. Usually, Delphi Studies are used for business forecasting. The author receives new viewpoints that are based on personal experience of the experts by living in Brazil and working in the consulting business during the last decades. The last part of the thesis draws the conclusion, comparing the classical market entry approach to the empirical findings of the Delphi Study. This then gives a profound basis for constructing strategic recommendations and provides a future outlook. It is interesting to see how the experts of the Delphi Study view the future prospect of the consulting business in the country and what should be done to boost economic growth in this area. The thesis concludes by summarizing all important findings under consideration of the background layed out in the first part of the thesis.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Contents: ABSTRACT IN ENGLISH LANGUAGEIII ABSTRACT AUF DEUTSCHIV 1.INTRODUCTION1 1.1OBJECTIVE, RELEVANCE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS1 1.2STRUCTURE OF THE TOPIC2 1.3METHODOLOGY5 2.ECONOMIC OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND OF BRAZIL7 2.1MERCOSUR7 2.1.1History8 2.1.2Foundation8 2.1.3Economic role of the Mercosur9 2.2THE COUNTRY BRAZIL10 2.2.1Political and economic history11 2.2.2Economic environment13 2.2.3Political environment14 2.2.4Macroeconomic data15 2.2.5Social inequality17 2.2.6Level of corruption and governance indicators19 3.MARKET EVALUATION22 3.1THE 'THREE-SECTOR-THEORY' OF BRAZIL22 3.2PRODUCTIVITY24 3.3POTENTIAL MARKETS FOR MANAGEMENT CONSULTING COMPANIES25 3.3.1Major Brazilian companies26 3.3.2Strongest regions in Brazil31 3.3.3Most promising branches34 3.4CONCLUSION35 4.LEAN CONSULTING37 4.1DEFINITION AND PHILOSOPHY OF LEAN37 4.2TYPICAL PRACTICES APPLIED39 4.3DIFFERENCES OF LEAN MANAGEMENT TOWARDS OTHER METHODS42 4.4MANAGEMENT CONSULTING COMPANIES IN BRAZIL44 4.4.1LEAN consulting companies in Brazil45 4.4.2The IBCO47 4.5REASONS TO CHOOSE AN EXTERNAL CONSULTANCY47 4.5.1Criteria to choose consulting services48 4.5.2Average consulting fees48 4.6CONCLUSION49 5.MARKET ENTRY STRATEGY51 5.1OVERVIEW OF THE CLASSICAL MARKET ENTRY STRATEGY51 5.1.1Methods for market entry52 5.1.1.1Contractual agreements53 5.1.1.2Sole Venture54 5.1.2Influencing factors for the entry mode decision55 5.1.3Special characteristics of services56 5.2MARKET ENTRY STRATEGY INTO THE LEAN CONSULTING MARKET57 5.2.1Competition57 5.2.2Opportunities and threats62 5.2.3Framework for strategy formulation64 5.2.3.1Business communication65 5.2.3.2Starting the business66 5.2.3.3Employing foreign workers67 5.2.3.4Obtaining a credit69 5.2.3.5Legal constraints70 5.2.4The Delphi Study71 5.2.4.1Reasons to choose the Delphi method73 5.2.4.2Limits to the Delphi method74 5.2.4.3Experts75 5.2.4.4First round76 5.2.4.5Second round78 5.2.4.6Short summary of most important findings81 6.CONCLUSION83 6.1FINAL RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS83 6.2DIRECT COMPARISON OF THEORY AND EMPIRICISM86 6.3FUTURE OUTLOOK88 6.4PROSPECT FOR FURTHER RESEARCH90 7.BIBLIOGRAPHY91 7.1BOOKS91 7.2ARTICLES/PUBLICATIONS92 7.3WEBSOURCES94 7.4FURTHER READING AND EXPERTS97 8.APPENDIX98 8.1DELPHI STUDY - SUMMARY OF FIRST ROUND98 8.2DELPHI STUDY - SUMMARY OF SECOND ROUND101 8.3CONCRETE STEPS FOR STARTING A BUSINESS IN BRAZIL105 8.4PAYING TAXES IN BRAZIL107Textprobe:Text Sample: Chapter 3, Market Evaluation: Today's marketplace is very competitive. In order to successfully place a company or a product in a new market its potential needs to be assessed first. The market evaluation uses information given about the market and helps to determine feasibility of a potential market and the competitive landscape. The aim is to compare different regions and sectors to find the strongest opportunities. This will reveal a strategic roadmap to the market entry. The Brazilian market has an enormous potential and growth is foreseen in the country for the next years. This chapter will provide an overview of the regions and branches in Brazil, pointing out the ones with the highest capability to be the future market for a management consulting company. The industrial sector is the most important one in this country and the focus of the strategy will lie on the branches present in this sector. A market segmentation presenting the biggest companies – measured by revenue – will provide the benchmark for potential growth and allows us to focus on prospective customers. The 'three-sector-theory" of Brazil: According to the 'three-sector-theory", developed by Jean Fourastié, the economy can be categorised into three different sectors of economic activity: the agricultural sector – the primary sector (commodity producing sector), the industry sector – the secondary sector (or goods-producing sector), and the service sector – the tertiary sector (or non-goods producing sector). The aim of this theory was to explain the transition from the agricultural to the industrial society and later on to the post-industrial service society in the 20th century. It is assumed that the three sectors have different opportunities to adapt to technological progress. Through the application of new technical procedures, the productivity in the primary and secondary sector increases while, at the same time, less manpower is needed and also the demand for these goods decreases with increased productivity. The excess manpower and demand, in turn, will be absorbed by the tertiary sector. The problem is that this theory assumes no influence by outside factors and therefore cannot be applied to any economy without precaution. In 2006, the agricultural sector accounted for 36% of the GDP worldwide, the industry sector for 22% and the service sector for 42%. In Brazil the distribution in the same year is considerably different, with the agricultural sector accounting for 5.5%, yielding coffee, soybeans, wheat and rice as the main products. The industry accounts for 28.7%, with its main products being textiles, shoes, chemicals, cement and iron ore. The services sector makes up 65.8% of total output. The GDP growth rate by sector in the years from 1997 to 2007 has been subject to fluctuation especially in the agricultural but also in the industry sector. The service sector has been rather stable during this period. The three-sector-theory is based on the assumption of above-average growth of demand and below-average growing productivity in the tertiary sector. The current situation in Brazil and in the global context shows a strong tertiary sector, followed by the secondary and the primary sector. This supports the three-sector-theory of the shift: agriculture > industry > service sector. Although the service sector is the strongest sector in the economy, both by total GDP and by year-over-year growth rate, it is a non-good producing sector, which makes it uninteresting for a management consulting company as they are concentrating on the industrial sector where production takes place. The theory does not explicitly state the distribution of the different branches among the three sectors. Therefore it can be assumed that some branches that are interesting for the strategy could be assigned to the service sector, although in the following this sector will not be elaborated on. The importance of the industrial sector has been fully recognized by the development studies all over the world. The industrial sector – through its linkages with other sectors – plays a very important role in achieving rapid growth and development. Most modern and rich countries have a well developed industrial sector through their early industrial revolution. It is the most important driver of the economy and apart from the service sector – the non-goods producing industry – it constitutes the biggest sector and generates the largest profit share out of all. During the last years the industrial production in Brazil was subject to many changes due to the slow growth of the economy. The country has set up an agenda to become a competitive economy that is able to provide qualified goods in sufficient quantity and to create a greater number of high skilled jobs. Brazil is on its way to transform into an economy that is included in the knowledge society and recognized as one of the main platforms for the industry worldwide. Productivity: The level of productivity is a crucial part in the context of this thesis. It indicates the general market growth and its potential for the future. Since management consulting companies will focus on the industry it is important to know, if there is a need to enhance productivity. If so, then this need would likely translate into higher investments in this area and a greater demand for support services from the consulting industry. The level of labour productivity is the primary determinant on the nation's GDP per capita growth. Brazil's weak economic growth is due to the relatively slow increase of labour productivity. The latest performance study, conducted by the Conference Board, shows a labour productivity growth rate of 1.9% in 2007. Compared to the other BRIC countries, this is the poorest rate. Russia, India and China showed a much better performance with 6.3%, 6.7% and 9.8%, respectively. This can be ascribed to transitional reallocations of employees by large companies into emerging markets that consequently foster productivity growth in the respective country. Especially India and China play a determining role in this context, since wages in these countries are notably lower than in Brazil and also in Russia, hence companies are more likely to turn to the Asian countries to make new investments that lead to job creation. According to a study on barriers to growth in the Brazilian economy, conducted by McKinsey's São Paulo office in 2005, there are two major root causes that lead to the relatively slower productivity growth. The first one refers to the modest per capita income, which promotes consumption of the lower-priced products and services. An example is the automotive industry, which produces primarily small and inexpensive cars. For the higher-priced vehicle section it relies on imports from other countries. The second cause is related to the first one – labour is cheaper than capital – which inhibits investment in new machinery that, in turn, would improve productivity levels. These barriers, however, will naturally fade once the government is able to resolve the social and economic problems by a policy shift. Labour and tax laws, price controls, product regulations, trade barriers and subsidies, among others, are present obstacles that limit productivity. Also, the unemployment rate, the level of inequality, the state of the educational system, are all factors that influence productivity levels and play a role in the performance studies. Potential markets for management consulting companies: After having identified the target sector and the level of productivity in the country, the next important step to defining a suitable market entry strategy is to determine specific markets in Brazil that yield the best prospects. Three different variables will influence the decision-making. These are the major Brazilian companies, the strongest regions and the most promising branches that are interesting for a management consulting company. Consequently, this will then lead to the establishment of the target branches as well as companies for LEAN business in Brazil and serve as a basis to formulate the entry strategy.
South Asia emerged as the fastest growing region in the world in 2015, posting GDP growth of 7 percent. Weak oil and commodity prices, slowing capital flows and shrinking global trade contributed towards a deceleration of growth in most of the world's economies. South Asia - as a net importer of oil - was an anomaly, growing significantly on the back of higher private consumption and public investment. Higher remittances and reserve buffers throughout the region offset the fall in exports caused by the drop in global demand. The region is set to maintain real GDP growth above 7 percent over the next few years. However, the tailwinds are now fading - capital flows have declined and remittances are starting to feel the reality of low oil prices. Pakistan, while not growing as quickly as its neighbors, has continued its steady growth recovery in H1FY16. Strong growth in consumption, rising foreign exchange reserves, fast-growing workers' remittances and a lower import bill compensated for a significant fall in exports. Low oil prices generated a significant boost, driving a 9.1 percent fall in the import bill and reducing inflation significantly, in turn creating scope to reduce the policy rate. Private sector consumption, propelled by higher remittances and a loosened monetary policy, is expected to account for over half of FY16 GDP growth.
In the last few years, Vietnam's macroeconomic situation has followed a predictable pattern. When faced with external shocks the authorities have opted to protect the country's rapid growth rate, even if it meant tolerating higher levels of macroeconomic instability. This has meant modest growth slowdowns and frequent episodes of overheating. So when the economy started to overheat in late 2010 following the delayed withdrawal of the fiscal and monetary stimulus put in place in 2009, few expected a determined response from the government to stem the ensuing macroeconomic volatility. The current episode of macroeconomic instability has been as severe as the previous overheating episode of mid-2008. The author constructed a summary measure of macroeconomic instability, Vietnam Index of Macroeconomic Stability (VIMS), based on the movement of four variables, namely nominal exchange rate, international reserves, inflation rate and nominal interest rate. Our measure shows that the degree of macroeconomic instability during the current episode did come quite close to mid-2008, but has not surpassed it yet. But unlike 2008, when the level of instability increased sharply and fell immediately, instability has persisted over a longer period of time during the current episode, from November 2010 to February 2011, exposing Vietnam's economy to a prolonged period of nervousness and uncertainty.
The Philippines quarterly update provides an update on key economic developments and policies over the past three months. It also presents findings from recent World Bank work on the Philippines. It places them in a longer-term and global context, and assesses the implications of these developments and other changes in policy for the outlook for the Philippines. Its coverage ranges from the macro-economy to financial markets to indicators of human welfare and development. It is intended for a wide audience, including policy makers, business leaders, financial market participants, and the community of analysts and professionals engaged in the Philippines. Though the revised gross domestic product (GDP) growth estimates show small deviation from the old base year and methodology, the revision has resulted in a nominal GDP which is 6 percent larger and hence, lower fiscal statistics as a percentage of GDP (e.g., lower tax effort, but improved debt ratio), but also important sectoral growth changes. Investment is now noticeably higher due to improved coverage and transfer of items previously booked under consumption (e.g., military goods) the investment-to-GDP ratio in 2010 is now 20.5 percent instead of 15.6 percent. The demand side growth continues to post a remarkable uptick in investment. Investment grew by 37 percent year-on-year and contributed 6.8 percentage points to GDP growth, mostly driven by durable equipment and private construction. Private construction grew by 22 percent, albeit at a slower pace than the preceding three quarters, and compensated for the contraction in public construction which shrank by 37.3 percent due to continued fiscal tightening and a high base effect. Investment in durable equipment grew 17 percent with the building up of inventory in industrial machineries and road vehicles.
This assessment of the Basel Core Principles (BCP) was conducted as part of the financial sector assessment program (FSAP) update evaluation of the El Salvador financial system from April 22 to May 10, 2010. The supervisory framework was assessed against the BCP methodology issued in October 2006. The assessment of compliance with each principle is made on a qualitative basis. A four-part assessment system is used: compliant; largely compliant; materially noncompliant; and noncompliant. A largely compliant assessment is given if only minor shortcomings are observed, and these are not seen as sufficient to raise serious doubts about the authority's ability to achieve the objective of that principle. A materially noncompliant assessment is given when the shortcomings are sufficient to raise doubts about the authority's ability to achieve compliance, but substantive progress has been made. A noncompliant assessment is given when no substantive progress toward compliance has been achieved. The ratings assigned during this assessment are not comparable to the ones assigned in the 2000 FSAP, as the bar to measure the effectiveness of a supervisory framework has been raised in the new methodology. This paper is structures as follows: introduction; information and methodology used for assessment; institutional and macroeconomic setting and market structure- overview; preconditions for effective bank supervision; main findings; and recommended action plan and authorities' response.
Egypt's growth accelerated in the second half of FY10. Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in FY10 reached 5.8 percent, up from 4.4 percent in FY09 and 4.8 percent in FY10, taking up overall GDP growth to an average of 5.3 percent for the full FY10. Egypt's macroeconomic outlook is stable. Assuming that domestic demand holds up, and Egyptian exports continue their observed recent trend, we expect that the Egyptian economy grows in the range of 6.0 to 6.2 percent in FY11. This is underpinned by strong commitment to maintain structural reforms momentum, and a relatively stable global economy. However, unemployment will remain a challenge as growth as high as 6 percent will barely absorb the increasing number of new entrants to the labor market. Unemployment will continue to be an overriding concern and will gradually fall to around 8.7 percent in FY11. Finally, inflationary pressures are expected to rise, as global prices are likely to filter to domestic consumer prices, domestic demand will gain more solid ground, and gradual adjustment of energy prices will be implemented. Interest rates are not thus expected to rise, yet real interest rates will remain low or negative. This outlook is consistent with that of standard and poor's ratings services which affirmed in 2010.
Doing business in India 2009 is the first country specific subnational report of the doing business series that measures business regulations and their enforcement across India. Doing business in India 2009 covers 10 out of the 12 previously measured cities, and documents their progress. It adds 7 new locations, expanding the study to 17 locations. Comparisons with the rest of the world are based on the indicators in doing business 2009. The indicators in doing business in India 2009 are also comparable with the data in other subnational and regional doing business reports. The indicators are used to analyze economic outcomes and identify what reforms have worked, where, and why. Other areas that significantly affect business, such as a country's proximity to markets, the quality of infrastructure services (other than services related to the trading across borders indicator), the security of property from theft and looting, the transparency of government procurement, macroeconomic conditions, or the underlying strength of institutions, are not directly studied by doing business.
Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate was 9.9 percent in 2007. Economic growth has been primarily driven by agriculture (which contributed 3.4 percentage points to economic growth), and services (which contributed 4.3 percentage points). In the agriculture sector, the December 2007 annual livestock census reported an increase of 15 percent of livestock from 34.8 to 40.3 mln livestock, with the number of goats, sheep and cattle increasing by 18, 15 and 14 percent respectively. While most of the foreign direct investment (FDI) coming into Mongolia continues to go to mining, its value-added only grew by only 1.7 percent this year (mainly came from coal extraction). On the non-bank side, the financial regulatory commission has been making efforts to improve the legal and regulatory framework, however, its weak institutional capacity and resource constraints continue to be a major impediment in effective supervision. Several key laws relating to the financial sector need to be finalized. Efforts have been made towards resolving immediate issues relating to the closed savings and credit cooperatives, developing the insurance industry and developing a framework and institutions to develop the mortgage market. However, several laws and enabling regulation still need to put in place before benefits of increase in financial sector efficiency (lower cost of financing) can be fully realized.