С XV века, когда Крымское ханство признало над собой власть Османской империи, его войска стали активно использоваться Османской империей в своей политике. Особенно татары были незаменимыми союзниками в западных походах против европейских государств, на Кавказе и, в последующем, для сдерживания Московского государства. Однако татарские войска Крымского ханства также использовались и в других направлениях политики Османской империи. Главным соперником Османского государства на востоке был Сефевидский Иран. Войска Крымского ханства также принимали участие в походах осман. В статье рассказывается об участии татарских войск в войне с Ираном. Татары в османских военных компаниях, по большей части, играли роль акынджы, продвигаясь впереди османского войска, собирая трофеи и добычу на вражеских землях, нежели участвовали во фронтовых сражениях. Изначально крымские ханы участвовали лишь в войнах, проходивших на западных территориях. Однако ситуация изменилась во второй половине XVI века при султане Сулеймане, когда крымская кавалерия начала привлекаться и к восточным походам. Татары не особо хотели участвовать в походах против Ирана. Были случаи, когда эти походы заканчивались плачевно: пленением наследника крымского престола (Адиль Гирея), его казнью и разгромом татарской армии. Однако Крымские ханы принимали участие в каждом походе против Ирана на стороне Османской империи. Невыполнение приказов султана могло привести к замене хана (Мехмед Гиреем II). Архивные документы показывают, что численность татарских войск, отправленных против Ирана, составляла от 5 до 10 тысяч воинов, хотя в османских источниках дается завышенное количество (30-40 тыс.). ; Starting from the 15 th century, when the Crimean Khanate recognized the authority of the Ottoman Empire, its forces was actively used by the Ottoman Empire in its foreign policy. Especially the Tatars were indispensable allies in campaigns against Western European countries, Caucasus, and, subsequently, in the containment of the Moscow State. However, Tatar troops of the Crimean Khanate were also used in other political directions of the Ottoman Empire. The main rival of the Ottoman State in the east was the Safavid Iran. Troops of the Crimean Khanate also took part in these campaigns of the Ottomans. The author describes the participation of Tatar troops in the war with Iran. During the Ottoman military campaigns, the Tatars, for the most part, played a role of Akinji moving ahead of the Ottoman forces and collecting trophies and prey in hostile lands, rather than participating in the frontline battles. Initially, the Crimean khans participated only in the wars that took place in the western territories. However, the situation changed in the second half of the 16 th century under Sultan Suleiman, when the Crimean cavalry was also involved in the eastern campaigns. The Tatars did not particularly want to participate in campaigns against Iran. There were cases, when these campaigns ended in tears: with the capture of the heir to the Crimean throne (Adil Giray), its execution and the defeat of the Tatar army. However, the Crimean khans participated in every campaign against Iran on the side of the Ottoman Empire. Disobeying the Sultan orders could lead to the replacement of khan (Mehmed Giray II). Archive documents reveal that the number of Tatar troops sent against Iran, ranged from 5 to 10 thousand soldiers, although the Ottoman sources overestimates the amount (30-40 thousand).
06.03.2018 tarihli ve 30352 sayılı Resmi Gazetede yayımlanan "Yükseköğretim Kanunu İle Bazı Kanun Ve Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerde Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun" ile 18.06.2018 tarihli "Lisansüstü Tezlerin Elektronik Ortamda Toplanması, Düzenlenmesi ve Erişime Açılmasına İlişkin Yönerge" gereğince tam metin erişime açılmıştır. ; Dini ideolojiler günümüz siyasi şartlarında çok önemli hale gelmektedir. Uluslararası siyasette dini ideolojinin tartışılmasında İran İslam Cumhuriyeti merkezi konumdadır. Bunun nedeni, 1979'dan beri devletin iç ve dış politikası, Safevi döneminden miras kalan 12 Şii ideolojisi tarafından kolaylaştırılmasıdır. Şiiliğin yaygınlaşması, dünyanın birçok yerinde Afrika da dahil olmak üzere yabancı diplomatların ve İslam Cumhuriyeti'nin diğer diplomatik kollarının gündemi haline geldi. Afrika'nın Fas, Sudan ve Komoros gibi bazı bölgelerinde Şiiliğin yayılması güçlü bir dirençle karşılaştı ve nihayetinde bu bölgelerdeki İslam Cumhuriyeti'nin elçiliklerinin kapatılmasına neden oldu. Bununla birlikte, Gana ve diğer bazı Batı Afrika ülkeleri Şiiliğin yayılması için üreme alanı haline geldi.1979'da İran büyükelçiliğinin ve kültür konsolosluğunun kurulmasından bu yana, Gana Müslümanlarının dikkatini Şiiliğe çekmek için Kudüs Günü kutlamaları, Devrim Günü kutlamalarının yanı sıra Mevlid kutlamaları gibi çeşitli programlar da düzenlenmektedir. Elçilik ve kültür konsolosluğu, Şiiliğin Ganalı Müslümanlar arasında yayılmasında rol oynamıştır. İran devletinin avantaj sağlamak için geleneksel okul (Havza) eğitim, sağlık ve mesleki tesisler gibi yapılar kurmuştur. Bu tesisler şimdi İran devletinin Şiilik yayma gündeminde bir aracı görevi görmektedir. Diplomatik misyon da Şiilikle alâkalı programlar düzenlemek için bu yapılarla işbirliği yapmaktadır. Ganalı Sünni Müslüman öğrencilere Sünni Müslümanların yoğun oluğu olan topluluklarda Şii inancını yaymak amacıyla ajanlık teklif edilmekte, onlara maddi destek sağlanmakta ve eğitim verilmektedir. İslam Cumhuriyeti tarafından kurulan İslam Üniversitesi, Şii ideolojisini Şii olmayan Müslüman öğrencilere ve işçilere tanıtan bir platform da sunmaktadır. Gana'da, hem İran Klinik hem de İran devletleri tarafından başlatılan Tarım ve Kırsal Kalkınma, Şiiliğin yayılmasına yardımcı olmaya devam ediyor. Diplomatik misyon, Gana'da Şiiliğin yaygınlaştırdığını reddetse de araştırmalardan elde edilen kanıtlar diplomatik misyonun bu işi yürüttüğünü ortaya koymaktadır. ; Religious ideologies are becoming crucial in today's political dispensation. The Islamic Republic of Iran is central in the discussion of religious ideology in international politics. This is because since 1979 both domestic and foreign policy of the state has been facilitated by the twelver Shia ideology it inherited from the Safavids era. The spread of Shiism became an agenda of diplomatic mission and other diplomatic corps of the Islamic Republic in many parts of the world including Africa. In some parts of Africa like Morocco, Sudan and Comoros the spread of Shiism met with strong resistance which led to closure of some embassies of the Islamic Republic. In Ghana, however, the state among other West African States has become a breeding ground for the spread of Shiism. Since, the establishment of the Iranian embassy and the cultural consulate in 1979, it has embarked on several programs such as the celebration of quds day, revolution day as well as mawlids to bring the attention of the Ghanaian Muslims to Shiism. Both the embassy and the cultural consulate have played several roles in the spread of Shiism among Ghanaian Muslims. The diplomatic mission collaborates with several structures in organizing programs of Shiism relevance. Chief among these institutions where Shiism is spread is the Ahlul Bayt Teacher Training Centre (ATTC). Ghanaian Sunni Muslims students are recruited, sponsored and trained to serve as agents of Shiism proselytization in dominant Sunni Muslim communities. The Islamic University established by the Islamic Republic also provides a platform for familiarizing the Shia ideology to non-Shiite Muslims students and workers. Both the Iranian Clinic and the Agriculture and Rural Development initiated by the Iranian state continue to aid in spreading Shiism in Ghana. The diplomatic mission continue to deny spreading Shiism in Ghana but evidence gathered from research reveals that it is involved in the act.
SUMMARY: Harsha Ram begins responding to his colleagues by addressing Harriet Murav's concerns with the Rabelaisian carnival experience and hence temporary nature of the supra 's power discourse, using it to reiterate his point about the facile binarism of repression and resistance. Ram comments on his colleagues' interpretations of the multivalence of the supra (the mode of acculturation and civilizing; the imposition of form and hence a set of rules onto the innately disruptive experience of inebriation; "unruly" material practice, etc.). He agrees that his literary-centered history of the supra should be supplemented with the spatial history and ethnography of the Georgian feast, mapping its transitions from the Safavid-inspired gardens and taverns of old Tiflis to the aristocratic, military and vice-regal milieus of imperial Russia, to the familial and professional networks of the Soviet era. While embracing similar suggestions, Ram rejects a view that the supra evolved from nativism to nationalism, with the latter understood as a political anti-imperial project. The last half of Ram's response deals with the main disagreement between his commentators and him, pertaining to Partha Chatterjee's methodological model adapted by Ram. Some of his critics suggest that the rootedness of Chatterjee's argument in the specifics of British India and Hindu nationalism makes his model impertinent to the very material Georgian case, whereas Gyan Prakash claims that Chatterjee falls into the trap of identifying with nationalism's metaphysical oppositions instead of exposing their historicity as by-products of a colonial rule that is as modern and hybrid as any other imperial formation. Ram rejects these criticisms of both Chatterjee's and his own attempts to overcome the binarism of nation and empire and explains how his approach parallels Chatterjee's. He does this by reconstituting the nativizing Georgian elite discourse that elevated the supra to the status of a national tradition, while also pointing to the feast's culturally heterogeneous constitutive elements that cannot readily be inscribed into the narrative of the nation. Finally, Ram calls for a renewed methodological synergy between literary history and literary theory on the one hand, and history and the social sciences on the other. Харша Рам начинает своей ответ коллегам с замечания Хэрриет Мурав, сравнившей супру с раблезианским карнавальным – и потому временным – перевертыванием властных отношений. Он отталкивается от этого замечания, чтобы еще раз разъяснить свою мысль об искусственности оппозиции репрессии и сопротивления. Рам с энтузиазмом отзывается на размышления коллег по поводу мультивалентности супры, понимаемой ими и как способ аккультурации и цивилизации; и как привнесение формы и, соответственно, правил в стихийный разрушительный процесс опьянения; и как "неуправляемую" материальную практику и проч. Рам соглашается с тем, что его литературоцентричная история супры должна быть дополнена пространственной историей и этнографией грузинского пира, очерчивающей его перемещение из сафавидских садов и таверн старого Тифлиса в аристократические, военные и правительственные пространства имперской России, а затем − в семейные и профессиональные сети советского времени. Принимая подобные предложения, Рам отвергает трактовку, согласно которой супра развивалась из нативистского института в антиимперский национально-политический институт. Во второй части своего эссе Рам разбирает главное расхождение между ним и его комментаторами, относящееся к методологической модели Парты Чаттерджи, воспринятой Рамом. В частности, некоторые участники форума считают, что модель Чаттерджи укоренена в специфике Британской Индии и индуистского национализма и потому не объясняет сугубо материальный грузинский феномен супры. Гаян Пракаш добавляет, что Чаттерджи идентифицируется с имплицитно заложенной в идеологии национализма метафизической дихотомией, недооценивая его исторические корни в колониальном контексте и модерную гибридность, присущую всем имперским формациям. Рам не согласен с подобной критикой, доказывая, что Чаттерджи осознает специфику имперской ситуации и стремится преодолеть бинарность нации и империи. Рам мыслит параллельно с Чаттерджи, одновременно реконструируя нативизирующий дискурс грузинской элиты, возводящий супру в статус национальной традиции, и указывая на культурную гетерогенность составных элементов супры, не вписывающихся в национальный нарратив. В заключение Рам призывает к обновленной методологической синергии истории и теории литературы, с одной стороны, и истории и социальных наук – с другой.
This essay investigates accounts of the Kurds and Kurdistan by sixteenth- and seventeenth-century British travellers to the Ottoman and Safavid empires by placing them alongside contemporary Kurdish and Iranian chronicles by Sharaf al-Din Khan Bedlisi (1597) and Eskandar Beg Monshi (1616-29). Although considerable attention has been paid in recent scholarship to early-modern British travellers' accounts of the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim communities of the Levant, Middle East, and Persia, the Kurds have been entirely ignored. Early British travellers most often encountered Kurds in and around Aleppo, where the Levant Company established its headquarters during the 1580s. Remarkably few, however, commented on the Kurdish presence. Further east, Anthony Shirley and his companions on their mission to visit Shah Abbas in 1598 recognised Kurdistan to be a province between Baghdad and Qazvin, and regarded the Kurds as uncivilised and rootless vagabonds; for Shirley himself they provided a means to magnify his own importance. While earlier Venetian merchants "described Kurdistan and Kurds with perspicacity and in detail" (Galletti, 1995: 99), the accounts by the first British travellers alternated between description and fabrication.ABSTRACT IN KURMANJIGerokên Brîtanî, kurd û Kurdistan: dîrokeke nivîskî ya kurt, c. 1520-1680Ev gotar li ser wan neql û berhemên derbarê kurdan û Kurdistanê de ye ku ji teref gerokên brîtanî (îngilîz) yên sedsalên 16 û 17an ên li nav împeratoriyên Osmanî û Safewî hatine nivîsandin; gotar, wan dide ber berhemên dîrokî yên kurd û îranî yên hevdemên wan, wek Şerefxanê Bidlîsî (1597/8) û Îskender Beh Monşî (1616-29). Digel ku di xebatên nûjen de baleke girîng hatiye dayîn bo zanyariyên gerokên Brîtanî yên serdema berî-modern li ser civakên Xirîstiyan, Yahûdî û Misilman ên Levant, Rojhilata Navîn û Îranê de, kurd bi temamî hatine piştguhkirin. Gerokên brîtanî yên ewil bi piranî li Heleb û derdora wê rastî kurdan hatine ji ber ku Şîrketa Levantê di salên 1580an de baregeha xwe li wir ava kiribû. Lê belê, gelek kêm ji wan behsa hebûna kurdan kiriye. Bêtir li aliyê rojhilat, Anthony Shirley û hevrêyên wî di serdana Şah Ebbas ya 1580an de, Kurdistan wek parêzgeheke di navbera Bexda û Qezwînê de destnîşan kiriye û kurd wek tolazên hov û bêesl dîtine, û ji bo Shirley bi xwe ew amrazek bûn ku girîngiya xwe qat-qat zêdetir bike. Tucarên Venedîkî yên ewil "Kurdistan û kurdan bi hişmendî û hûrbînî terîf kirine" (Galleti, 1995:99), lê belê, neql û terîfên gerokên brîtanî di navbera terîf û derewan de diguherin.ABSTRACT IN SORANIGerîde Berîtanîyekan, Kurd û Kurdistan; puxteyek le mêjû 1520-1680Em nusîne kêwmallî mijarekanî Kurd û Kurdistan le sedekanî şazdehem û ḧevdehem dekat, le jêr roşnayî nêrrînî gerrîde Berîtanyayiyekan le herdû împiratorî 'Usmanî û Sefewîda be leberçawgirtinî herdû şakarî Şerefedîn Xanî Bedlîsî (1597/8) û Eskender Begî Munşî (1616-29) herçende zorbey kare zanistîyekan tîşkyan xistûwete ser karekanî gerrîdeBberîtanîyekan le berebeyanîy modêrneda; bellam ziyatir leser Cûwekan, Krîstiyanekan, Musellmanekan le Şam, Rojhellatî Nawerast û willatî Fars rawestawn û betewawî Kurdyan piştgwê xistûwe. Gerrîde berîtanîye berayiyekan zorcar çawyan be kurd le naw yan ledewrî Ḧeleb kewtuwe; katê ke mekoy serekîy Kompanyay Şam damezra le sallî 1580kanda. Bellam zor be kemî leser bûnî kurd lewnaweda dwawin. Ziyatir bewer rojhellat, Anthony Shirley û hawrêkanî le rêgey seferyanda bo çawpêkewtin be Şa 'Ebas le sallî 1598, Kurdistanyan be wîlayetêk nasanduwe lenêwan Beẍdad û Qezwînda û Kurdanyan wek xellkêkî namedenî û koçer nasanduwe. Mebestî Shirley le derxistinî basî Kurdan ziyatir bo nîşandanî giringîy xoy buwe. Bellam bazirgane Vînîsyayiyekan wesfî Kurd û Kurdistanyan be deqîqtir û dûrudrêjtir kirduwe. (Galletti 1995: 99), baskirdinî Kurdan lelayen gerrîde berîtanyayiyekanewe ziyatir wesfkarîy wirûkeşane buwe.ABSTRACT IN ZAZAKIRaywanê brîtanyayijî, kurdî û Kurdîstan: tarîxo edebîyo kilm, dorê 1520-1680îNa meqale raporê ke Împeratorîyanê Osmanî û Sefewîyan de hetê raywananê brîtanyayijan yê seserranê şîyês û hewtêsinan ra derheqê kurd û Kurdîstanî de virazîyayî, înan ser o cigêrayîş kena û ê raporî kronîkanê hemdeman yê kurdan û îranijan yê Şerefxanê Bedlisî (1597/8) û Îskender Beg Munşî (1616-29) de nana pêver o. Herçiqas ke cigêrayîşanê peyênan de xeylê eleqe musnîyaye raporanê raywananê modernanê verênan yê Brîtanya ke derheqê komelanê xirîstîyan, yahudî û muslumanan yê Levant, Rojhelatê Mîyanênî û Îranî de virazîyayî, kurdî pêro pîya ameyî peygoş kerdene. Raywananê brîtanyayijan ê verênan kurdî zafane Haleb û derûdorê ci de dîyî, cayo ke Şîrketê Levantî serranê 1580an de merkezê xo nabî ro. Çi esto ke înan ra zaf tay kesan estbîyayîşê kurdan ser o şîrove kerd. Hîna zaf hetê rojhelatî de, Anthony Shirley û hevalê ey serra 1598î de kewtbî mîsyon ke Şah Abbasî zîyaret bikerê. Înan Kurdîstan sey wîlayetê mabênê Bexdad û Qazvînî de nas kerd û çimê înan de kurdî gewendeyê bê ristim û bê medenîyet bîyî. Seba Shirleyî kurdî tena wasitayêk bîyê ke pê înan muhîmîya xo berz bikero. Herçiqas ke bazirgananê venedîkijan "Kurdîstan û kurdî bi aqilo tuj û teferuat tarîf kerd" (Galletti, 1995: 99), raporanê raywananê brîtanyayijanê verênan mabênê terîf û pêardişî de ca girewt.
I. Introduction -- 1. The Conversation on Sunday Afternoon -- 2. Utopia -- 3. Facts -- 4. Casus Belli in Practice -- 5. Volumes One to Three -- 6. Volume Four -- II. The Glorious Revolution -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Republics -- 3. The First War between the Dutch and English Republics -- 4. Allies with France, War with Spain -- 5. The Restoration -- 6. Alliance with Portugal and Further War with Spain -- 7. A Second War with the Dutch, and then the French -- 8. Alliance with France, Further War against the Dutch, and Another Peace -- 9. War and Peace with English and the Indigenous Communities in the Colonies -- 10. The Causes of the Revolution in England -- 11. The Invasion of England -- 12. The Glorious Revolution -- 13. John Locke -- 14. Constitutional Monarchy Entrenched -- 15. Liberty -- 16. Conclusion -- III. The Wars of Louis XIV -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Ongoing Conflict with Spain -- 3. The War of Spanish Inheritance -- 4. The War of France and England against the Dutch Republic -- 5. The Reunion Wars -- 6. The Nine Years War -- 7. The War of Spanish Succession -- 8. Conclusion -- IV. The Interregnum -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Succession and Dynastic Considerations -- 3. The War of the Quadruple Alliance -- 4. The 1720s -- 5. Skirting a Major Conflict in the 1730s -- 6. Conclusion -- V. The War of Austrian Succession -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Prize -- 3. Frederick II -- 4. The Opportunities for Others of the Habsburg Inheritance -- 5. Splintering the Opposition and Building New Alliances -- 6. The Slide Towards World War -- 7. Coming to the Boil -- 8. Full Boil -- 9. Bonnie Prince Charlie -- 10. Expansion and Exhaustion -- 11. The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle -- 12. Conclusion -- VI. The Seven Years War -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The New Plan -- 3. Trouble in the Colonies -- 4. Austria Backs Away from its Alliance with Britain -- 5. Britain Makes a Deal with Russia -- 6. The Treaty of Westminster Trumps that with Russia -- 7. Misreading the Opposition -- 8. New Friends and New Neutrals: The First Treaties of Versailles -- 9. The Deepening Conflict -- 10. The Invasion of Saxony -- 11. The Widening Conflict in India and North America -- 12. The Expansion of the Anti-Prussian Alliance -- 13. Extreme Pressure Applied on Prussia -- 14. The Push Back -- 15. A Good Year for Britain -- 16. The Pressure on Prussia and Victories for Britain -- 17. The Entry of Spain -- 18. The Exit of Russia -- 19. The Last Actions -- 20. The Peace of Paris -- 21. The Peace of Hubertusburg -- 22. Conclusion -- VII. The War of American Independence -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Before the Revolution -- 3. After the Seven Years War -- 4. Land and Native Americans -- 5. Sugar and Stamps -- 6. A Revised Approach -- 7. Tea -- 8. The Intolerable Acts -- 9. 1774: The Reaction -- 10. A Shot Heard Across the World -- 11. The Justification and Escalation -- 12. The First Help and Assistance -- 13. Common Sense -- 14. The Declaration of Independence -- 15. Military Survival and Political Cohesion -- 16. The French Enter the War -- 17. As the War Grinds on in North America, it Expands into Other Parts of the World -- 18. Spain Enters the Fray -- 19. Tupac's Rebellion in Peru -- 20. A Global War -- 21. The League of Armed Neutrality -- 22. The Last Years of the Conflict -- 23. Peace -- 24. The Native American Question -- 25. What the Americans Fought for -- 26. The United States and the Wider World in the 1790s -- 27. The French Revolution and the Turn Towards Isolationism -- 28. Conclusion -- VIII. The French Revolution -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Kings -- 3. Philosophers -- 4. The Fuse to Revolution in France -- 5. The Foreign Context -- 6. War -- 7. The First Coalition against the Republic of France -- 8. Internal Enemies -- 9. The War Changes, Turns and Expands -- 10. Britain Fights Alone -- 11. The Second Coalition -- 12. Napoleon -- 13. Conclusion -- IX. Slavery -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Numbers and Impact -- 3. Supply -- 4. Traders -- 5. Indentured Labour -- 6. The Laws of Slavery -- 7. Slave Revolts in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century -- 8. Dissent against Slavery -- 9. Slave Revolts up to 1765 -- 10. The American Revolution -- 11. The Abolitionist Movement in Britain -- 12. The French Revolution -- 13. Saint Dominique/Haiti -- 14. The Revolt -- 15. Conclusion -- X. The Wars of North and Eastern Europe -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The First Northern War -- 3. The Second Northern War -- 4. Between the Wars -- 5. The War of Polish Succession -- 6. The Austrian War of Succession -- 7. The Seven Years War -- 8. Catherine the Great -- 9. The First Partition of Poland -- 10. Rebellions against Serfdom -- 11. The Almost War of Bavarian Succession -- 12. The Second Partition of Poland -- 13. The End of the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania -- 14. Paul I -- 15. Conclusion -- XI. Religion -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Enlightenment -- 3. Religion as a Pretext for War -- 4. The Movement Towards Tolerance -- 5. Religion in the Revolutionary Wars -- 6. Conclusion -- XII. The Muslim Territories -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Ottoman Empire -- 3. The Siege of Vienna -- 4. North Africa -- 5. New Ottoman Conflict with Russia -- 6. New Ottoman Conflict with the Venetians and the Habsburgs -- 7. The End of the Safavid Dynasty -- 8. The Rise of Nader Shah -- 9. The Austro-Russian and Ottoman War of 1735 to 1739 -- 10. Aurangzeb and the Mughal Empire -- 11. Nader Shah at Full Strength -- 12. The Rise of the British in India -- 13. Three Decades of Russian-Ottoman Conflict -- 14. War and Peace in Eighteenth-century North Africa -- 15. The Challenge at the Epicentre of the Ottoman Empire -- 16. Conclusion -- XIII. China and its Neighbours -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Shunzhi Emperor -- 3. The Kangxi Emperor -- 4. The Yongzheng Emperor -- 5. The Qianlong Emperor -- 6. Europeans -- 7. Conclusion -- XIV. Grand Plans for Peace -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Hobbes -- 3. Penn -- 4. Leibniz -- 5. The Abbé Charles de Saint-Pierre -- 6. Vattel and Wolff -- 7. Voltaire -- 8. Rousseau -- 9. Bentham -- 10. Kant -- 11. Conclusion -- XV. Conclusion -- 1. Absolute Rulers -- 2. Religion -- 3. Ideologies of the Enlightenment -- 4. The Muslim Territories -- 5. China and Asia.
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From nuclear weapons to terrorism, the United States and Iran clash on nearly even front. Yet, it has not always been this way. As recently as 1979, Norwich University, the oldest Senior Military College in the United States, played host to nearly eighty Iranian Midshipmen. Although Norwich's Iranian program was short-lived, it was one of the most successful cultural exchanges in the university's history. In the face of tremendous adversity, Norwich overcame all obstacles and successfully academically, militarily, and socially integrated the Iranian Midshipmen into the Corps of Cadets and the greater Norwich community. ; Winner of the 2022 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the University Archives category, honorable mention. ; Tribulation, Triumph, and Tragedy: Norwich University's Iranian Program (1976-1979) Joseph C. Chatterton History 249- Historical Methods Dr. Bennett 3, December 2021 Word Count: 3159 1 January 29, 2002, just five months after the most devastating terrorist attacks in American history, in his first State of the Union since the beginning of War on Terror President George W. Bush branded Iran as a member of the so-called Axis of Evil along with the likes of North Korea and Saddam Hussian's Iraq. In one line in particular, President Bush decried the Islamic Republic and made it clear that in his role as Commander and Chief, he regarded Iran as one of America's greatest geopolitical foes stating, "Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom."1 President Bush's remarks are unsurprising. After all, as recently as May of 2018, prominent Iranian politicians congregated in the hallowed halls of their Parliament to burn American flags and chant "Death to America."2 From nuclear weapons to terrorism, the United States and Iran clash on nearly even front. Yet, it has not always been this way. As recently as 1979, Norwich University, the oldest Senior Military College in the United States, played host to nearly eighty Iranian Midshipmen. Although Norwich's Iranian program was short-lived, it was one of the most successful cultural exchanges in the university's history. In the face of tremendous adversity, Norwich overcame all obstacles and successfully academically, militarily, and socially integrated the Iranian Midshipmen into the Corps of Cadets and the greater Norwich community. In the fifty years since the birth of Iran's Islamic Republic, scholars, historians, and government officials have devoted the vast majority of their analysis on the dramatic collapse of the Shah's regime, the ensuing hostage crisis, and the profound implications it had on American foreign policy. While the significance of this is undeniable, far less research has been done into 1 George W Bush, "2002 State of the Union ," National Archives and Records Administration (National Archives and Records Administration, January 29, 2002), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/stateoftheunion/2002/. 2 "Iranian Politicians Set Fire to US Flag in Parliament," BBC News (BBC), accessed November 4, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-middle-east-44055625. 2 academic links which bound the two nations, and the effects that the regime's collapse had on the vast number of Iranian students studying in the United States. Norwich's Iranian program was not the first of its kind, however it was the most successful. Similar programs were attempted at other military academies such as at The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) and the Citadel. However, both of these programs were plagued by difficulties. In 1976 Lieutenant Colonel Paul LaFond, the Deputy Commandant of Norwich's Corps of Cadets, visited VMI to observe VMI's Iranian program so that Norwich might draw lessons for the establishment of its own program. Following the trip Colonel LaFond compiled a detailed report. In the report, it becomes quickly evident that the VMI program consistently struggled to successfully integrate the Iranian students. Major flash point included the serving of Pork products during chow time and their "more relaxed idea of the honor code,"3 LaFond ends this memorandum with a section dedicated "Staff, Faculty and Cadre reaction to the Iranian Program." In this section it becomes evident that many prominent leaders of VMI had less than positive things to say about the program. One Cadet advisor remarked, "The Iranians have put a great strain on our system. The school has been weakened." he continued on dramatically stating, "If we had large numbers for very long it could destroy our system."4 Probably the gravest signal that VMI's Iran program was less than successful are the somber closing remarks of the schools highest ranking officials, the Commandant of Cadets: " You will have a severe problem. Are you ready to cope and is it worth it? There will be many problems with your own cadets."5 The first half of this quote is simple enough to analyze. Of course, there will be many general challenges with introducing a large contingent of foreign midshipmen into a military environment such as 3 Paul LaFond. Memorandum to Loring Hart, 7 May 1976. President Hart's Files on the Iranian Students, Norwich University Archives, Northfield Vt. 4 Paul LaFond, Memorandum to Loring Hart. 5 Paul LaFond, Memorandum to Loring Hart. 3 VMI, yet it is the second part of this quote that really requires some unpacking. What exactly was the Commandant's intent when he stated, "There will be many problems with your own cadets."6 As mentioned previously VMI's Iranian program was notorious for its struggles to integrate the Iranian Midshipmen into their Corps of Cadets, one aspect of this often overlooked is the initial hostility between American Cadets and the Iranian Midshipmen. Earlier in the memorandum VMI's Commandant is quoted to have stated in subsection 5, Discipline and Control, "At first, the 'Old Cadets' harassed the Iranians, and were hard on them. A period of turbulence resulted," he goes on to articulate his point stating that he "cautions, to watch our martinets that they don't cause trouble and states that this type of cadet is particularly frustrated when working with Iranians."7 Although the wording in certain sections of this memorandum can be somewhat confusing for a twenty-first century perspective to comprehend, the general theme is clear, VMI's Iranian program was plagued with trials and tribulations, many of which remained unresolved at the time of its publication. In spite of this evident adversity, Norwich remained resolved to push forward and succeed where VMI failed. With this in mind one must question why Senior Military Colleges such as Norwich placed such an emphasis on creating relations with Iran? For thousands of years Iran has been a strategic regional power. Throughout antiquity the Persian Empire was one of the world's premier powers, and this prominence continued into the Middle Ages. In the 7th century CE, the nation played a vital role in helping to facilitate the spread of Islam from the Arabian peninsula to Central Asia.8 As time progressed the nation's strategic value only grew. During the age of European Imperialism, Iran held a vital role as a 6 Paul LaFond, Memorandum to Loring Hart. 7 Paul LaFond, Memorandum to Loring Hart. 8 Kathryn Babayan, "The Safavid Synthesis: From Qizilbash Islam to Imamite Shi'ism." Iranian Studies 27, no. 1/4 (1994): 135–61. 4 buffer between the British lion and the Russian bear.9 By 1879, Iran was a colony within the British Empire in all but name. The Iranian government was forced to grant monopolies on everything from "the construction of railways, canals and irrigation system,"10 to control of the nation's banking system.11 Yet the nation's greatest strategic value laid below its surface. In 1908, as oil was beginning to gradually replace coal as the key to industrialization, foreign interest in the country skyrocketed with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company discovery of black gold beneath the waters of the Persian Gulf.12 Iran entered the Cold War in a very interesting position. Many of its institutions, and much wealth continued to be controlled by foreigners in London and by this point Washington. Understandably this angered many Iranians and many turned to socialist politicians like Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nassar, and in Iran's case Mohammad Mosaddegh. In the general election of 1951 Mosaddegh campaigned on the simple message that Iran must free itself from the British imperial yoke. He would win the Prime Ministership in a landslide, and upon assuming the highest office in the nation he set out to make good on his campaign promise. Symbolically on May Day in 1951, Mosaddegh announced the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In October of that year he doubled down, expelling all British subjects from the nation. Yet the Western powers did not take kindly to being forcefully evicted from Iran, especially taking into consideration the ongoing Cold War, the nation's strategic geography, and its valuable resources. Thus, the British Intelligence service (MI6) in conjunction with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), began planning for regime change. In August of 1953 Operation Ajax (alternatively known as Operation Boot) successfully ousted the democratically 9 Chris Paine and Erica Schoenberger, "Iranian Nationalism and the Great Powers: 1872-1954." MERIP Reports, no. 37 (1975): 3–28. 10 Paine, "Iranian Nationalism and the Great Powers. 1975. 11 Paine, "Iranian Nationalism and the Great Powers. 1975. 12 Paine, "Iranian Nationalism and the Great Powers. 1975. 5 elected Mosaddegh, and bestowed the on nation's monarch or Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi near absolute power.13 The Shah's Iran played a vital role in the United States' middle eastern policy. As described in his journal article, American–Iranian Alliances: International Education, Modernization, and Human Rights during the Pahlavi Era, Dr. Mathew K. Shannon "The Shah's Iran provided to successive American administrations, with a toe hold in the Persian Gulf region … a bulwark against Soviet expansion… and guaranteed the westward flow of Iranian oil."14 With this in context it is understandable that the United States wished to do everything within its power to strengthen its strategic relationship with Iran. While on one hand this means providing Iran with military funds and equipment, it also means flexing the United States' soft power. The Oxford dictionary defines "soft power" as, "a way of dealing with other countries that involves using economic and cultural influence to persuade them to do things, rather than military power."15 In the 1970s the United States had many of the top universities in the world, as well as one of the most robust and modern educational systems. Thus, it seems only logical that the US utilizes its education system, as a bastion of strength. Dr. Joseph Nye, a well-established political scientist and the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is quoted for stating, "The ideas and values that America exports in the minds of more than half a million foreign students who study every year in American universities and return to their home countries, tend to reach elites in power."16 Throughout the Cold War the United States would 13 Moyara de Moraes Ruehsen. "Operation 'Ajax' Revisited: Iran, 1953." Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 3 (1993): 467–86. 14 Matthew K. Shannon, "American–Iranian Alliances: International Education, Modernization, and Human Rights during the Pahlavi Era" Diplomatic History 39, no. 4, (2015) 661. 15 "Soft Power,"Definition, pictures, pronunciation and usage notes, Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary. 16 Carol Atkinson, "Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs 1980–2006" Foreign Policy Analysis 6 no. 1, (310) 2. 6 faithfully follow Dr. Nye's advice to further develop its relationship with the Shah's Iran. The previously mentioned Dr. Mathew Shannon notes the rapid and substantial growth of Iranian students in the United States stating, "The population grew from a mere five hundred in 1950, to upwards of fifty thousand in the late 1970, making them the largest national group of students in the United States."17 The significance of this cannot be understated. Upon graduating from American Universities these students returned to their homeland and played an active role in building the new modern Iran. It was on their shoulders that the "bulwark against Soviet expansion rested." It was the alumni of American universities that ran Iran's state oil company and made the plans for modernizing Iranian industry and infrastructure. These alumni would hold high positions in the nation's civil service, would serve as elected members of Iran's Majlis (Parliament), and crucial to Norwich as officers in the Iranian Military. While Iran benefited from this influx of a highly educated, professional class, the United States was able to stock the Iranian government with those sympathetic to the West. Norwich University first began accepting Iranian Midshipmen in the fall of 1976. President Loring Hart and his administration put a great deal of emphasis on naturalizing the Iranian Midshipmen to the University from the onset. Captain M. Ali Foroughizadeh an Iranian Imperial Navy officer stationed in Arlington, Virginia, would serve as the main point of contact between the University and the Iranian government, for much of the program's existence. The correspondences between Captain Foroughizadeh and President Hart provide unique insight into its early development. The process of integrating Iranian students into the Corps of Cadets and the greater University community did not begin in August with the traditional start of the school year, but rather in June of 1976. As detailed by William F. Beatty, the Executive Assistant to the 17 Shannon, American-Iranian Alliances, 662. 7 President, "Currently fifty-two Iranian midshipmen are undergoing an intensive English, Mathematics and Physical education study program at Norwich in preparation for their enrollment next September as members of the class of 1980."18 Clearly even from the onset of its program Norwich was taking the proactive? steps to fully integrate the Midshipmen firmly into the Corps. Although at times it can become easy to forget, at the end of day Norwich is not merely a remote outpost of the US military but is a university with a long and storied tradition of academic excellence. As such, the importance of academic integration for the Universities Iran students cannot be understated. One of the key takeaways from VMI's tumultuous Iranian program was that failure to integrate the Iranian students in the classroom could have disastrous consequences. Thus, Norwich's faculty and administration made every effort to thoroughly integrate the Iranian students academically into the University. Associate professor Dr. Hollis D. McBride of the Engineering Department described the climate in the classroom stating "Conflicts between Irani and Americans in class have been few." Dr. Hollis does briefly pause his praise to note that the Iranian students seemed more inclined to help each other than their fellow American students, and does advise that having fewer Iranians per class would "reduce their dependence on each other."19 Yet in spite of these challenges Dr. McBride makes it abundantly clear he believes that the presence of the Iranian midshipmen had a profound and positive impact on the education of all students of all nationalities. McBride's praise for the program goes as far as to state, "Never have I seen a class of students work as hard as both Irani and Americans." He goes on to state "I am convinced that the example of the Irani working 18 William F Beatty, Letter to CDR Abghari, 4 November 1976. President Hart's Files on the Iranian Students, Norwich University Archives, Northfield Vt. 19 Hollis D McBride, Memorandum to Dr. Hart and Dr. Chevalier, 15 July 1977. President Hart's Files on the Iranian Students, Norwich University Archives, Northfield Vt. 8 overcomes the more usual image of upperclassmen playing to encourage this premier academic effort I have witnessed in my ten years at Norwich."20 Great strides were also taken to properly integrate the Iranian midshipmen socially into the Norwich community. In one of his first memorandums regarding the arrival of Midshipmen, he encourages members of the staff to "host one or two Iranian students for an evening meal to socialize."21 The University also made a significant effort to integrate Iranian and American students within the barracks. The previously mentioned engineering professor, Dr. McBride makes a strong case for integration stating, "An American roommate is a plus, but even more important is an American roommate of the same major."22 The logic behind this is self-evident. Forcing American and Iranian students to live together in close quarters means they are far more likely to develop close cross-cultural bonds, which in turn are "beneficial to both the American and the Iranian."23 Having an American roommate also forced the Iranian Midshipmen to use English on a daily basis and forces them to not to rely solely on their fellow Iranians. Sports and extracurricular activities also played a role in assimilating the midshipmen into the campus community. Many of the Iranian midshipmen played soccer both competitively and recreationally for the school. President Hart remarks upon the Midshipmen in a memorandum he sent to Iranian Admiral Farzaneh regarding the filming of a promotional video stating, "we might arrange a game for the Iranian Cadets on the soccer team." 24 While it is easy to overlook such trivial events as American and Iranian athletes competing together, surely the connections and 20 Hollis McBride, Memorandum to Dr. Hart and Dr. Chevalier. 21 Loring E Hart , Memorandum to Distribution Lists I and II, 15 June 1976. President Hart's Files on the Iranian Students, Norwich University Archives, Northfield Vt. 22 Hollis McBride, Memorandum to Dr. Hart and Dr. Chevalier. 23 Hollis McBride, Memorandum to Dr. Hart and Dr. Chevalier. 24 Hart, Loring E, Memorandum to Vadm D. Farzaneh, 11 December 1978. President Hart's Files on the Iranian Students, Norwich University Archives, Northfield Vt. 9 comradery built on the playing field can overcome linguistic and cultural differences and help the Iranian students merge into the student body. Despite these successes, a shadow lurked over the entirety of the program. One with a limited knowledge of world history, might wonder why the program was so short lived if it was clearly so successful The simple answer: revolution. Despite the guise of modernization beneath Iran's surface, discontent was brewing against the Shah and his authoritarian regime. Chief among the dissenters' grievances were not only the brutal human rights violations committed by the secret police (SAVAK), but the perception of American imperialism, and backlash for the increasingly secular nature of Iranian society. By 1978, demonstrations against the Imperial government occurred across all the nation's major cities with riots targeting symbols of the West such as banks, cinemas, and restaurants.25 The nation's Shiite clergy also played a major role in the overthrow of the Imperial regime. With his health failing and the regime crumbling, the Shah and his family were forced to flee in exile in Egypt. Simultaneously the Ayatollah Khomeini, a leader of the Shiite clergy, and an outspoken critic of the government returned from exile just in time for revolutionary forces to capture Tehran.26 Meanwhile back in Northfield, President Hart's administration was doing everything within its power to look after the best interests of the Iranian Midshipmen. Initially it appeared that the situation was under control. As late as November 9th, 1979, the Institute of International Education wrote "Foreign students who are in this country to pursue an and who are lawfully engaged in that pursuit, properly enjoy the protection of the laws which allow them to enter the 25 Said Amir Arjomand, "The Causes and Significance of the Iranian Revolution." State, Culture, and Society 1, no. 3 (1985): 41–66. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20006816. 26 Said Amir, Arjomand,"The Causes and Significance of the Iranian Revolution." 10 country and permit them to remain."27 Five days later University Vice President James Galloway echoed similar sentiments, writing that the state department had advised him that "State and Defense were discussing Iranian students, but were oriented towards those Iranians holding student visas, not members of an organized program. Current guidance was the status quo, and to maintain a low profile."28 Unfortunately this good news would be short lived. November 4, 1979 saw the storming of the American embassy in Tehran and the capture of 52 American hostages, President Carter issued an executive order calling for all the review of all educational visas for Iranian students in the United States.29 The optimism that the program could survive evaporated Almost overnight. Less than a month later Vice President James Galloway was forced to send out a new memo with a far different tone. While the November addition spoke of maintaining the status quo, the updated version stated, "On the basis of official order from the Iranian government or the U.S government, the Norwich Naval Contingent is directed to terminate their school and depart or prepare to depart."30 Throughout the winter of 1980 the campus held its breath bracing for the inevitable. On April 7, this finally occurred when "The State Department severed diplomatic relations with Iran and ordered the deportation of "employees" and "officials of Iran by Friday April 11 at midnight."31 The next day on April 8, a glimmer of false hope set in, with 27 Hughes Jenkins, "Educational Exchange Agencies Urge Care in Coping with Iranian Students in U.S, 9 November 1979. President Hart's Files on the Iranian Students, Norwich University Archives, Northfield Vt. 28 James V Galloway, Memorandum For Record, 14 November 1979. President Hart's Files on the Iranian Students, Norwich University Archives, Northfield Vt. 29 Will Tiague, Hostages of the Crisis: Iranian Students in Arkansas, 1979-1981. The Arkansas Quarterly 77, no. 2 (2018): 113-130. 30 Harry A Buckley, Contingency Plan for the Iranian Crisis, 4 December 1979. President Hart's Files on the Iranian Students, Norwich University Archives, Northfield Vt. 31 Philip R Marsilius, Sequence of Events, 7-14 April 1980. President Hart's Files on the Iranian Students, Norwich University Archives, Northfield Vt. 11 the general feeling being that "the Iranian Cadets would be classified as students rather than as officials or employees, and would therefore be permitted to finish the semester."32 However, the next day such hopes would be shattered when the State department reversed its decision and labeled the Midshipmen as Officials of Iran. Two days later on April 10, President Hart briefed the Corps on the unfolding situation. In a testament to the successes of the program when Iranian Midshipmen " c/CPT Kazem Yahyapour bid farewell to the American students on behalf of the Iranians students, he received a standing ovation from the Corps. Faculty, and staff."33 On April 12, 1980 the Iranian program would officially die with the departure of 80 Iranian students and officials. The last communication upon touchdown in Tehran was simple and sober, "We received and are warm and ok."34 The Iranian program was over. Since that infamous date in 1980 the relation between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran have only grown worse. Today it would be unimaginable for Midshipmen from Iran to study at an American military college such as Norwich University. Yet only fifty years ago between 1976 and 1979 over 80 Iranian students were fully integrated, academically, socially, and militarily into the Norwich community. Although the program ended in tragedy, in a world where military cooperation continues to grow increasingly important, the story of success remains relevant and worth remembering. 32 Philip R Marsilius, Sequence of Events. 33Philip R Marsilius, Sequence of Events. 34 Philip R Marsilius, Sequence of Events. 12 Bibliography Primary Sources Beatty, William F. Letter to CDR Abghari, 4 November 1976. President Hart's Files on the Iranian Students, Norwich University Archives, Northfield Vt. Galloway, James V. Memorandum For Record, 14 November 1979. President Hart's Files on the Iranian Students, Norwich University Archives, Northfield Vt. Hart, Loring E. Memorandum to Distribution Lists I and II, 15 June 1976. President Hart's Files on the Iranian Students, Norwich University Archives, Northfield Vt. Hart, Loring E. Memorandum to Vadm D. Farzaneh, 11 December 1978. President Hart's Files on the Iranian Students, Norwich University Archives, Northfield Vt. LaFond, Paul. Memorandum to Loring Hart, 7 May 1976. President Hart's Files on the Iranian Students, Norwich University Archives, Northfield Vt. Marsilius, Philip R, Sequence of Events, 7-14 April 1980. President Hart's Files on the Iranian Students, Norwich University Archives, Northfield Vt. McBride, Hollis D. Memorandum to Dr. Hart and Dr. Chevalier, 15 July 1977. President Hart's Files on the Iranian Students, Norwich University Archives, Northfield Vt. Jenkins, Hughes. "Educational Exchange Agencies Urge Care in Coping with Iranian Students in U.S, 9 November 1979. President Hart's Files on the Iranian Students, Norwich University Archives, Northfield Vt. Secondary Sources Arjomand, Said Amir. "The Causes and Significance of the Iranian Revolution." State, Culture, and Society 1, no. 3 (1985): 41–66. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20006816. This article provided valuable information about the events of Iran's Islamic Revolution. It discusses the initial protests and the peoples major grievances against the secret police, the west, and the increasing secular nature of society. Babayan, Kathryn. "The Safavid Synthesis: From Qizilbash Islam to Imamite Shi'ism." Iranian Studies 27, no. 1/4 (1994): 135–61. 13 This article provides information on the history of Islam in Iran. Initially it was used to help inllistrate how historically Iran has been very stratiegic, but it also serves to introduce Islam, which would prove to be a very important factor in the 1979 Revolution. Carol Atkinson, "Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs 1980–2006" Foreign Policy Analysis 6 no. 1, (310) 2. This article helps to illustrate the significance of soft power, particularly the use of student exchange programs to project American power across the globe. Clearly this is very relevant to Norwich's Iranian exchange program, and helps to explain its significance and one of its purposes. Bush, George W. "2002 State of the Union ," National Archives and Records Administration (National Archives and Records Administration, January 29, 2002), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/stateoftheunion/2002/. Used in the introduction to help establish the very hostile relationship that that United States currently has with the Islam Republic of Iran. "Iranian Politicians Set Fire to US Flag in Parliament," BBC News (BBC), accessed November 4, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-middle-east-44055625 Used in the introduction to help establish the very hostile relationship that that United States currently has with the Islam Republic of Iran. Shannon, Matthew K. "American–Iranian Alliances: International Education, Modernization, and Human Rights during the Pahlavi Era" Diplomatic History 39, no. 4, (2015) 661. Provides valuable background information into the nature of the Iranian state, and the Iranian education system during the Shah's reign. Key to Norwich, this article mentions exchange programs particularly those with the United States. Moyara de Moraes, Ruehsen. "Operation 'Ajax' Revisited: Iran, 1953." Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 3 (1993): 467–86. Discussed the Anglo-American coup which overthrew Iran's democratically elected government, and handed the Shah absolute power. Played a vital role in creating the Iranian government which Norwich cooperated with, it is also key to understand the underlying factors behind the 1979 Revolution. Paine, Chris, and Erica Schoenberger. "Iranian Nationalism and the Great Powers: 1872-1954." MERIP Reports, no. 37 (1975): 3–28. Helps to establish the early history of Iran, and its history of Anglo-American domination. 14 "Soft Power,"Definition, pictures, pronunciation and usage notes, Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary. Provides a definition for soft power, to help illustrate its significance to the United States particularly in a strategic ally such as the Shah's Iran. Tiague, Will. Hostages of the Crisis: Iranian Students in Arkansas, 1979-1981. The Arkansas Quarterly 77, no. 2 (2018): 113-130. Provides context for the Iranian hostage crisis, President Carter's reaction, and the effects that it had on the vast number of Iranian students studying in the United States. Yarbrough, Tinsley E. Federal Alienage Doctrine and the Iranian Student Litigation. Human Rights Quarterly 4, no. 2 (1982): 243–60. Discusses the legal issues facing Iranian students facing deportation in the United States following the Islamic Revolution.
