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The American Civil War is one of the defining events in American history. Abundant studies cover every aspect of the conflict, from strategic analysis to the material culture of uniforms. Even with thousands of academic studies, each adding a new interpretation, there remains still unexplored territory. This study's objective is to expand upon and connect these previous interpretations to produce another tier in understanding a specific chapter of the war. The question posed centers on not the Confederate strengths but the Federal weaknesses. Research shows how the failure and limitations of Union strategy, policy, and the inability to logistically sustain massive offensives opened the way for the Confederacy to capitalize on, and turn the tide of the war. Furthermore, how did the Confederate strategies both militarily and politically have the greatest success and influence on the Kentucky and Maryland Campaigns and the overall outcome of the war? ; Master of Arts in Military History ; Capstone Autumn 1862 The High Tide of the Confederacy Colin E. Zimmerman A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Military History Norwich University MH562 Capstone Paper Dr. Wesley Moody 23-August-2020. 2 Thesis: The American Civil War is one of the defining events in American history. Abundant studies cover every aspect of the conflict, from strategic analysis to the material culture of uniforms. Even with thousands of academic studies, each adding a new interpretation, there remains still unexplored territory. This study's objective is to expand upon and connect these previous interpretations to produce another tier in understanding a specific chapter of the war. The question posed centers on not the Confederate strengths but the Federal weaknesses. Research shows how the failure and limitations of Union strategy, policy, and the inability to logistically sustain massive offensives opened the way for the Confederacy to capitalize on, and turn the tide of the war. Furthermore, how did the Confederate strategies both militarily and politically have the greatest success and influence on the Kentucky and Maryland Campaigns and the overall outcome of the war? It will be necessary to answer this question through a multilayered approach. Instead of viewing the Kentucky and Maryland campaigns on the tactical level, which has already consumed most of the historiography on the topic, this study will instead find an explanation to this question through political, logistical, organizational, leadership personalities, and economic components and how they dictated the overall strategic picture and framework. When synthesizing all these components together, one potential answer generates: the grand Confederate offensive in the autumn of 1862, a direct result of botched Federal strategic measures and limitations, divided political policies, and the Union's struggling logistical capabilities; indicated the high tide of the Confederacy. Through battlefield victories and seizing the initiative in direct and indirect courses, Confederate leadership allowed the Southern field armies to exploit the Federal weaknesses culminating in the Kentucky and Maryland campaigns. 3 These campaigns offered the Confederacy its only realistic chance of ending the war on political and strategic terms that favored the South. An examination of each specific component and its relation to the Confederate high tide's theory is therefore essential to back this new interpretation. Political Factors of the North, South, and Europe; and its Benefit to the Confederacy in 1862: All wars, especially civil wars, are political in their foundation, influence, and execution. In "On War," Carl von Clausewitz states that "the political object, as the original motive of the War, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and the amount of effort to be made." 1 This axiom applies to events in the autumn of 1862 since political factors dominated the motivation of strategy. The Confederacy's legitimacy resided within its field armies continued existence. Their ability to gain military victories that supported both the strategic and political realms was the essential component that needed to be sustained if the South was to remain independent. The North was in a completely different predicament, as the rival political factions, Republican's and Democrat's, each with its own opinion on the objective goals and the conduct of the war, could not in the early phase of the war come to common ground as to what the specific nature, cause, plan, and purpose of the Civil War was. The North was a nation at war without complete unification of mind, and purpose, which presented a weakness that could ultimately undo its efforts. Complicating matters for President Abraham Lincoln, and his party's agenda, was the fact the Northern Democratic party held just over 45% of the popular vote of free and border states in the 1860 election. 2 In short, the President and his administration existed only in a 1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Translated by Colonel J.J. Graham. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, 2004. 10. 2 James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 506. 4 narrow margin and needed to conduct the war in a way suitable to keep the two very different mindsets exhibited by both the Republicans and Democrats in agreement. The Kentucky and Maryland campaigns occurred while changing Republican ideas on the persecution of the war and mid-term congressional elections, which proved to be a significant juncture in Northern and foreign politics. To be sure, the summer and fall of 1862 were extremely delicate times for Lincoln and the Republicans, and they could not afford any negative setbacks. Lacking any precedent to draw on, the Lincoln Administration delicately approached the rebellion by seeking the destruction of Confederate armies and exempting the Southern population from the burdens of war by respecting the civilians' constitutional rights and property. Historian Mark Grimsley captured the conviction of the policy by pointing out that the Lincoln administration renounced any intention of attacking slavery; and the government's assumption that most white Southerners were lukewarm about secession, and if handled with forbearance, would withdraw their allegiance from the Confederacy once Union armies entered their midst. 3 This policy known as conciliation, therefore, served as the beat to which Union forces marched off to war. Not all Northern generals and radical Republicans embraced this; however, the policy served as the first step in an evolutionary process that would eventually culminate in "hard-war." The effects of conciliation created favorable conditions for the Confederacy from which they were able to exploit the "limited war" shortcomings of the Union and surge forward into the fall offensive and their high tide. These shortcomings manifest in several different forms: leadership, strategic limitation, and foreign and domestic political pressure. Unfortunately for the 3 Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 3. 5 Union, the combination of these factors exposed themselves in a negative light nearly all simultaneously, creating a perfect opportunity for the Confederates to take advantage of the drawbacks and pursue victory. Fueling the fire was the Lincoln Administration's policy regarding the appointment of military governors in captured territory. The issue arose when these cities, such as Nashville, were turned into massive supply centers for Union armies, resulting in intense rivalries between city and country, neighboring communities, and whites and blacks as they competed for jobs and dominance. 4 Henry Halleck, George McClellan, Don Carlos Buell, the key leaders of the Federal armies in 1862, generated the most immediate consequences stemming from the shortcomings of conciliation from as these three adherents to firm Democratic principles and military strategy are most responsible for creating the opportunity for a Confederate offensive. Generals Halleck, McClellan, and Buell are often portrayed by historians as lacking the "killer instinct," especially when compared to Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Phil Sheridan. However, a more accurate analysis finds them as men who followed the conciliation policy almost to the letter for political, personal, or logistical reasons. Halleck himself wrote the Elements of Military Art and Science, where he harped on the capture of strategic points, incurring the least number of casualties and damage as possible as the primary strategy of winning a war. Ironically, Halleck, the most influential Union general in 1862, believed that warfare was unjustifiable in most cases and should only be conducted with the utmost caution. 5 As General in Chief, Halleck had a significant influence on the conduct of operations of the Union forces. Each of these three 4 Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War, 35-36; Scott Nelson and Carol Sheriff, A People of War: Civilians and Soldiers in America's Civil War, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 88. The reference to negative leadership refers to the actions of Nathaniel Lyon and Francis Blair; who introduced "harsh" measures in 1861 prematurely which led to a brutal guerilla war and other political ramifications. 5 Henry Wagner Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science: Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactics of Battle, Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers, Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia, Third Edition, New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1862. 7-9. 6 commanders prescribed to similar variants of Halleck's theory, whose universal core value of caution above all else acted as the catalyst to create the conditions for the Confederacy to crest in the fall of 1862. While the reigns of military success were in McClellan's and Buell's hands during the Maryland and Kentucky campaigns; Halleck made two major errors in 1862 that are directly responsible for igniting the Confederate offensives. The first was his overabundance of caution in taking Corinth, allowing the Confederates to slip away and then failing to retain the initiative by pushing to Vicksburg while simultaneously failing to capture Chattanooga. The second major failure was his inability to harness his granted power and force McClellan to speedily and effectively send his army to the aid of John Pope, eliminating any opportunity for a combined assault on Lee's smaller army. 6 The Democratic principles these generals prescribed to differed in many respects from Lincoln and the Republican agenda on the idea of the war. Each strongly believed in the preservation of the Union yet favored winning the war by the least drastic measures, the least number of casualties, and on a platform acceptable to their Democratic party beliefs. 7 For instance, McClellan wrote Buell, upon the latter's elevation to command of the Army of the Ohio: "bear in mind that we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union and to uphold the power of General Government….be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us & the rebels." 8 Additionally, Generals Pope, Grant, and Rosecrans, who likely weren't as politically polarized as the former three, contributed to the growing political dissension in 1862 in their own right. Therefore, by their actions, federal military leadership did more to subvert the Union military from ending the war quickly and 6 Russel F. Weigley, A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861-1865, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000. 135-136. It is arguable whether or not the Army of the Potomac could have arrived in its entirety rapidly enough to join with Pope. However, personal and in-house political agendas did not move the efficiency along any faster. 7 Weigley, A Great Civil War, xix-xxi. 8 Grimsley, 64. 7 dividing political tension based on faction theology more than any other public figures in 1862. One of the more notable incidents that fit into the framework of subversion was Grant's debacle at Shiloh, which brought strong opposition from anti-war Democrats, causing cautious leaders such as Halleck and McClellan to tighten their grip and fear repeat attacks. Most detrimental in this respect was the administration's and Halleck's decision to temporarily bench Grant during the Corinth episode, then subsequently leaving him in a position where he could not act with his usual aggressiveness against Stirling Price and Earl Van Dorn. Before his removal as General in Chief, George McClellan wrote Halleck then in charge of western forces, "The future success of our cause demands that proceedings such as Grant's should at once be checked. Generals must observe discipline as well as private soldiers. Do not hesitate to arrest him at once if the good of service requires it, & place CF Smith in command." 9 Grant's "recklessness" at Shiloh created quite the stir on the home front, which as a result, political rivals of the Lincoln Administration, sought to break down Grant as a way to spread discontent and fit the anti-war platform. They harped on the high number of casualties, the surprise of the Confederate attack, and the black eye to the seemingly unstoppable Union war machine. The backlash reached Washington, prompting a response from the Administration. In a telegram to Halleck, Secretary of War Stanton wrote, "The President desires to know why you have made no official report to this department respecting the late battles of Pittsburg landing. And whether any neglect or misconduct of General Grant or any other officer contributed to the sad casualties that befell our forces on Sunday." 10 The battle of Shiloh became the first political debacle that militarily opened the door for the Confederacy to take the offensive in the fall of 1862. 9 Nancy Scott Anderson and Dwight Anderson, The Generals: Ulysses. S. Grant and Robert E. Lee, Avenel: New Jersey, 1987. 230. 10 Anderson, The Generals, 241. 8 The most immediate politically charged consequence materialized in Halleck's handling of the advance on Corinth, which exemplified his standard cautiousness with added paranoia of avoiding another repeat of Shiloh. 11 The delicate politically charged caution continued even after the successful capture of Corinth in Halleck's decision to send Buell, over Pope or Grant to seize Chattanooga. Halleck's snail-like cautious advance on Corinth, and the decision to send Buell to Chattanooga, allowed the disorganized Confederate army to withdraw from Corinth, establish a new commander in the form of Braxton Bragg, who in turn brought reorganization, discipline, and professionalization to the Army of Mississippi; which proved to be the genesis of Bragg and Smith having the ability to advance into Tennessee and Kentucky. 12 Military shortcomings turned political disasters in the Eastern Theater during the summer of 1862, soon overshadowed Shiloh, and added dramatic momentum and opportunity to the rise of the Confederate high tide in the war's primary theater. McClellan and his Army of the Potomac, having suffered political harassment in late 1861 into the spring of 1862, began their downward political spiral with the Army of the Potomac's loss of initiative and strategic defeat during the Seven Days Battles on the Peninsula. The setbacks along the James River coupled with the black eye at Shiloh, and the defeat of Federal forces in the Shenandoah Valley in the spring of 1862 had devastating political effects, which left the North and European powers believing that all hope for the Union resided with McClellan and his Army of the Potomac. The proximity of the Union and Confederate capitals made the Eastern theater a hot spot for journalists and policymakers on both sides, who saw the region as the deciding factor in the Civil War's outcome. This army's setback at the gates of Richmond did more to influence how events 11 Larry J. Daniel, Days of Glory: The Army of the Cumberland, 1861-1865, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006. 85. 12 Thomas Lawrence Connelly, Army of the Heartland: The Army of Tennessee, 1861-1862, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001. 188-194. 9 unfolded in the east in 1862 in both the strategic and political sense, both foreign and domestic. 13 The shortcomings on the Peninsula stymied the Union's hope to quickly end the war while making the voices of "Peace Democrats" louder and the political situation even more delicate. As if the Lincoln Administration did not already have enough burdens, both England and France, whose neutrality was necessary for the Union war effort, began to openly question the North's ability to subdue the South and end the rebellion. 14 Stonewall Jackson's brilliant campaign in the Valley, coupled with the Army of Northern Virginia's ferocious performance on the Peninsula elevated Southern patriotism, and simultaneously dampened Northern morale, convincing many on both sides that Southern victory was achievable. 15 Colonel Charles Marshall, Lee's Assistant Adjutant General believed that Robert E. Lee's emergence onto the scene was the greatest benefit to the Southern cause. He equated Lee's leadership on the Peninsula to that of a color bearer bravely advancing his banner towards the enemy. On political matters Marshall correctly believed that the Northern people were impatient for a speedy victory and that the Federal Government expressed this sentiment in its policy on conducting the war. However, this policy was forcefully and forever altered with the aggressive Lee's emergence onto the scene, whose plan called for carrying on the war indefinitely until the Confederacy achieved victory. Marshall outlined this plan as designed to, "frustrate the enemy's designs; to break up campaigns undertaken with vast expense and with confident assurance of success; to impress upon the minds of Northern people the conviction that they must prepare for a protracted struggle, great sacrifices of life and treasure, with the possibility that all might at last be of no 13 Stephen W. Sears, To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992. 355. 14 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 554-555. 15 Peter Cozzens, Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008. 507-508. 10 avail; and to accomplish this at the smallest cost to the Confederacy." 16 This leadership change at such a critical moment proved to be the dawn of turning Confederate fortunes in the east. Public opinion and political reactions to the Union failure on the Peninsula were mixed; however, strong opposition towards McClellan emerged and created discord among the rival Democrats and Republicans, each of whom found outlets to accuse the other of the responsibility of the campaign's failure. 17 Amid this political turmoil, Lincoln, in an effort to offset the discord introduced Major General John Pope, who only managed to escalate political dissension to a fever pitch with his disastrous Northern Virginia campaign. 18 In the Western Theater, the emergence of Braxton Bragg also came at a critical juncture in juxtaposition with the events occurring in the east. Bragg took command of the Army of Mississippi at one of its darkest hours, and through exemplary organizational skills, reshaped the Army of Mississippi into a professional, disciplined force capable of delivering a lethal blow. With such a force, Bragg was able to look to more risky opportunities that would offset the Union strategic gains in the west and regain Tennessee and perhaps set the stage for Kentucky.19 Private Sam Watkins of the 1st Tennessee recorded the positive change in morale from the melancholy atmosphere at Corinth to when new lifeblood in the army emerged. "We were in an ecstasy akin to heaven. We were happy; the troops were jubilant; our manhood blood pulsated more warmly; our patriotism was awakened; our pride was renewed and stood ready for any emergency; we felt that one Southern man could whip twenty Yankees. All was lovely and 16 Charles Marshall, Lees Aide-De-Camp: Being the Papers of Colonel Charles Marshall Sometime Aide-De-Camp, Military Secretary, and Assistant Adjutant General on the Staff of Robert E. Lee, 1862-1865, Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, and Frederick Maurice, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000. 74. 17 Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 346-347. 18 John J. Hennessy, Return to Bull Run: The Battle and Campaign of Second Manassas. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999. 468-472. 19 Earl J. Hess, Banners to the Breeze: the Kentucky Campaign, Corinth, and Stones River, Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2010. 19-22. 11 the goose hung high." 20 Although the Confederates had suffered initial setbacks early in 1862, the advantages afforded by conciliation, cautious Federal leadership, and the emergence of Lee and Bragg allowed for a reversal of fortunes. In 1862 Southern patriotism was running high; the idea of independence and the Confederate soldier's superiority was at its wartime peak. 21 Lee's decision to invade Maryland was political in nature. Maryland Campaign historians, Joseph Harsh, Scot Hartwig, Stephen Sears, James Murfin, and Ezra Carman while differing on strategic matters, all agree that Lee's primary purpose was to secure a decisive victory which would gain the South the political victory; either in the form of Northern domestic politics or international recognition and or intervention. The application of political pressure to Lee's offensive outweighs all the deficiencies faced by his army in the logistical realm, and further illustrated his grasp on the delicacy of Northern political division. Clearly, he understood this division and had faith that his smaller, ill-supplied force had a chance to deliver a blow that would fracture the Northern populace and produce an outcome that favored the South. General Lee suggested his understanding of such matters in a letter to President Jefferson Davis while in Dranesville on September 3. "The present seems to be the most propitious time since the commencement of the war for the Confederate Army to enter Maryland.….if it is ever desired to give material aid to Maryland and afford her and opportunity of throwing off the oppression to which she is now subject, this would seem the most favorable." 22 The domestic and foreign political objectives acting as primary motives for the "invasion," were in that instant equal to the strategic goals which accompanied them when 20 Samuel R. Watkins, Company Aytch or A Side Show of the Big Show: A Memoir of the Civil War. Edited by Ruth Hill Fulton McAllister. Nashville, TN: Turner, 2011. 45. 21 Joseph T. Glatthaar, General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse, New York: Free Press, 2008. 207; James Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Edited by Ned Bradford. New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979. 263. 22 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 19. Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. 590. 12 defining the military value of the campaign; this is a unique feature to the Maryland Campaign and its condition for victory, while only a secondary task in Kentucky. In contrast historian Edwin Coddington paints a different picture for Lee's purposes in the Pennsylvania Campaign of 1863. Coddington outlined that Lee, in this part of the war, contended with the new Federal doctrine of "hard war" and emancipation, eliminating the decisive battle matched with the political advantage that existed in 1862. Therefore, Lee's only real option was to defeat the Army of the Potomac in detail, earning a strategic victory rather than a political one. 23 Such a task required adequate logistics, and a complete and total battlefield victory, two factors that eluded the Confederacy during the war. Such victory conditions presented to Lee in 1862 were unique and would never materialize again in any substantial form. Political division in the North was at fever pitch in the late summer of 1862; evidence of the discord's depth is apparent in everything from personal letters through Northern news outlets. Robert E. Lee, an avid reader of Northern papers, understood this notion and sought to exploit it. Domestically, Northern Democrats maintained a loud voice in critical regions and states, which only grew more robust and more resilient with each military shortcoming and failure. August and early September saw a heightened level of panic and discouragement in the North, with Pope's defeat and Lee's invasion of Maryland, while at the same time Kirby Smith's Confederate Army of Kentucky demonstrated against Cincinnati. Pennsylvania was understandably the most unnerved due to its proximity to Maryland and vital war infrastructure, and its Republican governor Andrew Curtin's demand for 80,000 troops to defend his state embodied it. Additionally, the mayors of the influential northern cities of Harrisburg, Philadelphia, and 23 Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, New York: Simon and Schuster. 1968. 6-7. 13 Baltimore were alarmed, fearing their respective city was the target of Lee's advancing legions.24 In Cincinnati, the situation turned somewhat drastic. After destroying the Union forces at Richmond, Kentucky on August 30, Kirby Smith as a result had a clear road to the Ohio River. Understandably Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio all worried what Smith's next move would be while they scrambled to organize bodies of troops. General Lew Wallace arrived in Cincinnati, declared martial law and quickly set about organizing a defense. 25 With panic to the extremity of declaring martial law, the Northern population began to question their ability to win the war openly. Prominent figures such as George Templeton Strong, Samuel Galloway, Reverend Robert Laird Collier, and Senator Garrett Davis, spoke not only for themselves but also for the majority of the people by openly challenging President Lincoln and his administration on their ability to conduct the war. The accusations included Lincoln's unfitness for the Presidency, the constant change of military leadership in the east, which showed instability and was severely hurting morale in the North. Demands also arose that there be a complete reorganization of the Administration. 26 The Lincoln Administration's threat of a draft, unless an additional 300,000 volunteers could be raised created further tension. The idea of a draft disgusted many Northerners; however, with "patriotic" spirit enticed by bounties, nine-month service, and the threat of draft, the ranks of new regiments began to fill in late summer of 1862, only hitting forty-five percent of the intended quota. 27 The Union soldiers themselves cast a gloomy mood over the situation and expressed their views with varying levels of disgust. Lieutenant Elisha Hunt Rhodes of the 2nd 24 David H. Donald, Lincoln, New York, NY: Touchstone, 1996. 373. 25 Vernon L. Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground": Major General Lew Wallace Commands Cincinnati, September 1862." Indiana Magazine of History 85, no. 2 (1989): 139. 26 Donald, Lincoln, 373. 27 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 492. 14 Rhode Island expressed in his diary that: "I fear we are no nearer the end of the war than we were when we first landed at Fortress Monroe five months ago." 28 Captain Francis Donaldson of the 118th Pennsylvania captured the mood in Washington: "We are constant witness of the sad plight of the Army of the Potomac, as thousands of Genl. Pope's troops in great demoralization are ever passing the Fort in retreat to Washington. The poor old Army of the Potomac, how I pity it." 29 Captain Henry Pearson of the 6th New Hampshire also expressed his views in the aftermath of Second Manassas: "You need not be surprised if success falls to the rebels with astonishing rapidity." 30 Brigadier General Marsena Patrick's opinion bordered on insurrection: "There is a general feeling that the Southern Confederacy will be recognized & that they deserve recognition." 31 Lieutenant Charles Seton Fleming of the 2nd Florida Infantry, in a letter home to his mother describing the aftermath of the Second Manassas campaign, echoed Patrick's views when he wrote: "Our victory is complete, even the Yankee prisoners acknowledge it." 32 Lieutenant Colonel Henry Hubbell of the 3rd New York wrote in August 1862: "I am not sure that it would not be a good thing to have the rebels get possession of Washington however, as it might waken up the north to the fact that we are having a war in earnest, and not merely playing soldier…. We have got men & means enough in the north to put an end to this war in 90 days, if they would only go at it in earnest and let politics & the nigger alone." 33 28 Elisha Hunt Rhodes, All for the Union: A History of the 2nd Rhode Island Volunteer Infantry in the War of the Great Rebellion. Edited by Robert Hunt Rhodes. Lincoln, RI: A. Mowbray, 1985. 69. 29 Francis Adams Donaldson, Inside the Army of the Potomac: The Civil War Experience of Captain Francis Adams Donaldson. Edited by J. Gregory Acken. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1998. 104. 30 D. Scott Hartwig, To Antietam Creek: the Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019. 134-135. 31 Ibid., 134-135. 32 Francis P. Fleming, A Memoir of Captain C. Seton Fleming: of the Second Florida Infantry, C.S.A., Reprint 1985: Jacksonville: Times-Union Publishing House, 1884. 66. 33 Simon P. Newman, "A Democrat in Lincoln's Army: The Civil War Letters of Henry P. Hubbell." The Princeton University Library Chronicle 50, no. 2 (1989): 155-68. 157. 15 Hubbell eluded to the growing discord of racial issues that many Democrats saw as an unnecessary and politically charged motive to a war that was supposed to be strictly for preserving the Union. Nevertheless, this issue began to transform the cause of the war in the summer of 1862, adding only more weight to a very delicate political situation. Hubbell's feelings weren't isolated; instead, the sense that the war was taking on a new front to end slavery infuriated many Northerners. Hubbell's views on racial matters and slavery were not limited to himself, in fact, the stiffest opposition to war that had anything to do with freeing slaves came from the Midwest states; where racism was an epidemic culturally, especially in the Army of the Ohio. The talk of national emancipation led hundreds of men to desert and, in some cases, join the Confederacy. 34 Sentiments similar to these echoed across the Union armies and, undoubtedly, were shared by family and friends on the home front. Some individuals turned bitter, and perhaps extreme, which reflected political, ideological, and sectional differences in the North, which under the pressure of a seemingly collapsing system reared its ugly head. The term "invasion" has been used several times thus far, especially by the Union's most publicized general, George McClellan. This term and others related to it divided the minds of many of those who had significant power to dictate the war. Abraham Lincoln, at no point, recognized the Confederacy as a legitimate entity. He always maintained that the Southern States were in rebellion and needed to be brought back into the Union. Interestingly, his senior generals in 1862, mostly Democrats, saw the Confederate offensives as invasions, insinuating their conscious or subconscious recognition that Confederate armies were "foreign invaders" intent on doing harm, which helped fuel the panic, frustration, and seemingly lost Union cause ideology. 35 34 Daniel, Days of Glory, 101. 35 Andrew Pooley, "Shoo-ing the Geese: Lincoln and the Army of the Potomac, 1862-1863." Australian Journal of American Studies 21, no.2 (2002): 86-100. 86-87. 16 Jefferson Davis, the Confederate cabinet, Robert E. Lee, Braxton Bragg, and all the other high-ranking Confederate officers comprehended the growing Northern political disunion. This is evident in the decision to approve a Confederate offensive and the string of strategic goals associated with it. The Army of Northern Virginia, for example, fulfilled its duty of defeating the Federals time and again, completely reversing the tide of the war in the east. As Robert E. Lee sat at his headquarters in the aftermath of Chantilly, it had become abundantly clear that he now possessed the opportunity to strike the decisive blow against whatever Union army would oppose him in Maryland or Pennsylvania, which would likely result in some sort of peace talks. 36 Lieutenant Colonel Edward Porter Alexander Chief of Ordnance in the Army of Northern Virginia saw the picture as clear as Lee. Referring to the army, we wrote: "His [Lee's] army had, that magnificent morale which made them equal to twice their numbers, & which they never lost even to the surrender at Appomattox. And his confidence in them, & theirs in him, were so equal that no man can yet say which was greatest. And no old soldier need ask a prouder record than is implied in that fact. By going into Maryland Gen. Lee could at least subsist his army for a while upon the enemy, & he doubtless hoped, too, for a chance to force the Federal army to come out & fight him under favorable conditions." 37 Confederate officer William Allan, reverberated Alexander's sentiments when he wrote of the Army of Northern Virginia: "its spirit at this time was high. A series of brilliant successes had given it unbounded confidence in itself and its leaders, and the ragged dirty soldiers hailed with joy the advance across the Potomac." 38 The comparison of the Federal and Confederate views as indicated from primary sources, on 36 Hartwig, To Antietam Creek, 52-53. 37 Edward Porter Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, United States: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 139. 38 William Allan, The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862, Reprint: Middletown: DE, 2020. 273. 17 leadership and the progress of the war at the beginning of the Maryland Campaign were clearly in favor of the South. The leadership of Don Carlos Buell is a prime example of political dissatisfaction, both on the home front and in the army. While McClellan was unpopular with the Administration, he still held favor with most of his officers, and certainly the rank and file of the army and the nation. Buell, however, faced contention on three similar fronts – The Indiana bloc, the general and field officers of the First Division, and the supporters of Alexander McCook, one of his corps commanders. Much of the disgust with Buell occurred during the Kentucky Campaign. This break in unified efforts favored the Confederate cause, particularly in swaying popular opinion in Kentucky. Republican Indiana newspapers ripped into Buell's leadership, declaring that he was completely mishandling the pursuit of two Confederate armies that were ripping up Kentucky and potentially heading towards Indiana, Ohio, or Illinois. Some newspapers called for his immediate dismissal, and a few even demanded he be shot. 39 When comparing Lee and his army to Buell and his, there formulates a fascinating dissection of the polar extremes in popular and political opinion. Lee and his men were on the top of their game, while Buell's forces were at a low ebb. Using these two examples as the basis of measurement, it becomes apparent that overall, the Confederate forces enjoyed a much higher sense of public support and favorability then their Union counterparts did at that particular moment in the war. Scholars have hotly debated the prospect of European powers, particularly England and France intervening and mediating an end to the conflict. The idea of such a prospect was undoubtedly the primary goal for the Confederate strategy in the autumn of 1862. It is essential to view the idea of European intervention in the simplest of forms. The Southern strategy partly 39 Daniel, 128-129. 18 hinged on it, as can be observed via strategic decisions and public opinion, the North, however, feared the prospect. Intervention and mediation on any level would, in the end, be more beneficial to the South, and the Lincoln Administration would appear as incapable; in short, it would be a disaster for the North and Republicans. 40 The onset of a "cotton famine" and the scandal of the Trent affair occurred amid all the politically charged events in 1862, resulting in the British sending an additional 11,000 men to Canada and forcing Lincoln to tread lightly in foreign political matters. 41 Historian Max Beloff believed that the possibility of British intervention was extremely likely in 1862, mainly due to the North's refusal to make anti-slavery sentiments the basis of their cause, instead still focusing on the preservation of the Union, which only supported the pro-Southern faction in Parliament. 42 An examination of Southern newspapers and other editorials, shows public opinion in the South at the beginning of the war was universal in the belief that Great Britain would be forced, through the power of cotton, to intervene either by raising the blockade or by recognizing the Confederate States as an independent nation or perhaps both. 43 Regardless of the likelihood of actual intervention or recognition, the idea of it greatly influenced Confederate leaders, particularly Lee, who notated such objective goals in his correspondence with Davis. Davis agreed outlining his desires in a communication to Lee on September 7. He reminded Lee that the Confederacy was waging war solely for self-defense. Through the eight points he outlined as the guiding principles for the field armies to abide by, Davis continually revolved his doctrine around political objectives whose chief purpose were to achieve peace with the United States. If the South maintained a self- 40 McPherson, 444. 41 Nelson, A People at War, 166. 42 Max Beloff, "Historical Revision No. CXVIII: Great Britain and the American Civil War." History, New Series, 37, no. 129, (1952): 40-48. 42. 43 Schuyler Dean Hoslett, "The Richmond Daily Press on British Intervention in the Civil War: A Brief Summary." The William and Mary Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1940): 79-83. 80. 19 defense posture, with the objective of peace through battlefield victory; then the likelihood of positive European intervention on their behalf had a much higher probability, which in turn could possibly bring a speedy end to the war with terms that favored the Confederacy. 44 Logistical Concerns and Organizational Components: While the South always lagged behind the North in terms of finance, economy, manufacturing, manpower, and many other logistical concerns, the disparity was narrower in 1862 than in the coming years. As a point of contention, several trends and circumstances in the Union war effort benefited the South more than it aided the Union on the grand stage. Concerning logistics, Clausewitz's maxim states: "The dependence on the base increases in intensity and extent with the size of the Army, which is easy to understand. An Army is like a tree. From the ground out of which it grows it draws it's nourishment; if it is small it can easily be transplanted, but this becomes more difficult as it increases in size….When therefore, we talk of the influence of the base on the operations of an Army, the dimensions of the Army must always serve as the scale by which to measure the magnitude of that influence." 45 This axiom is precisely the predicament of the Northern war effort in the first two years of the war. The logistical portion of this study will examine the condition and availability of uniforms and equipment, quality of weaponry then in circulation, training and experience of soldiers, and finally the ability of each government to produce and supply its troops effectively. A logistical understanding is crucial for understanding the obstacles and conditions faced by the armies and how it dictated their effectiveness on campaign and immediate tactical ability on the battlefield in 1862. The South, as previously stated from the very beginning of the war, was behind its 44 OR, vol 19, 1: 598-599. 45 Clausewitz, On War, 353-354. 20 opponent in logistical matters; however, the North in 1862 was not at the climax in its ability of production and supply, and therefore lacked significantly in certain areas. However, it is essential to note that the limitations of the Federal logistical system by the fall of 1862 were only a few months shy of efficiently supplying the vast number of troops in the field. The first evidence of a marked change in the Union's logistical ability emerged in the Chancellorsville Campaign's genesis, after the winter of 1862-63. 46 Accepting the notion that the Confederate armies were in rough shape logistically; it is important to note that the primary leadership in the field was acutely aware of the shortages. However, the unfolding opportunity demanded a military strike that outweighed logistical concerns. Therefore, an examination into the Federal system's shortcomings is necessary to show the benefits it offered toward the Confederacy. The United States Army in the Antebellum period contained roughly 15,000 men of all arms. Compared with an army of 600,000 men in 1862, it is understandable that there would be significant shortcomings and hurdles to overcome in a nation that, as a rule, did not trust professional armies nor want to foot the bill for one. Nevertheless, the North had a clear advantage when it came to industrialization and manufacturing. Over one million Northerners worked in industrial jobs, ten times more than their Southern counterparts. Furthermore, the North contained roughly 100,000 factories compared to the South's 20,000. 47 Yet, as already pointed out, the prewar army was tiny and supplied with uniforms and equipment solely from the Schuylkill Arsenal in Philadelphia. Additionally, the arsenals producing firearms were limited, with all those existing in the South subsequently seized upon secession, having fewer firearms available to Northern regiments. 48 The North, therefore, would have to raise and equip an army 46 Stephen Sears, Chancellorsville, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996. 71-75 47 Matthew S. Muehlbauer and David J. Ulbrich, Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial Era to the Twenty-First Century. New York: Routledge, 2018. 174-175. 48 Joseph E. Chance, The Second Texas Infantry, From Shiloh to Vicksburg, Austin: Eakin Press, 1984. 16, 24. 21 primarily with outdated weapons and with an industrial system that wasn't geared toward war manufacturing. The North's only saving grace was its economic might. 49 Economically it is crucial to understand that the Union that won the war in 1865, was not the same financial institution nor economy in 1861 and 1862. It was in major part due to the Legal Tender Act of 1862 and the National Currency Act of 1863, that the North was able to pay for the sustainment of the war; yet it took time for these acts to take effect. Therefore, in 1862 financially, the North was undoubtedly at its weakest; many of the state and municipal banks, especially those in border states, had closed their doors, while millions of businesses and private civilians hoarded gold. 50 The Union was only able to field the armies it did in 1861-1862 because of its ability to pay for the conversion and development of machinery needed for equipment, weaponry, and uniforms while relying initially on its prewar militia. Faced with arming a massive army overnight, the United States was forced to arm many of its regiments with outdated firearms, such as the M-1842 Smoothbore musket, and the M-1816 Flintlocks that were converted to percussion, in addition to supplementing itself with foreign weapons, from Britain, Belgium, France, Austria, and others. These weapons except those from Britain, proved to be severely outdated compared to the technology available in the 1860s. The importance of recognizing the sub-standard firearms is their effectiveness on the battlefield and the potentiality of changing the outcome in a crucial moment in a battle. In an era of the rifled musket that was accurate from 250-300 yards, a typical smoothbore musket ranged from 80-100 yards. A significant portion of Federal troops were armed with outdated weapons in the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns. A focus on any of the principal engagements in that time frame will show that regiments armed 49 McPherson, 442-445. 50 Nelson, 132-133. 22 with such weapons were in certain circumstances ineffective on the immediate tactical plane, and perhaps beneficial to their adversary. The disparity of weapons had begun to improve for the North in 1862; however, the infusion of nearly 300,000 volunteers during the summer of 1862 created a logistical gap once again. Many of the existing regiments in the army still shouldered outdated weapons, and now with legions of new men forming, these troops found themselves supplied with weapons that were unequal to the rigors of Civil War combat. Of this second wave of new recruits, the 12th New Jersey Volunteers serve as an excellent microcosm to examine the Union's logistical deficiencies in the rush to arm new recruits in 1862. Initially, the Jerseymen expected to receive the celebrated Enfield rifle; instead, they ended up with the inferior Austrian Lorenz, which was later exchanged in Washington for the equally outdated 1842 Springfield musket, although they saw this as an improvement over the detested Austrian rifle. 51 While every regiment's experience is different, the new wave and veterans alike in 1862 experienced some level of logistical deficiency that impacted their abelites on campaign or in battle. Aside from weapons, much of the equipment in the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the Ohio at the beginning of the Confederate offensives were at the end of its serviceable life span, due to months of active campaigning, and the inability to properly re-muster the army on a large scale because of the continuity of Confederate aggressiveness, which certainly affected their performance as a cohesive fighting force. Brigadier General Abner Doubleday who commanded a brigade at Second Manassas submitted requisitions to replace equipment and clothing just before the onset of the Maryland Campaign, noted in disgust: "owing to the great number [of other officers] making requisitions, mine were not filled and we were soon obliged to 51 Edward G. Longacre, To Gettysburg and Beyond: The Twelfth New Jersey Volunteer Infantry, II Corps, Army of the Potomac, 1862-1865, Hightstown: Longstreet House, 1988. 24. 23 take the field deficient in everything." 52 This sentiment was backed up by Captain James Wren of the IX Corps, who wrote that the men in his division "looked very bad, being Lousey, Dirty & Almost naked & worn out." 53 The soldiers in the Army of the Ohio were in equally if not worse shape. The vast distances covered by the Western Theater's armies created long supply lines, which fell victim to frequent raids from rebel cavalry. T.J. Wright of the 8th Kentucky Infantry noted in his diary that the Army of the Ohio was: "the hungriest, raggedest, tiredest, dirtiest, lousiest and sleepiest set of men the hardships of this or any other war ever produced." 54 While it is certain that the Confederates were in equally bad situations logistically, they had the benefit victory behind them in the east, and in Bragg's army's case, high morale. Another major struggle for the Federals in 1862 was the ability to get the supplies to its armies. The reason is not one specific aspect, but rather a compilation of bureaucracy, corruption, and lack of precedent to draw off. McClellan's army on the Peninsula had to be supplied from the sea, Pope in command of the Army of Virginia never took the time to ensure his troops had everything they needed, and Buell's army along with the rest of the western forces contended with long supply lines originating in Cairo Illinois, that were frequently raided by Confederate cavalry. The 16th Maine Infantry is a classic example of the suffering that occurred in a system that was outside its capabilities in 1862. The regiment's adjutant and historian Abner Small wrote: "How those men suffered! Hunger, daily felt, was nothing compared with it. Men of education, of refinement, and wealth, who willingly and cheerfully gave up home, with all its love and comfort, for country, made to feel degraded for want of clothing!" Small then describes 52 Hartwig, 137. 53 Ibid., 137. 54 Kenneth W. Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011. 89. 24 the horrendous conditions: "…without shelter, without overcoats, shoeless, hatless, and hundreds without blankets; and through all that long, sad, and weary tramp, we were jeered at, insulted, and called the "Blanket Brigade!" 55 While examples like this are on the extreme, the narrative fits when assessing the entire logistical picture of the Army of the Potomac in September 1862. The term logistics also dovetails into organizational tables. Aside from sharing similar shortcomings in the area of supply and outdated weaponry, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was by far the superior force in leadership, experience, and organization when compared with McClellan's force. By September 2, 1862, nearly 61 percent of Lee's infantry had fought in three or more major battles, and 81 percent fought in two or more. All of his 184 infantry regiments were veterans of at least one battle. Not only were Lee's regiments superior in this regard, but his brigade commanders were highly efficient as well. Twenty-seven of Lee's forty brigades were veterans of two or more major battles, while the remaining thirteen had fought in either the Seven Days or Second Manassas. On the divisional level, the highest official level of organization at that point for the A.N.V.; all of the eleven divisions had seen at least one battle. 56 The Union leadership backed this notion up as well. It was widely accepted, and a point still argued amongst historians, that the Southern fighting man was superior. This mythology has far back as the American Revolution corroboration has its roots in early Confederate victories, particularly at First and Second Manassas, the Shenandoah Valley, and the Seven Days battles. These victories generated an aura of invincibility around the Army of Northern Virginia that transcended into the minds of the Federal troops. 57 In fact Lee, true to form was in the first days of September 1862, the living epithet of Baron De Jomini's maxims, "the general should do 55 Abner Ralph Small, The Sixteenth Maine Regiment in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865. London: Forgotten Books, 2015. 38. 56 Joseph L. Harsh, Taken at the Flood Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Ashland: The Kent State University Press, 2013. 39-40 57 Pooley, "Shoo-ing the Geese", 88. 25 everything to electrify his own soldiers, and to impart to them the same enthusiasm which he endeavors to repress his adversaries….in general, a cherished cause, and a general who inspires the confidence by previous success, are powerful means of electrifying an army and conducing to victory." 58 In contrast, McClellan's forces reformed into the Army of the Potomac, could not boast anything near the statistics of the Army of Northern Virginia could. September 1862 was the most disorganized and weakest the Army of the Potomac would find itself in the duration of the war. This school of thought canceled out, at least temporarily, any deficiencies faced by Lee's forces. When George B. McClellan rode out of Washington to take command, he found three very different organizations, each with its own command, divisional, brigade, artillery, cavalry, transportation, and quartermaster structures. Additionally, the newly formed regiments, many of whom were only a few weeks old, were rushed to the front and infused into the disorganized mess. Organizing these separate organizations into one effective command would weeks if not months, McClellan would be forced to do it in a matter of days, while in motion, in addition to planning a short-term strategy to deal with Lee. 59 The chaos of the reorganization is apparent in the 5th New York Volunteers' experience. Historian Brian Pohanka related an instance of the 5th as they passed McClellan on the march toward western Maryland: "As they marched, General McClellan reined up beside the troops of Warren's brigade. 'Well, and how is the Old Fifth this evening?' he asked. 'First rate, General, but we'd be better off if we weren't living so much on supposition." 60 Even though he had the bigger force, the disorganization and confusion associated with the rapidity of the Maryland Campaign denied the general his army's full might 58 Baron De Jomini, The Art of War, Translated by Capt. G.H. Mendell, and Lieut. W.P. Craighill, Radford: Wilder Publications, 2008. 30-31. 59 Hartwig, 133-136. 60 Brian C. Pohanka, Vortex of Hell: History of the 5th New York Volunteer Infantry. Lynchburg, VA: Schroeder Publications, 2012. 369. 26 on the battlefield. In different circumstances these obstacles may have been overcome had McClellan had time to prepare. Robert E. Lee sensed his enemy's weakness and used it as part of his foundation to seek permission from President Davis to invade Maryland. "The two grand armies of the United States that have been operating in Virginia, though now united, are much weakened and demoralized. Their new levies, of which I understand 60,000 men have already been posted in Washington, are not yet organized, and will take some time to prepare for the field." 61 Lee identified that his logistical situation was terrible, however, he recognized the unfolding opportunity in front of him. "The army is not properly equipped for an invasion of an enemy's territory. It lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes, and in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes. Still, we cannot not afford to be idle, and though weaker than our opponents in men and military equipment's, must endeavor to harass if we cannot destroy them. I am aware that the movement is attended with much risk, yet I do not consider success impossible, and shall endeavor to guard it from loss." 62 The amount of stock Lee put into the Federals logistical organization is apparent. In fact, if taken as a whole, his reliance on the overall Federal weakness is one of his only justifications for his ill-supplied and smaller force to go on the offensive. Additionally, these logistical matters, both of his own and the Federal weakness, coincide directly with Lee's desire to deliver a decisive blow to the Federals quickly. There was not a better opportunity to do it and expect fruitful results, then while the Army of Potomac was at its weakest moment, structurally, organizationally, numerically, and logistically. 61 OR, vol 19, 1: 590-591. 62 Ibid., 590-591. 27 Lee's conclusion of the ill-preparedness of the new Union regiments applies not only to the troops in his sector but also to those in the Western Theater. Much like Lee's army within reach of Washington, Kirby Smith's small army in Kentucky created a panic and proved Lee's theory on the reliability of new soldiers. Kirby Smith successfully and thoroughly destroyed an equally sized Federal force of raw recruits at Richmond, Kentucky, on August 30, 1862, eliminating them from the military equation. Historian Kenneth Noe termed the battle of Richmond as "the most lopsided Confederate victory of the war, as Kirby Smith's men inflicted casualties so staggering that entire Union brigades ceased to exist." 63 With Smith's incursion into Kentucky, a vacuum of chaos erupted in the region, in particular, Ohio. The microcosm of Cincinnati infuses both the political and the serious logistical problems faced by the North in 1862. Historian Vernon Volpe pointed out, "Although the influx of [Union] volunteers was inspiring, with it came a shortage of arms, ammunition, and other equipment needed to outfit the troops properly." 64 This example was echoed across the entire Kentucky region in 1862. Although McClellan's army outnumbered Lee with a total of roughly 87,000 men, twenty percent of his infantry were raw, having been in the army just a handful of weeks and had not even come close to mastering the level of proficiency needed in drill and tactics to be effective on a Civil War battlefield. 65 Even though the Federals were able to put fresh regiments into the field, it became an issue of quantity versus quality. The unfortunate story of the 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers is a classic case in point of these raw troops' ineffectiveness. Arriving to the Army of the Potomac just a few days before the battle of Antietam, the men prepared to enter their first engagement on September 19 at Shepherdstown. Their regimental historian 63 Noe, Perryville, 39. 64 Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground", 146. 65 Hartwig, 139. 28 wrote: "The teachings of the battalion-drill near Sharpsburg on the previous day [September 18] now had practical application." The 118th's Colonel stated in his official report that: "We returned their fire as fast as possible, but soon found that our Enfield rifles were so defective that quite one-fourth of them would not explode the caps." 66 The 118th's story, while extreme is not unique, another raw Federal regiment the 128th Pennsylvania found itself in an even worse circumstance, owing to its lack of training. The 128th Pennsylvania arrived at the army just days before as well and were assigned to the newly organized XII Corps, which itself contained some of the highest proportions of raw troops. During the battle of Antietam, the new regiment found itself in Miller's Cornfield and due lack of basic drill unable to maneuver itself back onto its brigade in the face of onrushing Confederates. Officers and sergeants from experienced neighboring outfits were sent to try and move the bewildered regiment all to no avail. In the end, the 128th was left to its fate and was nearly destroyed, having no effect on the enemy and only weakening their own brigades' position. 67 Stories similar in nature can be found across the Army of the Potomac on every sector of each battlefield during the Maryland Campaign, each in the midst of their own mishaps allowing the Confederates a level of superiority while hindering their supporting elements an opportunity to exploit any gains. Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio experienced similar circumstances with green regiments as its eastern counterpart. In a letter to Kirby Smith, Bragg detailed his understanding that Buell's men were in rough shape and utterly demoralized. These circumstances, Bragg believed, offered the South a greater benefit of success. 68 The raw, ill-trained, ill-equipped, and completely unprepared 105th Ohio, 123rd Illinois, and 21st Wisconsin infantry regiments were 66 Survivors' Association 118th (Corn Exchange) Regt., P.V., History of the Corn Exchange Regiment 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers,62. 67 Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red. New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1994. 206. 68 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 16: Part 2. Correspondence, Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. 754. 29 all glaring examples of this shortcoming. The 123rd Illinois found itself in a similar predicament as the 128th Pennsylvania at Antietam, exposed and on its own, and fell victim to veteran Confederate troops bearing down on them. The 105th Ohio, equally as green, found itself thrown into the breach in the midst of the 123rd Illinois collapse. Private Ayre of the 105th remarked: "…could not form into a proper line and after going through several maneuvers in order to do so we became mixed and confused." In similar fashion to the 123rd Illinois, the 105th Ohio was quickly stampeded by their Confederate attackers. 69 Much like the inferiority of outdated weapons, untrained, raw troops could not perform to a tactically sufficient level to keep par with the rapid pace and constantly changing conditions of a Civil War battlefield. While plenty of experienced units did exist in the Union armies, it is clear the inexperienced ones created more problems, affording the Confederate forces golden opportunities to exploit immediate tactical advantages they likely would not have had, had they been fighting experienced, or even trained troops. On the other side of the coin, the copious amounts of raw units severely hampered any notion gaining a decisive victory or rapidly following up a pursuit. This is evident in the in the results of Antietam and Perryville, both of which were Confederate tactical victories, and the speed at which Lee and Bragg's armies were pursued. The armies' organization is important when looking to understand the advantages and disadvantages and how this affected a particular side's likelihood of victory. The experience level and the amount of subpar weaponry in both the armies of the Potomac and Ohio was only one issue, their organizational structure in both leadership and how its units were grouped confounded their problems and offered the Confederates another edge over their opponent pushing the scale further in favor in the equation of obtaining a victory. As previously stated, the 69 Stuart W. Sanders, Maney's Confederate Brigade at the Battle of Perryville, Charleston: The History Press, 2014. 53-54. 30 Army of the Potomac during the Maryland Campaign was a conglomeration of several different organizations. It contained the II, V, and VI Corps the original Army of the Potomac, the re-designated I and XII Corps, the Army of Virginia, and the newly dubbed IX that had served on the North Carolina coast. Although there were certainly experienced troops and leaders in each of these components, they each spoke a different organizational "language." 70 George McClellan certainly had the most difficult task of any field commander regarding the organization of his army. Not only did he have three different organizations to mold together as a cohesive fighting force, but he also had the additional struggle of doing it on the fly in a military and national emergency. Therefore, although the Army of the Potomac was a potent fighting force, and managed to engage the Confederates, its capabilities in terms of operational effectiveness were severely limited. Buell's circumstances were much more appealing. His Army of the Ohio had remained intact as a cohesive fighting force since its formation; however, he received additional reinforcements from Grant, and a host of new regiments, diluting its effectiveness as an organization. The Army of the Ohio's real organizational issues manifested in the senior leadership's quirks, rivalries, and lack of cohesion. 71 The use of cavalry in both McClellan and Buell's forces paled in comparison to the South. This issue stemmed from the Federal government's inability to recognize the importance of that specific branch early in the conflict. Overwhelmingly, the cavalry found its commands broken apart and scattered across the army, acting in various guard and staff related duties. Those commands retained to perform the primary tasks of nineteenth-century, reconnaissance, screening, and raids were too few and spread out to have any significant impact on the outcome 70 Hartwig, 133-135. 71 Steven E. Woodworth, Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865. New York: Vintage, 2005. 216. 31 of the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns. 72 Although they lacked in cavalry ability the Federals were unquestionably superior in artillery. Union guns, although far superior to that of the South were severely flawed organizationally in 1862. Circling back to the theme of different organizational structures in McClellan's force, the arrangement of this branch varied, causing communication issues, and leadership vacuums. In common with the cavalry, the prominent artillery structure in 1862 in both the Army of the Potomac and Army of the Ohio, lacked a unified system of command; instead, most batteries were the responsibility of brigade commanders or divisional commanders. Therefore, at critical moments batteries could only take orders from infantry commanders and were presented with the difficult task of coordinating mass firing on specific targets. 73 While it may seem trivial, such inefficiency in employment and "bureaucratic red tape" of military organization prevented the cavalry and artillery from performing at its maximum potential which no doubt contributed to the shortcomings of the Union armies in 1862. The Confederate military organization also had its flaws; however, as previously noted, the experience level of Confederate forces as a whole were much higher and able to adapt to a situation more efficiently. Partly this had to do with the smaller size of the forces overall, and the Confederate authorities' choice to disperse recruits and conscripts across seasoned units rather than raise new organizations. The cavalry of J.E.B. Stuart, John Hunt Morgan, and Nathan Bedford Forrest for instance were vastly superior to their Federal counterparts in every respect. These commands were led well, centralized, and overall contained extremely efficient horsemen, which had proven themselves time and again on the battlefield. 74 Confederate artillery was 72 Hartwig, 155-158. 73 Curt Johnson and Richard C. Anderson, Jr., Artillery Hell: The Employment of Artillery at Antietam, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. 53; Daniel, 146, 148-150. 74 Hartwig, 88-90; Hess, Banners to the Breeze, 24. 32 generally inferior in respect to quality of mechanics, yet, the branch retained a slight advantage over its foes in its organization. Lee's artillery was organized on the divisional level, allowing for easier deployment, and concentrated fire, as the Army of Northern Virginia, did not have a corps structure during this time, division commanders held greater authority in placement and employment of artillery. Furthermore, several groups of divisions fell under an unofficial "wing" structure, allowing Jackson and Longstreet to concentrate guns further. 75 Bragg organized his army different than Lee's army. Bragg operated with two wings or corps, broken down into several divisions. His army maintained an organized and effective cavalry force; however, their weakest point was the artillery. Only fifty-six guns accompanied the Army of Mississippi into Kentucky compared to Buell's 147 guns. These Confederate guns like the Federals were assigned to individual brigades, same as its Federal counterpart, eliminating opportunities to converge fire effectively. 76 Understanding the organizational structure of an army allows for a realistic understanding of what that force is capable of; how it moves in the larger scheme of a campaign; and the benefits and challenges of its employment on the tactical level. Assuming the forces involved were all organized in the same fashion, with identical structures is detrimental in interpreting the ebb and flow of battles and campaigns. A clear picture of how a field army operates through an organizational table is, therefore, paramount. Using Lee and McClellan as examples illustrate the nature of this point. In the Maryland Campaign, Lee was able to give more direct orders to independent division commanders, therefore reducing somewhat the natural confusion begot of transferring and disseminating orders through multiple tiers of officers. On the other hand, McClellan had to give orders to "wing" commanders, who then cut the orders to corps 75 Johnson, Artillery Hell, 41-47. 76 Noe, 370-373, 381-382. 33 commanders then down to the divisional level, doubling the amount of personalities the orders had to go through compared to Lee's forces. It is clear from watching the battles of Antietam and Perryville's tactical evolution that the commanding generals' intent was time and again ineffectually carried out due to communication breakdown and misinterpretation of orders on both sides. Having only scratched the surface of the organizational components of only four of the principal armies involved in the fall of 1862, it becomes clear that each differed in how it chose to conduct its internal operations. However, it is equally apparent from this brief examination, that Confederate forces in the fall of 1862 were better organized and tactically more efficient than their Federal counterparts in Maryland and Kentucky, therefore lending an edge to overall Confederate success and perhaps victory. Strategic Considerations: The strategic components are unquestionably the most important when ascertaining why the fall of 1862 was the Confederacy's high tide. Having looked at the political, logistical, and organizational components and internalizing how each affected the grand design of Confederate strategy in 1862, this section will now tie these components together and shed light on how each influenced strategic decision and guided the final results of the campaigns. A clear understanding of what strategy is necessary to further examine this section. Clausewitz defines strategy as: "the employment of the battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of the War." 77 The "attainment of the object" is the crucial cog in accepting the purpose and direction of operations in Maryland and Kentucky. The strategic composition of these campaigns was different in what they sought to obtain as their achievable goal. Lee's objective was political in its foundation; his 77 Clausewitz, 133. 34 campaign didn't revolve around the occupation of land or control of any specific feature; instead, it sought a climactic battle with a decisive battlefield victory in which Lee was willing to risk his army in a desperate gamble. 78 Bragg and Smith's Kentucky incursions were much more multilayered on an operational platform. While some sort of showdown battle was necessary for the west, it was not the immediate goal, only a potentiality; instead, the relief and re-establishment of Tennessee was paramount with a secondary objective of the "liberation" of Kentucky. The second tier of goals included the control of rail and river systems as a means to eliminate the Union's ability to supply its forces and occupy any portion of the Upper or Deep South. The most significant strategic gain for the South in 1862 existed in Tennessee and Kentucky. Proof of this importance is shown through the fact that six of the seven Confederate field armies would make this region their primary objective in the fall of 1862. These six armies included the commands of Generals' Braxton Bragg, Kirby Smith, Earl Van Dorn, Stirling Price, William Loring, and Humphrey Marshall. Confederate control and or occupation of Tennessee and Kentucky offered benefits and a platform for victory that the remaining Confederate states collectively couldn't offer. Having been the first state to fall under Federal control, Tennessee's recapture would be a major morale boost for the Confederacy nationally and particularly to the large amount of Tennessee regiments that made up Bragg's army. The most significant benefit, however, resided in Tennessee's industrial capability, as it contained the ability to produce more raw items for the war effort then the rest of the Confederacy combined. 79 Confederate control 78 Harsh, 25; OR, vol 19, 1: 598-599. 79 Connelly. 5-15. The importance of Tennessee to the Confederacy is undeniable. Connelly argues that the region was the largest concentrated area for the production of war materials in the Confederacy. The region by 1864 had produced 22,665 pounds niter. Additionally, the area contained a significant source of lead, and was the chief producer of gunpowder in 1861. Tennessee also contained a vast number of factories that repaired old weapons, manufactured new small arms, cartridges, percussion caps, and other equipment. By the fall of 1861, Nashville plants alone turned out 100,000 percussion caps daily, with some 1,300,000 caps produced weekly. The region boasted on the two major Confederate sources of livestock, the other being 35 would, therefore, help in stabilizing the struggling logistical and economic constraints faced in the South. Additionally, the state's rail system would allow for the re-establishment of a direct connection to North Carolina and Virginia and the ability to ship supplies and material to the Confederate forces in the east. Conversely, the loss of Tennessee would be a major blow to Union morale, as its loss would have undone and nullified the Federal campaigns in 1861 and early 1862. 80 Kentucky also offered significant gains for the South. It was generally believed, particularly by the Confederate government's higher echelons, that the majority of Kentuckians were sympathetic to the Southern cause and would rally to Confederate banners if field armies were able to move into the region and strategically hold it. Logistically Kentucky offered a substantial increase for the South, particularly in animals, forage, and transportation options. Like Tennessee, Kentucky contained major river systems and rail lines that would drastically increase movement for the South and partially cut off the mid-west states from the rest of the Union. Politically, Kentucky, a vital border state under Confederate control, could be crippling to Northern domestic and foreign political views. In theory, this political aspect played on a successful campaign in Maryland, another vital border state. More immediately, Kentucky offered the western Confederate armies an opportunity to turn the war from one of defense to one poising them on the edge of invasion of critical Northern states, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana. Such a turn in the circumstances would be devastating for the Union, particularly politically. The Illinois town of Cairo on the Mississippi River, in 1862 was serving as the logistical launch point for the Union armies in the west; prolonged Confederate control of Kentucky would likely force the Shenandoah Valley in Virginia. More pork was raised in Tennessee save Missouri than any other state. Agriculturally, Middle Tennessee in 1860 produced an average of more than a million bushels of corn making it a leader amongst its sister states. 80 Connelly, 3-6. 36 the Federals to find an alternative method of supplying the troops in Corinth and other points in the Southern heartland. As long as the Federals controlled these regions, they would continue to pin the Confederacy in the Deep South denying them of access to vital infrastructure, maneuvering room, and favorable victory conditions. Braxton Bragg and Kirby Smith had to go on the offensive if they were to alleviate the situation by the very nature of the circumstances. As Lee's army with Richmond, their backs were on the doorstep of the Deep South, and they had no room to maneuver. Fortunately for the South, the western offensive was born out of an opportune moment of Halleck's caution that was strategically seized upon by Confederate commanders. In the necessity of the moment, launching an offensive like Lee during the Seven Days battles was the only beneficial option and a necessary risk if the war was going to be taken off the doorstep of the Deep South. Robert E. Lee on the other end of things saw himself and his army as the most important entity in the Confederacy at that moment. In his mind, the only scenario for Confederate victory rested in his hands alone. He showed this belief in dispatches and letters throughout the campaign in an effort to orchestrate movements across the Confederacy to complement his objective. In a letter to Jefferson Davis, he noted his desire to see his suggestion on what he felt Loring's command should do in the Kanawha Valley, in an effort to support his operation. 81 Lee did not stop with Loring; however, days prior, he communicated his victory at Manassas and planned offensive to Braxton Bragg and requested that Bragg pass the information along to Kirby Smith for further coordination. It was Lee's desire that these western armies gain similar victories to his at Manassas, that when added together may be enough to secure Southern 81 OR, vol 19, 1: 594. 37 victory.82 Lastly, he demonstrated his understanding of the confused state of Federal forces in Washington and the need to seize the initiative before the opportunity was lost. Like Kentucky, Maryland was a vital border state, not for its potentiality in resources, but rather for its geographic relation to Washington. Any serious Confederate incursion into the state would be life-threatening to the Union, and therefore demanded desperate measures on the part of Northern armies to repel such an advance. 83 Lee's leadership has been often criticized during the Maryland Campaign from historians and even shocked his subordinates, Jackson, and Longstreet. 84 Lee was certainly aggressive and was known for taking risks; however, he was not a foolish man, and never committed his army to a disaster, at least not one he foresaw. Comparing his stratagem throughout the rest of the war, it's probable to conclude that his movements were well thought out, with the least amount of risk generated from the objective demands of the campaign. Even in moments of reaction to McClellan, Lee always retained the initiative in Maryland. In the aftermath of Seconded Manassas and Chantilly, it was the opinion of many in both military and civilian leadership that a final showdown somewhere north of the Potomac River was all that was needed for Confederate victory. 85 If Lee was a poker player, he was taking his hand and going all in, he could only hope the Federals floundered. General Longstreet understood the gravity of the moment when he wrote: "When the Second Bull Run campaign 82 OR, vol 19, 1: 589. 83 Ezra A. Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. I: South Mountain. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 19-21. Carman was present at the battle of Antietam and dedicated his life to research and study of the Maryland Campaign in the post war years. Carman's work was able to capture not only the historical timeline of events, but offered an emotional aspect not seen in other works. This emotional component while subtle is an important tool in internalizing the mindset of Union soldiers and perhaps the North itself. 84 James Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Edited by Ned Bradford. New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979. 265. Longstreet claims that aside from himself, that General Jackson was also taken back from the boldness of Lee's designs on the Maryland Campaign, while at a meeting in Frederick MD, September 9th. 85 Harsh, 60-63. Multiple historians have agreed on this point. James Murfin considered the battle of Antietam to be the most important battle in American history, and one of the most decisive in world history. Ezra Carman portrays the campaign as requiring desperate action for the North, while Scot Hartwig, Stephen Sears and James McPherson center on the political undertone. 38 closed, we had the most brilliant prospects the Confederates ever had. We then possessed an army which, had it been kept together, the Federals would never have dared attack." 86 Lee's confidence in his army was surely the determining factor in his choice to assume the offensive into Maryland, and no doubt behind his reasoning to push the army as hard as he did in the maneuvering and fighting that took place in Maryland. The General expressed his confidence in the men and the importance of the offensive in General Order No. 102. on September 4: "This army is about to engage in most important operations." He further outlines the necessity of respecting private property, and the desire for his commands to lighten their supply encumbrance to allow them to move quickly and efficiently. 87 When coupling the logistical and organizational shortcomings, the political factors reinforced by his troops' confidence and his in them proved to be the energy from which the Maryland Campaign was executed. The offensives themselves presented each of these commanders a complicated set of obstacles and decisions to overcome while ensuring they offered the best possible benefit to their cause with the least amount of risk towards their army. This is certainly one of the most challenging aspects of being a commander in charge of any offensive-minded campaign. Johnston at Shiloh, Burnside at Fredericksburg, Hooker at Chancellorsville, and Hood in Tennessee all failed to capitalize on this principle. The fact that Lee and Bragg achieved the scale of operational measures they did is a testament to their leadership and ability to seize control and direction of a developing situation. If the argument is to be maintained that the Maryland and Kentucky campaigns provided the South the best chance the South had of winning the war, then proof of this claim must lay within the strategic composition of the campaigns themselves. If taken in this context, then it must be understood that every move Lee, Bragg, and 86 Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 263. 87 OR, vol 16, 2: 592. 39 Smith, along with the supporting roles of Loring, Marshall, Price, and Van Dorn were calculated if not on a grand scale, certainly on an individual level. Unlocking the purpose of the maneuvers, and their relation to strategic success will illustrate the continually changing dynamics and environment of each campaign, and how these generals continually altered their designs to fit the goals of their strategic objectives. The evolving strategic situation in the months leading up to the campaigns created the conditions under which the operations in Maryland and Kentucky were governed. Understanding the Confederate forces' strategic focus for needing to assume the offensive will outline the gravity and weight they placed on the outcome of these fall campaigns. The most measurable strategic potential in 1862 existed in the Western Theater. As already stated, the economic and logistical importance of this region necessitated an aggressive action on behalf of the South if the Confederacy was to survive. The first attempt at recovering control of Tennessee occurred in April with the battle of Shiloh. While tactically a Confederate failure, the aftermath of the fighting created adverse reactions from the Northern press and transposed into Halleck's overall cautious and slow pursuit towards Corinth. Halleck, after taking Corinth, was faced with limited choices on where to move next. Due to political and doctrinal restrictions of conciliation and Halleck's theory on war, the massive Union army was not able logistically to move into the Deep South. The only real move available to the Federal forces in the summer of 1862, was a lateral one east towards Chattanooga. 88 With Bragg at Tupelo and Kirby Smith's small command at Chattanooga, the path of success for an aggressive officer to take Chattanooga, a major supply hub for the South, was wide open. Halleck foiled this opportunity by sending Buell's command to accomplish the task. The slow-moving cautious Buell initially created consternation among 88 Daniel, 86. 40 Confederate leadership, yet once the pace of his progress was realized, the same trepidation turned into an opportunity. 89 Clausewitz described the potential for a reciprocal effect to take place should an army go on the offensive; however, he counterweighs that thought with pointing out that an army in a precarious position with the opportunity to gain a substantial amount should jump on the opportunity if one should be presented. 90 Certainly, Bragg and Smith applied a variation of this maxim into their decision to go on the advance. The term "invasion" is the defining ideology that bound both major theaters of war and other Confederate objectives in the fall of 1862. Clausewitz wrote that even if the complete overthrow of the enemy is impossible, which it was for the Confederacy, then the only other real option of winning a war is to conquer a portion of the enemy territory. In conquering the enemy territory, the invader has the opportunity to weaken the enemy's resources, crippling their ability to sustain an army. By carrying the war in enemy territory, the conditions will further the enemy's expense and ultimately lead to peace negotiations. 91 The term "invasion" generates a delicate question concerning what an invasion actually is, and how it fits into the American context, particularly in the political spectrum in 1862. Baron De Jomoni, whose military maxims were dominant in nineteenth-century America, distinguished what an "invasion" actually is. Breaking down the idea of an offensive, he wrote that: "…an invasion occurs against a great state whose whole or significant portion of territory is attacked. If only a province or moderate line of defense is attacked, then it is an offensive, and if such actions are limited only to a confined operation, then it is termed an initiative." 92 Indeed then, if taken in this context, 89 Connelly, 200-201. 90 Clausewitz, 707. 91 Clausewitz, 706. Neither of the primary Confederate armies had the ability to "conquer" Federal territory. However, the last part in reference to Clausewitz maxim was the adaptation applied by the Confederacy in its strategic goals. 92 Jomini, The Art of War, 54. The difference in the definition in understanding the purpose of the Confederate objective is critical. Many historians point to the Army of Northern Virginia's strategic goals as fitting into the framework of an 41 Confederate efforts militarily were an offensive and an invasion only in the political spectrum. Although the press and even the top military minds used the term invasion quite frequently in the North, there is nothing in the Confederate strategic framework of 1862, that fit the definition of invasion, Lee himself in a letter to Jefferson Davis on September 4, used the term expedition implying that his foray had a specific purpose and would be short. 93 Due to logistics alone, Confederate forces across the board could not sustain the long-term goals of an invasion. However, the Clausewitzian maxim of a "strategical attack" was within reach and achievable according to the conditional logistical framework. Much of the success for the Confederates relied on the superiority of its troops, and the avoidance of exhausting itself with an over achievement of objectives. 94 The window of opportunity was narrow, operationally because of logistics, but more importantly, because of politics. The two most significant benefits afforded to the Southern cause in 1862 were the Congressional fall elections and European superpowers. If Confederate forces could score a major political victory in the east, and both a strategic reversal coupled with a political coup in the west, then perhaps Northern voters would come to resent the war and vote for "Peace Democrats" in November, and more advantageously draw England and France in as mediators or some other influential role, to end the war. It is apparent that the pressure to act decisively if not at least aggressively before November was of paramount importance. While it is debated as to how far the European powers would intercede, what is certain is that the Confederacy banked part of its strategic decisions both politically and militarily on intervention. 95 Just as apparent was the frustration and delicate invasion, yet when looking at that particular army's logistics and Lee's strategic goals only the Jominian maxim of offensive fits the framework. 93 OR, vol 16, 2: 591-592. 94 Clausewitz, 601. 95 McPherson, 534-535. 42 statesmanship which had to be executed on behalf of the Union to convince the English mainly that the war was nothing more than a rebellion that the Republic could put down on its own. 96 However, this did not appear to be the scene in the late summer of 1862 with Union defeats and setbacks continually piling up. Lee retained the initiative by keeping the enemy guessing what his next move and true objective was. According to Henry McClellan, J.E.B. Stuart's adjutant, that as late as September 13, Federal forces maintained the: "utmost uncertainty regarding Lee's movements and intentions." 97 Lee designed his army's movements to draw out the Federals from Washington. By crossing at Leesburg, his army was initially east of the Catoctin Mountains and a direct threat to Washington and Baltimore, it was this crossing point that directly forced the disorganized Army of the Potomac to leave the defenses prematurely, and more importantly to force Lincoln's hand in placing McClellan back in overall command. 98 The key to the Army of Northern Virginia's movements was speed and mobility, thus the reasoning for Lee's series of orders, which included provisions for shoeless Confederates to remain at Winchester, a lightening of supplies, and an insistence that straggling be strictly forbidden. Lee's next major objective after crossing the Potomac River was to move on Frederick. A Confederate presence in a substantial pro-Union area was a direct insult to the North, and would only further press the Army of the Potomac to hurry faster in order to "repel the invasion" and "save the nation"; while most importantly for the Confederates, continually limit the progress of McClellan organizing his army into a capable force on the battlefield. 96 Nelson, 163-168. 97 H.B. McClellan, The Life and Campaigns of Major-General J.E.B. Stuart: Commander of the Cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia, Edison: The Blue & Grey Press, 1993. 113. 98 Harsh, 98; OR, vol 16, 2: 604-605. Letter from Lee to Davis on September 12 justifying is reasoning for crossing his army east of the mountains. 43 Lee's grand strategy was working so far; his movements northward from Richmond had stripped the Atlantic states of their Union occupiers to concentrate on Lee's Confederate force, while at the same time sending the Federal strategy of war into complete chaos as they scrambled to deal with the offensive. Lee believed that if he launched an unrelenting offensive, the Federals would be compelled to abandon their widely scattered smaller campaigns, which were gradually eating away the frontiers of the Confederacy; and, as a result, be forced to concentrate their columns in response to his initiatives. 99 Lee's movement into the western part of the state, via Frederick and into the Middleton and Pleasant valleys, opened the Shenandoah Valley up momentarily, which assisted Loring's advance in western Virginia, by isolating the small Federal commands in that region. In addition to freeing up Loring to make an offensive, Lee's army in western Maryland split the Federal war effort in half. The Army of the Potomac was now confined in environs around Washington, while Federal forces in the Western Theater had no direct route to reinforce McClellan. 100 The simultaneous advance of Lee, Loring, Marshall, Smith, and Bragg effectively drove a wedge between the Union field armies, while Price and Van Dorn's forces kept Grant fixed at Corinth. 101 Bragg and Smith's columns made their march through eastern and middle Tennessee and into Kentucky at an incredible speed, leaving Buell's army to have to hustle to catch up. 102 Kirby Smith realized the opportunity in front of him early on and moved his men forward roughly the same time Lee's men were preparing to destroy John Pope's forces near Manassas, beginning the Kentucky Campaign. Union Brigadier General George W. Morgan's command held the vital Cumberland Gap, which historian Earl Hess christened the "Gibraltar of the West." 99 Harsh, 116. 100 Hartwig, 162-163. 101 Harsh, 96-97; Hess, 31-35. 102 Hess, 57,62,64. 44 The Gap itself served as a platform for the Federals to invade East Tennessee, and as long as it remained in Federal hands, the Deep South, particularly Chattanooga and Atlanta, would be under constant threat. 103 Reducing this garrison was the first lynchpin in breaking Federal control and regaining Tennessee for the South. Smith, now free to maneuver feinted around the gap and threatened the supply lines, forcing a Federal withdrawal; he then turned his legions northward and moved into Kentucky. Smith moved through the eastern part of the state and pushed Heth's division as far as Covington, directly across from Cincinnati, sending that city and southern Ohio into a panic. 104 With Smith's small army running almost unmolested in Kentucky, Bragg's larger army moved through Middle Tennessee via Sparta feinting towards Nashville, forcing the Federals to concentrate there, while strategically widening the gap between Buell's command and Southern forces in Kentucky. Bragg, before departing to Chattanooga, left behind roughly 35,000 men in two separate commands under generals Stirling Price and Earl Van Dorn. These commands had a twofold objective. Their primary objective was to contain the Army of the Tennessee at Corinth, and once Bragg and Smith were in position, launch an offensive of their own against Grant, defeat him, and then rapidly march to connect with Bragg's army. 105 Bragg and Smith exposed the weakness in the Federal policy of limited war with its preoccupation of taking landmarks and reliance on cumbersome supply lines and within less than a months' time-reversed almost a year of Union progress in the west, in respect to subjugating the Upper South. Unlike John Bell Hood's offensive into Tennessee in late 1864, which, while certainly an emergency, did not deviate Sherman from his plans of marching to the sea. 106 In 103 Hess, 7-8. 104 Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground", 141. 105 Noe, 29. 106 Eric A. Jacobson and Richard A. Rupp, For Cause and for Country: A Study of the Affair at Spring Hill and the Battle of Franklin, Eric A. Jacobson, 2013. 42. 45 1862, this simply was impossible for Federal forces. Sherman operated under a "hard war" doctrine that allowed him to subsist off the land and changed his objective from key city centers to making war on the Southern people, through the destruction of their local economy, food subsistence, and ability subsist in a normal capacity. 107 Sherman effectively narrowed the war to the immediate doorstep of the Southern People. As a result the individual citizen was forced to deal with their own survival, and naturally the bigger picture of the Confederacy became less important. Union forces in 1862 did not have the same conditional framework, and by default, would be forced to pursue any Confederate force and meet it on the battlefield. Even though the fall of 1862 didn't produce the hoped-for victory conditions, strategically, the Confederates were more successful in this period than at any other part of the war. The results of this success were more apparent in the Western Theater than in the east. However, certain components in the Eastern Theater changed as well. The most significant measurable success emerged in time bought for the Confederacy, and a prolonged timetable for the Northern plan of war. In the summer, Federal plans in the west called for the capture of Vicksburg and Chattanooga, the latter of which was in progress when the offensive started. 108 It is highly probable that if able, the Federal forces would have moved on Vicksburg in the summer of 1862, and perhaps forced its capitulation much sooner. 109 However, this is only speculation, yet, the reality is this operation was certainly delayed by the events that occurred in Kentucky and the aggressive nature of Price and Van Dorn. Kentucky was only one variable in stymieing the Federal drive toward Vicksburg. Just as important were the aggressiveness of Price and Van Dorn at the battles of Iuka and Corinth in October. Although Confederate defeats, the outcome of 107 Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc. 321-328. 108 McPherson, 511-512. 109 Woodworth, Nothing but Victory, 243-244. 46 these battles managed to temporarily check the Federals, prompting an end to any realistic campaign season in Mississippi. At least for the foreseeable future, the Mississippi River remained open by way of Vicksburg, and Union strategy incomplete, in which case was Price and Van Dorn's big contribution. 110 Bragg and Smith failed to hold Kentucky and or convert her into a Confederate state. However, as the logistic concerns show, the state's complete occupation, with the available forces, was genuinely impossible. In all the engagements that had taken place, the Southerners had the better day. Kirby Smith's army completely routed Federal forces at Richmond in August, and Bragg's army captured the garrison at Munfordville. Before and during the campaign John Hunt Morgan's cavalry had wreaked havoc in Kentucky, capturing supplies, disrupting communications, and pushing to the Ohio River virtually unchallenged. 111 Even Kentucky's principle battle at Perryville was the better day tactically for the Confederates. More than anything, Kentucky showed the weakness of Buell, limited war, and the Union's inability to protect vital territory adequately under a conciliation policy. While in the end Bragg and Smith left, they did so generally unmolested, which showed Buell's unwillingness to fight another pitched battle. Therefore, this aftermath was certainly nothing for the Union to be proud of. In truth Buell did not drive Bragg and Smith out of Kentucky, rather the limitations of logistics and the realization of strategic objectives forced the Confederates back to Tennessee. 112 Although Braxton Bragg is surrounded by much controversy and sharp opinions on his leadership capabilities, one must look past emotion and see the facts as they present in the strategic element. While indeed, the Confederates failed to hold Kentucky, they did succeed in 110 Woodworth, 239-240. 111 Hess, 12. 112 Noe, 333. 47 regaining portions of Tennessee. In particular, Middle Tennessee by way of Murfreesboro, which sat astride the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and was seen as the key to the wealthy Stone, Duck, and Elk River valleys. 113 Historian Thomas Connelly pointed out, which was already previously noted, that Tennessee was by far the most critical state in terms of manufacturing to the South. Although the entire state wasn't in Confederate hands, over two-thirds of it was, and most importantly, the opportunity to secure the very vital Nashville and Mississippi River corridor remained a possibility for a future campaign. 114 The primary focal point in the interpretation of the Kentucky Campaign is the Confederate failure to remain within that state. However, the key phrase narrows down to opportunity and potential. If taken in this context, the Confederate forces in July were backed into a corner. However, come October, these same forces had managed to throw the Federal forces off balance and regain a significant portion of lost territory, changing the entire atmosphere and flow of the Western Theater. In short, the success of the Kentucky Campaign is that it allowed the Confederates to move from the verge of defeat to a position where the fate of the Western Theater was up in the air, which only a decisive campaign would bring to a conclusion. 115 The fall of 1862 was the last chance the Confederates had at securing Tennessee permanently during the war. While the Western Theater was more significant in terms of strategic gain and leverage, the Eastern Theater added its own momentous shift in the flow of events. Unlike the west, the Eastern Theater was very narrow, as it existed in the space between Richmond and Washington. In strategic terms, the region was harrowing regarding maneuvering room and logistical sustainment. In one sense, Lee and his army were successful in pushing the Army of the Potomac 113 Peter Cozzens, No Better Place to Die: The Battle of Stones River, Chicago: University of Illinois, 1990. 8. 114 Connelly, 16-22. 115 Cozzens, No Better Place to Die, 12-14; Hess, 116. 48 away from the gates of Richmond, along with wrecking the Army of Virginia, while lastly temporarily clearing the smaller theaters, such as the coast and Shenandoah Valley of Federal forces. 116 While this situation may have provided an opportunity in the west, it meant little or nothing in the east. The fact is, Lee understood his primary objective either consisted of breaking the Northern will to fight through battlefield victory or by the complete destruction of the Union army. 117 Lee's primary objective in Maryland was to bate the Federal forces into a showdown fight. He was successful in this mission by just crossing over the Potomac River. The location of Washington in the southern portion of Maryland across from Alexandria made an incursion in Maryland a threat for the Federal government. 118 Unlike the west, where a fair amount of effort was required for Bragg and Smith to march their armies the distance required to Kentucky, the Army of Northern Virginia did not have to move far to accomplish its mission. Another key component to Lee's strategic objective was the lack of overhead in its long-term goal. Unlike the Western Theater, there was no pressure for Lee to specifically secure any particular region, as the Confederacy in the east had not lost any of its production capabilities nor any significant amount of land to Federal occupation. Therefore, the Confederate movements' direction wasn't necessarily guided by a specific purpose, but rather by the necessity of strategic gains which were designed to draw out the Army of the Potomac in a state of haste and unpreparedness. However, whereas the Kentucky Campaign had different aspects of measurable success, the 116 Harsh, 19-20. 117 Murfin, 63-64. 118 Harsh, 23; Murfin, 36-40; McPherson, 555-556. All the major historians who focus on the Maryland Campaign point to this as a major component to deterring the outcome and purpose of Lee's strategy. 49 Maryland Campaign had none, only a single purpose that demanded a climactic clash to determine its outcome. 119 At no other point in the war did Lee have such an advantage and control of the initiative. Arguably, his combination of subordinate officers was the best in their position as a whole than at any other point. His army was operating off a long track of victory, the length of which they would not experience again. 120 And most importantly, the Maryland Campaign was truly the only time in which Lee would have direct control of the flow of events; in Richmond, he had acted out of desperation, in Northern Virginia, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, the Overland Campaign and Petersburg he counteracted his opponents moves, and at Gettysburg, he committed to a battle that was dictated by the Federals. In September of 1862, Lee was the composer of the campaign and the master of ceremonies, he and he alone decided when and where the climactic battle would be fought. 121 All too often, the argument arises that the Army of the Potomac moved quicker than Lee expected, and caught him off guard, forcing him to settle and fight an unprepared battle at Sharpsburg. This theory would make sense if Lee's strategic objectives were multilayered like Bragg or Smith. Nevertheless, this theory doesn't match up to his sole objective of a decisive engagement. As seen with logistical circumstances, Hagerstown was likely the limit for the army in terms of range, Lee, therefore, had decided to make the principle stand somewhere in that area. 122 Two factors make this apparent, the choice to reduce Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg, which are necessary for military doctrine, and the choice to have the army lay around Frederick 119 OR, vol 16, 2: Correspondence between Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis, September 8, 1862; Harsh, 119; Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy, 139. 120 Hartwig, 126-127. 121 Harsh, 57-59. 122 Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. I ,108-111; Harsh, 190; Hartwig, 116-117; Murfin, 113. All of these sources for reasons ranging from realistic logistical concerns to Lee's strategic initiative point towards the area of Hagerstown as the realistic goal of the Confederate offensive. 50 for several days. 123 If the plan had been to fight somewhere else or keep the Federals at a distance, these two factors fit the mold. The truth is that Lee wanted a fight, and he wanted it quick, the geography of Western Maryland affords a great opportunity to a defending army, which was Lee's primary tactical vision. 124 Looking at the scope of the Army of Northern Virginia's movements in the campaign, there a few abundantly clear facts that warrant Lee's strategic designs. It's already been stated that Lee's intention was to draw out the Army of the Potomac, which he did by simply crossing into Maryland, and ushered the emergency by crossing east of the mountains. 125 The next key was the layover or taunting of the Federals by having his army remain in Frederick for several days. The decision to reduce the Harpers Ferry garrison, while militarily necessary, also doubly acted as part of the "national emergency" which further put pressure on McClellan and his army to move with haste. 126 The battle of South Mountain, while a Confederate defeat, opened the way for the Federals to move over the range and meet Lee on the ground of his choosing. 127 South Mountain is interesting, particularly for strategic reasons. The choice to leave one division under D.H. Hill to hold the three passes stretched over ten miles indicates that Lee didn't intend to stop the Federals there and expected them to take the position. A decisive battle along the South Mountain range would not have been beneficial for Lee to meet his objectives. His army would not have been able to counterattack effectively due to terrain, and maneuvering room would have been limited. Although Lee initially considered scrapping the campaign due to the longer than expected siege of Harpers Ferry, once the garrison did fall, he was able to 123 Harsh, 147-150; Hartwig, 211-212, OR, vol 16, 2, 603 (Special Orders 191) 605-608. 124 Allan, 201-205; Harsh, 98-99; Marshall, 148-150. 125 Marshall, 146. 126 Brian Matthew Jordan, Unholy Sabbath: The Battle of South Mountain in History and Memory September 14, 1862, New York: Savas Beatie, 2012. 80-85. 127 Jordon, Unholy Sabbath, 301. 51 concentrate his forces in the area of Sharpsburg. 128 It may not be that Lee specifically wanted to fight at Sharpsburg, but the lay of the land and the tactical and strategic components of it, offered natural terrain on which to fight a decisive battle. 129 The Antietam battlefield offered several very strong defensive opportunities. First was the Antietam Creek, which was wide and deep enough to stop infantry from crossing unless over a bridge. The terrain, particularly on the southern end of the battlefield, is very suitable for a defending force, along with the ground near the center of the battlefield. On the northern end, the terrain is its weakest for defense; however, the entire battlefield, especially the northern end, is very suitable for artillery employment. Lee's position at Antietam Creek was without question formidable. 130 Whereas the events in Kentucky were one of maneuver, Maryland hinged on the tactical climax. Therefore, both forces needed to clash and soundly defeat the other to end the campaign. The battle of Antietam itself ended in a draw, and the opposing lines virtually remained the same. 131 Having realized the day after the engagement that McClellan wasn't likely to attack again, and understanding that his position offered no benefits for his army to attack, Lee promptly withdrew back into Shepherdstown, Virginia, (West Virginia) intending to regroup his army and re-crossing the Potomac River near Williamsport to again sue for a decisive battle. The Confederate's were blocked by several determining factors though, the two primary factors being McClellan's choice to move the VI Corps north towards Hagerstown to block a crossing, and a large amount of straggling that has taken place since the start of the 128 Allan, 320. 129 Harsh, 301-303. 130 Phillip Thomas Tucker, Burnside's Bridge: The Climatic Struggle of the 2nd and 20th Georgia at Antietam Creek, Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2000. 47-54. 131 Ezra Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. 2: Antietam. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 501. 52 campaigning that had severely reduced Lee's army from upwards of 70,000 men down to roughly 45,000. 132 While Lee did not thrash McClellan's army at Antietam to the extent his strategic objectives called for, the opportunity for a Confederate political victory was not entirely gone. In fact, Lee's offensive convinced Britain and France that Northern armies could never restore the Union, and they contemplated mediation, which would have constituted de facto recognition of the Confederacy. 133 Moving away from the narrow view of Lee and Maryland it is important to note that Bragg's army had achieved a significant victory on September 17 at Munfordville the same day the battle of Antietam was raging. While Lee's army was more or less locked in a stalemate in Maryland, the western Confederate forces still very much retained the initiative in Kentucky. If a successful outcome in Kentucky occurred, perhaps that would be enough to enhance the stalemate at Antietam into a negative outcome for the Union. 134 Lee did not wait in position along Antietam Creek, for events to develop in Kentucky, he didn't have to. By simply moving back across the river and McClellan's inability to pursue for logistical reasons, Lee still very much posed a serious threat, especially with re-crossing into Maryland if need be. Looking at the outcome of the Maryland Campaign and the factors involved in the forces' genetic composition, Lee's army achieved all that could reasonably be expected of it. Certainly, due to its size, it would be impossible to annihilate the Army of the Potomac, yet, by remaining together and gaining the tactical victory, that would have to be enough. 135 132 Murfin, 306. 133 McPherson, 546. 134 Earl J. Hess, Braxton Bragg: The Most Hated Man in the Confederacy, University of North Carolina Press, 2016. 63. 135 Ezra Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Vol. III: Shepherdstown Ford and the End of the Campaign. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 20-21. 53 Truly then the lynchpin of the 1862 Confederate offensive rested on the shoulders of Bragg and Smith. 136 Lee's offensive and climatic battle of Antietam would have held little or no importance if the events west of the Appalachian's hadn't been taking place in the manner they were. The ultimate failure of Bragg and Smith in Kentucky was their inability to link their armies together. The process involved in making this happen didn't occur until it was too late. 137 Regardless of why this juncture of uniting these armies didn't occur, the important point was that they retained the initiative until the battle of Perryville. Unlike Lee, Bragg and Smith didn't necessarily have to defeat Buell or Wright's local forces, but rather they just needed to exist in Kentucky. Smith's forces had cleared out Morgan and what pitiful resistance Wright was able to scrape together. Buell's army lingered exhausted and timidly in the western part of the state. Bragg and Smith controlled in theory over two-thirds of the state in the last weeks of September into October. 138 The high tide of the Confederacy occurred not at Antietam, but in the days before Perryville. Up until this date, the South had been successful in relieving Richmond, Chattanooga, Vicksburg, the Carolina coast, Shenandoah Valley, western Virginia, and Northern Virginia of any significant Federal occupation, or military operations. The Confederate armies were at its maxim of manpower, at least in theory, if not in actual employment and contained men who were wholly more experienced than their counterparts. Most importantly, the South had been successful universally of maintaining a Confederate wide offensive initiative. When looking at the battles of South Mountain, Richmond, Munfordville, Antietam, and Harpers Ferry, only 136 Hess, Braxton Bragg, 64. 137 Noe, 328-329. 138 Daniel, 128-129; Hess, 62-64; Noe, 104. 54 South Mountain had been a Federal victory and Antietam a draw, while the rest were complete decisive Confederate victories. The battle of Perryville long considered the principal battle of the Kentucky Campaign was neither decisive nor climatic. 139 The battle itself was fought only by portions of the armies, on ground that held no real strategic value to the overall goals of the campaign. However, the legacy of Perryville resides in Bragg's choice to withdraw his army from Kentucky in its aftermath. Leaving aside Bragg's personality, leadership issues, and his subordinates, the important aspect to look at is what was actually accomplished by his army. It's already been stated that Bragg and Smith's offensive knocked the Federal plan of war back a few pegs and opened up at two-thirds of Tennessee for the foreseeable future. Confederate goals upon entering Kentucky were unclear and varied in design between Bragg and Smith. 140 Perhaps the largest draw was establishing the state as Confederate, which they quickly understood wasn't a popular option amongst the people. That being the case, Confederate field armies could only subsist for so long in hostile territory until they would, by necessity, be forced to withdraw to friendly Tennessee. 141 Therefore, without the support of the majority of Kentuckians to endorse a Confederate government, the continuation of a Southern army within the state offered no benefit to the Confederacy. 142 Bragg and Smith's only true strategic failing was their inability to link together and deliver a decisive blow against Buell. If looked at in the context of the genetics of an ocean wave, the advance into Kentucky was the last little bit of the wave that rolls into the edge of the beach. It neither has the momentum nor the power to damage anything of significant strength. However, the break or 139 Noe, 343. 140 Hess, 56-57. 141 Connelly, 228; Noe, 334. 142 Noe, 336. 55 impact of the wave that occurs just before hitting shore tends to denote the power of the temporary effects inflicted within that particular wave's life span. Sticking with the ocean wave analogy, the Confederate wide offensive in the fall of 1862 was the last ocean wave before the tide changed. The lifespan of the Confederacy would perish in the calm time between the next high tide. Conclusion: The interpretations of the Civil War, its key moments, critical players, and even the purpose of the conflict, vary in many different extremes, platforms, and algorithms. Surely there were other critical moments of the war, in which the Confederacy could have theoretically changed the outcome or moments in which Union forces could have ended the war much sooner. The progress of the war is a fascinating storyline of complete unpreparedness through a series of excruciating growing pains that led to the high efficiency of conducting war. Looking at the grand scope of the conflict, particularly the logistics of the opposing sides, even the most novice student of the struggle can recognize that the Confederacy was severely behind in every aspect and shouldn't have waged war. 143 However, the fact remains they did, and the reality is any Southern hope for victory resided in the slowness, unpreparedness, and political deadlock of the North's ability to wage war. The true window in which to view why the fall of 1862 was the Southern high tide occurs in the aftermath of the campaigns themselves. The first and most critical component was the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation. The bold political move forever changed the direction and intent of the war. For the South, it had devastating consequences, as it eliminated 143 McPherson, 312-316. 56 any dream of European intervention, and essentially made the Confederacy an island left to its own. The proclamation also bled into the second crucial component, which truly had its roots at the beginning of 1862; however, it had become fully developed by the closing days of 1862, and that is the abandonment of "limited war" principals and the acceptance of "hard war" doctrine. 144 Militarily the South would never mount such a broad offensive again nor one with so much potential to gain from it. Lee's Pennsylvania Campaign in 1863, while more famous, did not have the potential as nine months prior when he crossed into Maryland. 145 Lee in June of 1863 was acting independently, while Confederate armies in the west were giving ground rapidly and losing Vicksburg. 146 Even with Confederate victory at Chickamauga, Bragg nor his predecessors could ever mount an effective counterthrust to regain vital Tennessee. 147 Hood's Tennessee Campaign in 1864 offered the closest opportunity; however, his cause was pyrrhic and traded the destruction of Georgia for the hope of gaining Tennessee. 148 The commencement of the Overland Campaign in 1864 saw the end of Lee's ability to mount a counterattack that had won for him on previous battlefields. With his numbers dwindling, and the Union's production capabilities at its height, continuing supply of reinforcements, and Grant's power to coordinate multiple armies upon Lee, forced the Confederate leader to dance to the tune of Grant's strategy. 149 144 McPherson, 567. 145 Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, 4-8. 146 Edwin C. Bearss and J. Parker Hills, Receding Tide: Vicksburg and Gettysburg the Campaigns that Changed the Civil War, National Geographic Society, 2010. 266. 147 Steven Woodworth, Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. 144. 148 Jacobson, For Cause and for Country, 524. 149 Gordon C. Rhea, The Battle of the Wilderness May 5-6, 1864, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994. 9-10, 12-13, 22. 57 The Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns were episodes that the Union could not afford to lose. Certainly, Union armies, especially in the east, met multiple setbacks, defeats, and disasters throughout the war; however, a loss at this critical juncture in each theater would have produced devastating consequences from which the North could not recover. The brilliance of these campaigns resides in the fact that neither side could afford a negative outcome, and a victorious outcome for either side had the power and capabilities to change the entire trajectory of the war. The Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns do not have a true decisive victor in respect to the definition, yet, the rate at which the Union declared victory and the rapidity with which it instituted new measures both politically and militarily showed the emergency the events in the fall of 1862 produced for the North. 150 An acceptance of that notion coupled with political density, logistical pitfalls, organizational hurtles, and strategic objectives, will clearly indicate that the fall of 1862 in the course of the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns, along with their supporting offenses was the high tide of the Confederacy, and the moment the Civil War changed trajectory in both political and military senses, which was the beginning of the Confederacy's defeat. 150 Muehlbauer, Ways of War, 197-200. 58 Bibliography Secondary Sources: Anderson, Nancy Scott and Dwight Anderson. The Generals: Ulysses. S. Grant and Robert E. Lee. Avenel: New Jersey, 1987. Bearss, Edwin C. and J. 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Texto finalizado el 15 de diciembre de 2023. Esta Nota Internacional es el resultado de la reflexión colectiva del equipo de investigación de CIDOB. Coordinada y editada por Carme Colomina, en el proceso de redacción ha contado con aportaciones de Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Ana Ballesteros, Pol Bargués, Moussa Bourekba, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Javier Carbonell, Carmen Claudín, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Agustí Fernández de Losada, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Seán Golden, Berta Güell, Julia Lipscomb, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Óscar Mateos, Sergio Maydeu, Pol Morillas, Diego Muro, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Reinhard Schweitzer, Antoni Segura, Cristina Serrano, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Alexandra Vidal, Pere Vilanova.  2024 será un año de urnas y armas. Las elecciones celebradas en más de 70 países, que actuarán como un test de estrés para el sistema democrático, y el impacto de la multiplicidad de conflictos que alimenta la inestabilidad global definirán un mundo en plena transición de poder y en claro retroceso humanitario y de derechos fundamentales.Se acentúa la erosión de las normas internacionales vigentes y aumenta la imprevisibilidad. 2024 empieza totalmente abierto, marcado por un mundo cada vez más diverso y (des)ordenado, definido por alianzas e intereses cambiantes en cuestiones como la competición geopolítica, las transiciones verde y digital o la seguridad internacional.Las consecuencias económicas de las sucesivas crisis serán más visibles que en años anteriores: el crecimiento económico será débil y el frenazo chino reverberará en las economías emergentes, cada vez más tensionadas por el endurecimiento de las condiciones financieras y la fortaleza del dólar.2024 será un año de urnas y armas. Un test de estrés tanto para el sistema democrático como para la multiplicidad de conflictos que alimenta la inestabilidad global. Seguimos ante un mundo desordenado, convulso y contestado, pero, esta vez, cualquier análisis pende del gran interrogante que supone el intenso ciclo electoral que marcará el próximo año. Con guerras abiertas en Ucrania, Palestina, Sudán o Yemen, el mundo concentra la mayor cantidad de conflictos activos desde el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Por eso, la agenda geopolítica de los próximos meses se entreteje a partir del impacto mutuo entre los distintos conflictos bélicos y el veredicto que lanzarán los más de 70 procesos electorales marcados en el calendario.Hay elecciones que pueden definir guerras. Las consecuencias políticas de la brutal ofensiva israelí en Gaza o el estancamiento del frente de guerra ucraniano también dependen de la carrera presidencial en Estados Unidos. Las grietas en la unidad transatlántica y las cada vez más categóricas acusaciones de doble rasero en las lealtades de Occidente no son ajenas a lo que ocurra el 5 de noviembre de 2024 en las urnas estadounidenses. Un retorno de Donald Trump a la Casa Blanca modificaría por completo las relaciones de fuerza y la posición de Washington en cada uno de estos conflictos, desde el suministro de armamento al Gobierno ucraniano, al apoyo a Israel, o en la confrontación con Rusia o China.Pero no se trata solo del futuro de la democracia en Estados Unidos: más de 4.000 millones de personas irán a las urnas en más de 70 países. La Unión Europea (UE), India, Pakistán, Indonesia, México, Taiwán, Venezuela o Senegal… grandes actores con peso demográfico e influencia geopolítica protagonizarán un año de una intensidad electoral sin precedentes, que definirá un mundo en plena transición global del poder y en claro retroceso humanitario y de derechos fundamentales. Sin embargo, tanta concentración de elecciones no significa más democracia. Estamos en tiempos de inteligencia artificial (IA) y de sofisticación extrema de la manipulación que amenazan la fiabilidad de las urnas. Los sistemas híbridos ganan terreno, y está por ver si el ciclo electoral de 2024 acaba siendo un momento de profundización de la degradación o de resistencia democrática. La sensación de desorden no es nueva, ni siquiera su aceleración. Pero cada año se acentúa la erosión de las normas internacionales vigentes y aumenta la imprevisibilidad. El mundo es cada vez más descentralizado, diversificado y multidimensional. Se consolida este «orden múltiplex» –como Amitav Acharya lo describió ya en 2017– porque todo ocurre simultáneamente. Y, sin embargo, seguimos ante un rediseño del mundo todavía abierto porque esta simultaneidad de cambios concentra distintas pugnas en liza. 1. Más conflictividad, más impunidad2023 ha sido uno de los años más conflictivos en el mundo desde el fin de la Segunda Guerra mundial. En solo doce meses, la violencia política ha aumentado un 27%. Crece en intensidad y en frecuencia. La guerra en Gaza ha marcado el final de 2023, con sus más de 17.000 víctimas mortales contabilizadas hasta el momento, las advertencias por parte de Naciones Unidas del riesgo de colapso humanitario y de genocidio de la población palestina atrapada en la Franja, así como el pulso entre el primer ministro Benyamín Netanyahu y el secretario general de la Naciones Unidas, António Guterres, para intentar lograr un alto el fuego. En esta crisis continuada del orden liberal y en plena discusión sobre la validez del derecho internacional, Israel ha asestado un golpe profundo a la credibilidad de Naciones Unidas. El Consejo de Seguridad se ha convertido en un instrumento para la parálisis; una tenaza al servicio de los intereses de viejas potencias que han llevado a Guterres a admitir públicamente la frustración de la impotencia. Unas Naciones Unidas que, debilitadas políticamente, se aferran a su acción humanitaria sobre el terreno para intentar marcar la diferencia entre la vida y la muerte. Más de 130 trabajadores humanitarios de Naciones Unidas han perdido la vida en Gaza desde el 7 de octubre, el mayor número de fallecidos entre su personal en un conflicto de su historia. 2023 ha sido un año violento. Se estima que 1 de cada 6 personas en el mundo ha estado expuesta a un conflicto en los últimos doce meses. La sensación de impunidad y de menosprecio por la legislación internacional se ha agravado. No solo en Gaza. El enquistamiento de la guerra en Ucrania; la expulsión de la población de origen armenio de Nagorno Karabaj; o la sucesión de golpes de estados vividos en seis países africanos en los últimos 36 meses dan buena cuenta de este momento de «desregulación del uso de la fuerza», que se ha ido fraguando durante años de erosión de las normas internacionales. Y si a finales de 2023 asistimos a la retirada de las tropas internacionales del G-5 Sahel desplegadas en Burkina Faso y Níger, como ya ocurrió un año antes con la expulsión de los soldados franceses de Mali, en 2024 será la misión de Naciones Unidas en Sudán (UNITAMS) la que tendrá que abandonar el país antes del 29 de febrero. Una retirada que Human Rights Watch ha calificado de «abdicación catastrófica» porque aumenta el riesgo de atrocidades y abusos a gran escala en un escenario de guerra civil, limpieza étnica y hambruna que ya ha provocado más de siete millones de desplazados internos, convirtiendo Sudán en el país con un mayor número de desplazados internos de todo el planeta.Y, sin embargo, el combate internacional por poner límites a la impunidad se dotará de nuevos instrumentos en 2024. A partir del 1 de enero, la Convención Liubliana-La Haya en cooperación internacional para la investigación y persecución del crimen de genocidio, lesa humanidad, crímenes de guerra y otros crímenes internacionales podrá ser firmado (y ratificado) por los estados miembros de Naciones Unidas que deseen adherirse. Se trata del mayor tratado para la lucha contra la impunidad internacional, que facilita la cooperación interestatal en la investigación judicial de estos crímenes, garantiza la reparación para las víctimas y agiliza la extradición. En paralelo, Naciones Unidas también está elaborando una Convención contra los crímenes contra la humanidad con el objetivo de crear un tratado vinculante de derecho internacional, especialmente en un contexto marcado por el aumento de estos crímenes en países como Myanmar, Ucrania, Sudán o Etiopía. En otoño de 2024, la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas tendrá que valorar el progreso de las negociaciones. Todo ello ocurrirá coincidiendo con los 30 años del genocidio de Rwanda.En marzo de 2023, la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI) emitió una orden de arresto contra el presidente ruso Vladímir Putin por crímenes de guerra en Ucrania, hasta ahora sin consecuencias. Sin embargo, si en noviembre de 2024 Putin decidiera asistir a la próxima cumbre del G-20 en Brasil, eso supondría un desafío para el país anfitrión ya que, a diferencia de India, Brasil sí es parte del Estatuto de Roma de 1998, el tratado internacional que condujo a la creación de la CPI. Si en un principio el presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva aseguró que Putin no sería detenido en caso de acudir a la cumbre, después matizó que la decisión recaería sobre la justicia brasileña y no en el Gobierno. A pesar del pesimismo que pueda generar la eficacia de estos tratados, en los últimos meses hemos visto como, tras la ofensiva militar azerí en Nagorno Karabaj, Armenia ratificó en noviembre el Estatuto de Roma de la CPI, adquiriendo el estatus de país miembro a partir de febrero de 2024. Además, a finales de 2023, Sudáfrica, Bangladesh, Bolivia, las Comores y Djibouti reclamaron una investigación de la Corte Penal Internacional por crímenes de guerra, crímenes de lesa humanidad y genocidio en Palestina. Asimismo, en noviembre de 2023, las autoridades judiciales francesas emitían una orden de detención internacional contra el presidente sirio Bashar al-Assad –rehabilitado este mismo año con su retorno a la Liga Árabe, más de una década después de su expulsión– y varios generales sirios por el uso de armas químicas contra su población civil en 2013.2. La democracia, a examenMás de 4.000 millones de personas están llamadas a las urnas en 76 países, casi el 51% de la población mundial. Mientras la mayoría de la ciudadanía de estos países votará en democracias plenas o con imperfecciones, uno de cada cuatro votantes participará en comicios en regímenes híbridos y/o autoritarios. Países como Rusia, Túnez, Argelia, Bielorrusia, Rwanda o Irán instrumentalizarán estos procesos electorales para tratar de fortalecer a los liderazgos en el poder y ganar legitimidad ante sus ciudadanos, mientras que casi la otra mitad del electorado ejercerá su derecho a voto en países que, en los últimos años, han mostrado una erosión democrática o tentaciones iliberales, como en Estados Unidos o India.2023 se cierra con la toma de posesión del «anarcocapitalista» Javier Milei a la presidencia argentina, que confirma la profunda crisis de los partidos tradicionales y el auge de las agendas radicales: desde el agresivo punitivismo penal de Nayib Bukele en El Salvador ―que aspira a la reelección en 2024―, a la irrupción electoral de Renovación Popular en Perú, refundada por el hoy alcalde de Lima, Rafael López Aliaga. Respuestas extremas a los distintos escenarios de crisis político-económicas y de seguridad. En Europa, las urnas europeas dieron una de cal y otra de arena, con la victoria de la oposición polaca, por un lado, y los buenos resultados del islamófobo Geert Wilders en los Países Bajos, por el otro. Pero el intenso ciclo electoral de 2024 será decisivo para saber si se consolida la contestación, la fragmentación y el auge del extremismo político que han transformado las democracias a nivel global, o bien si el sistema resiste.En este test democrático, el voto de las mujeres y los jóvenes será clave. Lo fueron en Polonia, como castigo a las políticas reaccionarias del Partido Ley y Justicia (PIS). En Brasil o Austria, por ejemplo, el apoyo de los hombres a fuerzas de extrema derecha es 16 puntos superior al de las mujeres. En México, las presidenciales de junio de 2024 elegirán, por primera vez a en su historia, a una mujer como presidenta del país. Las dos candidatas son Claudia Sheinbaum, exalcaldesa de la capital y representante del gubernamental partido de izquierdas, Morena, y Xóchitl Gálvez, en nombre de una coalición opositora de Frente Amplio por México, que agrupa, entre otros, al derechista Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN) y al Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). En Estados Unidos, la movilización de las juventudes de origen latino será especialmente relevante. En los últimos años, más de 4,7 millones de jóvenes hispanos han obtenido el derecho a voto y su papel va a ser significativo en estados claves como Nevada o Arizona. Si bien esta cohorte tiende a mostrar una actitud e inclinación progresista, su perspectiva sobre los partidos dominantes es complicada: cuestiones identitarias, de discriminación o racismo suelen marcar su relación tanto con los Demócratas como con los Republicanos, y rechazan la identificación política, lo que refuerza la idea de que la polarización en Estados Unidos es más evidente entre los políticos que entre sus votantes. A pesar de ello, el miedo a unas elecciones injustas ha aumentado dramáticamente (del 49% en 2021 al 61% en 2023). Aunque la desigualdad económica sigue siendo la principal amenaza percibida (69%) entre los votantes estadounidenses, el mayor desafío en esta carrera electoral es, probablemente, la presencia de Donald Trump, no solo porque su futuro inmediato está en manos de los tribunales, sino también porque si su candidatura llegara a materializarse significaría que el Partido Republicano habría decidido entregar su futuro al hombre que intentó revertir los resultados electorales de hace cuatro años y que el propio comité del Congreso, que investigó la toma del Capitolio del 6 de enero de 2020, acusó de «insurrección». A partir de enero empezarán las elecciones primarias y los caucus estatales; sin embargo, a falta de concretarse los candidatos definitivos, el imaginario de un posible duelo electoral entre octogenarios se resuelve, de momento según las encuestas, a favor de Trump. Mientras tanto, la fecha del juicio al expresidente se acerca peligrosamente al supermartes del 5 de marzo, el día en que 13 estados votan en las primarias republicanas.Una investigación de The Guardian con la Universidad de Chicago afirma que un 5,5% de los estadounidenses, es decir, 14 millones de personas, creen que el uso de la fuerza está justificado para restaurar a Donald Trump en la presidencia, mientras que otro 8,9%, unos 23 millones de estadounidenses, creen que la fuerza está justificada para impedirlo. No se trata de una tendencia aislada. El riesgo de inestabilidad política y de violencia vinculada a procesos electorales va al alza, así lo confirma la Fundación Kofi-Annan.También el futuro de una Unión Europea, que afronta este invierno con dos guerras en su vecindario, se decidirá en las urnas. Además de las elecciones al Parlamento Europeo, que se celebrarán entre el 6 y el 9 de junio de 2024, 12 estados miembros también tienen comicios. Las elecciones generales en Bélgica, Portugal o Austria serán un buen termómetro para medir la fuerza de la extrema derecha, que aspira a salir reforzada de las elecciones a la Eurocámara. Si los comicios de 2019 determinaron el fin de la gran coalición que, desde los orígenes del Parlamento Europeo, había garantizado a socialdemócratas y democristianos una mayoría de escaños en el pleno de Estrasburgo, ahora el gran interrogante está en saber dónde quedarán los límites de la derechización de la UE. Las últimas proyecciones en intención de voto muestran resultados importantes para el grupo Identidad y Democracia (ID) –hogar de partidos de extrema derecha como el Reagrupamiento Nacional (RN) de Marine Le Pen o Alternativa para Alemania (AfD)– que llegaría hasta los 87 escaños y superaría a la otra familia de derecha radical, los Conservadores y Reformistas Europeos (ECR), que preside la primera ministra italiana Giorgia Meloni, que pasaría de los 66 eurodiputados actuales a 83. Sin embargo, y a pesar de la pérdida de escaños que sufrirían las fuerzas tradicionales, el Partido Popular Europeo (PPE) seguiría como la principal familia política de la Unión. Por eso, unos de los interrogantes de este 2024 es saber si ¿estaría dispuesto el PPE, que preside el bávaro Manfred Weber, a buscar una posible mayoría con la derecha radical?Las nuevas mayorías en la UE serán cruciales para decidir el futuro de los compromisos climáticos, la continuidad de la ayuda a Ucrania y las urgentes reformas institucionales que deben facilitar la entrada de futuros miembros. La ampliación tiene que pasar de ser una promesa a una realidad, pero la UE está cada vez menos preparada para llevarla a cabo. En 2024, cuatro países candidatos a la Unión celebrarán elecciones: Bosnia y Herzegovina, Moldova, Macedonia del Norte y Georgia, además de la incógnita que pende sobre la convocatoria de elecciones en Ucrania. Según su Constitución, Ucrania debería celebrar comicios en marzo de 2024. Pero, bajo la ley marcial, impuesta tras la invasión de Rusia en 2022, con una parte del electorado reticente a ir a las urnas en plena excepcionalidad, y con ocho millones de refugiados ucranianos fuera del país, Volodímir Zelenski ya apuntó en noviembre que no era «el momento adecuado».También un Reino Unido en plena crisis política y social podría avanzar elecciones generales, previstas para enero de 2025. Con un escenario desafiante para los conservadores frente al Partido Laborista encabezado por Keir Starmer, el actual primer ministro, Rishi Sunak, tiene discreción para elegir la fecha de los comicios. Otro de los interrogantes es Libia que, tras quedar pospuesto indefinidamente en 2021 el plan de Naciones Unidas de celebrar elecciones, la incapacidad de alcanzar un acuerdo entre los miembros de los dos gobiernos en el este y el oeste del país ha vuelto a mover la fecha de una posible celebración de comicios a 2024.En África, se celebrarán 16 elecciones, aunque solo seis de ellas tendrán lugar en países considerados como democracias. Treinta años después de las elecciones de 1994 en Sudáfrica, que marcaron el inicio de un viaje democrático dominado desde entonces por el Congreso Nacional Africano (CNA), el panorama político empieza a cambiar. Las elecciones generales de 2024 pueden confirmar el debilitamiento del poder y de los apoyos al CNA, mientras los principales partidos de la oposición buscan alianzas para presentar una alternativa. Además, la complicada situación económica, unida a otros factores como la corrupción, ha hecho que crezcan en popularidad partidos extremistas.También en India la oposición se presenta más unida que nunca ante un Narendra Modi que aspira a renovar un tercer mandato en primavera. Aupado en el nacionalismo, la polarización y la desinformación, Modi exhibirá los logros económicos y geopolíticos del país que en 2023 superó a China como el más poblado del mundo.Finalmente, está por ver qué grado de participación podrá tener la oposición venezolana en las elecciones presidenciales pactadas por Nicolás Maduro para la segunda mitad del año. De momento, el panorama interno se ha enrarecido todavía más con la intensificación del conflicto territorial con Guyana y la movilización del ejército. 3. De la saturación informativa a la desconexión social Nos encontramos ante unas sociedades cada vez más cansadas. Abrumadas por la saturación de contenidos y exhaustas por la velocidad de los cambios que deben digerir. La incertidumbre política y electoral, así como la multiplicidad de conflictos que marcarán el 2024 alimentarán todavía más el desfase entre sociedad, instituciones y partidos políticos. La cantidad de personas que declara «evitar» ver las noticias permanece cerca de máximos históricos, y es especialmente visible en Grecia (57%), Bulgaria (57%), Argentina (46%) o el Reino Unido (41%). ¿Las razones principales? La repetición excesiva de algunas informaciones y el peso emocional que pueden comportar para la salud mental de la población. En concreto, esta fatiga apunta, según el Reuters Institute, a cuestiones como la guerra en Ucrania (39%), la política nacional (38%) y a acontecimientos relacionados con la justicia social (31%) con altos niveles de politización y polarización. Los ecos de la pandemia de la COVID-19, las imágenes de la violencia bélica y su impacto económico sobre unas condiciones de vida cada vez más adversas para la población han amplificado esta tendencia a la desconexión social, agravada por el sentimiento de soledad y la polarización. No obstante, esta reducción del consumo periodístico se ha dado en paralelo a un mayor uso de redes sociales: las nuevas generaciones, por ejemplo, cada vez prestan más atención a influencers que a periodistas. A su vez, crece la fragmentación de las redes sociales. La migración de usuarios hacia Instagram o TikTok también ha alterado la forma de consumir la actualidad, con una priorización del contenido de ocio en lugar del informativo. No se trata solo de una renuncia voluntaria a la información, sino que esta tendencia de desconexión también ha llevado a una reducción en la participación social y en los debates en redes tal como se vivieron durante las primaveras árabes en 2011, en la movilización del MeToo o en el Black Lives Matter. Casi la mitad de los usuarios de redes sociales abiertas (47%) ya no participa ni reacciona a las noticias. Pero, además, la desconexión informativa también está vinculada a la desconexión política y a las transformaciones sociales que han alterado claramente los comportamientos electorales. Los cambios demográficos relacionados con el uso de la tecnología y el contexto de volatilidad permanente también se han traducido en una menor fidelización del voto, lo que ha contribuido a la crisis de los partidos tradicionales. El elemento identitario de pertenencia a un partido ha mutado entre los más jóvenes. La identificación se construye desde el posicionamiento en cuestiones como el cambio climático, la inmigración, el racismo, los derechos de las mujeres o el colectivo LGTBI+, o incluso el conflicto de Israel y Palestina. El 65% de los adultos estadounidenses declara que se siente agotado, siempre o con frecuencia, cuando piensa en política. Según el Pew Research Center, 6 de cada 10 estadounidenses en edad de votar admite tener muy poca o ninguna confianza en el futuro del sistema político de su país. Y este descontento se extiende a las tres ramas del gobierno, a los actuales líderes políticos, y a los candidatos a cargos públicos. Cuando se les pide que resuman sus sentimientos sobre la política en una sola palabra, el 79% se muestra negativo o crítico. Las más repetidas son los adjetivos «divisiva», «corrupta», «caótica» o «polarizada», y lamentan la sobreexposición mediática de los conflictos entre republicanos y demócratas, y la poca atención prestada «a los problemas importantes que enfrenta el país». La paradoja, sin embargo, es que este descontento ha coincidido, en estos últimos años, con niveles históricamente altos de participación electoral. La duda es si se repetirán en las presidenciales del próximo noviembre, especialmente cuando coinciden con otro elemento de desafección generacional como es la gerontocracia. En 2023, la media de edad de los líderes mundiales ha sido de 62 años. Para los jóvenes, los partidos políticos tradicionales han sido incapaces de articular una forma de comunicación directa, aumentando la sensación de desconexión entre sociedad, políticos e instituciones. En este contexto, una reedición de la confrontación Biden-Trump en 2024 enfatizaría la extrema polarización entre republicanos y demócratas en un ciclo electoral considerado de riesgo. El derecho al aborto y la seguridad siguen siendo puntos fuertes de movilización para los votantes.Por otra parte, la desconexión también puede ser forzada y, en ese caso, el bloqueo informativo se convierte en un arma de represión y censura de la libertad de expresión. Irán, India y Pakistán fueron los tres países con más restricciones al acceso de Internet en la primera mitad de 2023, y los tres celebrarán elecciones en 2024. Con el auge y la consolidación de la IA, la desinformación será uno de los retos adicionales de este superaño electoral, ya que su rápido progreso, especialmente en el ámbito generativo, puede proyectar una sombra todavía mayor sobre la confianza en la información y en los procesos electorales. El perfeccionamiento de los deepfakes, la rápida y sencilla creación de imágenes, textos, audios o propaganda por IA, así como la creciente dependencia de las redes sociales para consultar e informarse de la realidad, representan un caldo de cultivo para la desinformación en un momento en el que aún no existe un control efectivo de estas tecnologías. Quizás por eso la palabra del año de 2023 para el diccionario Merriam-Webster ha sido «auténtico». Con el preludio de aquella «posverdad» de 2016, la capacidad tecnológica de manipular hoy la realidad no tiene precedentes, desde la autenticidad de una imagen a la redacción de un trabajo académico. Por eso, más de la mitad de los usuarios de redes sociales (56%) dudan sobre su propia capacidad de poder discernir aquello que es falso de la realidad en las noticias de Internet. 4. Inteligencia artificial: explosión y regulación 2023 fue el año de la irrupción de la IA generativa; el año de la presentación en sociedad de ChatGPT que, en enero, solo dos meses después de su lanzamiento, ya contaba con 100 millones de usuarios y, en agosto, llegó a los 180 millones. Pero, la revolución también trajo consigo una nueva consciencia de los riesgos, aceleración y transformación que supone una tecnología que aspira a compararse con la inteligencia humana, o incluso a mejorarla o superarla. Por eso, 2024 será un año fundamental para la regulación de la IA. Las bases ya están puestas y solo hay que repasar las distintas iniciativas en marcha. La más ambiciosa es la de la UE, que está decidida a convertirse en la primera región del mundo que se dota de una ley integral para regular la inteligencia artificial y liderar el salto adelante que hay en ciernes. La Unión ha optado por categorizar los riesgos (inaceptables, elevados, limitados o mínimos) que supone el uso de sistemas de IA y obligará a realizar una «evaluación de impacto en los derechos fundamentales» antes de que un sistema de IA de «alto riesgo» pueda ser sacado al mercado. El acuerdo alcanzado el 7 de diciembre se ratificará en el primer trimestre de 2024 y dará paso a un período de dos años hasta su implementación total en 2026.Casi también en tiempo de descuento, el G-7 adoptó el 1 de diciembre de 2023 una guía internacional para desarrolladores y usuarios de la inteligencia artificial, especialmente para la IA generativa, que menciona la necesidad de introducir medidas para gestionar la desinformación, considerada uno de los principales riesgos para los líderes del G-7 por su impacto en la manipulación de la opinión pública a las puertas de un año de sobreexcitación electoral global.Pero el debate de la gobernanza va de la mano de la carrera geopolítica por liderar la innovación tecnológica y, a diferencia de la UE, en el caso de Estados Unidos y China eso significa, además, el desarrollo de su aplicación militar. Ambos países buscan afianzar su liderazgo, y la primera cumbre mundial sobre seguridad de la IA, convocada por el primer ministro británico, Rishi Sunak, se convirtió en el punto de encuentro de los grandes poderes globales –públicos y privados; tecnoautoritarios o abiertos– intentando regular o influir en los debates sobre regularización en curso. La cumbre tendrá una segunda edición en Seúl y una tercera en París, ambas en 2024. De momento, deja sobre la mesa la «Declaración Bletchley», firmada por 28 países, que recoge un compromiso para abordar las principales amenazas de la IA, un acuerdo para examinar los modelos de IA de empresas tecnológicas antes de su lanzamiento, así como un pacto para establecer un panel global de expertos sobre inteligencia artificial, inspirado en el Panel Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático (IPCC) de Naciones Unidas. Además, en la embajada de Estados Unidos en Londres, 31 países firmaron, en paralelo, una declaración (no vinculante) para establecer límites al uso militar de la IA. Por su parte, China continúa avanzando hacia su objetivo de alcanzar un 70% de autosuficiencia en tecnología crítica para 2025, mientras va aumentando claramente su presencia en los principales organismos internacionales de estandarización relacionados con la tecnología.A toda esta hiperactividad normativa, se sumará la adopción, en septiembre de 2024, de un Pacto Digital Mundial, durante la Cumbre del Futuro que organizará Naciones Unidas. Este pacto supondrá la creación de un marco de cooperación multiactor y multisectorial entre gobiernos, empresas privadas y sociedad civil, que debería establecer unas reglas comunes que guíen el desarrollo digital en el futuro. La aplicación de los derechos humanos en Internet, la regulación de la IA y la inclusión digital serán algunos de los temas principales a discutir.Esta necesidad de regular la IA se verá acentuada también, en los próximos meses, por una creciente democratización de las herramientas de IA, lo que comportará una mayor integración en distintos sectores profesionales. El foco en una IA responsable se intensificará a escala local (más ciudades desplegando estrategias o marcos regulatorios de la IA), nacional y transnacional. Y es que, a medida que la IA adquiere un papel más importante en la toma de decisiones en toda la sociedad, la seguridad, la confiabilidad, la equidad y la responsabilidad son fundamentales. El informe anual de McKinsey sobre el uso de herramientas de IA generativa señala que un tercio de las empresas encuestadas han empezado a utilizar este tipo de programas. El sector tecnológico y de comunicaciones (40%), así como el financiero (38%) y el legal (36%), se encuentran a la cabeza en su uso y aplicación. Sin embargo, este mismo estudio también señala que justamente los sectores laborales que dependen en mayor medida del conocimiento de sus empleados serán los que verán un impacto más disruptivo de estas tecnologías –si este impacto es positivo o negativo es aún incierto–. A diferencia de otras revoluciones que han transformado el mercado laboral, son los llamados «trabajadores de cuello blanco» los que pueden sentirse más vulnerables ante la IA generativa. En cambio, un estudio del Banco Central Europeo asegura que la IA no está suplantando a los trabajadores, pero sí está reduciendo ligeramente sus sueldos, especialmente en empleos considerados como poco o medio cualificados, más expuestos a las herramientas de automatización, y entre las mujeres.En el marco de esta aceleración reguladora de la revolución digital, 2024 también será el año en que la UE desplegará, con todo su potencial, la nueva legislación de servicios y mercados digitales para fijar límites y obligaciones al poder monopolístico de las grandes plataformas y a su responsabilidad en la propagación algorítmica de desinformación y contenido dañino. A partir del 1 de enero, las Big Tech se enfrentan al imperativo de cumplir con estas regulaciones, con multas potenciales por incumplimiento que alcanzan hasta el 6% de la facturación global, según la DSA (Digital Services Act), y entre el 10% y el 20% de la facturación mundial según la DMA (Digital Markets Act). También aumentará en 2024 el flujo de datos internacionales, en particular las transferencias entre la UE y Estados Unidos, en virtud del nuevo Marco de privacidad de datos aprobado en julio de 2023. Veremos también un nuevo escrutinio por parte de ONG y grupos de defensa de los derechos digitales para determinar la legalidad y el respeto a la privacidad individual en estos intercambios.5. Resaca económica y sostenibilidad de la deudaEn 2024 serán más visibles las consecuencias económicas de la sucesión de crisis experimentadas en los últimos años, especialmente el impacto del aumento de los tipos de interés para hacer frente al mayor repunte de la inflación en cuarenta años tras la crisis energética de 2022. Asimismo, el endurecimiento de las condiciones de financiación limitará la política fiscal, tras el rápido aumento del endeudamiento para hacer frente a los impactos de la COVID-19 y la guerra en Ucrania.En este contexto, el crecimiento será débil. El Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI) no espera que la inflación se sitúe en el objetivo de la mayoría de bancos centrales hasta 2025, lo que augura tipos de interés elevados durante un largo período de tiempo, sobre todo si se vuelve a tensionar el precio del petróleo en un contexto de elevada incertidumbre geopolítica. La previsión de crecimiento del FMI para 2024 es del 2,9%, una tasa muy similar a la estimada para 2023 e inferior a las tasas de crecimiento prepandemia.Sin embargo, el enfriamiento será dispar por economías. Estados Unidos parece haber evitado la recesión gracias a la fortaleza de su mercado laboral y a los estímulos fiscales, por lo que se enfrentaría a un aterrizaje suave. En ese país, las políticas de relocalización industrial, como la Inflation Reduction Act, los beneficios empresariales récord poscovid, así como la extraordinaria pérdida de poder adquisitivo causada por la inflación han sido algunos de los ingredientes que explican el renacer del movimiento sindical estadounidense, sin precedentes desde los años setenta del siglo pasado. Su éxito puede ser contagioso a otros sectores y economías con mercados laborales tensionados. Así, en 2024, el descenso de la inflación y el alza de los salarios podría proveer de cierto alivio económico.En la UE habrá un mayor escrutinio sobre las cuentas públicas, especialmente de países con un menor margen financiero como Italia, tras el rápido aumento del endeudamiento para hacer frente a la pandemia y el impacto de la guerra en Ucrania, debido a las condiciones de financiación y la entrada en vigor de la reforma de las reglas fiscales. La «disciplina fiscal» estará también muy presente en la negociación del nuevo marco presupuestario de la UE (MFF, por sus siglas en inglés), donde la UE confrontará sus mayores deseos (apoyo a Ucrania, respaldo a la política industrial, la transición verde y aumento de las partidas para defensa, migración o el Global Gateway) con la realidad (falta de recursos y acuerdo para ampliarlos). La adopción de la Estrategia Europea de Seguridad Económica y el resultado de la investigación antidumping contra las subvenciones chinas al vehículo eléctrico determinarán en buena medida si en el frente económico la UE opta por alinearse con Estados Unidos en su competición estratégica con China o intenta mostrarse como paladín de una globalización reformada.También habrá que seguir de cerca la evolución de una China que se enfrenta a su menor crecimiento económico en 35 años, exceptuando los años de la COVID-19, lastrado por sus desequilibrios, especialmente en lo que concierne a una excesiva acumulación de deuda y a su dependencia del sector inmobiliario. El cambio de las reglas de la globalización impulsadas por la competencia estratégica de Estados Unidos lastrará también sus exportaciones y capacidad de atraer capital en un contexto en el que el liderazgo chino prioriza la seguridad económica al crecimiento. Con una demografía adversa, el país aún no ha conseguido erigir el consumo interno como motor de crecimiento.Por su parte, los países emergentes sentirán con fuerza el frenazo chino, especialmente aquellos con una mayor dependencia comercial y financiera. El éxito en términos de volumen de inversión de la Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta se ha visto ensombrecido por los problemas en la devolución de hasta el 60% de los préstamos, lo que ha llevado a Xi Jinping a anunciar una nueva etapa de inversiones con proyectos más pequeños. En 2024, el nuevo papel de China como prestamista de última instancia y su participación en los procesos de reestructuración de deuda de países en dificultades tendrán una creciente importancia en cómo es percibida y en su influencia geoeconómica sobre el Sur Global.Y es que un elevado número de países emergentes se encuentran en una delicada situación fiscal que, en un contexto de rápido tensionamiento de las condiciones financieras y de fortaleza del dólar, agrava también su vulnerabilidad externa. Aunque algunos de ellos, como México, Vietnam o Marruecos se están aprovechando de la reconfiguración del comercio y de las cadenas de valor (nearshoring), la mayoría de países emergentes pueden verse perjudicados por un escenario de mayor fragmentación económica. Según la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC), el comercio de bienes entre dos bloques geopolíticos hipotéticos –basados en los patrones de votación en Naciones Unidas– ha crecido entre un 4% y un 6% más lento que el comercio dentro de estos bloques desde la invasión de Ucrania.En este contexto de escaso margen monetario y fiscal, el colchón para amortiguar otra crisis es muy reducido, lo que puede exacerbar la volatilidad y el nerviosismo de los mercados ante episodios de incertidumbre. El principal foco de atención puede pasar de Ucrania a Oriente Medio, ya que los shocks de petróleo se transmiten a la economía de manera más amplia que los del gas natural. Esto podría afectar, directamente, a la UE y a España, especialmente dependientes porque importan más del 90% del petróleo que consumen. Además, las reservas estratégicas de petróleo en Estados Unidos se encuentran en mínimos equivalentes a los de 1983, y los pocos países con margen para incrementar su producción de crudo (Arabia Saudí, Emiratos Árabes Unidos y Rusia) puede que no estén por la labor de hacerlo sin concesiones políticas significativas.6. Sur(es) y Norte(s)tSi en nuestro ejercicio para 2023 anunciábamos la consolidación del Sur Global como espacio de confrontación y liderazgo, y apuntábamos a la presencia estratégica de India, Turquía, Arabia Saudí o Brasil, en 2024 esta reconfiguración dará una vuelta de tuerca más. Las contradicciones y fragmentaciones de esta lógica dicotómica Norte-Sur quedarán más expuestas que nunca. El Sur Global se ha consolidado como un actor clave en la contestación a Occidente bajo lógicas antiimperialistas o de doble rasero. La imagen más simbólica de este momento de expansión geopolítica la veremos en octubre de 2024, cuando los BRICS se reúnan en Rusia para formalizar su ampliación. Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica suman a su club a Arabia Saudí, Egipto, Emiratos Árabes Unidos, Etiopía e Irán. Juntos suponen el 46% de la población mundial, un 29% del PIB global, e incluyen a dos de los tres mayores productores de petróleo del mundo. De esta forma, los BRICS ganarán una voz todavía más potente, aunque inevitablemente también es posible que integren más contradicciones internas y agendas propias. No obstante, la elección de Javier Milei como presidente de Argentina, que ha confirmado su decisión de no unirse a los BRICS, también alimenta la idea de este choque de agendas e intereses en el Sur Global: Arabia Saudí e Irán son competidores por la influencia estratégica en el Golfo Pérsico, e India y China tienen sus propias disputas fronterizas en el Himalaya. El Sur Global seguirá ganando influencia, pero también heterogeneidad. Más allá de una retórica poscolonial compartida, su acción es muy diversa. El Sur Global es multirregional y multidimensional y está compuesto por regímenes políticos diferentes. Pero también es el espacio geográfico donde se consolidan los flujos comerciales globales como consecuencia de la reglobalización. El último informe anual de la OMC confirma que, a pesar de que las economías avanzadas siguen siendo actores clave del comercio mundial, ya no son dominantes. Sin embargo, si en 2023 hablábamos de la aceleración geopolítica de los «otros» con India como símbolo de este potencial liderazgo del Sur Global, en 2024 será América Latina quien tratará de adoptar un papel protagonista. Brasil será el país anfitrión del G-20, mientras que Perú acogerá la Cumbre de Cooperación Económica en Asia Pacífico (APEC).Y en esta superación de dicotomías, también el Norte Global puede sufrir una fractura interna profunda si se confirma el retorno de Donald Trump a la Casa Blanca. La distancia transatlántica se ha impuesto como el nuevo marco de unas relaciones con más carga transaccional que de alianza tradicional. El desencuentro entre Washington y Bruselas se agravará en 2024 cuando Estados Unidos pida a la UE aumentar su contribución al Gobierno de Volodímir Zelensky y la propia lógica de divisiones internas entre socios comunitarios lo impida. Especialmente tenso será el segundo semestre de 2024, cuando Hungría –el país más reticente de la UE sobre la ayuda militar y la futura adhesión de Ucrania– asuma la presidencia rotatoria de la Unión. Será también paradójico que esta brecha en el Norte Global se ensanche por la guerra de Ucrania. Precisamente, en 2023, la invasión rusa fue el mortero que cimentó la unidad transatlántica y confrontó a la UE y a Estados Unidos con los límites de su capacidad de influencia ante un Sur Global que cuestionaba el doble rasero de Occidente. En 2024, en cambio, la guerra en Ucrania puede aumentar la distancia entre Washington y Bruselas.A pesar de esta lógica de confrontación, la miopía geopolítica del binarismo está cada vez más fuera de lugar. Y, sin embargo, cuesta de superar. El hecho de que Estados Unidos y la UE sigan planteándose su relación con América Latina solo como espacio de explotación de recursos y de disputa geopolítica con China es parte de esa miopía. De momento, el fracaso reiterado de las negociaciones para un acuerdo UE-Mercosur alejan una vez más el sueño suramericano de poder reforzar su presencia comercial en el mercado único europeo. Las negociaciones se retomarán en el primer semestre de 2024, después de que Paraguay tome el relevo de Brasil en la presidencia de Mercosur.7. Retroceso en los compromisos internacionales2023 deja la cooperación internacional en la cuerda floja. Con un lenguaje cada vez más contundente, António Guterres declaraba que el mundo está «lamentablemente fuera de rumbo» en la consecución de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS), que en 2023 llegaron al ecuador de su implementación. 2024 tiene que demostrar si la comunidad internacional todavía es capaz y quiere consensuar respuestas coordinadas a problemas globales compartidos, a través de órganos de gobernanza colectiva. No será fácil. Estamos ante una aceleración de la crisis ecológica, ante un récord de migraciones y desplazamientos forzosos, así como ante una clara involución de la agenda para la igualdad de género.Por primera vez, la Agencia Internacional de la Energía (AIE) proyecta que la demanda mundial de petróleo, carbón y gas natural alcanzará su punto máximo en esta década basándose únicamente en la configuración de políticas actuales, según World Energy Outlook 2023. A corto plazo, los países productores de combustibles fósiles ignoran las alertas climáticas y planean aumentar la extracción de carbón, petróleo y gas. La elección de un Estado petrolero, los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, como anfitrión de una cumbre climática y el nombramiento de un ejecutivo de combustibles fósiles para presidirla, ya era, como mínimo, un mal augurio. Y, sin embargo, la COP28 de Dubái ha sido la primera que ha conseguido sacar un texto que reconoce explícitamente la necesidad de «dejar atrás» los combustibles fósiles: el petróleo, el carbón y el gas, como principales responsables de la crisis climática. Si bien el acuerdo final ha sido celebrado como histórico por hacer referencia a esta necesidad de iniciar una transición (transitioning away from) para garantizar unas emisiones cero netas en 2050, el grado de ambición demostrado no es suficiente para cumplir con los objetivos del Acuerdo de París. Asimismo, si bien la creación de un Fondo para Pérdidas y Daños para compensar a los países más afectados por el cambio climático también es un paso positivo, la recaudación inicial de 700 millones de dólares queda muy por debajo de lo necesario. Cada año, los países en desarrollo hacen frente a 400.000 millones de dólares de pérdidas vinculadas a la acción climática. En este contexto, no solo se corre el riesgo de empeorar los impactos climáticos, sino que también veremos emerger, todavía con más fuerza, tensiones sociales y políticas entre gobiernos y sociedades por la explotación de los recursos. En Europa hay una creciente insatisfacción con las políticas de transición climática de la Unión, y el previsible ascenso de las fuerzas euroescépticas y de derecha radical en las elecciones al Parlamento Europeo de junio de 2024 puede aumentar todavía más esta presión. La hiperactividad regulatoria en cuestiones climáticas e industriales está aumentando la politización de este tema, avivando el malestar social en ciertos estados miembros. Italia, Polonia, los Países Bajos y ciertos sectores de Alemania, en especial del partido de extrema derecha Alternativa para Alemania (AfD), están tratando de limitar las ambiciones de la UE en materia climática. La llegada del nuevo Gobierno sueco, apoyado por la derecha radical, ha frenado de golpe los compromisos climáticos que lideraba uno de los países de la UE que más ha contribuido a las políticas medioambientales comunitarias. Un retorno de Donald Trump a la Casa Blanca también haría tambalear de nuevo algunos de los limitados avances domésticos e internacionales en este ámbito.Según una encuesta realizada por Ipsos, mientras una gran parte de los hogares europeos continúan dando prioridad al medio ambiente frente al crecimiento económico, esta proporción está en declive: si en 2019 un 53% de los hogares preferían la protección del medio ambiente, en 2022 esta cifra se había reducido cinco puntos, pese al impacto evidente de los fenómenos climáticos. Sin embargo, esta tendencia de «no en mi patio trasero» no se limita a Europa. A finales de 2023, hemos visto la resistencia de los panameños contra la ampliación de contratos de minería. Algunos expertos hablan de «choque de ambientalismos» para referirse a la confrontación que surge entre aquellos que quieren proteger los recursos naturales de su país y el deterioro de los ecosistemas, y los intereses de gobiernos que buscan recursos para alimentar su transición energética. Lo mismo puede ocurrir en la UE. A principios de 2024, entrará en vigor la Ley de Materias Primas Críticas que quiere garantizar el suministro de níquel, litio, magnesio y otros materiales esenciales para la transición verde y las industrias estratégicas, vitales para los coches eléctricos y las energías renovables, los equipos militares y los sistemas aeroespaciales, así como para los ordenadores y los teléfonos móviles. Y, en este contexto, la UE prevé revivir la minería en el continente. Una decisión que puede movilizar protestas ecologistas en la Unión en los próximos meses.También en 2024 se espera que los estados miembros de Naciones Unidas lleguen a un acuerdo global para acabar con la contaminación por plásticos. Será un tratado internacional, jurídicamente vinculante, considerado como el pacto medioambiental multilateral más importante desde el Acuerdo de París, y que fijará un plan de actuación hasta 2040.Sin embargo, son las políticas de género y las políticas migratorias las que están más expuestas a esta ola radical que ha transformado las agendas gubernamentales, sobre todo, en la UE y en América Latina. Si bien es verdad que la igualdad de género durante 2023 se ha recuperado a niveles previos a la pandemia, el ritmo de progreso se ha desacelerado. A este paso, se necesitarán 131 años para alcanzar la plena paridad. Aunque la proporción de mujeres contratadas para puestos de liderazgo ha aumentado de manera constante en aproximadamente un 1% anual a nivel mundial durante los últimos ocho años, esta tendencia se revirtió en 2023, retrocediendo a los niveles de 2021. Las emergentes políticas exteriores feministas, que definían aquellos países con un claro compromiso de promover la igualdad de género en las relaciones internacionales, han sumado cuatro bajas importantes en los últimos meses: Suecia, Luxemburgo, los Países Bajos y Argentina. Los cambios de Gobierno, junto con la creciente politización y polarización de las cuestiones percibidas como «feministas», han demostrado el fácil abandono de estas iniciativas, dependientes de las orientaciones progresistas de los gobiernos en el poder. México, otro de los países que ha adoptado estas políticas, se enfrentará a unos comicios en junio que también marcarán la continuidad o el abandono de su compromiso con la igualdad de género en la acción exterior. Y, pese a no tener una política exterior feminista, el retorno de Trump a la Casa Blanca podría llevar al restablecimiento de políticas restrictivas sobre el aborto y de recortes de financiación contra las ONG internacionales que promueven los derechos sexuales y reproductivos.Además, el Instituto Internacional para la Democracia y la Asistencia Electoral (IDEA) denuncia el resurgimiento de tendencias antifeministas en países como Croacia e Italia, destacando discursos sexistas y homófobos por parte de líderes europeos como Viktor Orbán, Andrzej Duda o Giorgia Meloni, que justifican ataques a los derechos de las mujeres y de las personas LGBTQIA+ y socavan años de esfuerzos para lograr avances en la ruptura de los estereotipos de género. Si bien el Plan de Acción en materia de Género III de la UE tiene vigencia hasta 2025, un cambio de orientación política en Bruselas también diluiría los compromisos de uno de los actores más implicados en este ámbito. En una nota más positiva, será interesante seguir en 2024 los avances de Naciones Unidas respecto a la Convención contra los crímenes contra la humanidad, ya que movimientos feministas y de la sociedad civil de todo el mundo aprovecharán esta oportunidad para tratar de codificar el apartheid de género como crimen contra la humanidad –especialmente debido a la continua discriminación y opresión del régimen talibán hacia las mujeres afganas y a la situación de las mujeres iraníes.También las políticas migratorias europeas han formalizado un retroceso importante. El Pacto Europeo de Migración y Asilo, que está previsto que salga adelante antes de las elecciones europeas de 2024, supone una legitimación de las políticas antiinmigración de la UE. Dicho pacto permite retrasar el registro de los solicitantes de asilo, instaurar procedimientos de asilo fronterizos de segunda categoría y ampliar el tiempo de detención en frontera; es decir, rebaja estándares y legaliza lo que hasta ahora era directamente ilegal. Este acuerdo en ciernes refleja los niveles de polarización y politización que marcan el paso de la respuesta europea a las migraciones. Y, en plena precampaña electoral, la utilización política del debate migratorio será todavía más evidente en los próximos meses. Ello forma parte, además, de otro proceso más de fondo: las políticas de externalización de la migración de la UE, que han alimentado también la estigmatización de los inmigrantes y refugiados en la región de Oriente Medio y Norte de Africa (MENA por sus siglas en inglés). 8. Desbordamiento humanitarioLas guerras y la violencia impulsaron el desplazamiento forzado a escala mundial hasta una cifra récord estimada de 114 millones de personas a finales de septiembre de 2023, según ACNUR. Los principales generadores de estos desplazamientos forzados fueron la guerra en Ucrania y los conflictos en Sudán, la República Democrática del Congo y Myanmar; además de la sequía, las inundaciones y la inseguridad que azota Somalia; así como una prolongada crisis humanitaria en Afganistán.Solo en los primeros seis meses de 2023, se presentaron 1,6 millones de nuevas solicitudes individuales de asilo a nivel mundial, la cifra más alta jamás registrada. No se trata de una situación excepcional. La reactivación de conflictos olvidados ha aumentado los niveles de volatilidad y violencia. En octubre de 2023, más de 100.500 personas –más del 80% de los 120.000 habitantes estimados de Nagorno Karabaj– huyeron a Armenia tras la toma de control del enclave por parte de Azerbaiyán. También hubo miles de desplazados en el norte de Shan, por la escalada de combates entre las Fuerzas Armadas de Myanmar y varios grupos armados. A finales de octubre de 2023, casi dos millones de personas se encuentran desplazadas internamente en Myanmar, en condiciones precarias y necesitadas de asistencia vital. Y las imágenes de más de un millón de palestinos huyendo de sus hogares por los bombardeos israelíes, que se iniciaron tras el brutal ataque de Hamás del 7 de octubre, reflejan la crisis humanitaria que azota Gaza.Sin embargo, este incremento en el número de refugiados y desplazados no ha ido acompañado de un refuerzo de la ayuda internacional necesaria para cubrir sus necesidades. Más de un millón de refugiados rohingya en Bangladesh deberán hacer frente al menguante compromiso internacional. En 2023, Naciones Unidas redujo un tercio la asistencia alimentaria y la ayuda humanitaria a este colectivo. La falta de financiación internacional disminuyó considerablemente los niveles de asistencia en 2023, y el Programa Mundial de Alimentos (PMA) se vio obligado a recortar entre un 30% y un 50% el tamaño y el alcance de la asistencia alimentaria, monetaria y nutricional que ofrece. 2.300 millones de personas, casi un 30% de la población mundial, hoy están al límite de una situación de inseguridad alimentaria moderada o grave. El alza continuada del precio de los alimentos en 2024 y el impacto de las condiciones meteorológicas adversas en la producción agrícola pueden empeorar todavía más esta situación. La Oficina para la Coordinación de Asuntos Humanitarios (OCHA) de Naciones Unidas prevé que entre 105 y 110 millones de personas necesitarán asistencia alimentaria al menos hasta principios de 2024, con un aumento de las necesidades en las regiones de África Austral y América Latina y el Caribe, y una disminución neta en África Oriental.De momento, los expertos alertan sobre el riesgo de una nueva crisis del arroz en 2024, como consecuencia de la restricción en las exportaciones que impuso India para intentar contener los efectos del descenso de producción interna. La ola expansiva de esta prohibición ha provocado también el encarecimiento de los precios del arroz en Tailandia y Vietnam, segundo y tercer mayor exportador de arroz después de India, que han visto aumentar los precios un 14% y un 22%, respectivamente. A ello se suman los efectos del fenómeno climático de El Niño, asociado con el calor y la sequía en todo el Océano Pacífico, que puede dañar la producción de 2024. Por todo ello, los expertos advierten que, si India mantiene las restricciones actuales, el mundo va camino de repetir la crisis del arroz de 2008. El fenómeno de El Niño, que no se disipará hasta mediados de 2024, suele estar asociado, por una parte, a un incremento de las precipitaciones en algunas zonas meridionales de América del Sur, del sur de los Estados Unidos, el Cuerno de África y Asia central; pero, por la otra, también puede provocar graves sequías en Australia, Indonesia y partes del sureste asiático. El último episodio de este fenómeno, en 2016, significó el año más cálido jamás registrado, con unos récords globales de calor que todavía no se han superado.Los gobiernos donantes y las agencias humanitarias deben prepararse para un 2024 de grandes necesidades de asistencia en múltiples regiones. 2023 ya nos ha dejado varias muestras de ello: sequía extrema en el Amazonas y restricciones del tráfico marítimo en el canal de Panamá; incendios forestales en Bolivia y cortes de luz diarios en Ecuador debido a la baja producción de electricidad que proviene en más del 80% de centrales hidroeléctricas; las peores inundaciones registradas en el noroeste de Argentina, que provocaron además deslizamientos de tierra que afectaron a más de 6.000 personas; y un devastador huracán de categoría 5 en México que sorprendió a autoridades y científicos, los cuales no pudieron prever la intensidad del fenómeno. 9. Securitización versus derechosEl conflicto entre seguridad y derechos fundamentales ha sido una constante en 2023, y la incertidumbre electoral de los próximos meses fomentará, todavía más, la tentación de las políticas de control y mano dura. El debate público en toda América Latina, sin excepción, ha quedado copado por la seguridad, con efectos directos sobre otras crisis como la migratoria, que desde hace una década afecta a todo el continente, y que en 2024 se prevé todavía más intensa. El bukelismo gana adeptos. El nuevo presidente argentino, Javier Milei, ha declarado su admiración por las políticas de mano dura del presidente salvadoreño, Nayib Bukele. También la campaña electoral en Ecuador estuvo muy marcada por el debate de la seguridad. El continente lucha contra una nueva ola de criminalidad que se ha extendido a países tradicionalmente más estables, que ahora forman parte de rutas rentables del narcotráfico, como son los casos de Paraguay y Argentina. El tráfico de personas, sobre todo la explotación criminal de la crisis migratoria venezolana, también ha crecido en toda América Latina. En este contexto, Naciones Unidas y la Interpol han puesto en marcha una iniciativa conjunta contra la trata de seres humanos. Está por ver el impacto que las elecciones venezolanas puedan tener en esta crisis migratoria, que ya ha provocado la salida de más de siete millones de personas desde 2014.Asimismo, con el aumento de la impunidad, también ha crecido el riesgo de la tentación autoritaria por parte de los gobiernos de la región latinoamericana, con la militarización de la seguridad pública y el debilitamiento democrático en todo el continente. También en la UE. La sensación de vulnerabilidad se ha convertido, desde hace tiempo, en un revulsivo político para determinadas fuerzas en Europa. Desde el inicio de la guerra en Gaza, algunos países europeos han extremado la seguridad por miedo a atentados, hasta el punto de prohibir manifestaciones de apoyo a la población palestina, como fue el caso en Francia. En este sentido, la securitización de los movimientos sociales también emerge como una estrategia que seguirá ganando peso en 2024. Cada vez más, los gobiernos democráticos están extremando la presión sobre los movimientos de protesta: multas, prohibiciones de la libertad de expresión o persecución judicial están empequeñeciendo el espacio de la protesta civil. En este contexto, la UE ha llegado a un acuerdo en 2023 para legislar contra las demandas estratégicas que pretenden desincentivar la participación pública o silenciar a medios independientes (las llamadas SLAP, en sus siglas en inglés) que debería ratificarse antes del final de mandato.Finalmente, el debate de la seguridad y su efecto sobre los derechos individuales marcará también los meses previos a los Juegos Olímpicos de 2024 en París. Grupos de derechos humanos han denunciado los planes del Gobierno francés para la utilización de cámaras de reconocimiento con IA para detectar en tiempo real actividades sospechosas en las calles de la capital durante los juegos. La tecnología es un elemento crucial de la transformación que vive el binomio seguridad y conflicto. Los drones se han convertido en un arma clave para la resistencia en Ucrania, como también lo fue en el arsenal de Hamás utilizado en su ataque del 7 de octubre contra Israel. Precisamente unos Estados Unidos en pleno recorte presupuestario han asignado, en cambio, una inyección de dinero extra, en 2024, al Pentágono para el desarrollo de la llamada «guerra electrónica». 10. Desacoplamiento entre intereses y valoresHay un hilo conductor en muchos de los puntos anteriores que hilvana un mundo cada vez más diverso y (des)ordenado a través de intereses y alianzas cambiantes. En su informe de prospectiva estratégica de 2023, la Comisión Europea reconoce que la «batalla de narrativas» que durante tanto tiempo utilizó como argumento de la confrontación geopolítica entre democracia y autoritarismo está quedando obsoleta. Ello va más allá de la constatación de que Occidente ha perdido la batalla por el relato de la guerra de Ucrania y de que su doble rasero ante los conflictos del mundo empequeñece la capacidad de influencia de la UE. El caso de Sudán es el ejemplo más claro de cómo Occidente puede comprometerse con guerras que considera existenciales para la supervivencia de sus propios valores, como la de Ucrania, mientras ignora el genocidio que se está cometiendo, con asesinatos casa por casa, en los campos de refugiados de Darfur.El mundo se ha transformado en una «batalla de ofertas» que configura tanto la opinión pública como la acción de los gobiernos. Crece la diversidad de opciones y de alianzas. Las narrativas hasta hace poco hegemónicas o están contestadas o ya no sirven para explicar la realidad. En esta «multipolaridad desequilibrada» (unbalanced multipolarity), con potencias medianas marcando agendas regionales, los grandes actores tradicionales están obligados a buscar su propio espacio. La competición global por los recursos que deben alimentar las transiciones verde y digital acentúa, todavía más, esta geometría variable de acuerdos y alianzas. Y los resultados del ciclo electoral de 2024 pueden acabar reforzando está transformación. La tentación aislacionista de Estados Unidos es una realidad. Vladímir Putin revalidará en las urnas su capacidad de resistencia, después de haber sorteado los efectos de las sanciones internacionales y de haber construido un andamio económico para resistir una guerra larga en Ucrania. En India, la popularidad de Narendra Modi permanece intacta y alimenta el dominio de su partido. El interrogante electoral dibuja un 2024 que empieza totalmente abierto. La crisis del orden liberal, agudizada por la reacción internacional a los últimos conflictos, y la erosión del multilateralismo –con el desafío explícito a Naciones Unidas– alimentan todavía más esta sensación de dispersión del poder global hacia una variedad de potencias medianas dinámicas, capaces de ayudar a moldear el entorno internacional en las próximas décadas.Arranca un año clave para evaluar la capacidad de resistencia de unos sistemas democráticos sometidos, desde hace tiempo, a una profunda erosión. Estaremos pendientes del resultado de las urnas, así como de los límites de la impunidad con que actúan, cada vez más desacomplejadamente, las armas.Calendario CIDOB 2024: 75 fechas para marcar en la agenda1 de enero – Renovación Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas. Argelia, Guyana, la República de Corea, Sierra Leona y Eslovenia empezarán a formar parte del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU como miembros no permanentes en sustitución de Albania, Brasil, Gabón, Ghana y los Emiratos Árabes Unidos que finalizan membresía. 1 de enero – Disolución de la República de Artsaj. La autoproclamada república de Nagorno Karabaj dejará de existir a comienzos de año, después de más de tres décadas de control del territorio. En septiembre de 2023, Azerbaiyán emprendió una ofensiva militar con el objetivo de reintegrar este enclave de población mayoritariamente armenia. Esta ofensiva llevó a la autoproclamada república a anunciar su disolución. 1 de enero – Ampliación de los BRICS. Arabia Saudita, Egipto, Etiopía, Emiratos Árabes Unidos e Irán se unirán como miembros de pleno derecho en los BRICS (Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica). Finalmente, el nuevo presidente de Argentina, Javier Milei, ha descartado el ingreso de su país. 1 de enero – Presidencia belga del Consejo de la UE. Bélgica asumirá la presidencia rotatoria de la UE en substitución de España y hasta el 30 de junio. El semestre belga marcará el fin de este ciclo institucional en la Unión Europea. 7 de enero – Elecciones parlamentarias en Bangladesh. Estos comicios tendrán lugar en un contexto de una profunda división política del país. Esta división ha llevado a manifestaciones multitudinarias por parte de la oposición a finales de 2023 para reclamar un gobierno interino que supervise las elecciones. La actual primera ministra, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, aspira a renovar su mandato tras 15 años en el poder, mientras su principal contendiente, la líder del Partido Nacional de Bangladesh, Khaleda Zia, se encuentra actualmente en arresto domiciliario por cargos de corrupción. 13 de enero – Elecciones generales en Taiwán. Por primera vez desde la democratización de Taiwán, tres candidatos compiten por la presidencia tras el fracaso de la oposición para establecer un frente común: el actual vicepresidente, Lai Ching-te del gobernante Partido Democrático Progresista; Hou You-yi del Kuomintang; y Ko Wen-je, exalcalde de Taipéi y líder del Partido Popular Taiwanés. El resultado de estas elecciones marcará el curso de la política de Taiwán respecto a China, con la mirada puesta en Estados Unidos, en un momento de crecientes tensiones entre Taipéi y Beijing. 14 de enero – Toma de posesión de Bernardo Arévalo como presidente de Guatemala. La victoria del candidato del Movimiento Semilla en las elecciones de 2023 supuso una sorpresa general. Desde la celebración de los comicios, la tensión política y social se ha intensificado en el país debido a los esfuerzos de la fiscalía guatemalteca por impugnar los resultados electorales y evitar que Arévalo asuma el cargo. 15 – 19 de enero – Foro de Davos. Cita anual que reúne a los principales líderes políticos, altos ejecutivos de las compañías más importantes del mundo, líderes de organizaciones internacionales y ONGs, así como personalidades culturales y sociales destacadas. Esta edición se enfocará principalmente en examinar las oportunidades proporcionadas por el desarrollo de las tecnologías emergentes y sus repercusiones en la toma de decisiones y la cooperación internacional. 15 – 20 de enero – 19ª Cumbre del Movimiento de los Países No Alineados. Uganda será la sede de la próxima Cumbre formada por los 120 países pertenecientes a esta agrupación de estados. El lema de esta edición es «Profundizar la cooperación para una riqueza global compartida» y está previsto que se aborden múltiples retos globales actuales con el objetivo de fomentar la cooperación entre los estados miembros. 21 – 23 de enero – Tercera Cumbre del Sur del G-77 + China. Uganda será la anfitriona de este foro que, bajo el lema «No dejar a nadie atrás» busca promover la cooperación Sur-Sur. Los 134 países miembros de Asia, África, América Latina y el Caribe se focalizarán en ámbitos como el comercio, la inversión, el desarrollo sostenible, el cambio climático y la eliminación de la pobreza. 4 de febrero – Elecciones presidenciales en El Salvador. Nayib Bukele, quien encabeza el partido Nuevas Ideas y ocupa actualmente la presidencia de El Salvador, se perfila como el claro favorito para su reelección. Desde marzo de 2022, el país se encuentra en estado de excepción, como respuesta a los desafíos de seguridad que afectaban a la nación. 8 de febrero – Elecciones generales en Pakistán. Desde la destitución de Imran Khan como primer ministro en abril de 2022, Pakistán se encuentra en una situación de inestabilidad política, una profunda crisis económica y un aumento de la violencia por grupos armados. Los comicios serán supervisados por un gobierno interino creado tras la disolución del Parlamento pakistaní en agosto de 2023. 14 de febrero – Elecciones presidenciales y legislativas en Indonesia. Tres aspirantes compiten por suceder al actual presidente, Joko Widodo, que, después de dos mandatos, no puede presentarse a la reelección. El próximo líder se enfrentará al desafío de impulsar el crecimiento en una economía dependiente del consumo interno, impulsar el desarrollo de la industria tecnológica y gestionar las presiones de China y Estados Unidos para proteger sus intereses nacionales. 16 – 18 de febrero – 60ª Conferencia de Seguridad de Múnich. Con carácter anual, es el mayor foro independiente sobre políticas de seguridad internacional que reúne a figuras de más de setenta países con cargos de alto nivel. El fortalecimiento de un orden internacional basado en reglas, el impacto de las guerras en Ucrania y Gaza, la resistencia frente a tendencias revisionistas o las implicaciones del cambio climático para la seguridad serán algunos de los temas principales en la agenda de este año. 17 – 18 de febrero – Cumbre de la Unión Africana. Etiopía, quien ostenta la presidencia de la Unión Africana, será la organizadora de la cumbre. Este año se examinarán algunos de los numerosos frentes abiertos en el continente. Estos ejemplos incluyen: la situación de inestabilidad en el Sahel, la creciente inseguridad alimentaria mundial, los desastres naturales en el continente o el retroceso democrático. Además, las tensiones entre Marruecos y Argelia serán centrales ya que ambos países aspiran a la presidencia. 25 de febrero – Elecciones presidenciales en Senegal. Tras múltiples olas de protestas, el actual presidente senegalés, Macky Sall, anunció su decisión de no presentarse a un tercer mandato. Ha sido la primera vez en la historia democrática del país que un presidente incumbente no se presenta a la reelección. La necesidad de garantizar puestos de trabajo para la población joven del país será una de las cuestiones centrales en la campaña electoral. 26 – 29 de febrero – Mobile World Congress. Barcelona acoge el mayor evento de telefonía móvil del mundo donde reúne a las principales empresas tecnológicas y de comunicación internacionales. Esta edición estará dedicada a la tecnología 5G, la conectividad, la promoción de una inteligencia artificial humanista, o la transformación digital, entre otros temas. 1 de marzo – Elecciones parlamentarias en Irán. Con la mirada puesta en la sucesión del ayatolá Ali Jamenei por cuestiones de edad, los iraníes elegirán a los representantes de la Asamblea Consultiva Islámica y la Asamblea de Expertos; esta última encargada de elegir al nuevo líder supremo en los próximos años. No obstante, estos comicios se encontrarán marcados por la escalada de tensiones en Oriente Medio, y la profunda crisis económica y social que ha aumentado la desafección popular con el régimen. 8 de marzo – Día internacional de la mujer. Se ha convertido en una fecha clave en la agenda política y social de muchos países, como lo demuestran las movilizaciones masivas que han tomado impulso en los últimos años especialmente en América Latina, Estados Unidos y Europa. El objetivo común es la lucha por los derechos de la mujer y la igualdad de género en todo el mundo. 10 de marzo – Elecciones parlamentarias en Portugal. El país afronta elecciones anticipadas después de la crisis institucional abierta por la dimisión del primer ministro socialista António Costa. El exjefe de gobierno portugués fue objeto de una investigación judicial por presuntos delitos de corrupción que afectaron directamente a varios miembros de su gabinete. 17 de marzo – Elecciones presidenciales en Rusia. Aunque se presume que Vladímir Putin logrará la reelección manteniéndose en el poder hasta 2030, Rusia acude a las urnas en un contexto marcado por múltiples desafíos de seguridad interna. La retirada rusa de la región ucraniana de Járkov, el impacto de la guerra en Ucrania, el fallido levantamiento por parte de Wagner el pasado junio y los disturbios antisemitas en el Cáucaso Norte en octubre de 2023, podrían forzar a Putin a realizar profundas remodelaciones de la cúpula política y militar aprovechando el calendario electoral. 18 de marzo – Décimo aniversario de la anexión rusa de Crimea. La anexión de Crimea por parte de Rusia, país que había invadido la región semanas antes, fue formalizada mediante un referéndum sobre el estatus político de Crimea que sucedió sin reconocimiento internacional. La anexión se produjo tras la caída del entonces presidente ucraniano, Víktor Yanukóvich, de orientación prorrusa, tras una serie de protestas que exigían una mayor integración europea. 21 – 22 de marzo – Cumbre sobre Energía Nuclear. La Agencia Internacional de la Energía Atómica junto al Gobierno belga reunirá en Bruselas a más de 30 jefes de Estado y de gobierno de todo el mundo, así como a representantes de la industria energética y de la sociedad civil. La cumbre busca potenciar la energía nuclear frente a los desafíos que suponen la reducción del uso de combustibles fósiles, la mejora de la seguridad energética y el desarrollo económico sostenible. 31 de marzo – Elecciones presidenciales en Ucrania. Según la Constitución ucraniana, las elecciones presidenciales deben celebrarse en el último domingo de marzo durante el quinto año del mandato presidencial. Sin embargo, no es seguro que se acaben convocando ya que la ley marcial, impuesta desde el inicio de la invasión rusa del país en 2022, no permite su celebración. La falta de fondos y la oposición popular de los ucranianos a la celebración de los comicios en tiempo de guerra son factores a destacar. 31 de marzo – Elecciones locales en Turquía. El Partido Republicano del Pueblo (CHP), principal partido de la oposición, aspira a conservar el control de los municipios clave que obtuvo en 2019. Entre ellos, la capital, Ankara, Estambul, y otras ciudades significativas. La reelección de Recep Tayyip Erdoğan y la retención de la mayoría parlamentaria en las elecciones de 2023 han motivado a su formación, el Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo (AKP), a tratar de recuperar terreno a nivel municipal. 7 de abril – 30 aniversario del inicio del genocidio en Rwanda. Tras la muerte de los presidentes de Burundi y Rwanda al estrellarse el avión en el que viajaban, se inició una campaña de exterminio sistemático organizada por el gobierno hutu contra la población tutsi que duraría 100 días. El 15 de julio de 1994, el Frente Patriótico Rwandés estableció un gobierno interino de unidad nacional en Kigali que pondrían fin al genocidio. Se estima que entre 500.000 y 1.000.000 de personas fueron asesinadas. Abril – Mayo – Elecciones generales en la India. Pese a las crecientes tendencias iliberales, la «mayor democracia del mundo» acude a las urnas entre abril y mayo. El actual primer ministro indio, Narendra Modi, aspira a un tercer mandato frente a una oposición más unida que nunca bajo la Alianza Inclusiva de Desarrollo Nacional de la India (INDIA por sus siglas en inglés). 2 de mayo – Elecciones locales en Reino Unido. Las elecciones para renovar los consejos locales y alcaldías en Inglaterra, incluyendo Londres y el condado de Gran Manchester, serán un indicador del nivel de apoyo tanto para el Partido Laborista como para los Conservadores, anticipando las elecciones generales previstas para enero de 2025. 5 de mayo – Elecciones generales en Panamá. La sociedad civil panameña elegirá nuevos representantes para la presidencia, Asamblea Nacional, alcaldía y otros representantes locales. Este proceso electoral tiene lugar en un contexto de marcada polarización y creciente tensión social, acentuadas por temas relacionados con la seguridad interna, disputas políticas y la gestión de los recursos naturales. 19 de mayo – Elecciones presidenciales y legislativas en la República Dominicana. El actual presidente, Luis Abinader, líder del Partido Revolucionario Moderno, busca la reelección en unas elecciones en las que la mayoría de los partidos de la oposición se unirán bajo la Alianza Opositora Rescate, RD. Las tensiones territoriales, migratorias y económicas con la vecina Haití serán temas centrales durante la campaña electoral. Junio – Elecciones presidenciales en Mauritania. El actual presidente, Mohammed Ould Ghazouani, buscará la reelección después de cuatro años de un gobierno continuista que comenzó tras la salida del expresidente Mohammed Ould Abdelaziz en 2019, quien hoy enfrenta acusaciones de múltiples delitos de corrupción. El ganador de las elecciones deberá afrontar crecientes tensiones sociales, así como conflictos geopolíticos en toda la región. 2 de junio – Elecciones generales y federales en México. Claudia Sheinbaum, precandidata a la presidencia de México por el Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional (Morena), parte como clara favorita frente a la principal candidatura opositora del Frente Amplio por México, integrado por los partidos Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), Acción Nacional (PAN) y de la Revolución Democrática (PRD). En estas elecciones no solo se elige a la presidencia y el gobierno, sino también a senadurías y diputaciones federales, así como miles cargos estatales y/o municipales en 30 de las 32 entidades federativas. 6 – 9 de junio – Elecciones al Parlamento Europeo. Las elecciones se llevarán a cabo de manera simultánea en los 27 países que conforman la Unión Europea. Una de las mayores incógnitas será conocer el avance de los partidos populistas y de extrema derecha, el peso de las familias tradicionales socialdemócrata y conservadora, y las posibles alianzas que puedan surgir para la elección posterior de los principales cargos europeos. 9 de junio – Elecciones federales en Bélgica. Coincidiendo con la presidencia belga de la Unión Europea, el país celebrará elecciones federales, europeas y regionales el mismo día. Una de las incógnitas más significativas será el resultado del partido de ultraderecha Vlaams Belang, que aspira a aumentar considerablemente su apoyo hasta poner a prueba la resistencia del cordón sanitario que los ha mantenido hasta ahora apartados del poder. 13 – 15 de junio – 50ª Cumbre del G-7 en Italia. Savelletri, un pequeño pueblo en la región italiana de Apulia será el escenario de una nueva edición del G-7. En esta reunión, se abordarán los principales desafíos geopolíticos a nivel mundial y su impacto en la economía internacional, junto con otros temas fundamentales para la agenda italiana, como la inmigración y las relaciones con África. 20 de junio – Día Mundial del Refugiado. El número de personas desplazadas por la fuerza en 2023 ha alcanzado cifras récord. Los impactos de la guerra en Ucrania, los numerosos conflictos en Oriente Medio y en el continente africano, así como las catástrofes naturales vinculadas al cambio climático, han llevado a un mayor número de desplazados internos y refugiados. Durante esta semana de junio, se dará a conocer el informe anual de ACNUR de tendencias de desplazamientos forzados en todo el mundo. Primer semestre – Despliegue de la Misión Internacional en Haití. Kenia liderará el despliegue de un contingente de seguridad en el cual participarán diferentes países. El objetivo es hacer frente a la violencia de las pandillas haitianas que han provocado una importante crisis de seguridad y de gobernabilidad. El Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, previa solicitud del secretario general y del primer ministro haitiano, autorizó una misión multinacional de seguridad con un año de duración, en octubre de 2023. Primer semestre – Cumbre del Diálogo de Seguridad Cuadrilateral (QUAD). India acogerá una nueva edición de este foro estratégico del Indo-Pacífico del que forman parte Australia, India, Japón y Estados Unidos para abordar cuestiones comunes en materia de comercio, tecnologías críticas, derechos humanos o cambio climático.Julio – 24ª Cumbre de la Organización de Cooperación de Shanghai. Kazajistán asume la presidencia anual del principal foro regional de Asia Central en materia de seguridad, economía y política, compuesto por China, India, Irán, Kazajistán, Kirguistán, Pakistán, Rusia, Tayikistán y Uzbekistán. Los ejes de la presidencia kazaja estarán centrados en cuestiones de seguridad y unidad regional, así como en el desarrollo económico y el comercio regional. Además, se espera que Bielorrusia ingrese en la organización este año. 1 de julio – Hungría asume la presidencia rotatoria del Consejo de la UE. Durante el segundo semestre del año, Hungría asumirá la presidencia rotatoria del Consejo de la Unión Europea, en plenas tensiones con la Comisión Europea y el Parlamento Europeo por sus incumplimientos de la legislación comunitaria. 8 – 18 de julio – Foro Político de Alto Nivel sobre Desarrollo Sostenible. Líderes y representantes mundiales se reunirán en Nueva York para realizar el seguimiento y monitoreo de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS), además de presentar Informes Nacionales Voluntarios de los ODS. El lema de esta edición será «Reforzar la Agenda 2030 y erradicar la pobreza en tiempos de múltiples crisis: la adopción eficaz de soluciones sostenibles, resilientes e innovadoras». 09 – 11 de julio – Cumbre de la OTAN. Washington será la sede de la cumbre de la Alianza Atlántica donde se prevé la presentación de una estrategia de seguridad para el flanco sur en respuesta al mandato surgido de la cumbre de Vilna de 2023. Además, en 2024 se cumple el 75 aniversario de la fundación de la OTAN. 26 de julio – 11 de agosto – Juegos Olímpicos de Verano en París. Francia acoge la XXXIII edición del principal acontecimiento deportivo mundial que se realiza cada cuatro años; una buena oportunidad para el país anfitrión de dinamizar una economía estancada en los últimos años. Agosto – Elecciones presidenciales y parlamentarias en Ruanda. El actual presidente de Ruanda, Paul Kagame, en el cargo desde 2000, opta a la reelección tras sucesivas elecciones en las que ha obtenido más del 90% de los votos. Septiembre – Elecciones parlamentarias en Austria. La mayor incógnita radica en si la actual coalición gobernante de los conservadores (ÖVP) y los verdes (Die Grünen) podrá revalidar su gobierno o si los resultados de la extrema derecha del Partido de la Libertad de Austria (FPÖ), y de los socialdemócratas del SPÖ podrían generar otras mayorías. 22 – 23 de septiembre – Cumbre del Futuro de Naciones Unidas. Basándose en el informe «Nuestra Agenda Común» presentado por el secretario general, António Guterres, en 2021 sobre multilateralismo y cooperación internacional, este evento de alto nivel tiene como objetivo acelerar el cumplimiento de compromisos internacionales existentes, y abordar desafíos y oportunidades emergentes. La culminación de este esfuerzo será la creación de un Pacto para el Futuro, que será negociado y respaldado por los países participantes. 24 de septiembre – 79ª Sesión de Debate General de la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas. Una cita anual que reúne a todos los líderes mundiales para evaluar el actual estado de sus políticas nacionales y su visión del mundo. 26 –27 de septiembre – 10º aniversario del caso Ayotzinapa. México conmemora el décimo aniversario del caso Ayotzinapa (o caso Iguala), uno de los mayores escándalos de derechos humanos en la historia reciente del país. Aún sin resolver, este caso supuso la desaparición forzosa de 43 estudiantes de la Escuela Normal Rural de Ayotzinapa, estado de Guerrero. Octubre – XVI Cumbre de los BRICS. Kazán será la sede de una nueva edición de los BRICS en Rusia, ahora ampliados a 11 países, lo que representa un impulso en los esfuerzos de Moscú por demostrar que el país no está aislado a pesar de la invasión a gran escala de Ucrania. 1 de octubre – 75º aniversario de la fundación de la República Popular de China. Se cumplen 75 años de la fundación de la República Popular China por Mao Zedong, que puso fin a la guerra civil entre el Partido Comunista Chino y el Kuomintang, que estalló inmediatamente tras la rendición de Japón y la disolución del Segundo Frente Unido entre ambas fuerzas políticas durante la segunda guerra sino-japonesa. 6 de octubre – Elecciones municipales en Brasil. Estas elecciones serán un buen termómetro para evaluar el grado de apoyo al Partido de los Trabajadores y al resto de partidos que respaldan al presidente Lula, así como el avance o retroceso de candidatos vinculados al bolsonarismo. En las ciudades donde se requiera una segunda vuelta, esta se llevará a cabo el 27 de octubre. 9 de octubre – Elecciones generales y regionales en Mozambique. El presidente, Filipe Nyusi, concluye su segundo y último mandato presidencial y, según la Constitución, no puede presentarse nuevamente. Su partido, el Frente de Liberación de Mozambique (FRELIMO), en el poder desde hace décadas, deberá encontrar otro candidato. El próximo gobierno tendrá que hacer frente a diversos desafíos, incluyendo tensiones políticas, un aumento del terrorismo yihadista, y una pronunciada exclusión social. 24 de octubre – Día Internacional contra el Cambio Climático. Tiene como objetivo movilizar y sensibilizar a las sociedades y gobiernos de todo el mundo acerca de los efectos del cambio climático. Se trata de un buen momento para analizar las diferentes agendas de lucha contra la emergencia climática y los avances que se están dando desde los principales países contaminantes. 27 de octubre – Elecciones generales en Uruguay. El Frente Amplio (FA), un partido de centroizquierda, con fuertes vínculos con los sindicatos y otras organizaciones sociales, competirá por la victoria frente a la Coalición Multicolor de centroderecha, actualmente en el gobierno, y que ha enfrentado diversos casos de corrupción en los últimos meses. Noviembre – Cumbre de la APEC. Perú acogerá una nueva edición del foro de Cooperación Económica de Asia-Pacífico, que reúne a 21 países y que se celebrará bajo el lema «Personas, Negocios, Prosperidad». Noviembre – Cumbre sobre el Cambio Climático, COP29. Azerbaiyán acogerá esta nueva edición de la mayor cumbre internacional dedicada al cambio climático. Por segundo año consecutivo, se celebrará en un país cuya economía depende de la producción de combustibles fósiles. Noviembre – XXIX Cumbre Iberoamericana. Ecuador acoge la Cumbre Iberoamericana de jefes de Estado y de Gobierno bajo el lema «Innovación, Inclusión y Sostenibilidad». De forma paralela las principales ciudades de América Latina, España y Portugal celebrarán un «Encuentro de Ciudades Iberoamericanas» cuyas conclusiones serán presentadas durante la Cumbre. 4 – 8 de noviembre – XII Foro Urbano Mundial. El Cairo acogerá la reunión más importante en materia de urbanismo y asentamientos humanos organizada por ONU-Hábitat. 5 de noviembre – Elecciones presidenciales en Estados Unidos. El actual presidente Joe Biden aspira a la reelección y, a falta de confirmarse la candidatura del expresidente Donald Trump, la campaña electoral se prevé muy polarizada. El calendario electoral condicionará las decisiones de Washington en política exterior. 5 de noviembre – Elecciones generales en Georgia. La coalición gobernante Sueño Georgiano aspira a revalidar mandato. La guerra en Ucrania ha vuelto a dividir al país entre aquellos que buscan una integración más profunda con Occidente y aspiran a un futuro ingreso en la Unión Europea, y los que abogan por normalizar las relaciones con Rusia. 11 de noviembre – 20 aniversario muerte de Yasir Arafat. El histórico líder palestino y presidente de la Autoridad Nacional Palestina falleció hace 20 años en París. Su papel fue fundamental en el proceso de paz en Oriente Próximo, lo que, junto a los dirigentes israelíes Isaac Rabin y Shimon Peres, les valió el premio Nobel de la Paz en 1994. 18 – 19 de noviembre – Cumbre del G-20 en Brasil. Bajo el lema «Construir un mundo justo y un planeta sostenible», los ejes de discusión y de debate de esta edición incluirán las políticas de transición energética y desarrollo, la reforma de las instituciones de gobernanza global, así como la lucha contra la desigualdad, el hambre y la pobreza. Diciembre – Elecciones presidenciales en Argelia. El presidente, Abdelmadjid Tebboune, previsiblemente optará a la reelección. El país afronta varios desafíos de seguridad debido a la inestabilidad en el Sahel y las crecientes tensiones con Marruecos respecto al Sáhara Occidental. Además, desempeña un papel crucial como proveedor de gas para Europa, en medio de la crisis energética generada por la guerra en Ucrania. Diciembre – Elecciones generales en Sudán del Sur. Los acuerdos de paz de 2018, que pusieron fin al conflicto armado interno que duró cinco años, establecieron la formación de un Gobierno de Unidad Nacional liderado por el actual presidente, Salva Kiir. y su rival, el vicepresidente Riek Machar. Kiir ha propuesto la celebración de elecciones presidenciales libres para finales de 2024. 7 de diciembre – Elecciones presidenciales en Ghana. Se espera que las elecciones sean una carrera de dos entre Mahamudu Bawumia, actual vicepresidente del gobernante Nuevo Partido Patriótico (NPP), y el expresidente John Dramani Mahama, candidato del principal partido opositor, Congreso Nacional Demócrata (NDC). El país se enfrenta a su peor crisis económica en las últimas décadas, y a importantes desafíos de seguridad por el contexto geopolítico en el Sahel. Segundo Semestre – Elecciones presidenciales en Venezuela. El chavismo y la oposición, agrupada bajo el paraguas de la Plataforma Unitaria, acordaron en Barbados la celebración de elecciones presidenciales, a las que se podrá invitar a misiones técnicas electorales de organismos regionales e internacionales. Esta decisión se tomó de forma paralela al anuncio de Estados Unidos del levantamiento de sanciones al gas y al petróleo venezolanos en octubre de 2023. Pendiente – 53º Foro de las Islas del Pacífico. Tonga acogerá una nueva edición del principal foro de discusión panregional de Oceanía, que agrupa los intereses de 18 estados y territorios en materia de cambio climático, uso sostenible de los recursos marítimos, seguridad y cooperación regional. Un espacio geográfico de creciente interés por parte de China y Estados Unidos, que han iniciado una carrera diplomática para atraer a sus esferas de influencia a algunos de estos países y territorios. Pendiente – 44ª Cumbre de la ASEAN. Laos acogerá una nueva edición del principal foro regional del sudeste asiático que agrupa a 10 países, bajo el lema «Mejorar la conectividad y la resiliencia». Pendiente – Cumbre sobre la Seguridad de la Inteligencia Artificial. Francia acogerá la segunda edición de esta cumbre internacional que tiene como objetivo poner en marcha trabajos e iniciativas para abordar los riesgos tecnológicos que plantea la Inteligencia Artificial. La primera edición, celebrada en Londres en 2023, resultó en la Declaración Bletchley, que abogó por una mayor cooperación internacional para abordar los desafíos y riesgos asociados con la inteligencia artificial. Pendiente – XXXIII Cumbre de la Liga Árabe. Bahréin acogerá una nueva edición de la principal organización política que agrupa países de Oriente Medio y del Norte de África. El conflicto palestino-israelí, las cuestiones de seguridad alimentaria y energética, y los impactos regionales de la guerra en Ucrania, serán algunos de los temas principales de discusión y debate. Pendiente – Elecciones presidenciales y parlamentarias en Sri Lanka. La tensión social en el país, inmerso en una profunda crisis económica que ha llevado a un rescate por parte del Fondo Monetario Internacional, ha aumentado en los últimos meses y se espera que se intensifique durante todo el proceso electoral. Pendiente – Elecciones generales en Chad. El presidente interino de Chad, Mahamat Idriss Déby, que asumió el poder en abril de 2021 tras la muerte de su padre, Idriss Déby, mediante la instauración de una junta militar, prometió la celebración de elecciones libres a finales de 2024. El país se encuentra en una profunda crisis alimentaria y de seguridad. Pendiente – III Cumbre para la Democracia. Corea del Sur será la anfitriona de esta cumbre, impulsada por Estados Unidos, que desde 2021 reúne a líderes de gobiernos, la sociedad civil y el sector privado. Tiene como objetivo abordar los desafíos y oportunidades que enfrentan las democracias en el siglo XXI, relacionados con la gobernanza, la protección de los derechos humanos, y la lucha contra la corrupción. Pendiente – Elecciones generales y regionales en Sudáfrica. El Congreso Nacional Africano (ANC), en el poder desde las primeras elecciones libres y generales de 1994, aspira a revalidar el poder, aunque el principal partido opositor, la Alianza Democrática, podría dar una sorpresa. El país enfrenta innumerables desafíos, especialmente en materia de seguridad con altas tasas de criminalidad, una importante crisis energética, y niveles elevados de desempleo. Pendiente – Elecciones presidenciales en Túnez. Serán los primeros comicios tras el autogolpe de Estado del presidente tunecino, Kaïs Saied, en 2021, y el retorno al autoritarismo del único país que parecía haber consolidado la democracia tras las primaveras árabes de 2010-11. Saied ya ha anunciado que no permitirá la presencia de misiones de supervisión electoral extranjeras.