Nowadays society's lifestyle encourages a high rate of consumption of natural resources; many of them are non-renewable, meaning that an inadequate management will lead to a certain degree of scarcity in the medium to long term. The most illustrative example is water, used in almost any human activity, for human consumption, cleaning and domestic use or in industrial processes (even in energy production), either as cooling medium or directly intervening in the productive process, water is present. It was up to the 2000s that the Legislative Authorities were considering water no more than a commercial asset being the implementation of the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/CE) the inception to a mentality change towards water, considering it now more an heritage deserving protection and laying the foundations for the development of specific regulations that will establish minimum quality limits to be achieved prior to the discharge of the effluents into the environment. Specifically, chemical industry undergone a strong development owed to a growing demand for new products to satisfy the needs of the consumers. The manufacture of drugs, personal care products, or pesticides and fertilizers to improve agricultural production has led to the appearance, development and deployment of new organic substances. These are usually toxic, non-biodegradable and highly recalcitrant, thus they are difficult to assimilate for microorganisms, being active in the environment for long periods of time and with unknown effects on the discharge ecosystems. That situation motivates arisen, development and application of new highly oxidizing technologies, aiming the degradation of these emerging compounds and even, depending to their complexity, enhancing the biodegradability of the whole effluent. For this reason, electrochemical processes pose a versatile, useful and powerful tool since only by applying an electric current or potential on the electrodes it is able to generate oxidizing species that interacts with a broad spectra of contaminants, facilitating their removal. Some electrochemical processes have been widely used at industrial scale. For example, electrocoagulation implies an advantage over the conventional coagulationflocculation physicochemical process, since avoids the addition of chemical reagents by the use of sacrificial electrodes, generating a lower amount of sludge, and presenting higher efficiency in the colloids removal. On the other hand, electrodialysis, an electrically assisted membrane process, is able to separate the ions from an influent, yielding a highquality effluent of low ionic charge, being mainly applied in desalination processes aimed to produce drinking water. In spite of involving great advantages such as an easy control of the process and therefore easy automatization, as well as the absence of external reagents, some electro-oxidative processes have not been evaluated further than at laboratory scale. In fact, most of the studies reported in the literature are focused in the development of new materials for electrodes manufacturing, to improve effectiveness and reduce costs associated to this technology. However, it must be highlighted that electrochlorination has been implemented on a larger scale due to the low cost of the electrodes. The scarcity of studies facing these technologies under a realistic approach and for the purification of complex water matrices, has limited the possibilities of electro-oxidative systems from a commercial standpoint. It is important to note that from the ions species naturally contained in certain waters, a large amount and variety of oxidizing species can be generated, which entails an intrinsic improvement over the basic studies using a supporting electrolyte whose only function is to allow the transition of electrons. Furthermore, many of these electrogenerated species are photoactive, which means that just by irradiating the solution with ultraviolet light the generation of even more oxidizing species could be promoted, which results in an increase of the contaminants degradation rate. This has meant that the development, implementation, start-up and evaluation of these systems on a larger scale have not been also addressed in depth, hindering the scale-up of the electro-oxidative process. In this context, the opportunity of this PhD Thesis arises bringing the study of electrochemical technology to a new level closer to reality. The application of electrooxidative processes at pilot plant scale in actual wastewaters is addressed, assessing the operating conditions seeking to improve contaminants removal and water depuration. Combination of electro-oxidative systems with a natural and renewable energy source such as sunlight is also tackled. The first objective addressed was characterization, start-up and optimization of the main operational parameters of a solar photoelectro-Fenton (SPEF) pilot plant able to treat up to 100 L of water developed and installed at Plataforma solar de Almería (PSA) (CIEMAT). The system consists of four electro-cells equipped with a niobium-supported boron doped diamond anode (Nb-BDD) and a carbon-polytetrafluoroethylene (carbonPTFE) gas diffusion cathode (GDE) (Electro MP-Cells from ElectroCell). The cells are connected in parallel to a recirculation tank and this, in turn, to a solar photoreactor based on compound parabolic collectors (CPC) with 2 m2 of illuminated surface. Optimization of the main input variables, pH and current density (j), was carried out to maximize onsite H2O2 electrogeneration with the maximum current efficiency (CE). A central composite experimentaldesign was defined, and after the completion of the 19 experiments proposed in the matrix, by means of the statistical analysis of the results, the adjustment model for H2O2 concentration was obtained: [H2O2] = 2.19 - 0.31 · pH + 0.81 · j - 0.05 · pH · j + 0.15 · pH2 - 2.42 × 10-3 · j 2 , as well as for the CE percentage: = 61.68 - 0.43 · pH - 0.18 · j - 0.0275 · pH · j, and the corresponding response surface graphs. Finally, the model was validated, corroborating that, at pH 3 and applying 73.66 mA cm-2, the maximum production of H2O2 is achieved (64.9 mg min-1) with a CE associated of 89.3%. Once these parameters were established, the influence of the water and air flows, as well as the concentration of the electrolyte on the H2O2 electrogeneration was also studied, reaching the maximum applying a water flow of 5.6 L min-1, an air flow of 10 L min-1, and with 50 mM of Na2SO4. Afterwards, preliminary tests were developed assessing the efficiency in the removal of reference compounds, pyrimethanil and methomyl in a concentration of 50 mg L-1 and 90 mg L-1, respectively, by the application of the different oxidation processes that are able to be developed in the pilot plant system: anodic oxidation (AO), electro-Fenton (EF) and solar SPEF, having as supporting electrolyte a solution of Na2SO4 50 mM. The highest degradation rates were attained by SPEF process: 55% of pyrimethanil and 50% of methomyl after only 5 minutes. This research was performed with the collaboration of Prof. Anastasios J. Karabelas and Dr. Konstantinos V. Plakas of the Chemical Processes and Energy Resources Institute of the Centre for Research and Technology-Hellas (Greece) in the framework of the European project SFERA-II at PSA facilities. Second objective was focused on a real application of the previously optimized electrochemical pilot plant through its combination with a pre-treatment consisting of a nanofiltration (NF) membrane system. Urban wastewater treatment plant effluent was pre-treated for increasing the concentration of organic microcontaminants (OMCs) in the NF retentate stream, together with reducing the total volume to be treated in the tertiary electro-oxidation system. Also noteworthy is the increase in water salinity achieved after the NF system in the retentate, decreasing ohmic resistance and thus facilitating a subsequent tertiary treatment based on electro-oxidation. For studying the behavior of the SPEF system in highly saline and complex matrices, a recipe of simulated NF concentrate was developed from the characterization of concentrates previously reported in literature. Aiming to work at the effluent natural pH, avoiding the addition of reagents for acidification and neutralization, the use of ethylenediamine-N,N'-disuccinic acid (EDDS) as an iron complexing agent in the electro-Fenton (EF) process was evaluated. It was also checked the stability of Fe3+:EDDS complex in the EF process, which was degraded after 15 min of treatment, although iron did not precipitate completely until 30 min. Thereupon, the degradation of four OMCs was studied: pentachlorophenol, terbutryn, chlorfenvinphos and diclofenac (at 200 and 500 µg L-1 of initial concentration each); by AO, EF, SPEF and solar-assisted AO at natural pH, using Fe3+:EDDS (1:2) at 0.1:0.2 mM in EF and SPEF treatments. When using simulated NF retentate, whose chloride concentration was 555 mg L-1, the highest degradation of OMCs (500 µg L-1 of initial concentration each) was obtained using SPEF reaching 85% of total contaminants removal. The reason is that chlorine species generated by solar-assisted AO were not enough to degrade OMCs (75% of total amount), despite the presence of lower organic matter in solution due to the absence of EDDS. On the other hand, EF process was discarded since no improvement was observed with respect to AO, consuming the hydroxyl radicals produced by the Fenton reaction in the degradation of the EDDS instead of the OMCs. The evaluation of the SPEF system for the tertiary treatment of actual wastewater, was carried out by collecting effluent from the secondary treatment of El Ejido WWTP (in Almería, South-East of Spain), after its pre-treatment in the NF pilot plant installed at PSA until reducing the initial volume 4 times. The salinity of the effluent increased from 2.1 - 2.3 mS cm-1 to 6.1 - 6.8 mS cm-1, and the chloride concentration reached 1182 - 1960 mg L-1. The concentrate was spiked with the four target OMCs (100 µg L-1 each) and their degradation was studied by AO, SPEF (with the carbonates naturally contained in the concentrate and reducing them to 20 mg L-1 to diminish the scavenger effect on hydroxyl radicals) and solar-assisted AO. The percentages of degradation of the sum of OMCs after 180 minutes of each applied treatment were 84% (AO), 69% (SPEF with carbonates), 75% (SPEF with low carbonates) and 84% (solar-assisted AO), respectively. In this occasion, the highest percentage of degradation with the lowest electricity consumption, 5.3 kWh m-3, was obtained by solar-assisted AO, since the higher concentration of chlorides promoted a higher generation of active chlorine species. Finally, tertiary treatment by applying solar-assisted AO was chosen for the degradation of 44 OMCs actually contained in the secondary effluent of the WWTP and detected by LC-QqLIT-MS/MS, resulting in the elimination of 80% of the sum. This work was performed in collaboration with Prof. Ana Agüera and Dr. Ana Martínez-Piernas from CIESOL (mixed center CIEMAT-UAL) at the University of Almería. After the experimental program conducted in the electrochemical pilot plant, which began with its start-up and optimization of operation parameters, it was considered to study and diagnose the state of the cathode surface of the cells used in those tests. While cathode usage hours increased, onsite production of H2O2 decreased progressively from 43 mg L-1 of accumulated H2O2 in 30 min, in the first use of the cathode, to 1.5 mg L-1 after several experiments. At the moment an important reduction of the H2O2 electrogenerated was observed, making impossible the effective development of EF and SPEF processes, the cell was disassembled and the autopsy of the cathode surface was carried out by means of scanning electron microscopy and X-rays in order to try to identify the main reasons for the contamination of the cathode and the consequent loss of efficiency. In the images obtained, a loss of the carbon-PTFE coating was detected as well as the formation of iron deposits, justifying the drop in H2O2 electrogenerated with the loss of the electrode active surface. In the framework of the Marie Curie - ALICE project "AcceLerate Innovation in urban wastewater management for Climate change", H2020-MSCA-RISE, the PhD candidate carried out a research internship at the Nanotechnology and Integrated BioEngineering Centre (NIBEC) of the University of Ulster (UK), in collaboration with the Photocatalysis Research Team lead by Prof. John Anthony Byrne. The goal of this collaboration was the development and application of a laboratory-scale photoelectrocatalytic reactor for the simultaneous elimination of OMCs and pathogenic microorganisms in natural water. As a core part of the reactor, two nanotube photoanodes of titanium dioxide were manufactured by anodizing a titanium mesh at 30 V for 3 h and then annealing it at 500°C to promote the anatase phase. The reactor consists of a 190 mL cell with a double photoanode of titanium dioxide nanotubes illuminated by a 9 W UV-A lamp through a quartz window, with an applied irradiation of 50 W m-2. The main objective was the simultaneous removal of OMCs (terbutryn, chlorfenvinphos and diclofenac at 500 µg L-1 of initial concentration each) and pathogens (E. coli as reference bacteria at an initial concentration of 106 CFU mL-1), at the same time that a possible improvement by replacing a counter cathode with no contribution to the degradation process (platinumcoated titanium) by a carbon felt cathode able to electrogenerate H2O2, was evaluated. Assessing separately the degradation of OMCs and the inactivation of E. coli, when applying the photoelectrocatalytic process with platinum cathode, a clear improvement in the inactivation of bacteria was observed (2 Log reduction after 120 minutes of treatment), compared to the photo-catalytic process on its own (0.8 Log reduction in the same treatment time). However, degradation of OMCs remained at the same ratio; around 70% of the sum after 60 min. Replacement of the platinum cathode by a carbón felt cathode increased the efficiency of E. coli inactivation, reducing its concentration in 2.7 Log, although OMCs showed similar degradation percentages. When finally the degradation of OMCs was carried out simultaneously to the inactivation of bacteria by photoelectrocatalysis with carbon cathode, a significant increase in disinfection was observed, reaching the detection limit of the method through a reduction of 4.5 Log. This improvement could be attributed to the presence of methanol from the stock solution where OMCs were pre-dissolved, that acts as a hole scavenger increasing the photocurrent and getting oxidized so generating formaldehyde, a highly toxic substance for microorganisms (LC50 for E. coli = 1 mg L-1). As a consequence of this outcome, the effect of hole scavengers presence in disinfection was evaluated, using acetate and methanol at a concentration of 5 mM. In both cases, as described in literature, an increase in the photocurrent was observed under their presence, observing also an increase in the rate of bacteria inactivation, which was greater in the case of methanol due to the generation of formaldehyde. Finally, as a result of the strong collaboration between the PhD student and the Solar Water Treatment Unit with the electrochemical company DeNora built during transnational access program within SFERA-II project, the evaluation of a commercial electro-oxidation system specially designed for the abatement of chemical oxygen demand in industrial waters and supported by the action of active chlorine spices was carried out. Within the framework of this collaboration, and as part of the objectives developed in this PhD Thesis, the evaluation of a pilot plant equipped with a dimensionally stable anode cell (DSA) manufactured by DeNora was performed, combining it with a solar CPC photoreactor (3.08 m2), reaching a total capacity of 38 L, and with the aim of evaluating the possible improvement in efficiency of two batches of landfill leachates. These leachates were characterized by high organic loads (>2000 mgL-1 of dissolved organic carbon (DOC)) and a high toxicity in one of the batches (53 % of inhibition on activated sludge) so the main purpose was to reduce the toxicity and increase the biodegradability enough for a subsequent combination with a conventional biological treatment (thus reducing the associated operation costs). First step was the treatment of two batches by solar photo-Fenton process, which required an excessive accumulated UV energy (142.2 kJ L-1) to achieve only a 30% reduction of DOC in the first batch of leachate (diluted 1:1 with distilled water). In the second batch it was not possible to perform solar photo-Fenton treatment due to the large amount of foams generated, causing large oscillations of the DOC along the process. Later on, the two batches were treated by electro-oxidation, electro-oxidation by adding H2O2 and electrooxidation combined with solar radiation, being the second batch the one that showed the highest DOC and total nitrogen removal rates, 3.5 g DOC kWh-1 and 18 g TN kWh-1 in the first batch of leachate and 13.4 g DOC kWh-1 and 45.2 g TN kWh-1 in the second batch. After the application of electro-oxidation assisted by solar energy, a reduction on toxicity from 53% to 6% of inhibition, and a sufficient improvement of biodegradability were observed in both batches. This study corroborates the improvement caused by the application of sunlight to the electrochemical treatment of industrial wastewater, which may represent a step forward towards the application of these powerful oxidation systems, presenting themselves as a feasible, sustainable and green alternative to purely electrochemical treatments, with lower operation costs due to lower energy consumption. Resumen: El ritmo de vida impuesto por la sociedad actual conlleva un alto consumo de recursos naturales, muchos de ellos no renovables, por lo que una gestión inadecuada puede producir una escasez de estos a medio o largo plazo. El caso más evidente es el del agua, que se utiliza tanto para consumo humano, en agua de bebida, aseo y labores domésticas, como en procesos industriales, ya sea como refrigerante o como parte del propio proceso de producción. Hasta el año 2000, este recurso ha sido considerado por las autoridades legislativas como un bien comercial, pero a partir de la implantación de la Directiva Marco de Agua (2000/60/EC) pasó a ser considerado como un patrimonio a proteger, sentando las bases para el desarrollo de una normativa más específica que establece unos límites mínimos de calidad a alcanzar previo a la descarga de efluentes en el medio ambiente. Específicamente la industria química ha sufrido un fuerte desarrollo por la creciente demanda de nuevos productos que satisfagan las necesidades de los consumidores. La fabricación de fármacos, productos para el cuidado personal, o plaguicidas y fertilizantes para mejorar la producción agrícola, ha dado lugar a la aparición de nuevas sustancias orgánicas. Estas suelen ser tóxicas, no biodegradables y altamente recalcitrantes por lo que no son fácilmente asimilables por los microorganismos, permaneciendo por largos periodos de tiempo en el medio ambiente sin conocer los efectos que pueden generar en el ecosistema. Por este motivo surge la necesidad de desarrollar y aplicar nuevas tecnologías altamente oxidantes, capaces de reaccionar con estos compuestos degradándolos o mineralizándolos e incluso, dependiendo de su complejidad, mejorando la biodegradabilidad del efluente. Para ello, los procesos electroquímicos suponen una herramienta útil versátil y potente ya que únicamente aplicando una corriente o potencial eléctricos sobre unos electrodos se pueden generar especies altamente oxidantes que interaccionen con esos contaminantes facilitando su eliminación. Algunos de estos procesos electroquímicos han sido ampliamente utilizados a escala industrial. Por ejemplo, la electrocoagulación supone una ventaja respecto al proceso físico-químico convencional de coagulación-floculación, ya que utiliza un electrodo de sacrificio evitando la adición de reactivos, se genera menos lodo y es más efectivo en la eliminación de coloides. La electrodiálisis, un proceso de membrana asistido eléctricamente, es capaz de separar los iones de un influente generando un efluente de alta calidad con muy baja carga iónica siendo principalmente aplicado en procesos de desalación para la obtención de agua potable. Pese a presentar importantes ventajas como la facilidad para controlar el proceso y, por tanto su fácil automatización, así como la ausencia de reactivos externos, algunos procesos electro oxidativos aún no han sido evaluados más que a escala de laboratorio, centrando la mayoría de los estudios recogidos en la literatura en el desarrollo de nuevos materiales para la fabricación de electrodos para la mejora de la efectividad y la reducción de costes asociados a dicha tecnología. Sin embargo, la electro-cloración ha sido el único tratamiento implementado a mayor escala debido al bajo coste de los electrodos. La escasez de estudios aplicando estas tecnologías en situaciones reales, para la purificación de aguas residuales complejas, ha limitado, desde el punto de vista comercial, las posibilidades de los sistemas electro-oxidativos. Es importante mencionar que, a partir de los diferentes iones presentes de forma natural en determinadas aguas, se pueden generar gran cantidad y variedad de especies oxidantes, lo que conlleva una mejora intrínseca en la eficacia del proceso con respecto a una solución salina cuya única función es permitir el tránsito de electrones. Además, muchas de esas especies electro-generadas son fotoactivas, lo que supone que tan sólo con irradiar con luz ultravioleta la solución, se pueden generar especies aún más oxidantes incrementando la tasa de degradación de los contaminantes. Esto ha provocado que el desarrollo, implementación, puesta en marcha y evaluación de estos sistemas a mayor escala tampoco haya sido abordado en profundidad, lo que dificulta su escalado y aplicación industrial. En este contexto surge la motivación de la presente Tesis Doctoral, que aborda la aplicación de procesos oxidativos a escala planta piloto en aguas reales, además de estudiar las condiciones de operación que lleven a un incremento en la degradación de contaminantes y depuración de aguas, combinando el sistema electro-oxidativo con una fuente de luz natural y renovable como es la energía solar. El primer objetivo abordado fue la puesta en marcha, caracterización y optimización de los principales parámetros de operación de una planta piloto de foto electro-Fenton solar (SPEF siglas en inglés) con un volumen máximo de 100 L instalada en la Plataforma Solar de Almería (CIEMAT). El sistema está constituido por cuatro celdas comerciales equipadas con un ánodo de diamante dopado con boro soportado en niobio y un cátodo de difusión de gas de carbono-politetrafluoroetileno (Electro MP-Cells suministradas por ElectroCell). Las celdas están conectadas en paralelo a un tanque de recirculación y éste a su vez a un foto-reactor solar basado en captadores cilindro parabólico compuestos (CPC) con 2 m-2 de superficie iluminada. Se llevó a cabo la optimización de las principales variables de entrada del proceso: el pH y la densidad de corriente (j), para maximizar la electro-generación in situ de H2O2 con la máxima eficiencia en el empleo de la corriente eléctrica (CE). Se definió un diseño experimental central compuesto, de forma que tras la consecución de una matriz de 19 experimentos y a partir del análisis estadístico de los resultados se obtuvo el modelo de ajuste para la concentración de H2O2 generada directamente en el reactor: [H2O2] = 2.19 - 0.31·pH + 0.81·j - 0.05·pH· j + 0.15·pH2 - 2.42×10-3· j2 , y para la CE, = 61.68 - 0.43·pH - 0.18·j - 0.0275·pH·j, así como los gráficos de superficie de respuesta asociados. Finalmente se validó el modelo, corroborando que a pH 3 y aplicando 73.66 mA cm-2 se logra la mayor producción de H2O2, 64.9 mg min-1 con una eficiencia de la corriente aplicada del 89.3%. Una vez establecidos estos parámetros se estudió la influencia del caudal de agua, de aire y la concentración de electrolito en la electro-generación in situ de H2O2, alcanzando el máximo con un caudal de agua de 5.6 L min-1, de 10 L min-1 de aire, y una concentración de Na2SO4 de 50 mM. Posteriormente, se realizaron ensayos preliminares para la evaluación de la eficacia de eliminación de compuestos de referencia, concretamente pirimetanil y metomilo en una concentración de 50 mg L-1 y 90 mg L-1, respectivamente, mediante los diferentes procesos de electro-oxidación que podían llevarse a cabo en la planta piloto empleando como electrolito una solución 50 mM de Na2SO4, desde oxidación anódica (AO, siglas en inglés) hasta foto electroFenton solar (SPEF, siglas en inglés), obteniéndose las mayores tasas de degradación con este último: 55% y 50% de pirimetanil y metomilo, respectivamente, en 5 minutos de tratamiento. Este trabajo se realizó con la colaboración del Prof. Anastasios J. Karabelas y el Dr. Konstantinos V. Plakas del Instituto de procesos químicos y recursos energéticos del Centro para la Investigación y Tecnología-Hellas (Grecia) en el marco del proyecto europeo de capacitación SFERA-II. El segundo objetivo de esta Tesis Doctoral se centró en abordar la aplicación del sistema experimental a escala planta piloto previamente optimizado a un caso real mediante su combinación con un pre-tratamiento con membranas de nanofiltración (NF) del efluente de una Estación Depuradora de Aguas Residuales (EDAR). De esta manera se buscó aumentar la concentración de microcontaminantes orgánicos (OMCs, siglas en inglés) en la corriente de concentrado a la salida de la NF, a la vez que reducir el volumen total a tratar en el sistema terciario de electro-oxidación. Cabe destacar además el aumento en la salinidad del agua que se logra tras el sistema de NF en la corriente de concentrado, disminuyendo la resistencia óhmica y favoreciendo, por tanto, el tratamiento terciario posterior basado en electro-oxidación. Para estudiar el comportamiento del sistema de SPEF en matrices altamente salinas y complejas, se desarrolló una receta de simulado de concentrado de NF a partir de la caracterización de concentrados previamente reportados en la literatura. Con el fin de trabajar al pH natural del agua, evitando la adición de reactivos para acidificar y volver a neutralizar, se evaluó el uso de ácido etilenediamina-N,N'-disuccínico (EDDS) como quelante del hierro en el proceso electro-Fenton (EF). A continuación, se estudió la degradación de cuatro OMCs: pentaclorofenol, terbutrina, clorfenvinfos y diclofenaco (a 200 y 500 µg L1 de concentración inicial cada uno); mediante AO, EF, SPEF y AO asistida por luz solar a pH natural, usando Fe3+:EDDS (1:2) a una concentración 0.1:0.2 mM en los tratamientos EF y SPEF. Cuando se empleó como matriz el agua simulada de concentrado de NF, con una concentración de cloruros de 555 mg L-1, el mayor porcentaje de degradación de los OMCs (500 µgL-1 de concentración inicial cada uno), se obtuvo mediante SPEF, alcanzando el 85% de eliminación del total. Esto se debe a que las especies oxidantes del cloro generadas mediante AO asistida por luz solar no fueron suficientes para degradar los OMCs (75% del total), pese a la presencia de menor materia orgánica en disolución debido a la ausencia de EDDS. Por otro lado, el proceso EF fue descartado ya que no se observó mejora con respecto a AO, consumiendo los radicales hidroxilo generados por la reacción Fenton en la degradación del EDDS. Para la evaluación de este sistema de electro-oxidación en agua real, se recolectó efluente del tratamiento secundario de la EDAR de El Ejido y se pre-trató en el sistema piloto de NF disponible en la Plataforma Solar de Almería, hasta reducir el volumen inicial 4 veces (factor de concentración de 4). La salinidad del agua se incrementó de 2.1 - 2.3 mS cm-1 a 6.1 - 6.8 mS cm-1, con una concentración de cloruros final entre 1182 – 1960 mg L-1. El concentrado generado fue fortificado con los cuatro OMCs evaluados en el trabajo previo con agua simulada (100 µg L-1 de cada uno) y se estudió su degradación mediante AO, SPEF (con los carbonatos naturalmente contenidos en el concentrado y reduciéndolos a 20 mg L-1 para disminuir la interacción con los radicales hidroxilo) y AO asistida por luz solar. Los porcentajes de degradación de la suma total de OMCs tras 180 minutos de tratamiento fueron 84%, 69%, 75% y 84%, respectivamente. En esta ocasión, el mayor porcentaje de degradación con el menor consumo eléctrico, 5.3 kWh m-3, se obtuvo mediante AO asistida por luz solar, ya que la mayor concentración de cloruros promovió una mayor generación de especies activas del cloro. Finalmente, se escogió el tratamiento terciario mediante AO asistida por luz solar para la degradación de 44 OMCs realmente contenidos en el efluente secundario de la EDAR y detectados mediante LC-QqLIT-MS/MS, consiguiendo eliminar el 80% del total. Este trabajo se llevó a cabo en colaboración con la Prof. Ana Agüera y la Dra. Ana Martínez-Piernas del CIESOL (centro mixto CIEMAT-UAL) en la Universidad de Almería. Tras el programa experimental realizado en la planta piloto de electro-oxidación iniciando con su puesta en marcha y optimización de parámetros de operación, se consideró estudiar y diagnosticar el estado de la superficie de los cátodos de las celdas empleadas en dichos ensayos. A medida que las horas de uso del cátodo se incrementaron, la producción in situ de H2O2 sufrió un progresivo descenso, desde 43 mg L-1 de H2O2 acumulado en 30 min, en el primer uso del cátodo, a 1.5 mg L-1 en el peor de los casos. En el momento en el que se observó una importante reducción de la electrogeneración de H2O2 que imposibilitaba el correcto desarrollo de los procesos EF y SPEF, se procedió al des ensamblaje de la celda y se realizó la autopsia de la superficie del cátodo mediante microscopía electrónica de barrido y rayos X, con objeto de intentar discernir los motivos principales del ensuciamiento del mismo y la consiguiente pérdida de eficiencia. En las imágenes obtenidas se observó una pérdida del recubrimiento de carbono-politetrafluoroetileno además de la formación de depósitos de hierro, justificando la caída en electrogeneración de H2O2 con la pérdida de superficie activa del electrodo. Como parte de las actividades recogidas en el proyecto Marie Curie - ALICE "AcceLerate Innovation in urban wastewater management for Climate changE", H2020- MSCA-RISE, la doctoranda realizó una estancia de investigación en el Centro de Nanotecnología y Bioingeniería Integrada (NIBEC) de la Universidad de Ulster (Reino Unido), en colaboración con el grupo de Investigación en Fotocatálisis liderado por el Prof. John Anthony Byrne. El objetivo de dicha colaboración fue el desarrollo y aplicación de un reactor foto-electro-catalítico a escala de laboratorio, para la eliminación simultánea de OMCs y microorganismos patógenos en agua natural. Como parte fundamental del reactor, se fabricaron dos foto-ánodos de nanotubos de dióxido de titanio mediante la anodización de una malla de titanio a 30V durante 3h y su posterior recocido a 500°C para promover la fase anatasa. El reactor consiste en una celda de 190 mL con un doble foto-ánodo de nanotubos de dióxido de titanio iluminados por una lámpara ultravioleta de 9 W a través de una ventana de cuarzo, con una irradiación aplicada de 50 W m-2. El objetivo del tratamiento fue la eliminación simultánea de OMCs (terbutrina, clorfenvinfos y diclofenaco a 500 µg L-1 de concentración inicial cada uno) y patógenos (E. coli como bacteria de referencia en una concentración inicial de 106 UFC mL-1), evaluando además la posible mejora al sustituir un cátodo sin contribución en el proceso de degradación, titanio recubierto de platino, por uno de fieltro de carbono capaz de electrogenerar H2O2. Evaluando por separado la degradación de los OMCs e inactivación de E. coli, en la aplicación del proceso foto-electro-catalítico con cátodo de platino se observa una clara mejora en la inactivación de la bacteria (2 Log de reducción tras 120 minutos de tratamiento), con respecto al proceso foto-catalítico sólo (0.8 Log de reducción en el mismo tiempo de tratamiento). Sin embargo, la degradación de OMCs se mantuvo en el mismo ratio, en torno al 70% del total tras 60 min. Al sustituir el cátodo de platino por uno de fieltro de carbono se incrementó la eficacia en la inactivación de E. coli, reduciendo su concentración en 2.7 Log, aunque los OMCs mostraron porcentajes de degradación similares. Cuando finalmente se llevó a cabo la degradación de OMCs de forma simultánea a la inactivación de bacterias mediante foto-electrocatálisis con cátodo de carbono, se observó un aumento significativo en la desinfección, alcanzando el límite de detección del método con una reducción de 4.5 Log. Esta mejora se debe a la presencia de metanol procedente de la solución en la que van pre-disueltos los OMCs, que actúa como neutralizador de huecos aumentando la fotocorriente y que además se oxida generando formaldehido, una sustancia altamente tóxica para los microorganismos (LC50 for E. coli = 1 mg L-1). Como consecuencia de este resultado, se evaluó el efecto de la presencia de sustancias neutralizadoras de huecos en la desinfección, utilizando para ello acetato y metanol en una concentración de 5 mM. En ambos casos, como está descrito en la literatura, se observó un aumento en la fotocorriente respecto a la alcanzada por el sistema en ausencia de ellos y, por lo tanto, se produjo un incremento en la tasa de inactivación de la bacteria siendo mayor en el caso del metanol por la generación de formaldehido. Finalmente, y como resultado de la estrecha colaboración de la doctoranda y la Unidad de Tratamientos Solares del Agua en el proyecto SFERA-II con la empresa DeNora, se llevó a cabo la evaluación de un sistema comercial de electro-oxidación especialmente diseñado para la reducción de demanda química de oxígeno en aguas industriales y basado en la acción de las especias activas del cloro. En el marco de esta colaboración, y como parte de los objetivos desarrollados en esta Tesis Doctoral, se llevó a cabo la evaluación de una planta piloto equipada con una celda de ánodos dimensionalmente estables (DSA, siglas en inglés) procedente de DeNora, combinándola con un reactor solar CPC, con una capacidad total de 38 L y con el objetivo de evaluar la posible mejora en la eficiencia del tratamiento de lixiviados de vertedero. Dichos lixiviados presentaban una alta carga orgánica (>2000 mg L-1 de carbono orgánico disuelto (DOC)), siendo el objetivo del tratamiento disminuir su toxicidad e incrementar su biodegradabilidad para poder combinar finalmente con un posterior tratamiento biológico (logrando así reducir los costes de operación asociados). En primer lugar se llevó a cabo el tratamiento de los dos lotes de concentrado de lixiviados mediante foto-Fenton solar, observando una necesidad de energía UV acumulada excesiva (142.2 kJ L-1) para lograr sólo un 30% de reducción del carbono orgánico disuelto (DOC, siglas en inglés) en el primer lote de lixiviados (diluido 1:1 con agua destilada). En el segundo lote no fue posible llevar a cabo el tratamiento de foto-Fenton solar a causa de la gran cantidad de espumas generada, que provocó grandes oscilaciones del DOC imposibilitando su seguimiento. Posteriormente se trataron los lixiviados mediante electro-oxidación, electro-oxidación añadiendo H2O2 y electro-oxidación combinada con radiación solar, siendo este último el que mayores tasas de degradación de DOC y de nitrógeno total mostró, 3.5 g DOC kWh-1 y 18 g TN kWh-1 en el primer lote de lixiviado tratado y 13.4 g DOC kWh-1 y 45.2 g TN kWh-1 en el segundo lote. Con este tratamiento, el primer lote de lixiviados, que presentaba una toxicidad del 53% de inhibición en la tasa de consumo de oxígeno por parte de fangos activos de EDAR, disminuyó su toxicidad al 6% de inhibición, y en ambos lotes estudiados se incrementó su biodegradabilidad hasta valores adecuados para la posterior aplicación de un tratamiento biológico. Gracias a este estudio se corrobora la mejora que supone la aplicación de la luz solar a los tratamientos electroquímicos de aguas industriales, lo que puede significar un paso adelante hacia la aplicación de estos sistemas altamente oxidantes presentándose como alternativa viable, sostenible y verde, a los tratamientos puramente electroquímicos, suponiendo unos costes de explotación menores debido al menor consumo energético.
COVID-STORM Clinicians Giuseppe Foti1, Giacomo Bellani 1, Giuseppe Citerio1, Ernesto Contro1, Alberto Pesci2, Maria Grazia Valsecchi3, Marina Cazzaniga4 1Department of Emergency, Anesthesia and Intensive Care, School of Medicine and Surgery, University of Milano-Bicocca, San Gerardo Hospital, Monza, Italy. 2Department of Pneumology, School of Medicine and Surgery, University of Milano-Bicocca, San Gerardo Hospital, Monza, Italy. 3Center of Bioinformatics and Biostatistics, School of Medicine and Surgery, University of Milano-Bicocca, San Gerardo Hospital, Monza, Italy. 4Phase I Research Center, School of Medicine and Surgery, University of Milano-Bicocca, San Gerardo Hospital, Monza IT ; COVID Clinicians Jorge Abad1, Sergio Aguilera-Albesa2, Ozge Metin Akcan3, Ilad Alavi Darazam4, Juan C. Aldave5, Miquel Alfonso Ramos6, Seyed Alireza Nadji7, Gulsum Alkan8, Jerome Allardet-Servent9, Luis M. Allende10, Laia Alsina11, Marie-Alexandra Alyanakian12, Blanca Amador-Borrero13, Zahir Amoura14, Arnau Antolí15, Sevket Arslan16, Sophie Assant17, Terese Auguet18, Axelle Azot19, Fanny Bajolle20, Aurélie Baldolli21, Maite Ballester22, Hagit Baris Feldman23, Benoit Barrou24, Alexandra Beurton25, Agurtzane Bilbao26, Geraldine Blanchard-Rohner27, Ignacio Blanco1, Adeline Blandinières28, Daniel Blazquez-Gamero29, Marketa Bloomfield30, Mireia Bolivar-Prados31, Raphael Borie32, Cédric Bosteels33, Ahmed A. Bousfiha34, Claire Bouvattier35, Oksana Boyarchuk36, Maria Rita P. Bueno37, Jacinta Bustamante20, Juan José Cáceres Agra38, Semra Calimli39, Ruggero Capra40, Maria Carrabba41, Carlos Casasnovas42, Marion Caseris43, Martin Castelle44, Francesco Castelli45, Martín Castillo de Vera46, Mateus V. Castro37, Emilie Catherinot47, Martin Chalumeau48, Bruno Charbit49, Matthew P. Cheng50, Père Clavé31, Bonaventura Clotet51, Anna Codina52, Fatih Colkesen53, Fatma Çölkesen54, Roger Colobran55, Cloé Comarmond56, David Dalmau57, David Ross Darley58, Nicolas Dauby59, Stéphane Dauger60, Loic de Pontual61, Amin Dehban62, Geoffroy Delplancq63, Alexandre Demoule64, Jean-Luc Diehl65, Stephanie Dobbelaere66, Sophie Durand67, Waleed Eldars68, Mohamed Elgamal69, Marwa H. Elnagdy70, Melike Emiroglu71, Emine Hafize Erdeniz72, Selma Erol Aytekin73, Romain Euvrard74, Recep Evcen75, Giovanna Fabio41, Laurence Faivre76, Antonin Falck43, Muriel Fartoukh77, Morgane Faure78, Miguel Fernandez Arquero79, Carlos Flores80, Bruno Francois81, Victoria Fumadó82, Francesca Fusco83, Blanca Garcia Solis84, Pascale Gaussem85, Juana Gil-Herrera86, Laurent Gilardin87, Monica Girona Alarcon88, Mònica Girona-Alarcón88, Jean-Christophe Goffard89, Funda Gok90, Rafaela González-Montelongo91, Antoine Guerder92, Yahya Gul93, Sukru Nail Guner93, Marta Gut94, Jérôme Hadjadj95, Filomeen Haerynck96, Rabih Halwani97, Lennart Hammarström98, Nevin Hatipoglu99, Elisa Hernandez-Brito100, Cathérine Heijmans101, María Soledad Holanda-Peña102, Juan Pablo Horcajada103, Levi Hoste104, Eric Hoste105, Sami Hraiech106, Linda Humbert107, Alejandro D. Iglesias108, Antonio Íñigo-Campos91, Matthieu Jamme109, María Jesús Arranz110, Iolanda Jordan111, Philippe Jorens112, Fikret Kanat113, Hasan Kapakli114, Iskender Kara115, Adem Karbuz116, Kadriye Kart Yasar117, Sevgi Keles118, Yasemin Kendir Demirkol119, Adam Klocperk120, Zbigniew J. Król121, Paul Kuentz122, Yat Wah M. Kwan123, Jean-Christophe Lagier124, Bart N. Lambrecht33, Yu-Lung Lau125, Fleur Le Bourgeois60, Yee-Sin Leo126, Rafael Leon Lopez127, Daniel Leung125, Michael Levin128, Michael Levy60, Romain Lévy20, Zhi Li49, Agnes Linglart129, Bart Loeys130, José M. Lorenzo-Salazar91, Céline Louapre131, Catherine Lubetzki131, Charles-Edouard Luyt132, David C. Lye133, Davood Mansouri134, Majid Marjani135, Jesus Marquez Pereira136, Andrea Martin137, David Martínez Pueyo138, Javier Martinez-Picado139, Iciar Marzana140, Alexis Mathian14, Larissa R. B. Matos37, Gail V. Matthews141, Julien Mayaux142, Jean-Louis Mège143, Isabelle Melki144, Jean-François Meritet145, Ozge Metin146, Isabelle Meyts147, Mehdi Mezidi148, Isabelle Migeotte149, Maude Millereux150, Tristan Mirault151, Clotilde Mircher67, Mehdi Mirsaeidi152, Abián Montesdeoca Melián153, Antonio Morales Martinez154, Pierre Morange155, Clémence Mordacq107, Guillaume Morelle156, Stéphane Mouly13, Adrián Muñoz-Barrera91, Leslie Naesens157, Cyril Nafati158, João Farela Neves159, Lisa FP. Ng160, Yeray Novoa Medina161, Esmeralda Nuñez Cuadros162, J. Gonzalo Ocejo-Vinyals163, Zerrin Orbak164, Mehdi Oualha20, Tayfun Özçelik165, Qiang Pan-Hammarström166, Christophe Parizot142, Tiffany Pascreau167, Estela Paz-Artal168, Sandra Pellegrini49, Rebeca Pérez de Diego84, Aurélien Philippe169, Quentin Philippot77, Laura Planas-Serra170, Dominique Ploin171, Julien Poissy172, Géraldine Poncelet43, Marie Pouletty173, Paul Quentric142, Didier Raoult143, Anne-Sophie Rebillat67, Ismail Reisli174, Pilar Ricart175, Jean-Christophe Richard176, Nadia Rivet28, Jacques G. Rivière177, Gemma Rocamora Blanch15, Carlos Rodrigo1, Carlos Rodriguez-Gallego178, Agustí Rodríguez-Palmero179, Carolina Soledad Romero180, Anya Rothenbuhler181, Flore Rozenberg182, Maria Yolanda Ruiz del Prado183, Joan Sabater Riera15, Oliver Sanchez184, Silvia Sánchez-Ramón185, Agatha Schluter170, Matthieu Schmidt186, Cyril E. Schweitzer187, Francesco Scolari188, Anna Sediva189, Luis M. Seijo190, Damien Sene13, Sevtap Senoglu117, Mikko R. J. Seppänen191, Alex Serra Ilovich192, Mohammad Shahrooei62, Hans Slabbynck193, David M. Smadja194, Ali Sobh195, Xavier Solanich Moreno15, Jordi Solé-Violán196, Catherine Soler197, Pere Soler-Palacín137, Yuri Stepanovskiy198, Annabelle Stoclin199, Fabio Taccone149, Yacine Tandjaoui-Lambiotte200, Jean-Luc Taupin201, Simon J. Tavernier202, Benjamin Terrier203, Caroline Thumerelle107, Gabriele Tomasoni204, Julie Toubiana48, Josep Trenado Alvarez205, Sophie Trouillet-Assant206, Jesús Troya207, Alessandra Tucci208, Matilde Valeria Ursini83, Yurdagul Uzunhan209, Pierre Vabres210, Juan Valencia-Ramos211, Eva Van Braeckel33, Stijn Van de Velde212, Ana Maria Van Den Rym84, Jens Van Praet213, Isabelle Vandernoot214, Hulya Vatansev215, Valentina Vélez-Santamaria42, Sébastien Viel171, Cédric Vilain216, Marie E. Vilaire67, Audrey Vincent35, Guillaume Voiriot217, Fanny Vuotto107, Alper Yosunkaya90, Barnaby E. Young126, Fatih Yucel218, Faiez Zannad219, Mayana Zatz37, Alexandre Belot220* ; Imagine COVID Group Christine Bole-Feysot, Stanislas Lyonnet*, Cécile Masson, Patrick Nitschke, Aurore Pouliet, Yoann Schmitt, Frederic Tores, Mohammed Zarhrate Imagine Institute, Université de Paris, INSERM UMR 1163, Paris, France. *Leader of the Imagine COVID Group. ; French COVID Cohort Study Group Laurent Abel1, Claire Andrejak2, François Angoulvant3, Delphine Bachelet4, Romain Basmaci5, Sylvie Behillil6, Marine Beluze7, Dehbia Benkerrou8, Krishna Bhavsar4, François Bompart9, Lila Bouadma4, Maude Bouscambert10, Mireille Caralp11, Minerva Cervantes-Gonzalez12, Anissa Chair4, Alexandra Coelho13, Camille Couffignal4, Sandrine Couffin-Cadiergues14, Eric D'Ortenzio12, Charlene Da Silveira4, Marie-Pierre Debray4, Dominique Deplanque15, Diane Descamps16, Mathilde Desvallées17, Alpha Diallo18, Alphonsine Diouf13, Céline Dorival8, François Dubos19, Xavier Duval4, Philippine Eloy4, Vincent VE Enouf20, Hélène Esperou21, Marina Esposito-Farese4, Manuel Etienne22, Nadia Ettalhaoui4, Nathalie Gault4, Alexandre Gaymard10, Jade Ghosn4, Tristan Gigante23, Isabelle Gorenne4, Jérémie Guedj24, Alexandre Hoctin13, Isabelle Hoffmann4, Salma Jaafoura21, Ouifiya Kafif4, Florentia Kaguelidou25, Sabina Kali4, Antoine Khalil4, Coralie Khan17, Cédric Laouénan4, Samira Laribi4, Minh Le4, Quentin Le Hingrat4, Soizic Le Mestre18, Hervé Le Nagard24, François-Xavier Lescure4, Yves Lévy26, Claire Levy-Marchal27, Bruno Lina10, Guillaume Lingas24, Jean Christophe Lucet4, Denis Malvy28, Marina Mambert13, France Mentré4, Noémie Mercier18, Amina Meziane8, Hugo Mouquet20, Jimmy Mullaert4, Nadège Neant24, Marion Noret29, Justine Pages30, Aurélie Papadopoulos21, Christelle Paul18, Nathan Peiffer-Smadja4, Ventzislava Petrov-Sanchez18, Gilles Peytavin4, Olivier Picone31, Oriane Puéchal12, Manuel Rosa-Calatrava10, Bénédicte Rossignol23, Patrick Rossignol32, Carine Roy4, Marion Schneider4, Caroline Semaille12, Nassima Si Mohammed4, Lysa Tagherset4, Coralie Tardivon4, Marie-Capucine Tellier4, François Téoulé8, Olivier Terrier10, Jean-François Timsit4, Théo Trioux4, Christelle Tual33, Sarah Tubiana4, Sylvie van der Werf34, Noémie Vanel35, Aurélie Veislinger33, Benoit Visseaux16, Aurélie Wiedemann26, Yazdan Yazdanpanah36 1Inserm UMR 1163, Paris, France. 2CHU Amiens, France. 3Hôpital Necker, Paris, France. 4Hôpital Bichat, Paris, France. 5Hôpital Louis Mourrier, Colombes, France. 6Institut Pasteur, Paris, France. 7F-CRIN Partners Platform, AP-HP, Université de Paris, Paris, France. 8Inserm UMR 1136, Paris, France. 9Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative, Geneva, Switzerland. 10Inserm UMR 1111, Lyon, France. 11Inserm Transfert, Paris, France. 12REACTing, Paris, France. 13Inserm UMR 1018, Paris, France. 14Inserm, Pôle Recherche Clinique, Paris, France. 15CIC 1403 Inserm-CHU Lille, Paris, France. 16Université de Paris, IAME, INSERM UMR 1137, AP-HP, University Hospital Bichat Claude Bernard, Virology, Paris, France. 17Inserm UMR 1219, Bordeaux, France. 18ANRS, Paris, France. 19CHU Lille, Lille, France. 20Pasteur Institute, Paris, France. 21Inserm sponsor, Paris, France. 22CHU Rouen–SMIT, Rouen, France. 23FCRIN INI-CRCT, Nancy, France. 24Inserm UMR 1137, Paris, France. 25Centre d'Investigation Clinique, Inserm CIC1426, Hôpital Robert Debré, Paris, France. 26Inserm UMR 955, Créteil, France; Vaccine Research Instiute (VRI), Paris, France. 27F-CRIN INI-CRCT, Paris, France. 28CHU de Bordeaux–SMIT, Bordeaux, France. 29RENARCI, Annecy, France. 30Hôpital Robert Debré, Paris, France. 31Hôpital Louis Mourier–Gynécologie, Colombes, France. 32University of Lorraine, Plurithematic Clinical Investigation Centre Inserm CIC-P; 1433, Inserm U1116, CHRU Nancy Hopitaux de Brabois, F-CRIN INI-CRCT (Cardiovascular and Renal Clinical Trialists), Nancy, France. 33Inserm CIC-1414, Rennes, France. 34Institut Pasteur, UMR 3569 CNRS, Université de Paris, Paris, France. 35Hôpital la Timone, Marseille, France. 36Bichat–SMIT, Paris, France. ; CoV-Contact Cohort Loubna Alavoine1, Karine K. A. Amat2, Sylvie Behillil3, Julia Bielicki4, Patricia Bruijning5, Charles Burdet6, Eric Caumes7, Charlotte Charpentier8, Bruno Coignard9, Yolande Costa1, Sandrine Couffin-Cadiergues10, Florence Damond8, Aline Dechanet11, Christelle Delmas10, Diane Descamps8, Xavier Duval1, Jean-Luc Ecobichon1, Vincent Enouf3, Hélène Espérou10, Wahiba Frezouls1, Nadhira Houhou11, Emila Ilic-Habensus1, Ouifiya Kafif11, John Kikoine11, Quentin Le Hingrat8, David Lebeaux12, Anne Leclercq1, Jonathan Lehacaut1, Sophie Letrou1, Bruno Lina13, Jean-Christophe Lucet14, Denis Malvy15, Pauline Manchon11, Milica Mandic1, Mohamed Meghadecha16, Justina Motiejunaite17, Mariama Nouroudine1, Valentine Piquard11, Andreea Postolache11, Caroline Quintin1, Jade Rexach1, Layidé Roufai10, Zaven Terzian11, Michael Thy18, Sarah Tubiana1, Sylvie van der Werf3, Valérie Vignali1, Benoit Visseaux8, Yazdan Yazdanpanah14 1Centre d'Investigation Clinique, Inserm CIC 1425, Hôpital Bichat Claude Bernard, APHP, Paris, France. 2IMEA Fondation Léon M'Ba, Paris, France. 3Institut Pasteur, UMR 3569 CNRS, Université de Paris, Paris, France. 4University of Basel Children's Hospital. 5Julius Center for Health Sciences and Primary Care, Utrecht, Netherlands. 6Université de Paris, IAME, Inserm UMR 1137, F-75018, Paris, France, Hôpital Bichat Claude Bernard, APHP, Paris, France. 7Hôpital Pitiè Salpétriere, APHP, Paris. 8Université de Paris, IAME, INSERM UMR 1137, AP-HP, University Hospital Bichat Claude Bernard, Virology, Paris, France. 9Santé Publique France, Saint Maurice, France. 10Pole Recherche Clinique, Inserm, Paris, France. 11Hôpital Bichat Claude Bernard, APHP, Paris, France. 12APHP, Paris, France. 13Virpath Laboratory, International Center of Research in Infectiology, Lyon University, INSERM U1111, CNRS UMR 5308, ENS, UCBL, Lyon, France. 14IAME Inserm UMR 1138, Hôpital Bichat Claude Bernard, APHP, Paris, France. 15Service des Maladies Infectieuses et Tropicales; Groupe Pellegrin-Place Amélie-Raba-Léon, Bordeaux, France. 16Hôpital Hotel Dieu, APHP, Paris, France. 17Service des Explorations Fonctionnelles, Hôpital Bichat–Claude Bernard, APHP, Paris, France. 18Center for Clinical Investigation, Assistance Publique-Hôpitaux de Paris, Bichat-Claude Bernard University Hospital, Paris, France. ; Amsterdam UMC Covid-19 Biobank Michiel van Agtmael1, Anna Geke Algera2, Frank van Baarle2, Diane Bax3, Martijn Beudel4, Harm Jan Bogaard5, Marije Bomers1, Lieuwe Bos2, Michela Botta2, Justin de Brabander6, Godelieve de Bree6, Matthijs C. Brouwer4, Sanne de Bruin2, Marianna Bugiani7, Esther Bulle2, Osoul Chouchane1, Alex Cloherty3, Paul Elbers2, Lucas Fleuren2, Suzanne Geerlings1, Bart Geerts8, Theo Geijtenbeek9, Armand Girbes2, Bram Goorhuis1, Martin P. Grobusch1, Florianne Hafkamp9, Laura Hagens2, Jorg Hamann10, Vanessa Harris1, Robert Hemke11, Sabine M. Hermans1, Leo Heunks2, Markus W. Hollmann8, Janneke Horn2, Joppe W. Hovius1, Menno D. de Jong12, Rutger Koning4, Niels van Mourik2, Jeaninne Nellen1, Frederique Paulus2, Edgar Peters1, Tom van der Poll1, Benedikt Preckel8, Jan M. Prins1, Jorinde Raasveld2, Tom Reijnders1, Michiel Schinkel1, Marcus J. Schultz2, Alex Schuurman13, Kim Sigaloff1, Marry Smit2, Cornelis S. Stijnis1, Willemke Stilma2, Charlotte Teunissen14, Patrick Thoral2, Anissa Tsonas2, Marc van der Valk1, Denise Veelo8, Alexander P.J. Vlaar15, Heder de Vries2, Michèle van Vugt1, W. Joost Wiersinga1, Dorien Wouters16, A. H. (Koos) Zwinderman17, Diederik van de Beek4* 1Department of Infectious Diseases, Amsterdam UMC, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 2Department of Intensive Care, Amsterdam UMC, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 3Experimental Immunology, Amsterdam UMC, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 4Department of Neurology, Amsterdam UMC, Amsterdam Neuroscience, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 5Department of Pulmonology, Amsterdam UMC, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 6Department of Infectious Diseases, Amsterdam UMC, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 7Department of Pathology, Amsterdam UMC, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 8Department of Anesthesiology, Amsterdam UMC, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 9Department of Experimental Immunology, Amsterdam UMC, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 10Amsterdam UMC Biobank Core Facility, Amsterdam UMC, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 11Department of Radiology, Amsterdam UMC, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 12Department of Medical Microbiology, Amsterdam UMC, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 13Department of Internal Medicine, Amsterdam UMC, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 14Neurochemical Laboratory, Amsterdam UMC, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 15Department of Intensive Care, Amsterdam UMC, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 16Department of Clinical Chemistry, Amsterdam UMC, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 17Department of Clinical Epidemiology, Biostatistics and Bioinformatics, Amsterdam UMC, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 18Department of Neurology, Amsterdam UMC, Amsterdam, Netherlands. *Leader of the AMC Consortium. ; COVID Human Genetic Effort Laurent Abel1, Alessandro Aiuti2, Saleh Al Muhsen3, Fahd Al-Mulla4, Mark S. Anderson5, Andrés Augusto Arias6, Hagit Baris Feldman7, Dusan Bogunovic8, Alexandre Bolze9, Anastasiia Bondarenko10, Ahmed A. Bousfiha11, Petter Brodin12, Yenan Bryceson12, Carlos D. Bustamante13, Manish Butte14, Giorgio Casari15, Samya Chakravorty16, John Christodoulou17, Elizabeth Cirulli9, Antonio Condino-Neto18, Megan A. Cooper19, Clifton L. Dalgard20, Alessia David21, Joseph L. DeRisi22, Murkesh Desai23, Beth A. Drolet24, Sara Espinosa25, Jacques Fellay26, Carlos Flores27, Jose Luis Franco28, Peter K. Gregersen29, Filomeen Haerynck30, David Hagin31, Rabih Halwani32, Jim Heath33, Sarah E. Henrickson34, Elena Hsieh35, Kohsuke Imai36, Yuval Itan8, Timokratis Karamitros37, Kai Kisand38, Cheng-Lung Ku39, Yu-Lung Lau40, Yun Ling41, Carrie L. Lucas42, Tom Maniatis43, Davoud Mansouri44, Laszlo Marodi45, Isabelle Meyts46, Joshua Milner47, Kristina Mironska48, Trine Mogensen49, Tomohiro Morio50, Lisa FP. Ng51, Luigi D. Notarangelo52, Antonio Novelli53, Giuseppe Novelli54, Cliona O'Farrelly55, Satoshi Okada56, Tayfun Ozcelik57, Rebeca Perez de Diego58, Anna M. Planas59, Carolina Prando60, Aurora Pujol61, Lluis Quintana-Murci62, Laurent Renia63, Alessandra Renieri64, Carlos Rodríguez-Gallego65, Vanessa Sancho-Shimizu66, Vijay Sankaran67, Kelly Schiabor Barrett9, Mohammed Shahrooei68, Andrew Snow69, Pere Soler-Palacín70, András N. Spaan71, Stuart Tangye72, Stuart Turvey73, Furkan Uddin74, Mohammed J. Uddin75, Diederik van de Beek76, Sara E. Vazquez77, Donald C. Vinh78, Horst von Bernuth79, Nicole Washington9, Pawel Zawadzki80, Helen C. Su52, Jean-Laurent Casanova81 1INSERM U1163, University of Paris, Imagine Institute, Paris, France. 2San Raffaele Telethon Institute for Gene Therapy, IRCCS Ospedale San Raffaele, Milan, Italy. 3King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 4Kuwait University, Kuwait City, Kuwait. 5University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, USA. 6Universidad de Antioquia, Group of Primary Immunodeficiencies, Antioquia, Colombia. 7The Genetics Institute, Tel Aviv Sourasky Medical Center and Sackler Faculty of Medicine, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel. 8Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY, USA. 9Helix, San Mateo, CA, USA. 10Shupyk National Medical Academy for Postgraduate Education, Kiev, Ukraine. 11Clinical Immunology Unit, Pediatric Infectious Disease Departement, Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy, Averroes University Hospital; LICIA Laboratoire d'Immunologie Clinique, d'Inflammation et d'Allergie, Hassann Ii University, Casablanca, Morocco. 12Karolinska Institute, Stockholm, Sweden. 13Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA. 14University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA. 15Medical Genetics, IRCCS Ospedale San Raffaele, Milan, Italy. 16Emory University Department of Pediatrics and Children's Healthcare of Atlanta, Atlanta, GA, USA. 17Murdoch Children's Research Institute, Victoria, Australia. 18University of São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil. 19Washington University School of Medicine, St. Louis, MO, USA. 20The American Genome Center; Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Bethesda, MD, USA. 21Centre for Bioinformatics and System Biology, Department of Life Sciences, Imperial College London, South Kensington Campus, London, UK. 22University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA; Chan Zuckerberg Biohub, San Francisco, CA, USA. 23Bai Jerbai Wadia Hospital for Children, Mumbai, India. 24School of Medicine and Public Health, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA. 25Instituto Nacional de Pediatria (National Institute of Pediatrics), Mexico City, Mexico. 26Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland. 27Research Unit, Hospital Universitario Nuestra Señora de Candelaria, Canarian Health System, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Spain. 28University of Antioquia, Medellín, Colombia. 29Feinstein Institute for Medical Research, Northwell Health USA, Manhasset, NY, USA. 30Department of Paediatric Immunology and Pulmonology, Centre for Primary Immunodeficiency Ghent (CPIG), PID Research Lab, Jeffrey Modell Diagnosis and Research Centre, Ghent University Hospital, Edegem, Belgium. 31The Genetics Institute, Tel Aviv Sourasky Medical Center, Tel Aviv, Israel. 32Sharjah Institute of Medical Research, College of Medicine, University of Sharjah, Sharjah, UAE. 33Institute for Systems Biology, Seattle, WA, USA. 34Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA, USA. 35Anschutz Medical Campus, Aurora, CO, USA. 36Riken, Tokyo, Japan. 37Hellenic Pasteur Institute, Athens, Greece. 38University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia. 39Chang Gung University, Taoyuan County, Taiwan. 40The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China. 41Shanghai Public Health Clinical Center, Fudan University, Shanghai, China. 42Yale School of Medicine, New Haven, CT, USA. 43New York Genome Center, New York, NY, USA. 44Shahid Beheshti University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran. 45Semmelweis University Budapest, Budapest, Hungary. 46KU Leuven, Department of Immunology, Microbiology and Transplantation, Leuven, Belgium. 47Columbia University Medical Center, New York, NY, USA. 48University Clinic for Children's Diseases, Skopje, North Macedonia. 49Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark. 50Tokyo Medical & Dental University Hospital, Tokyo, Japan. 51Singapore Immunology Network, Singapore. 52National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD, USA. 53Bambino Gesù Children's Hospital, Rome, Italy. 54Department of Biomedicine and Prevention, University of Rome "Tor Vergata," Rome, Italy. 55Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland. 56Hiroshima University, Hiroshima, Japan. 57Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey. 58Laboratory of Immunogenetics of Human Diseases, Innate Immunity Group, IdiPAZ Institute for Health Research, La Paz Hospital, Madrid, Spain. 59IIBB-CSIC, IDIBAPS, Barcelona, Spain. 60Faculdades Pequeno Príncipe e Instituto de Pesquisa Pelé Pequeno Príncipe, Curitiba, Brazil. 61Neurometabolic Diseases Laboratory, IDIBELL–Hospital Duran I Reynals; Catalan Institution for Research and Advanced Studies (ICREA); CIBERER U759, ISCiii Madrid Spain, Barcelona, Spain. 62Institut Pasteur (CNRS UMR2000) and Collège de France, Paris, France. 63Infectious Diseases Horizontal Technology Center and Singapore Immunology Network, Agency for Science Technology (A*STAR), Singapore. 64Medical Genetics, University of Siena, Siena, Italy; Genetica Medica, Azienda Ospedaliero-Universitaria Senese, Italy; GEN-COVID Multicenter Study. 65Hospital Universitario de Gran Canaria Dr. Negrín, Canarian Health System, Canary Islands, Spain. 66Imperial College London, London, UK. 67Boston Children's Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA. 68Saeed Pathobiology and Genetic Lab, Tehran, Iran. 69Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Bethesda, MD, USA. 70Hospital Universitari Vall d'Hebron, Barcelona, Spain. 71University Medical Center Utrecht, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 72Garvan Institute of Medical Research, Sydney, Australia. 73The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. 74Holy Family Red Crescent Medical College; Centre for Precision Therapeutics, NeuroGen Children's Healthcare; Genetics and Genomic Medicine Centre, NeuroGen Children's Healthcare, Dhaka, Bangladesh. 75Mohammed Bin Rashid University of Medicine and Health Sciences, College of Medicine, Dubai, UAE; The Centre for Applied Genomics, Department of Genetics and Genome Biology, The Hospital for Sick Children, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. 76Amsterdam UMC, University of Amsterdam, Department of Neurology, Amsterdam Neuroscience, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 77University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA. 78McGill University Health Centre, Montreal, Canada. 79Charité–Berlin University Hospital Center, Berlin, Germany. 80Molecular Biophysics Division, Faculty of Physics, A. Mickiewicz University, Uniwersytetu Poznanskiego 2, Poznań, Poland. 81Rockefeller University, Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Necker Hospital, New York, NY, USA. *Leaders of the COVID Human Genetic Effort. ; NIAID-USUHS/TAGC COVID Immunity Group Huie Jing1,2, Wesley Tung1,2, Christopher R. Luthers3, Bradly M. Bauman3, Samantha Shafer2,4, Lixin Zheng2,4, Zinan Zhang2,4, Satoshi Kubo2,4, Samuel D. Chauvin2,4, Kazuyuki Meguro1,2, Elana Shaw1,2, Michael Lenardo2,4, Justin Lack5, Eric Karlins6, Daniel M. Hupalo7, John Rosenberger7, Gauthaman Sukumar7, Matthew D. Wilkerson7, Xijun Zhang7 1Laboratory of Clinical Immunology and Microbiology, Division of Intramural Research, NIAID, NIH, Bethesda, MD, USA. 2NIAID Clinical Genomics Program, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD, USA. 3Department of Pharmacology & Molecular Therapeutics, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Bethesda, MD, USA. 4Laboratory of Immune System Biology, Division of Intramural Research, NIAID, NIH, Bethesda, MD, USA. 5NIAID Collaborative Bioinformatics Resource, Frederick National Laboratory for Cancer Research, Leidos Biomedical Research, Inc., Frederick, MD, USA. 6Bioinformatics and Computational Biosciences Branch, Office of Cyber Infrastructure and Computational Biology, NIAID, NIH, Bethesda, MD, USA. 7The American Genome Center, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Bethesda, MD, USA. ; Clinical outcome upon infection with SARS-CoV-2 ranges from silent infection to lethal COVID-19. We have found an enrichment in rare variants predicted to be loss-of-function (LOF) at the 13 human loci known to govern TLR3- and IRF7-dependent type I interferon (IFN) immunity to influenza virus, in 659 patients with life-threatening COVID-19 pneumonia, relative to 534 subjects with asymptomatic or benign infection. By testing these and other rare variants at these 13 loci, we experimentally define LOF variants in 23 patients (3.5%), aged 17 to 77 years, underlying autosomal recessive or dominant deficiencies. We show that human fibroblasts with mutations affecting this pathway are vulnerable to SARS-CoV-2. Inborn errors of TLR3- and IRF7-dependent type I IFN immunity can underlie life-threatening COVID-19 pneumonia in patients with no prior severe infection. ; We thank the generous donation from Fisher Center for Alzheimer's Research Foundation for our research. The Laboratory of Human Genetics of Infectious Diseases is supported by the Howard Hughes Medical Institute, the Rockefeller University, the St. Giles Foundation, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) (R01AI088364), the National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (NCATS), NIH Clinical and Translational Science Award (CTSA) program (UL1 TR001866), a Fast Grant from Emergent Ventures, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, the Yale Center for Mendelian Genomics and the GSP Coordinating Center funded by the National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI) (UM1HG006504 and U24HG008956), the French National Research Agency (ANR) under the "Investments for the Future" program (ANR-10-IAHU-01), the Integrative Biology of Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory of Excellence (ANR-10-LABX-62-IBEID), the French Foundation for Medical Research (FRM) (EQU201903007798), the FRM and ANR GENCOVID project, ANRS-COV05, the Square Foundation, Grandir - Fonds de solidarité pour l'enfance, the SCOR Corporate Foundation for Science, Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale (INSERM), the University of Paris. The French COVID Cohort study group was sponsored by Inserm and supported by the REACTing consortium and by a grant from the French Ministry of Health (PHRC 20-0424). Regione Lombardia, Italy (project "Risposta immune in pazienti con COVID-19 e co-morbidità"), and the Intramural Research Program of the NIAID, NIH. The laboratory of Genomes & Cell Biology of Disease is supported by "Integrative Biology of Emerging Infectious Diseases" (grant no. ANR-10-LABX-62-IBEID), the "Fondation pour la Recherche Medicale" (grant FRM - EQU202003010193), the "Agence Nationale de la Recherche" (ANR FLASH COVID project IDISCOVR cofounded by the "Fondation pour la Recherche Médicale"), University of Paris ("Plan de Soutien Covid-19": RACPL20FIR01-COVID-SOUL). IM is a senior clinical investigator with the FWO Vlaanderen; IM and LM are supported by FWO G0C8517N – GOB5120N. The VS team was supported by "Agence Nationale de la Recherche" (ANR-17-CE15-0003, ANR-17-CE15-0003-01), and by Université de Paris "PLAN D'URGENCE COVID19". LK was supported by a fellowship from the French Ministry of Research. VS-S is supported by a UKRI Future Leaders Fellowship (MR/S032304/1). SZA-M is supported by the Elite Journals Program at King Saud University through grant number PEJP-16-107. JM lab is supported by Columbia University COVID biobank and grant: UL1TR001873. Work in the Laboratory of Virology and Infectious Disease was supported by NIH grants P01AI138398-S1, 2U19AI111825, and R01AI091707-10S1, a George Mason University Fast Grant, and the G. Harold and Leila Y. Mathers Charitable Foundation. JLP is supported by a European Molecular Biology Organization Long-Term Fellowship (ALTF 380-2018). Work at the Neurometabolic Diseases Laboratory received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No 824110 (EasiGenomics grant COVID-19/ PID12342) to A.P., and Roche and Illumina Covid Match Funds to M.G. C.R.G and colleagues are supported by cInstituto de Salud Carlos III (COV20_01333 and COV20_01334), Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, with the funding of European Regional Development Fund-European Social Fund -FEDER-FSE; (RTC-2017-6471-1; AEI/FEDER, UE), and Cabildo Insular de Tenerife (CGIEU0000219140 and "Apuestas científicas del ITER para colaborar en la lucha contra la COVID-19"). D.C.V. is supported by the Fonds de la recherche en santé du Québec clinician-scientist scholar program. Helen Su is adjunct faculty at the University of Pennsylvania. A-L.N. was supported by the Foundation Bettencourt Schueller. The Amsterdam UMC Covid-19 Biobank was funded by the Netherlands Organization for Health Research and Development (ZonMw, NWO-vici 91819627), The Corona Research Fund (Amsterdam UMC), Dr. J. C. Vaillantfonds, and Amsterdam UMC. Work on COVID-19 at the AG-S lab is partly supported by NIH supplements to grants U19AI135972, U19AI142733 and R35 HL135834, and to contract HHSN272201800048C, by a DoD supplement to grant W81XWH-20-1-0270, by DARPA project HR0011-19-2-0020, by CRIP (Center for Research on Influenza Pathogenesis), a NIAID funded Center of Excellence for Influenza Research and Surveillance (CEIRS, contract HHSN272201400008C), by an NIAID funded Collaborative Influenza Vaccine Innovation Center (SEM-CIVIC, contract 75N93019C00051) and by the generous support of the JPB Foundation, the Open Philanthropy Project (research grant 2020-215611(5384)) and anonymous donors. The Virscan analysis presented in fig. S11 was performed with financial support from Sidra Medicine ; Peer reviewed
"Self-preservation is the first duty of a nation"Alexander Hamilton "The whole point of the doomsday machineis lost if you keep it a secret!!"Dr. Strangelove I) Introducción: El realismo, la moral y la condición humana El realismo político ha sido la teoría de filosofía política de referencia por más de dos mil años y el programa de investigación dominante en las relaciones internacionales en el siglo XX. A pesar de todos sus defectos e imprecisiones, es el paradigma a partir del cual todas las corrientes rivales se han desarrollado. Tanto Holsti (1984) como Viotti y Kauppi (1993) identifican tres grandes paradigmas en RR.II: los enfoques clásicos o realistas, los enfoques pluralistas (ej. liberalismo) y los enfoques globalizadores o neo-marxistas. El paradigma realista ha sido, sin lugar a contestación, la teoría dominante. De manera más que sucinta es posible afirmar que las dos principales escuelas en RR.II, el realismo y el liberalismo, fundan toda su filosofía sobre concepciones opuestas de la condición humana. En última instancia cualquier filosofía política no es más que un "acto de fe", porque, más allá de cualquier validación heurística o de encadenamiento lógico, ser "realista", "liberal" o "marxista", implica una concepción particular del individuo, una forma de creer y ver al Hombre sobre la cual construiremos nuestra visión de la sociedad. El liberalismo es principalmente una filosofía positiva de la condición humana, basada en la libertad, en la racionalidad, en el libre albedrío y en la perfectibilidad social y humana. La perspectiva realista, como se verá a lo largo de este trabajo, parte de suposiciones radicalmente diferentes. Un supuesto central del realismo, mas no el único, es que el hombre anhela, ansía el Poder por encima de todas las cosas. Pero, ahí donde el liberalismo ve un defecto moral destinado a ser reparado o dominado, el realismo no reconoce más que una característica inmanente al individuo. El ansia de poder, para los realistas, no es ni buena ni mala, simplemente es. He aquí una distinción central entre ambas corrientes filosóficas, mientras el liberalismo anhela un mundo como "debería ser", el realista se contenta de observar cómo es el mundo. Esto ha derivado en un par de críticas importantes hacia la escuela realista. La primera es su ausencia de "compás moral"; la segunda, más relevante para este estudio, es su incapacidad para pensar o explicar el cambio. Algo así como si en la teoría realista el individuo (o el sistema internacional para los neorrealistas), careciese de pasado y futuro y estuviese destinado a vivir el presente encorsetado por una fuerza que lo domina: su apetito de poder para los realistas clásicos y la estructura del S.I en el caso de los neorrealistas. Conviene aquí incorporar una primera distinción, así como una aclaración con respecto a la centralidad del argumento depredador de la condición humana presente en el realismo. Con respecto a la aclaración, varios teóricos que han revisado exhaustivamente el "catalogo de pensadores realistas", refutan la idea que el ansia por el poder sea un argumento central al realismo (sí puede ser subsidiario). Tanto Viotti y Kauppi (1993: 6-7) como Vasquez (1983: 18) no encuentran que la naturaleza humana depredadora sea una suposición fundamental del realismo político. Con respecto a la distinción, he aquí una primera diferenciación entre el realismo clásico y el neorrealismo (o realismo estructural). Si bien es cierto que en el neorrealismo, preocupado únicamente por un análisis estructural (distribución de fuerzas y reglas que gobiernan el S.I), la naturaleza humana está ausente de todo análisis, en el realismo clásico, ya sea el de Tucídides, Hobbes o Morgenthau, es difícil edificar cualquier base teórica sin tener recurso, por lo menos como axioma no declarado, a la condición humana. Así lo expone Shimko (1992: 288): "Assumptions about human nature were not merely afterthoughts, excess intellectual baggage, or flowery rhetorical flourishes; they were the cornerstone of the classical realist analysis of political conflict". Y en palabras de George Kennan, sobre si la divina providencia había protegido o no al pueblo estadounidense de las tentaciones del fascismo propias a otros pueblos: "Unfortunately, I know that is not true…the fact of the matter is that there is a little bit of totalitarian buried somewhere, way down deep, in each and every one of us" (Kennan, 1967:319 en Shimko, 1992:289). El realismo clásico no asume que la moral está ausente de las RR.II, como erróneamente a menudo se expone, sino que argumenta que toda acción basada en la moral es contraproducente a los intereses del estado, principalmente a su seguridad y supervivencia. Es su fundamental oposición al idealismo moral lo que ha en parte dado su nombre al realismo clásico, que se inscribe antes que nada como un enfoque teórico reaccionario al idealismo (Forde, 1995: 143). La manipulación de principios morales sólo puede debilitar la política exterior y conducir a situaciones catastróficas porque, plantean los realistas, las normas que gobiernan el S.I nada tienen que ver con la moral y, con respecto a la condición humana, negar su naturaleza es un acto de ceguera. Así lo explica Morgenthau cuando critica la intervención de los Estados Unidos en la primera guerra mundial "The invocation of abstract moral principles was in part hardly more than an innocuous pastime; for embracing everything it came to grips with nothing. In part, however, it was a magnificent instrument for marshaling public opinion in support of war and warlike policies- and for losing the peace to follow. The intoxications with moral abstractions…has become the prevailing substitute for political thought, is indeed one of the great sources of weakness and failure in American foreign policy" (Morgenthau, 1950: 834). Para Morgenthau, los intereses morales están totalmente divorciados del interés nacional. El único acto verdaderamente inmoral, para los realistas clásicos, es actuar en contra de los intereses racionales del estado. II) El núcleo duro del realismo político Antes de lanzarse al estudio de la escuela realista, de sus principales aportes así como de las críticas que se le han realizado, conviene detenerse brevemente en los postulados centrales que han hecho del programa de investigación del realismo político uno de los más fecundos de las RR.II . En complemento al falsacionismo popperiano, Imre Lakatos (1980) desarrolla la idea del programa de investigación como medio para hacer avanzar el conocimiento científico. Lakatos afirma que el progreso científico no se alcanza únicamente a través de la refutación, sino igualmente, y sobretodo, a partir de la confirmación de conjeturas audaces. La ciencia no progresa automáticamente a través del rechazo de teorías, es más, Lakatos avanza que, para que un programa de investigación pueda progresar es necesario preservar un "núcleo duro" de supuestos fundamentales que serán centrales en el desarrollo de cada programa. Este núcleo duro del programa de investigación es, por decisión metodológica, infalsificable (Lakatos, 1980:112). El núcleo estará rodeado por una "cintura protectora", un conjunto de teorías e hipótesis (derivadas de los supuestos del núcleo duro), destinada a explicar los hechos observados así como predecir nuevos. La validación de estas teorías fortalecerá el núcleo, pero su rechazo, y he aquí una de las innovaciones metodológicas de Lakatos, no invalidará el conjunto del programa de investigación. Un programa será rechazado únicamente cuando un programa rival demuestre un mayor "poder heurístico". ¿Cuál es entonces el núcleo duro del realismo político?, ese conjunto de supuestos infalsificables que, a la manera de axiomas o dogmas, sustentan toda la construcción teórica del programa de investigación del realismo y que están más allá de cualquier cuestionamiento ontológico. Dependiendo de los autores, 3, 4 o hasta 5 son los "dogmas" realistas. Sin embargo, conviene aclarar que no todos los autores realistas adhieren ciegamente a la integralidad de estos supuestos a la manera de un tipo ideal weberiano. Como ya dije, el supuesto de la "naturaleza humana", por ejemplo, es cuestionado. Asimismo, algunos autores resaltan algunos principios por sobre otros. Sin embargo, a pesar de ciertas disensiones entre teóricos sobre el tratamiento y alcance de cada uno de estos axiomas, existe un consenso sobre la centralidad de estas cuestiones en la teoría realista. A mi entender, el realismo político se sustenta en los siguientes principios. A) Los estados son los actores principales de las RR.II; B) El estado es unitario y racional; C) El interés nacional, entendido en términos de seguridad nacional, debe ser la principal preocupación del estado y guiar su política exterior (Los estados buscan el poder); D) La anarquía es la norma que regula el accionar de los estados en el Sistema Internacional. Los tres primeros principios resurgen en prácticamente todos los teóricos realistas como los tres axiomas centrales (y únicos para algunos) del realismo político. Por otra parte, la centralidad del argumento de la anarquía dependerá en gran medida de si la consideramos o no como una característica secundaria o derivada del primer supuesto (el mundo es anárquico porque está compuesto sólo por estados soberanos). Veremos igualmente que si bien la anarquía no es un principio central para la mayor parte de los realistas clásicos como Tucídides o Hobbes, ya que no existiría "de por sí", la anarquía sí representa para los neorrealistas un supuesto fundamental. Ciertos teóricos, inclusive dentro de la escuela realista, han considerado que la anarquía del S.I ha sido por momentos "exagerada" y que existen en los hechos ciertas reglas, normas y mecanismos de cooperación que limitan y regulan el accionar de los estados. En este caso, el concepto de anarquía no sería un supuesto central del realismo. Vasquez (1883: 18) propone que otra suposición central al realismo es que existe una clara distinción entre la política doméstica y la política internacional, y que las relaciones internacionales representan una lucha por el poder y la paz. Entender como funciona esa dinámica, y encontrar formas o normas para dominarla, debe ser el propósito de la disciplina de las relaciones internacionales. Los estados son los actores principales de las RR.II: Otros actores no estatales, transnacionales o internacionales no son tan importantes, principalmente porque no ejercen el monopolio de la violencia interna o no tienen la capacidad de representar una amenaza física a la integridad del estado. Actores como las organizaciones internacionales (N.U, OTAN), no son sujetos de análisis importante ya que están compuestas por estados soberanos e independientes y, por lo tanto, no son autónomos de las partes que los componen. El estado es unitario: Por unitario se entiende que el estado es una única unidad política, soberana sobre su propio territorio. Independientemente de los diferendos internos o de los procesos de negociación políticos o burocráticos que puedan existir, el estado sólo tiene una posición en el concierto internacional. El estado es racional: Los realistas asumen que el estado siempre adoptará la decisión más eficiente, dados los recursos y capacidades disponibles y en un contexto de incertidumbre e información incompleta, para alcanzar sus objetivos (Legro y Moravcsik, 1999: 12). La racionalidad del estado pasa, para los realistas, casi exclusivamente por garantizar su seguridad y buscar el poder. La racionalidad del estado no puede desasociarse de la naturaleza de anarquía del S.I. Es sólo a través de la respuesta racional del estado ante las condiciones de anarquía internacional, que el realismo puede pretender establecer pautas y regularidades en el comportamiento, necesarias al establecimiento de una ciencia que explique comprensivamente el accionar de los estados (Forde, 1995: 145). Un concepto interesante es el de la naturaleza de las preferencias del estado o, dicho de otra manera, del interés nacional. Se tratará este tema en detalle más adelante, pero valga aquí una primera aclaración. El realismo, al asumir que las preferencias de los estados son fijas y mutualmente excluyentes o conflictivas (la seguridad o la búsqueda del poder), se aleja de la "tentación reduccionista" de buscar las causas de la acción del estado en los procesos domésticos de formación y negociación de preferencias, así como de las interpretaciones moralistas, utópicas o legalistas de la naturaleza de la política internacional (Legro y Moravcsik, 1999:14). El realismo propone entonces que las RR.II son un perpetuo proceso de negociación sobre la conquista, distribución y redistribución de recursos y bienes escasos. III) Poder, Sistema y Seguridad Dos cuestiones son centrales al pensamiento realista: el Poder y el Sistema. Ambos conceptos pueden ser pensados desde una perspectiva estática o dinámica. El poder estático representaría el conjunto de atributos o capacidades, militares, económicos, tecnológicos, diplomáticos y otros que posee un estado. El Poder dinámico debe ser pensado, no como un absoluto, sino como la capacidad de influenciar el accionar de otros estados. En este sentido, la influencia de un estado en el plano internacional no depende únicamente de su dotación objetiva de poder, sino de a) su voluntad de usar dicho poder, b) la percepción que los otros estados tengan de su voluntad a utilizar dicho poder, c) su influencia efectiva sobre otros estados (Viotti y Kauppi, 1993: 44). Es innegable que para muchos realistas el poder es la principal herramienta de presión para influenciar el resultado de la negociación interestatal y que este resultado es proporcional al total de las capacidades materiales (Legro y Moravcsik), 1999: 17). En otras palabras, en un mundo entre iguales (estados soberanos) los poderosos tienen más opciones que los débiles, cuya única opción a menudo es sufrir la dominación del más fuerte. El primero en expresar esta idea, dos mil años antes que Maquiavelo, fue Tucídides en su Historia de la Guerra del Peloponeso, en el famoso diálogo de los Melios, cuando los emisarios atenienses advierten a los melios (libro V: verso 89): "…lo saben ustedes tan bien como nosotros, la justicia sólo forma parte del razonamiento humano cuando las fuerzas en presencia son iguales, de lo contrario, los fuertes ejercen su poder y los débiles deben inclinarse ". En relación al concepto de sistema, una corriente minoritaria (principalmente behaviorista), ve al sistema como un conjunto de interacciones entre el estado y otros actores no estatales. La corriente mayoritaria, entiende el sistema como las diferentes distribuciones de capacidades o de poder entre los estados y las normas que regulan dichas relaciones, principalmente: la anarquía y la incertidumbre (Viotti y Kaupi, 1993: 45-46). Por los tanto, los realistas ven el mundo como una competencia constante por recursos limitados. Lo que cuenta no son las capacidades absolutas, sino el cambio relativo en las capacidades de los actores (Schweller, 1997: 928). Para reflexionar sobre la idea de seguridad y como ésta resulta indisociable de las nociones de poder y sistema, conviene profundizar sobre la brevemente mencionada noción de anarquía, para así reconstruir el encadenamiento lógico del realismo. La anarquía, pieza clave en el entendimiento de la teoría realista implica que, en un sistema internacional compuesto por estados soberanos y autónomos, no existe autoridad superior a la de los estados. La anarquía conlleva que no existe jerarquía entre los estados en el S.I. Si bien es cierto que hay estados más poderosos que otros, y he aquí la diferencia entre autoridad y poder, ningún estado tiene una autoridad superior, ningún derecho legal a gobernar a otro por el solo hecho de ser más poderoso. De esta visión de un mundo anárquico, podemos extrapolar por lo menos dos aspectos importantes que se relacionan con la falta de confianza, o la desconfianza preventiva en la que incurren los actores de las RR.II. y que afectará la seguridad de los estados y del sistema. El primero es que el estado sólo puede contar consigo mismo ya que no existe una autoridad central (a la imagen del Leviatán de Hobbes), capaz de hacer respetar las reglas y compromisos acordados a nivel internacional. Por lo tanto, los estados se encuentran en una situación de self-help. El segundo punto derivado de la anarquía del sistema es lo que ha pasado a denominarse como el dilema de seguridad, que funciona de la siguiente manera: en un contexto de desconfianza y self-help, un estado procederá a armarse para preservar su seguridad frente a cualquier posible amenaza. El dilema radica en que mientras un estado más se arma (aunque sus intenciones sean puramente defensivas), más amenaza la seguridad de terceros estados, quienes, desde una óptica puramente racional, recurrirán a un proceso similar para defenderse de cualquier posible amenaza del primer estado (es la lógica detrás de cualquier carrera armamentística). Así lo expone Waltz (1988: 619): "The uneasy state of affairs is exacerbated by the familiar security dilemma, wherein measures that enhance one state´s security typically diminish that of others. In an anarchic domain, the source of one´s own comfort is the source of another worry". En virtud de la anarquía del sistema internacional, por más que todos los actores conscientemente busquen la paz, la racionalidad del estado (salvaguardar su seguridad) lo conducirá a la única alternativa posible: igualar o superar el armamento rival. Así es como Tucídides explica la guerra entre Atenas y Esparta. Esparta, temerosa del aumento del poder militar ateniense se lanzó en su propia campaña de alianzas para contrarrestar cualquier cambio desfavorable en el balance de poder. Dadas las condiciones del sistema y la naturaleza de los actores que acabo de enunciar, los teóricos, realistas y otros, han pretendido siempre encontrar la fórmula mágica que garantice un S.I más seguro. Parte de esos esfuerzos tienen que ver con el estudio de la teoría de juegos que, aplicada al estudio de las relaciones internacionales, intenta descifrar los diferentes escenarios de cooperación y conflicto, las normas, los incentivos o las amenazas que provocarán determinados comportamientos (siempre entendidos desde la perspectiva de un actor racional) y promoverán la seguridad o la inseguridad en el S.I. Los escenarios más conocidos son los de la "caza del ciervo" de J. J Rousseau, y el dilema del prisionero. El problema de aplicar la teoría de juegos a las relaciones entre estados radica en que, para que la estrategia sea exitosa (o sea, que todos los casos posibles de "jugadas" puedan ser previstos), la información con que cuentan los actores debe ser perfecta (Wagner, 1983: 345). Sin embargo, para los realistas, y en particular para los neorrealistas, la incertidumbre es parte central de la estructura en el S.I. A menudo, los estados actúan como "cajas negras" que proveen escasa o nula información otra que el resultado directo de sus políticas exteriores (Glaser, 1997: 195). Una pregunta interesante es la de saber si ¿el dilema de seguridad es una resultante de la naturaleza del sistema o, si por el contrario, es construido por los estados? Para Alexander Wendt (1995: 73), uno de los principales teóricos de la escuela constructivista, el dilema de la seguridad, así como la idea de anarquía, no están dados por el sistema o por la "naturaleza", sino que son construcciones sociales. Para él, el dilema de seguridad es producto de percepciones intersubjetivas de los estados que, impregnados de una desconfianza generalizada, asumen siempre lo peor en las intenciones de los otros actores. Si, como asume Wendt, el dilema de la seguridad es una creación, o más bien una percepción de los estados, estaría también en ellos la posibilidad de llevar adelante políticas que eviten crear dicho dilema. La respuesta realista ha sido en parte de argumentar que los constructivistas, así como los liberales, magnifican el nivel de competición y conflicto en la teoría realista. Sería más correcto afirmar que muchos realistas (principalmente los realistas defensivos) no ven a los estados como entidades ontológicamente agresivas e identificadas negativamente con la seguridad de otros, sino más bien como actores egoístas, y, por lo tanto, indiferentes a la seguridad ajena, salvo en los casos en que esta los afecte negativamente (Glaser, 1997: 197). La anarquía y la incertidumbre del S.I, ligadas al dilema de la seguridad, han provocado un quiebre de la escuela neorrealista entre los defensores de un realismo ofensivo y los que apoyan un realismo defensivo. Tanto los neorrealistas ofensivos como defensivos parten de los mismos supuestos, algunos de los cuales comparten con los realistas clásicos: los estados poderosos son los principales actores de las RR.II (en esto difieren de los realistas clásicos); los estados son racionales (maximizan sus recursos para alcanzar sus objetivos, en este caso su seguridad) y, producto de la anarquía y de la incertidumbre del S.I, nunca pueden estar del todo seguros de las intenciones de los otros estados y se encuentran entonces en una situación de sef-help; por lo tanto, la principal preocupación de los estados es asegurar su seguridad y supervivencia (security seekers), es decir, minimizar la probabilidad de ser conquistados o destruidos por otros actores; por último, para asegurar su seguridad en el contexto de self-help, los estados procederán a armarse y contarán con capacidades ofensivas y defensivas. Los realistas ofensivos mantienen que los estados intentarán siempre maximizar el poder, mientras que los realistas defensivos proponen que los estados buscan antes que nada mantener el status quo y, por lo tanto, buscarán balancear el poder dentro del sistema internacional. John Mearsheimer (2001) ha sido el principal proponente del realismo ofensivo, mientras que Kenneth Waltz y Stephen Walt del realismo defensivo. Este debate ha provocado la emergencia de una teoría relacionada con el balance entre las estrategias defensivas y ofensivas. Los teóricos se han abocado a estudiar si es posible separar ambas estrategias (en particular en un contexto de supremo desarrollo tecnológico) y si las variaciones entre ofensa-defensa pueden alterar las probabilidades de la guerra y de la competencia en materia de seguridad. Esta teoría, desarrollada en los años 70, ha sido utilizada exhaustivamente para explicar los diferentes escenarios de cooperación y conflicto, las carreras armamentísticas o el control del armamento, la formación de alianzas o las formas óptimas de disuasión, e igualmente para estudiar si los estados buscan ganancias absolutas o relativas. La teoría ofensa/defensa (Offense-Defense Theory ) plantea que existe un balance entre ofensa y defensa que determinará la eficacia relativa de las estrategias de seguridad ofensivas y defensivas. Las variaciones en las dotaciones de ofensa y defensa afectarán los patrones de las relaciones internacionales y de la política exterior. La teoría avanza que el conflicto internacional y la guerra son más factibles de ocurrir cuando la ofensiva lleva la ventaja, mientras que la paz y la cooperación más factibles cuando la defensa tiene ventaja (Lynn-Jones, 1995: 660-661). En materia de seguridad y de relacionamiento internacional, los estados tiene dos estrategias básicas (o una combinación de las dos) para maximizar su seguridad: ofensivas o defensivas. La opción defensiva implica que el estado intenta defender el territorio y los recursos que controla e imposibilitar así cualquier tentativa de conquista sobre su territorio. La estrategia defensiva asume igualmente que dicho estado no busca expandirse, conquistar o destruir un estado rival. La estrategia ofensiva, por el contrario, utiliza la conquista militar para aumentar los recursos del estado, conquistar, intimidar o someter a otros estados que puedan representar una amenaza para el primero. Igualmente, a través de la expansión agresiva, el estado busca cimentar su fortaleza defensiva Lynn-Jones, 1995: 665). Para los ofensivos, la incertidumbre de las acciones contrarias, así como la capacidad de cualquier estado de contar en cualquier momento con determinadas capacidades ofensivas, lleva a que la mejor manera para sobrevivir en un estado de anarquía, sea la de ganar poder a expensas de un estado contrario (Mearsheimer, 2001: 31). El realismo ofensivo parte del supuesto que los estados buscan antes que nada (o exclusivamente) garantizar su seguridad y supervivencia (security seekers) y consideran a los otros estados rivales como agresores en potencia y deben por lo tanto asegurarse ganancias de poder relativas. Mearsheimer argumenta que los estados buscan maximizar su posición de poder relativa ya que la seguridad depende grandemente de la ventaja militar de un estado sobre otro (Mearsheimer, 1994: 11). Esto tiene dos consecuencias, la primera es que la noción de poder es relacional (o dinámica) para los neorrealistas y la segunda es que bajo esta suposición, el dilema de la seguridad corre el riesgo de agravarse. Para los neorrealistas defensivos, esta visión es errónea. Argumentan que el nivel de inseguridad se reduce cuando los estados adoptan una posición defensiva, o más precisamente, cuando el ratio defensa/ofensa aumenta. Una clara ventaja ofensiva hará que la expansión o la conquista sea más factible, provocando el comportamiento agresivo de los estados "codiciosos" y aumentando el dilema de la seguridad. Contrariamente, una fuerte posición defensiva hace de la conquista una posibilidad más remota y aumenta la seguridad colectiva (Montgomery, 2006: 156). Ciertos autores han criticado la offense-defense theory porque consideran que es imposible determinar el balance entre ofensa/defensa porque todas las armas modernas pueden ser utilizadas, casi sin excepción, tanto en una estrategia ofensiva como defensiva (Mearsheimer, 1994: 23). Por lo tanto, si no es posible determinar el ratio ofensa/defensa, la teoría carecería de aplicación práctica. En respuesta a estas críticas, los defensores de este enfoque han argumentado que resulta irrelevante el tipo de arma utilizado (ofensiva o defensiva), lo que cuenta y debe ser objeto de medida o evaluación, es la capacidad de las fuerzas atacantes de derrotar a las fuerzas defensivas (Glaser, 1997:199). En ese caso, podríamos preguntarnos ¿qué pasa, o qué es necesario para que una fuerza defensiva superior se transforme en fuerza ofensiva? *Este artículo fue presentado en la 9° sesión el Seminario Interno de Discusión Teórica 2013, organizado por el Departamento de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad ORT Uruguay. Germán Clulow es Licenciado en Estudios Internacionales por la Universidad ORT –Uruguay, Master en Ciencia Política por la Université de Genève – Suiza, y Master en Estudios de Desarrollo por el Instituto de Altos Estudios Internacionales y de Desarrollo (IHEID-The Graduate Institute) Ginebra, Suiza.
El objeto principal de este trabajo de investigación es el debate sobre la justificación de la pena en el pensamiento de Jorge Enrique Zavala Baquerizo (1922-2014), como el autor más representativo de las ciencias penales y criminológicas y ponderado como "el más destacado penalista de la segunda mitad del siglo XX" y uno de los más altos valores de la democracia ecuatoriana. En primer lugar, abordamos la cuestión desde la perspectiva que exige este tipo de investigación. Para ello, exponemos algunas cuestiones particulares sobre la selección y definición del tema, planteamiento y formalización del problema, hipótesis, pregunta de la investigación o punto de partida, objetivos generales y específico, justificación metodológica, justificación práctica, una pincelada del Ecuador como un país intercultural y pluricultural, un resumen profesional del doctorando, el marco teórico y metodológico de la investigación, antecedentes, estado del arte o de la cuestión, definiciones conceptuales, bibliografía preliminar y cronograma. En segundo lugar, presentaremos este tema en la formación y progreso de la figura vital de Zavala como punto de partida, incluyendo sus manifestaciones, como heredero de la cultura liberal radical ecuatoriana, analizando las causas del mismo, su desarrollo y consecuencias; trataremos de establecer cuáles son los factores que inciden en la construcción de su ideario, en concreto, aquellos procedentes de la académica, de la docencia, de la doctrina jurídica, de la política, entre otros. En tercer lugar, expondremos el desarrollo de este tema en Zavala y la cuestión analítica de académico y docente, producción intelectual y publicaciones, jurista y político, presentando algunas tesis de su concepción del derecho, del individuo y de la sociedad. Finalmente, abordamos unas breves conclusiones en las que pretendemos revelar y dar más voz a nuestro autor, dar más a conocer y promocionar su obra ante la comunidad científica internacional, para esclarecer algunas cuestiones centrales sobre el problema de la justificación de la pena desde la perspectiva del autor. La finalidad perseguida en esta investigación que se presenta como tesis doctoral es sobre todo la de exponer el pensamiento jurídico y político de Jorge Enrique Zavala Baquerizo, respetado como el más eminente jurista y político de la segunda mitad del siglo XX en Ecuador. No hemos pretendido realizar un estudio de todo su pensamiento sino que nos centramos en ciertos aspectos esenciales de su filosofía jurídica como son el concepto, el fundamento y los fines de la pena. Lo primero que tratamos es la relación que para Zavala se da entre el castigo y la pena, observándose que para él coexiste una continuidad entre ambos saberes considerados en la sistematización de su aquilatada obra jurídicopenal, que merece ser rescatada de los garfios del olvido, tanto por su valor ético, como por su valor histórico. Dentro de este contexto, la ciencia jurídica y la filosofía del derecho también son para el maestro ecuatoriano dos formas necesarias y complementarias para comprender la realidad de los fines de la pena. Luego del abordaje de este itinerario, nos introducimos en la cuestión sobre el concepto, el fundamento y los fines del castigo o pena defendidos por el autor. El trabajo intelectual y político de Zavala se distingue por sus valores éticos fundamentales y su defensa de la racionalidad, así como por un gran bagaje epistémico y cultural que, sin duda, le permitió adoptar posiciones nada comunes en el liberalismo radical de su época, así como comprender los problemas del velasquismo y de las dictaduras emergidos antes, durante y después de los años 70. En la misma se pone al descubierto la axiología jurídica en relación con su formación humana dentro del contexto de una estructura lógico-filosófica, cuya expresión se manifiesta a través de una relación armónica en el seno de la actividad humana y su concreción e inserción en la cultura jurídica, política y académica ecuatoriana. En esta propuesta académica partimos de la premisa mayor de que la obra científica, académica y política de Zavala tiene un propósito, el de vislumbrar una imagen más evidente de él y su argumento humanista. De esta forma hay que revelar y dar voz a Zavala, dar a conocer y exponer su obra, como objetivos específicos de esta investigación. Por último, hemos prestado mucha atención a los autores y doctrinas que consideramos influyeron de una manera decisiva en el pensamiento de nuestro autor. El trabajo de investigación sobre el itinerario jurídico y político de Jorge Enrique Zavala Baquerizo, está estructurado en cinco capítulos bien diferenciados, a saber: En el capítulo primero se muestran los aspectos en concreto que han motivado el desarrollo de este estudio partiendo de la situación del problema que se presenta en la comunidad científica al reconocer al profesor Jorge Enrique Zavala Baquerizo, como el más destacado penalista de Ecuador en la segunda mitad del siglo XX y uno de los valores más altos de la democracia ecuatoriana. Se presentan las preguntas y los objetivos de la investigación, así como las decisiones metodológicas realizadas para diseñarla. Y, además, cuenta con el cronograma y organización de esta tesis doctoral. En el capítulo segundo centramos una mirada poliédrica a la biografía de Zavala Baquerizo como punto de partida, incluyendo una referencia de su itinerario personal e intelectual: grandes cosas; una breve caracterización social, política y económica del Ecuador durante el siglo XX y algo del XXI; el pensamiento político-social de Jorge Enrique: ideología y política social, posición ideológica y la quinta parte del siglo XXI, una caracterización económica, aproximación a los valores e influencia de Alfaro en Zavala. Se examinan aspectos relevantes sobre la sistematización de la obra científica del autor de nuestro estudio. En el capítulo tercero se expone la justificación axiológica de la pena, en el que se sistematiza la obra del autor. Esta relación ofrece nuevos elementos enriquecedores del debate gracias al análisis de distintas variables y factores que inciden en la problematización del contenido, fundamentación crítica y el discurso iusfilosófico-penal sobre el fundamento y las finalidades de la pena, que se constituyen en componentes ineludibles. En el capítulo cuarto se realiza el análisis teórico del capítulo anterior y se construye una formulación teórica atribuida al autor. Aquí se estudian algunas cuestiones generales en el ideario de Zavala Baquerizo, el concepto castigo-pena y su finalidad, y se concluye con los enfoques de los juristas Nicolás Castro Benites, Edmundo Durán Díaz y Guillermo Bossano Valdivieso, distinguidos profesores y contemporáneos del ilustre profesor ecuatoriano. En el capítulo quinto se discuten resultados y reflexiones finales con lo que se deja constancia de las conclusiones y aprendizajes obtenidos de la investigación, permiten avizorar futuras líneas de investigación. Y, finalmente, optamos por una exposición axiológica del discurso que promueva en lenguaje sencillo el itinerario del ilustre autor ecuatoriano –como jurista, docente, publicista y político–, capaz de generar la atención de lectores hispanoparlantes que, a fin de cuentas, son aliados estratégicos para, sin duda, dar voz a Zavala Baquerizo en la comunidad científica. Como bien se sabe, las conclusiones son constructos teóricos a través de los cuales se exponen aquellos datos confirmatorios o limitaciones finales de la investigación, es decir, son las ideas de cierre de la investigación ejecutada a fin de colaborar con el acervo académico. Por lo tanto, de acuerdo con la discusión de resultados que se constaron entre en el capítulo segundo, tercero y cuarto de esta tesis doctoral y de acuerdo con la metodología empleada y particularmente el diseño de la investigación, las conclusiones son las que se exponen a continuación. A pesar de la falta de información, es posible vislumbrar la inteligencia poliédrica de Jorge Enrique Zavala Baquerizo en su itinerario personal e intelectual que incide positivamente en su formación individual, razón por la cual se destaca como buena persona, ciudadano ejemplar, maestro de las ciencias penales y criminológicas, publicista, excelente padre, ecuatoriano ilustre. No obstante, nosotros compartimos como discípulo sus enseñanzas; mucho más que simples enseñanzas, en realidad son un torrente impresionante de ideas que parecen liberarse luego de un largo cautiverio para apoderarse de nuestras mentes, como aquel hombre modelado en la mística suprema que llega a la profundidad de las cosas y de los hechos. De este modo, se identifica que las cuestiones y los escenarios que incidieron en el pensamiento y obra de Jorge Enrique Zavala Baquerizo objeto de estudio, demuestran con mayor seguridad y frecuencia que son la docencia universitaria, el ejercicio profesional de penalista y criminólogo, la publicación de su obra aquilatad y la política lo que le permite ocupar diversos cargos públicos de elección popular, tales como consejero, diputado, vicepresidente de la república y presidente del H. Congreso Nacional, entre otros cargos importantes. De igual forma, creemos importante tener en consideración la descripción de la sistematización de la obra jurídica y científica del profesor Jorge Enrique Zavala Baquerizo, especialmente, La pena, en donde no es evidente únicamente el penalista, sino que razona y escribe el iusfilósofo. En definitiva, se percibe que la pena es un mal, y debe ser administrada con prudencia, con mesura, sin perder jamás el punto de vista imprescindible de que vaya dirigida contra seres humanos e impuesta por otros seres humanos, de manera que el autor tiene interés por los mensajes de humanización patrocinados por Voltaire y Montesquieu, que se yuxtaponen a su pasión y erudición de escribir sobre las ciencias penales y criminológicas. Es apasionante decir que el castigo es tan antiguo como la humanidad y la historia del castigo es historia también de la crueldad humana. En consecuencia, la crueldad humana es tan antigua como la humanidad. Así, el autor en su obra desarrolla y sustenta su teoría que bautizamos como castigo-pena. Dentro del análisis expuesto, es posible percibir las revelaciones de juristas como León Roldós Aguilera, Alfonzo Zambrano Pasquel, Hernán Pérez Loose, Víctor Hugo Sicouret Olvera, Lenin Arroyo Baltán, entre otros, cuyas orientaciones jurídicopenales son consecuencias de las enseñanzas de Jorge Enrique Zavala Baquerizo, que lo distinguen y posicionan de modo individual como el más destacado penalista ecuatoriano. No obstante, nosotros compartimos por experiencia y convicción las revelaciones hechas por los juristas en el presente informe. En conclusión, todos podemos realizar un itinerario personal e intelectual si contamos con las herramientas adecuadas para ello, en este caso, es posible indicar que a través de los instrumentos metodológicos de investigación se determina que Jorge Enrique Zavala Baquerizo es el más destacado penalista ecuatoriano de la segunda mitad del siglo XX y uno de los valores más altos de la democracia ecuatoriana, debido a su larga trayectoria académica como docente de derecho penal y derecho procesal penal en las universidades ecuatorianas, el libre ejercicio profesional, la publicación de su abundante obra jurídica y científica, así como la política. Efectivamente, se cumple con la expectativa trazada en los cinco objetivos específicos de esta investigación, lo que nos permite establecer la construcción del objetivo general y la demostración de las preguntas iniciales o hipótesis de investigación. Como consecuencia de lo expuesto en el informe, hemos de refutar las hipótesis o preguntas iniciales de investigación, afirmando que las cuestiones específicas que influyen en el reconocimiento del profesor Jorge Enrique Zavala Baquerizo como el más destacado penalista de la segunda mitad del siglo XX y uno de los más altos valores de la democracia ecuatoriana, son las de jurista, docente, publicista y político, todo cuanto se encuentra debidamente documentado. Y fue un penalista modelado en la mística suprema que lo llevó al fondo de las cosas y de los hechos. Para lograr este cometido queda en evidencia la relación causa efecto, las pruebas que son analizadas de manera lógica y se verifica las consecuencias deducidas a partir de la hipótesis de esta investigación. Se delimita con cuidado las generalidades respaldadas en las pruebas pertinentes, por lo tanto, en el informe final no existen contradicciones, incongruencias o enunciados confusos, vagos o exagerados. En efecto, se aprecia también que las opiniones, inferencias y contrastación de la hipótesis, no se confunde con los hechos investigados. Las referencias bibliográficas que más contribuyen en las contrastación de los hechos son la obra de Jorge Enrique; la obra escrita sobre Zavala, particularmente, las opiniones de los juristas contemporáneos de Zavala como Nicolás Castro Benites, Edmundo Durán Díaz y Guillermo Bossano Valdivieso, así como también las obras y opiniones afectivas de los juristas discípulos y amigos del profesor ecuatoriano: Roldós Aguilera, León (2014); Pérez Pimentel, Rodolfo (2014); Zambrano Pasquel, Alfonzo (2014); Pérez Loose, Hernán (2014); Rodríguez Vicéns, Antonio (2014); Echeverría Gavilanes, Enrique (2014); Sicouret Olvera, Víctor Hugo (2014); Solís, Jeremy (2014); y, Arroyo Baltán, Lenin T. & Albert Márquez, José J. (2018), entre otros. Además, para comprobar este objetivo se relacionaron los hallazgos del Análisis de la teoría de la pena en la obra de Jorge Enrique Zavala Baquerizo. Un enfoque desde el saber criminológico y su influjo dogmático en el foro jurídico penal ecuatoriano (Trabajo Final de Máster, presentado en la Universidad de Córdoba, en septiembre de 2016), realizado por el autor de estas líneas y dirigido por el Dr. José J. Albert Márquez –profesor de Filosofía del Derecho de la Universidad de Córdoba–. Y, finalmente, logramos establecer un nexo cognoscitivo entre el profesor Jorge Zavala Baquerizo, y los profesores Luigi Ferrajoli y Juan Bustos Ramírez, por cuanto, entre ellos confluye derecho penal (garantismo penal), filosofía del derecho, derechos humanos y, además, son de izquierda, tal como hemos señalado en el devenir del discurso de esta tesis doctoral. ; The main purpose of this research paper is the debate on the justification of the penalty in the thinking of Jorge Enrique Zavala Baquerizo (1922-2014), as the most representative author of criminal and criminological sciences and weighted as "the most prominent criminalist of the second half of the twentieth century" and one of the highest values of Ecuadorian democracy. First, we address the issue from the perspective required by this type of research. To do this, we present some particular questions about the selection and definition of the topic, approach and formalization of the problem, hypothesis, research question or starting point, general and specific objectives, methodological justification, practical justification, a brushstroke of Ecuador as a country intercultural and pluricultural, a professional summary of the doctoral student, the theoretical and methodological framework of the research, background, state of the art or issue, conceptual definitions, preliminary bibliography and schedule. Secondly, we will present this theme in the formation and progress of the vital figure of Zavala as a starting point, including its manifestations, as heir to the Ecuadorian radical liberal culture, analyzing its causes, its development and consequences; We will try to establish what are the factors that influence the construction of your ideology, specifically, those coming from academics, teaching, legal doctrine, politics, among others. Thirdly, we will present the development of this topic in Zavala and the analytical question of academic and teacher, intellectual production and publications, jurist and politician, presenting some theses of his conception of law, of the individual and of society. Finally, we discuss some brief conclusions in which we intend to reveal and give more voice to our author, to make his work more known and promoted before the international scientific community, to clarify some central questions about the problem of justification of punishment from the perspective of the author. The purpose of this research presented as a doctoral thesis is above all to expose the legal and political thinking of Jorge Enrique Zavala Baquerizo, respected as the most eminent jurist and politician of the second half of the twentieth century in Ecuador. We have not intended to conduct a study of all your thinking but we focus on certain essential aspects of your legal philosophy such as the concept, the basis and the ends of the penalty. The first thing we are dealing with is the relationship that Zavala has between punishment and punishment, observing that for him a continuity coexists between both knowledge considered in the systematization of his quarrelsome legal work, which deserves to be rescued from the hooks of oblivion, both for its ethical value, as for its historical value. Within this context, legal science and the philosophy of law are also for the Ecuadorian teacher two necessary and complementary ways to understand the reality of the ends of the sentence. After approaching this itinerary, we introduce ourselves to the question about the concept, the basis and the purposes of the punishment or punishment defended by the author. The intellectual and political work of Zavala is distinguished by its fundamental ethical values and its defense of rationality, as well as by a great epistemic and cultural background that, without a doubt, allowed it to adopt positions not common in the radical liberalism of its time, thus how to understand the problems of Velasquism and the dictatorships that emerged before, during and after the 70s. In it, legal axiology is revealed in relation to its human formation within the context of a logical-philosophical structure, whose expression is manifests through a harmonious relationship within human activity and its concretion and insertion in the Ecuadorian legal, political and academic culture. In this academic proposal we start from the main premise that the scientific, academic and political work of Zavala has a purpose, to glimpse a more evident image of him and his humanist argument. In this way we must reveal and give voice to Zavala, publicize and expose his work, as specific objectives of this research. Finally, we have paid close attention to the authors and doctrines that we believe had a decisive influence on the thinking of our author. The research work on the legal and political itinerary of Jorge Enrique Zavala Baquerizo, is structured in five distinct chapters, namely: The first chapter shows the specific aspects that have motivated the development of this study based on the situation of the problem that arises in the scientific community by recognizing Professor Jorge Enrique Zavala Baquerizo, as the most prominent criminal in Ecuador in the second half of the twentieth century and one of the highest values of Ecuadorian democracy. The questions and objectives of the research are presented, as well as the methodological decisions made to design it. And, in addition, it has the schedule and organization of this doctoral thesis. In the second chapter we focus a polyhedral look at the biography of Zavala Baquerizo as a starting point, including a reference to his personal and intellectual itinerary: great things; a brief social, political and economic characterization of Ecuador during the twentieth century and some of the twenty-first; Jorge Enrique's political-social thought: ideology and social policy, ideological position and the fifth part of the 21st century, an economic characterization, approximation to the values and influence of Alfaro in Zavala. Relevant aspects of the systematization of the scientific work of the author of our study are examined. In the third chapter the axiological justification of the sentence is exposed, in which the author's work is systematized. This relationship offers new enriching elements of the debate thanks to the analysis of different variables and factors that affect the problematization of the content, critical foundation and the iusphilosophical-criminal discourse on the foundation and the purposes of the penalty, which are inescapable components. In the fourth chapter the theoretical analysis of the previous chapter is carried out and a theoretical formulation attributed to the author is constructed. Here some general questions are studied in the ideology of Zavala Baquerizo, the punishment-punishment concept and its purpose, and it concludes with the approaches of jurists Nicolás Castro Benites, Edmundo Durán Díaz and Guillermo Bossano Valdivieso, distinguished professors and contemporaries of the illustrious Ecuadorian professor. In the fifth chapter, final results and reflections are discussed, which records the conclusions and lessons learned from the research, allowing us to anticipate future lines of research. And, finally, we opted for an axiological exposition of the discourse that promotes in simple language the itinerary of the illustrious Ecuadorian author -as a jurist, teacher, publicist and politician-, capable of generating the attention of Spanish-speaking readers who, after all, are allies strategic to undoubtedly give voice to Zavala Baquerizo in the scientific community. As is well known, the conclusions are theoretical constructs through which those confirmatory data or final limitations of the research are exposed, that is, they are the closing ideas of the research carried out in order to collaborate with the academic heritage. Therefore, according to the discussion of results that were recorded in the second, third and fourth chapters of this doctoral thesis and in accordance with the methodology used and particularly the design of the research, the conclusions are those that are exposed to continuation. I. In spite of the lack of information, it is possible to glimpse the polyhedral intelligence of Jorge Enrique Zavala Baquerizo in his personal and intellectual itinerary that positively affects his individual training, which is why he stands out as a good person, exemplary citizen, teacher of criminal and criminological sciences, publicist, excellent father, illustrious Ecuadorian. However, we share his teachings as a disciple; much more than simple teachings, in reality they are an impressive torrent of ideas that seem to be released after a long captivity to seize our minds, like that man modeled on the supreme mysticism that reaches the depth of things and facts. II. In this way, it is identified that the issues and scenarios that influenced the thinking and work of Jorge Enrique Zavala Baquerizo object of study, demonstrate with greater security and frequency that they are university teaching, the professional practice of criminal and criminologist, the publication of his aquilatad work and the This policy allows him to hold various public positions of popular election, such as counselor, deputy, vice president of the republic and president of the H. National Congress, among other important positions. III. Similarly, we believe it is important to take into account the description of the systematization of the legal and scientific work of professor Jorge Enrique Zavala Baquerizo, especially, La Pena, where not only the criminalist is evident, but he reasons and writes the iusphilosopher. In short, it is perceived that the penalty is an evil, and must be administered with prudence, with restraint, without ever losing the essential point of view that it is directed against human beings and imposed by other human beings, so that the author has interest in the humanization messages sponsored by Voltaire and Montesquieu, which juxtapose their passion and erudition to write about criminal and criminological sciences. It is exciting to say that punishment is as old as humanity and the history of punishment is also history of human cruelty. Consequently, human cruelty is as old as humanity. Thus, the author in his work develops and supports his theory that we baptize as punishment. IV. Within the above analysis, it is possible to perceive the revelations of jurists such as León Roldós Aguilera, Alfonzo Zambrano Pasquel, Hernán Pérez Loose, Víctor Hugo Sicouret Olvera, Lenin Arroyo Baltán, among others, whose legal orientations are consequences of the teachings of Jorge Enrique Zavala Baquerizo, which distinguish it and position it individually as the most prominent Ecuadorian criminalist. However, we share from experience and conviction the revelations made by the jurists in this report. V. In conclusion, we can all make a personal and intellectual itinerary if we have the appropriate tools for this, in this case, it is possible to indicate that through the methodological investigation instruments it is determined that Jorge Enrique Zavala Baquerizo is the most prominent criminalist Ecuadorian of the second half of the twentieth century and one of the highest values of Ecuadorian democracy, due to his long academic career as a teacher of criminal law and criminal procedural law in Ecuadorian universities, free professional practice, the publication of his abundant legal and scientific work, as well as politics. Indeed, the expectation set in the five specific objectives of this investigation is fulfilled, which allows us to establish the construction of the general objective and the demonstration of the initial questions or research hypotheses. As a result of what is stated in the report, we have to refute the initial hypotheses or research questions, stating that the specific issues that influence the recognition of professor Jorge Enrique Zavala Baquerizo as the most prominent criminal of the second half of the 20th century and one of the highest values of Ecuadorian democracy, are those of jurist, teacher, publicist and politician, everything is properly documented. And he was a criminal modeled on the supreme mysticism that took him to the bottom of things and facts. To achieve this task, the cause-effect relationship, the evidence that is analyzed in a logical way and the consequences deduced from the hypothesis of this investigation are evidenced. The generalities supported by the relevant evidence are carefully defined, therefore, in the final report there are no contradictions, inconsistencies or statements that are confusing, vague or exaggerated. Indeed, it can also be seen that the opinions, inferences and contrast of the hypothesis are not confused with the facts investigated. The bibliographical references that contribute most to the contrast of the facts are the work of Jorge Enrique; the written work on Zavala, particularly the opinions of Zavala's contemporary jurists such as Nicolás Castro Benites, Edmundo Durán Díaz and Guillermo Bossano Valdivieso, as well as the works and emotional opinions of the jurist disciples and friends of the Ecuadorian professor: Roldós Aguilera, León (2014); Pérez Pimentel, Rodolfo (2014); Zambrano Pasquel, Alfonzo (2014); Pérez Loose, Hernán (2014); Rodríguez Vicéns, Antonio (2014); Echeverría Gavilanes, Enrique (2014); Sicouret Olvera, Víctor Hugo (2014); Solís, Jeremy (2014); and, Arroyo Baltán, Lenin T. & Albert Márquez, José J. (2018), among others. In addition, to verify this objective the findings of the Analysis of the theory of the penalty in the work of Jorge Enrique Zavala Baquerizo were related. An approach from the know criminological and its dogmatic influence in the Ecuadorian criminal legal forum (Master's Final Project, presented at the University of Córdoba, in September 2016), carried out by the author of these lines and directed by Dr. José J. Albert Márquez –professor of Philosophy of Law of the University of Córdoba–. And, finally, we managed to establish a cognitive link between professor Jorge Zavala Baquerizo, and professor Luigi Ferrajoli and Juan Bustos Ramírez, because, among them, criminal law (criminal guarantee), philosophy of law, human rights and, in addition, are on the left, as we have pointed out in the future of the discourse of this doctoral thesis.
Technical Report 2018-08-ECE-138 Technical Report 2002-09-ECE-007 Enterprise Engineering - A Transdisciplinary Activity: Mapping IT to Core Competency Rajani S. Sadasivam Urcun J. Tanik Murat M. Tanik This technical report is a reissue of a technical report issued December 2002 Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Alabama at Birmingham August 2018 Technical Report 2002-09-ECE-007 Enterprise Engineering- A Transdisciplinary Activity: Mapping IT to Core Competency Rajani S. Sadasivam Urcun J. Tanik Murat M. Tanik TECHNICAL REPORT Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Alabama at Bi1mingham December 2002 ENGINEERING OF ENTERPRISES: A TRANSDISCIPLINARY ACTIVITY Mapping Information Technology to Core Competency Contributors: Murat M. Tanik, Rajani S. Sadasivam, lJrcun J. Tanik 1. ELEMENTS Qli' INTERNET ENTERPRISE ENGINEERING 1.1) Uusiness Language Structure Before any e n gin~ring takes place, the requirements of the project must be identified in as much detail as possible to satisfy the customer. Hence a customer-driven system is created, with the goal of ensuring that the end product is profitable. Business analysts should be able to accurately assess customer needs and break them down into manageable pieces for the technology analysts and engineering team, and that analysis can be effectively done on common ground with an object-oriented design language called Unified Modeling Language (UML). Introduced in November 1997, UML has quickly become the standard modeling language for software development, later adapted by business analysts to systematically design business processes [15]. UML has a business model approach that provides a pJan for engineering an orchestrated set of business functions. It provides a framework by which business is to be perf01med, allowing for changes and various improvements in the process. The model is designed to anticipate changes in business function and adapt software implementation accordingly in order for a business to maintain a competitive edge. One of the advantages of modeling in UML is that it can visually depict functions, relationships, and paradigms. UML is reconunended for business analysts to breakdown a large-scale business operation into its constituent parts for restructming and design. 1.2 Strategic Guidance One innovative approach to safely guiding an lEE venture through unce11ain waters is the Cosmos model, proposed by Yeh [10]. It is a model designed to assist a business manage change through holistic, three-dimensional modeling. One of the important aspects of this model is that it should be noted that three dimensions exist interdependently, as each dimension behaves as an enabler and an inhibitor to the other dimensions. The Cosmos model provides a conceptual tool for managers to guide their company along the best possible path by providing a structure for effective decision-making, while navigating from one point of an organizational situation to another over . time. The managerial decision made at each point in the path detetmines the future course of the company and the most optimum tradeoff's along the way. 1.3 General Business Types and Characterizations The Enterprise Maturity Model is introduced in the beginning of Chapter 2 to serve as a general reference for business and technology analysts working together to build an Intemet enterprise riO]. This model helps to accurately define the objectives for the specific type of organization they wish to build with respect to the maturity level of the organizational structure. In order to characterize a business in terms of its level of maturity, focus, activity, coordination, and infrastructure, these various faclors are covered explicitly. It is very helpful to understand the maturity level of a given organization in order to apply the most appropriate management techniques according to enterprise type. 1.4 Online Business Model Selection and Analysis An enterprise business model is one of the most important aspects in the construction of a viable business initiative. The combination of a company's policy, operations, technology, and ideology defines its business model [16]. Entrepreneurs who wish to launch e-businesses need to be aware of these models and how to implement them effectively. An array of business model types are provided that have proven profitable for actual enterprises in operation today, including the storefront model, auction model, portal model, and dynamic pricing model [11]. The case study is used as an example for online business model selection and analysis. 1.5 Online Financial Transactions In financial transactions, it is critical to have a reliable method to collect payment. Since the scope of this thesis covers lEE systems, this thesis describes those that would be relevant to Cyberspace operations. There are various methods and mechanisms that merchants online use to collect income through electronic transactions. The types of transactions covered include credit card, ewallet, debit card, digital currency, peer-lo-peer, smartcard, micropayment and ebilling mechanisms [11]. 1.6 Online Legal Contracts In order for proper oversight of monetary operations, legal issues must be addressed for lEE projects, so the concept of the online contract is introduced. An online contract can be accomp.lished through the use of Digital Signatures [1 1]. These electronic signatures are the electronic equivalent of written signatures. The ";Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000" (E-sign Bill) was recently passed into law [ 1 I, 4]. This technology was developed for use in public-key cryptography to solve the problems of authentication and integrity. The purpose of a digital signature is for electronic authentication. The U.S. govemment's digitalauthentication standard is called the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [1 1]. The U.S. government also recently passed digital-signature legislation that makes digital signatures as legally binding as hand-written signatures. This legislation is designed to promote more activity in e-business by legitimizing online contractual agreements. 1.7 OnUne Security For centuries in human society whenever something of value was transferred, a method to protect that shipment or trade had to be established. Naturally, this subject is discussed to illustrate the measures taken by current security agencies to protect value on the Internet. For example, Netscape Communications developed the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol, developed as a non-proprietary protocol commonly used to secure communication on the Internet and the Web. SSL is designed to use public key technology and digital certificates to authenticate the server in a transaction and to protect private information as it passes f1·om one party to another over the Internet. Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) protocol was developed by Visa International and Mastercard and was designed specifically to protect e-commerce payment transactions [11, 12]. SET uses digital certificates to authenticate each party in an e-commerce transaction, induding the customer, the merchant, and the merchant's bank. 1 . 8 Online Business Prototyping Technologies and Development In order for technologists to satisfy the requirements set forth by the business analysts expressed in a language such as UML, various high-level tools are needed to develop an accepta~le solution. One such tool, Macromedia . Drumbeat 2000, recently released by Elemental Software, is capable of accepting and delivering complex information and functionality through a Web-interface [20). This technology is introduced as a recommended tool for building a professional enterprise through rapid prototyping. The tool aids a visually skilled Web designer to competitively build a website without necessarily having to do any coding. It is a sophisticated tool that interacts with the back-end database by building user-friendly client-side applications with Active Server Page (ASP) Web technology. 1.9 Government Initiatives in Cyberspace An enterprise planning for the future should consider the overall development of the global Internet infrastructure. It is important to understand the territory in which an Internet enterprise is to be launched. In addition to the current Intemet environment, a new government initiative is in the works, entitled The Next Generation Internet (NGI). This multi-agency, national U.S. research and development program began on October 1, 1997 with the partidpation of the following agencies: DARPA, DOE, NASA, NJH, NIST, and NSF. These agencies are charged with the responsibility of developing advanced networking technologies, developing revolutionary applications that require advanced networking, and demonstrating these capabilities on test beds that are 100 to 1,000 times faster th
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The cost of transitioning economies towards net-zero will be immense. According to the Commission, the European Union will need around 620 billion euros annually,[1] with Italy and Germany requiring respectively up to 3.5 and 2.3 trillion euros in additional investment by 2050 to reach their climate targets.[2] Since the 2015 Paris Agreement, attention to the financial aspects of the transition has grown both at European and national levels. In parallel, the private financial sector has also committed to decarbonisation, with the largest Italian and German banks and insurance companies, like Intesa SanPaolo, UniCredit, Generali, Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank, becoming members of the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero, pledging to align their operations with carbon neutrality.[3] The private financial sector will be crucial to mobilise the necessary funds for the transition, and Italy and Germany should encourage collaboration between public and private financial actors, promoting guarantees and incentives for investing in green projects. At the same time, they should increase cooperation at the European and bilateral levels to increase market stability and develop common financing solutions.Public finance in Germany and Italy In the last years, Italy and Germany's finances have been burdened by several factors, from the economic slowdown caused by the pandemic and the energy crisis to the consequent increased spending on emergency measures to support households and businesses. Despite these events, national and European recovery plans have significantly boosted investment in green projects.[4] In Italy, 71.7 billion euros of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (37.5 per cent of the total national fund) were allocated to green projects;[5] similarly, in Germany, 12.5 billion euros (42.7 per cent of the total national fund) were designated for the energy transition.[6] Furthermore, the EU allocated additional 20 billion euros in REPowerEU grants to support clean energy initiatives.[7] However, both governments may not be able to sustain these levels of funding in the long run without resorting to increasing debt. Furthermore, the time horizon of NextGenerationEU is approaching and there is uncertainty about the realisation of a similar tool for non-emergency times. The 2023 German debt crisis further aggravated its public financial fatigue. The crisis began when the German Federal Constitutional Court found the proposed government's 60 billion euros climate fund in violation of the Schuldenbremse, the constitutional rule aimed at limiting deficit under 0.35 per cent of the GDP.[8] The Court's decision blocked the implementation of the fund, forcing the Government to revise its budget, downplaying the role of climate action investment.[9] The crisis arrived at a moment when German industries estimated the necessity of 213 billion euros in additional public investment over the next ten years for the energy-efficient modernisation of buildings, grid expansion for electricity, hydrogen infrastructures, and production and storage of renewable energies.[10] Similarly, Italy is experiencing some financial strain due to the slowdown in economic activities and the high cost of emergency measures implemented in recent years, as shown by the decision not to extend the tax cuts on fuels.[11] Italy has proven itself more fragile than Germany, with persistently low productivity growth and slow administrative procedures contributing to low investment attraction in all sectors.[12] In 2023, investment slowed down even further due to rising financing costs and the phasing out of the so-called Superbonus programme, the housing renovation tax credits.[13] The limits of public finance in both countries show the necessity to involve private financial actors to carry part of the cost of the energy transition.Aligning climate objectives and profitability Profitability remains the main indicator of the private financial sector's willingness to invest in sustainable projects. However, there are ways to sustain green projects while increasing returns. First, thanks to their proficiency in risk assessments and market trends predictions, commercial banks and investment funds may have an advantage in evaluating future demand for green sectors beforehand. This may help them identify opportunities that will be increasingly profitable in a future net-zero scenario. Similarly, they may be able to identify and provide loans to businesses developing sustainable technologies that are not particularly competitive in current markets but that are expected to thrive in a post-transition world. Insurance companies can also support the transition by addressing risks of climate-induced disasters, such as floods and drought damages, and limiting large-scale losses. Financial products, like green bonds, can also enable capital raising for sustainable projects while maintaining profitability. In Italy and Germany, green bonds segments of the national stock exchanges have been extremely profitable, reaching total outstanding amounts of 261 billion euros in Germany and 161 billion euros in Italy, with insurance companies and commercial banks like Deutsche Hypothekenbank, Commerzbank and DZ Bank in Germany,[14] and Intesa SanPaolo and Unicredit in Italy being the largest private financial green bond issuers.[15] Green bonds have been an effective tool to finance adaptation strategies and preventive measures, like increasing food and water systems' resilience against climate-induced disasters, which generally attract less private funding.[16] Indeed, financial actors may benefit from promoting adaptation strategies in their portfolios, as they would be exposed to decreasing returns if they invest in or lend to companies with low resilience to climate-induced events.[17] The 2021 floods in Germany were estimated to have caused up to 44 billion euros of damages, while the losses related to the 2023 Italian floods were recorded to be around 40 billion euros.[18] In both cases, spillover losses from the real economy to financial markets have been difficult to quantify, but the disasters have halted planned investment, impacted investors' confidence to fund future projects in those areas, and even increased borrowing costs.[19] Financial actors may address these situations by expanding their role as advisors, helping customers to develop adaptation plans. Allianz, for example, thanks to its propensity to assess scenarios, has established a service to advise customers on climate-related risks and to help them adapt their operations to climate change.[20] Unaddressed climate consequences may also increase insurance costs, leading to unaffordable premiums for some customers. If insurance markets become too expensive for customers and offering coverage becomes too risky for insurers, the entire sector could be paralysed. A solution could be to offer adaptation discounts for those customers who have spent part of their budget on building resilience. This would effectively lower risk-return calculations for insurers that would be able to lower prices.Regulatory framework Market disruption caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine has lowered investors' confidence, as Germany and Italy were among the most vulnerable economies to natural gas shocks. Additionally, persistent high interest rates in Europe have limited financial actors' capacity to invest in clean energy projects. Therefore, to promote private investments, there is a need for regulators to enact measures to increase market stability and to derisk green projects. Monetary policies are the main tool to channel private capital where it is needed. Following the energy crisis, the European Central Bank's actions to slow down inflation have had a particularly negative impact on the energy transition. While high borrowing costs are an obstacle for any investment, renewable projects are more capital-intensive and are therefore more susceptible to high interest rates.[21] While the ECB's recent interest rate cut may lead to some improvement in investments,[22] national action is still necessary. Banca d'Italia and Deutsche Bundesbank should increase their bilateral coordination through the alignment of their macroprudential measures and stronger information exchange, which might have a positive impact on building investors' confidence and increasing financial stability for companies that operate in both countries.[23] Regulators may also attract capital by increasing clarity related to green projects. The main instrument to do so is the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, which establishes a common framework to define sustainability for investors and companies. However, a possible reform could expand its classification to comprehend a "brown" taxonomy, which would define criteria to classify high-emissions activities as harmful to the environment. It could be instrumental in helping financial institutions in their assessment of the environmental impact of companies they are involved with.[24] A sustainability reference framework should also be applied to private green bond issuance. Indeed, while most green bonds in Italy and Germany have been issued by public development or central banks, there has been a rising tendency for private companies to develop their own fixed-income instruments promoting the development of environmental projects.[25] Currently, both Borsa Italiana and Börse Frankfurt, respectively the two countries' largest stock exchanges, bundle in their green segments exclusively bonds that meet the voluntary guidelines of the International Capital Markets Association (ICMA).[26] Linking private green bond issuance to the EU taxonomy could stimulate capital-raising for the transition and avoid greenwashing. An initiative on this matter is the European Green Bond Standard (EUGBS), a certification that attests that bond issuers are aligned with taxonomy criteria. However, the Standard is also voluntary and there is no obligation for an issuer to adhere to it to market its financial products as green bonds.[27] A better solution would be the establishment of the EUGBS as binding to define bonds as green. This would guarantee a harmonisation of green bonds across the EU that would lead to a more coherent language for financial operations for Italian and German actors.Looking ahead It is becoming increasingly urgent to direct financial flows toward the transition. Public finance in Germany and Italy is facing difficulties, and market instability has made it riskier for private financial actors in both countries to invest in green projects. Both the German and Italian financial sectors have been more focused on lowering risks than increasing returns, resulting in lower-than-average profitability, which has directly impacted available resources for new investments.[28] To attract capital toward net-zero opportunities, there is a need for collaboration between public and private actors, as well as bilateral coordination between the two countries. The recent Italian German Action Plan offers a positive model to strengthen coordination, as it includes the establishment of a bilateral macroeconomic forum to discuss financial and economic issues, and it could be an ideal platform to align the two countries' positions on EU-wide reforms, such as proposals on how to adjust the Economic and Monetary Union and the Capital Market Union in ways compatible with sustainability goals. Public efforts should also be spent to strengthen regulatory frameworks to facilitate and de-risk investment for private financial companies, with Germany and Italy coordinating to develop common financing instruments and derisking strategies. Blended finance models should be explored as a way to promote capital raising. A relatively small amount of public funds, constituting a risk cover guarantee, can help catalyse additional private investment. This can take various forms, such as Germany's two auctions model. The initiative consists of two auctions organised by the Federal Government. The first is a descending price auction held between producers to secure long-term contracts for hydrogen supply. The second is an ascending price auction to sell the purchased hydrogen to the highest bidder. Typically, the price requested by the producers in the first auction is higher than what the final buyers offer in the second one and, as a result, the Federal Government bears the additional cost as a form of indirect subsidy to bridge the gap between them.[29] In this way, 900 million euros were provided for the purchase of hydrogen above market prices which allowed the ramp-up of private hydrogen companies, contributing to lower the perceived risk of investing in them and attracting risk-averse private investments.[30] As Germany and Italy navigate market instability, blended finance offers a promising solution, as it may alleviate both the burden on public funds and mitigate risks for private investors. However, to ensure long-term success, both countries must prioritise wider strategies that enhance profitability for investors committed to decarbonisation. This could be achieved through enhanced bilateral coordination to review regulatory gaps not addressed by broader EU frameworks. Tailored bilateral solutions between Germany and Italy will be essential to develop stable market conditions that align with both countries' financing needs and climate goals.Alessio Sangiorgio is Junior Researcher in the Energy, Climate and Resources Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). This commentary presents some of the key issues discussed during a workshop organised by IAI, which brought together financial sector representatives from both Germany and Italy. The event is part of a broader IAI project, "An Italian-German Dialogue on Energy Security and Transition amid Russia's War on Ukraine", supported by the German Federal Foreign Office.[1] European Commission, Questions and Answers on the Sustainable Finance Package, 13 June 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_23_3194.[2] "Quanto ci costerà la transizione verso un mondo a emissioni zero? Spoiler: molto più del previsto", in Il Sole 24 Ore, 11 February 2022, https://www.infodata.ilsole24ore.com/2022/02/11/quanto-ci-costera-la-transizione-verso-mondo-a-emissioni-zero-spoiler-molto-piu-del-previsto; Federal Association of German Industry (BDI), Klimapfade für Deutschland, 18 January 2018, https://bdi.eu/publikation/news/klimapfade-fuer-deutschland.[3] Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ), 2023 Progress Report, December 2023, https://assets.bbhub.io/company/sites/63/2023/11/GFANZ-2023-Progress-Report.pdf.[4] International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Investment 2023, May 2023, https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-investment-2023.[5] Italian Government, Recovery and Resilience Plan, 12 January 2021, https://www.mef.gov.it/export/sites/MEF/en/focus/documents/PNRR-NEXT-GENERATION-ITALIA_ENG_09022021.pdf.[6] German Federal Ministry of Finance, German Recovery and Resilience Plan, January 2021, https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/EN/Standardartikel/Press_Room/Publications/Brochures/2021-01-13-german-recovery-and-resilience-plan.pdf.[7] European Commission, REPowerEU – 2 Years on, 13 May 2024, https://energy.ec.europa.eu/node/5357_en.[8] Shahin Vallée, "Germany Has Narrowly Swerved Budget Disaster – But Its Debt Taboo Still Threatens Europe", in The Guardian, 13 December 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/p/pfzhb.[9] Ibid.[10] Sebastian Dullien et al., "Herausforderungern für die Schuldenbremse. Investitionsbedarfe in der Infrastruktur und für die Transformation", in IW-Policy Papers, No. 2/2024 (14 May 2024), p. 8-9, https://www.iwkoeln.de/en/studies/simon-gerards-iglesias-michael-huether-investment-needs-in-infrastructure-and-for-the-transformation.html.[11] Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance, Italy's Stability Programme 2023. Abridged Version, 28 April 2023, p. 23-27, https://www.dt.mef.gov.it/en/attivita_istituzionali/analisi_programmazione_economico_finanziaria/documenti_programmatici/index.html?selezione-anno=2023.[12] Banca d'Italia, Financial Stability Report, No. 1/2024 (April 2024), https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/rapporto-stabilita/index.html.[13] Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance, Italy's Stability Programme 2024. Abridged Version, 9 April 2024, p. v-vii, https://www.dt.mef.gov.it/en/attivita_istituzionali/analisi_programmazione_economico_finanziaria/documenti_programmatici/index.html?selezione-anno=2024.[14] Climate Bonds Initiative, Germany: Green Finance State of the Market, July 2019, https://www.climatebonds.net/node/38227.[15] Danilo Liberati and Giuseppe Marinelli, "Everything You Always Wanted to Know about Green Bonds (But Were Afraid to Ask)", in Questioni di Economia e Finanza, No. 654 (November 2021), https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/qef/2021-0654/index.html.[16] Ujala Qadir and Kamleshan Pillay, Green Bonds for Climate Resilience. State of Play and Roadmap to Scale, Rotterdam, Global Center on Adaptation, 2021, https://gca.org/?p=6754.[17] Nicola Ranger, Olivier Mahul and Irene Monasterolo, Assessing Financial Risks from Physical Climate Shocks: A Framework for Scenario Generation, Washington, World Bank, 2022, p. 19, https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/760481644944260441.[18] European Environment Agency (EEA), Economic Losses from Weather- and Climate-related Extremes in Europe, 6 October 2023, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/economic-losses-from-climate-related.[19] EEA, European Climate Risk Assessment, 2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/european-climate-risk-assessment.[20] Kristin Stechemesser, Jan Endrikat and Edeltraud Guenther, "Insurance Companies' Responses to Climate Change: Adaptation, Dynamic Capabilities and Competitive Advantage", in The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Vol. 40, No. 4 (October 2015), p. 557-584, DOI 10.1057/gpp.2015.1.[21] Peter Martin et al., "Conflicts of Interest: The Cost of Investing in the Energy Transition in a High Interest-rate Era", in Wood Mackenzie Horizons, April 2024, p. 2, https://www.woodmac.com/horizons/energy-transition-investing-in-a-high-interest-rate-era.[22] Martin Arnold, "European Central Bank Cuts Interest Rates for First Time in 5 Years", in Financial Times, 6 June 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/97543fe0-32cb-4427-a1d2-aac2ea5180fc.[23] Banca d'Italia, Decision to Reciprocate a German Macroprudential Measure Pursuant to Recommendation ESRB/2022/4 of the European Systemic Risk Board, 20 October 2022, https://www.bancaditalia.it/compiti/stabilita-finanziaria/politica-macroprudenziale/esrb-20221020/index.html.[24] European Central Bank, Eurosystem Reply to the European Commission's Public Consultations on the Renewed Sustainable Finance Strategy and the Revision of the Non-Financial Reporting Directive, 8 June 2020, p. 20, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.eurosystemreplyeuropeancommissionpubliconsultations_20200608~cf01a984aa.en.pdf.[25] Danilo Liberati and Giuseppe Marinelli, "Everything You Always Wanted to Know about Green Bonds", cit.[26] Deutsche Börse, Segment for Green Bonds, June 2019, https://www.boerse-frankfurt.de/en/wissen/wertpapiere/anleihen/green-bonds; and International Capital Market Association, The Green Bond Principles. Voluntary Process Guidelines for Issuing Green Bonds, June 2021, https://www.icmagroup.org/sustainable-finance/the-principles-guidelines-and-handbooks/green-bond-principles-gbp.[27] European Parliament and Council of the EU, Regulation (EU) 2023/2631 of 22 November 2023 on European Green Bonds and Optional Disclosures for Bonds Marketed as Environmentally Sustainable and for Sustainability-linked Bonds, point 20, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2631/oj.[28] International Monetary Fund (IMF), "Germany: Financial Sector Assessment Program. Technical Note–The Determinants of Bank Profitability", in IMF Country Reports, No. 22/273 (August 2022), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2022/08/10/Germany-Financial-Sector-Assessment-Program-Technical-Note-The-Determinants-of-Bank-522098; and IMF, "Italy: Financial Sector Assessment Program. Technical Note–Banking Regulation and Supervision and Bank Governance", in IMF Country Reports, No. 20/236 (August 2020), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2020/08/03/Italy-Financial-Sector-Assessment-Program-Technical-Note-Banking-Regulation-and-Supervision-49633.[29] German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, "What Exactly Is H2Global?", in Energiewende direkt, No. 01/2022 (4 February 2022), https://www.bmwk-energiewende.de/EWD/Redaktion/EN/Newsletter/2022/01/Meldung/direkt-account.html.[30] German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, Roadmap on Expected Hydrogen Off-take in Germany in the German-Norwegian Context, 23 April 2024, https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/P-R/240424-roadmap-deu-nor-hydrogen-task-force.pdf.
In: Klein , R A , Vianello , M , Hasselman , F , Adams , B G , Adams , R B , Alper , S , Aveyard , M , Axt , J R , Babalola , M T , Bahník , Š , Batra , R , Berkics , M , Bernstein , M J , Berry , D R , Bialobrzeska , O , Binan , E D , Bocian , K , Brandt , M J , Busching , R , Rédei , A C , Cai , H , Cambier , F , Cantarero , K , Carmichael , C L , Ceric , F , Chandler , J , Chang , J-H , Chatard , A , Chen , E E , Cheong , W , Cicero , D C , Coen , S , Coleman , J A , Collisson , B , Conway , M A , Corker , K S , Curran , P G , Cushman , F , Dagona , Z K , Dalgar , I , Dalla Rosa , A , Davis , W E , de Bruijn , M , De Schutter , L , Devos , T , de Vries , M , Doğulu , C , Dozo , N , Dukes , K N , Dunham , Y , Durrheim , K , Ebersole , C R , Edlund , J E , Eller , A , English , A S , Finck , C , Frankowska , N , Freyre , M , Friedman , M , Galliani , E M , Gandi , J C , Ghoshal , T , Giessner , S R , Gill , T , Gnambs , T , Gómez , Á , González , R , Graham , J , Grahe , J E , Grahek , I , Green , E G T , Hai , K , Haigh , M , Haines , E L , Hall , M P , Heffernan , M E , Hicks , J A , Houdek , P , Huntsinger , J R , Huynh , H P , Ijzerman , H , Inbar , Y , Innes-ker , Å H , Jiménez-leal , W , John , M , Joy-gaba , J A , Kamiloğlu , R G , Kappes , H B , Karabati , S , Karick , H , Keller , V N , Kende , A , Kervyn , N , Knežević , G , Kovacs , C , Krueger , L E , Kurapov , G , Kurtz , J , Lakens , D , Lazarević , L B , Levitan , C A , Lewis , N A , Lins , S , Lipsey , N P , Losee , J E , Maassen , E , Maitner , A T , Malingumu , W , Mallett , R K , Marotta , S A , Međedović , J , Mena-pacheco , F , Milfont , T L , Morris , W L , Murphy , S C , Myachykov , A , Neave , N , Neijenhuijs , K , Nelson , A J , Neto , F , Lee Nichols , A , Ocampo , A , O'donnell , S L , Oikawa , H , Oikawa , M , Ong , E , Orosz , G , Osowiecka , M , Packard , G , Pérez-sánchez , R , Petrović , B , Pilati , R , Pinter , B , Podesta , L , Pogge , G , Pollmann , M M H , Rutchick , A M , Saavedra , P , Saeri , A K , Salomon , E , Schmidt , K , Schönbrodt , F D , Sekerdej , M B , Sirlopú , D , Skorinko , J L M , Smith , M A , Smith-castro , V , Smolders , K C H J , Sobkow , A , Sowden , W , Spachtholz , P , Srivastava , M , Steiner , T G , Stouten , J , Street , C N H , Sundfelt , O K , Szeto , S , Szumowska , E , Tang , A C W , Tanzer , N , Tear , M J , Theriault , J , Thomae , M , Torres , D , Traczyk , J , Tybur , J M , Ujhelyi , A , Van Aert , R C M , Van Assen , M A L M , Van Der Hulst , M , Van Lange , P A M , Van 't Veer , A E , Vásquez- Echeverría , A , Ann Vaughn , L , Vázquez , A , Vega , L D , Verniers , C , Verschoor , M , Voermans , I P J , Vranka , M A , Welch , C , Wichman , A L , Williams , L A , Wood , M , Woodzicka , J A , Wronska , M K , Young , L , Zelenski , J M , Zhijia , Z & Nosek , B A 2018 , ' Many Labs 2: Investigating Variation in Replicability Across Samples and Settings ' , Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science , vol. 1 , no. 4 , pp. 443-490 . https://doi.org/10.1177/2515245918810225
We conducted preregistered replications of 28 classic and contemporary published findings, with protocols that were peer reviewed in advance, to examine variation in effect magnitudes across samples and settings. Each protocol was administered to approximately half of 125 samples that comprised 15,305 participants from 36 countries and territories. Using the conventional criterion of statistical significance (p < .05), we found that 15 (54%) of the replications provided evidence of a statistically significant effect in the same direction as the original finding. With a strict significance criterion (p < .0001), 14 (50%) of the replications still provided such evidence, a reflection of the extremely high-powered design. Seven (25%) of the replications yielded effect sizes larger than the original ones, and 21 (75%) yielded effect sizes smaller than the original ones. The median comparable Cohen's ds were 0.60 for the original findings and 0.15 for the replications. The effect sizes were small (< 0.20) in 16 of the replications (57%), and 9 effects (32%) were in the direction opposite the direction of the original effect. Across settings, the Q statistic indicated significant heterogeneity in 11 (39%) of the replication effects, and most of those were among the findings with the largest overall effect sizes; only 1 effect that was near zero in the aggregate showed significant heterogeneity according to this measure. Only 1 effect had a tau value greater than .20, an indication of moderate heterogeneity. Eight others had tau values near or slightly above .10, an indication of slight heterogeneity. Moderation tests indicated that very little heterogeneity was attributable to the order in which the tasks were performed or whether the tasks were administered in lab versus online. Exploratory comparisons revealed little heterogeneity between Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) cultures and less WEIRD cultures (i.e., cultures with relatively high and low WEIRDness scores, respectively). Cumulatively, variability in the observed effect sizes was attributable more to the effect being studied than to the sample or setting in which it was studied.
In: Klein , R A , Vianello , M , Hasselman , F , Adams , B G , Adams , R B , Alper , S , Aveyard , M , Axt , J R , Babalola , M T , Bahník , Š , Batra , R , Berkics , M , Bernstein , M J , Berry , D R , Bialobrzeska , O , Binan , E D , Bocian , K , Brandt , M J , Busching , R , Rédei , A C , Cai , H , Cambier , F , Cantarero , K , Carmichael , C L , Ceric , F , Chandler , J , Chang , J-H , Chatard , A , Chen , E E , Cheong , W , Cicero , D C , Coen , S , Coleman , J A , Collisson , B , Conway , M A , Corker , K S , Curran , P G , Cushman , F , Dagona , Z K , Dalgar , I , Dalla Rosa , A , Davis , W E , de Bruijn , M , De Schutter , L , Devos , T , de Vries , M , Doğulu , C , Dozo , N , Dukes , K N , Dunham , Y , Durrheim , K , Ebersole , C R , Edlund , J E , Eller , A , English , A S , Finck , C , Frankowska , N , Freyre , M-Á , Friedman , M , Galliani , E M , Gandi , J C , Ghoshal , T , Giessner , S R , Gill , T , Gnambs , T , Gómez , Á , González , R , Graham , J , Grahe , J E , Grahek , I , Green , E G T , Hai , K , Haigh , M , Haines , E L , Hall , M P , Heffernan , M E , Hicks , J A , Houdek , P , Huntsinger , J R , Huynh , H P , IJzerman , H , Inbar , Y , Innes-Ker , Å H , Jiménez-Leal , W , John , M-S , Joy-Gaba , J A , Kamiloğlu , R G , Kappes , H B , Karabati , S , Karick , H , Keller , V N , Kende , A , Kervyn , N , Knežević , G , Kovacs , C , Krueger , L E , Kurapov , G , Kurtz , J , Lakens , D , Lazarević , L B , Levitan , C A , Lewis , N A , Lins , S , Lipsey , N P , Losee , J E , Maassen , E , Maitner , A T , Malingumu , W , Mallett , R K , Marotta , S A , Međedović , J , Mena-Pacheco , F , Milfont , T L , Morris , W L , Murphy , S C , Myachykov , A , Neave , N , Neijenhuijs , K , Nelson , A J , Neto , F , Lee Nichols , A , Ocampo , A , O'Donnell , S L , Oikawa , H , Oikawa , M , Ong , E , Orosz , G , Osowiecka , M , Packard , G , Pérez-Sánchez , R , Petrović , B , Pilati , R , Pinter , B , Podesta , L , Pogge , G , Pollmann , M M H , Rutchick , A M , Saavedra , P , Saeri , A K , Salomon , E , Schmidt , K , Schönbrodt , F D , Sekerdej , M B , Sirlopú , D , Skorinko , J L M , Smith , M A , Smith-Castro , V , Smolders , K C H J , Sobkow , A , Sowden , W , Spachtholz , P , Srivastava , M , Steiner , T G , Stouten , J , Street , C N H , Sundfelt , O K , Szeto , S , Szumowska , E , Tang , A C W , Tanzer , N , Tear , M J , Theriault , J , Thomae , M , Torres , D , Traczyk , J , Tybur , J M , Ujhelyi , A , van Aert , R C M , van Assen , M A L M , van der Hulst , M , van Lange , P A M , van 't Veer , A E , Vásquez- Echeverría , A , Ann Vaughn , L , Vázquez , A , Vega , L D , Verniers , C , Verschoor , M , Voermans , I P J , Vranka , M A , Welch , C , Wichman , A L , Williams , L A , Wood , M , Woodzicka , J A , Wronska , M K , Young , L , Zelenski , J M , Zhijia , Z & Nosek , B A 2018 , ' Many Labs 2 : investigating variation in replicability across samples and settings ' , Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science , vol. 1 , no. 4 , pp. 443-490 . https://doi.org/10.1177/2515245918810225
We conducted preregistered replications of 28 classic and contemporary published findings, with protocols that were peer reviewed in advance, to examine variation in effect magnitudes across samples and settings. Each protocol was administered to approximately half of 125 samples that comprised 15,305 participants from 36 countries and territories. Using the conventional criterion of statistical significance (p <.05), we found that 15 (54%) of the replications provided evidence of a statistically significant effect in the same direction as the original finding. With a strict significance criterion (p <.0001), 14 (50%) of the replications still provided such evidence, a reflection of the extremely high-powered design. Seven (25%) of the replications yielded effect sizes larger than the original ones, and 21 (75%) yielded effect sizes smaller than the original ones. The median comparable Cohen?s ds were 0.60 for the original findings and 0.15 for the replications. The effect sizes were small (<0.20) in 16 of the replications (57%), and 9 effects (32%) were in the direction opposite the direction of the original effect. Across settings, the Q statistic indicated significant heterogeneity in 11 (39%) of the replication effects, and most of those were among the findings with the largest overall effect sizes; only 1 effect that was near zero in the aggregate showed significant heterogeneity according to this measure. Only 1 effect had a tau value greater than .20, an indication of moderate heterogeneity. Eight others had tau values near or slightly above .10, an indication of slight heterogeneity. Moderation tests indicated that very little heterogeneity was attributable to the order in which the tasks were performed or whether the tasks were administered in lab versus online. Exploratory comparisons revealed little heterogeneity between Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) cultures and less WEIRD cultures (i.e., cultures with relatively high and low WEIRDness scores, respectively). ...
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This document brings together the conclusions of the seminar "European AI Regulation. Opportunities, Risks, and Future Scenarios from a Metropolitan Perspective" which, held on 19 September 2024 at CIDOB, was attended by academics and experts—from public and private sectors—on the regulation and management of AI technologies. The seminar is part of CIDOB's research and foresight programme in geopolitics and international relations, with support from the Barcelona Metropolitan Area. This programme aims to offer knowledge to the general and specialist public, to produce publications and stimulate debate, and to incorporate new foresight methodologies into the analysis of the today's most urgent international challenges.
Social and technological innovation is crucial for responding to people's needs and moving towards more inclusive and equitable local governments. Break-through technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) open up new opportunities for improving the provision of public services and managing some of the more urgent problems, among them sustainable mobility, energy transition, responsible use of water, and pollution reduction. In the coming years increasing use of AI will lead to transformation of the various branches of public administration, which will need to be prepared to deal with new challenges and risks associated with extensive use of algorithmic systems. It should be borne in mind, moreover, that local governments have a double responsibility as both "consumers" of technological solutions and "regulators" which must guarantee the development of a safe, ethical framework that would respect the laws currently in force, be compatible with social and cultural norms, and put people at the centre.In this regard, the PAM 2024-2027 (Metropolitan Action Plan of the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona) has pinpointed AI as one of the main focuses of future metropolitan policies. Metropolitan cities must be prepared to adopt algorithm-based solutions and to manage the risks this might entail, but they must also promote policy measures that would allow them to compete, and to attract and retain talent in order to advance the consolidation of the Barcelona Metropolitan Area as a digital metropolis. All this should be done bearing in mind the regulatory context in which they operate which, in future, will be conditioned by the recently approved EU Regulation on Artificial Intelligence (known as the AI Act), and also by geopolitical trends on the global scale.This CIDOB Briefing aims to contribute to reflection on how local governments should prepare so that they can successfully tackle the challenges associated with adoption of AI. In the first section, it analyses the implications for local governments and metropolitan areas of European AI regulation, while the second section presents the results of a forecasting exercise carried out in the seminar, which identified some desirable futures for the governance of artificial intelligence, the main factors of uncertainty that might condition these futures, and four future scenarios. The Briefing concludes with some reflections on how it might be possible to ensure that the strategies and political frameworks currently being established by the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona will be resilient and adaptable in the various potential directions that the processes of digital transformation might take at the local level.The context: European AI regulation and its impact on local governmentsAfter years of negotiation, on 13 June 2024, the European Union approved the European Regulation on Artificial Intelligence (AI Act) which, in this domain, establishes harmonised rules at the European level. The most outstanding characteristic of this regulation is that it seeks to establish a comprehensive AI legal framework throughout Europe with the aim of ensuring that AI systems are responsibly developed and used. In doing so, it adopts a risk-based approach. It prohibits uses that create an unacceptable risk because they are likely to violate fundamental rights (for example some systems of biometric classification, systems of cognitive behaviour manipulation, and social scoring systems), and regulates uses that entail a high risk (like critical transport infrastructure) or limited risk (like chatbots). In the case of AI models of general use, like ChatGPT, the AI Act takes into account the systemic risks that might derive from their large-scale use.This European regulation generates new obligations for a wide range of actors, from companies and technology developers to governments and regulating entities, including local administrations. In particular, from now on, town and city councils will need to make sure that the AI systems they use or intend to use are properly classified, and they must also identify the risks that might result from their use. Moreover, when bidding to acquire this technology they must ensure that the systems obtained comply with the AI Act and other European regulations, among them the General Data Protection Regulation (Almonacid, 2024).1 It should also be noted that many algorithmic systems used by local governments could be classified as being of high or limited risk (Galceran-Vercher and Vidal, 2024). Examples would include systems used in the provision of essential public goods and services, those used to evaluate the eligibility of applicants for certain social services, and those used to improve traffic management and urban mobility.Furthermore, the AI Act (Article 27) stipulates that, prior to their deployment, high-risk AI systems must be submitted to assessment of the impact their use might entail for basic rights. This means that local administrations will have to introduce checks on some applications, ideally on a recurring basis, with the aim of evaluating the algorithms as well as data sets to detect possible biases based on gender, language, origin, ethnicity, religious belief, age, educational level, physical and mental disability, health, and economic situation. Finally, the European regulations impose obligations regarding transparency and explainability of the algorithmic systems used, especially when they affect citizens' rights. In this regard, public registers of algorithms, which are already being used by local governments in Amsterdam, Helsinki, Nantes, and Lyon, are very useful tools.To sum up, the AI Act represents a significant challenge for local governments, which will have to adapt their processes, policies, and strategies in order to comply with these new stipulations. In this sense, a common concern is whether they will be able to implement this new regulatory framework, not because of a lack of willingness to do so but because of insufficient technical capacity Indeed, a widespread problem for local administrations is a deficiency of technical skills and specialist knowledge, not only about the complex mesh of European regulations but also about the very functioning of AI-based systems.2 Hence, there is an urgent need to encourage both digital literacy and specific AI literacy among both public employees and citizens. Only then can the full potential of AI be used responsibly.How can we prepare public administrations for tomorrow? Identifying uncertainties and plausible scenariosArtificial intelligence is a general-purpose technology, and this characteristic together with the fact that it has a very large number of applications gives rise to many uncertainties while also presenting difficulties for any forecasting exercise. These uncertainties spring not only from the development of the technology itself, but also from the evolution of the political and socioeconomic context in which its use occurs. Identifying them, and estimating the potential impact of their evolution on local governments make it possible to anticipate risks and opportunities for improving strategic planning and producing public policies. Presented below are five dimensions of interest and uncertainty that might have medium- to long-term effects on the development and management of algorithmic systems at the local level.
With these elements in mind and on the basis of a review of several forecasting exercises carried out in the past four years (specifically, PWC, 2020; United Kingdom Government Office for Science, 2023; and Economist Impact, 2024; OECD, 2024), two core axes (accessibility and geopolitical context) have been selected to assist in organising the construction of plausible scenarios on governing artificial intelligence in the coming decade.
Four specific hypothetical futures for the governance of AI in 2035 have been outlined: (1) Sustainable AI; (2) Wild AI; (3) Limited AI; and (4) Isolated AI. Before describing them, I believe that it is important to stress that these scenarios are not predictions of the future but, rather, have been conceived as instruments for debate and reflection, taking into account both desirable and undesirable elements of governance.Scenario 1 – Sustainable AIThere is general consensus on a set of ethical principles and technical standards for the development of artificial intelligence. The EU has played an influential role in negotiating this unified governance framework, which has ended up including values such as privacy, transparency, and protection of basic rights. Most of the world's governments have played very active roles: national AI strategies are multiplying, levels of public investment have risen significantly, and initiatives to promote responsible use of algorithmic systems are proliferating everywhere. The existence of regulatory and, to some extent, restrictive, frameworks has resulted in fewer AI applications being developed, but those that do appear on the market are more secure. Meanwhile, this has improved public perception of the safety of algorithmic systems, and these better levels of confidence have led to greater demand for, and adoption of these technologies. Finally, this scenario is presented in a context of high levels of accessibility to the development and use of algorithmic systems, which would explain the preference among developers (and the industry) for open source models.Scenario 2 – Wild AIAll attempts over the last decade to reach global consensus on basic ethical principles and standards of technical harmonisation standards for the development of AI systems have failed. Accordingly, this is a world in which there coexist multiple heterogeneous policy frameworks, with different levels of maturity, and entailing various degrees of responsibility and obligations. Likewise, several AI regulatory blocs have been established among countries with shared values. A few countries have adopted national AI regulations and strategies, and there is some degree of public investment, although the role of national governments in the development of algorithmic systems is very modest, as industry and the large technological corporations predominate in the development and regulation of this break-through technology. Furthermore, in this scenario, the regulations promoted from the various levels of government are much less strict. In some cases, interpretation of data privacy laws is looser in order to facilitate innovation and experimentation. Regulatory fragmentation enables companies and smaller startups to explore market niches, and there is a certain prevalence of open source models. This situation of high levels of accessibility to the technology in the absence of a unified policy framework, and a lax regulatory approach leads to an uncontrolled proliferation of AI systems that engage in morally questionable practices, for example manipulation of behaviour. Moreover, it is very easy for malicious actors to gain access to enormously powerful AI systems, which increases the risk of accidents and cyberattacks, as well as an escalation of the deepfakes crisis. This feeling of insecurity and lack of control reduces levels of trust and safety in algorithmic systems, which then leads to moderate use by organisations and the population in general.Scenario 3 –Limited AIThere is some degree of general consensus on the establishment of overall technical standards for the development of AI technology, but not on ethical principles. One must speak, then, of a moderately unified framework of global governance. In this situation, the EU has a very limited global influence since China and the United States dominate the world market. Some national regulations exist but they are mostly very lax. The levels of public investment in AI systems are very low and their development is basically led by industry. Closed source models prevail and participation of small and medium-sized companies in the market is scant. This is mostly explained by the high costs associated with the development of algorithmic systems, and also difficulties in complying with fragmented regulatory frameworks (only large companies can manage this), as well as lack of public investment. In this scenario, the degrees of public confidence concerning algorithmic systems and levels of confidence are noticeably moderate, which leads to relatively low levels of adoption by organisations and individuals.Scenario 4 – Isolated AIIt has not been possible to reach consensus on promoting a framework of unified global AI governance. Hence, there is a fragmented mosaic of regulatory initiatives and models. This situation is also the case in Europe, where the Regulation on Artificial Intelligence (AI Act) has not been implemented satisfactorily, which means that the situation is one of considerable regulatory fragmentation, and this is leading to numerous problems deriving from the limited scalability of AI systems. In this scenario, local governments play a rather limited role. They neither regulate nor invest in the development of AI systems. On the contrary, it is industry that promotes initiatives of voluntary self-regulation and also decides which applications are to be developed. It does this, however, in keeping with commercial criteria that do not necessarily consider social benefits (or harm). This creates an environment of low-level accessibility to development and use of algorithmic systems, which is explained by a situation of complex, fragmented governance that—except for big companies with better resources—hampers scalability in the different contexts of many AI products. This, then, has repercussions in very low levels of adoption, as would be expected from a factious data milieu that results in low-quality and low-performance AI. Furthermore, many defective and insecure products are sold on the market, which lowers levels of confidence and use of algorithmic systems in quite a variety of organisations.Risks, opportunities, and desirable future scenariosAs noted above, the construction of scenarios is understood not as an instrument for predicting the future, but as one to stimulate debate and reflection. To be specific, in the exercise carried out in the framework of this seminar, the aim was to find answers to three basic questions: (1) what futures might be more desirable than others?; (2) from the perspective of local government, what risks and opportunities might be expected to arise in each of these scenarios?; and (3) how might the risks associated with each of these scenarios be managed? To sum up, it is a matter of thinking about how, in a situation marked by many uncertainties, local governments might guarantee democratic supervision of the algorithmic systems that are used.To begin with the first question, the one about desirable futures, it could be argued that the scenario of sustainable AI is that which possibly brings together more elements that might be favourable to responsible deployment of algorithmic systems on the local and metropolitan scales. These elements, which could be considered in the strategic reflection and policy advocacy processes that might be promoted by the Barcelona Metropolitan Area, are summarised below.
Besides identifying desirable futures and analysis of the different contexts that are outlined in the four scenarios presented, a series of implications for local governments arise. For example, it is plausible to imagine that, in a context in which there is a certain overall consensus on the ethical principles and/or technical standards that must guide the development of artificial intelligence, it would be easier to develop robust regulatory frameworks and improve the general acceptance of algorithmic systems. This would allow local governments to develop and deploy AI-based solutions for more secure urban management without encountering resistance from citizens.In this scenario, public (and also local) administrations will have to establish viable frameworks for certification, audits, and checks that must ensure compliance with the different regulations. Hence, resources should be assigned for reinforcing the AI domain (national, regional, and local) and also for improving the technical skills of those with positions of responsibility in government agencies directly or indirectly involved in the deployment of algorithmic systems. This should also be a situation that is open to increased funding and technical training programmes for local governments so that they will be able to manage the responsibilities they will need to take on. It should also be open to the rising number of new occasions for collaborating with the private sector and universities.On the other hand, in a context of fragmented global governance and uncontrolled expansion of algorithmic systems, governments may have to design strategies for integrating AI development efforts in a more unstable and uncertain environment. For this, they will need flexible, adaptable approaches that will aim to reduce unnecessary regulatory complexity. Then again, it is expected that cyberattacks will increase and (especially small and middle-sized) municipalities are not always prepared to deal with them. This is also the scenario that poses the most challenges for protection of data and the digital rights of citizens. This will accentuate the need to promote local frameworks of AI management that are aligned with democratic values.Finally, we could think that a context of high levels of accessibility could possibly facilitate the spread of smaller and also local developers that would be able to adapt algorithmic systems to the specific needs of each municipality. Otherwise, in scenarios characterised by a prevalence of large multinationals, local governments would have less ability to acquire products that are tailored to their particular situations.How to guarantee democratic oversight of algorithmic systems and satisfactory distribution of AI benefits? There is general consensus on the urgent need to reform the present model of public administration in order to make it more efficient, transparent, and focused on citizens' needs. The increasing accessibility of groundbreaking technologies like AI opens up new opportunities for advancing in this direction but only if the processes of digitalisation are accompanied by measures that will also change how the public administration works. In other words, it is necessary not only to digitalise but also to transform. Given the rising importance and growing popularity of artificial intelligence technologies, many local governments must manage two realities that coexist in a single organisation. One is excessive optimism about the potentialities of algorithmic systems to fix every problem, and the other is characterised by its apocalyptic discourse about the risks associated with the use of these technologies, which could slow down their adoption.In these circumstances, it is more relevant than ever to try to provide answers to the question of how to guarantee democratic oversight of algorithmic systems, which would assure a satisfactory distribution of the benefits associated with AI use by local administrations. A first suggestion in this regard would be to shift the debate—about whether it is necessary to regulate or not—to a focus, first on having good regulations and, second, on ensuring effective implementation of those already in place. For example, there is no need to wait for the AI Act to ban social scoring systems because other European regulations, like the General Data Protection Regulation, already prohibit such practices. Then again, several experts have repeatedly warned that some requirements of European regulations can only be applied by large corporations, and not by small and medium-sized companies. This warning can be extrapolated to local governments since highly demanding regulations can mean a high percentage of non-compliance. Indeed, in some cases, it might even be desirable for the public administration to accept the reasonable risks entailed by any process of digital transformation.Meanwhile, to ensure effective implementation of European, national, and regional regulations, it is important to have regulatory bodies (like the European Centre for Algorithmic Transparency (ECAT) and the Spanish National Agency for Supervision of Artificial Intelligence) that would function to the maximum of their potential. It is also to be desired that they could offer technical assistance and practical guidance specifically designed for local governments. In this regard, it is necessary to equip local administrations with more practical tools that would guarantee responsible use of algorithmic systems. For example, many bodies have AI governance strategies but few local administrations have introduced public registers of algorithms or carried out ethical evaluations of data and artificial intelligence systems.3Finally, no effort should be spared in educational and awareness-raising actions that aim to improve general understanding of AI and its impact on both municipal workers and citizens, and to encourage initiatives that would assure their participation in safe and ethical deployment of algorithmic systems. Such actions need not necessarily be carried out by the public administration because it frequently does not have either tools or the appropriate knowledge. It might, instead, be much more effective to encourage alliances with organisations like Xnet and CIVICAi, with a proven track record in defending digital rights, the protection of which is more important than ever, whatever the AI future towards which we end up advancing.BibliographyAlmonacid, V. (2024) "Reglamento (europeo) de Inteligencia Artificial: impacto y obligaciones que genera en los Ayuntamientos". El Consultor de los Ayuntamientos, 15 de Julio de 2024, LA LEY. Diario LA LEY, No 10553, Sección Tribuna, 24 de Julio de 2024, LA LEY Ben Dhaou, S., Isagah, T., Distor, C., and Ruas, I.C. (2024). Global Assessment of Responsible Artificial Intelligence in Cities: Research and recommendations to leverage AI for people- centred smart cities. Nairobi, Kenya. United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) Economist Impact (2024) AI landscapes: Exploring future scenarios of AI through to 2030. London: Economist impact. Online at: https://impact.economist.com/projects/what-next-for-ai/ai-landscapes/Galceran-Vercher, M., and Vidal, A. (2024) "Mapping urban artificial intelligence: first report of GOUAI's Atlas of Urban AI". CIDOB Briefings, No. 56. Online at: https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/mapping-urban-artificial-intelligence-first-report-gouais-atlas-urban-aiOECD (2024) "Assessing potential future artificial intelligence risks, benefits and policy imperatives". OECD Artificial Intelligence Papers, November 2024, No. 27. PWC (2020) The many futures of Artificial Intelligence: Scenarios of what AI could look like in the EU by 2025. March 2020United Kingdom Government Office for Science (2023) "Future Risks of Frontier A: Which capabilities and risks could emerge at the cutting edge of AI in the future?". Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. Government of the United Kingdom. October 2023. Online at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/653bc393d10f3500139a6ac5/future-risks-of-frontier-ai-annex-a.pdf (last access, 30 November 2024)Notas:1-This is the sister regulation of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of May 2018, as there can be no AI without data.2- A recent study indicates that up to 20% of chief technology managers and directors and more than 55% of civil servants in a sample of 122 cities around the world are working on AI projects without the required knowledge and prior experience (Dhaou et al., 2024). 3- The PIO (Principles, Indicators, and Observables) self-assessment model designed by the Observatory for Ethics in Artificial Intelligence of Catalonia (OEIAC) could easily be implemented by local administrations, for example. All the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution
Con la presente Tesis Doctoral abordamos críticamente la visión ilustrada del indígena de la frontera meridional chilena como marco geográfico y la centuria de la Ilustración como coordenada temporal, especialmente su segunda mitad. Un análisis de sus tres familias básicas que no contempla por razones cronológicas a los picunches o gentes del norte, pero sí a los mapuches –gente de la tierra–, huilliches –gente del sur o sector meridional mapuche– y los pehuenches cordilleranos –gente del pehuén o pino chileno–. Esta división horizontal en razón de su distribución latitudinal se complementa necesariamente con la clásica repartición cuatripartita longitudinal de los butalmapus o distritos indígenas. Así, la frontera araucana, entre el río Bío-Bío y la plaza de Valdivia, se dividía en: costa, llanos, precordillera y la Cordillera propiamente, barrera que no fue obstáculo para unas relaciones fluidas. Además, al sur de la misma se extendía la frontera huilliche, que abarcaba desde el presidio valdiviano hasta Chiloé. Y, por supuesto, los pehuenches, que enseñoreaban ambas vertientes andinas. La naturaleza del estudio parte de un enfoque metodológico multidisciplinar histórico y antropológico, y supone un análisis de media duración del espacio fronterizo, en especial de su actor indígena, que con la Ilustración va a ver revalorizado en su papel. Asimismo, destacamos un aspecto básico transversal a todo el trabajo de aproximación a la realidad fronteriza araucana y hulliche, como es el proceso de cambio cultural, cuando al choque inicial le sucede un sistema complejo de relaciones. El surgimiento de una cultura de frontera se realiza dentro de unos parámetros de comportamiento social relativamente compartidos por ambas comunidades en contacto prolongado. Un proceso de aculturación con fases de aceleración y retroceso, y bidireccional en cuanto a los elementos culturales cedidos y adaptados; aunque sea la cultura hispana la principal donadora. Pretendemos observar si la historia de la frontera chilena es una historia que supera el mero enfrentamiento para convertirse en una frontera dinámica, donde la convergencia de protagonistas colectivos alcanzó en el siglo XVIII una dimensión propia como espacio compartido y nuevo en sus interrelaciones. Comprobar si la nueva fisonomía social y mestizaje de elementos culturales heredados de la implantación hispana y legatarios del habitante nativo, dieron lugar a una sociedad que rompía el ciclo de lucha y se ofrecía mestiza y original. Igualmente, procuramos comprobar si el resultado más significativo del contacto secular fue el conocimiento y la integración de ambas comunidades por encima de conflictos cerrados. Nuestra principal contribución, que matizamos más abajo, va en la línea de reivindicar el espacio fronterizo chileno como un territorio de confluencia e intercambio, superando la visión de choque continuado de una parte de la historiografía más interesada en la consagración de mitos "incuestionables", que ignora la complejidad de un fenómeno mucho más rico y cambiante. Si bien esta corriente interpretativa ya está marcada por la historiografía reciente de la mano de autores como Gertrudis Payás, José Manuel Zavala, Jorge Pinto, Leonardo León, Jaime Valenzuela y Jimena Obregón, entre otros estudiados exhaustivamente en el presente texto, hemos querido profundizar en la misma y analizar el progresivo proceso de secularización de la frontera más allá de los intercambios comerciales y el mestizaje. Aquí radica nuestro aporte más sustancial y personal, mencionado anteriormente. Siguiendo las orientaciones de Guillaume Boccara al respecto y añadiendo al comercio el elemento simbólico, las representaciones culturales, el universo de las mentalidades y los imaginarios colectivos junto a los recursos, semántica y otros elementos de apropiación. El estudio de la frontera nos lleva ineludiblemente a las formas de contacto violentas y pacíficas entre sociedades, y la génesis de una nueva entidad diferenciada. Esta idea cenital de la literatura producida por los estudios fronterizos desde las aportaciones del profesor Sergio Villalobos y sus discípulos ha quedado matizada o, mejor, enriquecida por el análisis de los procesos de interacción étnica, podemos recordar a Rolf Foerster o José Bengoa, por ejemplo. En este sentido, recordamos la clarividente idea de Pinto Rodríguez en relación a los intercambios mutuos, aparte de los circuitos comerciales locales o regionales –incluso de una futura proyección imperial–. Los cambios fueron simultáneos y obedecieron a factores de índole externa e interna. Desde el punto de vista indígena, no solo la resistencia y sus derivaciones contribuyeron a conformar una sociedad fronteriza, sino también las transformaciones operadas en el propio seno del mundo nativo a consecuencia del contacto sostenido en eltiempo con los españoles. El tema es de una gran relevancia y actualidad, objeto de debates y polémicas sobre la inserción en la sociedad chilena, a los cuales no han permanecido ajenos los historiadores, muy al contrario. El conflicto que mantiene el pueblo mapuche con el gobierno chileno arranca de la misma constitución del Estado, así lo hemos contemplado, aunque sucintamente por su contemporaneidad, al hablar de las categorías semánticas y especialmente del debate historiográfico fronterizo, en consecuencia emplazamos al capítulo correspondiente de la primera parte. Las escuelas de estudios fronterizos y de relaciones interétnicas quedan contrastadas en dicho apartado de la Tesis con un estado de la cuestión bibliográfica, así como las soluciones de síntesis más novedosas y actuales. Todos estos valiosos aportes historiográficos y antropológicos enhebran el trabajo y son comentados recurrentemente, pues sin tales cimientos no se podría seguir construyendo una ciencia histórica capaz de explicar y comprender el presente desde la reconstrucción del pasado, según la "Escuela de los Annales" y en palabras de Braudel. De igual manera, al final del trabajo hemos incluido un comentario acerca de las fuentes consultadas, que manifiestan la colaboración interdisciplinar metodológica y cruce de testimonios de naturaleza variada, al cual remitimos para una lectura más amplia y pormenorizada. Tan solo anticipar su diversidad documental y de centros de investigación a lo largo de tres estancias en Chile. Asimismo, en orden a la temporalidad, queremos realizar dos matizaciones previas. En primer lugar, hemos analizado la cuestión mapuche actual someramente allí donde ha sido necesario para comprender el presente desde su raíces históricas, en concreto el reformismo tardío de Carlos III y Carlos IV. En segundo lugar, igualmente analizamos la primera mitad de la centuria ilustrada cuando sirve al conocimiento del periodo tardocolonial, pues aunque somos conscientes del inicio de la política reformadora desde Felipe V, nuestro interés se centra en el marco cronológico finisecular, precisamente donde el vacío historiográfico es mayor o requiere de nuevas interpretaciones de cara al próximo movimiento emancipador. Respecto al indígena, se trata de rescatar la diversidad de sus respuestas frente a la forzada homogeneidad y las valoraciones de los ilustrados que plasmaban esa nueva realidad desde premisas novedosas. Interrogando a los testimonios de españoles y extranjeros sobre sus estrategias de subsistencia, realidad política, estructura social y valores o patrones culturales, podremos captar las continuidades y los cambios de los indígenas y las transformaciones en las visiones de los observadores europeos. Las hipótesis de trabajo planteadas y sujetas a verificación se centran en la nueva situación de la frontera ilustrada. Es decir, si hubo una nueva concepción global fronteriza desde la metrópoli y sus autoridades indianas delegadas tendente a reforzar territorios en movimiento de expansión y el control efectivo de los integrados en la Monarquía Hispánica por temor a las repercusiones de la cambiante política europea. Si quedó ratificado de facto lo consagrado de iure, esto es, la soberanía efectiva sobre la frontera. ¿Pudieron operar factores exógenos como la amenaza real de asentamiento foráneo en puntos clave geoestratégicos de la América española que llevaran al replanteamiento acerca de los "salvajes" o "bárbaros" por los hombres del absolutismo ilustrado? Si fue así, ¿enfocaron la cuestión con métodos propios o se insertaron en la cadena de soluciones heredada frente al fenómeno fronterizo? ¿Se implementaron dispositivos y mecanismos de contenido cultural y fondo político como estrategias novedosas? La frontera del reformismo debe abrirse a otros protagonistas, como los agentes de intermediación, en especial las mujeres. En este sentido nos planteamos cuál fue el verdadero alcance de su papel, olvidado entre el ruido de las armas, al igual que la importancia de los recursos en la apropiación del medio y sus habitantes. Además de verificar esta política oficial intencionada y planificada durante el XVIII, de modo acentuado en su segunda mitad, comprobaremos si pudo obedecer igualmente a la influencia de respuestas locales que condicionaran la dinámica interna y hasta qué grado son posibles los análisis comparativos con otras fronteras indianas. El uso del universo simbólico para la inclusión y su verdadero alcance constituye una hipótesis primordial de nuestro enfoque antropológico. Asimismo, planteamos la nueva visión del "otro" indígena, que por encima de enfrentamientos bélicos los presenta como hombres en última instancia súbditos del rey distante, que es necesario reintegrar por vías de la asimilación cultural a su verdadera condición de vasallos del rey católico. Un acercamiento que supera mitos nacionales consagrados por la historiografía en muchos casos y en proceso de revisión, que deja atrás la idea del indio rebelde y lo contempla como elemento en sí mismo, integrado más o menos según la variedad de respuestas y los tiempos de las mismas. Igualmente, en conclusión lógica de lo anterior, entre los objetivos que perseguimos está contemplar la frontera mucho más allá de la dinámica de enfrentamiento, optando por la concepción de un espacio total e integrador, eso sí, de personalidad propia y diferenciada. Un espacio de confluencias que se abre paso gracias al progresivo entendimiento fruto del conocimiento y de necesidades mutuas. Finalmente, otra hipótesis de trabajo observa la frontera secularizada de finales del siglo XVIII no solo como un proceso de aculturación inicial y posterior transculturación, sino también como un medio aprovechado por los españoles de cara a la movilidad social ascendente. De ahí que el conocimiento sobre el indígena sea objeto de variadas reflexiones que coloquen al nativo como elemento clave del desarrollo regional y camino de la promoción político-administrativa. La reconstrucción del pasado debe cumplir la función social de mejorar el presente, si consideramos que somos lo que fuimos, dicha comprensión retrospectiva sirve para reconocer que seremos lo que somos, de ahí la importancia de reflexionar sobre espacios de encuentro, de mediación intercultural entre europeos y americanos. Partimos de la premisa de que toda historia es historia contemporánea, como Benedetto Croce apuntó. Escribimos y leemos Historia para comprender y mejorar nuestro presente, para adquirir el bagaje suficiente que nos permita hacer frente a los retos de nuestro tiempo, como los desafíos de las migraciones y contactos o la diversidad cultural, por otra parte tan añejos como la dispersión de nuestra especie por el planeta. No es el camino emprendido colocar datos en secuencia por la mera información por sí mismos aportada, sino que la posición que adoptemos ante el pasado y sus relaciones con el presente son vitales para la sociedad entera y no solo para los historiadores, albaceas de la memoria de la experiencia colectiva. Nos preguntamos, siguiendo al maestro Hobsbawm: "¿Qué puede decirnos la historia sobre la sociedad contemporánea?". El contexto económico, político y sociocultural de aquella lejana frontera debe considerarse relativo al punto de vista del observador, por ello adoptamos una perspectiva inclusiva desde la historia social. La historiografía tradicional iberoamericana se caracterizó por fijar la atención en el Estado-nación y su historia broncínea de héroes epónimos fundadores. Hoy en día, ante los retos de la globalización resulta inexcusable una historia regional integradora y comparada, en línea con las nuevas rutas abiertas por la historia atlántica. América ha adoptado una postura crítica como marco intelectual, aceptar las "certezas supuestas" suele ser cómodo, pero resulta muy discutible cuando falta la investigación que acredite dicha certidumbre. Las polémicas, en la raíz americana, avivaron una autocrítica histórica que bien puede transformarse en sano criterio de búsqueda actual, sin llegar a la iconoclasia, pues construimos historia sobre lo preexistente. Al fin y al cabo, "no es la Historia campo de curiosidades (…) En este gran Theatro no se entra à especulaciones infructuosas", sino a interpretar los cambios y permanencias que explican su continua construcción en beneficio personal y social: "asi por lo que mira à su persona, como al gobierno de otros". Los contactos entre pueblos son tan antiguos como la historia misma de la humanidad, sin embargo, aunque mantienen similitudes, también operan divergencias, siempre dentro del proceso general de cambio experimentado, pues "transición es todo en la Historia hasta el punto que puede definirse la Historia como la ciencia de la transición". La frontera es un escenario privilegiado en este sentido y se constituye como un espacio geográfico y cultural de choque y encuentro entre mundos diferentes que interactúan recíprocamente por medio de procesos de aculturación o transculturación. Respecto al primero, entendemos el término como un proceso complejo de contacto cultural, cuyo fruto consiste en la asimilación o recepción por un grupo social de rasgos de otra sociedad mediante la imposición, física o simbólica. Mientras que en relación al segundo, partimos del proceso dibujado por Fernando Ortiz e inspirado por José Martí y la idea de integración cultural, según el cual sería la gradual recepción por un pueblo o grupo social de formas culturales ajenas, que terminan sustituyendo a las propias. Ambas partes resultan modificadas, pues siempre se da algo a cambio de lo que se recibe, en palabras de Bronislaw Malinowski14. En las fronteras chilenas analizadas –araucana, cordillerana y huilliche– se intentó lo primero, pero operó lo segundo. Los préstamos culturales circularon reciproca pero desigualmente entre ambas comunidades. El hecho fronterizo –tanto humano como territorial– puesto ante los procesos globales del tiempo presente puede, sin duda, acometerse con mayores posibilidades de éxito gracias al conocimiento de ámbitos de contacto pasados. La globalización no significa homogeneidad, pues la diversidad etnológica y cultural es patrimonio de todos, pero sí es oportunidad para una mayor solidaridad y cooperación entre pueblos, máxime si mantienen fuertes lazos históricos y afectivos. Por otra parte, permite el análisis crítico sobre la interculturalidad en relación a la colonialidad del poder, aunque no es nuestra intención actual. América es un continente multicultural por obra del mosaico de pueblos que lo habitan con sus respectivas culturas, la mirada no-indígena define desde fuera su realidad, lo cual significa la construcción de un sujeto ajeno a la propia identidad indígena. La identidad étnica es un concepto dinámico que tiene un punto referencial en su propia historia. Una visión lineal impuso el recorrido de "salvajes" a "bárbaros" y de aquí a "vasallos", luego vendrían los "ciudadanos", pero tal recorrido fue dispar en cuanto a una comunicación constructiva entre ambos a pesar de la interacción permanente. El conocimiento mutuo entre españoles y mapuche-araucanos vino de la mano de nuevas relaciones y perspectivas hacia el otro diferente nacidas de la visión reformista, y sirvió de enlace entre unos y otros vía complementariedad o interdependencia. Por otra parte, la naturaleza de la interacción y la ordenación de las relaciones interétnicas deben contemplar la existencia de límites identitarios a las asociaciones y adaptaciones. El interés ilustrado por el indígena y el medio americanos ofrece una abundante posibilidad de consulta documental de múltiples orígenes y con variadas finalidades que describen e interpretan el mundo indígena desde la etnografía y la ecohistoria en larga duración. Nos ha parecido vital partir del cruce de testimonios oficiales y privados –políticos, religiosos y científicos– y de las reflexiones etnológicas así de españoles como de viajeros extranjeros. De igual manera, acudir a archivos americanos y españoles de diferente naturaleza resulta necesario para el conocimiento de diversos tipos documentales. Asimismo, la bibliografía especializada consultada ha permitido establecer el estado de la cuestión y adentrarnos en los debates historiográficos de nuestro enfoque sociocultural. Las interpretaciones acerca del indígena de la frontera sur chilena son variadas, según el cambio de percepción operado con el transcurso del tiempo. Sin duda, en el siglo XVIII las diversas visiones posibles tienen en común el tamiz, en mayor o menor grado, del pensamiento ilustrado. Aunque algunas referencias constituyen fenómenos de continuidad, el cambio aparece no solo en la propia evolución nativa sino también en el resultado de la observación europea. Españoles, criollos y extranjeros no dejaron iguales testimonios acerca de los araucanos, si bien es verdad que los rasgos distintivos básicos son comunes en sus escritos. Las distintas visiones se nos presentan dispares pero no por ello incompatibles; al contrario, son complementarias. No hay oposición entre sus testimonios más allá de los diversos objetivos de cada colectivo. Con el análisis del enfoque que dieron españoles o criollos al aborigen, se podrán observar sus diversos intereses, lo que la frontera y sus habitantes significaban para el español americano y el peninsular. Además, militares, misioneros o pobladores diferirán en sus resultados al partir de premisas variadas; divergencia que se repetirá en las observaciones del hombre que vive en la frontera con respecto al que la contempla desde la lejanía. Pero el acercamiento al indio desde la visión ilustrada quedaría incompleto sin el estudio de los testimonios dejados por los extranjeros que, aunque parten del mismo patrón cultural occidental, resultan también enriquecedores para configurar un esquema interpretativo del mapuche-araucano en el siglo XVIII. Cada grupo fija su atención primordial en un aspecto, por lo que la conjunción de todos conformará una aproximación adecuada al panorama general de la vida indígena y sus relaciones con los demás protagonistas de la frontera chilena del Setecientos. La actuación y visión de todos los agentes fronterizos nos permitirá comprender la dinámica de cambio en el análisis de un espacio físico y cultural que contempla no sólo las potencialidades del medio sino también la incorporación del indio, mediante la aculturación entre otras estrategias, a la sociedad hispánica. No podemos valorar las visiones del indio y su incorporación como vasallos de la mano del reformismo borbónico, sin partir de la dualidad básica del mundo fronterizo, esto es, la relación hispano-indígena. Pero fueron más los agentes histórico-sociales que intervinieron, no sólo los europeos de distintas procedencias y por ende con acervos particulares, sino los propios indígenas, fragmentados en sus respuestas al choque cultural. Así pues, consideramos vital estudiar el mundo amerindio en su diversidad de desarrollos y adaptaciones al medio y de actitudes respecto al hispano-criollo. Tampoco podemos olvidar los actores culturales de intermediación entre ambas comunidades. Para abordar las relaciones entre españoles y nativos partimos de los sistemas de valores de las sociedades en contacto y del marco físico como condicionante en cuanto a la adaptación cultural del hombre al medio. Un medio que merece un estudio en sí mismo junto a los grupos humanos que lo habitaron y las interrelaciones que tejieron con las demás colectividades que confluían en un mismo territorio. Hay que observar la frontera como lugar físico de confluencia y como proceso de cambio cultural. Estudiar si el inicial rechazo evolucionó con el tiempo hacia el contacto humano fluido, el intercambio de elementos culturales y la creación de un espacio resultante de las interacciones continuadas. Además, el tiempo ilustrado resulta óptimo para un balance de las posibles continuidades y cambios, así como para fijar la naturaleza de la evolución del pensamiento respecto al indio "bárbaro" de las fronteras imperiales. A mediados de la centuria ilustrada, Rousseau rescataba en su "Discurso sobre las ciencias y las artes" una idea clásica y a la vez novedosa –que enlazaba con el ideal cosmopolita de la época– sobre la barbarie. De manos de Ovidio recogía: Barbarus hic ego sum, quia non intelligor illis ("Aquí soy un bárbaro porque no me entienden"). La diferencia convertía en extraño a cualquiera en función del posicionamiento o la mirada ajena. La mutua observación entre ilustrados e indígenas nos ofrece las visiones de unos y otros. Recuperada esta percepción más amable y recíproca de la alteridad y el poder, faltaba la segunda premisa para comprender el contexto en lo relativo a la configuración de las fronteras: el pacto. Otro destacado pensador, no en balde estamos en el "Siglo de la Filosofía", aportó su comprensión al respecto: "debe buscarse la paz allí donde pueda encontrarse", tan precisa era la primera ley de naturaleza. Desde Clío, aunque con un enfoque interdisciplinario, podemos acercarnos a esta realidad en transformación, pues "la Historia no solo es una valiosa parte del conocimiento, sino que abre la puerta a muchas otras partes y aporta materiales a la mayoría de las ciencias". El fenómeno de la frontera chilena en el siglo XVIII centra el contenido de nuestra Tesis Doctoral. La naturaleza de este estudio parte de un enfoque interdisciplinario y de un análisis de media duración del proceso fronterizo y sus consecuencias desde una metodología histórica y etnológica. Aplicamos el método etnohistórico a las fuentes documentales en un marco de análisis del hecho fronterizo chileno desde sus orígenes hasta sus resultados más significativos y enriquecedores durante la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII, cuando el contacto secular entre españoles e indígenas desembocó en una nueva realidad distinta de las anteriores pero fruto de ellas. El encuentro entre sociedades de niveles socioculturales dispares originó la formación de una "frontera" en cuanto espacio físico y proceso cultural. A su vez esta frontera es variada dependiendo del actor fronterizo desde el que se analice, en este sentido los testimonios marcan las distintas visiones del "otro" en base a su situación en el entramado de relaciones. El estudio de la frontera chilena, como objetivo general, se inicia con el análisis global de lo que la frontera ha significado en la historia humana en cuanto espacio de confluencia de realidades y generadora de mitos. Los precedentes peninsulares medievales se prestan especialmente al tratamiento comparativo entre fronteras en cuanto contacto prolongado, pues junto a las convergencias encontramos divergencias que permiten establecer una tipología del fenómeno en el espacio indiano y remarcar la singularidad de las fronteras americanas. Las similitudes y los desencuentros permiten un extenso abanico interpretativo –lato sensu– de respuestas desde la historia y la antropología. La capitanía general chilena estaba circundada al norte por el desierto de Atacama, que la separaba de la matriz peruana, al oeste por el océano Pacífico, al este por la cordillera andina, y al sur por la Araucanía y el archipiélago de Chiloé. Esta región política y natural claramente delimitada era un espacio peculiar en el orden físico y étnico, que ejercía su influencia sobre el imaginario de los españoles asentados en el valle central. La frontera del reino de Chile, desde el río Bío-Bío hasta el archipiélago chilote, constituyó una zona fronteriza –en analogía con las marcas carolingias–, temparana en su problemática y tardía en su resolución. Una frontera inestable, marcada por el medio natural y la posición periférica. Los cronistas y los primeros investigadores han dejado testimonio de la singularidad de un espacio que se resistió a su inclusión en el engranaje de la Monarquía Hispánica en Indias, empresa cargada de dificultades y trabajos, y que originó un mito conformador de la identidad chilena. El debate historiográfico sobre la frontera chilena y sus aborígenes en relación con la zona plenamente hispanizada central y septentrional ha originado posicionamientos diversos que interpretan su evolución histórica de forma dispar. La complejidad viene del cambio y la continuidad en el mundo fronterizo que terminó por originar un fenómeno modificable en el proceso y sujeto a reajustes; además de la imagen fraguada desde el inicio, que se debate entre la realidad y el mito. Los protagonistas que interactuaron en la frontera meridional chilena, objetivo específico de la Tesis junto a los cambios culturales experimentados, tenían diferentes intereses y estrategias, en relación con su cometido y función respecto al "otro" y el territorio. El distinto nivel de complejidad social de cacicazgos y estatalidad se reflejaba en la apropiación de los recursos mediante un menor o mayor grado tecnológico y acumulación excedentaria. Como pueblo nativo y ágrafo, los araucano-mapuches poseían un conocimiento exacto del medio. Además, según la visión coetánea sobre el origen de la desigualdad, los "salvajes" estaban acostumbrados a fatigas, rigores y "forzados a defenderse". Entre españoles e indios el sistema de relaciones fue un continuum, recurrentemente la presencia de europeos amigos o enemigos de la monarquía española aumentaba la complejidad de visiones de la dinámica fronteriza. Los ojos que observaban la cultura aborigen eran múltiples y variados, consecuentemente las formas de mirarla también lo serían. Pero todos dejaron constancia de su capacidad pragmática de adaptación y tránsito de la autarquía al intercambio. En definitiva, la cultura es producto del aprendizaje más que de la herencia, de la asimilación de unos hábitos compartidos por miembros de una misma sociedad que podemos conceptuar paulatinamente de fronteriza en su conjunto. Tras el choque inicial de la conquista los hispanos se establecieron en el valle central, agrícola y ganadero, preocupados por la estabilización más al sur de una frontera conflictiva que escapaba al control efectivo de la hispanización política y cultural. Durante la época de los Austrias y en el tránsito al siglo XVIII, los españoles y criollos, alejados ya de su interés por enlazar con los fundadores hispanos y próximos a reivindicar los orígenes y medio americano como elemento diferenciador, asumieron una nueva actitud hacia el mundo fronterizo. Durante la primera mitad del Setecientos se reestructuró la acción sobre el indígena en base a reforzar la política de "parlamentos", factor de continuidad y proyección. Eran encuentros transfronterizos entre los representantes de ambas comunidades, a la cabeza hispano-criolla iban las autoridades político-militares y eclesiásticas, mientras que los jefes tribales –caciques o loncos– de las parcialidades indígenas encarnaban la autoridad nativa. Los dos interlocutores se hacían acompañar, respectivamente, de un gran número de tropa e indios –capitanejos y mocetones–, que participaban de una ceremonia ritualizada junto a grandes banquetes y ofrendas de regalos que concluían con un articulado que establecía las normas del juego fronterizo y el reconocimiento de vasallaje al monarca español. Con el tiempo, este corpus contractual se convirtió en un estatuto fronterizo que consagraba igualmente la representación mapuche-araucana tras su presentación ante la autoridad hispana delegada en el territorio. Posteriormente, durante los reinados de Carlos III y Carlos IV, la visión ilustrada llevó al descubrimiento científico del indígena, al conocimiento del medio y a una política integradora encaminada a preservar aquellos espacios de la amenaza exterior mediante ideas de asimilación cultural y su control práctico bajo soberanía española. Esta etapa de los dos Carlos es la que ha centrado nuestra atención, respecto al primero las razones son tan obvias como su protagonismo a la cabeza del reformismo borbónico ilustrado. En relación a su hijo, a pesar del pánico de Floridablanca ante la deriva de los sucesos revolucionarios franceses, las reformas tuvieron durante su reinado hasta 1808 cierta posibilidad de implementación y, sobre todo, de comprobación de sus resultados. Además, se trata de periodo relativamente olvidado por la historiografía y que es preciso poner en valor, apremio mayor en Indias. La imagen colectiva del indómito y resistente araucano es fruto del sistema de valores y creencias compartidos por los colonizadores españoles y transmitida a la historiografía posterior, sin olvidar su gran proyección literaria. La visión del "otro" difería de la realidad pues estaba condicionada por el subjetivismo y limitada por la dificultad de percibir una cultura en construcción que, por otra parte, tomaría carta de naturaleza precisamente gracias al observador ajeno. Observaremos en nuestro estudio a los grupos genéricamente englobados bajo la denominación de araucanos por parte de los conquistadores, extrapolando una singularidad a un conjunto de familias étnicas que quedaron arrinconadas al sur del Bío-Bío, en la zona de contacto fronterizo desde la Araucanía hasta la isla grande de Chiloé. Con pautas culturales sedentarias agropecuarias en estadios poco evolucionados y comportamientos que iban del enfrentamiento abierto con los españoles a la alianza o entendimiento, pasando por las actitudes ajustables según la coyuntura. Muy brevemente, estos son los grupos de nuestra atención: huilliches, con cierto desarrollo cultural agrícola y ganadero, además de la pesca en torno al archipiélago chilote, límite frente a los juncos o cuncos. Los mapuches, reacios a la colonización y enemigos de los hispano-criollos, que con el tiempo y por medio de cauces indirectos quedaron englobados en el mundo mestizo de la frontera. Por otra parte, los pehuenches u hombres del pehuén, fruto o piñón de la araucaria con el cual elaboraban una harina base de su alimentación y fácil de transportar en sus desplazamientos por ambas bandas cordilleranas. Asentados en la zona centro-sur y desplazados progresivamente hacia el sur y la Cordillera, eran recolectores y cazadores que atravesaban los Andes en dirección a los grandes espacios rioplatenses donde se les conocía por indios pampa araucanizados. La incorporación del caballo aumentó su área de desplazamiento e incidió en sus pautas nómadas. Se dedicaban a la venta de sal, animales y manufacturas de piel, fueron aliados de los españoles, especial y definitivamente a partir de las campaña de 1770. Otros grupos étnicos menores cualitativa o cuantitativamente son contemplados en relación a los anteriores. En conjunto, unos pueblos de diferente nivel de desarrollo sociocultural y contrastadas respuestas a la presencia española que, progresivamente, fueron uniformándose a ojos extraños por la aceptación del orden colonial cuando no implicándose en su mantenimiento. La percepción ilustrada del indio entre "bárbaro" y "buen salvaje", o los afanes del reformismo borbónico por integrar a estos súbditos díscolos definitivamente, se articuló en varias líneas de actuación: el poblamiento fronterizo, la transición de la guerra defensiva a ofensiva y los mecanismos de asimilación y encuentro dieron dinámica propia a una frontera extrema. Cabe recordar que el pensamiento antropológico de la Ilustración está en el origen de una visión clasificadora de otras sociedades humanas al diferenciarlas y situarlas, en su afán taxonómico, en la historia. Un tercer agente fronterizo en la América meridional englobaría la presencia europea: holandesa, francesa e inglesa fundamentalmente, también de centroeuropeos, situados fuera de la relación bidireccional español-indígena, ambos nominalmente súbditos de la Corona. La percepción europea ilustrada proporciona valiosa información sobre la visión externa de las relaciones y vías de integración, así como de los factores del rechazo, por encima de la impresión de la época centrada en la posible alteración del equilibrio y entendimiento forzado entre españoles e indígenas. Como sabemos, la segunda mitad del XVIII contempló choques reales o temidos entre las potencias europeas en América. Estas fronteras imperiales en expansión propiciaron el encuentro europeo en escenarios americanos, y los cambios o permanencias de soberanía que en el caso chileno quedaron en el pánico defensivo y la asunción de una geopolítica revalorizadora de la frontera por obra de sus potencialidades y de las amenazas políticas. Las relaciones de viajeros extranjeros que no compartían la escala de valores de eclesiásticos y militares españoles o criollos afrontaban la conducta indígena desde otras perspectivas. Su formación científica ilustrada, el espíritu crítico y la desvinculación con el medio social indiano les llevaron a otra valoración complementaria de las interrelaciones. La frontera meridional chilena fue objeto de atención por la metrópoli en una doble vertiente: la problemática doméstica y la amenaza exterior. El control del territorio y el definitivo abandono del statu quo que había permitido en la práctica, parcialmente, el desarrollo en paralelo de ambas comunidades dejaron paso finalmente, merced al contacto continuado, a una nueva realidad en aquel espacio. En segundo lugar, por la urgente defensa del territorio amenazado por los ecos revolucionarios franceses y las ambiciones inglesas de asentamiento, es decir, la proyección americana del juego de relaciones políticas europeas. Por otra parte, actuó como factor endógeno de la sociedad hispanochilena la percepción del mundo fronterizo no solo como un elemento diferenciador, sino como un cauce u oportunidad de servir al rey y cimentar un cursus honorum. La vida militar y la carrera político-administrativo propiciaron la movilidad social ascendente de unos hombres que, con espíritu ilustrado, quisieron reformar y racionalizar las estructuras de gobierno y administración. En repetidas ocasiones el paso por la capitanía general chilena fue fase previa a la promoción al virreinato peruano y momento de aplicación de políticas de infraestructuras y desarrollo regional. La fidelidad jugó un papel importante en aquel distante territorio y se plasmó en imágenes colectivas de lealtad. Volviendo a la realidad fronteriza desde Chile, un aspecto básico es el intercambio cultural entre agentes donadores y receptores en ambas direcciones. Tras el choque, los agentes fronterizos entraron en un largo periodo de contacto que terminó originando con sus múltiples transformaciones un cambio cultural. Una nueva cultura de frontera surgió en base a unos parámetros de comportamiento social compartidos relativamente por indígenas y españoles. El proceso de aculturación, sostenido en el tiempo pero con fases de aceleración y de estancamiento, va más allá de la mera integración del indígena en las pautas socioculturales españolas. Los métodos de los misioneros por asimilar o de los agentes de la administración civil y militar por controlar difieren no sólo por el diferente talante de las órdenes religiosas o de los funcionarios, sino por los momentos de actuación. La frontera era vista también desde la metrópoli. Una visión que podía llegar por los informes de hombres de frontera plasmando sus experiencias y aportando sus remedios, por los miembros de las múltiples expediciones ilustradas preocupados en el avance científico y la conservación del territorio o por las propuestas oficiales de la práctica de gobierno fronterizo. Gobernantes reformistas afrontaron la inclusión de la alteridad y la integración del limes chileno como prioridad, lo que alteraría la visión tradicional del otro e incluso de sí mismos. El estudio del hecho fronterizo chileno implica una gran complejidad metodológica respecto a la investigación a ambos lados del Atlántico y el cruce de testimonios. Asimismo, respecto del establecimiento de unas notas comunes y diferenciadoras que al tiempo que inserten el fenómeno en la casuística indiana y lo singularicen, presenten un análisis dual y paralelo de dos comunidades de desarrollo sociocultural dispar que chocan en un mismo espacio físico, que está vivo, en movimiento y flujo constante por la presión de la cultura donadora y que origina la resistencia de la receptora que merced a los elementos de integración queda asociada a una misma realidad compartida. La variedad de visiones y tiempos en la evolución de las mismas trae consigo la multiplicidad de relaciones que debemos observar y contrastar en sus testimonios. A la información de los españoles y criollos se suma la presencia de agentes externos a los vínculos originarios hispano-indígenas. Además, unos y otros ofrecen una división interna a tenor de sus intereses. Autoridades, militares, misioneros, colonos se relacionaban de distinto modo con el indio según sus objetivos. Incluso un último nivel de complicación lo ofrece la pertenencia a una u otra orden religiosa, al origen del gobernante o a la misión del extranjero. No cabe duda de que los métodos misionales diferían no sólo por la marcha del tiempo, sino por la pertenencia a la orden seráfica o ignaciana, por ejemplo. De igual modo, un gobernante o militar español no percibía el mundo indígena como lo hacía un extranjero, también dependía del tiempo de permanencia y grado de adaptación al país, y diferente visión ofrecía el criollo al peninsular. Por último, está la problemática de la visión del mapuche-araucano acerca del español. Si bien por condicionantes de su desarrollo cultural no contamos con textos directos, sí pretendemos analizar los testimonios indirectos de los misioneros, defensores del indio y compiladores de sus tradiciones, así como de los extranjeros que tomaron nota de su situación, quejas y actitud ante los hispanos. Además, debemos partir desde la percepción del propio pasado, es decir, desde el sistema de valores culturales y de conducta de los grupos que interactuaron en la frontera. Se hace imprescindible una consulta documental contrastada de opiniones diferentes sobre una misma realidad múltiple para intentar reconstruir los valores y patrones socioculturales de la dinámica fronteriza. La documentación archivística oficial ha pasado ya por un primer tamiz de elaboración consciente por el informante que ha transformado la realidad según el destino de la misma e incluso su valoración personal de los hechos; por ello debe filtrarse mediante la interpretación metodológica. Por el contrario, la información primaria que se originó sin fin prefijado, fruto de la interacción sociocultural fronteriza y con la finalidad de canalizar las relaciones entre comunidades, lo que no evita la exégesis, sí posee el valor de una relativa espontaneidad. Con la investigación sobre el indio de la frontera meridional chilena durante el siglo XVIII pretendemos adentrarnos en la realidad nativa por sí misma y en relación con la visión que tuvieron del mundo indígena los ilustrados españoles –peninsulares o americanos– y los europeos. En nuestro análisis utilizamos complementariamente los métodos del historiador y de la antropología, más exactamente la etnohistoria, mediante la consulta de numerosos repositorios archivísticos europeos y americanos y de una amplia bibliografía especializada, producto de la historiografía atlántica. Nuestra idea-clave es "frontera", entendida como marco físico y mental de confluencia de sociedades con niveles socioculturales dispares. Creemos que este concepto aporta una visión global del proceso superadora de mitos historiográficos y análisis compartimentados. Por otra parte, el estudio en secuencia de tiempo medio, permite valorar las continuidades; y lo que es más importante: los cambios. Pasar de una imagen de indio rebelde y de resistencia secular a otra en la que termina integrándose cuando no colaborando con los españoles. Tras un primer choque se establecieron mecanismos de relaciones en ambas direcciones de las que surgió una cultura de frontera que era fruto de la aculturación y del contacto prolongado y pacífico, aunque con episodios bélicos. Además, la historiografía chilena mantiene una visión más centrada en el marco geográfico concreto y en los agentes que actuaron en el mismo. Pensamos que desde una perspectiva mucho más amplia se observa la frontera en toda su dimensión en cuanto a espacio, actores y líneas de investigación, lo que enriquece el estudio histórico del área. Igualmente, la comparación entre fronteras meridionales y septentrionales permite situar en sus justos términos lo común y lo original local. De nuevo la historiografía chilena es reticente a los análisis comparativos indianos, lastre que actúa en la mayoría de los países hispanoamericanos e impide estudios de conjunto. Nuestra proposición contempla la frontera chilena del Setecientos, que ya ha superado el conflicto de centurias precedentes, dejando paso a un nuevo y consolidado sistema de relaciones políticas, económicas, sociales y culturales. Los parlamentos, las fluidas y complementarias relaciones comerciales, y los elementos culturales donados mayoritariamente por los españoles y adoptados por los indígenas, confirman un mundo de intercambios que dejaban atrás la dinámica de enfrentamientos. La sociedad mestiza de frontera, resultante de la confluencia del aporte hispánico y la herencia amerindia, gracias al conocimiento mutuo propició la síntesis de culturas en un espacio fronterizo. Como fenómeno complejo y en evolución, se dieron variadas actitudes indígenas desde la resistencia a la alianza. El mundo mapuche estaba fragmentado y en muchas ocasiones enfrentado. Las valoraciones de los ilustrados reflejan una nueva concepción del indígena y del medio. Las estrategias de subsistencia y las realidades políticas y socioculturales evidencian fenómenos de continuidad y de cambio que van a ser considerados de diferente forma, según los intereses del observador. Las interpretaciones, aun teniendo un común denominador, responden a una rica variedad de testimonios que cruzados fraguan una imagen del indio y una frontera novedosa en relación a siglos anteriores. La obra de misioneros, militares y gobernantes que con un nuevo prisma observaron al araucano, iba encaminada a la evangelización del indio, pero igualmente a su hispanización, entendida como transmisión de pautas de comportamiento social e individual: el sedentarismo que superara el nomadismo, rasgo claramente "bárbaro" a ojos ilustrados; la inclusión de los indígenas como vasallos efectivos de la monarquía y el control territorial soberano frente a la injerencia de potencias rivales. Todo ello configura un marco de nuevas relaciones. Las visiones confluentes de españoles y otros europeos acerca de la vida material y creencias araucanas desde la crítica ilustrada de la realidad, ofrecen además de un balance de recuperación etnográfica, un panorama de las propias creencias por contraposición a las ajenas. De hecho el "otro" sirvió para definir y tomar conciencia del "yo", pues la noción de diferencia o alteridad implica la de mismidad. No obstante, los comportamientos indígenas quedan matizados por el descubrimiento científico del hombre y su entorno, lo que revaloriza su papel y la necesidad de su conocimiento e integración. La visión del "otro" resulta mucho más enriquecedora y novedosa con la Ilustración que la mera observación del indio de frontera desde postulados de conflicto. Pretendemos igualmente observar el estado de la cuestión del hecho fronterizo chileno y su aportación a la conformación de su identidad y mitos nacionales. Una aproximación sin apriorismos condicionantes consagrados por el transcurso del tiempo, los cuales además deben ser matizadas a la luz de los resultados de la investigación histórica y antropológica sobre el papel del indígena en la sociedad colonial. Nuestra principal contribución va en la línea de reivindicar el espacio fronterizo chileno como un territorio de confluencia e intercambio, superada la visión de choque continuado frente a la complejidad de un fenómeno mucho más rico y cambiante. Respecto del indígena, se trata de rescatar la diversidad de sus respuestas y las valoraciones de los ilustrados que plasmaban esa nueva realidad desde premisas novedosas. Interrogando a los testimonios de españoles y extranjeros sobre sus estrategias de subsistencia, realidad política, estructura social y valores o patrones culturales, podremos captar las continuidades y los cambios de los aborígenes. Así como también las transformaciones en las visiones de los observadores europeos. Abordamos el análisis fronterizo desde un enfoque centrado en la existencia de varias fronteras a tenor de su propia evolución y de las distintas visiones de la misma, tan dispares como los intereses y objetivos de militares, civiles, pobladores o misioneros españoles y criollos; las actitudes de indios amigos o enemigos; y las percepciones de ambos por los extranjeros. Por encima de la frontera imaginada, la frontera real fue un proceso de confluencias y aportes variados que permite una clasificación tipológica gracias a su abundante casuística. Las visiones e interpretaciones del fenómeno fronterizo no se oponen, sino que se complementan; aparentemente cada una fija su atención primordial en un aspecto pero entre todas conforman un acercamiento al hecho fronterizo, un intento por vislumbrar sus complejas interrelaciones. Analizar la frontera chilena ilustrada en razón del cambio de percepción de la misma por parte de todos sus agentes puede ayudar a comprender los elementos de continuidad y su dinámica de cambio. Además, un enfoque maximalista de sus protagonistas y espacios puede superar tópicos anclados en una visión reduccionista. La frontera chilena temáticamente se ha circunscrito a la relación hispano-indígena, pero fueron más los agentes histórico-sociales que intervinieron y es necesario contar con sus testimonios; por otra parte, los marginados de la sociedad colonial o los indios amigos de la misma en cuanto agentes culturales de intermediación merecen atención con la finalidad de estudiar los puntos de conexión que terminaron imponiéndose en la vida cotidiana. Examinar el área y el fenómeno fronterizo interpretando su dinámica sociocultural propia partiendo del sistema de valores de las sociedades en contacto y del marco físico como condicionante en cuanto a la adaptación cultural del hombre al medio. Este enfoque nos podrá poner en el camino de la comprensión global de la frontera, física y humana, en cuanto espacio y proceso. Se trata de observar la frontera como territorio y como proceso desde variados puntos de vista, no sólo desde América sino también desde España, con un horizonte que contemple la diversidad indígena y sus respuestas al impacto o choque cultural; así como las relaciones que se establecieron y los resultados de las interacciones. El tiempo ilustrado resulta el más adecuado para hacer balance de las continuidades y de los cambios y fijar la naturaleza de la frontera y sus actores. Además, ese tiempo histórico presenció un intento planificado y general de ocupación de espacios no sólo por motivos internos de la sociedad colonial en articulación con el mundo indígena fronterizo, sino también por la presión de los extranjeros. El interés ilustrado por el indígena y el medio americano ofrece una abundante posibilidad de consulta documental de múltiples orígenes y finalidades que describen e interpretan desde la etnografía o la ecohistoria. Además, durante el siglo de la Ilustración y el reformismo se aplicó una política indiana que interrogaba al otro e instaba a su asimilación, reconocida ya su variedad étnica y en proceso de formación científica de su nueva imagen. La defensa y ocupación de la frontera, la relación directa con el indio y la convicción como instrumento de integración son elementos de una política de frontera ilustrada que en el caso chileno discurre por un pactismo entre comunidades de diferentes niveles socioculturales. A pesar de la supremacía española sobre la indígena en la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII, se busca no sólo el acatamiento de los postulados impuestos en los parlamentos sino también su reconocimiento como medio para solucionar conflictos y lograr la definitiva pacificación. La diplomacia no se desgajó de la acción a sangre y fuego cuando se consideraba necesario, pero sí ocupó un lugar importante en el entramado de relaciones. Posiblemente esta política intencionada y continuada de parlamentos o encuentros, de facto institucionalizada en medio de ceremoniales, reviste importancia no únicamente como paradigma de acercamiento y conocimiento, sino como vía compartida de resolución de conflictos y ejemplo extrapolable a otras fronteras americanas de parecida problemática étnica y espacial. De ahí que el estudio de los mecanismos desplegados en los parlamentos nos resulte una línea de trabajo primordial y base de hipótesis sobre la confirmación o negación de estos instrumentos político-jurídicos como ideas-fuerza para interpretar las relaciones fronterizas. La historia de la frontera chilena bajo el reformismo borbónico es, obviamente, una historia de contactos que se inician con la conquista y que van a tener una larga vida y amplia proyección. Una frontera dinámica que retrocede al empuje cambiante de los colonizadores, donde la confluencia de los protagonistas colectivos fue temprana y rápida para ralentizarse y alcanzar el estancamiento después. Al centrarnos en la etapa de finales del siglo XVIII buscamos el objetivo de interpretar la frontera cuando toma dimensión propia como espacio objeto de atención y adquiere ya unas características que le otorgan una marcada personalidad. ¿Podemos considerar sus parámetros culturales y sociales como herederos de la implantación hispana al tiempo que legatarios de los usos y costumbres de sus habitantes nativos? ¿Se observan elementos de continuidad que ceden ante los factores de integración que paulatinamente se van imponiendo? Los cambios traen en todo caso una nueva sociedad original y mestiza que tiene sus raíces en lo que un día fue un choque y que por obra del contacto prolongado y el progresivo conocimiento del "otro", plasmado en varias visiones, percepciones e interpretaciones, se transforma en un espacio sincrético fruto de un proceso de aculturación; enfoque global que consideramos nuestro verdadero objetivo. Como concepto básico y transversal del marco teórico y metodológico hemos situado la idea de frontera, en cuanto a espacio y proceso al mismo tiempo. Partimos de una introducción conceptual y metodológica acerca de las realidades de frontera y su dinámica, naturaleza y alcance; estableciendo puntos de convergencia y de divergencia en el marco de un tratamiento comparativo entre las fronteras a nivel universal y las fronteras indianas en particular. La teoría de las fronteras centra su atención en la periferia distante y marginal respecto al centro de poder metropolitano, de ahí la diversidad de enfoques según se contemple la frontera desde América o España. En todo caso nos parece que ambos proporcionan una visión complementaria. Como consecuencia de las premisas anteriores, utilizamos el método histórico stricto sensu: planteamiento de objetivos e hipótesis de trabajo, prospección archivística, selección, crítica, análisis e interpretación, para finalmente llegar a unas conclusiones fruto de la investigación que validen o no las hipótesis planteadas; de igual modo contamos complementariamente con los instrumentos de la etnohistoria como método. Establecemos tres tiempos que nos permiten analizar la evolución de la frontera sur chilena, en proximidad creciente Estos se corresponden al choque inicial entre españoles y araucanos, a los primeros contactos relativamente pacíficos y reglamentados, y al cambio cultural operado desde entonces y que desembocó en una nueva realidad. En cuanto al tiempo, se insertan sin delimitaciones precisas en los tres siglos de presencia española. Como ya hemos señalado, el momento histórico privilegiado por nuestra investigación es el siglo XVIII, con especial hincapié en su segunda mitad, por lo que dentro del período colonial la época ilustrada se nos presenta como la más acertada para establecer balances generales, y no sólo por la simple cronología, sino sustancialmente por la transformación de actitudes de los españoles y criollos y de los araucanos. Además, los fenómenos de continuidad y cambio, como hilo conductor de la investigación, muestran sus resultados coincidiendo con los prolegómenos de la Independencia. Respecto al cuerpo de la Tesis Doctoral y su contenido, queda estructurado en dos partes bien delimitadas en tres capítulos cada una, pero con una continuidad tan clara como necesaria: el medio físico y humano junto a las políticas de inclusión. Además, consideramos imprescindible que junto a la introducción y conclusiones figure un glosario de términos araucanos y un apéndice documental e índice gráfico, pues hemos prestado especial atención a las representaciones iconográficas y a la cartografía. Nuestro trabajo se estructura en seis capítulos, si bien el todo es más que la suma de sus partes. En primer lugar abordaremos el marco físico de la frontera meridional pacífico-americana en sus dos escenarios básicos: continental o Araucanía e insular o archipiélago de Chiloé. Poniendo énfasis, según ojos ilustrados, en sus recursos. Seguidamente, los grupos indígenas y sus divisiones internas, así como sus imágenes y representaciones por medio de la indumentaria y el lenguaje. Sin olvidar el contexto conceptual y metodológico acerca de la realidad fronteriza e indígena y su tratamiento por la historiografía chilena que nos introduce en la temática de la identidad y la variedad de corrientes historiográficas y líneas de investigación. Del mito configurador de la nacionalidad al estudio del paulatino roce que generó una realidad nueva alejada de simplificaciones. A continuación, las visiones cercanas y extrañas de la alteridad y los procesos socioculturales de integración frente al rechazo. En el cuarto capítulo, abordamos el cambio en la percepción del indio que de "salvaje" se pretende pase a "vasallo", y los esfuerzos del reformismo ilustrado fronterizo, teórico y práctico, por absorberlo. Todo gracias a una nueva interpretación del "otro" por parte de los misioneros y políticos ilustrados, fruto del pensamiento, las necesidades y los temores a la incursión foránea. La necesidad de su integración efectiva en la Monarquía mediante mecanismos simbólicos y estrategias de asimilación varias, entre las cuales destacamos el papel de las mujeres y agentes de mediación intercultural. También la obra evangelizadora de frontera llevada a cabo por jesuitas y franciscanos que, junto a las poblaciones y los caminos que reorganizan el espacio fronterizo, articulan las relaciones con el indígena. En el panorama de fronteras imperiales en expansión y su nuevo papel en las rivalidades europeas, no se puede soslayar la secularización de la frontera desde finales del siglo XVIII. Por último, la estratégica plaza de Valdivia, como paradigma central entre las dos fronteras septentrional y austral, la proyección transitoria del levantamiento andino tupamarista en la frontera de Concepción y la interacción étnica pactista vía parlamentos, especialmente útil a la hora de confirmar o no hipótesis de trabajo. Finalmente, la selección bibliográfica nos ayuda a entender un tiempo histórico concreto y nos sitúa en el estado de la cuestión. Así pues, respecto a las investigaciones precedentes, partimos de una bibliografía que encuadra el tema en su contexto histórico y nos presenta sus aspectos más amplios y esenciales, para acudir, posteriormente, en busca de una visión más profunda a una bibliografía especializada. Respecto a las fuentes utilizadas corresponden a archivos chilenos, peruanos y españoles, entre otros, en una amplia variedad documental, cruzando documentación de diversa procedencia y que, complementariamente, proporciona la base de este acercamiento a las fronteras chilenas del siglo XVIII tardío. Enfoque interdisciplinar y análisis que se nutre de miradas cruzadas locales, regionales y metropolitanas en íntima conexión con el contexto europeo y americano, siempre en línea con la renovación historiográfica de la denominada historia atlántica. El apartado de las siglas utilizadas en la presente Tesis Doctoral pone de manifiesto la gran variedad de fondos documentales y diversidad de instituciones archivísticas consultadas, casi siempre in situ, ya fuera en España o América. Tales fuentes han permitido profundizar con material inédito en el objeto de nuestra investigación, que continúa abierta y sujeta a crítica. Por último, aportamos una breve selección, pero significativa, de textos en el Apéndice Documental en orden cronológico y un índice de las ilustraciones que apoyan el texto y refuerzan su contenido de modo visual.
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This post takes up from two previous posts (part 1; part 2), asking just what do we (we economists) really know about how interest rates affect inflation. Today, what does contemporary economic theory say? As you may recall, the standard story says that the Fed raises interest rates; inflation (and expected inflation) don't immediately jump up, so real interest rates rise; with some lag, higher real interest rates push down employment and output (IS); with some more lag, the softer economy leads to lower prices and wages (Phillips curve). So higher interest rates lower future inflation, albeit with "long and variable lags." Higher interest rates -> (lag) lower output, employment -> (lag) lower inflation. In part 1, we saw that it's not easy to see that story in the data. In part 2, we saw that half a century of formal empirical work also leaves that conclusion on very shaky ground. As they say at the University of Chicago, "Well, so much for the real world, how does it work in theory?" That is an important question. We never really believe things we don't have a theory for, and for good reason. So, today, let's look at what modern theory has to say about this question. And they are not unrelated questions. Theory has been trying to replicate this story for decades. The answer: Modern (anything post 1972) theory really does not support this idea. The standard new-Keynesian model does not produce anything like the standard story. Models that modify that simple model to achieve something like result of the standard story do so with a long list of complex ingredients. The new ingredients are not just sufficient, they are (apparently) necessary to produce the desired dynamic pattern. Even these models do not implement the verbal logic above. If the pattern that high interest rates lower inflation over a few years is true, it is by a completely different mechanism than the story tells. I conclude that we don't have a simple economic model that produces the standard belief. ("Simple" and "economic" are important qualifiers.) The simple new-Keynesian model The central problem comes from the Phillips curve. The modern Phillips curve asserts that price-setters are forward-looking. If they know inflation will be high next year, they raise prices now. So Inflation today = expected inflation next year + (coefficient) x output gap. \[\pi_t = E_t\pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t\](If you know enough to complain about \(\beta\approx0.99\) in front of \(E_t\pi_{t+1}\) you know enough that it doesn't matter for the issues here.)Now, if the Fed raises interest rates, and if (if) that lowers output or raises unemployment, inflation today goes down. The trouble is, that's not what we're looking for. Inflation goes down today, (\(\pi_t\))relative to expected inflation next year (\(E_t\pi_{t+1}\)). So a higher interest rate and lower output correlate with inflation that is rising over time. Here is a concrete example: The plot is the response of the standard three equation new-Keynesian model to an \(\varepsilon_1\) shock at time 1:\[\begin{align} x_t &= E_t x_{t+1} - \sigma(i_t - E_t\pi_{t+1}) \\ \pi_t & = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t \\ i_t &= \phi \pi_t + u_t \\ u_t &= \eta u_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t. \end{align}\] Here \(x\) is output, \(i\) is the interest rate, \(\pi\) is inflation, \(\eta=0.6\), \(\sigma=1\), \(\kappa=0.25\), \(\beta=0.95\), \(\phi=1.2\). In this plot, higher interest rates are said to lower inflation. But they lower inflation immediately, on the day of the interest rate shock. Then, as explained above, inflation rises over time. In the standard view, and the empirical estimates from the last post, a higher interest rate has no immediate effect, and then future inflation is lower. See plots in the last post, or this one from Romer and Romer's 2023 summary:Inflation jumping down and then rising in the future is quite different from inflation that does nothing immediately, might even rise for a few months, and then starts gently going down. You might even wonder about the downward jump in inflation. The Phillips curve makes it clear why current inflation is lower than expected future inflation, but why doesn't current inflation stay the same, or even rise, and expected future inflation rise more? That's the "equilibrium selection" issue. All those paths are possible, and you need extra rules to pick a particular one. Fiscal theory points out that the downward jump needs a fiscal tightening, so represents a joint monetary-fiscal policy. But we don't argue about that today. Take the standard new Keynesian model exactly as is, with passive fiscal policy and standard equilibrium selection rules. It predicts that inflation jumps down immediately and then rises over time. It does not predict that inflation slowly declines over time. This is not a new issue. Larry Ball (1994) first pointed out that the standard new Keynesian Phillips curve says that output is high when inflation is high relative to expected future inflation, that is when inflation is declining. Standard beliefs go the other way: output is high when inflation is rising. The IS curve is a key part of the overall prediction, and output faces a similar problem. I just assumed above that output falls when interest rates rise. In the model it does; output follows a path with the same shape as inflation in my little plot. Output also jumps down and then rises over time. Here too, the (much stronger) empirical evidence says that an interest rate rise does not change output immediately, and output then falls rather than rises over time. The intuition has even clearer economics behind it: Higher real interest rates induce people to consume less today and more tomorrow. Higher real interest rates should go with higher, not lower, future consumption growth. Again, the model only apparently reverses the sign by having output jump down before rising. Key issuesHow can we be here, 40 years later, and the benchmark textbook model so utterly does not replicate standard beliefs about monetary policy? One answer, I believe, is confusing adjustment to equilibrium with equilibrium dynamics. The model generates inflation lower than yesterday (time 0 to time 1) and lower than it otherwise would be (time 1 without shock vs time 1 with shock). Now, all economic models are a bit stylized. It's easy to say that when we add various frictions, "lower than yesterday" or "lower than it would have been" is a good parable for "goes down over time." If in a simple supply and demand graph we say that an increase in demand raises prices instantly, we naturally understand that as a parable for a drawn out period of price increases once we add appropriate frictions. But dynamic macroeconomics doesn't work that way. We have already added what was supposed to be the central friction, sticky prices. Dynamic economics is supposed to describe the time-path of variables already, with no extra parables. If adjustment to equilibrium takes time, then model that. The IS and Phillips curve are forward looking, like stock prices. It would make little sense to say "news comes out that the company will never make money, so the stock price should decline gradually over a few years." It should jump down now. Inflation and output behave that way in the standard model. A second confusion, I think, is between sticky prices and sticky inflation. The new-Keynesian model posits, and a huge empirical literature examines, sticky prices. But that is not the same thing as sticky inflation. Prices can be arbitrarily sticky and inflation, the first derivative of prices, can still jump. In the Calvo model, imagine that only a tiny fraction of firms can change prices at each instant. But when they do, they will change prices a lot, and the overall price level will start increasing right away. In the continuous-time version of the model, prices are continuous (sticky), but inflation jumps at the moment of the shock. The standard story wants sticky inflation. Many authors explain the new-Keynesian model with sentences like "the Fed raises interest rates. Prices are sticky, so inflation can't go up right away and real interest rates are higher." This is wrong. Inflation can rise right away. In the standard new-Keynesian model it does so with \(\eta=1\), for any amount of price stickiness. Inflation rises immediately with a persistent monetary policy shock. Just get it out of your heads. The standard model does not produce the standard story. The obvious response is, let's add ingredients to the standard model and see if we can modify the response function to look something like the common beliefs and VAR estimates. Let's go. Adaptive expectations We can reproduce standard beliefs about monetary policy with thoroughly adaptive expectations, in the 1970s ISLM form. I think this is a large part of what most policy makers and commenters have in mind. Modify the above model to leave out the dynamic part of the intertemporal substitution equation, to just say in rather ad hoc way that higher real interest rates lower output, and specify that the expected inflation that drives the real rate and that drives pricing decisions is mechanically equal to previous inflation, \(E_t \pi_{t+1} = \pi_{t-1}\). We get \[ \begin{align} x_t &= -\sigma (i_t - \pi_{t-1}) \\ \pi_t & = \pi_{t-1} + \kappa x_t .\end{align}\] We can solve this sytsem analytically to \[\pi_t = (1+\sigma\kappa)\pi_{t-1} - \sigma\kappa i_t.\]Here's what happens if the Fed permanently raises the interest rate. Higher interest rates send future inflation down. (\(\kappa=0.25,\ \sigma=1.\)) Inflation eventually spirals away, but central banks don't leave interest rates alone forever. If we add a Taylor rule response \(i_t = \phi \pi_t + u_t\), so the central bank reacts to the emerging spiral, we get this response to a permanent monetary policy disturbance \(u_t\): The higher interest rate sets off a deflation spiral. But the Fed quickly follows inflation down to stabilize the situation. This is, I think, the conventional story of the 1980s. In terms of ingredients, an apparently minor change of index from \(E_t \pi_{t+1}\) to \(\pi_{t-1}\) is in fact a big change. It means directly that higher output comes with increasing inflation, not decreasing inflation, solving Ball's puzzle. The change basically changes the sign of output in the Phillips curve. Again, it's not really all in the Phillips curve. This model with rational expectations in the IS equation and adaptive in the Phillips curve produces junk. To get the result you need adaptive expectations everywhere. The adaptive expectations model gets the desired result by changing the basic sign and stability properties of the model. Under rational expectations the model is stable; inflation goes away all on its own under an interest rate peg. With adaptive expectations, the model is unstable. Inflation or deflation spiral away under an interest rate peg or at the zero bound. The Fed's job is like balancing a broom upside down. If you move the bottom (interest rates) one way, the broom zooms off the other way. With rational expectations, the model is stable, like a pendulum. This is not a small wrinkle designed to modify dynamics. This is major surgery. It is also a robust property: small changes in parameters do not change the dominant eigenvalue of a model from over one to less than one. A more refined way to capture how Fed officials and pundits think and talk might be called "temporarily fixed expectations." Policy people do talk about the modern Phillips curve; they say inflation depends on inflation expectations and employment. Expectations are not mechanically adaptive. Expectations are a third force, sometimes "anchored," and amenable to manipulation by speeches and dot plots. Crucially, in this analysis, expected inflation does not move when the Fed changes interest rates. Expectations are then very slowly adaptive, if inflation is persistent, or if there is a more general loss of faith in "anchoring." In the above new-Keynesian model graph, at the minute the Fed raises the interest rate, expected inflation jumps up to follow the graph's plot of the model's forecast of inflation. As a simple way to capture these beliefs, suppose expectations are fixed or "anchored" at \(\pi^e\). Then my simple model is \[\begin{align}x_t & = -\sigma(i_t - \pi^e) \\ \pi_t & = \pi^e + \kappa x_t\end{align}\]so \[\pi_t = \pi^e - \sigma \kappa (i_t - \pi^e).\] Inflation is expected inflation, and lowered by higher interest rates (last - sign). But those rates need only be higher than the fixed expectations; they do not need to be higher than past rates as they do in the adaptive expectations model. That's why the Fed thinks 3% interest rates with 5% inflation is still "contractionary"--expected inflation remains at 2%, not the 5% of recent adaptive experience. Also by fixing expectations, I remove the instability of the adaptive expectations model... so long as those expectations stay anchored. The Fed recognizes that eventually higher inflation moves the expectations, and with a belief that is adaptive, they fear that an inflation spiral can still break out.Even this view does not give us any lags, however. The Fed and commenters clearly believe that higher real interest rates today lower output next year, not immediately; and they believe that lower output and employment today drive inflation down in the future, not immediately. They believe something like \[\begin{align}x_{t+1} &= - \sigma(i_t - \pi^e) \\ \pi_{t+1} &= \pi^e + \kappa x_t.\end{align}\] But now we're at the kind of non-economic ad-hockery that the whole 1970s revolution abandoned. And for a reason: Ad hoc models are unstable, regimes are always changing. Moreover, let me remind you of our quest: Is there a simple economic model of monetary policy that generates something like the standard view? At this level of ad-hockery you might as well just write down the coefficients of Romer and Romer's response function and call that the model of how interest rates affect inflation. Academic economics gave up on mechanical expectations and ad-hoc models in the 1970s. You can't publish a paper with this sort of model. So when I mean a "modern" model, I mean rational expectations, or at least the consistency condition that the expectations in the model are not fundamentally different from forecasts of the model. (Models with explicit learning or other expectation-formation frictions count too.) It's easy to puff about people aren't rational, and looking out the window lots of people do dumb things. But if we take that view, then the whole project of monetary policy on the proposition that people are fundamentally unable to learn patterns in the economy, that a benevolent Federal Reserve can trick the poor little souls into a better outcome. And somehow the Fed is the lone super-rational actor who can avoid all those pesky behavioral biases. We are looking for the minimum necessary ingredients to describe the basic signs and function of monetary policy. A bit of irrational or complex expectation formation as icing on the cake, a possible sufficient ingredient to produce quantitatively realistic dynamics, isn't awful. But it would be sad if irrational expectations or other behavior is a necessary ingredient to get the most basic sign and story of monetary policy right. If persistent irrationality is a central necessary ingredient for the basic sign and operation of monetary policy -- if higher interest rates will raise inflation the minute people smarten up; if there is no simple supply and demand, MV=PY sensible economics underlying the basic operation of monetary policy; if it's all a conjuring trick -- that should really weaken our faith in the whole monetary policy project. Facts help, and we don't have to get religious about it. During the long zero bound, the same commentators and central bankers kept warning about a deflation spiral, clearly predicted by this model. It never happened. Interest rates below inflation from 2021 to 2023 should have led to an upward inflation spiral. It never happened -- inflation eased all on its own with interest rates below inflation.Getting the desired response to interest rates by making the model unstable isn't tenable whether or not you like the ingredient. Inflation also surged in the 1970s faster than adaptive expectations came close to predicting, and fell faster in the 1980s. The ends of many inflations come with credible changes in regime. There is a lot of work now desperately trying to fix new-Keynesian models by making them more old-Keynesian, putting lagged inflation in the Phillips curve, current income in the IS equation, and so forth. Complex learning and expectation formation stories replace the simplistic adaptive expectations here. As far as I can tell, to the extent they work they largely do so in the same way, by reversing the basic stability of the model. Modifying the new-Keynesian modelThe alternative is to add ingredients to the basic new-Keynesian model, maintaining its insistence on real "micro-founded" economics and forward-looking behavior, and describing explicit dynamics as the evolution of equilibrium quantities. Christiano Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) is one of the most famous examples. Recall these same authors created the first most influential VAR that gave the "right" answer to the effects of monetary policy shocks. This paper modifies the standard new-Keynesian model with a specific eye to matching impulse response functions. The want to match all impulse-responses, with a special focus on output. When I started asking my young macro colleagues for a standard model which produces the desired response shape, they still cite CEE first, though it's 20 years later. That's quite an accomplishment. I'll look at it in detail, as the general picture is the same as many other models that achieve the desired result. Here's their bottom line response to a monetary policy shock: (Figure from the 2018 Christiano Eichenbaum and Trabandt Journal of Economic Perspectives summary paper.) The solid line is the VAR point estimate and gray shading is the 95% confidence band. The solid blue line is the main model. The dashed line is the model with only price stickiness, to emphasize the importance of wage stickiness. The shock happens at time 0. Notice the funds rate line that jumps down at that date. That the other lines do not move at time 0 is a result. I graphed the response to a time 1 shock above. That's the answer, now what's the question? What ingredients did they add above the textbook model to reverse the basic sign and jump problem and to produce these pretty pictures? Here is a partial list: Habit formation. The utility function is \(log(c_t - bc_{t-1})\). A capital stock with adjustment costs in investment. Adjustment costs are proportional to investment growth, \([1-S(i_t/i_{t-1})]i_t\), rather than the usual formulation in which adjustment costs are proportional to the investment to capital ratio \(S(i_t/k_t)i_t\). Variable capital utilization. Capital services \(k_t\) are related to the capital stock \(\bar{k}t\) by \(k_t = u_t \bar{k}_t\). The utilization rate \(u_t\) is set by households facing an upward sloping cost \(a(u_t)\bar{k}_t\).Calvo pricing with indexation: Firms randomly get to reset prices, but firms that aren't allowed to reset prices do automatically raise prices at the rate of inflation.Prices are also fixed for a quarter. Technically, firms must post prices before they see the period's shocks.Sticky wages, also with indexation. Households are monopoly suppliers of labor, and set wages Calvo-style like firms. (Later papers put all households into a union which does the wage setting.) Wages are also indexed; Households that don't get to reoptimize their wage still raise wages following inflation. Firms must borrow working capital to finance their wage bill a quarter in advance, and thus pay a interest on the wage bill. Money in the utility function, and money supply control. Monetary policy is a change in the money growth rate, not a pure interest rate target. Whew! But which of these ingredients are necessary, and which are just sufficient? Knowing the authors, I strongly suspect that they are all necessary to get the suite of results. They don't add ingredients for show. But they want to match all of the impulse response functions, not just the inflation response. Perhaps a simpler set of ingredients could generate the inflation response while missing some of the others. Let's understand what each of these ingredients is doing, which will help us to see (if) they are necessary and essential to getting the desired result. I see a common theme in habit formation, adjustment costs that scale by investment growth, and indexation. These ingredients each add a derivative; they take a standard relationship between levels of economic variables and change it to one in growth rates. Each of consumption, investment, and inflation is a "jump variable" in standard economics, like stock prices. Consumption (roughly) jumps to the present value of future income. The level of investment is proportional to the stock price in the standard q theory, and jumps when there is new information. Iterating forward the new-Keynesian Phillips curve \(\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t\), inflation jumps to the discounted sum of future output gaps, \(\pi_t = E_t \sum_{j=0}^\infty \beta^jx_{t+j}.\) To produce responses in which output, consumption and investment as well as inflation rise slowly after a shock, we don't want levels of consumption, investment, and inflation to jump this way. Instead we want growth rates to do so. With standard utility, the consumer's linearized first order condition equates expected consumption growth to the interest rate, \( E_t (c_{t+1}/c_t) = \delta + r_t \) Habit, with \(b=1\) gives \( E_t [(c_{t+1}-c_t)/(c_t-c_{t-1})] = \delta + r_t \). (I left out the strategic terms.) Mixing logs and levels a bit, you can see we put a growth rate in place of a level. (The paper has \(b=0.65\) .) An investment adjustment cost function with \(S(i_t/i_{t-1})\) rather than the standard \(S(i_t/k_t)\) puts a derivative in place of a level. Normally we tell a story that if you want a house painted, doubling the number of painters doesn't get the job done twice as fast because they get in each other's way. But you can double the number of painters overnight if you want to do so. Here the cost is on the increase in number of painters each day. Indexation results in a Phillips curve with a lagged inflation term, and that gives "sticky inflation." The Phillips curve of the model (32) and (33) is \[\pi_t = \frac{1}{1+\beta}\pi_{t-1} + \frac{\beta}{1+\beta}E_{t-1}\pi_{t+1} + (\text{constants}) E_{t-1}s_t\]where \(s_t\) are marginal costs (more later). The \(E_{t-1}\) come from the assumption that prices can't react to time \(t\) information. Iterate that forward to (33)\[\pi_t - \pi_{t-1} = (\text{constants}) E_{t-1}\sum_{j=0}^\infty \beta^j s_{t+j}.\] We have successfully put the change in inflation in place of the level of inflation. The Phillips curve is anchored by real marginal costs, and they are not proportional to output in this model as they are in the textbook model above. That's important too. Instead,\[s_t = (\text{constants}) (r^k_t)^\alpha \left(\frac{W_t}{P_t}R_t\right)^{1-\alpha}\] where \(r^k\) is the return to capital \(W/P\) is the real wage and \(R\) is the nominal interest rate. The latter term crops up from the assumption that firms must borrow the wage bill one period in advance. This is an interesting ingredient. There is a lot of talk that higher interest rates raise costs for firms, and they are reducing output as a result. That might get us around some of the IS curve problems. But that's not how it works here. Here's how I think it works. Higher interest rates raise marginal costs, and thus push up current inflation relative to expected future inflation. The equilibrium-selection rules and the rule against instant price changes (coming up next) tie down current inflation, so the higher interest rates have to push down expected future inflation. CEE disagree (p. 28). Writing of an interest rate decline, so all the signs are opposite of my stories, ... the interest rate appears in firms' marginal cost. Since the interest rate drops after an expansionary monetary policy shock, the model embeds a force that pushes marginal costs down for a period of time. Indeed, in the estimated benchmark model the effect is strong enough to induce a transient fall in inflation.But pushing marginal costs down lowers current inflation relative to future inflation -- they're looking at the same Phillips curve just above. It looks to me like they're confusing current with expected future inflation. Intuition is hard. There are plenty of Fisherian forces in this model that want lower interest rates to lower inflation. More deeply, we see here a foundational trouble of the Phillips curve. It was originally a statistical relation between wage inflation and unemployment. It became a (weaker) statistical relation between price inflation and unemployment or the output gap. The new-Keynesian theory wants naturally to describe a relation between marginal costs and price changes, and it takes contortions to make output equal to marginal costs. Phillips curves fit the data terribly. So authors estimating Phillips curves (An early favorite by Tim Cogley and Argia Sbordone) go back, and separate marginal cost from output or employment. As CET write later, they "build features into the model which ensure that firms' marginal costs are nearly acyclical." That helps the fit, but it divorces the Phillips curve shifter variable from the business cycle! Standard doctrine says that for the Fed to lower inflation it must soften the economy and risk unemployment. Doves say don't do it, live with inflation to avoid that cost. Well, if the Phillips curve shifter is "acyclical" you have to throw all that out the window. This shift also points to the central conundrum of the Phillips curve. Here it describes the adjustment of prices to wages or "costs" more generally. It fundamentally describes a relative price, not a price level. OK, but the phenomenon we want to explain is the common component, how all prices and wage tie together or equivalently the decline in the value of the currency, stripped of relative price movements. The central puzzle of macroeconomics is why the common component, a rise or fall of all prices and wages together, has anything to do with output, and for us how it is controlled by the Fed. Christiano Eichenbaum and Evans write (p.3) that "it is crucial to allow for variable capital utilization." I'll try explain why in my own words. Without capital adjustment costs, any change in the real return leads to a big investment jump. \(r=f'(k)\) must jump and that takes a lot of extra \(k\). We add adjustment costs to tamp down the investment response. But now when there is any shock, capital can't adjust enough and there is a big rate of return response. So we need something that acts like a big jump in the capital stock to tamp down \(r=f'(k)\) variability, but not a big investment jump. Variable capital utilization acts like the big investment jump without us seeing a big investment jump. And all this is going to be important for inflation too. Remember the Phillips curve; if output jumps then inflation jumps too. Sticky wages are crucial, and indeed CEE report that they can dispense with sticky prices. One reason is that otherwise profits are countercyclical. In a boom, prices go up faster than wages so profits go up. With sticky prices and flexible wages you get the opposite sign. It's interesting that the "textbook" model has not moved this way. Again, we don't often enough write textbooks. Fixing prices and wages during the period of the shock by assuming price setters can't see the shock for a quarter has a direct effect: It stops any price or wage jumps during the quarter of the shock, as in my first graph. That's almost cheating. Note the VAR also has absolutely zero instantaneous inflation response. This too is by assumption. They "orthogonalize" the variables so that all the contemporaneous correlation between monetary policy shocks and inflation or output is considered part of the Fed's "rule" and none of it reflects within-quarter reaction of prices or quantities to the Fed's actions. Step back and admire. Given the project "find elaborations of the standard new-Keynesian model to match VAR impulse response functions" could you have come up with any of this? But back to our task. That's a lot of apparently necessary ingredients. And reading here or CEE's verbal intuition, the logic of this model is nothing like the standard simple intuition, which includes none of the necessary ingredients. Do we really need all of this to produce the basic pattern of monetary policy? As far as we know, we do. And hence, that pattern may not be as robust as it seems. For all of these ingredients are pretty, ... imaginative. Really, we are a long way from the Lucas/Prescott vision that macroeconomic models should be based on well tried and measured microeconomic ingredients that are believably invariant to changes in the policy regime. CEE argue hard for the plausibility of these microeconomic specifications (see especially the later CET Journal of Economic Perspectives article), but they have to try so hard precisely because the standard literature doesn't have any of these ingredients. The "level" rather than "growth rate" foundations of consumption, investment, and pricing decisions pervade microeconomics. Microeconomists worry about labor monopsony, not labor monopoly; firms set wages, households don't. (Christiano Eichenbam and Trabandt (2016) get wage stickiness from a more realistic search and matching model. Curiously, the one big labor union fiction is still the most common, though few private sector workers are unionized.) Firms don't borrow the wage bill a quarter ahead of time. Very few prices and wages are indexed in the US. Like habits, perhaps these ingredients are simple stand ins for something else, but at some point we need to know what that something else is. That is especially true if one wants to do optimal policy or welfare analysis. Just how much economics must we reinvent to match this one response function? How far are we really from the ad-hoc ISLM equations that Sims (1980) destroyed? Sadly, subsequent literature doesn't help much (more below). Subsequent literature has mostly added ingredients, including heterogeneous agents (big these days), borrowing constraints, additional financial frictions (especially after 2008), zero bound constraints, QE, learning and complex expectations dynamics. (See CET 2018 JEP for a good verbal survey.) The rewards in our profession go to those who add a new ingredient. It's very hard to publish papers that strip a model down to its basics. Editors don't count that as "new research," but just "exposition" below the prestige of their journals. Though boiling a model down to essentials is maybe more important in the end than adding more bells and whistles. This is about where we are. Despite the pretty response functions, I still score that we don't have a reliable, simple, economic model that produces the standard view of monetary policy. Mankiw and Reis, sticky expectations Mankiw and Reis (2002) expressed the challenge clearly over 20 years ago. In reference to the "standard" New-Keynesian Phillips curve \(\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t\) they write a beautiful and succinct paragraph: Ball [1994a] shows that the model yields the surprising result that announced, credible disinflations cause booms rather than recessions. Fuhrer and Moore [1995] argue that it cannot explain why inflation is so persistent. Mankiw [2001] notes that it has trouble explaining why shocks to monetary policy have a delayed and gradual effect on inflation. These problems appear to arise from the same source: although the price level is sticky in this model, the inflation rate can change quickly. By contrast, empirical analyses of the inflation process (e.g., Gordon [1997]) typically give a large role to "inflation inertia."At the cost of repetition, I emphasize the last sentence because it is so overlooked. Sticky prices are not sticky inflation. Ball already said this in 1994: Taylor (1979, 198) and Blanchard (1983, 1986) show that staggering produces inertia in the price level: prices just slowly to a fall in th money supply. ...Disinflation, however, is a change in the growth rate of money not a one-time shock to the level. In informal discussions, analysts often assume that the inertia result carries over from levels to growth rates -- that inflation adjusts slowly to a fall in money growth. As I see it, Mankiw and Reis generalize the Lucas (1972) Phillips curve. For Lucas, roughly, output is related to unexpected inflation\[\pi_t = E_{t-1}\pi_t + \kappa x_t.\] Firms don't see everyone else's prices in the period. Thus, when a firm sees an unexpected rise in prices, it doesn't know if it is a higher relative price or a higher general price level; the firm expands output based on how much it thinks the event might be a relative price increase. I love this model for many reasons, but one, which seems to have fallen by the wayside, is that it explicitly founds the Phillips curve in firms' confusion about relative prices vs. the price level, and thus faces up to the problem why should a rise in the price level have any real effects. Mankiw and Reis basically suppose that firms find out the general price level with lags, so output depends on inflation relative to a distributed lag of its expectations. It's clearest for the price level (p. 1300)\[p_t = \lambda\sum_{j=0}^\infty (1-\lambda)^j E_{t-j}(p_t + \alpha x_t).\] The inflation expression is \[\pi_t = \frac{\alpha \lambda}{1-\lambda}x_t + \lambda \sum_{j=0}^\infty (1-\lambda)^j E_{t-1-j}(\pi_t + \alpha \Delta x_t).\](Some of the complication is that you want it to be \(\pi_t = \sum_{j=0}^\infty E_{t-1-j}\pi_t + \kappa x_t\), but output doesn't enter that way.) This seems totally natural and sensible to me. What is a "period" anyway? It makes sense that firms learn heterogeneously whether a price increase is relative or price level. And it obviously solves the central persistence problem with the Lucas (1972) model, that it only produces a one-period output movement. Well, what's a period anyway? (Mankiw and Reis don't sell it this way, and actually don't cite Lucas at all. Curious.) It's not immediately obvious that this curve solves the Ball puzzle and the declining inflation puzzle, and indeed one must put it in a full model to do so. Mankiw and Reis (2002) mix it with \(m_t + v = p_t + x_t\) and make some stylized analysis, but don't show how to put the idea in models such as I started with or make a plot. Their less well known follow on paper Sticky Information in General Equilibrium (2007) is much better for this purpose because they do show you how to put the idea in an explicit new-Keynesian model, like the one I started with. They also add a Taylor rule, and an interest rate rather than money supply instrument, along with wage stickiness and a few other ingredients,. They show how to solve the model overcoming the problem that there are many lagged expectations as state variables. But here is the response to the monetary policy shock: Response to a Monetary Policy Shock, Mankiw and Reis (2007). Sadly they don't report how interest rates respond to the shock. I presume interest rates went down temporarily. Look: the inflation and output gap plots are about the same. Except for the slight delay going up, these are exactly the responses of the standard NK model. When output is high, inflation is high and declining. The whole point was to produce a model in which high output level would correspond to rising inflation. Relative to the first graph, the main improvement is just a slight hump shape in both inflation and output responses. Describing the same model in "Pervasive Stickiness" (2006), Mankiw and Reis describe the desideratum well: The Acceleration Phenomenon....inflation tends to rise when the economy is booming and falls when economic activity is depressed. This is the central insight of the empirical literature on the Phillips curve. One simple way to illustrate this fact is to correlate the change in inflation, \(\pi_{t+2}-\pi_{t-2}\) with [the level of] output, \(y_t\), detrended with the HP filter. In U.S. quarterly data from 1954-Q3 to 2005-Q3, the correlation is 0.47. That is, the change in inflation is procyclical.Now look again at the graph. As far as I can see, it's not there. Is this version of sticky inflation a bust, for this purpose? I still think it's a neat idea worth more exploration. But I thought so 20 years ago too. Mankiw and Reis have a lot of citations but nobody followed them. Why not? I suspect it's part of a general pattern that lots of great micro sticky price papers are not used because they don't produce an easy aggregate Phillips curve. If you want cites, make sure people can plug it in to Dynare. Mankiw and Reis' curve is pretty simple, but you still have to keep all past expectations around as a state variable. There may be alternative ways of doing that with modern computational technology, putting it in a Markov environment or cutting off the lags, everyone learns the price level after 5 years. Hank models have even bigger state spaces! Some more modelsWhat about within the Fed? Chung, Kiley, and Laforte 2010, "Documentation of the Estimated, Dynamic, Optimization-based (EDO) Model of the U.S. Economy: 2010 Version" is one such model. (Thanks to Ben Moll, in a lecture slide titled "Effects of interest rate hike in U.S. Fed's own New Keynesian model") They describe it as This paper provides documentation for a large-scale estimated DSGE model of the U.S. economy – the Federal Reserve Board's Estimated, Dynamic, Optimization- based (FRB/EDO) model project. The model can be used to address a wide range of practical policy questions on a routine basis.Here are the central plots for our purpose: The response of interest rates and inflation to a monetary policy shock. No long and variable lags here. Just as in the simple model, inflation jumps down on the day of the shock and then reverts. As with Mankiw and Reis, there is a tiny hump shape, but that's it. This is nothing like the Romer and Romer plot. Smets and Wouters (2007) "Shocks and Frictions in US Business Cycles: A Bayesian DSGE Approach" is about as famous as Christiano Eichenbaum and Evans as a standard new-Keynesian model that supposedly matches data well. It "contains many shocks and frictions. It features sticky nominal price and wage settings that allow for backward inflation indexation, habit formation in consumption, and investment adjustment costs that create hump-shaped responses... and variable capital utilization and fixed costs in production"Here is their central graph of the response to a monetary policy shockAgain, there is a little hump-shape, but the overall picture is just like the one we started with. Inflation mostly jumps down immediately and then recovers; the interest rate shock leads to future inflation that is higher, not lower than current inflation. There are no lags from higher interest rates to future inflation declines. The major difference, I think, is that Smets and Wouters do not impose the restriction that inflation cannot jump immediately on either their theory or empirical work, and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans impose that restriction in both places. This is important. In a new-Keynesian model some combination of state variables must jump on the day of the shock, as it is only saddle-path stable. If inflation can't move right away, that means something else does. Therefore, I think, CEE also preclude inflation jumping the next period. Comparing otherwise similar ingredients, it looks like this is the key ingredient for producing Romer-Romer like responses consistent with the belief in sticky inflation. But perhaps the original model and Smets-Wouters are right! I do not know what happens if you remove the CEE orthogonalization restriction and allow inflation to jump on the day of the shock in the date. That would rescue the new-Keynesian model, but it would destroy the belief in sticky inflation and long and variable lags. Closing thoughtsI'll reiterate the main point. As far as I can tell, there is no simple economic model that produces the standard belief. Now, maybe belief is right and models just have to catch up. It is interesting that there is so little effort going on to do this. As above, the vast outpouring of new-Keynesian modeling has been to add even more ingredients. In part, again, that's the natural pressures of journal publication. But I think it's also an honest feeling that after Christiano Eichenbaun and Evans, this is a solved problem and adding other ingredients is all there is to do. So part of the point of this post (and "Expectations and the neutrality of interest rates") is to argue that this is not a solved problem, and that removing ingredients to find the simplest economic model that can produce standard beliefs is a really important task. Then, does the model incorporate anything at all of the standard intuition, or is it based on some different mechanism al together? These are first order important and unresolved questions!But for my lay readers, here is as far as I know where we are. If you, like the Fed, hold to standard beliefs that higher interest rates lower future output and inflation with long and variable lags, know there is no simple economic theory behind that belief, and certainly the standard story is not how economic models of the last four decades work. Update:I repeat a response to a comment below, because it is so important. I probably wasn't clear enough that the "problem" of high output with inflation falling rather than rising is a problem of models vs. traditional beliefs, rather than of models vs. facts. The point of the sequence of posts, really, is that the traditional beliefs are likely wrong. Inflation does not fall, following interest rate increases, with dependable, long, and perhaps variable lags. That belief is strong, but neither facts, empirical evidence, or theory supports it. ("Variable" is a great way to scrounge data to make it fit priors.) Indeed many successful disinflations like ends of hyperinflations feature a sigh of relief and output surge on the real side.
This paper aims to examine how effective Cuba's national security services were in working with drug traffickers to obtain their national goals, how exactly the Cuban government was involved and when these drug operations began, as well as the level of culpability on the part of the Castro brothers and legal veracity of the drug trials. Given the extreme lack of academic study into Cuban intelligence and their potential involvement in the drug trade, this research (utilizing interviews with persons who have direct involvement and insight, analyzing declassified files and memorandums) is highly instrumental in determining how effective Cuba has been in making effective foreign policy in addition to offering insights into how Cuba's military and intelligence agencies have performed covert action operations. ; Winner of the 2021 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the College of Graduate and Continuing Studies Graduate category. ; CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY "Trafficking for a Cause": Cuban Drug Trafficking Operations as a Foreign Policy Alan Chase Cunningham Norwich University Advisor: Gamze Menali 01 June 2021 CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham ABSTRACT A capable intelligence service and military force is immensely integral to the national security policy of any nation, regardless of their political ideology or international activity. Cuba's national security apparatuses have proven themselves time and again to be exceptional at accomplishing the Republic's foreign policy goals. From the nation's early beginnings, in the 1960s and 70s, elements of the Cuban government were involved in the drug trade, either on an official or unofficial basis, utilizing drug trafficking as a form of aiding likeminded non-state actors, acquiring small arms and other weaponry, gaining U.S. currency, and making war against the United States. In the 1980s, following increased international outcry, multiple members of Cuba's military and intelligence forces were arrested, tried, and either executed or sentenced to prison for their roles in the drug trade. Many international observers, alongside defectors from Cuba's military and intelligence services and foreign governments, claimed that these trials were for show designed to protect the Castros. This paper aims to examine how effective Cuba's national security services were in working with drug traffickers to obtain their national goals, how exactly the Cuban government was involved and when these drug operations began, as well as the level of culpability on the part of the Castro brothers and legal veracity of the drug trials. Given the extreme lack of academic study into Cuban intelligence and their potential involvement in the drug trade, this research (utilizing interviews with persons who have direct involvement and insight, analyzing declassified files and memorandums) is highly instrumental in determining how effective Cuba has been in making effective foreign policy in addition to offering insights into how Cuba's military and intelligence agencies have performed covert action operations. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham ACKNOWLEDGMENT I would first like to thank my thesis advisor, Professor Gamze Menali, at Norwich University. She provided exceptional advice and support that was highly integral to the completion of this thesis and my degree. Her comments were always well-received and significantly bolstered my paper's overall effect and allowed my research to take on a professional quality. A better advisor could not have been provided nor found. I additionally must thank those persons who sacrificed their time and allowed themselves to be interviewed for my final project. Bobby Chacon of the FBI, Fulton Armstrong of the Intelligence Community, Harry Sommers of the DEA, Mike Powers of the DEA, Pierre Charette of the DEA, Richard Gregorie of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida, Mike Waniewski of the DEA, Harry Fullett of the DEA, and Seth Taylor of the U.S. Customs Service. This work is intended to honor them and their years of service and dedication to the U.S. government. I would also like to thank two professors whom were of immense importance in my academic career; Professor Jonathan Brown and Assistant Professor Joshua Frens-String of the University of Texas. Both sparked my interest in Latin American affairs and guided me on how to conduct historical research. They were inspirations and role models for me as a historian. Finally, I would like to offer special thanks to both my mother and father who supported me in more ways than one through my entire educational career. My family, importantly Kaytlynn Lopez, were a source for comfort, relaxation, and support throughout this endeavor. I could not have done this without any of them. I hope this work looks well upon all of those who helped and inspired me and allows a new generation of researchers and scholars to better understand this period in Cuban history. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham Table of Contents Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………….01 A Basic History of Cuba's Military and Intelligence Services……………………………….03 Early Beginnings: Cuba and Drugs in the 1960s…………………………………………….07 A Change in Policy: Cuba and Drugs in the 1970s………………………………………….16 The Cocaine Boom: Cuba and Drugs in 1980s……………………………………………….21 The Question of Culpability on the Part of the Castros…………………………………….52 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………61 CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham1 Introduction Cuba's intelligence and military services are among the best in the world. They have been described in laudatory terms by intelligence professionals, national security theorists, and academics alike. Brian Latell, a former National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Latin America and career Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst, agrees and recounts how veteran counterintelligence officers from all areas of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) would, "stand in awe of how Cuba, a small island nation, could have built up such exceptional clandestine capabilities and run so many successful operations against American targets".1 The CIA's former Chief of Counterintelligence, James M. Olson, agrees, writing, "no foreign intelligence service rankled me more than [Cuba's]…It was ruthless, it was devious, and worst of all, it was very, very good".2 Analysts from the research and analysis think tank CNA agree with Latell, writing, "[Cuba's] intelligence services are widely regarded as among the best in the world – a significant accomplishment given the country's meager financial and technological resources".3 The longtime lead historian of Cuban affairs, Jorge I. Dominguez, wrote in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, "Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)…have been among the world's most successful military".4 Longtime attorney and the Chief of Narcotics for the U.S. 1 Brian Latell, Castro's Secrets: The CIA and Cuba's Intelligence Machine (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 01, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/733231302. 2 James M. Olson, To Catch A Spy: The Art of Counterintelligence (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2019), p. 31, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/1055568332. 3 Sean Durns, "Castro's dead, but his spies live on," The Hill, Capitol Hill Publishing, published 05 December 2016, https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/308811-castros-dead-but-his-spies-live-on. 4 Jorge I. Dominguez, "Cuban Military and Politics," Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford University Press, published 29 May 2020, https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1810. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham2 Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida (USAO-SDFL) during the early 1980s, Richard Gregorie, has said that Cuba's intelligence services "is better than the CIA in Miami".5 It is apparent that, across multiple fields and specialties, Cuba is a well-regarded foreign power with a highly effective intelligence apparatus and robust military force. Not only that, but Cuba has been able to maintain effective relationships with like-minded state and non-state actors. Throughout the Cold War, Cuba maintained effective relationships with Latin American states by encouraging leftist revolutions amongst foreign populaces and aligning with foreign political parties6, becoming a benefactor to various regimes, political parties, and revolutionary groups in places like Venezuela, Angola, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. These relationships were maintained in a variety of ways from the providing of covert financial and military aid to the physical commitment of Cuban troops to ground warfare. It is well documented that, one of these relationships included the providing of security to drug traffickers and the usage of Cuba as a weigh station for drug traffickers. Through this almost three decade long covert operation, Cuba was heavily entrenched in building up beneficial relationships with non-state actors like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and legitimate nation states like Manuel Noriega's Panama, finding a steady source of income, and being able to make war against their age old adversary, the United States of America. By efficiently coordinating these operations and working to traffic illicit substances abroad, Cuba was able to improve their standing in Latin America and assist in the making of revolution abroad, essentially using the trafficking of drugs and other narcotics as a form of positive foreign policy. 5 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. 6 "Castro and the Cold War," American Experience, Public Broadcasting Service, published 2005, republished November 2015, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/comandante-cold-war/. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham3 Despite the fact that this incident offers a great deal of information as to how Cuba has conducted themselves in a foreign policy sense and has made war against the United States, it has been only minimally studied. In researching this area, one can find only a few academic papers and books written from the late 1990s which covers this issue in depth, with other books on Cuban history or drug trafficking in Latin America failing to cover this area or devoting only a paragraph or two to the entire ordeal. By examining this issue in depth, one can be able to determine just how intricate and involved Cuba's foreign policy endeavors were in addition to better understanding Cuba and the Castro's commitment to the exportation of revolution. This research chronologically catalogs how Cuba engaged in the drug trade, where they expanded and how they altered plans to most effectively suit their own needs. This research also intends to determine the level of knowledge Fidel and Raul Castro, Cuba's most well-known and high ranking officials, had of the operation and show how Cuba's drug trafficking efforts either succeeded or failed in bringing about the results desired by the island nation. A Basic History of Cuba's Military and Intelligence Services To fully and best understand Cuba's involvement in the drug trade, one must first come to understand the nation's intelligence and military infrastructure. The history of the FAR began when Fidel Castro and the military arm of his 26th of July Movement (M26) returned to the nation in December of 1956.7 Though soundly crushed by Fulgencio Batista's forces, Castro's rebellion was able to persevere by launching successful guerilla raids upon important military targets and acquiring a devoted following of students and lower to middle-class Cuban citizens, eventually becoming militarily superior to Batista's forces and claiming the country in January of 1959.8 The rebel army, under the command of Fidel Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, 7 Marc Becker, Twentieth-Century Latin American Revolutions (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), p. 111. 8 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham4 purged the military corps of Batista's regime, executing, exiling, or simply discharging various officers before officially creating the FAR in October of 1959.9 The FAR was initially under the control of the Ministry of Defense, yet this was renamed to the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR) and was headed by Raul Castro, Fidel's brother and later Vice President.10 Between 1959 and 1961, Castro populated the FAR with officers and enlisted personnel who would remain loyal to the new government, implemented educational programs which served to expose the military to Communist and Marxist teachings, and established militias which bridged the gap between Cuba's military and societal structures.11 Cuba's intelligence service, the Dirección General de Inteligencia (until 1989, the service went by the acronym DGI, before being changed to DI; the acronym DGI will be used when referring to this service), was created sometime in 1961, the actual date being unclear, as placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior (MININT).12 What is clear with the DGI, however, is their connections to the Soviet Union and the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezposnosti (KGB). Immediately following the Bay of Pigs crisis, the KGB assisted Cuba in infiltrating Cuban exile groups in Florida and New York to determine if the Kennedy administration would try and oust Castro from power again.13 In March of 1962, the KGB set up an "operations base in Havana to export revolution across Latin America,"14 while later beginning an information 9 Damián J. Fernández, "Historical Background: Achievements, Failures, and Prospects," in The Cuban Military Under Castro, ed. Jaime Suchlicki (Miami, FL: University of Miami Graduate School of International Studies, 1989), p. 05. 10 Ibid. 11 Fernández, "Historical Background: Achievements, Failures, and Prospects," in The Cuban Military Under Castro ed. Jaime Suchlicki, p. 07-08. 12 "Cuba, Intelligence and Security," in Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security, ed. K. Lee Lerner & Brenda Wilmoth Lerner (Farmington Hills, MI: The Gale Group, 2004), p. 292, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/55960387. 13 Oleg Kalugin, Spymaster: My Thirty-Two Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West (United States of America: Basic Books, 2009), p. 51-53. 14 Christopher Andrew & Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (United States of America: Basic Books, 2001), p. 184, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/727648881. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham5 sharing operation with the Cubans and even putting in place a KGB liaison officer within the DGI.15 Since the beginning of Cuba's foray into the world of counterintelligence and foreign intelligence collection, the KGB has been heavily invested and taken a special interest in Cuban intelligence operations. Early Beginnings: Cuba and Drugs in the 1960s Stratfor, a private geopolitical intelligence firm based in Austin, Texas, wrote in 2008 that, "While seeking refuge from Batista forces in the hills outside Havana, the future dictator was sheltered by marijuana farmers. Castro promised the growers protection for their hospitality".16 While trying to corroborate this claim about Castro's promise is difficult, it is well-documented that the Sierra Maestra mountain range, where Castro and his 26th of July Movement carried out guerilla attacks against the Batista regime, "had been traditional outlaw country long before Castro – rife with smuggling, marijuana growing…".17 Cuban governmental involvement in the drug trade seemingly sometime shortly after the DGI was founded in 1961. A declassified Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD – the precursor to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)) document details how, in 1961, a meeting was held between Che Guevara (then the President of Cuba's National Bank and head of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA)18), Ramiro Valdes (Che's deputy during the revolution and now head of the "[state's] security and intelligence apparatus"19), a Captain from Valdes' outfit, and Salvador Allende, then a Senator from Chile.20 The meeting first revolved 15 Ronald Young, "Cuba," in Encyclopedia of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), p. 186, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/436850527. 16 "Organized Crime in Cuba," Stratfor, Rane Corporation, published 16 May 2008, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/organized-crime-cuba. 17 Gil Carl Alroy, "The Peasantry in the Cuban Revolution," The Review of Politics Vol. 29, No. 01 (1967), p. 97, https://www-jstor-org.library.norwich.edu/stable/1405815?seq=4#metadata_info_tab_contents. 18 Jon Lee Anderson, Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (New York, NY: Grove Press, 2010), p. 424. 19 Anderson, Che Guevara, p. 368. 20 Rachel Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1990), p. 24. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham6 around Chilean politics, "but soon Comandante Valdes turned the talk to setting up a cocaine-trafficking network in order to raise money to help finance Allende…Valdes…suggested that Roberto Alvarez, chief of Cuban espionage, head the new organization".21 While attempts were made to gain access to this document via a FOIA request to the DEA, the DEA was unable to provide the document by the time of publication. This is not the only document which alleges Cuban governmental involvement in the drug trade during the early 1960s. Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN - the precursor to the BNDD and therefore the DEA) Henry Giordano specified in multiple letters and internal memoranda that the FBN and BNDD had located, "a "pattern of Cuban nationals," who were "suspected Castro sympathizers . . . dominating the traffic" and "operating in Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile to distribute large quantities of cocaine throughout the United States",".22 This mirrors what Giordano's predecessor, Harry J. Anslinger, seemed to believe in early 1961, that "the island nation [was] trying to subvert the United States with drugs".23 The BNDD too apparently, "investigated a purported Cuban government operation to sponsor marijuana and heroin crops in Cuba's Oriente province, using a secret department within the country's National Institute of Agrarian Reform".24 While both these incidences mention drug trafficking/production on the part of INRA and within Chile, seemingly backing up what the defector alleged to the BNDD, Giordano and Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury David Acheson both changed their opinions in the mid-1960s. The two officials believed that while individual Cubans were involved in the drug trade, this was not government 21 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism, p. 24-25. 22 William L. Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine: How U.S. Foreign Policy Has Created a Thriving Drug Industry in Central and South America (Chicago, IL: Chicago Review Press, 2010), p. 92, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/592756109. 23 William O. Walker III, Drugs in the Western Hemisphere: An Odyssey of Cultures in Conflict (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1996), 171, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/33132446. 24 Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine, p. 91. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham7 sanctioned and was of such a tiny scale that it would be "too small to have much of an effect on the supply of dollars to that country".25 Naturally, for a government official to change their personal opinion (especially those with the highest access to sensitive documents), they must have been exposed to some form of information which detailed to them that their previously held notion of Cuban involvement was faulty. This being said, evidence collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), individual FBN agents, and allegations by Soviet defectors, seem to corroborate the investigations by federal agencies, pointing to drug trafficking endeavors sanctioned by the Cuban government. According to a letter penned by J. Edgar Hoover, the longtime director of the FBI, "several Colombian airplanes taken to Cuba in 1967 were hijacked on behalf of the Cuban government for the purpose of obtaining the cargo—smuggled heroin".26 The Federal Bureau of Narcotics also agreed with the FBI's assessment and even estimated the total worth of the heroin was in the twenty million dollar range.27 Also in 1967, "a Cuban trained Venezuelan intelligence officer established…Cuban link of drugs for guerrilla weapons in the hemisphere," detailing this information before the Organization of American States (OAS), "providing a major connection between Havana, the guerilla movements, and narcotics".28 Acting Federal Narcotics Commissioner and long-time FBN agent Charles Siragusa also claimed in March of 1962 that six Cuban drug traffickers arrested in Miami and New York were transporting cocaine from Cuba to the U.S. for the purposes of "raising money [and] 25 Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine, p. 92. 26 Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine, p. 93. 27 Ibid. 28 Ralph E. Fernandez, "Historical Assessment of Terrorist Activity and Narcotic Trafficking by the Republic of Cuba," The Law Offices of Ralph E. Fernandez and Associates, P.A., Ralph E. Fernandez, P.A., published 22 January 2003, p. 02. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham8 demoralizing Americans and discrediting Cuban exiles in Miami".29 An FBN agent involved in the investigation and raid also confirmed this.30 A 2003 historical assessment focusing on the Cuban government's involvement in the drug trade and terrorism published by the law offices of Ralph E. Fernandez in Tampa, Florida indicated that Juvenito Pablo Guerra, the Miami group's ringleader, was an intelligence officer.31 Among the evidence that this cell was linked to the Cuban government and that Guerra was an intelligence officer includes "a supply of Communist literature and pictures of Cuban premier Fidel Castro in Guerra's apartment".32 While this piece of information is highly circumstantial in trying to link Castro to the drug ring, it does indicate that this cell was most likely not a grouping of exiled Cubans, ones who fled following Castro's claiming power in 1959, but rather were supporters of the Castro regime. Upon being sentenced in June of 1962 to "fifteen years in prison [for] narcotics conspiracy and assault with intent to kill a Federal officer…an undercover narcotics agent testified that Guerra was closely associated with Premier Castro and has been a member of a ring that had smuggled cocaine into this country from Cuba to obtain arms for Dr. Castro during the revolution".33 Also in the early 1960's, a FBN agent named Salvatore Vizzini was involved in the arrest of, "two Cuban agents…in Miami with large amounts of cocaine in their possession".34 29 "Cuba Plot Is Cited in Narcotics Raids," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 31 March 1962, https://www.nytimes.com/1962/03/31/archives/cuba-plot-is-cited-in-narcotics-raids.html?searchResultPosition=78. 30 "Big Cocaine Seizure Held Cuban in Origin," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 30 March 1962, https://www.nytimes.com/1962/03/30/archives/big-cocaine-seizure-held-cuban-in-origin.html?searchResultPosition=106. 31 Fernandez, "Historical Assessment of Terrorist Activity and Narcotic Trafficking by the Republic of Cuba," The Law Offices of Ralph E. Fernandez and Associates, P.A, p. 02. 32 "Big Cocaine Seizure Held Cuban in Origin," The New York Times. 33 "U.S. Jails 2 in Narcotics Case; One Reported Close to Castro," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 02 June 1962, https://www.nytimes.com/1962/06/02/archives/us-jails-2-in-narcotics-case-one-reported-close-to-castro.html?searchResultPosition=12. 34 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism, p. 25. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham9 Recounting the arrest in a 1978 letter to Morley Safer of CBS' 60 Minutes, Vizzini detailed that the subsequent investigation proved conclusively that the arrestees (Ramon Diaz and Jose Barrel) were both working for the Cuban government and were either selling the cocaine for profit or were involved in trading the coke for weapons.35 Throughout Vizzini's law enforcement career, this would not be the only time he would encounter evidence of Cuban governmental involvement in the drug trade. Writing in his 1972 memoirs, Vizzini recounted one undercover operation in which he was sent to San Juan, Puerto Rico and received a teletype by HQ. The teletype contained "a lot of unconfirmed rumor" which included headquarters' suspicion, "that Castro and his boys were secretly involved in the smuggling [of narcotics]," while also including the names of two Cuban expats, Luis Valdez and Caesar Vega.36 Eventually being able to infiltrate the Puerto Rican underworld and meet with Valdez and Vega, Vizzini bought $750.00 USD for an ounce of cocaine. While the eventual arrests of those involved failed to capture both Valdez and Vega, the San Juan Police Department's Narcotics Squad seemed to believe the two had already fled back to Cuba.37 While the FBN seemingly was never able to confirm their suspicions about Valdez and Vega's relationships to the Castro government, it is worth pointing out that, in early Summer 1959, a Cuban Major similarly named Cesar Vega was in charge of a Castro sanctioned operation to overthrow the Panamanian government.38 Vizzini it seems held that, "there was reason to believe the operation was being carried on with the knowledge of Fidel Castro, that his supporters were running it, and that the profits were getting back to shore up the dictator's shaky 35 Sal Vizzini, letter to Morley Safer, 27 February 1978. 36 Sal Vizzini, Vizzini: The Secret Lives of America's Most Successful Undercover Agent (New York, NY: Pinnacle Books, 1972), p. 284. 37 Vizzini, Vizzini, p. 309. 38 Robert L. Scheina, Latin America's Wars: The Age of the Professional Soldier Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2003), p. 56. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m0 government".39 In an extension of remarks placed in the Congressional Record in May of 1965, the CIA's view of these allegations and claims comes through. DeWitt S. Copp, a CIA analyst, detailed additional evidence concerning Castro and the Cuban government's culpability in the drug trade in a paper titled, "Castro's Subversion in the United States". Copp writes, "In December 1964, three Castro agents were arrested at Miami Airport – one of them a Cuban, Marlo Carabeo Nerey…On January 15, 1965, Oscar H. Reguera and Elidoro Martinéz were taken into custody in a New York motel with $3 million worth of cocaine in their luggage. Martinéz is believed to be a Cuban agent," while also making the claim that Cuba was engaging in narcotics trafficking in order "to finance an insurrection in Puerto Rico".40 The CIA, while any comment on the arrests of Juvenito Guerra's cell or the other arrests listed was unable to be found, certainly seemed to investigating that Cuba was, on some level, involved in the trafficking of narcotics to better support their own desires and machinations. This would also not be the last time that a group of drug traffickers would be alleged to be aligned with Cuba in the 1960s as well. In September of 1967, it was reported that, following an investigation conducted by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and Queens District Attorney's Office, six persons were arrested for their involvement in a drug ring which brought in, "$2.88 million [of cocaine]…from Cuba to Montego Bay, Jamaica and then to New Orleans for the flight to New York".41 According to law enforcement officers, Cuban governmental officials knew about this drug trafficking ring yet, "did not interfere in the 39 Vizzini, Vizzini, p. 282. 40 Representative Craig Hosmer, Extension of Remarks, on 25 May 1965, "Castro's Subversion in the United States – Part I," 89th Cong., Congressional Record, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP75-00149R000400100003-7.pdf. 41 "6 Are Seized Here With Cocaine Worth Nearly $3-Million," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 10 September 1967, https://www.nytimes.com/1967/09/10/archives/6-are-seized-here-with-cocaine-worth-nearly-3million-cuban-did-not.html?searchResultPosition=156. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m1 narcotics ring's activities and, in return, ring members supplied the Cuban government with information about anti-Castro elements in the United States," with members posing, "as fundraisers for anti-Castro elements," and then transmitting the contributor's information back to Cuba.42 Attempts to access the NYPD's files or interview detectives with relevant knowledge of the case were unsuccessful. In the late 1960s as well, it appears that some measure of involvement by the Cuban military in the drug trade was occurring within South Florida. Around 1969, two agents from the FBN/BNDD's Miami Field Office (FO) went undercover as local drug dealers to meet with a Cuban contact at a dock behind the Playboy Club in Miami at 7701 Biscayne Boulevard. According to former DEA Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge (ASAC) Pierre Charette, "the two agents did meet with a Cuban general and had discussed using Cuba as an entry point [for drugs]".43 Charette, who was not himself involved in the meeting but was close with one of the agents who was present, also confirmed that the Cuban general was an "active-duty [officer] with Castro's forces" and that the conversation was audio recorded by one of the agents.44 What one can see here is Cuba utilizing drug trafficking, not as a way of gaining an upper hand against the United States or to gain a better financial standing, but rather as a form of information gathering and intelligence collection on potential political and national security threats. By aligning themselves with a non-state actor able to work abroad in foreign land without arising suspicion from counterintelligence organizations, the Cuban government was able to better defend from foreign threats by Batista supporters and anti-Castro groups. In the form of gaining the upper hand on adversaries and gathering intelligence, this is an ingenious 42 Ibid. 43 Pierre "Pete" Charette (retired Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge with DEA) in discussion with the author, 16 March 2021. 44 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m2 tactic. In the late-1960s, a defector alleged that "Raúl Castro and/or his associates within the Cuban Defense Ministry actively discussed the issue of drug trafficking as an ideological weapon to be used against the United States [and that] Czech intelligence operatives trained Cuban agents to produce and distribute drugs and narcotics into the United States".45 This claim was made by Major General Jan Sejna, a military officer in the Czechoslovak People's Army and, "chief of the political wing of the Czech Defense Ministry and…member of the Communist Party's General Staff and the National Assembly, the country's legislative body".46 Sejna defected in 1968 following the "Prague Spring" under allegations of embezzlement by reformist Communists led by Alexander Dubček, a political opponent of Sejna's "patron, Antonin Novotny".47 Following Sejna's defection, both the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) kept Sejna on their payroll as a counterintelligence analyst and consultant.48 Throughout the 1960s, it is apparent that Cuba was, at the least, a way station for drug traffickers to resupply before heading on into the United States (as the island nation had served since the mid-1500s)49 or, at the most, was officially sanctioning the trafficking of narcotics into the U.S. for profit. Given the fact that Cuba was a newly created country and was in dire need of economic stability, it makes sense that Castro's regime would engage in some form of drug 45 Emilio T. González, "The Cuban Connection: Drug Trafficking and the Castro Regime," CSA Occasional Paper Series Vol. 02. No. 06 (1997), p. 01-02, https://scholarship.miami.edu/discovery/delivery?vid=01UOML_INST:ResearchRepository&repId=12355424610002976#13355471490002976. 46 Louie Estrada, "Gen. Jan Sejna, Czech Defector, Dies," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 27 August 1997, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1997/08/27/gen-jan-sejna-czech-defector-dies/0aa7916b-1005-4595-9a2e-5dc51012dbf5/. 47 David Stout, "Jan Sejna, 70, Ex-Czech General and Defector," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 30 August 1997, https://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/30/world/jan-sejna-70-ex-czech-general-and-defector.html. 48 "Gen. Jan Sejna, Czech defector, dead at 70," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 26 August 1997, https://apnews.com/article/395f04eda00526846fb4d3cfff44f726. 49 T.J. English, The Corporation: An Epic Story of the Cuban American Underworld (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 2018), p. 04, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/990850150. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m3 production and trafficking to provide a certain level of income. Additionally, it also would allow the new nation to craft strong foreign ties to non-state actors and individual governmental officials abroad who could prove valuable in other, more legitimate matters. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April of 1961, in which the United States and the Cuban governments became more antagonistic towards one another, one can see (based upon U.S. documents and defector testimony) that Cuba began taking further actions of trafficking narcotics into the U.S. as a method of covert action, "those activities carried out by national governments or other organizations…to secretly influence and manipulate events abroad".50 Sejna's allegations, if true, corroborate a great deal of what the FBN/BNDD and FBI found during the course of their criminal investigations, that the Cuban government was involved in the creating of narcotics and the trafficking of drugs throughout the Latin America region. Given the abundance of evidence surrounding Cuba and the drug trade in the 1960s, it would be logical to believe that some elements of the Cuban government (either individual ministers, agency heads, etc.) or Fidel and Raul Castro themselves, were involved in the trafficking or shipping of narcotics to the United States from Cuba. While the amount of evidence conclusively linking the Castros to the drug trade in the 1960s is minimal (with perhaps the most concrete evidence being the undercover agent's testimony during the Guerra trial), given the fact that Castro exerted a tight grasp upon the daily functions of the government and was heavily involved in minute details of military operations, foreign policy endeavors, and domestic matters, it is hard to envision that Castro was not aware of these operations or was completely oblivious to them. These operations to traffic drugs, throughout the 1960s, do not appear to be a large scale 50 Loch K. Johnson & James J. Wirtz, "Part IV: Covert Action," in Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies: An Anthology, ed. Loch K. Johnson & James J. Wirtz (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 237. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m4 policy stance. It did not appear to be organized nor a prominent feature of the Cuban government's foreign policy or income. The usage of drug trafficking by governmental entities and the allowing of drug traffickers to ply their trade within the island nation indicates this was done in an effort to garner additional currency, gather intelligence on threatening groups, or temporarily assist foreign allies. These operations do not seem to be large scale or integral to the overall conduct of the Cuban government, but are instead minor and almost done in a tentative way, perhaps out of fear of reprisal from the U.S. or the Soviet Union had their activities been uncovered. A Change in Policy: Cuba and Drugs in the 1970s Throughout the 1970s, the solidifying of the relationship between the Cuban state and non-state actors became more apparent. It was at this time that the Cuban government began making more long-lasting and profitable strides into the global drug trade while also greatly increasing their alignment with non-state actors and strengthening their foreign policy goals. At this time in Cuban history, Cuba was involved in a variety of foreign policy endeavors and military conflicts. Having failed in the 1960s to become self-sufficient economically, the island, "turned to the Soviet Union for support…[increasing] its subsidies for the Cuban economy through running trade deficits with the island and paying above-market prices for its sugar", further cementing the Soviets' presence in the nation-state.51 Given the fact that Cuba was in need of hard currency and did not desire to be too reliant upon the Soviets, Cuba can be seen as somewhat increasing their drug trafficking and security operations significantly in the mid to late-1970s. Evidence of Cuban involvement in the 1970's drug trade came through in the early-mid 51 Becker, Twentieth-Century Latin American Revolutions, p. 127. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m5 1980s and onward, with multiple defectors and arrested drug traffickers from Cuban military/intelligence organizations and Latin American cartels respectively offering this information to the U.S. government. Cuban defectors and drug cartel associates arrested in the 1980s indicated "in late 1975, some of Colombia's best-known and biggest cocaine kingpins met secretly in Bogotá…with the Cuban ambassador Fernando Ravelo-Renendo…Havana not only was prepared to ignore drug-laden mother ships operating in its waters but also to provide fueling and repair services to its ports…Havana also offered to escort the narcotics boats upon leaving Cuban ports, as well as provide Cuban flags to disguise their origin all the way to feeder vessels stationed off the Florida Keys," in return for roughly "$800,000 per vessel".52 In her book Narco-Terrorism, Rachel Ehrenfeld, then a research scholar at New York University School of Law, claims that Ravelo-Renendo was a Cuban intelligence operative from the Departamento América53, a "parallel intelligence apparatus"54 headed by Manuel Piñeiro Losada. It does seem that Ravelo-Renendo was a Cuban intelligence operative of sorts as, upon his death in July of 2017, a former Cuban Army officer wrote a detailed obituary documenting Ravelo-Renendo's services to Cuba, mentioning his entry into Cuba's intelligence service and his tenure during the 1970s as Cuba's Ambassador to Colombia.55 According to Dirk Krujit, professor emeritus of development studies at Utrecht University, the Departamento América was a unit which, "conducted Cuba's secret foreign 52 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism, p. 29-30. 53 Ibid. 54 Nora Gámez Torres, "He now hunts Cuban human-rights abusers in the U.S. Was he one himself?" Miami Herald, The McClatchy Company, published and updated 12 July 2018, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article214754450.html. 55 Alfredo García, "Cuban internationalist veteran Fernando Ravelo dies," Colarebo, Colarebo, published 04 July 2017, https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=https://colarebo.wordpress.com/2017/07/04/fallece-veterano-internacionalista-cubano-fernando-ravelo/&prev=search&pto=aue. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m6 relations under the direct supervision of, and access to, Fidel Castro"56 with these secret foreign relations techniques coming in the form of "[supplying] arms, money, intelligence, guidance, and a rear base to a variety of leftist guerilla movements in Latin America that wanted to duplicate the Cuban model".57 Manuel Piñeiro Losada too was a close friend of both Fidel and Raul Castro, having solidified his position as a loyal intelligence officer during the revolution.58 An interview with retired Resident Agent-in-Charge (RAC) of the DEA's Tampa office, Mike Powers, also was able to shed some light on how important Cuba was in the Colombian drug trade. He relayed an incident detailed to him by a smuggler arrested sometime in the 1980s who later became an informant. According to the smuggler, in the early 1970s, "he was flying a load of marijuana from Colombia to Florida…As he was almost across [Cuban airspace], a Cuban MiG came up, flew next to him and signaled to follow him and land. At that point, he [the smuggler] held up a bale of marijuana and the pilot laughed and signaled [him to] go ahead [through Cuban airspace]".59 While this incident does not indicate official government sanctioning of the drug trade nor some larger effort by the Cuban government to enter into the drug trade, this piece of information is indicative of how important Cuban airspace was in the drug trade and also how individual Cuban military officers or officials may have begun engaging in the drug trade to attain either larger foreign policy goals or as an extra source of income. This information is all quite interesting as this is the first time there is some form of evidence, albeit tangentially, in which Cuban officials and members of drug cartels met to 56 Dirk Krujit, Cuba and Revolutionary Latin America: An Oral History (London, UK: Zed Books, 2017), p. 05, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/964892858. 57 Larry Rohter, "Manuel Pineiro, Spymaster For Cuba, Is Dead at 63," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 13 March 1998, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/13/world/manuel-pineiro-spymaster-for-castro-is-dead-at-63.html. 58 Dirk Krujit, "Cuba and the Latin American Left: 1959-Present," Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina Vol. 28, No. 02 (2017), p. 32, http://eial.tau.ac.il/index.php/eial/article/view/1519/1623. 59 Mike Powers (retired Resident Agent-in-Charge with DEA) in discussion with the author, 20 December 2020. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m7 discuss a potential relationship revolving around the drug trade. However, this information must be treated with care in that these come from the mouths of defectors who must be listened to warily and have their claims treated with suspicion given the facts they, on occasion, will say anything in order to be given a lesser sentence or protection. Attempts to try and access CIA or other IC members' files were largely unsuccessful. However, declassified files were able to shed some light on the area. According to a declassified November 1983 document from the CIA, the Agency documented a series of claims revolving around Cuba and the drug trade, including one which mentioned how "Cuban officials, including Fidel Castro, has considered a scheme in 1979 to deal with narcotics smugglers in order to obtain hard currency for Cuba and contribute to the deterioration of US society".60 The CIA did mention as well that "not all of [these reports] have been corroborated", though were comfortable enough with the totality of the reports that they did endorse the belief that Cuba was involved, in some measure, with drug traffickers.61 The American non-profit, Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba (FHRC), produced a historical work in 2019 documenting Cuba's involvement in Venezuela, including a section on Cuba's alleged involvement in the international drug trade. They allege that Cuba's official entry into the narcotics trade began in 1978, "with the creation of a department for [MININT] operations inside the Cuban corporation CIMEX [Corporación de Industrias Mixtas de Exportación], for money laundering and marijuana trafficking".62 The FHRC cites Norberto 60 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Drug Trafficking: The Role of Insurgents, Terrorists, and Sovereign States (Langley, November 1983), p. 05-06, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00283R000300010008-6.pdf. 61 Ibid. 62 Juan Antonio Blanco, Rolando Cartaya, Luis Domínguez, & Casto Ocando, "Cubazuela: Chronicle of a Cuban Intervention," Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba, Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba, published April 2019, p. 87, https://www.fhrcuba.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/CUBAZUELA-CUBAN-INTERVENTION-English.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m8 Fuentes, an original member of the Cuban Revolution and Castro historian, as the source for the claims. While Fuentes' exact statements were unable to be accessed, it is known that a defector from Cuba's Ministry of the Interior, Major Jose Rodriguez Antonio Menier, too claimed that CIMEX was "linked to the drug trade" while even going a step further and stating that Castro had knowledge of general drug trafficking and CIMEX operations, using the profits to "support and opulent lifestyle [and fund] off-budget projects".63 Maria C. Werlau, an independent scholar and Cuban human rights activist, speaking to other anonymous defectors from the DGI, confirmed that CIMEX had a department entirely under the control of MININT in addition to making the allegation that, "100% of their revenue went into Fidel Castro's accounts".64 In testimony before Congressional subcommittees during the late-1980s, two convicted drug traffickers provided similar statements on Cuban involvement in the drug trade. One of them, Luis Garcia, testified that, in either "late-1979 or early-1980, Cuban officials offered him use of airstrips for refueling drug flights" and though he did not accept, "he was aware of other smugglers who did".65 Another trafficker named George Morales claimed that during a 1979 meeting in Cuba, he was sold planes which were seized by the Cuban government (presumably, Morales either stripped these planes for parts or would use them in his own drug trafficking endeavors) before eventually getting the Cubans to agree "to allow his pilots overflight rights through Cuban airspace".66 Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, 63 Don Podesta, "Ex-Cuban Officer Says Castro Profited from Drug Trafficking," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 26 August 1989, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/08/26/ex-cuban-officer-says-castro-profited-from-drug-trafficking/5f7a23ba-b4ad-4bc6-b8ec-fbea4470bac5/. 64 Maria C. Werlau, "Fidel Castro, Inc. A Global Conglomerate," Cuba in Transition Vol. 15 (2005), p. 379, https://ascecuba.org//c/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/v15-werlau.pdf. 65 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: A Report, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., December 1988, p. 64. 66 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m9 Narcotics, and International Operations, did however call Morales' statements "obviously incomplete", indicating that Morales' assertions required additional substantiation either through federal investigations, informants, or defectors.67 Attempts to find further evidence of Cuban involvement in the Western Hemispheric drug trade during the 1970s was minimal. It does appear that a top-secret, interagency, criminal investigation, initially codenamed "Operation Delta", was being conducted by the FBI, DEA, NYPD, and Chicago Police Department with the stated goal of "[digging] into the burgeoning Cuba-to-Florida narcotics trade and the distribution of drugs out of Miami".68 The details of this operation, however, are incredibly marginal, with attempts to access the records of this operation failing, despite multiple FOIA requests to the relevant agencies. It is possible that Cuba was not as active in the drug trade during this time due to the other foreign policy endeavors the nation-state was undertaking at that time (extensive military operations in Angola, South Africa, and Ethiopia). Due to the immense pressures going on with the nation, it is highly possible and logical even that Cuba toned down any drug trafficking activities that may have been going on. However, with the Soviet Union's death becoming more imminent and Cuba's foreign policy becoming more Latin American focused in the 1980s, Cuba seems to have significantly increased their ability at trafficking and providing security for drugs shipments as the crack epidemic swept into the U.S. during that time. The Cocaine Boom: Cuban and Drugs in the 1980s The 1980s saw a boom of drug trafficking and use throughout the Western Hemisphere. During the late 1970s, cocaine "[surged] in popularity…[being] associated with celebrities, high 67 Joan Mower, "Witness Claims Contra Drug Smuggling, Payoffs To Cuban, Bahamian Officials With," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 15 July 1987, https://apnews.com/article/5f5dd485a6d6825e88496281a2b1711c. 68 "Drugs gangs here, terrorist linked," Chicago Sun-Times, Sun-Times Media Group, published 16 April 1979, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/drugs/faln-drugs.htm. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m0 rollers and glamorous parties" with this continuing into the 1980s before peaking in 1985 and being declared a nationwide epidemic.69 Throughout this time period, cocaine (and the even more popular derivative crack cocaine) was trafficked into the United States predominantly by organized criminal elements utilizing "a distribution system that imported cocaine from South America into the U.S. market using sea and air routes via the Caribbean and the South Florida coast" in addition to trafficking drugs through Mexico.70 While these trafficking routes are now largely managed and controlled by Mexican cartels like the Gulf Cartel or the Los Zetas, in the 1980s, the Colombians were the largest drug traffickers in the Western Hemisphere. The Medellín and Cali Cartels were the two largest players in the drug trade, with the Medellín Cartel being the dominant organized criminal element until 1993 with the death of Pablo Escobar.71 While both the Medellín and Cali Cartels are now extinct, they were incredibly powerful at the time, with the Medellín Cartel raking "up to $60 million daily in drug profits"72 and the Cali Cartel, by 1992, being "responsible for seventy percent of the cocaine sold in the United States, as well as for the extraordinary growth of the cocaine market in Europe".73 Because of the massive influence these organizations had and their wide area of operations throughout Central and North America, these cartels, mainly the Medellín, also joined forces with legitimate state enterprises such as Manuel Noriega's Panama to drastically increase their 69 Jason Ferris, Barbara Wood, & Stephanie Cook, "Weekly Dose: cocaine, the glamour drug of '70s, is making a comeback," The Conversation, The Conversation, published 08 March 2018, updated 12 March 2018, https://theconversation.com/weekly-dose-cocaine-the-glamour-drug-of-the-70s-is-making-a-comeback-88639. 70 Deonna S. Turner, "Crack epidemic," Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., published 08 July 2016, updated 04 September 2017, https://www.britannica.com/topic/crack-epidemic. 71 U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Strategic Intelligence Section, The Cocaine Threat to the United States (Springfield, VA, 19 July 1995), p. 04, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/154678NCJRS.pdf. 72 Sara Miller Llana, "Medellín, once epicenter of Colombia's drug war, fights to keep peace," The Christian Science Monitor, Christian Science Publishing Society, published 25 October 2010, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2010/1025/Medellin-once-epicenter-of-Colombia-s-drug-war-fights-to-keep-the-peace. 73 Juan E. Méndez, Political Murder and Reform in Colombia: The Violence Continues (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, April 1992), p. 82. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m1 drug trafficking abilities.74 During the 1980s, many organized elements utilized the Caribbean to traffic narcotics either into Europe or into North America. It is without question that Cuba was one of these locations in which both air and sea craft landed to refuel and resupply before continuing on their way with payloads of narcotics.75 The first instance of Cuban involvement in the drug trade came in 1982 and 1983, with the apprehension and subsequent investigation of three persons with firsthand knowledge of these operations. These persons were Mario Estebes Gonzalez, an associate of Cuban intelligence, Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombian weapons and drug smuggler, and Johnny Crump, a Colombian lawyer and drug smuggler. Mario Estebes' story was first reported on in the New York Times in April of 1983. According to Selwyn Raab, Estebes "was arrested by the Coast Guard on Nov. 29, 1981, while he was transporting 2,500 pounds of marijuana in a speedboat off the Florida coast. He was indicted on a charge of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and faced a maximum prison term of 15 years".76 Facing many years in prison, Estebes decided to turn state's evidence and inform, in returning for immunity from some criminal charges, delivering rather explosive testimony. Estebes' testified that his mission priorities included, "disrupting Cuban exile groups and performing economic espionage, but that his principal mission was the distribution of cocaine, marijuana, and methaqualone[sic] tablets in New York, northern New Jersey, and 74 Mimi Yagoub, "How Panama's Criminal Landscape Has Changed Since the Days of Narco-Dictator Noriega," InSight Crime, InSight Crime, published 30 May 2017, https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/how-panama-criminal-landscape-changed-since-narco-dictator-noriega/#. 75 Robert Filippone, "The Medellin Cartel: Why We Can't Win the Drug War," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. 17, Iss. 04 (1994), p. 332, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576109408435960. 76 Selwyn Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 04 April 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/04/04/nyregion/a-defector-tells-of-drug-dealing-by-cuba-agents.html. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m2 Florida" and returned multiple millions of dollars back to Cuba.77 He also testified that "heroin and other narcotics were shipped to the New York area inside vans with concealed compartments to hide the drugs" in addition to claiming "he saw Vice Admiral [Aldo] Santmaria give orders permitting the unloading of narcotics at Paredon Grande [a small island off the Northern Coast of Cuba] brought in by a reputed international narcotics trafficker, Jaime Guillot Lara".78 In May of that same year, Estebes spoke before the United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control in a joint hearing, testifying that the Cuban government, "used the 1980 Mariel boatlift to send as many as 7,000 spies to the United States, some of whom were ordered to help drug smugglers ''flood'' this country with illegal narcotics [and that] some agents were in this country for propaganda purposes and others were to create ''chaos'' in the event of war".79 Estebes expanded upon his earlier allegations and stated, "one scheme [involved] 23,000 pounds of marijuana and 10 million methaqualone tablets [being] shipped from Cuba to Florida," the profits of which were to be split between Cuban officials and the smugglers themselves.80 Jaime Guillot Lara is perhaps the most important of the three. Guillot Lara was a well-known drug/arms smuggler in Colombia who also happened to be "a close personal friend of the leader of the M-19 guerilla group, Jaime Bateman".81 As far as his smuggling habits, Guillot Lara, according to the DEA who had been keeping tabs on him as far back at 1975, "he was delivering over 400,000 pounds of marijuana, more than 20 million illicit methaqualone pills and 77 Alex Larzelere, Castro's Ploy-America's Dilemma: The 1980 Cuban Boatlift (Fort. Lesley J. McNair: National Defense University, 1988), p. 229-230, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Apr/23/2002287258/-1/-1/0/LARZELERE_MARIEL_BOATLIFT.PDF. 78 Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times. 79 "Cuban Ties Boatlift To Drug Trade," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 01 May 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/01/us/cuban-ties-boatlift-to-drug-trade.html. 80 Ibid. 81 LT. Timothy J. Doorey, "The Cuban Interventionary Forces: The Growing Strategic and Regional Threat to the United States and NATO" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 1986), p. 115, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a180123.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m3 thousands of pounds of cocaine to U.S. markets each year" while also acquiring an impressive fleet of ships for trafficking purposes.82 Guillot Lara first became introduced to the Cuban ambassador to Colombia, Ravelo-Renendo, through their mutual friend, Johnny Crump, during a meeting (conducted at Gonzalo Bassols' apartment, the number two at the Cuban Embassy in Colombia) which resulted in a profitable relationship between Guillot Lara and the Cubans. While Crump would also corroborate this meeting between the following members, Guillot Lara's girlfriend, who was there when the meetings took place, corroborated many aspects, while also testifying that Bassols "told Mr. Guillot-Lara that the drug scheme had been cleared by a high Cuban official" which Bassols then identified was Fidel Castro.83 Either during or immediately after this introduction, according to Congressional testimony from Francis M. Mullen, Jr., the Administrator of the DEA in the early 1980s, Guillot Lara "began to receive official Cuban protection for the movement of his drug-ladened[sic] vessels to the United States…[in addition to transporting and delivering] arms which were ultimately destined for the Colombian terrorist group, M-19" on Cuban behalf.84 Not only did Guillot Lara traffic weapons to Cuban aligned rebels and allow the Cubans in on his drug trafficking endeavors, it appears he "also transferred funds to the guerillas through an employee of a Panamanian bank" acting as something of a go-between.85 From 1980 to 1981, Guillot Lara 82 Nathan M. Adams, "Havana's Drug-Smuggling Connection, Reader's Digest, Reader's Digest Association, Inc., published July 1982, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/drugs.htm. 83 Extensions of Remarks, Cuba's Active Role in Drug Trafficking to the United States, 98th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 130, pt. 24B: 10400, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1984-pt8/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1984-pt8-2-3.pdf. 84 Leslie Maitland Werner, "U.S. Officials Link Castro and Drugs," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 10 November 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/10/us/us-officials-link-castro-and-drugs.html. 85 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication. Cuban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency in the Western Hemisphere, edited by Colleen Sussman, (Washington, D.C., 12 March 1982), p. 02, https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QafYFT9344IVwbKAk5KG_OJydGlr3Q7oZPpK8WHGSx3JeWsUS431ZZwaW55TaMUk3UvHW4jiCHRb9Utgv1_TsoAFZD6FOi8njL3jjxp8gSVFo2zCTKSLLP0KOTaXLPl9ZdycsUgqn7e8ud91hnk09ZPGbYZ0QYrbwbNypMoakmWoqtvZNPGG0e9cQ33AwwDL7jITmBXQF CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m4 and the Cubans entered into a cozy relationship, though one that quickly became fraught with complications. In March of 1981, Colombian authorities found a "cache of M-19 weapons" and, with captured M-19 fighters implicating Cuban involvement, the Colombian government "[broke] off diplomatic relations with Havana and [expelled Ambassador Ravelo] and his staff".86 From midsummer to November of 1981, two Guillot Lara operated boats and one aircraft (the aircraft and one of the boats carried weapons for M-19) were apprehended by both the Colombian Coast Guard and United States Coast Guard; the capture of three M-19 rebels by the Colombian military also resulted in smuggling operations being significantly damaged.87 Guillot Lara fled Colombia, facing criminal charges, before being arrested by Mexican authorities.88 Awaiting extradition by the Mexicans to either the United States or Colombia, Guillot Lara revealed to both Mexican and U.S. investigators that he had "been involved in trafficking operations to Colombia for the M-19 on behalf of the government of Cuba. The latter provided the funds for the purchase of the arms".89 Following his revelations, however, Guillot Lara was released from Mexican custody and disappeared; according to the Colombian daily newspaper El Tiempo, Guillot Lara died in early April 1991 in Cuba of a myocardial infarction having "been detained on the island for twelve years".90 xujwOix6ni7j0-eT0RVti430wKPH9bicd8LdzulTZPXR8JDPGMTsyF2guKz20_HFjQkKlW8r6xpBfdR4TEC5SqWHYuetwHCl4rS7YWkCl0. 86 Adams, "Havana's Drug-Smuggling Connection, Reader's Digest. 87 John Dorschner & Jim McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine, The Miami Herald, KnightRidder, published 20 November 1983, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/crump.htm. 88 Edna Buchanan, "Miami drug smuggler ran drugs for Castro to guerillas, agents say," Miami Herald, Knight Ridder, published 24 January 1982, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00552R000303490005-9.pdf. 89 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 90 "Guillot Died of a Infarction," El Tiempo, Casa Editorial El Tiempo S.A., published 13 April 1991, https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-61284. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m5 Johnny Crump is where the public first became aware of a Cuban connection to the drug trade, though the last defector to be arrested by U.S. authorities. Crump, according to investigative reporter Ernest Volkman, was a Colombian lawyer of American descent who "went into the narcotics racket, running a large-scale cocaine and marijuana-smuggling operation" following the failing of his family's ranch in the late-1970s.91 Being politically well-connected, he was asked to serve as a guide for the newly appointed Cuban Ambassador to Colombia, the aforementioned Fernando Ravelo-Renendo, in 1975, the two quickly becoming friends.92 The two became so close that Crump even asked Ravelo to be his newborn daughter's godfather.93 At one point in 1979, in both federal testimony and statements made to Miami Herald journalists John Dorschner & Jim McGee, Crump detailed a meeting he had between Ravelo in which the ambassador detailed, "was dealing with some Chileans who needed help…seeking American weapons, not traceable back to Cuba, to use in the fight to overthrow Augusto Pinochet," to which Crump agreed and offered assistance.94 Following this, Crump tried to arrange a deal in which a plane would transport marijuana into the country, however, few pilots were willing to enter Cuba's Camaguey airport where Ravelo had arranged for refueling.95 In a previously mentioned meeting between Ravelo, Crump, 91 Ernest Volkman, "The Odd Couple: Castro and Vesco: The Cocaine Alliance," The Gadsden Times, Edward Marsh, published 29 April 1984, https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1891&dat=19840428&id=jKkfAAAAIBAJ&sjid=etYEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5242,6122535. 92 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 93 NBC Nightly News, "The Cuban Connection," featuring Roger Mudd, Brian Moss, Johnny Crump, and George H.W. Bush, aired 29 September 1982, transcript, NBC Network, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88-01070R000100380010-3.pdf. 94 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 95 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991, transcript, Public Broadcasting System, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/archive/cubaandcocaine.html. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m6 and Guillot Lara, the four agreed to transport the drugs via boat to Cuba with protection from Cuban Navy and Coast Guard forces.96 In a 1991 interview with PBS Frontline, Crump detailed the finalization of the first watercraft drug shipment to Cuba, discussing how he disembarked from "the plane to a Cuban government car that was waiting for us in the airport. I mean, there's no way that you can go to any country with no passport, with nothing like that, landing from another country in an international airport and have a car waiting for you right there in the field. It has to be with the OK of that government, that country… Everything was paid by the Cuban government. The hotel, you had to sign, like, you are a guest from the Cuban government because they don't let me pay for the hotel"; while Crump left the country before he personally could see any drugs entering the country, he was reassured by Ravelo that the drugs indeed touched down on Cuban soil.97 From that point onward, Crump became very involved in trafficking narcotics and arms with the Cubans, doing so via air and seacraft and aiding the Cubans larger foreign policy goals in aiding left-wing insurgent groups through Central and South America. In January of 1982, however, Crump was arrested in a joint Customs-DEA operation "at the Omni Hotel in Miami…on drug trafficking charges".98 At the time, Crump was acquiring arms and other weaponry "to be sent to an unspecified group in Bolivia" via his friend Jaime Guillot Lara.99 Much like Estebes, Crump was facing heavy prison time and began cooperating with federal 96 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 97 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991, accessed through vault, Public Broadcasting System, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/cuba-and-cocaine/. 98 Buchanan, "Miami drug smuggler ran drugs for Castro to guerillas, agents say," Miami Herald. 99 U.S. Department of State. Cuban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency in the Western Hemisphere, edited by Colleen Sussman, p. 02. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m7 authorities, providing them "with details of his meetings and alleged drug dealings with Cuban government officials in Bogota and Havana".100 Much of Estebes, Guillot Lara, and Crump's claims are astounding, however, it must be kept in mind that these persons are convicted drug traffickers and defectors from Colombian drug cartels or are in some way associated with Cuba's military respectively. Despite this, many prosecutors and U.S. government agencies found some, if not a sizeable portion of their claims, credible. In Estebes' case, Richard Gregorie commented at the time on Estebes' validity as a witness describing how his comments were "very credible" and had been "independently corroborated".101 In an interview with Gregorie, the former attorney stressed he "found him credible because of that [outside and additional] corroboration".102 The Senate Chair of one committee also stated that Estebes' credibility was "checked out…with the Justice Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration".103 As far as Guillot Lara's credibility goes, the CIA's opinion of him seems to be rather high. According to a CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate from 1983, "[t]he Guillot Lara case…is proof that Cuba has used Colombian drug smuggling networks move arms to Colombian insurgents. In this case, Cuban officials and Colombian drug traffickers were clearly associated in facilitating narcotics shipments to the United States. Guillot paid the Cubans in hard currency and used his vessels and smuggling networks to move arms to Colombia for the insurgents. On the other hand, Cuba rather routinely searches some drug-smuggling ships found 100 NBC Nightly News, "The Cuban Connection," featuring Roger Mudd, Brian Moss, Johnny Crump, and George H.W. Bush, aired 29 September 1982, transcript. 101 Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times. 102 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. 103 Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m8 in Cuban waters, confiscates drugs found and often imprisons the crew".104 Through this excerpt, the CIA seems to endorse the view that the overall claims about drug traffickers smuggling weaponry and drugs in collusion with Cuban figures and through Cuban waters is true and based in fact. While the CIA did seem to treat the accounts and his entire involvement with legitimacy, the agency was careful to note they were unsure of "the extent to which Cuba has continued to facilitate drug trafficking, either for money or arms".105 While the following document is not exactly an intelligence estimate or official analysis, an August 1982 conference report conducted by the CIA and the National Intelligence Council (NIC) stated, "Given the involvement of senior Cuban officials and at least two Cuban embassies, we believe this activity was approved at the highest levels of the Cuban Government. It almost certainly was not a case of corruption by mid- or low-level Cuban officials…Given the level of Guillot's Cuban contacts and the political implications of the arrangements, the operation was almost certainly approved at the highest levels of the Havana government" though the document was clear in stating that the U.S. government was uncertain as to who was behind the operation.106 These three witnesses were able to corroborate a great deal of information that the U.S. federal government, mainly the DEA and U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), had been investigating since the late 1970s. With this testimony from defectors and arrested drug traffickers who were seemingly vetted and verified, the U.S. government finally was able to bring forth official charges against certain members of the Cuban government and military. 104 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Implications for the United States of the Colombian Drug Trade Vol. II (Langley, 28 June 1983), p. 02, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00302R000600990002-9.pdf. 105 Ibid. 106 U.S. Intelligence Community, National Intelligence Council and Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Cuban Involvement in Narcotics and Terrorism (Langley, August 1982), p. iii, 3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83B00851R000100160008-1.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m9 On 05 November, 1982, an indictment brought by the USAO-SDFL in Miami, Florida charged that certain drug traffickers and members of the Cuban government did "knowingly, willfully and unlawfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree, together with each other, and with diverse other persons who are both known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to commit certain offenses against the United States" in the importation and possession of methaqualone tablets and marijuana and "used and caused to be used facilities in interstate and foreign commerce, including the telephone, and traveled and caused others to travel in interstate and foreign commerce between the Southern District of Florida, Colombia, Cuba and elsewhere, with the intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on and facilitate the promotion, management, establishment and carrying on of an unlawful activity, said unlawful activity being a business enterprise involving controlled substances".107 The persons charged in this indictment brought forth by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida included Jaime Guillot Lara, Fernando Ravelo-Renendo, Gonzalo Bassols-Suarez, Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado, Rene Rodriguez-Cruz, and David Lorenzo Perez, Jr. alongside multiple other, predominantly, Miami-based drug traffickers.108 Neither Crump or Estebes were charged as both had testified for the prosecution and received either partial or full immunity in addition to new identities and federal protection. The Cuban Interests Section in Washington, Cuba's foreign policy arm operating as an independent section of the Czechoslovakian Embassy, commented that the charges against Ravelo, Bassols, Santamaria, and Rodriguez-Cruz were "all lies"109; a January 1982 letter from 107 United States v. Jaime Guillot Lara et al., No. 82-643-Cr-JE (S.D. Fla., 05 November 1982), http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/drugs/indictment-82.htm. 108 Ibid. 109 George Volsky, "U.S. Drug Charges Cite 4 Cuban Aides," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 06 November 1982, https://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/06/us/us-drug-charges-cite-4-cuban-aides.html. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m0 Cuba's Ministry of Foreign Relations (MINREX) denied Cuba ever utilized drug traffickers to transport arms to rebels in Latin America, never gave arms to guerillas in Colombia, and denied that Guillot Lara had ever set foot in Cuba or received any monies from the Republic of Cuba.110 The denial by Cuba of having never gave arms to Colombian guerillas was roundly criticized, most notably in a 1990 interview with former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Thomas Boyatt.111 Among those charged were high level Cuban officials, some of whom have already been discussed including the Cuban Ambassador to Colombia Ravelo-Renendo and his "minister-counsel" at the Cuban Embassy in Colombia Bassols-Suarez.112 In addition to these figures, the indictment also charged Vice Admiral (VADM) of the Cuban Navy Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado and Rene Rodriguez-Cruz a "member of the Cuban Community Party Central Committee and president of the Cuban Institute of Friendship With The Peoples [ICAP]" with the same charges.113 It is worth noting that the ICAP was described by the CIA in a 1984 brief as being an organization which, in addition to bringing in foreign youths interested in Communism, Socialism, or Cuba also "provided Cuban intelligence services with a registry of aliens who might prove useful for intelligence collection efforts and operations in their homelands".114 110 "Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Drugs," Minister of Foreign Affairs Isidoro Malmierca Peoli (28 January 1982), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin America Report, Cuba, JPRS L/10334, 18 February 1982, p. 03-04, heading: Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Drugs, Republic of Cuba, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Latin America Report, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030043-6.pdf. 111 Ambassador Thomas D. Boyatt (Ret.), interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 08 March 1990, p. 48, https://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Boyatt,%20Thomas%20D.toc.pdf?_ga=2.264396167.981542772.1592939617-1066174783.1588020094&_gac=1.137161348.1589401103.EAIaIQobChMIgqnAwtSx6QIVSx-tBh2tGgsJEAAYASAAEgKALvD_BwE. 112 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, Directory of Officials of the Republic of Cuba (Langley, October 1979), p. 224, https://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/AA/00/07/66/14/00003/AA00076614_00003.pdf. 113 Mary Thornton, "Four Cuban Officials Indicted in Drug Smuggling," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 06 November 1982, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/11/06/four-cuban-officials-indicted-in-drug-smuggling/d70ed042-0adc-42d2-971b-23475f7adc83/. 114 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Cuba: Castro's Propaganda Apparatus and Foreign Policy (Langley, November 1984), p. 13, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000972183.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m1 David Lorenzo Perez, Jr. is an interesting figure within this legal case as he, in December of 1982, pled guilty to the first count of the criminal indictment.115 In his plea, Lorenzo Perez indicated culpability on Guillot Lara's part to "purchase, receive, store, and possess with intent to distribute approximately eight and one-half million methaqualone tablets" while indicating "that Jaime Guillot-Lara would provide ships to transport methaqualone tablets from Columbia[sic] with the knowledge of the Cuban governmental officials".116 Lorenzo Perez admitted he assisted Guillot Lara in all of these actions while also admitting he "traveled by private vessel from the Southern District of Florida to Paredon Grande, Cuba [and] met with Cuban government officials" including Santamaria and Rodriguez-Cruz.117 In Congressional testimony, Lorenzo Perez also testified that that "Cuban government was also to receive one-third of the profit of the marihuana[sic] sale" yet this did not go through as it appears Guillot Lara kept the profits [just under half a million USD] to himself.118 This case was the most significant development in the long standing allegations against Cuba on the area of narcotics trafficking. However, it is incredibly important to note that there was no evidence linking the Castros to the drug trade. The lead attorney who personally handled the case for the DOJ, Richard Gregorie, stated "Was Fidel Castro involved? At this point, no…[I] can't honestly say I saw that open Cuban involvement [and] did not come up with anyone who spoke directly to Fidel in those early cases".119 115 United States v. David Lorenzo Perez, Jr., et al., No. 82-643-Cr-JE (S.D. Fla., 09 December 1982), p. 01, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/perez-jr.htm. 116 United States v. David Lorenzo Perez, Jr., et al., No. 82-643-Cr-JE, p. 02, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/perez-jr-1.htm. 117 Ibid. 118 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 30 April 1983, p. 33. 119 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m2 Also around this time, many officials from the DOJ and U.S. Department of State (DOS) changed their previously emphasized opinions on the extent of Cuban involvement in the drug trade. In an October 1983 hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, DEA Administrator Mullen stated, "I moved very cautiously at first wanting to have evidence before publicly stating I was convinced that the Cuban Government was involved in drug trafficking. I am now convinced, as I have stated in prior sessions, that there is Cuban Government involvement in drug trafficking", bringing forth the above indictments and other "[classified and confidential] information" to support his reasoning.120 The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, James H. Michel, stated before Congress also in May of 1983 "the evidence clearly indicates more than a case of corruption by local or mid-level security officials in Cuba…Narcotics trafficking has apparently been sanctioned by Cuba as a means to finance subversion in Latin America".121 These comments were found by the Washington Post to, "fit in with a Reagan administration campaign to rally public and congressional support for its Central American policies, including more aid for El Salvador's army".122 Michel was not the only State Department official to make this claim either. The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence S. Eagleburger stated in May of 1983 that he "would find it very difficult to believe that the Cuban Government itself is not 120 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Impact of the South Florida Task Force on Drug Interdiction In The Gulf Coast Area, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 28 October 1983, p. 16, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/97516NCJRS.pdf. 121 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, Cuban Involvement in Narcotics Trafficking, edited by Colleen Sussman, (Washington, D.C., 30 April 1983), p. 02, https://www.google.com/books/edition/Cuban_Involvement_in_Narcotics_Trafficki/NItKAQAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0. 122 Edward Cody, "Castro Ties To Drugs Suggested," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 01 May 1983, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/05/01/castro-ties-to-drugs-suggested/242170fe-a930-4bc4-b30c-18016f794497/. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m3 involved… [The evidence is] really quite clear that there is major Cuban involvement in the drug traffic in this country", while also accusing the Castro government of playing a role in this.123 However, this appears to be more Eagleburger's own personal opinion as a more senior State Department official stated later that no agency had been able to prove "personal involvement by Fidel Castro".124 A spokesman for the Cuban Interests Section responded to the comments by Mullen and Michel by stating, "[This is] propaganda against the Cubans…We [the Cuban government] are refusing this accusation. We have consistent fighting against drug traffic. There are many American people who are put in Cuban jails for drug trafficking".125 At this stage, in relation to the Guillot Lara/Crump case, these definitive comments that Castro or the Cuban government officially was involved seemed to an extreme jump and other officials protested against this characterization. Stanley Marcus, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida and the attorney whose office brought forth the indictments against the four Cuban officials, stated before Congress "I think it is a fair and accurate statement to say some of the major organs and institutions of the Cuban state and some high-ranking officials of those organs and institutions of the state are involved in drug-running to the United States".126 William H. Webster, then Director of the FBI, also spoke about this in a television interview, stating the majority of the evidence currently being used by some officials to make judgements "[came] from one set of 123 Kenneth B. Noble, "Official Ties Cuba to U.S. Drug Traffic," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 02 May 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/02/world/official-ties-cuba-to-us-drug-traffic.html. 124 Ibid. 125 Werner, "U.S. Officials Link Castro and Drugs," The New York Times. 126 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism and Security, The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 30 April 1983, p. 15. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m4 sources and should be viewed with care".127 At this juncture, there was a great deal of conflicting views upon the established evidence, some most likely based upon political and individual biases based upon preconceived notions on both the nature of Communism and Latin America in general. While the evidence linking Castro or the Cuban government as a whole is very minimal (mostly relegated to evidence that would be considered hearsay in a U.S. court of law), it is undeniable that sections of the Cuban government, including areas of Cuba's diplomatic and intelligence services, were utilizing drug traffickers to achieve larger foreign policy goals within the Latin American region. As the 1980s progressed, additional evidence of Cuban involvement in the drug trade became even more apparent with defectors from Noriega's Panama, Cuba's DGI, and the arrests of multiple drug traffickers all speaking to U.S. officials. During this time as well, many criminal investigators of the U.S. federal government found or came across evidence of drug trafficking on Cuba's part along with the U.S. IC coming to a more solid conclusion on the matter. Prior to these November 1982 indictments, an FBI investigation into Cuban involvement in the drug trade was underway. In October of 1982, a U.S. Customs plane near Corpus Christi, Texas intercepted a Cessna aircraft that was having a mechanical malfunction and tracked it to Cleburne, Texas. The pilot, an American, "was arrested with 877 pounds of marijuana onboard" with "Chemical analysis [showing the marijuana] almost certainly was grown in Cuba".128 Following the pilot's conviction in April of 1983, federal investigators detailed "the ring operated for two years in violation of government embargoes on trade with Cuba by shipping computers and other equipment. Some of the return flights carried high-grade Cuban 127 Ibid. 128 "Did Cuba get computers in return for marijuana?" The Miami Herald, KnightRidder, published 02 April 1983, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/computers.htm. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m5 marijuana".129 The evidence necessary to make the claim that this ring was operating with the explicit approval of Cuban government officials or the Castros themselves is very lacking, however, what this does indicate is that there were individual smugglers beyond large metropolitan centers who were found to have ties to Cuba and that Cuba seemingly was involved in producing drugs in some quantity. In December of 1984, the CIA released an interagency intelligence memorandum stating outright, "Cuba is currently supporting drug trafficking…We judge that Fidel Castro is fully cognizant of and condones the drug-related activity that is taking place with the support of Cuban officials…The key Cuban participants are officers of the Interior Ministry or America Department of the Cuban Communist Party's Central Committee…Their participation strongly indicates a sanctioned government policy, rather than an arrangement for personal gain".130 While a good portion of this document is redacted, this is the first time in which an intelligence agency, or the CIA at least, has openly accused the upper echelon of the Cuban government and Castro himself of playing some role or in some way supporting the activities occurring. During this period, many criminal investigations uncovered more information on Cuban involvement in the drug trade, with additional evidence of Castro involvement becoming more apparent. In addition to this, many Congressional hearings and panels were convened with the goal of exploring the Latin American drug trade, during which many witnesses were called. Among these witnesses was Diego Viafara Salinas, an M-19 physician who infiltrated an armed civilian group with ties to members of the Medellín Cartel.131 Salinas held the belief he would be 129 Ibid. 130 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Cuban Government Involvement in Drug Trafficking (Langley, December 1984), p. 03, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87T00217R000700140002-5.pdf. 131 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Structure of International Drug Trafficking Organizations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 12-13 September 1989, p. 70, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/146771NCJRS.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m6 killed due to his past association with M19 and began providing evidence to the Colombian government, which eventually resulted in the deaths of many prominent Medellín Cartel leaders.132 In testimony before the U.S. Congress, Salinas recalled that, "[on November 22, 1988] two pilots flying a Commander 1000 aircraft were planning to stop and refuel in Cuba. They were leaving from an estate [in the Department of Cordoba] …When the seats of the plane were removed to load the cocaine, I saw the navigation charts, which indicated they were flying over the southern coast of Cuba. These pilots commented that they had to be sure to carry some amount of U.S. dollars with them to leave in Cuba as prearranged payment for the stopover".133 While the pilots Salinas spoke with never identified who gave them clearance to fly over Cuba with drugs, Salinas did testify "that it [the drug trafficking operation] was all the way up to Fidel Castro" with this information apparently coming from Fidel's spokesman.134 It is worth noting that this piece of testimony would effectively qualify as hearsay in a U.S. court of law. Many informants also came forward with information that would prove to be incriminatory to many persons with ties to the drug trade, including certain high-ranking Cuban leaders. On such source, a confidential informant for the DEA, who, after being arrested in 1985 on conspiracy charges, provided information on much of the Medellín's drug trafficking activities to the U.S. government.135 In a request for payment from the DEA's Asuncion Country Office, the agency noted the source's decades of service to the United States, describing him as having led "successful 132 U.S. Congress, Senate, Structure of International Drug Trafficking Organizations, p. 73. 133 U.S. Congress, Senate, Structure of International Drug Trafficking Organizations, p. 71-72. 134 Ibid. 135 U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Asuncion Country Office, REQUEST for PAYMENT under 28 U.S.C. 524 (C)(1)(B) for CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE (CS #####) (Asuncion, post-2009), p. 01. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m7 negotiations for landing rights and refueling operations in [among other countries] Cuba…[the source] purchased a birthday surprise (an airplane bought in the U.S.) for Fidel CASTRO's[sic] birthday, which he personally handed over to Castro's brother Raúl (then Cuba's Minister of Defense) during lunch".136 This information is quite damning to the Castro regime and, if true, would prove that, at the least, Raúl Castro did have knowledge of Cuban involvement in the drug trade and condoned those operations. While it cannot be emphasized enough that this confidential source pled "nolo contendere to the conspiracy charges in 1986", it does speak volumes that the DEA found him an essential and trustworthy source to continue using well into the 21st century.137 At this same time, another development implicated an American fugitive with close ties to the Castro regime in the drug trade. In April of 1985, appearing "before the Senate subcommittee on children, family, and drugs" (which was investigating Nicaraguan governmental involvement in the drug trade) were two convicted smugglers who provided further information on Cuban involvement in the drug trade.138 One of them was smuggler James A. Herring, Jr. who, while insisting he never transported drugs for the Cubans or Nicaraguans, detailed his smuggling activities with the Cubans in an interview with PBS Frontline, saying, "When I would go into Varadero with boatloads of equipment, we would be received by marked vessels that the Cuban navy, so to speak, utilized, their military gunboats. They would escort us into the gunboat dockage there at Varadero. From there they would offload. We would stay as long as we felt necessary to refuel us, wined and dined us. And when we were ready to return to 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid. 138 "Witnesses Testify on Vesco Link to Drug trafficking in Nicaragua, Cuba," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 19 April 1985, https://apnews.com/article/09e42836a8f58d76da155fa155da7847. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m8 the Keys, they would take and escort us out".139 In addition to this, Herring also claimed that the DGI, "would even offer drugs in lieu of the cash. [They] had the availability of enormous amounts of drugs that they had warehoused through seizures that they had made in their country on drug operations that weren't paying protection for their air space or their waterways. So they had a readily available amount of drugs in the form of cocaine, Qualudes[sic] and marijuana".140 Herring also testified that "he worked with Cuban Government officials and [Robert Vesco] to help the Nicaraguan government build a cocaine-processing laboratory near Managua".141 Vesco had been a successful businessman in the United States, creating a hundred-million-dollar manufacturing empire by 1970 before being twice indicted on federal charges for "defrauding thousands of investors [of $224 million USD]" and "for making illegal contributions totaling $250,000" to Richard Nixon's re-election campaign in 1972 and 1976 respectively.142 Following this, Vesco fled to numerous Latin American countries (including Nicaragua) before settling in Cuba around 1984.143 In a March 1996 profile for Vanity Fair, Vesco's immediate family indicates a friendly relationship to Fidel and Raul Castro in addition to a partnership to traffic narcotics with Col. Antonio De La Guardia, a high-ranking figure in the DGI and an important part of Cuba's overall foray into the drug trade.144 Eventually, however, Vesco attracted the eye of U.S. federal law enforcement for his 139 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991. 140 Ibid. 141 Joel Brinkley, "Panel Hears Details Linking Managua and Drugs," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 20 April 1985, https://www.nytimes.com/1985/04/20/world/panel- hears-details-linking-managua-and-drugs.html. 142 Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, "Robert L. Vesco," Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., published 20 July 1998, updated 30 November 2020, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Robert-L-Vesco. 143 Ibid. 144 Ann Louise Bardach, "Vesco's Last Gamble," Vanity Fair, Condé Nast, published March 1996, https://archive.vanityfair.com/article/1996/3/vescos-last-gamble. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m9 alleged participation in drug trafficking and, though some convicted drug traffickers and Cuban intelligence defectors implicated him in criminal acts, the "FBI and [DEA] denied he had any role" in certain elements of the drug trade, disproving these traffickers and defectors' claims.145 Ultimately, Vesco was arrested and sentenced to prison in Cuba in 1996 "for economic crimes against the government of Fidel Castro".146 Since at least April of 1987, the DEA's Miami Office was actively pursuing an investigation against Cuban government and military officials. Harry Sommers, a newly minted DEA agent to the Miami FO and later Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) of the Atlanta FO, was the lead investigator on the case and detailed his investigation in an April 1990 academic work for Florida International University. According to Sommers, in April of 1987, "two pilots [an American and Cuban national] flew approximately 480 pounds of cocaine from Colombia to [Varadero Military Base, Cuba]…where the cocaine was transferred to Cuban military officers".147 According to Sommers, the pilots were both questioned by U.S. officials and, in this interview, both pilots claimed they had stopped in Cuba to make "emergency repairs" and "presented documentation from the Cuban government confirming their story".148 The drugs were then placed upon a boat named the "Flerida" and, while attempting to enter Florida waters that April, was intercepted by the DEA. In the ensuing interviews with the boat's operators (all Cubans who were "residing in 145 Jim McGee, Pierre Thomas, Guy Gugliotta, & Jerry Knight "Vesco Held In Cuba," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 09 June 1995, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/06/09/vesco-held-in-cuba/874c16d3-81a5-4700-84ce- 6a4e8300fdab/. 146 Douglas Farah, "Vesco Gets 13-Year Sentence in Cuba," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 27 August 1996, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/08/27/vesco-gets-13-year-sentence-in-cuba/77271414- 9219-4efe-b68c-5d30b0f9b11b/. 147 Harry Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," (graduate paper, Florida International University, 23 April 1990), p. 07. 148 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 08. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m0 Miami"), the DEA found the boat was "[initially] met at sea by a Cuban Coast Guard vessel and escorted to the military base in Varadero [where the] crew members were housed and fed until the cocaine was loaded onto the vessel" upon which the boat was escorted out of Cuban waters by a Coast Guard ship.149 Additional evidence showing U.S.-based drug traffickers of Cuban descent docking and landing at Varadero and interacting heavily with Cuban military officers was uncovered through further investigations in May and November of 1987.150 This investigation led to the federal indictments of various figures in late 1988, including Reinaldo and Rueben Ruiz, a Cuban father and son drug trafficking team operating out of the South Florida.151 Reinaldo Ruiz, facing a sentence of life imprisonment, agreed to make a deal with the government in return for a lighter sentence.152 In a television interview with PBS Frontline before his death, Ruiz detailed his involvement in the drug trade and his associations with the Cuban government. According to Ruiz, he would transport a boat from Florida to Varadero where "everything had been arranged in advance [by Colonel Pardo, Chief of Command of Naval Operations in Varadero]" while his son, Rueben, would fly the cocaine from Colombia to Varadero which, upon landing, would be transferred to Ruiz's boat by members of the Cuban military and MININT.153 In this interview, Ruiz also stated "Every time that I went over there, I was completely sure that I was a 100 percent backing[sic], all the way to the top, otherwise I never, ever touch a thing out there". 154 149 Ibid. 150 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 08-10. 151 Buddy Nivens, "Jury Links Cuba To Drug Smuggling," South Florida Sun Sentinel, Tribune Publishing, published 27 February 1988, https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-1988-02-27-8801120759-story.html. 152 Richard Cole, "Prosecutors: Trafficker Implicated More Top Cuban Officials," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 21 August 1989, https://apnews.com/article/348da22ca41fd9a7e77c7ab9226c504e. 153 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991. 154 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m1 Despite Ruiz's comment, he never once indicated to federal investigators he met Fidel or Raul Castro; the closest Ruiz got to implicating either senior leader was a secret recording made by a DEA informant in which Ruiz claimed "The [payoff] money went in Fidel's drawer".155 Again, Ruiz never identified this person as being Fidel Castro and, if he did, the information would have come from someone who had heard this information from someone else, effectively being inadmissible evidence. What is quite serious about Ruiz's allegations and testimony however are his connections to Cuban intelligence. According to Harry Sommers and confirmed by other federal investigations, Ruiz was a "cousin of Miguel Ruiz-Poo…a Cuban captain in the Ministry of the Interior" who was working in Panama when he met Reinaldo Ruiz.156 While they initially began transporting U.S. goods and products to circumvent the embargo, Reinaldo Ruiz eventually floated the idea of trafficking cocaine through Cuba which resulted in Ruiz-Poo informing his superior Major Amado Padrón Trujillo and Colonel Antonio "Tony" de la Guardia, both members of the Moneda Convertible (MC) Department, a division meant to "circumvent the United States embargo and earn Cuba hard currency".157 This is where Ruiz's involvement in shipping boats and aircraft filled with cocaine and other narcotics to Cuba and then on to Florida began. According to esteemed journalist Andres Oppenheimer, shortly after de la Guardia and Ruiz initially met, Ruiz asked de la Guardia if Fidel Castro was aware of their arrangement to traffic narcotics to which de la Guardia replied in the affirmative. Oppenheimer writes however 155 "Secret Drug Case Tape Talks of 'Fidel' Payoffs" Associated Press, Associated Press, published 09 March 1988, https://apnews.com/article/0800e600293914df73901e1fe452316b. 156 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 11. 157 González, "The Cuban Connection: Drug Trafficking and the Castro Regime," CSA Occasional Paper Series Vol. 02. No. 06 (1997), p. 10. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m2 "It is unclear whether Tony de la Guardia had personally discussed his cocaine-trafficking plans with Castro. The Commandante, with his instinctive revulsion for money matters, seldom got involved in dirty business deals. That was Interior Minister Abrantes's job…De La Guardia's statement to Reinaldo Ruiz may have reflected the colonel's assumption that Abrantes never would have okayed something as hot as a drug operation without Fidel's blessing".158 Also around this time was the federal indictment against Manuel Noriega, the dictator of Panama who had become an increasing annoyance to the U.S. government. Despite having initially been friendly to the U.S., providing information to the CIA and DEA159, his involvement in substantial drug trafficking and racketeering efforts (in addition to the significant corruption and general abuses of his regime) had made him a liability.160 Among the witnesses who provided information against Noriega was Jose Blandón Castillo, a former key member of Noriega's intelligence service and a "consul general in New York".161 Blandón provided first-hand knowledge of incidences, confirming some of what was already suspected by American officials and investigators on Noriega's activities, but also claimed Fidel Castro mediated a dispute between Noriega and the Medellín Cartel in the Darién Province of Panama. According to Blandón, he "met with Castro in Havana on June 21 or 22, 1984 [and] Castro recommended that Noriega return the $5 million in protection money and return the plant, personnel, and equipment to the Cartel" and on either June 27th or 28th, "Noriega and Castro met 158 Andres Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour: The Secret Story Behind the Coming Downfall of Communist Cuba (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 29. 159 Robert L. Jackson, "Noriega Gave DEA Limited Aid for 5 Years, Officials Say," Los Angeles Times, Times Mirror Company, published 16 December 1991, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-12-16-mn-517-story.html. 160 Philip Shenon, "Noriega Indicted by U.S. For Links to Illegal Drugs," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 06 February 1988, https://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/06/world/noriega-indicted-by-us-for-links-to-illegal-drugs.html. 161 Stephen Engelberg with Elaine Sciolino, "A U.S. Frame-Up of Nicaragua Charged," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 04 February 1988, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90M00005R001100160023-3.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m3 directly" and Noriega agreed to go forward with Castro's suggestions, resulting in the release of numerous prisoners.162 While this information was used in indictments against senior Cuban officials and Manuel Noriega, some have found reason to doubt Blandón's claims. John Dinges, a noted investigative journalist and current Professor Emeritus of International Journalism at Columbia University, documented Blandón's claims in his 1991 book Our Man in Panama, stating, "There was no independent corroboration for the story…No other witnesses, including [Floyd Carlton Caceres, Noriega's personal pilot], had any knowledge of the Cuban meeting. If investigators had checked flight records and even press clips in Panama, they might have discovered that Blandón had gotten some basic facts of the Darién incident wrong: the dates for the trip to Cuba were wrong, and the prisoners supposedly released at Castro's urging had been freed more than one month before Blandón and Noriega went to Cuba".163 Richard Gregorie, who met with Blandón, disagrees with Dinges' assertions, saying, "Blandón provided the US government with valid evidence that was corroborated, but Blandón volunteered his cooperation and no one knew his true motivation. He was caught, prior to trial, recording his interviews by agents… The photos and information he provided were valid, but whether this was a lure by some foreign intelligence service or an attempt to sell his story for personal gain made him untrustworthy as a witness".164 Castro was interviewed around this time by Maria Shriver of NBC News and wholeheartedly rejected "José Blandón's charge" while also "[inviting] the Congressional committee [which heard Blandón's claims] to visit Cuba to receive evidence that Blandón was 162 U.S. Congress, Senate, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: A Report, p. 66. 163 John Dinges, Our Man in Panama: The Shrewd Rise and Brutal Fall of Manuel Noriega (New York, NY: Random House, 1991), p. 292, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/232993288. 164 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m4 lying to Congress".165 In this interview, he also "[denied] that the Medellín drug cartel has ever trafficked drugs through Cuba to the United States".166 Despite Castro's invitation to the committee, subcommittee chairman Senator John Kerry approached the Cuban Interests Section in D.C. and requested to visit Cuba on the conditions that "staff [be] permitted to advance the trip and…the Cubans agreed to discuss the drug trafficking problem in general" along with being able to meet Robert Vesco; the trip never materialized as "The Cubans never replied to any of these requests and never made any further arrangements for the visit".167 The concentrated U.S. criminal investigations, Congressional hearings, and federal indictments, the intense media speculation and reporting, along with seeming pressure from the Soviet Union168 forced the Cuban government's hand. On 12 June, 1989, multiple high-ranking members of Cuba's military and intelligence services were arrested. These members included General Arnaldo T. Ochoa Sanchez,169 Brigadier General Patricio de la Guardia, Colonel Antonio "Tony" de la Guardia (twin brother to Patricio), Colonel Antonio Rodriguez Estupinan, Captain Jorge Martinez Valdes, Lieutenant Colonel Alexis Lago Archoa, and Major Amado Padrón Trujillo.170 Also charged were Captain Leonel Estevez-Soto, Captain Antonio Sanchez-Lima, First Lieutenant Jose Luis Pineda-Bermudez, Captain Miguel Ruiz-Poo, Captain Rosa Maria Abierno-Gobin, and Captain Eduardo Diaz-Izquierdo.171 165 Jane Franklin, Cuba and the United States: A Chronological History (New York, NY: Ocean Press, 1992), p. 239, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/944186211. 166 Ibid. 167 U.S. Congress, Senate, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: A Report, p. 66-67. 168 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, International Narcotics Situation Report (Langley, VA: May 1989), p. 13, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91M01043R002200150004-9.pdf. 169 Robert Pear, "Cuba Arrests Top General on Corruption Charges," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 16 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/16/world/cuba-arrests-top-general-on-corruption-charges.html?searchResultPosition=8. 170 Robert Pear, "Cuba Seizes 6 More Officers Amid Signs of Big Shakeup," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 17 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/17/world/cuba-seizes-6-more-officers-amid-signs-of-big-shakeup.html. 171 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 14. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m5 The majority of these persons were members of Cuba's Ministry of the Interior and intelligence services, though Estupinan and Martinez were both former aides-de-camp to General Ochoa.172 Save for Archoa and Trujillo, who were not charged with any crime, the other persons were charged with a variety of public corruption crimes, including money laundering, drug trafficking, and treason. As well, though all were arrested rather simultaneously, there were two separate cases going on which involved the drug trade in Cuba. The first involved, "[Antonio "Tony"] de la Guardia, Major Padrón, and six other officers who worked at [the MC Department] … The Cuban government charged that de la Guardia's group arranged for six tons of cocaine to be sent from Colombia through Cuba to the United States in the two years after April 1987, and that they were paid $3.4 million for doing so".173 The second case involved primary Ochoa and his aide-de-camp Martinez (in addition to "several others") in which the Cuban government charged that "[Ochoa] enriched himself in black-market trading, using army resources, when he was stationed in Angola in 1988, and to have neglected his military duties…[stole] $161,000 from Nicaragua's Sandinista army through a failed weapons deal…[and] was said to have conceived of a scheme to send major cocaine shipments to the United States, and for that purpose to have sent Martínez secretly to Medellín, Colombia, in 1988 to meet with Pablo Escobar Gaviria, a magnate of the drug cartel".174 The charges against Ochoa did not allege he was involved in de la Guardia's operations nor ever took part in a drug deal, alleging only he engaged in treason and efforts to gain private funds for either independent military operations or for personal use. 172 Ibid. 173 Julia Preston, "The Trial that Shook Cuba," The New York Review of Books, NYREV, Inc., published 07 December 1989, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1989/12/07/the-trial-that-shook-cuba/. 174 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m6 The trial (which aired on public television throughout Cuba) began on 25 June, 1989, thirteen days after Ochoa had initially been arrested, with the first hearing beginning on the 26th of June.175 Throughout the course of the trial, numerous witnesses were called who testified in regards to the charges, in some cases admitting culpability and accepting responsibility for individual actions which were illegal while also implicating others such as Ochoa and the de la Guardia brothers in the illegal activities they had been charged with. Both Patricio and Tony de la Guardia and Arnaldo Ochoa admitted their involvements in drug trafficking and treasonous activities, respectively, before the trial had commenced.176 At the trial's conclusion, the prosecutor for the government recommended to the Honor Tribunal, a board of 47 high-ranking Cuban military officers (one of whom was Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado, who had been charged with drug trafficking by the U.S. in 1982)177, that "Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, Antonio de la Guardia Font, Jorge Martinez Valdez, Amado Bruno Padron Trujillo, Antonio Sanchez Lima, Alexis Lago Arocha, and Eduardo Diaz Izquierdo [receive] the death penalty…[for] the most serious crimes in this indictment, which are drug trafficking and treason against the fatherland".178 The prosecutor also recommended "30 years imprisonment for defendants Patricio de la Guardia Font and Rosa Maria Abierno Gobin, 25 years imprisonment for defendants Gabriel Prendes Gomez, Leonel Estevez Soto, Miguel Ruiz 175 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 03, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a347578.pdf. 176 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 07, 154, 164. 177 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 44. 178 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 187. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m7 Poo, and Luis M. Pineda Bermudez, and 15 years imprisonment for defendant Antonio Rodriguez Estupinan".179 The Honor Tribunal agreed unanimously on 11 July 1989, with the stripping of ranks coming later on 12 July 1989.180 On 13 July 1989, Ochoa, Tony de la Guardia, Valdez, and Trujillo were all executed by way of firing squad.181 During and following the trial, Cuba's Ministry of the Interior and the Cuban government as a whole was revamped; Diocles Torralba Gonzalez, Cuba's Minister of Transportation "was dismissed [on 14 June 1989] for "improper conduct" – suggesting he may have been engaged in corruption"182 while Cuba's Minister of the Interior, Brigadier General Jose Abrantes Fernandez, "was dismissed [on] June 26" and then arrested on 31 July 1989 alongside "Brig. Gen. Roberto Gonzalez Caso, a former head of immigration; Oscar Carreno Gomez, former customs chief; Lt. Col. Rolando Castaneda Izquiero, and Hector Carbonell Mendez, director of a state-owned company that dealt in foreign currency".183 Five more Brigadier Generals of the Cuban military, presumably aligned with the Ministry of the Interior, were also "demoted to colonel and retired".184 Both Abrantes and Torralba would later receive twenty year prison sentences, with Abrantes dying in 1991 of a heart attack.185 Replacing Abrantes in the MININT was "trusted four-star general Abelardo Colomé Ibarra" who quickly revamped much of MININT's capabilities.186 179 Ibid. 180 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 208-209. 181 Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour, p. 01-03. 182 Jim Anderson, "U.S.: High-level shakeup may be under way in Cuba," United Press International, United Press International, published 14 June 1989, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/06/14/US-High-level-shakeup-may-be-under-way-in-Cuba/4954613800000/. 183 Isaac A. Levi, "Five Senior Cuban Officers Arrested in Drug Scandal," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 31 July 1989, https://apnews.com/article/0782d185225919535cf3aa518ed550a9. 184 Ibid. 185 Richard Gott, Cuba: A New History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 285. 186 Krujit, Cuba and Revolutionary Latin America, p. 183. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m8 During and after the trial, the charges and convictions were heavily criticized. Some cast doubt on the trial's veracity in regards to having a military officer who had allegations of drug trafficking leveled against him187, while others (Cuban human rights activities, American journalists, and international human rights advocacy and monitoring groups) took offense to the lack of questions asked by the defendants' military appointed prosecutors (in addition to the rather loaded way in which some questions were asked).188 Jaqueline Tillman, a member of the National Security Council, was quoted as saying, "The evidence of Cuban involvement in narcotics trafficking was becoming so abundant that the regime moved to protect Fidel Castro by dissociating him from those activities" while Frank Calzon, a member of the human rights group Freedom House stated that either of the Castros, either Fidel or Raul, "had to approve of this activity, or at least [look] the other way".189 Even civilians of the island nation, according to former diplomat Wayne Smith, were "questioning the official explanation and arguing that there has to be a lot more to this than what is contained in the official announcement".190 Following the trials and into the 1990s, however, Cuba seemingly became more committed to halting drug traffic in Cuba. Fulton Armstrong, a former NIO for Latin America and two-time Director for Inter-American Affairs for the NSC, has stated that "Since Ochoa, collaboration has been good" mentioning that, since 1997, a formal relationship between the United States and Cuba exists, with both the U.S. and Cuba "[identifying] this as a matter of 187 Richard Cole, "Admiral's Role Calls Cuba Drug Crackdown Into Question," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 29 June 1989, https://apnews.com/article/9ef279d0c5de07e958d53e9c1a7bea5b. 188 Preston, "The Trial that Shook Cuba," The New York Review of Books. 189 Robert Pear, "Cuba Discloses A Drug Network Of Top Officials," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 24 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/24/world/cuba-discloses-a-drug-network-of-top-officials.html. 190 Larry Rohter, "Castro Is Anxious About His Military," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 25 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/25/weekinreview/the-world-castro-is-anxious-about-his-military.html?searchResultPosition=10. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m9 national interest".191 Pierre Charette, the ASAC for the DEA's Caribbean division during the late-1980s, identified that into the early-1990s, cooperation with the Cuban government has been "fantastic [with] drug trafficking through go-fast boats dropping significantly" and that this productive relationship remains in place today.192 In 1991, the U.S. Customs Service detailed to Frontline that "[drug, arms, and other illicit] trafficking had declined since the trial, but…not stopped".193 The DEA's Administrator194 and Chief of International Operations195, in 1996 and 1999 respectively, both testified before Congress that, despite large profile cases in the media, the Cuban government itself nor senior officials were not involved in drug trafficking. Also in 1996, the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs "recognized cuban[sic] counter-drugs efforts, stating that the cuban[sic] government was giving anti-narcotics policies higher public profile in the face of growing narcotics transshipments and consumption".196 General Barry McCaffrey, who served as Commander of U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and was President Clinton's Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ODNCP) from 1994 to 2001, recalled in 2015 "Cuba's a police state, and I don't believe the Cuban government wants to be a hub for drug smugglers. They saw it as a 191 Fulton Armstrong (retired National Intelligence Officer for Latin America with NSC) in discussion with the author, 13 January 2021. 192 Pierre "Pete" Charette (retired Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge with DEA) in discussion with the author, 16 March 2021. 193 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991. 194 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Statement by: Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, 104th Cong., 06 June 1996, https://fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/h960606c.htm. 195 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Statement by: William E. Ledwith, Chief of International Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration, 106th Cong., 17 November 1999, https://fas.org/irp/congress/1999_hr/ct111799.htm. 196 Isabella Bellezza-Smull, "Will Cuba Update its Drug Policy for the Twenty First Century?," Igarapé Institute, Igarapé Institute, published 29 December 2017, https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/08-11-2017-NE-29-Cuba-Drog-Policy.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m0 threat to their children, the workforce, their economy, their government" while noting that though cooperation was imperfect, there was constant communication with the Cubans throughout his time in terms of combating drug trafficking.197 The Question of Culpability on the Part of the Castros The involvement on the part of Fidel and Raul Castro in the drug trade is something that has long been debated and speculated. Since the 1960s, individual criminal investigations, U.S. federal government memorandums, Cuban intelligence defectors, convicted criminals, and congressional hearings have included testimony that has tried to implicate Fidel, Raul, or both Castros in the drug trade. With the 1989 trials, these speculations have increased and, in some cases, due to the handling of the trials, been given more credence. At least two U.S. Congressional hearings have been conducted since 1989, both of which focused on continuing drug traffic in Cuba.198 199 Into the 1990s, more evidence of possible involvement by the Castro regime was revealed. First were the allegations of Carlos Ledher, an experienced drug trafficker and pilot and co-founder of the Medellín Cartel.200 Ledher, upon his arrest and extradition in 1987, was "convicted…on charges of conspiracy and running a criminal enterprise as well as other charges related to the importation and sale of cocaine" in May of 1988.201 Due to this, Ledher began 197 Joshua Partlow & Nick Miroff, "In fight against drugs, Cuba and U.S. on same team," The Washington Post, Nash Holdings, LLC., published 05 January 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-fight-against-drugs-cuba-and-us-on-same-team/2015/01/05/6416305a-90fc-11e4-a66f-0ca5037a597d_story.html. 198 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Cuba's Link to Drug Trafficking, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 November 1999, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=2027. 199 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, Drug Trafficking in the Caribbean: Do Traffickers Use Cuba and Puerto Rico As Major Transit Locations For State-Bound Narcotics?, 106th Cong., 2nd Sess., 3-4 January 2000, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg69521/pdf/CHRG-106hhrg69521.pdf. 200 Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2001), p. 45, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/45086854. 201 Patricia Bauer, "Carlos Ledher," Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., published 18 June 2018, updated 03 September 2020, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Carlos-Lehder. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m1 cooperating with the U.S. government for a lesser sentence. In federal testimony during the Noriega trial, Ledher claimed "that Castro mediated a bitter 1984 dispute between Noriega and Colombia's Medellin cartel that saved Panama's strongman from probable assassination…and bribed Cuban government officials to ship tons of cocaine into the United States".202 Lieutenant Colonel Luis del Cid, a close aide to Manuel Noriega, alleged during Noriega's trial that he "accompanied Noriega on a flight to Cuba and met Castro following the raid [in which Panamanian troops raided a cocaine lab in Darién province Colombia]" though specified he did not attend the meeting in question.203 While both Ledher and del Cid's testimonies seem to corroborate what Blandón had previously testified in regards to Castro's connections to Noriega and the Medellín Cartel, it must be noted that both del Cid and Ledher testified in exchange for reductions in their sentences (which numbered into the hundreds of years for each of them) and also could easily have become aware of Blandón's testimony in any of the three years prior to their providing evidence to the U.S. government. Two former officials who defected from Cuba two years before the trials, Oscar Valdes from the Ministry of Trade and Manuel de Beunza from the Ministry of the Interior, offered their insights on the trial, claiming the trials were for "show" and were more politically motivated as Castro desired to remove opponents whom he saw as a threat to his power.204 This allegation that the drug trials were a show trial meant to snub out political opponents of Castro's hold on Cuba has become a very prominent. 202 Robert L. Jackson, "Cartel Leader Reveals Secrets of Drug World," The Los Angeles Times, Time Mirror Company, published 21 November 1991, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-11-21-mn-404-story.html. 203 Richard Cole, "Former Aide Tells of Drug Cash, Castro, and Prostitutes," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 24 September 1991, https://apnews.com/article/0b7fcac1c0842630af2d1cc758ab1acd. 204 Jim Anderson, "Defectors: Cuba trials about politics, not drugs," United Press International, United Press International, published 27 July 1989, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/07/27/Defectors-Cuba-trial-about-politics-not-drugs/2648617515200/?spt=su. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m2 Other defectors, including those from the DGI who defected, also voiced their views on the trial. Jorge Masetti, a DGI officer and Tony de la Guardia's son-in-law who defected from Cuba in 1990, claimed in an interview, "If this operation really existed, it could only have existed if Fidel and Raúl Castro knew about it. They made these accusations, which were supposed to make the case against Ochoa. Arnaldo Ochoa was never proven to have smuggled drugs. The direct evidence does not exist, but they accused Ochoa, and why? Because Fidel wanted to send a message to all the officials with high authority".205 Juan Reinaldo Sánchez, a seemingly credible defector206 from Cuba's MININT who was the personal bodyguard to Castro for seventeen years, wrote in his book The Double Life of Fidel Castro that Castro had knowledge of subordinates' involvement in the drug trade and sanctioned it. Sánchez recalls overhearing a conversation in 1988 between Minister of the Interior Jose Abrantes and Castro in "centered on a Cuban [drug trafficker] living in the United States" who wanted to travel to Cuba to visit his parents; Castro approved the trip along with allowing the trafficker to, as a cover, say he was a Cuban intelligence operative while also requesting that Tony de la Guardia handle "the logistics of the trip".207 This conversation, while innocuous, seems to indicate that Castro did maintain a friendly relationship with some drug traffickers, yet reveals no legitimate information of Castro's involvement in the drug trade. Into the 1990s, working off the indictments against the Ruiz Family in 1988 and the 1992 Noriega trial, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida began investigating senior level members of the Cuban government. In 1993, the USAO-SDFL "drafted a [proposed 205 The Cuba Libre Story, season 1, episode 7, "Secrets and Sacrifices," directed by Emmanuel Amara, Kai Christiansen, & Florian Dedio, aired 11 December 2015, https://www.netflix.com/title/80109535. 206 Edward A. Lynch, "All Socialists Are Equal, but Some Are More Equal Than Others," Military Review (November-December 2019), p. 124, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/ND-19/ND-19-Book-B.pdf. 207 Juan Reinaldo Sánchez with Axel Gyldén, The Double Life of Fidel Castro: My 17 Years as Personal Bodyguard to El Líder Máximo (New York, NY: St. Martin's Griffin, 2015), p. 230. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m3 indictment that] would have charged Raul Castro and 14 other top Cuban officials [including Manuel Piñeiro, head of the Departamento América] with conspiracy and racketeering for allegedly providing safe passage for Medellin cartel cocaine loads, including permission to fly over Cuba and use its waters".208 Among others allegedly involved in this large enterprise was Abelardo Colomé Ibarra, the Minister of the Interior who replaced Jose
When looking at the literature surrounding the Iran Hostage Crisis, many scholars focus solely on the events that occurred in Iran leading up to the embassy being taken. This focus tends to paint Iranians as the "bad guys" in all situations. However, there was a large population of Iranian students in the US at the time, and these students had a completely different experience than those often remembered from the nightly news. Few scholars have set out to demonstrate the lives of those Iranian students, but those who have often describe the controversy that surrounded them. Scholars recognize how Iranian students in the US faced discrimination and how the US government was looking to deport them. These scholars tend to look at the lives of students who had it the worst, assuming all Iranian students' lives were atrocious in the US. They do not take into account those who were still welcomed at their universities throughout the crisis, as students disregarded diplomatic tensions and looked at the humans they spent their days with instead. By looking at more universities and more student experiences, a broader picture can be understood about the lives of Iranian students in the US during the crisis. ; Winner of the 2020 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the University Archives category. ; A Diplomatic Fiasco: How Iranian Students in the US were Affected Throughout the Iran Hostage Crisis Faith Privett Professor Boonshoft HI 249 Historical Methods 0800 5 December 2019 3979 Words 2 Not long after Ronald Reagan's inauguration as President of the United States on January 20th, 1981, former President Jimmy Carter was meeting the hostages he tried so desperately to release for 444 days. One of the bleakest moments of United States foreign policy history is the Iranian Hostage Crisis, which lasted from November 4th, 1979 to Reagan's inauguration day. In total, 66 people were taken hostage initially, but 52 were held for the full 444 days. America and the rest of the world watched as the days in captivity kept getting longer and longer, and their hopes conversely dropped. However, those accounts rarely showed the perspectives of the thousands of Iranian students in the US who suffered discrimination, harassment, and questioning throughout the crisis. They were seen as the enemy in a country that is supposed to be the "Land of the Free" and the "Great American Melting Pot." Nevertheless, this was not the case for all students; some were accepted with open arms throughout the crisis, as all so desperately sought world peace. Some students who did not necessarily feel the general American abhorrence were those who attended Norwich University, a private military college in central Vermont. Even though the rest of the country had conflicting views towards Iranian students in the US during the late 1970s, the Iranian Imperial Navy students at Norwich University were welcomed and well respected because of the well-developed program, the shared military experience and respect for authority, and the outward-looking ideals taught by the university, despite the tensions between the US and Iranian governments at the time. When looking at the literature surrounding the Iran Hostage Crisis, many scholars focus solely on the events that occurred in Iran leading up to the embassy being taken. This focus tends to paint Iranians as the "bad guys" in all situations.1 However, there was a large population of Iranian students in the US at the time, and these students had a completely different experience 1 Scott, "Bound for Glory." 3 than those often remembered from the nightly news. Few scholars have set out to demonstrate the lives of those Iranian students, but those who have often describe the controversy that surrounded them.2 Scholars recognize how Iranian students in the US faced discrimination and how the US government was looking to deport them. These scholars tend to look at the lives of students who had it the worst, assuming all Iranian students' lives were atrocious in the US.3 They do not take into account those who were still welcomed at their universities throughout the crisis, as students disregarded diplomatic tensions and looked at the humans they spent their days with instead. By looking at more universities and more student experiences, a broader picture can be understood about the lives of Iranian students in the US during the crisis. The US and Iran have a tumultuous diplomatic relationship that continues to this day, or better put does not continue to this day. The US had an interest in Iran during World War II and later into the start of the Cold War due to the fear of communism spreading and the fact that Iran had copious amounts of oil. In 1953, this came to a head when the leader of Iran, Mohammed Mossadegh, showed some "communist" tendencies that did not support US and British interests. The two countries staged a coup that removed Mossadegh and placed the previous ruler, Muhammed Reza Shah, back into power. This jumpstarted US involvement in Iran through diplomatic means that continued until the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. According to research by Dr. David Patrick Houghton, this involvement consequently may have led to the interest of the revolutionaries to take the hostages in 1979, as they saw the US as a threat to their sovereignty once again.4 2 Shannon, "American-Iranian Alliances." 3 Teague, "Hostages of the Crisis." 4 Houghton, US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis, 58-59. 4 Iranians may also have related the actions of the Shah to US involvement because the US supported him despite his authoritarian tendencies. Dr. Matthew Shannon notes the injustices that took place under the Shah in numerous works. When the Shah came into power, he instilled policies that led to "rapid socioeconomic modernization," but the process in which he did it brings about questions of civil rights and democracy.5 The modernization process that took place in Iran, known as the White Revolution, made the country incredibly western by allowing capitalist practices in land and factory holdings and giving women the right to vote, among other things.6 However, the vote that supposedly put these acts into power was not necessarily ratified by the legislative body of Iran at the time, although the Shah made it look as such.7 By taking away democratic practices such as these, the Shah furthered his cause of becoming an authoritarian ruler without opposition. Along with taking away democratic practices, the Shah also limited expression in Iran, especially for those that may have come out against his reign. Much of this was enforced by SAVAK, or the National Intelligence and Security Organization, who was known for repressing any anti-government sentiments, especially anti-Shah sentiments. Starting in the 1950s, SAVAK was trained in the US by government officials, and their only oversight and command came from the Shah, meaning they did whatever they were told to do by him directly.8 News came out in the 1970s that SAVAK was using torture to suppress anti-government acts within Iran. Military tribunals, which were open to the public for a time, were moved behind closed doors for over a year by the Shah after a defendant showed scars during a tribunal they had obtained from torture by SAVAK.9 These human rights abuses and the fact that 5 Shannon, "American-Iranian Alliances," 662. 6 Shannon, "American-Iranian Alliances," 675. 7 Shannon, Losing Hearts and Minds, 63. 8 Shannon, Losing Hearts and Minds, 25-27. 9 Shannon, "American-Iranian Alliances," 681. 5 SAVAK could be anywhere instilled fear in the hearts of Iranians both at home and abroad, which helped the Shah uphold his authoritarian regime. Besides support for the Shah by the US, Shannon also focuses on how US involvement in Iran from 1953 to 1979 focused highly on education, as many of those who worked in the Iranian government in the early days of the Shah were educated at American universities. The exchange rate of students from Iran to the US to study in college was greater than any other country at the time, with over 50,000 Iranian students enrolled in US universities in the 1979-1980 school year, and in the years following, post-secondary education in Iran was oftentimes structured after American universities.10 The cooperation between the US and Iran regarding education before the Shah's removal helped to modernize the country, which was seen differently by each party involved. Luckily for historians, many of the documents from the era are still preserved in university archives, including those at Norwich University, where upwards of 134 Iranian students were attending in the spring of 1979.11 Numerous student newspaper articles, administrative files, and oral histories tell the stories of Iranian students at Norwich from 1976 to 1980. The President Loring Hart files describe the administrative set up of the program, which was modeled after the program at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), where Iranian students had been attending for a few years before the program starting at Norwich. Deputy Commander LTC Paul Lafond went down to VMI to review their program in early May 1976, and he detailed a report that helped to eventually flesh out Norwich's Iranian student program. Some of the recommendations Lafond had were that Iranian students should room with American students, not with other Iranian students, because this would help them adapt to American life and learn 10 Hamidreza, "A Follow-Up Study on U.S.-Trained Iranian Faculty Members," 1038-1039. 11 Hart, "The President's Corner," Norwich University Record. 6 English quicker.12 Because of the Corps of Cadets' lifestyle at both VMI and Norwich, other recommendations were made regarding how cadre, or student military leaders, should train the Iranian cadets, as their learning styles were not the same. Lafond recommended that Iranian students respond well to clear orders, but they do not always respond well to negativity or derogatory or vulgar language. They should also be told when something is wrong, as they are oftentimes eager to fix it, but they will not understand if it is not brought to their attention. Lastly, Lafond notes that English proficiency is the biggest issue on campus, and even though the students attended a summer program that focused on English, it was not enough.13 This information was taken into account when designing the Norwich program. The administration designed an eighteen-week summer program that prepared the first fifty Iranian students with classes mainly focused on English, Math, Physical Education, and Naval ROTC, before the start of the school year in August 1976.14 With each year that Iranian students were on campus, more and more were able to attend as they worked out some of the issues with the program, and it became better established. Early on, Iranian students on campus ran across a few issues in their daily lives that highlight some of the changes that Norwich went through from 1976 to 1980 to improve the program. In a Norwich Guidon article published in October 1976, American author Gerard Grimes interviewed "Recruit Mohammad Zerehi from Iran" about what life was like at Norwich and how students could better understand their international counterparts.15 Zerehi noted some of the issues he and his fellow Iranian students were having on campus included English proficiency, adapting to the climate, and the diet. Zerehi asks readers that they do not 12 Lafond to Hart, 7 May 1976. 13 Lafond to Hart, 7 May 1976. 14 "Iranian Students Come to Norwich" Norwich Guidon. 15 Grimes, "Iranian Students at Norwich" Norwich Guidon. 7 discriminate against the Iranian students on the issue of pork, which many chose not to eat, because it is a religious practice.16 Other accounts by Iranian students recognize the issue with pork as well, but that over time, both the students and the school were able to resolve these problems and continue growing.17 Because this was written so early on in the program, it is noticeable that eventually, American and Iranian students got used to each other's practices, which led to their friendship and respect for one another throughout the years. Vital to the descriptions of life at Norwich from 1976-1980 are the oral histories of Iranian cadets Arsalan Namdar and Benjamin Heydary. Both men described what training was like, how they got along with their classmates, struggles they had, and how they eventually had to leave. Namdar described Rook Week as a "Piece of cake" because they had already been through years of more intense training in the Iranian Imperial Navy (IIN).18 Namdar also noted the Iranians "goofed off" at the beginning of training, much to the chagrin of their American classmates. This behavior transitioned once tasks started getting more intense. Another issue they ran into was the fact that their cadre were often younger and more inexperienced than they were, which created difficulties when they would get yelled at and disciplined.19 Heydary described similar feelings towards younger authority figures, but that he often kept his head down and dealt with it due to his humble upbringing.20 Another issue that arose earlier in the Iranian student's time at Norwich was that they often had more money than their American classmates because they were still getting paid their full salaries while attending school. This created a bit of strife between students, as the Iranians were not afraid to spend their money on cars and stereos.21 16 Grimes, "Iranian Students at Norwich" Norwich Guidon. 17 Namdar, interview by Yahm, April 2, 2015, transcript. 18 Namdar, interview by Yahm, April 2, 2015, transcript. 19 Namdar, interview by Yahm, April 2, 2015, transcript. 20 Heydary, interview by Yahm, March 10, 2015, transcript. 21 Namdar, interview by Yahm, April 2, 2015, transcript. 8 Dr. Matthew Shannon also describes the Norwich Iranian Cadets in his book Losing Hearts and Minds. Without saying much, he recognizes that Norwich had one of the largest programs in the US training Iranian Naval officers and that it trained women as well, which was new in the era and especially in the Middle East. He also describes some of the programs at Maine Maritime Academy, The Citadel, the Virginia Military Institute, and the United States Naval Academy. In general, these programs were similar because they were building off of each other's programs; Iranian students studied engineering and business most often while receiving Naval ROTC training and improving their English.22 He finds that Iran sent their naval officers to US military schools because they wanted a standard education, which was difficult when they sent their cadets to numerous other countries to train as Iran did not have an officer training facility at the time. Also, Shannon notes that the US had an interest in training Iranian cadets because of the protection of oil assets in the Middle East.23 The Nixon Doctrine, which was President Nixon's plan to support conflicts in the Pacific through management and materials but not manpower, was also being upheld through the act of training and providing military aid.24 Iranian students throughout the rest of the country were not as lucky as those at Norwich, as protests against them often occurred on college campuses. Will Teague described some of the protests held on college campuses in the South throughout the entire hostage crisis, but mainly in 1979 as the news was fresh in the minds of Americans. Teague documents protests at Lamar University in Beaumont, Texas, the University of Tulsa, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville, and the University of Arkansas at Little Rock. These protests included gatherings of hundreds of students marching against Iranians, 22 Shannon, Losing Hearts and Minds, 105. 23 Shannon, Losing Hearts and Minds, 103. 24 Gannon. "25 July 1969: The Nixon Doctrine." https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2008/07/25-july-1969-the-nixon-doctrine/ [accessed 20 Nov 2019]. 9 burnings of flags and images of Ayatollah Khomeini, and derogatory and threatening signs all directed towards the Iranian students that were on these campuses.25 Newspapers were also an outlet for protest, as correspondence and letters to the editor called Iranian students, "savages, barbarians, bandits, and terrorists."26 However, Teague also notes that Iranian students were writing to newspapers as well, trying to show their side of the issue. Overall, they described their confusion about the event, just as much as American students were confused, but they wanted their fellow students to know the Shah was not whom they thought he was, and because they were not the ones who experienced his reign, they should not be quick to let him into the US.27 Besides the protests against Iranians on college campuses, Iranian students in the US themselves were protesting, for other reasons. The Iranian Student Association in the United States (ISAUS) was a student led-group with chapters around the country that organized protests and lobbied against the Shah's actions. Because they were in the US, they were able to use their freedom of speech rights to express their beliefs, where if they were in Iran, they most likely would not have been able to express their opinions for fear of getting imprisoned. Early on in the history of the ISAUS, their goals were to advocate for more democratic practices in Iran, including freedom of expression. They lobbied the Kennedy administration, specifically Robert Kennedy, to try and influence US foreign policy towards Iran and the Shah's regime.28 After news of SAVAK's torture started coming to the US from new students arriving, the ISAUS switched their tactics and started advocating for bringing to light the crimes against humanity that the Shah and SAVAK were committing. The ISAUS issued "On the Violation of Human Rights in Iran," which outlined the abuses under the Shah and called for the US to stop 25 Teague, "Hostages of the Crisis," 115-116. 26 Teague, "Hostages of the Crisis," 120. 27 Teague, "Hostages of the Crisis," 116-118. 28 Shannon, "American-Iranian Alliances," 672-674. 10 supporting him. They were able to get attention in newspapers around the world, but the US continued to support the Shah due to their prior commitments.29 Protests against the Shah continued throughout the US the entire time he was in power. However, both Namdar and Heydary describe what set Norwich Iranian cadets apart from the rest of the Iranian students in the US at the time. Namdar states, "In later years…Americans and Iranians really became friends based on the values…."30 He goes on to say, "I think Norwich taught me a lot in terms of quality and integrity…experiencing life, and trying hard, and just trying to work with others and be friendly."31 At first, things were difficult for the students because of the language barrier and the fact that the Iranian and American cultures were so different. As Namdar recognizes, through time, both the American and the Iranian cadets learned more about one another and grew to respect the fact that they were different, which improved how they worked together. One can hypothesize that this might have something to do with the military training that all students received at Norwich. The military encourages the fact that soldiers need to work together to produce the best outcome in the field, despite their differences at home, which allowed the Iranian and American cadets to look past their many differences and unite on common ground. President Loring Hart described the impact that the Iranian students had on the American students at Norwich as, "They have brought to all of us broader horizons, and a new awareness…. They have provided a current which has flowed through our campus and our town…, reminding us that our college and our community is indeed a part of the greater scene beyond us."32 This statement describes the worldly perspective that Iranian students brought to the school and how it made Norwich students more aware of others who were not like 29 Shannon, "American-Iranian Alliances," 682-684. 30 Namdar, interview by Yahm, April 2, 2015, transcript. 31 Namdar, interview by Yahm, April 2, 2015, transcript. 32 "The Rest of the Story," Norwich University Record. 11 themselves. Like Heydary states, there were instances of discrimination or derogatory slang terms used against the Iranian students at the beginning of their time at Norwich, but once students got to know each other and the barriers were broken down, they were able to become friends despite their differences.33 After all of the unrest occurring in Iran at the time, 1979 was the icing on top of the cake. The Shah left Iran in early 1979, and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a popular religious leader who was incredibly anti-Shah and anti-American and who became an icon for revolutionary voices within Iran while in exile, took power shortly after.34 The entire country was calling for the Shah's return so he could face charges in front of the people he oppressed for so many years. Instead, the Shah sought cancer treatment in the US, which is what most people think caused the hostage situation to occur. A substantial diplomatic issue arose as President Carter considered allowing the Shah into the US, which many Iranians thought was the US harboring their criminal and preventing them from exerting their sovereignty. When the Shah was admitted into the US, the unrest came to a peak, and protesters outside the US embassy in Tehran, Iran, many of which were US-educated students, stormed the embassy and took 66 Americans inside hostage, 52 of which they held for the entirety of the crisis. With so many people protesting the Shah both in the US and Iran, there is much to say about how the media spun the story to make all Iranian's the bad guys in the situation when they faced discrimination in the US themselves. Professor Catherine Scott explained the "captivity narrative" that was portraited throughout the crisis by the media and the government, which convinced the American citizens to hate Iran more than they ever had before. A captivity narrative is best described when a story is portraited in such a way that the victims' actions 33 Heydary, interview by Yahm, March 10, 2015, transcript. 34 Shannon, Losing Hearts and Minds, 70. 12 against the captors are justified because of the actions that were committed against them.35 What she is saying is that the Americans knew they were the victims during the hostage crisis, and they played into it, but they were not willing to take into account the atrocities that they themselves committed beforehand. Retaliation, by any means, was not only justified but also necessary to protect the American people. This only increased the abhorrent treatment by Americans against Iranians because it was for the public good, even if the public included over one hundred thousand Iranians. The fact that the media portraited the US as victims, and the federal government was retaliating against Iranians just made it more acceptable for the everyday Americans to lash out against their Iranian counterparts. Because of the backlash against Iranians by the US public, there was also government backlash as well. President Carter issued Section 214.5, which called for the investigation into Iranian students in the US to ensure that they were abiding by their visas. If they were not, they were to be deported. This turned into somewhat of a witch hunt as Iranian students could be investigated and deported at any point. According to Tinsley Yarbrough, the deportations were supposed to reduce the number of protests in the US against Iranians so they would not get in the way of hostage negotiations.36 However, many people outside of the government sector questioned the constitutionality of the act, including members of the ISAUS, who brought a case forward against Section 214.5 in late 1979. The original ruling on the case by DC District Court Judge Joyce Green was that the students were correct, and the order was unconstitutional due to discrimination.37 The Appeals Court overruled Judge Green's decision because Section 214.5 had to due with foreign affairs, and under the Constitution, the judiciary could not shoot down 35 Scott, "Bound for Glory," 180. 36 Yarbrough, "Federal Alienage Doctrine," 248. 37 Teague, "Hostages of the Crisis," 124-125. 13 any law regarding the handling of foreign affairs by the executive.38 This allowed the deportations to continue without question, and arguably set a precedent that is followed today. While the rest of the country was dealing with Section 214.5, Iranian students at Norwich encountered a different dilemma. Because they were members of the Iranian military, they had different travel visas than Iranian students at other universities around the US. On April 9th, 1980, President Carter issued a deportation order that all, "non-diplomatic and consular officials and employees of Iran in the US leave no later than Friday April 11th."39 This made it clear that the Iranian cadets at Norwich had to leave for good because their visas made them fall under this category. A newspaper article from the Iranian students' departure day describes the fact that President Loring Hart and the administration contacted as many agencies as possible, trying to allow the cadets to remain at school to finish the year, but there were no loopholes they could use as students at the Citadel and VMI also had to leave. The article then goes on to describe the last few days of the Iranian students on campus, their rush to pack and sell their belongings, and the "emotional farewell" that awaited them on April 11th.40 Cadet Kazem Yahyapour stated in an interview on the day he was forced to leave that he wished he could kiss everyone goodbye, and that, "friendships…made at Norwich will never be forgotten."41 The article also says that Cadet Yahyapour hugged Cadet Colonel William Elliott in a "symbolic gesture."42 This symbolic gesture represents the experiences Iranian cadets had at Norwich, and how their time was much different from that of their counterparts at other American universities, as Norwich welcomed 38 Yarbrough, "Federal Alienage Doctrine," 252-253. 39 "Fond Farewell to Iranian Students" Norwich Guidon. 40 "Fond Farewell to Iranian Students" Norwich Guidon. 41 "Fond Farewell to Iranian Students" Norwich Guidon. 42 "Fond Farewell to Iranian Students" Norwich Guidon. 14 these students with open arms despite the hard times in their country, when they could have turned against them as so many others in the US did at the time. Overall, the Norwich program tried incredibly hard to welcome the Iranians into the US by basing their training and education off of other programs in the US and using their misgivings to make their program the best they could be. The values of respect, tolerance, friendship, integrity, and hard work made people from different backgrounds, and even different countries, able to work together instead of hate one another when diplomatic ties between the two countries fell apart. This was not the case in the rest of the United States at the time, when tensions ran high among neighbors, and Iranian students were constantly on edge, wondering when the government was going to send them back to their revolution-torn homeland. Today, diplomatic ties still have not been reestablished, and the situation with Iran created a deeply divided society in which blame was able to be placed on anyone at any time based on where they came from, a sight not unseen throughout history before and since then. However, the precedent set by Norwich students during the crisis could be an example to the rest of the world of how people from different backgrounds can learn to work together when their two countries could not seem to get along. 15 Bibliography Primary Sources Arsalan M. Namdar, interview by Sarah Yahm, April 2, 2015, transcript, Norwich Voices Oral History Project, Norwich University Archives, Kreitzberg Library, Northfield, VT. • Arsalan Namdar was an IIN student at Norwich and faced the issue of deportation in April 1980. His oral history was recorded in 2015, and he looks back on his time at Norwich, as well as his experiences in the US in general and back home in Iran. Benjamin Heydary, interview by Sarah Yahm, Northbridge, MA, March 10, 2015, transcript, Norwich Voices Oral History Project, Norwich University Archives, Kreitzberg Library, Northfield, VT. • Heydary's oral history works alongside Namdar's oral history to describe what was going on at Norwich from 1976 to 1980 when they were both IIN cadets at Norwich. Heydary also explains how he got to Norwich and how he actually went back to do his military service under the Ayatollah before coming to the US. "Degree Status of Deported Iranian Students" Norwich University Record, May 1980. • The article describes a meeting with the Board of Trustees to determine the degree status of those Iranian seniors who were deported but who were supposed to graduate in May or in the summer. It states that they can get their degrees eventually once relations with Iran are restored, which to this day have yet to be formally restored. "Fond Farewell to Iranian Students" Norwich Guidon, May 10, 1980. • In an article written in the Guidon following the deportation of the Iranian students, the author describes the scene in the last few days the students were on campus. They note specifically that the Iranians had to leave because of the Executive Order issued by 16 President Carter on April 9th that all, "non-diplomatic and non-consular officials and employees of Iran in the U.S. leave no later than Friday April 11th." They state the overall good relations that everyone had on campus, even though the rest of the country was deeply divided along the lines of their country of origin. Grimes, Gerard. "Iranian Students at Norwich" Norwich Guidon, October 31, 1976. • A Guidon writer, Gerard Grimes, interviewed an Iranian recruit, Mohammad Zerehi, about his experiences and those of his fellow Iranians during their first year at Norwich. It describes the overall good treatment the students received, although this was before tensions rose too much between Iran and the US. Hart, Loring. "The President's Corner" Norwich University Record, March 1979. • The article describes President Loring Hart's views about the IIN students at Norwich at the time. He mentions how there is currently turmoil in the country, and that he wishes for peace. He also notes how many students are at Norwich and that Iranian women are now enrolled. "Iranian Students Come to Norwich" Norwich Guidon, May 6, 1976. • The article describes the beginning of the program at Norwich after the students arrived and some of their expectations overall, including some of the characteristics of the new students. Report from Deputy Commandant LTC Paul Lafond to President Loring Hart, 7 May 1976. Loring Edward Hart Records, Box 12, Norwich University Archives, Kreitzberg Library, Northfield, VT. • The report states the observations that LTC Lafond made when he went to VMI to go over their Iranian exchange program to see what would work best for Norwich. This 17 bases their program off of the VMI program, based on their mistakes and successes, including how the language barrier made a difference. "The Rest of the Story" Norwich University Record, Winter 2012. http://thenorwichrecord.com/the-rest-of-the-story/ [accessed 20 November 2019]. • This is a story from the alumni newspaper was written long after the Iranian students left campus. However, it takes into account the memories of IIN students of their time at Norwich, departure day, and what it was like going back to Iran. It paints a picture of the Iranian students on campus and when they left. Secondary Sources Chaichian, Mohammed A. "The New Phase of Globalization and Brain Drain: Migration of Educated and Skilled Iranians to the United States." International Journal of Social Economics 39, No. 2 (2012): 18-38. • Dr. Chaichian is a professor of sociology at Mount Mercy University. His article recognizes the "brain drain," which is the emigration of educated individuals that is currently occurring from Iran to other western nations, like the US. He states that this is caused not only by a shift in the internal structure of Iran and its acceptance of western-based education but also the international economic opportunities that are available outside of the country. Gannon, Frank. "25 July 1969: The Nixon Doctrine." https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2008/07/25-july-1969-the-nixon-doctrine/ [accessed 20 Nov 2019]. • This article makes note of President Nixon's words regarding the announcements he made about his plans for Asia, which explains what came to be known as the Nixon 18 Doctrine. He wanted to get away from using manpower and focus more on management and support for countries attempting to fight oppressive or communist regimes than by providing troops. Hamidreza, Arasteh. "A Follow-Up Study on U.S.-Trained Iranian Faculty Members: Satisfactions and Dissatisfactions." College Student Journal 43, No. 4 (Dec 2009): 1037- 1045. • Dr. Hamidreza is a professor of education and psychology at a university in Tehran, Iran, and his study is based on US-educated college faculty in Tehran, giving him access to the information. He notes some of the problems that US-educated faculty have because of the openness of American education and the structured, hierarchal nature of Iranian that do not always agree with each other. However, Iranian higher education is still based on the American system of higher education. Houghton, David Patrick. US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. • Dr. Houghton is a professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College and is an expert on US foreign policy. This book goes into depth about the actions taken both in Iran and the US to solve the Iranian Hostage Crisis, while also going into depth about the causes of the crisis from both perspectives. He analyzes how each group, Americans and Iranians, looked at the historical background of the situation and drew upon different events to support their reasoning for their actions during the crisis. The argument is that it was their own experiences that validated their analogies and their actions. The issue of foreign policy is brought up as there was no precedent for this, so 19 they analyze the information that was used as the basis of American and Iranian decisions. Kessel, John H. "The Structures of the Carter White House." American Journal of Political Science 27, No. 3 (Aug 1983): 431-463. • This article is from 1983 and was written shortly after President Carter left office. Professor Kessel was a distinguished scholar at Ohio State, and he interviewed the members of the Carter administration upon their phasing out, getting information straight from the source. He sets up what the Carter administration did, how it changed over time, and how the goals and interests of the President are carried out through his staff. It never uses the words "Iran Hostage Crisis" at all. Mobasher, Mohsen. "Cultural Trauma and Ethnic Identity Formation Among Iranian Immigrants in the United States." American Behavioral Scientist 50, No. 1 (Sept 2006): 100-117. • Dr. Mobasher is a professor of anthropology at the University of Houston. This article recognizes the shift in pride within Iranian immigrants to the United States during and after the crisis, and how it has affected them to this day. Because of their status as both Iranians and as Muslims, American society automatically looks down on them and makes assumptions, which puts them in a position to suppress their heritage and culture. Scott, Catherine V. "Bound for Glory: The Hostage Crisis as Captivity Narrative in Iran." International Studies Quarterly 44, No. 1 (Mar 2000): 177-188. • Scott is a professor of political science at Agnes Scott College. In her article she describes the use of the media to influence the stories coming out of crises, such as the Iran Hostage Crisis, that made America rally behind the hostages and the President as the 20 victims who were fighting brutal and vicious Islamic captors, changing the narrative for years to come. Shannon, Matthew K. "American-Iranian Alliances: International Education, Modernization, and Human Rights During the Pahlavi Era." Diplomatic History 39, No. 4 (Sept 2015): 661- 688. • Professor Shannon is educated at UNC and Temple and teaches history at Emory and Henry College. He also authored Losing Hearts and Minds about Iranian relations. Shannon tells the story of American-Iranian relations that began and ended with the shah. Iranian students in the US tried multiple times to get the US to dump the shah because of his authoritarian tendencies and campaign against human rights, although the US's international policy regarding them eventually failed. Shannon, Matthew K. Losing Hearts and Minds: American Iranian Relations and International Education During the Cold War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017. • By describing the events of the Iran Hostage Crisis and those that lead up to it, Shannon focuses on the importance of education throughout. He recognizes how the Iranian students that came to the US and went back helped to support the White Revolution and how all Iranian students, in turn, became voices for their country outside of its borders because they could not within. The main argument is that it was the students who inevitably brought about the Iranian Revolution and the actions that came with it due to their activeness in government, including how they used their American educations to further their causes and cause the destruction of US-Iranian relations. 21 • The book actually mentions the military programs at the SMCs that were in place and how they inevitably influenced the educational training aspect of both country's diplomacy towards one another. Teague, Will. "Hostages of the Crisis: Iranian Students in Arkansas, 1979-1981." The Arkansas Historical Quarterly 77, No. 2 (Summer 2018): 113-130. • When writing this journal article, Teague was a doctoral student of history at the University of Arkansas Fayetteville, so he had the access and resources to make a clear argument for examples within the state of Arkansas and its experience with Iranian students. He also uses sources from other universities, mostly throughout the South, which painted a picture of what protests were like and how often they occurred on college campuses with Iranian students. This can be used to compare Norwich to the rest of the country. He also adds some of the challenges that came up with deportation, and how America was trying to decide whether or not it was legal, which can be related to past events like Executive Order 9066 and even today with President Trump's Muslim ban. Yarbrough, Tinsley E. "Federal Alienage Doctrine and the Iranian Student Litigation." Human Rights Quarterly 4, No. 2 (Spring 1982): 243-260. • Tinsley Yarbrough is an expert on the mid-20th century US Supreme Court and has published numerous books and articles on the topic. By relating the Iranian student litigation in 1979 to numerous cases and rulings throughout the 20th century regarding immigration issues, he establishes a precedent for the decisions made that can be brought into question in the modern-day by explaining the arguments of the case against Section 214.5.
Podría presentar este trabajo de una manera muy sencilla, pero desapropiada seguramente para la ocasión y su finalidad, diciendo que: "es una cuestión de valores, o de principios para el caso que nos ocupa, y detrás de los buenos valores o principios siempre hay buenas personas", por ello este trabajo también está dedicado y dirigido a todas aquéllas buenas personas que hay en el Mundo, sobre todo a las que tienen o tendrán capacidad decisoria y de influencia en los asuntos públicos. La contratación pública constituye uno de los ámbitos vertebrales de la actuación administrativa, teniendo además un gran significado económico y a la vez social y medioambiental, no en vano representa aproximadamente un 19% del PIB de la Unión Europea y es una de las principales herramientas para luchar contra la crisis y lograr un desarrollo sostenible social, ambiental y económico. En un mundo tan globalizado e interrelacionado como en el que actualmente vivimos resulta complicado dudar de la existencia de un Derecho administrativo global, así como del trascendental impacto que el mismo tiene en los ordenamientos administrativos internos o nacionales. Autores como BENEDICT KINGSBURY, NICO KRISCH Y RICHARD B. STEWART, lo han puesto de manifiesto, de forma brillante, en trabajos como "El surgimiento del Derecho administrativo global". Así, como añadido y método de profundización de lo anterior uno de los objetos del presente estudio es realizar una reflexión sobre si la contratación pública puede considerarse uno más de los ámbitos o campos del Derecho que reflejan el proceso de formación, desarrollo y consolidación de este Derecho administrativo global, de forma que ello nos permita hablar, también en la actualidad, de la existencia de un Derecho global de los contratos públicos, pero no sólo eso sino también señalar a través de los principios generales que lo informan cuál es el camino que debería tomar en su desarrollo ese Derecho global de la contratación pública. A ello dedicamos la Parte Preliminar y el Capítulo I de este trabajo. Asimismo el presente trabajo está enfocado al estudio del sistema de Derecho de la Unión Europea y del sistema judicial compuesto de la Unión Europea como sistema administrativo y de la contratación pública global, con el fin de analizar, tanto los principios generales de ese Derecho de la Unión Europea, entre los que se incardinan los derechos fundamentales, como los distintos medios que tiene ese sistema judicial compuesto para la defensa de los derechos e intereses legítimos de los ciudadanos europeos y la tutela cautelar de esos derechos e intereses legítimos frente a las Leyes internas nacionales a priori incompatibles con el Derecho de la Unión Europea y sus principios generales. Del mismo modo, desde la perspectiva de los derechos de los ciudadanos de la Unión Europea, se aborda el constitucionalismo económico en la Unión Europea a través del estudio del intento fallido de implantación de una Constitución económica europea y las características de la misma, frente al éxito del Tratado llevado a cabo inmediatamente después, esto es, el Tratado de Lisboa, Tratado que constituye en estos momentos el último eslabón en el proyecto de integración europea. De esta forma, partiendo de esta premisa, y pasando por el constitucionalismo nacional español fruto de la influencia comunitaria, se ponen en solfa ambos textos comunitarios, uno fallido y otro actualmente en vigor, con un enfoque muy centrado en los derechos fundamentales y en los derechos e intereses legítimos de los ciudadanos y ciudadanas de la Unión Europea en el marco de ese sistema de Derecho y judicial compuesto de la Unión Europea. Siempre evidentemente bajo un enfoque muy centrado en ese Derecho global de la contratación pública, en este caso de la Unión Europea, cuestiones todas ellas a las que se dedica la Parte I de la obra compuesta por los capítulos II a V. También desde el marco de esa concepción global y ya en la Parte II de la obra, el Capítulo VI realiza una aproximación al sistema nacional de contratación pública español, cuya "alma máter", cuya madre nutricia, es el Derecho de la Unión Europea como Derecho global que en toda medida es del conjunto de los veintiocho Estados miembros que conforman la Unión y por tanto también de España. De forma que partiendo de la exposición de los pilares que sustentan al Derecho de la Unión Europea y que constituyen igualmente los paradigmas que hacen comprensible su interrelación con el Derecho español, se pasa a exponer las cuatro generaciones de Directivas en materia de contratación pública, así como el ordenamiento jurídico español en materia de contratación pública, para avocar finalmente en una visión constructiva a los principios generales que conforman ese ordenamiento jurídico interno y que conforman el anteproyecto de Ley de Contratos del Sector Público a la hora de incorporar la nueva generación de Directivas al ordenamiento doméstico nacional. Desde esa visión constructiva es cómo se clasifican acto seguido los distintos principios generales en función de su aceptación, separando a los que tienen un mayor grado de antigüedad y de aceptación; de aquéllos de nacimiento más reciente pero con un alto y fácil nivel de aceptación y a su vez de aquellos otros que inician su andadura con pretensiones de generalizarse, pero con muchas más dificultades que los segundos a la hora de ser aceptados. A estas tres categorías de principios se dedican los Capítulos siguientes de forma que el Capítulo VII afronta, por todos los demás de esta serie de principios de fácil aceptación, el estudio del principio vertebral de transparencia del que se estudian los antecedentes de este principio en la contratación pública, así como la influencia de la Ley de Transparencia, Acceso a la Información y Buen Gobierno desde el punto de vista de su incidencia en la normativa sectorial de contratación pública. El Capítulo VIII, se dedica sin embargo antes que al segundo grupo al tercer grupo de principios generales antes clasificados, por su mayor necesidad, de forma que se enfrentan en este Capítulo las llamadas propuestas, esto es, los principios generales de promoción del desarrollo humano y de promoción de la sostenibilidad ambiental que se encuentran en el seno del primero de los principios generales de todo Derecho, el derecho a la vida. La línea argumentaría de estos principios se continúa en este caso, respecto de todo lo abundando con anterioridad a lo largo del estudio, desde el desarrollo de la óptica de lo que yo denomino actualmente 'aspectos' socio-laborales y medioambientales en la contratación pública y, especialmente a título simplemente de ejemplo, respecto a la consideración de la igualdad de género como aspecto social en el marco de las políticas de contratación pública. Para ello se pone el énfasis en cuáles son las claves actuales para la correcta utilización de estos aspectos en la praxis de la contratación pública. Acercándonos ya a la última de las clasificaciones de principios generales que nos quedaba por tratar, en el Capítulo IX y nuevamente desde una conceptualización global del Derecho de la contratación pública se va descendiendo en la disciplina hasta, a través del principio general de vigencia tecnológica, llegar a la contratación pública electrónica, de manera que sobre esta última se realiza una exposición de la génesis normativa, esto es, de los antecedentes normativos tanto del sistema comunitario como nacional que han contribuido al nuevo sistema de contratación pública electrónica que se plantea en el ámbito de los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea. Del mismo modo se muestra la regulación existente actualmente en contratación pública en materia de medios electrónicos, con especial referencia por su potencialidad futura al perfil de contratante; haciendo hincapié, por último en la parte final de este Capítulo, en el calendario de implantación obligatoria de la contratación pública electrónica y en el contenido normativo y aplicación práctica que esta implantación obligatoria por etapas conlleva a los sistemas nacionales de contratación de los Estados miembros que forman parte del sistema global de contratación pública de la Unión Europea. La Parte III de la obra es consecuencia de la necesidad de atajar una lesividad común que se da en la práctica de la contratación pública a los principios generales que conforman el primer grupo de principios expuestos. Así, la aprobación del texto refundido de la Ley de Contratos del Sector Público con sus ingentes modificaciones y más recientemente de la última generación de Directivas en materia de contratación pública y su obligatoria transposición, obligan a los juristas y profesionales de la contratación pública a ampliar sus conocimientos en esta materia, resultando trascendental en este sentido saber diferenciar correctamente las figuras jurídicas de los convenios de colaboración, las encomiendas de gestión y los contratos públicos, porque la errónea tipificación contractual del negocio jurídico en cuestión, tiene como consecuencia la coartación de raíz de los principios generales de la contratación pública comúnmente aceptados y la no legitimación del régimen jurídico que se haya aplicado al contrato y por tanto la invalidez de este, algo de una enorme trascendencia práctica. Idéntica situación se produce en la correcta calificación de los contratos de servicios de los de gestión de servicios públicos. He ahí la importancia práctica del tema elegido y el objetivo del mismo a colación de la gran novedad en el Derecho global de la contratación pública de la Unión Europea, cuál es la regulación por primera vez de las concesiones de servicios. Por ello, en los siguientes Capítulos de la obra la nueva generación de Directivas está, si cabe, cada vez más presente, dedicando en todo caso un epígrafe a la nueva regulación que establecen. Es por ello, que partiendo en esta Parte III de un Capítulo iniciático, el X, que nos permita diferenciar a los contratos públicos de otras figuras afines como son los convenios y las encomiendas de gestión, logramos llegar a la figura del contrato administrativo, para una vez en ella proceder al estudio detallado a lo largo de los dos Capítulos siguientes, XI y XII, de las características propias de los contratos administrativos típicos de servicios y de gestión de servicios públicos, con el objetivo último de llegar a un capítulo final de esta Parte III, el XIII, que nos concluye tanto las diferencias teóricas como prácticas existentes entre estos dos tipos de contratos, de manera que nos permitan de forma clara y concisa diferenciarlos, sobre todo en el aspecto práctico por resultar el más complicado. De este modo, el objetivo del Capítulo X es acometer un estudio basado en la jurisprudencia y en la escuela consultiva que, existente sobre los contratos públicos, nos permita diferenciar claramente cuáles son las posibilidades de uso y aplicación que otorgan las distintas figuras jurídicas de los convenios de colaboración, los encargos o encomiendas de gestión y los propios contratos públicos, a efectos de delimitar las fronteras que diferencian estos negocios jurídicos, como paso previo al estudio y diferenciación último de los contratos administrativos típicos de servicios y gestión de servicios públicos. Por su parte, el Capítulo XI tiene por objeto conocer en profundidad el contrato administrativo típico de servicios mediante el estudio en detalle de sus características y régimen jurídico propio, todo ello a través del análisis normativo de los preceptos que lo regulan, pero también a través de la delimitación que de sus fronteras han establecido la doctrina jurisprudencial, los informes de las juntas de contratación administrativas y las resoluciones de los tribunales administrativos propios de la contratación pública. Idéntico objetivo al que posee el Capítulo XII, en este caso, respecto del contrato administrativo típico de gestión de servicios públicos. Por último para cerrar esta tercera Parte de la obra, a través del Capítulo XIII se consigue finalmente delimitar las fronteras que diferencian los contratos de servicios y los contratos de concesión de servicios, que es donde realmente está el quid de la confusión, de forma que ello permite realizar una correcta diferenciación teórica y práctica de los mismos, analizando cuáles son los elementos prácticos decisivos de esta diferenciación e indicando aquéllos otros que carecen de relevancia para esta determinación práctica, todo ello apoyado nuevamente en una abundantísima casuística jurisprudencial y consultiva. En resumen, podemos decir que esta tercera Parte de la obra nos proporciona con detalle, a más de, inicialmente, las características diferenciadoras de las figuras de los convenios administrativos, las encomiendas de gestión y los contratos administrativos, todas las peculiaridades y características que de los contratos de servicios y los contratos de gestión de servicios públicos recoge la normativa y su interpretación por la jurisprudencia, permitiendo de esta manera, en último lugar, diferenciar con nitidez, no sólo el contrato administrativo de servicios del contrato administrativo de gestión de servicios públicos, sino y sobre todo, dentro de estos últimos, del de concesión de servicios, tanto en su vertiente teórica como, especialmente, práctica. Ya que en la justificación de esa relevancia práctica de todo el trabajo, se ha optado por afrontar un estudio más empírico basado en el análisis de la Jurisprudencia, tanto la de la Unión Europea como la propia nacional; de las Resoluciones o Acuerdos de los distintos Tribunales Administrativos de Recursos Contractuales, así como los de otros órganos como puedan ser el Tribunal de Cuentas español; de los Dictámenes e Informes de las Juntas Consultivas de Contratación Administrativa o de otros órganos consultivos o con funciones de informe, como es el caso del Consejo de Estado o la Abogacía del Estado, respectivamente; y también de los pronunciamientos en materia de contratos públicos de los distintos órganos del entramado orgánica de la administración global de la Unión Europea, a saber el Defensor del Pueblo, el Tribunal de Cuentas, el Comité de las Regiones, el Comité Económico y Social Europeo, etc., llegando al estudio y análisis de un cuarto de millar de referencias y, todo ello, con el apoyo permanente del estudio de una seleccionada bibliografía en las que todas las menciones que se han hecho están incluidas en notas al pie de página, de forma que no existe una sola referencia bibliográfica que no tenga su cita individualizada. Es de este modo como a través de la Bibliografía y del Anexo I se recoge lo anteriormente expuesto, enumerando hasta 174 referencias bibliográficas principales y 225 referencias prácticas principales, figurando a mayores incluidas a lo largo de la obra, en ambos casos, también referencias que no han sido consideradas para su inclusión en ambos listados. Además, el trabajo se completa con un Anexo II en el que se recogen otros recursos Web principalmente consultados. Para terminar esta presentación del trabajo he querido dejar precisamente la Parte Final del estudio, en la que se recoge la conclusión reflexiva que como decía al inicio: es una cuestión de principios. CONCLUSIÓN REFLEXIVA No es una, sino muchas, las conclusiones a las que se ha ido llegando después de este estudio, sirvan a título de ejemplo el resumen de las principales: 1. Hemos sentado la existencia de un Derecho administrativo global con un ya consolidado Derecho global de la contratación pública como parte integrante y fundamental del primero. Pero hemos observado una importante carencia respecto de sus principios generales a la que nos referiremos posteriormente y también en el plano organizativo, porque pese a la existencia de un Administración global multifacética, es notoria la carencia de una jurisdicción global administrativa, con competencia global, que ponga cerco a este Derecho global administrativo y de la contratación pública. Estaríamos hablando de una jurisdicción global de carácter contencioso-administrativo, al igual que la encontramos en otros ámbitos como el penal o el de los derechos humanos, siendo preciso que, al menos al caso de estudio que nos ocupa, tuviera competencias en el orden de las contrataciones públicas de carácter internacional, al modo de lo que ocurre en la Unión Europea con el TJUE. 2. El análisis del conjunto del Derecho global administrativo de la Unión Europea desde una perspectiva general y también organizacional de su Administración global, para conocer y entender el Derecho global de la contratación pública de la Unión Europea, al objeto de presentar las posibilidades que el mismo otorga a los ciudadanos para la defensa de sus derechos e intereses legítimos en este sistema de Derecho y judicial compuesto de la Unión, entre ellos sus derechos e intereses en el campo de la contratación pública, ya sea como operadores económicos, como beneficiarios, usuarios o destinatarios de los contratos públicos o como simples ciudadanos en general que se puedan de algún modo ver favorecidos por las compras públicas, presentando a su vez estos derechos e intereses legítimos como derecho de contraposición al más predominante constitucionalismo económico en la Unión Europea. 3. El retrato de la nueva configuración de la transparencia en la contratación pública, con ese plus de exigencia a nuestra primera Ley de Transparencia a la hora de fijar las lagunas o deficiencias que para la publicidad activa y el cumplimiento del principio de transparencia pueda tener la norma, en la falta también de coordinación entre la misma y el resto de normas sectoriales a las que afecta, particularmente con el TRLCSP en el caso de los contratos públicos, a riesgo no obstante de que se produzca falta de efectividad en la aplicación de las nuevas obligaciones de publicidad y donde he subrayado también el papel preferente que el perfil de contratante puede cumplir como herramienta de publicidad, de forma que garantice un auténtico derecho de toda la ciudadanía a acceder a una información pública de calidad que asegure el conocimiento y el control que se realiza de los recursos que son de todos. También en esta como en otras materias que hemos señalado a lo largo del trabajo, es el momento oportuno de corregir, con la oportuna transposición de las nuevas Directivas, las deficiencias aquí planteadas. 4. La importante determinación de las claves jurídicas y prácticas para la correcta utilización de los 'aspectos' socio-laborales y medioambientales de forma que su uso no devenga incorrecto e inservible por parte de los poderes adjudicadores que los utilicen. Claves que permiten aprovechar las oportunidades que la contratación pública otorga a los poderes públicos como instrumento para influir positivamente en la protección del medioambiente y de los sectores más desfavorecidos de la sociedad. Claves que pasan por: Primero, hacer una meridiana diferenciación entre las distintas fases del procedimiento de adjudicación de los contratos públicos a la hora de utilizar estas herramientas. Segundo, diferenciar nítidamente la existencia de un grupo de aspectos (cláusulas) sociales y medioambientales que tienen carácter general y son aplicables en todos los contratos públicos, de otro grupo que tiene un carácter más específico, más delimitado, más ceñido en su uso, que se podrán incluir en aquellas licitaciones en que el medioambiente o el aspecto social pretendido sea parte o constituya el propio objeto del contrato, siendo el grado de exigencia de cumplimiento de requisitos mayor para este segundo grupo. Entendiendo que ambos tipos de cláusulas pueden utilizarse complementariamente en un mismo contrato. Tercero, subordinar el alcance de lo que disponga la normativa sectorial referida al medioambiente o a cuestiones sociales y que es ajena a la contratación pública, a la conformidad de lo dispuesto por la legislación contractual-administrativa, actuando esta última en materia de contratos públicos como límite a la transversalidad de las políticas ambientales y sociales. Cuarto, destacar que el impacto que el medioambiente y los aspectos sociales en general tienen en la vida de las personas a través de diversas esferas o ámbitos, siendo uno de esos ámbitos el denominado espacio público, en el que le corresponde intervenir a la acción pública, es el que motiva la aplicación de criterios medioambientales y sociales en el marco de la contratación pública. 5. La ubicación del principio de vigencia tecnológica, poco conocido como tal, y de todos los beneficios que para la contratación pública y en particular la contratación pública electrónica nos traerán: Denunciando la laxitud al respecto de la normativa anterior y el tiempo y ahorro perdido en aras de la consecución de estos beneficios, estimados en millones de euros. Ahorros significativos que permiten a la sociedad un desarrollo equilibrado, igualitario y más sostenible, mejorando los resultados al permitir también a los poderes adjudicadores evitar, detectar y corregir los errores derivados de una interpretación incorrecta de las normas de contratación pública, consiguiendo al mismo tiempo una herramienta estadística, de control del gasto y de control automatizado previo y coetáneo, extraordinaria para la gobernanza económica a efectos de impulsar la buena gestión, la eficacia y la transparencia, la libertad de acceso a la información, la igualdad y no discriminación, la publicidad y la necesaria ausencia de corrupción, permitiendo en definitiva destinar esos ahorros a otros sectores más básicos y necesitados de la sociedad. Abundando en esos beneficios que nos reporta la contratación pública electrónica, ya que centraliza la información y permite así compartirla con mayor agilidad; automatiza los procedimientos de conformidad con la normativa haciéndolos más simplificados y más y mejor documentados, regidos y controlados, permitiendo por ejemplo controles automatizados o la detección de alertas; consiguiendo unos contratos públicos más accesibles a través de la eliminación de las barreras geográficas y también físicas, incrementando de este modo la concurrencia competitiva y por tanto no sólo el ahorro económico resultante de esta competencia, sino también la mejora de los servicios y una mayor especialización, que como consecuencia también provocan una mejora de la eficiencia y de la eficacia, con el consiguiente ahorro directo en logística y a su vez, nuevamente, en costes, tanto para la Administración como para los operadores económicos; consiguiendo al mismo tiempo con la eliminación y automatización de todas estas tareas burocráticas un ahorro estimable de tiempo que se podrá dedicar a otras actividades más productivas; suponiendo igualmente una fuente invaluable de información que permite optimizar los recursos; por último supone un aumento de la garantía de los tan importantes e imprescindibles principios generales de la contratación pública. Plasmando el calendario de implantación de la contratación pública electrónica que la nueva Directiva clásica sobre contratación pública impone. De forma que en un primer término pretende que a partir de la fecha límite de transposición, 18 de abril de 2016, el uso de las tecnologías de la información y las comunicaciones electrónicas sean obligatorios en lo que respecta a determinadas fases del procedimiento. Para después culminar de forma obligatoria la transición a la contratación electrónica en la Unión Europea: en un segundo término fijado en el 18 de abril de 2017 para las centrales de contratación; en un tercer término establecido el 18 de abril de 2018, para dilatar la aplicación de lo dispuesto al respecto del documento europeo único de contratación y su ofrecimiento exclusivamente en formato electrónico; y en un cuarto y definitivo momento, para todos los órganos de contratación, en el día 18 de octubre de 2018, con el objetivo último de conseguir una contratación pública electrónica de principio a fin en la que todas las fases del procedimiento se llevan a cabo por medios electrónicos como mecanismo estándar de comunicación. 6. La elemental diferenciación de tres figuras jurídicas bien distintas y no alternativas: los convenios administrativos, las encomiendas de gestión y los contratos públicos en aras de la salvaguarda anticipada de los principios generales habitualmente aplicables a la contratación pública. Primero, distinguiendo que el núcleo de la cuestión que nos ocupa está focalizado en realizar una correcta utilización de la figura de los convenios administrativos, para lo que resultará imprescindible saber diferenciar muy bien esta figura de otras figuras análogas como las encomiendas de gestión y los contratos públicos, al objeto de conocer ceñidamente cuál es la delgada línea roja que marca las fronteras de uso entre las mismas, teniendo en cuenta que su distinta utilización supone importantes consecuencias prácticas. De forma que el estudio nos permite concluir que los convenios se diferencian de las encomiendas de gestión, en que en los primeros, las partes, no tienen por qué pertenecer a la misma esfera pública como sí ocurre en las encomiendas de gestión; además, son consecuencia de un libre acuerdo de voluntades entre las partes en pie de igualdad en busca un interés común, mientras que en las encomiendas de gestión, es el poder adjudicador el que controla la voluntad del ente instrumental, sin necesidad de acuerdo de voluntades. Siendo así que los contratos públicos se diferencian, a su vez, de los convenios en que el acuerdo de voluntades ha de ser de naturaleza contractual, lo que por definición lleva aparejada una contraposición de intereses de carácter oneroso, mientras que en los convenios la regla debe ser la cooperación real para la consecución de algún objetivo de interés común, además de que, en virtud del TRLCSP, no pueden tener el mismo objeto prestacional que los contratos públicos. Es igualmente este acuerdo de voluntades, de carácter oneroso en los contratos, el que diferencia a los mismos de las encomiendas de gestión, donde ya hemos visto que no existe acuerdo de voluntades alguno. Segundo, que las conclusiones a las que podemos llegar para realizar esa correcta utilización de la figura de los convenios administrativos, son que estando incluido el objeto del supuesto convenio dentro de la delimitación de los distintos tipos contractuales, hay que concluir necesariamente que nos encontramos en el marco jurídico de un contrato público, lo que conlleva que no pueden equipararse a los convenios de colaboración a los efectos de la dispensa de someterse a los principios y normas de la contratación pública. Asimismo, sólo se puede huir de los principios generales de la contratación pública a través de la figura de las encomiendas de gestión si se dan los dos criterios Teckal, que consisten en que, acumulativamente, el ente territorial ejerza sobre la persona de que se trate un control análogo al que ejerce sobre sus propios servicios y esta persona realice la parte esencial de su actividad con el ente o los entes a que pertenece. Tercero, que las soluciones pasan, la primera y principal, en el caso de los convenios de colaboración, por la creación de un verdadero régimen jurídico propio de esta figura legal en el que se regule ampliamente la misma, tanto para el caso de convenios con personas públicas como privadas, de forma que se regule su concepto legal, se le diferencie de figuras similares, se fijen sus ámbitos subjetivos y objetivos, su procedimiento y también la habilitación normativa tanto por razón del órgano como por razón de la materia, para la firma de un convenio. Mientras que para el caso de las encomiendas de gestión pasa por elaborar unas pautas de carácter obligatorio que sirvan de guía al gestor público para hacer un uso adecuado de este instrumento, mediante la definición de las características y requisitos que debe reunir cada tipo de encomienda de gestión, la enumeración de los documentos que deben acompañar su tramitación y la comprobación de que se cumplen todos los requerimientos legales para usar correctamente este instrumento jurídico, cuestiones que hoy en día también brillan por su ausencia. A partir de aquí vendría ya la aplicación práctica de estas nuevas regulaciones jurídicas, de una manera mucho más fácil y amparada en el tan importante principio de seguridad jurídica. 7. La definición que del estudio jurisprudencial se ha obtenido del concepto de 'servicio público' del que podemos deducir los elementos que definen un servicio público, ya que: debe tratarse de una actividad administrativa de prestación; el titular de tal actividad debe ser una Administración; la prestación debe estar sometida a un régimen de Derecho Público y la prestación debe ser ejercitada de una manera regular y continua. 8. La concreción metódica del concepto jurídico indeterminado de 'autoridad inherente a los poderes públicos', equiparando la misma a las funciones específicas del Estado y de las colectividades que pueden ser asimiladas, como por ejemplo son las fuerzas armadas, las fuerzas y cuerpos de seguridad del Estado, la magistratura, la Administración fiscal y la diplomacia, pero con necesidad de añadir un grado más de exigencia respecto de las funciones que corresponden al empleado público conforme se va ascendiendo en los distintos Cuerpos o Escalas, de forma que realmente para ejercer esta autoridad inherente a los poderes públicos se deberán en puridad realizar funciones o trabajos que suponga el ejercicio de potestades públicas o funciones públicas de autoridad, o sea, que dicho añadido se corresponde en realidad con ser depositario de una autoridad o potestad pública y no con el simple hecho de ser un empleado público perteneciente a alguna de las colectividades aludidas. 9. El análisis de la doctrina del 'factum principis', como sistema de equilibrio económico del contrato en la modificación de los contratos de gestión de servicios públicos, procediendo calcular la compensación para el restablecimiento del equilibrio económico, por ejemplo de una concesión, siendo el poder adjudicador el que deba acordar el modo más adecuado de hacerla efectiva y observando que es viable jurídicamente el restablecimiento del equilibrio económico del contrato que puedan plantear las empresas concesionarias si se incardinan en los criterios jurídicos expuestos acerca de la doctrina del 'Hecho del Príncipe'. 10. El punto y final a la considerable inseguridad jurídica acerca de hasta qué punto los contratos celebrados por los poderes adjudicadores deben estar reglamentados por las normas sobre concesiones, distinguiendo meridianamente los contratos típicos de servicios y de gestión de servicios públicos, relacionando a modo conclusivo no sólo sus diferencias teóricas de régimen jurídico y acentuando la importancia práctica de su correcta aplicación, sino llegando a la conclusión final, que lo que caracteriza en el plano práctico a las concesiones de servicios, a diferencia de los contrato de servicios, es que el contratista asume el riesgo y ventura de la explotación de los servicios percibiendo como contrapartida una retribución por el uso del servicio abonada ya sea por los usuarios, por terceros o incluso por la propia Administración contratante; pero, eso sí, una retribución vinculada estrechamente al propio riesgo y ventura en la explotación del servicio por el contratista, y quedándonos la duda sobre qué hará nuestro legislador nacional nuevamente con el resto de modalidades de los contratos de gestión de servicios públicos que, diferentes a la concesión, no han estado reguladas antes en el Derecho de la Unión Europea, ni lo están ahora en la cuarta generación de Directivas sobre contratación pública. Conclusiva, sin embargo todas estas conclusiones avocan en todo momento en este estudio hacia una misma dirección e idea, la utilización del Derecho administrativo como herramienta de los poderes públicos para la promoción del desarrollo del ser humano y su dignidad en base al primero de los principios generales que debería estar presente en cualquier rama del Derecho, en especial del Derecho público, el derecho a la vida, entendiendo a la contratación como la más potente de las herramientas jurídicas de actuación administrativa que sirve para hacer efectivo este desarrollo digno del ser humano y ello por el ya conocido potencial económico que proyecta el Derecho de la contratación pública. El Derecho administrativo como uno de los máximos exponentes del Derecho público y en su marco el Derecho de la contratación pública por su importancia económica cuantitativa, deben por imperativo legal y moral estar dirigidos al desarrollo del ser humano y a todas las facetas implícitas a este derecho. Es sólo a través de los principios generales del Derecho, esencia misma de todo Derecho, omnipotentes y omnipresentes, como podemos lograr nuevamente en nuestras sociedades que el Derecho público, el Derecho administrativo, el Derecho de la contratación pública se dirijan hacia la consecución de la dignidad de sus verdaderos destinatarios, las sociedades en su conjunto y la población que la forma. En una realidad globalizada como la nuestra, en la que hemos dado por manifiesta la existencia de un Derecho administrativo global; también de un Derecho global de la contratación pública, que aunque en proceso de expansión contribuye generosamente a la consolidación de ese Derecho administrativo global; y en la que los principios generales del Derecho y de la contratación pública se erigen como principios-guía que conforman el elemento integrador de ese marco global, resulta ineludible abundar en el arraigo de aquéllos principios-guías que hagan que el Derecho público, el Derecho administrativo, el Derecho de la contratación pública, tanto en el ámbito global, como regional y local, cumplan el que es el objetivo de la acción pública y política, el desarrollo de la persona, del ciudadano, del ser humano y de todos los derechos inalienables e inherentes a su condición. Es de este modo como los principios generales de la contratación pública son la pieza nuclear del Derecho de la contratación pública y a la vez la mejor herramienta para el equilibrio de los distintos intereses en el seno de esta disciplina, al objeto de corregir a tiempo la dirección a seguir como contraposición a la actual vertiente eminentemente económica, sin caer al momento en la trampa de pensar en el carácter ficticio de esta idea. La importancia fundamental en todo Derecho que hoy revisten los principios generales es por todos conocida y reconocida y ha sido expuesta con ahínco a lo largo de esta obra, de ahí deriva también la importancia de su positivización en el Derecho escrito, en aras no sólo de esa mayor seguridad jurídica, sino también de su presencia en las mentes y conciencias de todos los operadores del Derecho de la contratación pública. Los principios generales de la contratación pública constituyen los verdaderos cimientos y pilares de este Derecho, ya que sirven como criterio de interpretación de las normas escritas, para colmar las lagunas o vacíos normativos, y para constituir el medio más idóneo de asegurar la unidad dentro de la pluralidad de preceptos que se aplican en las Administraciones Públicas y poderes adjudicadores. Son, en definitiva, el fundamento y origen de todas las normas, principalidad que les confiere preeminencia frente a otras fuentes del Derecho. Cimientos y pilares, en definitiva, que se instalan en el respeto del ser humano o en la naturaleza de las cosas. Hemos clasificado a los principios generales de la contratación pública en función de su aceptación a través de tres grupos: por un lado los que tienen un mayor grado de antigüedad y de aceptación pacífica (libre circulación de mercancías, el derecho de establecimiento, la libre prestación de servicios, la no discriminación y la igualdad de trato, la transparencia, la proporcionalidad, el reconocimiento mutuo, la publicidad y la concurrencia competitiva y muchos otros enumerados a lo largo de este trabajo); por otro lado, aquéllos de nacimiento más reciente pero con un alto y fácil nivel de aceptación (por ejemplo el ya referido principio de vigencia tecnológica claramente unido a la contratación pública electrónica) y, por un tercer lado, aquellos otros que son inherentes al ordenamiento jurídico, que lo inspiran, lo informan, que son innatos al mismo pero que deben tener un impulso en su difusión y defensa con el ánimo de generalizarlos y que formen parte del primer grupo. Es en este tercer grupo en el que encuadramos como auténticos principios generales en todo su ser a los principios de promoción del desarrollo humano y de promoción de la sostenibilidad ambiental, ya sea sin olvidar que como principios-guía entre los principios generales se encuentran reconocidos los derechos fundamentales de las personas, porque no podremos hablar del carácter social y medioambiental de la contratación pública, ni de los principios generales de desarrollo humano y sostenibilidad ambiental sin antes saber si están garantizados los derechos del ser humano. Si bien este punto de vista puede parecer ilusorio, lo cierto es que el Derecho público, el Derecho administrativo, el Derecho de la contratación pública en sus concepciones global, regional o local debe estar enfocado al respeto de los derechos del ser humano y al respeto del medio ambiente en mejora de un medioambiente sano y saludable y de la calidad de vida, del mismo que está impregnado por los principios generales comúnmente aceptados aludidos anteriormente respecto del primer grupo de principios. Es de este modo que desde el primer Capítulo de esta obra se ha venido enfocando la aplicación de la contratación pública desde un punto de vista socio-laboral y medioambiental, como instrumento de progreso económico, social y medioambiental en manos de los poderes públicos y al servicio de los ciudadanos. Creo, por consiguiente, que para conseguir un Derecho global, regional y local de la contratación pública y de esta forma un Derecho administrativo global, regional y local más justos, y por tanto basados también en el principio de justicia, no se debería limitar, como entiendo que viene ocurriendo, estos Derechos hacia una proyección eminentemente económica de los mismos, de modo que se avance hacia la consecución de Estados y situaciones de Derecho global, regional y local más sociales y democráticas como contraposición al actual Derecho de corte predominantemente económico, sin que esta idea, a través de la importancia económica y social que la contratación pública supone, deba, como he dicho, necesariamente ser tachada de descabellada porque es necesario añadir, como se ha venido motivando reiteradamente, que estos principios generales de desarrollo humano y sostenibilidad ambiental en absoluto están reñidos con el carácter marcadamente económico que hoy se busca dar a la contratación pública, dando lugar precisamente a un crecimiento social, ambiental y económico también, más sostenible. Es realmente en este juego de intereses en el que entran en práctica técnicas como el proteccionismo, que merece siquiera en las siguientes líneas una mínima mención. Es inevitable escuchar voces a favor de la mayor de las igualdades para los oferentes o licitadores, esto es una tónica en el seno de las relaciones comerciales internacionales de la Unión Europea, pero debemos tener presente que los principios generales de la contratación pública también deben estar pensados y dirigidos a los destinatarios y usuarios finales de esos bienes y servicios, las sociedades y los individuos que las forman, ese es mi parecer, y que por tanto ese principio de igualdad también debe ser trasladado en la contratación pública a las sociedades equilibrando a través de este mismo principio allí donde haya desigualdades. En eso consiste precisamente también la esencia de los principios generales, en la utilización adaptada al caso concreto y no en la interpretación sesgada y unilateral de los mismos. De ahí el empeño de la Unión Europea por ejemplo en combatir el proteccionismo nacional en los Acuerdos de Libre Comercio que afectan a la contratación pública global, pudiendo ocurrir no obstante que la realidad sobre el terreno sea bien distinta. Parámetros que si no se respetan, justifican y motivan sobradamente el proteccionismo de regiones, naciones y territorios, normalmente en el corto plazo y para circunstancias específicas. Por ello la cooperación y el libre comercio global en contratación pública debe ser beneficiosa para todas las partes y no configurarse a través de meros instrumentos de adhesión al más poderoso, sino que esos instrumentos, normas y acuerdos deben guiarse también por los principios generales de desarrollo humano y sostenibilidad ambiental, atendiendo las desigualdades existentes entre los miembros de cada región desde la óptica social y medioambiental de cada uno y en aras también de la proyección de ese principio de igualdad de oportunidades, consiguiendo así la expansión de la contratación pública global mediante el establecimiento de derechos y obligaciones multilaterales y bilaterales equilibradas y no abusivas. Sólo así cabrá la crítica justificada al proteccionismo local. Como hemos ido viendo, gran parte de este estudio está dedicado precisamente al Derecho global administrativo y de la contratación pública de la Unión Europea, ergo al sistema nacional de contratación pública español como fiduciario que es del primero. A ellos debemos también referirnos a continuación en esta conclusión reflexiva. Sabemos que la Unión Europea es la mayor economía mundial, el primer exportador e importador mundial y también el principal origen y destino de inversión extranjera. Con aproximadamente el 7% de la población mundial, genera más de la cuarta parte del PIB global. Es en definitiva la región líder del comercio internacional y mundial. Es por tanto fundamentalmente a ella a la que le corresponde jugar un papel primordial y tomar opción o no en lo defendido en este trabajo hasta el momento. El ordenamiento jurídico comunitario es el auténtico fundamento de la Unión Europea y confiere a ésta su carácter de comunidad de Derecho social y democrática, dado que la contribución de este ordenamiento a la solución de los problemas políticos, económicos y sociales de los Estados miembros es incuestionable. Nadie puede negar la paz que ha traído a Europa. Este ordenamiento jurídico está amparado por una consolidada estructura orgánica, por una Administración global de la Unión que entre otras funciones hace las veces de fuente material del Derecho de la Unión Europea. Sólo a través de la creación de este nuevo Derecho y su salvaguardia pueden realizarse los objetivos perseguidos con la creación de la Unión Europea. El ordenamiento jurídico comunitario ya ha realizado grandes logros en este sentido, muchos de ellos expuestos a lo largo del trabajo y que no procede recuperar aquí, lo cual no obsta para que no haya elementos en los que también quepa mejorar: es enormemente criticable el marcado carácter económico que ha adquirido en las últimas décadas, más que nunca si cabe, esta organización supranacional alejándose de su carácter de comunidad de Derecho social. El ordenamiento jurídico comunitario y la comunidad de Derecho que se fundamenta en él sólo pueden sobrevivir si se garantiza su respeto y su protección. Los garantes jurídicos de ello son los tres pilares del ordenamiento jurídico comunitario: su autonomía, su aplicabilidad directa y la primacía de este último sobre los Derechos nacionales. Porque la construcción de una Unión Europa se fundamenta en unos principios vertebrales con los que los Estados miembros se tienen obligatoriamente que comprometer y cuya aplicación se confía a las instituciones de la Unión, entre ellas al TJUE que es el garante del ordenamiento jurídico Comunitario, asistido en esa labor por los sistemas jurídicos nacionales. Principios vertebrales, por tanto, cuya existencia y mantenimiento son defendidos decididamente por el TJUE, que garantiza la validez uniforme y prioritaria del Derecho de la Unión Europea en todos los Estados miembros y en campos como el de la contratación pública. En consecuencia, el Alto Tribunal Europeo es una institución que ha jugado y juega un papel decisivo en el desarrollo de ese ordenamiento jurídico comunitario y por ende de los ordenamientos jurídicos nacionales de los distintos Estados miembros, desarrollo que se debe en buena parte a los principios instaurados por el TJUE a lo largo de su práctica judicial en defensa, entre otros bienes protegidos, de los derechos e intereses legítimos de los ciudadanos de la Unión Europea. Es por ello que a pesar de todas las lagunas y ambigüedades, que al igual que a otros ordenamientos jurídicos caracterizan al ordenamiento jurídico comunitario, la contribución de éste ordenamiento y, por consiguiente, del Acervo Comunitario a la defensa de los derechos e intereses legítimos de los habitantes de la Unión Europea y a la solución de los problemas políticos, económicos y sociales de los Estados miembros y de sus ciudadanos no deja de ser también de un valor excepcional que merece ser nuevamente destacado. Es así como el TJUE ha contribuido también a integrar y armonizar los Derechos nacionales de los distintos Estados miembros a favor de una normativa más igualitaria y fundada en los clásicos principios generales de la contratación pública y cada vez más, en los que considero venideros principios generales que entiendo se acabarán por instaurar, de promoción del desarrollo humano y de promoción de la sostenibilidad ambiental, que han tenido y tienen sus primeras manifestaciones en los aspectos sociales (socio-laborales) y medioambientales, criterios o cláusulas por las que se hace una decidida, aunque como hemos visto debatible y todavía insuficiente apuesta por parte de la nueva generación de Directivas de contratación pública de la Unión Europea. De este modo, el TJUE ha formulado en muchas ocasiones principios generales, unas veces como desarrollo de categorías ya contempladas normativamente y otras suponiendo una construcción 'ex novo' ante el silencio normativo al respecto. Ese es el caso de la evolución normativa que se ha venido produciendo con respeto a los denominados aspectos socio-laborales y medioambientales, sin llegar a la fuerza jurídica de principios generales. Pues bien, es el momento de destacar nuevamente que entre los principios generales formulados reiteradamente por el TJUE dentro de todo el conjunto del Derecho de la Unión Europea se encuentran los derechos fundamentales de las personas. De este modo al declarar el Tribunal de Justicia que los derechos fundamentales forman parte de los principios generales del derecho, ha contribuido a elevar los niveles de protección y seguridad de estos derechos fundamentales y de estos principios generales. Principios generales cuyo respeto el Tribunal impone no sólo a las instituciones comunitarias, sino también a todas las autoridades nacionales encargadas de aplicar el Derecho de la Unión Europea. Encontrándonos con que el Derecho de la contratación pública no es una rama, ni una materia ajena a los derechos fundamentales y tampoco al resto de principios generales del Derecho, por lo que todos ellos son aplicables por consiguiente al ámbito de la contratación pública y a los procedimientos administrativos de adjudicación derivados de las compras públicas. Llegados a esta realidad nos encontramos con otra, la óptica desde la que son observados con generalidad los principios generales de la contratación pública. Son dos o tres los sujetos, las partes, en un contrato público, por un lado siempre nos encontramos con el poder adjudicador y el contratista, siendo que muchas de las veces hay una tercera parte que son los destinatarios de esos contratos pública, tercera parte que opino se podría pensar está siempre presente, ya que aunque el destinatario del contrato sea el propio poder adjudicador, éste siempre tiene como objetivos unos fines públicos para los que fue creado y que repercuten en las sociedades. Ocurre que los principios generales que hemos ubicado en el primer grupo (que son podríamos decir todos los existentes en el Derecho positivo), los comúnmente aceptados, son vistos desde la única óptica subjetiva de las dos primeras partes de los contratos públicos a las que me he referido, poderes adjudicadores y contratistas, ignorando por tanto los beneficiarios finales de esos contratos. Pondré como ejemplo por todos los demás principios al principio de igualdad. Mucho se ha hablado y escrito sobre este principio general en la contratación pública enfocado por regla general desde el predominante punto de vista de igualdad de acceso a las licitaciones por parte de los operadores económicos. Pues bien, es factible pensar en la posibilidad de interpretar el principio de igualdad desde la única óptica de la igualdad en el acceso al mercado y a los contratos públicos de los licitadores y proveedores, por ejemplo extranjeros en el marco del Derecho global, o bien cabe también la posibilidad de prolongar ese principio de igualdad de oportunidades, como yo lo entiendo, hacia la fase de ejecución de los contratos públicos y por tanto extrapolar dicho principio en aplicación también de las ventajas o desventajas de los beneficiarios y usuarios de los Acuerdos de Libre Comercio y de los contratos públicos de ellos derivados. Lo mismo podríamos decir del principio de transparencia, tradicionalmente pensado en la contratación pública desde el prisma de la publicidad del contrato para el cumplimiento del principio de igualdad entre los oferentes y de publicidad, y sólo más recientemente pensado en la contratación pública como derecho a la información que tenemos todos los ciudadanos de conocer el uso y destino que se da al dinero que es de todos, que es básicamente como ha sido tratado este principio general en el Capítulo de esta obra dedicado a él. Es este por tanto el mismo ejercicio que tenemos que hacer con el resto de principios de los tres grupos de principios generales enunciados y en definitiva con el Derecho de la contratación pública, el Derecho administrativo y el Derecho público en toda su dimensión. Es decir, la mayor parte de los principios generales de la contratación pública que actualmente se plasman por escrito en las distintas normas y que forman por tanto parte de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico positivo han sido planteados y valorados, podríamos decir simplificadamente, desde la visión de las primeras fases del procedimiento de adjudicación de los contratos públicos, esto es, desde las fases de admisión y adjudicación del contrato, enfocados casi únicamente a las personas del poder adjudicador y contratista. Ello ha supuesto la omisión de la concepción de los principios generales en la fase de ejecución de los contratos, históricamente la menor regulada de todas en el ámbito del Derecho de la contratación pública, de forma que podríamos afirmar también casi taxativamente que los únicos principios que se han pensado para esta fase tienen que ver más con la vertiente económica que con cualquier otra perspectiva, como es el ejemplo de la inclusión en el artículo 1 del TRLCSP, como pórtico del sistema de contratación pública español y en compañía con los principios generales del primer grupo, del objetivo de estabilidad presupuestaria y control del gasto. Se omite pues la responsabilidad social corporativa que más que a nadie le corresponde sea exigida a los poderes públicos, la responsabilidad social y medioambiental como pórtico también del Derecho de la contratación pública, principios generales dirigidos claramente a esa tercera persona que forma parte de los contratos públicos, los usuarios, destinatarios y beneficiarios finales, o sea, la sociedad en su conjunto y los individuos que la forman, los contribuyentes si lo preferimos e incorporamos la perspectiva económica, los cuáles también son titulares de derechos. Como hemos ido viendo el último eslabón en el marco normativo de la contratación pública en el Derecho de la Unión Europea lo forman las nuevas Directivas 2014/23, 24 y 25. Los Estados miembros tienen la obligación de transponerlas como máximo el 16 de abril de 2016 y la previsión en España es que se incumpla como tantas otras veces anteriores este mandato. La doctrina coincide en que es un excelente momento para mejorar el marco normativo y el sistema de contratación pública nacional. Los actuales anteproyectos de Ley de Contratos del Sector Público y sobre procedimientos de contratación en los sectores especiales así lo auguran. Así ocurre por ejemplo con respecto a los principios generales, en los que en muchas ocasiones los nuevos textos en su versión actual son más garantistas que las Directivas de contratación pública. Si bien, como digo habrá que esperar al resultado último de los textos finales que puedan resultar de las postrimerías de una legislatura y del inicio de otra. No obstante, es necesario seguir profundizando en esta disertación hacía el cumplimiento del objetivo último de la acción pública y política, la persona, a través de una suma constructiva a los principios generales de la contratación pública del Derecho de la Unión Europea y del Derecho español. Reiteraré nuevamente la manifiesta y generalizada aceptación de determinados principios generales y su consubstancialidad a la contratación pública, ubicados en los primeros considerandos o preceptos tanto de las normas comunitarias como españolas. Sin embargo, no es nada habitual en nuestros ordenamientos (podríamos afirmar que es inédito) que se defienda la inclusión de los principios generales de desarrollo humano y sostenibilidad ambiental, haciendo valer de esta forma con carácter imperativo otra clase de principios generales que hoy por hoy todavía constituyen, voy a decir, 'empeños'. Me he posicionado claramente a lo largo de este estudio, dentro del marco del ordenamiento jurídico de la Unión Europea y nacional, a favor de la defensa de los derechos fundamentales de las personas por encima de los intereses económicos particulares, sabiendo que el principio de desarrollo ambiental sostenible es un derecho fundamental más. Pues bien, del mismo modo que el actual Anteproyecto de Ley de Contratos del Sector Público es en ocasiones más garantista a lo exigido por la nueva generación de Directivas a transponer, así por ejemplo en lo concerniente a los principios generales, resulta también el momento oportuno para introducir en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico estos principios generales encuadrándolos expresamente dentro del artículo primero de la nueva Ley de Contratos del Sector Público. Dicho 'ex professo' lo anterior, es evidente la existencia de los aspectos sociales o socio-laborales y medioambientales en la contratación pública, si bien su aplicabilidad real no sea la que podría ser. Aspectos respecto de los cuales también se ahonda en este estudio poniendo de manifiesto los problemas futuros de aplicación que traerá la nueva normativa, lo que hace dudar de su manifestado espíritu en pro de su utilización, así por ejemplo en la fase de ejecución del contrato al fijar un inexorable vínculo con el objeto contractual que hasta ahora no era exigido. Sabemos que estos aspectos de la contratación pública son ubicables en las tres fases de los procedimientos de adjudicación, entendiendo por las mismas la fase de admisión, la de valoración/adjudicación y la de ejecución y que era precisamente en la última de las fases en la que su utilización era más viable. Quiero destacar ahora antes de continuar, el abismo normativo, teórico y práctico, que existe entre aspectos (cláusulas o criterios) sociales y medioambientales y unos verdaderos principios generales, ya que las diferencias entre unos y otros son evidentes, pasando de primera mano por el carácter potestativo de los aspectos y no así del carácter obligatorio y consustancial al concepto de principio general que tendría el desarrollo humano y la sostenibilidad ambiental. Pero además, es necesario e imprescindible destacar, que al igual, en su origen, que el resto de principios generales comúnmente aceptados y conocidos por todos, estos dos principios que he enunciado no son en puridad creaciones 'ex novo', ya que forman parte del ordenamiento jurídico positivo expreso de algunos otros Estados como por ejemplo Perú o República Dominicana, cuya constitución recoge el principio de sostenibilidad ambiental en la contratación pública. Si los principios generales de la contratación pública, que ya hemos adelantando cuál es su carácter de esencia de todo Derecho, son también el fundamento de la misma y se caracterizan por su transversalidad, ya que alcanzan a todos los contratos, independientemente de su cuantía, de su naturaleza jurídica de administrativos o privados, manifestándose asimismo en todas las fases del procedimiento de contratación, es que podríamos incluir con los mismos efectos los principios generales de desarrollo humano y sostenibilidad ambiental como verdaderos principios-guía del marco normativo de la contratación pública. Pues bien, es igualmente que estos principios ya son principios generales del ordenamiento jurídico de la Unión y de España, porque son intrínsecos a los mismos, resta ahora desvelarlos, generalizarlos y potenciarlos, haciéndolos en primer lugar visibles en el Derecho positivo español ahora que está pendiente la transposición de las últimas Directivas, avanzando un paso adelante en lo establecido al respecto por el ordenamiento de la Unión. Permitiéndome el atrevimiento en este mismo instante de avanzar en esta defensa primigenia de los principios generales de promoción del desarrollo humano y de promoción de la sostenibilidad ambiental en el ámbito del Derecho global de la contratación pública, de la Unión Europea y del Derecho español de contratación pública, que quizás más tarde que temprano se acaben por implantar en el Derecho global, pero dónde seguro más temprano que tarde acabarán implantándose es en el ámbito espacial del Derecho global de la contratación pública en la Unión Europea, de forma que puede que dichos principios se tornen en obligatorios en la próxima (quinta) generación de Directivas de la Unión Europea en materia de contratación pública a través de la plasmación imperativa de los hoy llamados criterios o cláusulas sociales (socio-laborales) y medioambientales, sino incluso antes, de forma más reducida y sesgada aunque no expresa, en la venidera transposición al ordenamiento jurídico interno nacional español de la que es ahora la cuarta de generación de Directivas sobre contratación pública, Directivas 2014/23/UE, 2014/24/UE y 2014/25/UE. Del estudio realizado esa es la tendencia que proyecta seguir el ordenamiento jurídico comunitario, ergo, español. Porque si estos dos principios ya son parte en realidad de nuestros ordenamientos jurídicos (comunitario y nacional) porque no incluirlos entonces también expresamente en la contratación pública al nivel jurídico, interpretativo y dogmático de principios generales. Reconocidos, como se ha demostrado en el estudio, estos principios generales de promoción del desarrollo humano y de sostenibilidad ambiental por el TJUE, los encontramos también en los Tratados de la Unión, como el de Ámsterdam, el de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea o el último de los Tratados, el de Lisboa; en la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea con rango de Derecho primario; como obligatorios los acoge igualmente Constitución española y todos los tratados y acuerdos internacionales ratificados por España que forman parte de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico interno. Porque todas las normas de ámbito global, regional o nacional estudiadas y citadas en este trabajo, que buscan una acción positiva a favor del medioambiente o de los aspectos sociales, encuentran cobijo, como no podía ser de otra forma y dentro del pleno respecto al principio de primacía del Derecho de la Unión Europea, en nuestra Constitución, incardinándose al amparo del mandato contenido por ejemplo en sus artículos 10, 14, 15 y 45.2 y del derecho que recoge el apartado primero de este mismo precepto constitucional, de forma que es lícito promover por las Administraciones Públicas y poderes adjudicadores como interés general los aspectos medioambientales y sociales en el marco de las políticas de contratación pública. Siendo que estos principios generales como he venido reiteradamente defendiendo resultan legales, obligatorios, necesarios y rentables social, medioambiental y económicamente a corto, medio y largo plazo, constituyendo en la antesala del ordenamiento jurídico de la contratación pública la herramienta que permita promover las condiciones para que la libertad y la igualdad del individuo y de los grupos en que se integra sean reales y efectivas; remover los obstáculos que impidan o dificulten su plenitud y facilitar la participación de todos los ciudadanos en la vida política, económica, cultural y social y cumplir con el mandato imperativo que marca, sin ir más allá de nuestras fronteras, nuestro ordenamiento jurídico en el artículo 9.2 de su norma suprema. Es decir, no es ni siquiera necesario descifrar estos principios generales en el conjunto de nuestros ordenamientos, están presentes pero en cierta medida obviados, olvidados, máxime en una materia que supone aproximadamente de media el 25% de la ejecución del presupuesto de gasto de las Administraciones Públicas. Requieren, por consiguiente, de un impulso, defensa, promoción y aspiración para ser consignados expresamente de manera positiva en el ordenamiento jurídico de la contratación pública, en igualdad de lugar y condiciones que otros principios generales totalmente aceptados. Se trata de principios generales que son legales porque se encuentran incorporados en los pilares de las normas fundamentales de la Unión Europea y de España y obligatorios porque como obligatorios los acogen también los mandatos que realizan a los poderes públicos ambos ordenamientos jurídicos a través de sus normas más supremas y fundamentales. Su carácter de necesario es una realidad global, regional y local que nos sobrepasa como individuos diariamente. Su también necesaria e imprescindible rentabilidad se justifica porque en el equilibrio de las poblaciones sociales y del medioambiente se encuentra en definitiva el desarrollo sostenible, económico también, de los pueblos y los Estados. Pero si su existencia en el ordenamiento jurídico es tan manifiesta, por qué incluirlos expresamente. Entonces por qué hemos incluido el resto de principios generales del primer grupo si se encontraban en la misma situación: por qué tienen un perfil más económico, los aquí patrocinados también, consiguiendo, a la vez, ese crecimiento social, ambiental y económico sostenible. Por lo tanto he aquí mi apuesta y mi crítica constructiva. Nos encontramos en el momento idóneo para introducir y plasmar como Derecho positivo los principios generales de desarrollo humano y de sostenibilidad ambiental en el marco nacional de las normas de contratación pública, haciéndolos de este modo visibles, omnipotentes y omnipresentes en los actuares de los órganos de contratación y en las mentes y conciencias de los políticos, de los gestores y de los operadores jurídicos y económicos de los contratos públicos. A nadie se le escapa ya la existencia de los otros principios generales, los por todos conocidos y aceptados, y sí a muchos todavía los hoy todavía denominados 'aspectos' socio-laborales y medioambientales. Esta es una realidad cotidiana, muy utilizada también por quienes infravaloran esta concepción del Derecho administrativo y del Derecho de la contratación pública, para qué exigir con respecto al adecuado cumplimiento de las normas sociales, laborales y medioambientales si ya todo está en el resto del ordenamiento jurídico, si bien la experiencia determina que no se detienen a reflexionar que sí se exija, sin embargo, la honorabilidad del licitador desde el punto de vista deudor de la Hacienda Pública o de la Seguridad Social si también son ya obligaciones que establece la correspondiente normativa. La misma limitada visión que supone el creer por los órganos de contratación que no les compete, cuando en realidad las competencias de una Administración Pública, de un poder público, no son compartimentos estancos que se agotan en la unidad u órgano creado al efecto, sino que abarcan y obligan al conjunto de la Administración o poder público como persona jurídica única, pensemos por ejemplo en las competencias de medioambiente, de igualdad de la mujer, de menores, de personas con discapacidad, de bienestar social, de empleo y un largo etcétera, son competencias de todos, son competencias transversales, amparadas además por la obligación de acción de los poderes públicos contenida en el artículo 9.2 de la Constitución española. Es así que he abogado al inicio de este estudio por la inclusión de estos principios generales en el ordenamiento jurídico global de la contratación pública, en el Derecho de la Unión Europea y en el sistema de contratación pública español. Ocurriendo que para este último se ubica el momento perfecto con la incorporación de las nuevas Directivas y la aprobación de la que será nuestra próxima normativa nacional sobre contratación administrativa, todavía en trámite. Como anteriormente señalé, hemos perdido un preciado tiempo en la implantación de la contratación electrónica favorecedora de los principios generales también por sus posibilidades de transparencia. Seguro que otro tiempo maravilloso perderemos también en el Derecho de la Unión Europea de la contratación pública para la implantación de los principios generales que ahora defiendo, confiando en que este hecho se produzca. No perdamos pues la extraordinaria la oportunidad que se nos brinda con la transposición de las nuevas Directivas incorporando a nuestro sistema nacional de contratación pública estos novedosos principios generales en el ámbito de la contratación pública, puede que adelantándonos así a otros actores, dando ejemplo y haciendo justicia social y medioambiental con el dinero que es de todos. Porque, en conclusión, la inclusión en nuestro Derecho positivo más actual de estos principios de promoción del desarrollo humano y de promoción de la sostenibilidad ambiental, depende únicamente de las personas que tienen la capacidad de decidir e influir en las normas de contratación pública y del esfuerzo que las mismas hagan en tal sentido, porque si nadie se cuestiona la inclusión en el pórtico de la normativa de contratación pública del principio general de eficiencia en conexión con el objetivo de estabilidad presupuestaria y de control del gasto; si es posible también establecer en los contratos públicos un objetivo basado en el 100% en el aspecto económico, por qué cuestionarse entonces la inclusión y existencia de estos principios generales que como mandato obligatorio nos imponen nuestros ordenamientos jurídicos si los mismos resultan a su vez rentables para el conjunto de la sociedad formada por todos nosotros. Empecemos, por tanto, a corregir la trayectoria y tendencia del actual Derecho administrativo y de la contratación pública por el principio, por los principios.
The American Civil War is one of the defining events in American history. Abundant studies cover every aspect of the conflict, from strategic analysis to the material culture of uniforms. Even with thousands of academic studies, each adding a new interpretation, there remains still unexplored territory. This study's objective is to expand upon and connect these previous interpretations to produce another tier in understanding a specific chapter of the war. The question posed centers on not the Confederate strengths but the Federal weaknesses. Research shows how the failure and limitations of Union strategy, policy, and the inability to logistically sustain massive offensives opened the way for the Confederacy to capitalize on, and turn the tide of the war. Furthermore, how did the Confederate strategies both militarily and politically have the greatest success and influence on the Kentucky and Maryland Campaigns and the overall outcome of the war? ; Master of Arts in Military History ; Capstone Autumn 1862 The High Tide of the Confederacy Colin E. Zimmerman A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Military History Norwich University MH562 Capstone Paper Dr. Wesley Moody 23-August-2020. 2 Thesis: The American Civil War is one of the defining events in American history. Abundant studies cover every aspect of the conflict, from strategic analysis to the material culture of uniforms. Even with thousands of academic studies, each adding a new interpretation, there remains still unexplored territory. This study's objective is to expand upon and connect these previous interpretations to produce another tier in understanding a specific chapter of the war. The question posed centers on not the Confederate strengths but the Federal weaknesses. Research shows how the failure and limitations of Union strategy, policy, and the inability to logistically sustain massive offensives opened the way for the Confederacy to capitalize on, and turn the tide of the war. Furthermore, how did the Confederate strategies both militarily and politically have the greatest success and influence on the Kentucky and Maryland Campaigns and the overall outcome of the war? It will be necessary to answer this question through a multilayered approach. Instead of viewing the Kentucky and Maryland campaigns on the tactical level, which has already consumed most of the historiography on the topic, this study will instead find an explanation to this question through political, logistical, organizational, leadership personalities, and economic components and how they dictated the overall strategic picture and framework. When synthesizing all these components together, one potential answer generates: the grand Confederate offensive in the autumn of 1862, a direct result of botched Federal strategic measures and limitations, divided political policies, and the Union's struggling logistical capabilities; indicated the high tide of the Confederacy. Through battlefield victories and seizing the initiative in direct and indirect courses, Confederate leadership allowed the Southern field armies to exploit the Federal weaknesses culminating in the Kentucky and Maryland campaigns. 3 These campaigns offered the Confederacy its only realistic chance of ending the war on political and strategic terms that favored the South. An examination of each specific component and its relation to the Confederate high tide's theory is therefore essential to back this new interpretation. Political Factors of the North, South, and Europe; and its Benefit to the Confederacy in 1862: All wars, especially civil wars, are political in their foundation, influence, and execution. In "On War," Carl von Clausewitz states that "the political object, as the original motive of the War, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and the amount of effort to be made." 1 This axiom applies to events in the autumn of 1862 since political factors dominated the motivation of strategy. The Confederacy's legitimacy resided within its field armies continued existence. Their ability to gain military victories that supported both the strategic and political realms was the essential component that needed to be sustained if the South was to remain independent. The North was in a completely different predicament, as the rival political factions, Republican's and Democrat's, each with its own opinion on the objective goals and the conduct of the war, could not in the early phase of the war come to common ground as to what the specific nature, cause, plan, and purpose of the Civil War was. The North was a nation at war without complete unification of mind, and purpose, which presented a weakness that could ultimately undo its efforts. Complicating matters for President Abraham Lincoln, and his party's agenda, was the fact the Northern Democratic party held just over 45% of the popular vote of free and border states in the 1860 election. 2 In short, the President and his administration existed only in a 1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Translated by Colonel J.J. Graham. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, 2004. 10. 2 James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 506. 4 narrow margin and needed to conduct the war in a way suitable to keep the two very different mindsets exhibited by both the Republicans and Democrats in agreement. The Kentucky and Maryland campaigns occurred while changing Republican ideas on the persecution of the war and mid-term congressional elections, which proved to be a significant juncture in Northern and foreign politics. To be sure, the summer and fall of 1862 were extremely delicate times for Lincoln and the Republicans, and they could not afford any negative setbacks. Lacking any precedent to draw on, the Lincoln Administration delicately approached the rebellion by seeking the destruction of Confederate armies and exempting the Southern population from the burdens of war by respecting the civilians' constitutional rights and property. Historian Mark Grimsley captured the conviction of the policy by pointing out that the Lincoln administration renounced any intention of attacking slavery; and the government's assumption that most white Southerners were lukewarm about secession, and if handled with forbearance, would withdraw their allegiance from the Confederacy once Union armies entered their midst. 3 This policy known as conciliation, therefore, served as the beat to which Union forces marched off to war. Not all Northern generals and radical Republicans embraced this; however, the policy served as the first step in an evolutionary process that would eventually culminate in "hard-war." The effects of conciliation created favorable conditions for the Confederacy from which they were able to exploit the "limited war" shortcomings of the Union and surge forward into the fall offensive and their high tide. These shortcomings manifest in several different forms: leadership, strategic limitation, and foreign and domestic political pressure. Unfortunately for the 3 Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 3. 5 Union, the combination of these factors exposed themselves in a negative light nearly all simultaneously, creating a perfect opportunity for the Confederates to take advantage of the drawbacks and pursue victory. Fueling the fire was the Lincoln Administration's policy regarding the appointment of military governors in captured territory. The issue arose when these cities, such as Nashville, were turned into massive supply centers for Union armies, resulting in intense rivalries between city and country, neighboring communities, and whites and blacks as they competed for jobs and dominance. 4 Henry Halleck, George McClellan, Don Carlos Buell, the key leaders of the Federal armies in 1862, generated the most immediate consequences stemming from the shortcomings of conciliation from as these three adherents to firm Democratic principles and military strategy are most responsible for creating the opportunity for a Confederate offensive. Generals Halleck, McClellan, and Buell are often portrayed by historians as lacking the "killer instinct," especially when compared to Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Phil Sheridan. However, a more accurate analysis finds them as men who followed the conciliation policy almost to the letter for political, personal, or logistical reasons. Halleck himself wrote the Elements of Military Art and Science, where he harped on the capture of strategic points, incurring the least number of casualties and damage as possible as the primary strategy of winning a war. Ironically, Halleck, the most influential Union general in 1862, believed that warfare was unjustifiable in most cases and should only be conducted with the utmost caution. 5 As General in Chief, Halleck had a significant influence on the conduct of operations of the Union forces. Each of these three 4 Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War, 35-36; Scott Nelson and Carol Sheriff, A People of War: Civilians and Soldiers in America's Civil War, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 88. The reference to negative leadership refers to the actions of Nathaniel Lyon and Francis Blair; who introduced "harsh" measures in 1861 prematurely which led to a brutal guerilla war and other political ramifications. 5 Henry Wagner Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science: Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactics of Battle, Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers, Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia, Third Edition, New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1862. 7-9. 6 commanders prescribed to similar variants of Halleck's theory, whose universal core value of caution above all else acted as the catalyst to create the conditions for the Confederacy to crest in the fall of 1862. While the reigns of military success were in McClellan's and Buell's hands during the Maryland and Kentucky campaigns; Halleck made two major errors in 1862 that are directly responsible for igniting the Confederate offensives. The first was his overabundance of caution in taking Corinth, allowing the Confederates to slip away and then failing to retain the initiative by pushing to Vicksburg while simultaneously failing to capture Chattanooga. The second major failure was his inability to harness his granted power and force McClellan to speedily and effectively send his army to the aid of John Pope, eliminating any opportunity for a combined assault on Lee's smaller army. 6 The Democratic principles these generals prescribed to differed in many respects from Lincoln and the Republican agenda on the idea of the war. Each strongly believed in the preservation of the Union yet favored winning the war by the least drastic measures, the least number of casualties, and on a platform acceptable to their Democratic party beliefs. 7 For instance, McClellan wrote Buell, upon the latter's elevation to command of the Army of the Ohio: "bear in mind that we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union and to uphold the power of General Government….be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us & the rebels." 8 Additionally, Generals Pope, Grant, and Rosecrans, who likely weren't as politically polarized as the former three, contributed to the growing political dissension in 1862 in their own right. Therefore, by their actions, federal military leadership did more to subvert the Union military from ending the war quickly and 6 Russel F. Weigley, A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861-1865, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000. 135-136. It is arguable whether or not the Army of the Potomac could have arrived in its entirety rapidly enough to join with Pope. However, personal and in-house political agendas did not move the efficiency along any faster. 7 Weigley, A Great Civil War, xix-xxi. 8 Grimsley, 64. 7 dividing political tension based on faction theology more than any other public figures in 1862. One of the more notable incidents that fit into the framework of subversion was Grant's debacle at Shiloh, which brought strong opposition from anti-war Democrats, causing cautious leaders such as Halleck and McClellan to tighten their grip and fear repeat attacks. Most detrimental in this respect was the administration's and Halleck's decision to temporarily bench Grant during the Corinth episode, then subsequently leaving him in a position where he could not act with his usual aggressiveness against Stirling Price and Earl Van Dorn. Before his removal as General in Chief, George McClellan wrote Halleck then in charge of western forces, "The future success of our cause demands that proceedings such as Grant's should at once be checked. Generals must observe discipline as well as private soldiers. Do not hesitate to arrest him at once if the good of service requires it, & place CF Smith in command." 9 Grant's "recklessness" at Shiloh created quite the stir on the home front, which as a result, political rivals of the Lincoln Administration, sought to break down Grant as a way to spread discontent and fit the anti-war platform. They harped on the high number of casualties, the surprise of the Confederate attack, and the black eye to the seemingly unstoppable Union war machine. The backlash reached Washington, prompting a response from the Administration. In a telegram to Halleck, Secretary of War Stanton wrote, "The President desires to know why you have made no official report to this department respecting the late battles of Pittsburg landing. And whether any neglect or misconduct of General Grant or any other officer contributed to the sad casualties that befell our forces on Sunday." 10 The battle of Shiloh became the first political debacle that militarily opened the door for the Confederacy to take the offensive in the fall of 1862. 9 Nancy Scott Anderson and Dwight Anderson, The Generals: Ulysses. S. Grant and Robert E. Lee, Avenel: New Jersey, 1987. 230. 10 Anderson, The Generals, 241. 8 The most immediate politically charged consequence materialized in Halleck's handling of the advance on Corinth, which exemplified his standard cautiousness with added paranoia of avoiding another repeat of Shiloh. 11 The delicate politically charged caution continued even after the successful capture of Corinth in Halleck's decision to send Buell, over Pope or Grant to seize Chattanooga. Halleck's snail-like cautious advance on Corinth, and the decision to send Buell to Chattanooga, allowed the disorganized Confederate army to withdraw from Corinth, establish a new commander in the form of Braxton Bragg, who in turn brought reorganization, discipline, and professionalization to the Army of Mississippi; which proved to be the genesis of Bragg and Smith having the ability to advance into Tennessee and Kentucky. 12 Military shortcomings turned political disasters in the Eastern Theater during the summer of 1862, soon overshadowed Shiloh, and added dramatic momentum and opportunity to the rise of the Confederate high tide in the war's primary theater. McClellan and his Army of the Potomac, having suffered political harassment in late 1861 into the spring of 1862, began their downward political spiral with the Army of the Potomac's loss of initiative and strategic defeat during the Seven Days Battles on the Peninsula. The setbacks along the James River coupled with the black eye at Shiloh, and the defeat of Federal forces in the Shenandoah Valley in the spring of 1862 had devastating political effects, which left the North and European powers believing that all hope for the Union resided with McClellan and his Army of the Potomac. The proximity of the Union and Confederate capitals made the Eastern theater a hot spot for journalists and policymakers on both sides, who saw the region as the deciding factor in the Civil War's outcome. This army's setback at the gates of Richmond did more to influence how events 11 Larry J. Daniel, Days of Glory: The Army of the Cumberland, 1861-1865, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006. 85. 12 Thomas Lawrence Connelly, Army of the Heartland: The Army of Tennessee, 1861-1862, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001. 188-194. 9 unfolded in the east in 1862 in both the strategic and political sense, both foreign and domestic. 13 The shortcomings on the Peninsula stymied the Union's hope to quickly end the war while making the voices of "Peace Democrats" louder and the political situation even more delicate. As if the Lincoln Administration did not already have enough burdens, both England and France, whose neutrality was necessary for the Union war effort, began to openly question the North's ability to subdue the South and end the rebellion. 14 Stonewall Jackson's brilliant campaign in the Valley, coupled with the Army of Northern Virginia's ferocious performance on the Peninsula elevated Southern patriotism, and simultaneously dampened Northern morale, convincing many on both sides that Southern victory was achievable. 15 Colonel Charles Marshall, Lee's Assistant Adjutant General believed that Robert E. Lee's emergence onto the scene was the greatest benefit to the Southern cause. He equated Lee's leadership on the Peninsula to that of a color bearer bravely advancing his banner towards the enemy. On political matters Marshall correctly believed that the Northern people were impatient for a speedy victory and that the Federal Government expressed this sentiment in its policy on conducting the war. However, this policy was forcefully and forever altered with the aggressive Lee's emergence onto the scene, whose plan called for carrying on the war indefinitely until the Confederacy achieved victory. Marshall outlined this plan as designed to, "frustrate the enemy's designs; to break up campaigns undertaken with vast expense and with confident assurance of success; to impress upon the minds of Northern people the conviction that they must prepare for a protracted struggle, great sacrifices of life and treasure, with the possibility that all might at last be of no 13 Stephen W. Sears, To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992. 355. 14 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 554-555. 15 Peter Cozzens, Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008. 507-508. 10 avail; and to accomplish this at the smallest cost to the Confederacy." 16 This leadership change at such a critical moment proved to be the dawn of turning Confederate fortunes in the east. Public opinion and political reactions to the Union failure on the Peninsula were mixed; however, strong opposition towards McClellan emerged and created discord among the rival Democrats and Republicans, each of whom found outlets to accuse the other of the responsibility of the campaign's failure. 17 Amid this political turmoil, Lincoln, in an effort to offset the discord introduced Major General John Pope, who only managed to escalate political dissension to a fever pitch with his disastrous Northern Virginia campaign. 18 In the Western Theater, the emergence of Braxton Bragg also came at a critical juncture in juxtaposition with the events occurring in the east. Bragg took command of the Army of Mississippi at one of its darkest hours, and through exemplary organizational skills, reshaped the Army of Mississippi into a professional, disciplined force capable of delivering a lethal blow. With such a force, Bragg was able to look to more risky opportunities that would offset the Union strategic gains in the west and regain Tennessee and perhaps set the stage for Kentucky.19 Private Sam Watkins of the 1st Tennessee recorded the positive change in morale from the melancholy atmosphere at Corinth to when new lifeblood in the army emerged. "We were in an ecstasy akin to heaven. We were happy; the troops were jubilant; our manhood blood pulsated more warmly; our patriotism was awakened; our pride was renewed and stood ready for any emergency; we felt that one Southern man could whip twenty Yankees. All was lovely and 16 Charles Marshall, Lees Aide-De-Camp: Being the Papers of Colonel Charles Marshall Sometime Aide-De-Camp, Military Secretary, and Assistant Adjutant General on the Staff of Robert E. Lee, 1862-1865, Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, and Frederick Maurice, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000. 74. 17 Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 346-347. 18 John J. Hennessy, Return to Bull Run: The Battle and Campaign of Second Manassas. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999. 468-472. 19 Earl J. Hess, Banners to the Breeze: the Kentucky Campaign, Corinth, and Stones River, Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2010. 19-22. 11 the goose hung high." 20 Although the Confederates had suffered initial setbacks early in 1862, the advantages afforded by conciliation, cautious Federal leadership, and the emergence of Lee and Bragg allowed for a reversal of fortunes. In 1862 Southern patriotism was running high; the idea of independence and the Confederate soldier's superiority was at its wartime peak. 21 Lee's decision to invade Maryland was political in nature. Maryland Campaign historians, Joseph Harsh, Scot Hartwig, Stephen Sears, James Murfin, and Ezra Carman while differing on strategic matters, all agree that Lee's primary purpose was to secure a decisive victory which would gain the South the political victory; either in the form of Northern domestic politics or international recognition and or intervention. The application of political pressure to Lee's offensive outweighs all the deficiencies faced by his army in the logistical realm, and further illustrated his grasp on the delicacy of Northern political division. Clearly, he understood this division and had faith that his smaller, ill-supplied force had a chance to deliver a blow that would fracture the Northern populace and produce an outcome that favored the South. General Lee suggested his understanding of such matters in a letter to President Jefferson Davis while in Dranesville on September 3. "The present seems to be the most propitious time since the commencement of the war for the Confederate Army to enter Maryland.….if it is ever desired to give material aid to Maryland and afford her and opportunity of throwing off the oppression to which she is now subject, this would seem the most favorable." 22 The domestic and foreign political objectives acting as primary motives for the "invasion," were in that instant equal to the strategic goals which accompanied them when 20 Samuel R. Watkins, Company Aytch or A Side Show of the Big Show: A Memoir of the Civil War. Edited by Ruth Hill Fulton McAllister. Nashville, TN: Turner, 2011. 45. 21 Joseph T. Glatthaar, General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse, New York: Free Press, 2008. 207; James Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Edited by Ned Bradford. New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979. 263. 22 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 19. Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. 590. 12 defining the military value of the campaign; this is a unique feature to the Maryland Campaign and its condition for victory, while only a secondary task in Kentucky. In contrast historian Edwin Coddington paints a different picture for Lee's purposes in the Pennsylvania Campaign of 1863. Coddington outlined that Lee, in this part of the war, contended with the new Federal doctrine of "hard war" and emancipation, eliminating the decisive battle matched with the political advantage that existed in 1862. Therefore, Lee's only real option was to defeat the Army of the Potomac in detail, earning a strategic victory rather than a political one. 23 Such a task required adequate logistics, and a complete and total battlefield victory, two factors that eluded the Confederacy during the war. Such victory conditions presented to Lee in 1862 were unique and would never materialize again in any substantial form. Political division in the North was at fever pitch in the late summer of 1862; evidence of the discord's depth is apparent in everything from personal letters through Northern news outlets. Robert E. Lee, an avid reader of Northern papers, understood this notion and sought to exploit it. Domestically, Northern Democrats maintained a loud voice in critical regions and states, which only grew more robust and more resilient with each military shortcoming and failure. August and early September saw a heightened level of panic and discouragement in the North, with Pope's defeat and Lee's invasion of Maryland, while at the same time Kirby Smith's Confederate Army of Kentucky demonstrated against Cincinnati. Pennsylvania was understandably the most unnerved due to its proximity to Maryland and vital war infrastructure, and its Republican governor Andrew Curtin's demand for 80,000 troops to defend his state embodied it. Additionally, the mayors of the influential northern cities of Harrisburg, Philadelphia, and 23 Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, New York: Simon and Schuster. 1968. 6-7. 13 Baltimore were alarmed, fearing their respective city was the target of Lee's advancing legions.24 In Cincinnati, the situation turned somewhat drastic. After destroying the Union forces at Richmond, Kentucky on August 30, Kirby Smith as a result had a clear road to the Ohio River. Understandably Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio all worried what Smith's next move would be while they scrambled to organize bodies of troops. General Lew Wallace arrived in Cincinnati, declared martial law and quickly set about organizing a defense. 25 With panic to the extremity of declaring martial law, the Northern population began to question their ability to win the war openly. Prominent figures such as George Templeton Strong, Samuel Galloway, Reverend Robert Laird Collier, and Senator Garrett Davis, spoke not only for themselves but also for the majority of the people by openly challenging President Lincoln and his administration on their ability to conduct the war. The accusations included Lincoln's unfitness for the Presidency, the constant change of military leadership in the east, which showed instability and was severely hurting morale in the North. Demands also arose that there be a complete reorganization of the Administration. 26 The Lincoln Administration's threat of a draft, unless an additional 300,000 volunteers could be raised created further tension. The idea of a draft disgusted many Northerners; however, with "patriotic" spirit enticed by bounties, nine-month service, and the threat of draft, the ranks of new regiments began to fill in late summer of 1862, only hitting forty-five percent of the intended quota. 27 The Union soldiers themselves cast a gloomy mood over the situation and expressed their views with varying levels of disgust. Lieutenant Elisha Hunt Rhodes of the 2nd 24 David H. Donald, Lincoln, New York, NY: Touchstone, 1996. 373. 25 Vernon L. Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground": Major General Lew Wallace Commands Cincinnati, September 1862." Indiana Magazine of History 85, no. 2 (1989): 139. 26 Donald, Lincoln, 373. 27 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 492. 14 Rhode Island expressed in his diary that: "I fear we are no nearer the end of the war than we were when we first landed at Fortress Monroe five months ago." 28 Captain Francis Donaldson of the 118th Pennsylvania captured the mood in Washington: "We are constant witness of the sad plight of the Army of the Potomac, as thousands of Genl. Pope's troops in great demoralization are ever passing the Fort in retreat to Washington. The poor old Army of the Potomac, how I pity it." 29 Captain Henry Pearson of the 6th New Hampshire also expressed his views in the aftermath of Second Manassas: "You need not be surprised if success falls to the rebels with astonishing rapidity." 30 Brigadier General Marsena Patrick's opinion bordered on insurrection: "There is a general feeling that the Southern Confederacy will be recognized & that they deserve recognition." 31 Lieutenant Charles Seton Fleming of the 2nd Florida Infantry, in a letter home to his mother describing the aftermath of the Second Manassas campaign, echoed Patrick's views when he wrote: "Our victory is complete, even the Yankee prisoners acknowledge it." 32 Lieutenant Colonel Henry Hubbell of the 3rd New York wrote in August 1862: "I am not sure that it would not be a good thing to have the rebels get possession of Washington however, as it might waken up the north to the fact that we are having a war in earnest, and not merely playing soldier…. We have got men & means enough in the north to put an end to this war in 90 days, if they would only go at it in earnest and let politics & the nigger alone." 33 28 Elisha Hunt Rhodes, All for the Union: A History of the 2nd Rhode Island Volunteer Infantry in the War of the Great Rebellion. Edited by Robert Hunt Rhodes. Lincoln, RI: A. Mowbray, 1985. 69. 29 Francis Adams Donaldson, Inside the Army of the Potomac: The Civil War Experience of Captain Francis Adams Donaldson. Edited by J. Gregory Acken. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1998. 104. 30 D. Scott Hartwig, To Antietam Creek: the Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019. 134-135. 31 Ibid., 134-135. 32 Francis P. Fleming, A Memoir of Captain C. Seton Fleming: of the Second Florida Infantry, C.S.A., Reprint 1985: Jacksonville: Times-Union Publishing House, 1884. 66. 33 Simon P. Newman, "A Democrat in Lincoln's Army: The Civil War Letters of Henry P. Hubbell." The Princeton University Library Chronicle 50, no. 2 (1989): 155-68. 157. 15 Hubbell eluded to the growing discord of racial issues that many Democrats saw as an unnecessary and politically charged motive to a war that was supposed to be strictly for preserving the Union. Nevertheless, this issue began to transform the cause of the war in the summer of 1862, adding only more weight to a very delicate political situation. Hubbell's feelings weren't isolated; instead, the sense that the war was taking on a new front to end slavery infuriated many Northerners. Hubbell's views on racial matters and slavery were not limited to himself, in fact, the stiffest opposition to war that had anything to do with freeing slaves came from the Midwest states; where racism was an epidemic culturally, especially in the Army of the Ohio. The talk of national emancipation led hundreds of men to desert and, in some cases, join the Confederacy. 34 Sentiments similar to these echoed across the Union armies and, undoubtedly, were shared by family and friends on the home front. Some individuals turned bitter, and perhaps extreme, which reflected political, ideological, and sectional differences in the North, which under the pressure of a seemingly collapsing system reared its ugly head. The term "invasion" has been used several times thus far, especially by the Union's most publicized general, George McClellan. This term and others related to it divided the minds of many of those who had significant power to dictate the war. Abraham Lincoln, at no point, recognized the Confederacy as a legitimate entity. He always maintained that the Southern States were in rebellion and needed to be brought back into the Union. Interestingly, his senior generals in 1862, mostly Democrats, saw the Confederate offensives as invasions, insinuating their conscious or subconscious recognition that Confederate armies were "foreign invaders" intent on doing harm, which helped fuel the panic, frustration, and seemingly lost Union cause ideology. 35 34 Daniel, Days of Glory, 101. 35 Andrew Pooley, "Shoo-ing the Geese: Lincoln and the Army of the Potomac, 1862-1863." Australian Journal of American Studies 21, no.2 (2002): 86-100. 86-87. 16 Jefferson Davis, the Confederate cabinet, Robert E. Lee, Braxton Bragg, and all the other high-ranking Confederate officers comprehended the growing Northern political disunion. This is evident in the decision to approve a Confederate offensive and the string of strategic goals associated with it. The Army of Northern Virginia, for example, fulfilled its duty of defeating the Federals time and again, completely reversing the tide of the war in the east. As Robert E. Lee sat at his headquarters in the aftermath of Chantilly, it had become abundantly clear that he now possessed the opportunity to strike the decisive blow against whatever Union army would oppose him in Maryland or Pennsylvania, which would likely result in some sort of peace talks. 36 Lieutenant Colonel Edward Porter Alexander Chief of Ordnance in the Army of Northern Virginia saw the picture as clear as Lee. Referring to the army, we wrote: "His [Lee's] army had, that magnificent morale which made them equal to twice their numbers, & which they never lost even to the surrender at Appomattox. And his confidence in them, & theirs in him, were so equal that no man can yet say which was greatest. And no old soldier need ask a prouder record than is implied in that fact. By going into Maryland Gen. Lee could at least subsist his army for a while upon the enemy, & he doubtless hoped, too, for a chance to force the Federal army to come out & fight him under favorable conditions." 37 Confederate officer William Allan, reverberated Alexander's sentiments when he wrote of the Army of Northern Virginia: "its spirit at this time was high. A series of brilliant successes had given it unbounded confidence in itself and its leaders, and the ragged dirty soldiers hailed with joy the advance across the Potomac." 38 The comparison of the Federal and Confederate views as indicated from primary sources, on 36 Hartwig, To Antietam Creek, 52-53. 37 Edward Porter Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, United States: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 139. 38 William Allan, The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862, Reprint: Middletown: DE, 2020. 273. 17 leadership and the progress of the war at the beginning of the Maryland Campaign were clearly in favor of the South. The leadership of Don Carlos Buell is a prime example of political dissatisfaction, both on the home front and in the army. While McClellan was unpopular with the Administration, he still held favor with most of his officers, and certainly the rank and file of the army and the nation. Buell, however, faced contention on three similar fronts – The Indiana bloc, the general and field officers of the First Division, and the supporters of Alexander McCook, one of his corps commanders. Much of the disgust with Buell occurred during the Kentucky Campaign. This break in unified efforts favored the Confederate cause, particularly in swaying popular opinion in Kentucky. Republican Indiana newspapers ripped into Buell's leadership, declaring that he was completely mishandling the pursuit of two Confederate armies that were ripping up Kentucky and potentially heading towards Indiana, Ohio, or Illinois. Some newspapers called for his immediate dismissal, and a few even demanded he be shot. 39 When comparing Lee and his army to Buell and his, there formulates a fascinating dissection of the polar extremes in popular and political opinion. Lee and his men were on the top of their game, while Buell's forces were at a low ebb. Using these two examples as the basis of measurement, it becomes apparent that overall, the Confederate forces enjoyed a much higher sense of public support and favorability then their Union counterparts did at that particular moment in the war. Scholars have hotly debated the prospect of European powers, particularly England and France intervening and mediating an end to the conflict. The idea of such a prospect was undoubtedly the primary goal for the Confederate strategy in the autumn of 1862. It is essential to view the idea of European intervention in the simplest of forms. The Southern strategy partly 39 Daniel, 128-129. 18 hinged on it, as can be observed via strategic decisions and public opinion, the North, however, feared the prospect. Intervention and mediation on any level would, in the end, be more beneficial to the South, and the Lincoln Administration would appear as incapable; in short, it would be a disaster for the North and Republicans. 40 The onset of a "cotton famine" and the scandal of the Trent affair occurred amid all the politically charged events in 1862, resulting in the British sending an additional 11,000 men to Canada and forcing Lincoln to tread lightly in foreign political matters. 41 Historian Max Beloff believed that the possibility of British intervention was extremely likely in 1862, mainly due to the North's refusal to make anti-slavery sentiments the basis of their cause, instead still focusing on the preservation of the Union, which only supported the pro-Southern faction in Parliament. 42 An examination of Southern newspapers and other editorials, shows public opinion in the South at the beginning of the war was universal in the belief that Great Britain would be forced, through the power of cotton, to intervene either by raising the blockade or by recognizing the Confederate States as an independent nation or perhaps both. 43 Regardless of the likelihood of actual intervention or recognition, the idea of it greatly influenced Confederate leaders, particularly Lee, who notated such objective goals in his correspondence with Davis. Davis agreed outlining his desires in a communication to Lee on September 7. He reminded Lee that the Confederacy was waging war solely for self-defense. Through the eight points he outlined as the guiding principles for the field armies to abide by, Davis continually revolved his doctrine around political objectives whose chief purpose were to achieve peace with the United States. If the South maintained a self- 40 McPherson, 444. 41 Nelson, A People at War, 166. 42 Max Beloff, "Historical Revision No. CXVIII: Great Britain and the American Civil War." History, New Series, 37, no. 129, (1952): 40-48. 42. 43 Schuyler Dean Hoslett, "The Richmond Daily Press on British Intervention in the Civil War: A Brief Summary." The William and Mary Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1940): 79-83. 80. 19 defense posture, with the objective of peace through battlefield victory; then the likelihood of positive European intervention on their behalf had a much higher probability, which in turn could possibly bring a speedy end to the war with terms that favored the Confederacy. 44 Logistical Concerns and Organizational Components: While the South always lagged behind the North in terms of finance, economy, manufacturing, manpower, and many other logistical concerns, the disparity was narrower in 1862 than in the coming years. As a point of contention, several trends and circumstances in the Union war effort benefited the South more than it aided the Union on the grand stage. Concerning logistics, Clausewitz's maxim states: "The dependence on the base increases in intensity and extent with the size of the Army, which is easy to understand. An Army is like a tree. From the ground out of which it grows it draws it's nourishment; if it is small it can easily be transplanted, but this becomes more difficult as it increases in size….When therefore, we talk of the influence of the base on the operations of an Army, the dimensions of the Army must always serve as the scale by which to measure the magnitude of that influence." 45 This axiom is precisely the predicament of the Northern war effort in the first two years of the war. The logistical portion of this study will examine the condition and availability of uniforms and equipment, quality of weaponry then in circulation, training and experience of soldiers, and finally the ability of each government to produce and supply its troops effectively. A logistical understanding is crucial for understanding the obstacles and conditions faced by the armies and how it dictated their effectiveness on campaign and immediate tactical ability on the battlefield in 1862. The South, as previously stated from the very beginning of the war, was behind its 44 OR, vol 19, 1: 598-599. 45 Clausewitz, On War, 353-354. 20 opponent in logistical matters; however, the North in 1862 was not at the climax in its ability of production and supply, and therefore lacked significantly in certain areas. However, it is essential to note that the limitations of the Federal logistical system by the fall of 1862 were only a few months shy of efficiently supplying the vast number of troops in the field. The first evidence of a marked change in the Union's logistical ability emerged in the Chancellorsville Campaign's genesis, after the winter of 1862-63. 46 Accepting the notion that the Confederate armies were in rough shape logistically; it is important to note that the primary leadership in the field was acutely aware of the shortages. However, the unfolding opportunity demanded a military strike that outweighed logistical concerns. Therefore, an examination into the Federal system's shortcomings is necessary to show the benefits it offered toward the Confederacy. The United States Army in the Antebellum period contained roughly 15,000 men of all arms. Compared with an army of 600,000 men in 1862, it is understandable that there would be significant shortcomings and hurdles to overcome in a nation that, as a rule, did not trust professional armies nor want to foot the bill for one. Nevertheless, the North had a clear advantage when it came to industrialization and manufacturing. Over one million Northerners worked in industrial jobs, ten times more than their Southern counterparts. Furthermore, the North contained roughly 100,000 factories compared to the South's 20,000. 47 Yet, as already pointed out, the prewar army was tiny and supplied with uniforms and equipment solely from the Schuylkill Arsenal in Philadelphia. Additionally, the arsenals producing firearms were limited, with all those existing in the South subsequently seized upon secession, having fewer firearms available to Northern regiments. 48 The North, therefore, would have to raise and equip an army 46 Stephen Sears, Chancellorsville, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996. 71-75 47 Matthew S. Muehlbauer and David J. Ulbrich, Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial Era to the Twenty-First Century. New York: Routledge, 2018. 174-175. 48 Joseph E. Chance, The Second Texas Infantry, From Shiloh to Vicksburg, Austin: Eakin Press, 1984. 16, 24. 21 primarily with outdated weapons and with an industrial system that wasn't geared toward war manufacturing. The North's only saving grace was its economic might. 49 Economically it is crucial to understand that the Union that won the war in 1865, was not the same financial institution nor economy in 1861 and 1862. It was in major part due to the Legal Tender Act of 1862 and the National Currency Act of 1863, that the North was able to pay for the sustainment of the war; yet it took time for these acts to take effect. Therefore, in 1862 financially, the North was undoubtedly at its weakest; many of the state and municipal banks, especially those in border states, had closed their doors, while millions of businesses and private civilians hoarded gold. 50 The Union was only able to field the armies it did in 1861-1862 because of its ability to pay for the conversion and development of machinery needed for equipment, weaponry, and uniforms while relying initially on its prewar militia. Faced with arming a massive army overnight, the United States was forced to arm many of its regiments with outdated firearms, such as the M-1842 Smoothbore musket, and the M-1816 Flintlocks that were converted to percussion, in addition to supplementing itself with foreign weapons, from Britain, Belgium, France, Austria, and others. These weapons except those from Britain, proved to be severely outdated compared to the technology available in the 1860s. The importance of recognizing the sub-standard firearms is their effectiveness on the battlefield and the potentiality of changing the outcome in a crucial moment in a battle. In an era of the rifled musket that was accurate from 250-300 yards, a typical smoothbore musket ranged from 80-100 yards. A significant portion of Federal troops were armed with outdated weapons in the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns. A focus on any of the principal engagements in that time frame will show that regiments armed 49 McPherson, 442-445. 50 Nelson, 132-133. 22 with such weapons were in certain circumstances ineffective on the immediate tactical plane, and perhaps beneficial to their adversary. The disparity of weapons had begun to improve for the North in 1862; however, the infusion of nearly 300,000 volunteers during the summer of 1862 created a logistical gap once again. Many of the existing regiments in the army still shouldered outdated weapons, and now with legions of new men forming, these troops found themselves supplied with weapons that were unequal to the rigors of Civil War combat. Of this second wave of new recruits, the 12th New Jersey Volunteers serve as an excellent microcosm to examine the Union's logistical deficiencies in the rush to arm new recruits in 1862. Initially, the Jerseymen expected to receive the celebrated Enfield rifle; instead, they ended up with the inferior Austrian Lorenz, which was later exchanged in Washington for the equally outdated 1842 Springfield musket, although they saw this as an improvement over the detested Austrian rifle. 51 While every regiment's experience is different, the new wave and veterans alike in 1862 experienced some level of logistical deficiency that impacted their abelites on campaign or in battle. Aside from weapons, much of the equipment in the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the Ohio at the beginning of the Confederate offensives were at the end of its serviceable life span, due to months of active campaigning, and the inability to properly re-muster the army on a large scale because of the continuity of Confederate aggressiveness, which certainly affected their performance as a cohesive fighting force. Brigadier General Abner Doubleday who commanded a brigade at Second Manassas submitted requisitions to replace equipment and clothing just before the onset of the Maryland Campaign, noted in disgust: "owing to the great number [of other officers] making requisitions, mine were not filled and we were soon obliged to 51 Edward G. Longacre, To Gettysburg and Beyond: The Twelfth New Jersey Volunteer Infantry, II Corps, Army of the Potomac, 1862-1865, Hightstown: Longstreet House, 1988. 24. 23 take the field deficient in everything." 52 This sentiment was backed up by Captain James Wren of the IX Corps, who wrote that the men in his division "looked very bad, being Lousey, Dirty & Almost naked & worn out." 53 The soldiers in the Army of the Ohio were in equally if not worse shape. The vast distances covered by the Western Theater's armies created long supply lines, which fell victim to frequent raids from rebel cavalry. T.J. Wright of the 8th Kentucky Infantry noted in his diary that the Army of the Ohio was: "the hungriest, raggedest, tiredest, dirtiest, lousiest and sleepiest set of men the hardships of this or any other war ever produced." 54 While it is certain that the Confederates were in equally bad situations logistically, they had the benefit victory behind them in the east, and in Bragg's army's case, high morale. Another major struggle for the Federals in 1862 was the ability to get the supplies to its armies. The reason is not one specific aspect, but rather a compilation of bureaucracy, corruption, and lack of precedent to draw off. McClellan's army on the Peninsula had to be supplied from the sea, Pope in command of the Army of Virginia never took the time to ensure his troops had everything they needed, and Buell's army along with the rest of the western forces contended with long supply lines originating in Cairo Illinois, that were frequently raided by Confederate cavalry. The 16th Maine Infantry is a classic example of the suffering that occurred in a system that was outside its capabilities in 1862. The regiment's adjutant and historian Abner Small wrote: "How those men suffered! Hunger, daily felt, was nothing compared with it. Men of education, of refinement, and wealth, who willingly and cheerfully gave up home, with all its love and comfort, for country, made to feel degraded for want of clothing!" Small then describes 52 Hartwig, 137. 53 Ibid., 137. 54 Kenneth W. Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011. 89. 24 the horrendous conditions: "…without shelter, without overcoats, shoeless, hatless, and hundreds without blankets; and through all that long, sad, and weary tramp, we were jeered at, insulted, and called the "Blanket Brigade!" 55 While examples like this are on the extreme, the narrative fits when assessing the entire logistical picture of the Army of the Potomac in September 1862. The term logistics also dovetails into organizational tables. Aside from sharing similar shortcomings in the area of supply and outdated weaponry, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was by far the superior force in leadership, experience, and organization when compared with McClellan's force. By September 2, 1862, nearly 61 percent of Lee's infantry had fought in three or more major battles, and 81 percent fought in two or more. All of his 184 infantry regiments were veterans of at least one battle. Not only were Lee's regiments superior in this regard, but his brigade commanders were highly efficient as well. Twenty-seven of Lee's forty brigades were veterans of two or more major battles, while the remaining thirteen had fought in either the Seven Days or Second Manassas. On the divisional level, the highest official level of organization at that point for the A.N.V.; all of the eleven divisions had seen at least one battle. 56 The Union leadership backed this notion up as well. It was widely accepted, and a point still argued amongst historians, that the Southern fighting man was superior. This mythology has far back as the American Revolution corroboration has its roots in early Confederate victories, particularly at First and Second Manassas, the Shenandoah Valley, and the Seven Days battles. These victories generated an aura of invincibility around the Army of Northern Virginia that transcended into the minds of the Federal troops. 57 In fact Lee, true to form was in the first days of September 1862, the living epithet of Baron De Jomini's maxims, "the general should do 55 Abner Ralph Small, The Sixteenth Maine Regiment in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865. London: Forgotten Books, 2015. 38. 56 Joseph L. Harsh, Taken at the Flood Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Ashland: The Kent State University Press, 2013. 39-40 57 Pooley, "Shoo-ing the Geese", 88. 25 everything to electrify his own soldiers, and to impart to them the same enthusiasm which he endeavors to repress his adversaries….in general, a cherished cause, and a general who inspires the confidence by previous success, are powerful means of electrifying an army and conducing to victory." 58 In contrast, McClellan's forces reformed into the Army of the Potomac, could not boast anything near the statistics of the Army of Northern Virginia could. September 1862 was the most disorganized and weakest the Army of the Potomac would find itself in the duration of the war. This school of thought canceled out, at least temporarily, any deficiencies faced by Lee's forces. When George B. McClellan rode out of Washington to take command, he found three very different organizations, each with its own command, divisional, brigade, artillery, cavalry, transportation, and quartermaster structures. Additionally, the newly formed regiments, many of whom were only a few weeks old, were rushed to the front and infused into the disorganized mess. Organizing these separate organizations into one effective command would weeks if not months, McClellan would be forced to do it in a matter of days, while in motion, in addition to planning a short-term strategy to deal with Lee. 59 The chaos of the reorganization is apparent in the 5th New York Volunteers' experience. Historian Brian Pohanka related an instance of the 5th as they passed McClellan on the march toward western Maryland: "As they marched, General McClellan reined up beside the troops of Warren's brigade. 'Well, and how is the Old Fifth this evening?' he asked. 'First rate, General, but we'd be better off if we weren't living so much on supposition." 60 Even though he had the bigger force, the disorganization and confusion associated with the rapidity of the Maryland Campaign denied the general his army's full might 58 Baron De Jomini, The Art of War, Translated by Capt. G.H. Mendell, and Lieut. W.P. Craighill, Radford: Wilder Publications, 2008. 30-31. 59 Hartwig, 133-136. 60 Brian C. Pohanka, Vortex of Hell: History of the 5th New York Volunteer Infantry. Lynchburg, VA: Schroeder Publications, 2012. 369. 26 on the battlefield. In different circumstances these obstacles may have been overcome had McClellan had time to prepare. Robert E. Lee sensed his enemy's weakness and used it as part of his foundation to seek permission from President Davis to invade Maryland. "The two grand armies of the United States that have been operating in Virginia, though now united, are much weakened and demoralized. Their new levies, of which I understand 60,000 men have already been posted in Washington, are not yet organized, and will take some time to prepare for the field." 61 Lee identified that his logistical situation was terrible, however, he recognized the unfolding opportunity in front of him. "The army is not properly equipped for an invasion of an enemy's territory. It lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes, and in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes. Still, we cannot not afford to be idle, and though weaker than our opponents in men and military equipment's, must endeavor to harass if we cannot destroy them. I am aware that the movement is attended with much risk, yet I do not consider success impossible, and shall endeavor to guard it from loss." 62 The amount of stock Lee put into the Federals logistical organization is apparent. In fact, if taken as a whole, his reliance on the overall Federal weakness is one of his only justifications for his ill-supplied and smaller force to go on the offensive. Additionally, these logistical matters, both of his own and the Federal weakness, coincide directly with Lee's desire to deliver a decisive blow to the Federals quickly. There was not a better opportunity to do it and expect fruitful results, then while the Army of Potomac was at its weakest moment, structurally, organizationally, numerically, and logistically. 61 OR, vol 19, 1: 590-591. 62 Ibid., 590-591. 27 Lee's conclusion of the ill-preparedness of the new Union regiments applies not only to the troops in his sector but also to those in the Western Theater. Much like Lee's army within reach of Washington, Kirby Smith's small army in Kentucky created a panic and proved Lee's theory on the reliability of new soldiers. Kirby Smith successfully and thoroughly destroyed an equally sized Federal force of raw recruits at Richmond, Kentucky, on August 30, 1862, eliminating them from the military equation. Historian Kenneth Noe termed the battle of Richmond as "the most lopsided Confederate victory of the war, as Kirby Smith's men inflicted casualties so staggering that entire Union brigades ceased to exist." 63 With Smith's incursion into Kentucky, a vacuum of chaos erupted in the region, in particular, Ohio. The microcosm of Cincinnati infuses both the political and the serious logistical problems faced by the North in 1862. Historian Vernon Volpe pointed out, "Although the influx of [Union] volunteers was inspiring, with it came a shortage of arms, ammunition, and other equipment needed to outfit the troops properly." 64 This example was echoed across the entire Kentucky region in 1862. Although McClellan's army outnumbered Lee with a total of roughly 87,000 men, twenty percent of his infantry were raw, having been in the army just a handful of weeks and had not even come close to mastering the level of proficiency needed in drill and tactics to be effective on a Civil War battlefield. 65 Even though the Federals were able to put fresh regiments into the field, it became an issue of quantity versus quality. The unfortunate story of the 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers is a classic case in point of these raw troops' ineffectiveness. Arriving to the Army of the Potomac just a few days before the battle of Antietam, the men prepared to enter their first engagement on September 19 at Shepherdstown. Their regimental historian 63 Noe, Perryville, 39. 64 Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground", 146. 65 Hartwig, 139. 28 wrote: "The teachings of the battalion-drill near Sharpsburg on the previous day [September 18] now had practical application." The 118th's Colonel stated in his official report that: "We returned their fire as fast as possible, but soon found that our Enfield rifles were so defective that quite one-fourth of them would not explode the caps." 66 The 118th's story, while extreme is not unique, another raw Federal regiment the 128th Pennsylvania found itself in an even worse circumstance, owing to its lack of training. The 128th Pennsylvania arrived at the army just days before as well and were assigned to the newly organized XII Corps, which itself contained some of the highest proportions of raw troops. During the battle of Antietam, the new regiment found itself in Miller's Cornfield and due lack of basic drill unable to maneuver itself back onto its brigade in the face of onrushing Confederates. Officers and sergeants from experienced neighboring outfits were sent to try and move the bewildered regiment all to no avail. In the end, the 128th was left to its fate and was nearly destroyed, having no effect on the enemy and only weakening their own brigades' position. 67 Stories similar in nature can be found across the Army of the Potomac on every sector of each battlefield during the Maryland Campaign, each in the midst of their own mishaps allowing the Confederates a level of superiority while hindering their supporting elements an opportunity to exploit any gains. Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio experienced similar circumstances with green regiments as its eastern counterpart. In a letter to Kirby Smith, Bragg detailed his understanding that Buell's men were in rough shape and utterly demoralized. These circumstances, Bragg believed, offered the South a greater benefit of success. 68 The raw, ill-trained, ill-equipped, and completely unprepared 105th Ohio, 123rd Illinois, and 21st Wisconsin infantry regiments were 66 Survivors' Association 118th (Corn Exchange) Regt., P.V., History of the Corn Exchange Regiment 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers,62. 67 Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red. New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1994. 206. 68 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 16: Part 2. Correspondence, Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. 754. 29 all glaring examples of this shortcoming. The 123rd Illinois found itself in a similar predicament as the 128th Pennsylvania at Antietam, exposed and on its own, and fell victim to veteran Confederate troops bearing down on them. The 105th Ohio, equally as green, found itself thrown into the breach in the midst of the 123rd Illinois collapse. Private Ayre of the 105th remarked: "…could not form into a proper line and after going through several maneuvers in order to do so we became mixed and confused." In similar fashion to the 123rd Illinois, the 105th Ohio was quickly stampeded by their Confederate attackers. 69 Much like the inferiority of outdated weapons, untrained, raw troops could not perform to a tactically sufficient level to keep par with the rapid pace and constantly changing conditions of a Civil War battlefield. While plenty of experienced units did exist in the Union armies, it is clear the inexperienced ones created more problems, affording the Confederate forces golden opportunities to exploit immediate tactical advantages they likely would not have had, had they been fighting experienced, or even trained troops. On the other side of the coin, the copious amounts of raw units severely hampered any notion gaining a decisive victory or rapidly following up a pursuit. This is evident in the in the results of Antietam and Perryville, both of which were Confederate tactical victories, and the speed at which Lee and Bragg's armies were pursued. The armies' organization is important when looking to understand the advantages and disadvantages and how this affected a particular side's likelihood of victory. The experience level and the amount of subpar weaponry in both the armies of the Potomac and Ohio was only one issue, their organizational structure in both leadership and how its units were grouped confounded their problems and offered the Confederates another edge over their opponent pushing the scale further in favor in the equation of obtaining a victory. As previously stated, the 69 Stuart W. Sanders, Maney's Confederate Brigade at the Battle of Perryville, Charleston: The History Press, 2014. 53-54. 30 Army of the Potomac during the Maryland Campaign was a conglomeration of several different organizations. It contained the II, V, and VI Corps the original Army of the Potomac, the re-designated I and XII Corps, the Army of Virginia, and the newly dubbed IX that had served on the North Carolina coast. Although there were certainly experienced troops and leaders in each of these components, they each spoke a different organizational "language." 70 George McClellan certainly had the most difficult task of any field commander regarding the organization of his army. Not only did he have three different organizations to mold together as a cohesive fighting force, but he also had the additional struggle of doing it on the fly in a military and national emergency. Therefore, although the Army of the Potomac was a potent fighting force, and managed to engage the Confederates, its capabilities in terms of operational effectiveness were severely limited. Buell's circumstances were much more appealing. His Army of the Ohio had remained intact as a cohesive fighting force since its formation; however, he received additional reinforcements from Grant, and a host of new regiments, diluting its effectiveness as an organization. The Army of the Ohio's real organizational issues manifested in the senior leadership's quirks, rivalries, and lack of cohesion. 71 The use of cavalry in both McClellan and Buell's forces paled in comparison to the South. This issue stemmed from the Federal government's inability to recognize the importance of that specific branch early in the conflict. Overwhelmingly, the cavalry found its commands broken apart and scattered across the army, acting in various guard and staff related duties. Those commands retained to perform the primary tasks of nineteenth-century, reconnaissance, screening, and raids were too few and spread out to have any significant impact on the outcome 70 Hartwig, 133-135. 71 Steven E. Woodworth, Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865. New York: Vintage, 2005. 216. 31 of the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns. 72 Although they lacked in cavalry ability the Federals were unquestionably superior in artillery. Union guns, although far superior to that of the South were severely flawed organizationally in 1862. Circling back to the theme of different organizational structures in McClellan's force, the arrangement of this branch varied, causing communication issues, and leadership vacuums. In common with the cavalry, the prominent artillery structure in 1862 in both the Army of the Potomac and Army of the Ohio, lacked a unified system of command; instead, most batteries were the responsibility of brigade commanders or divisional commanders. Therefore, at critical moments batteries could only take orders from infantry commanders and were presented with the difficult task of coordinating mass firing on specific targets. 73 While it may seem trivial, such inefficiency in employment and "bureaucratic red tape" of military organization prevented the cavalry and artillery from performing at its maximum potential which no doubt contributed to the shortcomings of the Union armies in 1862. The Confederate military organization also had its flaws; however, as previously noted, the experience level of Confederate forces as a whole were much higher and able to adapt to a situation more efficiently. Partly this had to do with the smaller size of the forces overall, and the Confederate authorities' choice to disperse recruits and conscripts across seasoned units rather than raise new organizations. The cavalry of J.E.B. Stuart, John Hunt Morgan, and Nathan Bedford Forrest for instance were vastly superior to their Federal counterparts in every respect. These commands were led well, centralized, and overall contained extremely efficient horsemen, which had proven themselves time and again on the battlefield. 74 Confederate artillery was 72 Hartwig, 155-158. 73 Curt Johnson and Richard C. Anderson, Jr., Artillery Hell: The Employment of Artillery at Antietam, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. 53; Daniel, 146, 148-150. 74 Hartwig, 88-90; Hess, Banners to the Breeze, 24. 32 generally inferior in respect to quality of mechanics, yet, the branch retained a slight advantage over its foes in its organization. Lee's artillery was organized on the divisional level, allowing for easier deployment, and concentrated fire, as the Army of Northern Virginia, did not have a corps structure during this time, division commanders held greater authority in placement and employment of artillery. Furthermore, several groups of divisions fell under an unofficial "wing" structure, allowing Jackson and Longstreet to concentrate guns further. 75 Bragg organized his army different than Lee's army. Bragg operated with two wings or corps, broken down into several divisions. His army maintained an organized and effective cavalry force; however, their weakest point was the artillery. Only fifty-six guns accompanied the Army of Mississippi into Kentucky compared to Buell's 147 guns. These Confederate guns like the Federals were assigned to individual brigades, same as its Federal counterpart, eliminating opportunities to converge fire effectively. 76 Understanding the organizational structure of an army allows for a realistic understanding of what that force is capable of; how it moves in the larger scheme of a campaign; and the benefits and challenges of its employment on the tactical level. Assuming the forces involved were all organized in the same fashion, with identical structures is detrimental in interpreting the ebb and flow of battles and campaigns. A clear picture of how a field army operates through an organizational table is, therefore, paramount. Using Lee and McClellan as examples illustrate the nature of this point. In the Maryland Campaign, Lee was able to give more direct orders to independent division commanders, therefore reducing somewhat the natural confusion begot of transferring and disseminating orders through multiple tiers of officers. On the other hand, McClellan had to give orders to "wing" commanders, who then cut the orders to corps 75 Johnson, Artillery Hell, 41-47. 76 Noe, 370-373, 381-382. 33 commanders then down to the divisional level, doubling the amount of personalities the orders had to go through compared to Lee's forces. It is clear from watching the battles of Antietam and Perryville's tactical evolution that the commanding generals' intent was time and again ineffectually carried out due to communication breakdown and misinterpretation of orders on both sides. Having only scratched the surface of the organizational components of only four of the principal armies involved in the fall of 1862, it becomes clear that each differed in how it chose to conduct its internal operations. However, it is equally apparent from this brief examination, that Confederate forces in the fall of 1862 were better organized and tactically more efficient than their Federal counterparts in Maryland and Kentucky, therefore lending an edge to overall Confederate success and perhaps victory. Strategic Considerations: The strategic components are unquestionably the most important when ascertaining why the fall of 1862 was the Confederacy's high tide. Having looked at the political, logistical, and organizational components and internalizing how each affected the grand design of Confederate strategy in 1862, this section will now tie these components together and shed light on how each influenced strategic decision and guided the final results of the campaigns. A clear understanding of what strategy is necessary to further examine this section. Clausewitz defines strategy as: "the employment of the battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of the War." 77 The "attainment of the object" is the crucial cog in accepting the purpose and direction of operations in Maryland and Kentucky. The strategic composition of these campaigns was different in what they sought to obtain as their achievable goal. Lee's objective was political in its foundation; his 77 Clausewitz, 133. 34 campaign didn't revolve around the occupation of land or control of any specific feature; instead, it sought a climactic battle with a decisive battlefield victory in which Lee was willing to risk his army in a desperate gamble. 78 Bragg and Smith's Kentucky incursions were much more multilayered on an operational platform. While some sort of showdown battle was necessary for the west, it was not the immediate goal, only a potentiality; instead, the relief and re-establishment of Tennessee was paramount with a secondary objective of the "liberation" of Kentucky. The second tier of goals included the control of rail and river systems as a means to eliminate the Union's ability to supply its forces and occupy any portion of the Upper or Deep South. The most significant strategic gain for the South in 1862 existed in Tennessee and Kentucky. Proof of this importance is shown through the fact that six of the seven Confederate field armies would make this region their primary objective in the fall of 1862. These six armies included the commands of Generals' Braxton Bragg, Kirby Smith, Earl Van Dorn, Stirling Price, William Loring, and Humphrey Marshall. Confederate control and or occupation of Tennessee and Kentucky offered benefits and a platform for victory that the remaining Confederate states collectively couldn't offer. Having been the first state to fall under Federal control, Tennessee's recapture would be a major morale boost for the Confederacy nationally and particularly to the large amount of Tennessee regiments that made up Bragg's army. The most significant benefit, however, resided in Tennessee's industrial capability, as it contained the ability to produce more raw items for the war effort then the rest of the Confederacy combined. 79 Confederate control 78 Harsh, 25; OR, vol 19, 1: 598-599. 79 Connelly. 5-15. The importance of Tennessee to the Confederacy is undeniable. Connelly argues that the region was the largest concentrated area for the production of war materials in the Confederacy. The region by 1864 had produced 22,665 pounds niter. Additionally, the area contained a significant source of lead, and was the chief producer of gunpowder in 1861. Tennessee also contained a vast number of factories that repaired old weapons, manufactured new small arms, cartridges, percussion caps, and other equipment. By the fall of 1861, Nashville plants alone turned out 100,000 percussion caps daily, with some 1,300,000 caps produced weekly. The region boasted on the two major Confederate sources of livestock, the other being 35 would, therefore, help in stabilizing the struggling logistical and economic constraints faced in the South. Additionally, the state's rail system would allow for the re-establishment of a direct connection to North Carolina and Virginia and the ability to ship supplies and material to the Confederate forces in the east. Conversely, the loss of Tennessee would be a major blow to Union morale, as its loss would have undone and nullified the Federal campaigns in 1861 and early 1862. 80 Kentucky also offered significant gains for the South. It was generally believed, particularly by the Confederate government's higher echelons, that the majority of Kentuckians were sympathetic to the Southern cause and would rally to Confederate banners if field armies were able to move into the region and strategically hold it. Logistically Kentucky offered a substantial increase for the South, particularly in animals, forage, and transportation options. Like Tennessee, Kentucky contained major river systems and rail lines that would drastically increase movement for the South and partially cut off the mid-west states from the rest of the Union. Politically, Kentucky, a vital border state under Confederate control, could be crippling to Northern domestic and foreign political views. In theory, this political aspect played on a successful campaign in Maryland, another vital border state. More immediately, Kentucky offered the western Confederate armies an opportunity to turn the war from one of defense to one poising them on the edge of invasion of critical Northern states, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana. Such a turn in the circumstances would be devastating for the Union, particularly politically. The Illinois town of Cairo on the Mississippi River, in 1862 was serving as the logistical launch point for the Union armies in the west; prolonged Confederate control of Kentucky would likely force the Shenandoah Valley in Virginia. More pork was raised in Tennessee save Missouri than any other state. Agriculturally, Middle Tennessee in 1860 produced an average of more than a million bushels of corn making it a leader amongst its sister states. 80 Connelly, 3-6. 36 the Federals to find an alternative method of supplying the troops in Corinth and other points in the Southern heartland. As long as the Federals controlled these regions, they would continue to pin the Confederacy in the Deep South denying them of access to vital infrastructure, maneuvering room, and favorable victory conditions. Braxton Bragg and Kirby Smith had to go on the offensive if they were to alleviate the situation by the very nature of the circumstances. As Lee's army with Richmond, their backs were on the doorstep of the Deep South, and they had no room to maneuver. Fortunately for the South, the western offensive was born out of an opportune moment of Halleck's caution that was strategically seized upon by Confederate commanders. In the necessity of the moment, launching an offensive like Lee during the Seven Days battles was the only beneficial option and a necessary risk if the war was going to be taken off the doorstep of the Deep South. Robert E. Lee on the other end of things saw himself and his army as the most important entity in the Confederacy at that moment. In his mind, the only scenario for Confederate victory rested in his hands alone. He showed this belief in dispatches and letters throughout the campaign in an effort to orchestrate movements across the Confederacy to complement his objective. In a letter to Jefferson Davis, he noted his desire to see his suggestion on what he felt Loring's command should do in the Kanawha Valley, in an effort to support his operation. 81 Lee did not stop with Loring; however, days prior, he communicated his victory at Manassas and planned offensive to Braxton Bragg and requested that Bragg pass the information along to Kirby Smith for further coordination. It was Lee's desire that these western armies gain similar victories to his at Manassas, that when added together may be enough to secure Southern 81 OR, vol 19, 1: 594. 37 victory.82 Lastly, he demonstrated his understanding of the confused state of Federal forces in Washington and the need to seize the initiative before the opportunity was lost. Like Kentucky, Maryland was a vital border state, not for its potentiality in resources, but rather for its geographic relation to Washington. Any serious Confederate incursion into the state would be life-threatening to the Union, and therefore demanded desperate measures on the part of Northern armies to repel such an advance. 83 Lee's leadership has been often criticized during the Maryland Campaign from historians and even shocked his subordinates, Jackson, and Longstreet. 84 Lee was certainly aggressive and was known for taking risks; however, he was not a foolish man, and never committed his army to a disaster, at least not one he foresaw. Comparing his stratagem throughout the rest of the war, it's probable to conclude that his movements were well thought out, with the least amount of risk generated from the objective demands of the campaign. Even in moments of reaction to McClellan, Lee always retained the initiative in Maryland. In the aftermath of Seconded Manassas and Chantilly, it was the opinion of many in both military and civilian leadership that a final showdown somewhere north of the Potomac River was all that was needed for Confederate victory. 85 If Lee was a poker player, he was taking his hand and going all in, he could only hope the Federals floundered. General Longstreet understood the gravity of the moment when he wrote: "When the Second Bull Run campaign 82 OR, vol 19, 1: 589. 83 Ezra A. Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. I: South Mountain. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 19-21. Carman was present at the battle of Antietam and dedicated his life to research and study of the Maryland Campaign in the post war years. Carman's work was able to capture not only the historical timeline of events, but offered an emotional aspect not seen in other works. This emotional component while subtle is an important tool in internalizing the mindset of Union soldiers and perhaps the North itself. 84 James Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Edited by Ned Bradford. New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979. 265. Longstreet claims that aside from himself, that General Jackson was also taken back from the boldness of Lee's designs on the Maryland Campaign, while at a meeting in Frederick MD, September 9th. 85 Harsh, 60-63. Multiple historians have agreed on this point. James Murfin considered the battle of Antietam to be the most important battle in American history, and one of the most decisive in world history. Ezra Carman portrays the campaign as requiring desperate action for the North, while Scot Hartwig, Stephen Sears and James McPherson center on the political undertone. 38 closed, we had the most brilliant prospects the Confederates ever had. We then possessed an army which, had it been kept together, the Federals would never have dared attack." 86 Lee's confidence in his army was surely the determining factor in his choice to assume the offensive into Maryland, and no doubt behind his reasoning to push the army as hard as he did in the maneuvering and fighting that took place in Maryland. The General expressed his confidence in the men and the importance of the offensive in General Order No. 102. on September 4: "This army is about to engage in most important operations." He further outlines the necessity of respecting private property, and the desire for his commands to lighten their supply encumbrance to allow them to move quickly and efficiently. 87 When coupling the logistical and organizational shortcomings, the political factors reinforced by his troops' confidence and his in them proved to be the energy from which the Maryland Campaign was executed. The offensives themselves presented each of these commanders a complicated set of obstacles and decisions to overcome while ensuring they offered the best possible benefit to their cause with the least amount of risk towards their army. This is certainly one of the most challenging aspects of being a commander in charge of any offensive-minded campaign. Johnston at Shiloh, Burnside at Fredericksburg, Hooker at Chancellorsville, and Hood in Tennessee all failed to capitalize on this principle. The fact that Lee and Bragg achieved the scale of operational measures they did is a testament to their leadership and ability to seize control and direction of a developing situation. If the argument is to be maintained that the Maryland and Kentucky campaigns provided the South the best chance the South had of winning the war, then proof of this claim must lay within the strategic composition of the campaigns themselves. If taken in this context, then it must be understood that every move Lee, Bragg, and 86 Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 263. 87 OR, vol 16, 2: 592. 39 Smith, along with the supporting roles of Loring, Marshall, Price, and Van Dorn were calculated if not on a grand scale, certainly on an individual level. Unlocking the purpose of the maneuvers, and their relation to strategic success will illustrate the continually changing dynamics and environment of each campaign, and how these generals continually altered their designs to fit the goals of their strategic objectives. The evolving strategic situation in the months leading up to the campaigns created the conditions under which the operations in Maryland and Kentucky were governed. Understanding the Confederate forces' strategic focus for needing to assume the offensive will outline the gravity and weight they placed on the outcome of these fall campaigns. The most measurable strategic potential in 1862 existed in the Western Theater. As already stated, the economic and logistical importance of this region necessitated an aggressive action on behalf of the South if the Confederacy was to survive. The first attempt at recovering control of Tennessee occurred in April with the battle of Shiloh. While tactically a Confederate failure, the aftermath of the fighting created adverse reactions from the Northern press and transposed into Halleck's overall cautious and slow pursuit towards Corinth. Halleck, after taking Corinth, was faced with limited choices on where to move next. Due to political and doctrinal restrictions of conciliation and Halleck's theory on war, the massive Union army was not able logistically to move into the Deep South. The only real move available to the Federal forces in the summer of 1862, was a lateral one east towards Chattanooga. 88 With Bragg at Tupelo and Kirby Smith's small command at Chattanooga, the path of success for an aggressive officer to take Chattanooga, a major supply hub for the South, was wide open. Halleck foiled this opportunity by sending Buell's command to accomplish the task. The slow-moving cautious Buell initially created consternation among 88 Daniel, 86. 40 Confederate leadership, yet once the pace of his progress was realized, the same trepidation turned into an opportunity. 89 Clausewitz described the potential for a reciprocal effect to take place should an army go on the offensive; however, he counterweighs that thought with pointing out that an army in a precarious position with the opportunity to gain a substantial amount should jump on the opportunity if one should be presented. 90 Certainly, Bragg and Smith applied a variation of this maxim into their decision to go on the advance. The term "invasion" is the defining ideology that bound both major theaters of war and other Confederate objectives in the fall of 1862. Clausewitz wrote that even if the complete overthrow of the enemy is impossible, which it was for the Confederacy, then the only other real option of winning a war is to conquer a portion of the enemy territory. In conquering the enemy territory, the invader has the opportunity to weaken the enemy's resources, crippling their ability to sustain an army. By carrying the war in enemy territory, the conditions will further the enemy's expense and ultimately lead to peace negotiations. 91 The term "invasion" generates a delicate question concerning what an invasion actually is, and how it fits into the American context, particularly in the political spectrum in 1862. Baron De Jomoni, whose military maxims were dominant in nineteenth-century America, distinguished what an "invasion" actually is. Breaking down the idea of an offensive, he wrote that: "…an invasion occurs against a great state whose whole or significant portion of territory is attacked. If only a province or moderate line of defense is attacked, then it is an offensive, and if such actions are limited only to a confined operation, then it is termed an initiative." 92 Indeed then, if taken in this context, 89 Connelly, 200-201. 90 Clausewitz, 707. 91 Clausewitz, 706. Neither of the primary Confederate armies had the ability to "conquer" Federal territory. However, the last part in reference to Clausewitz maxim was the adaptation applied by the Confederacy in its strategic goals. 92 Jomini, The Art of War, 54. The difference in the definition in understanding the purpose of the Confederate objective is critical. Many historians point to the Army of Northern Virginia's strategic goals as fitting into the framework of an 41 Confederate efforts militarily were an offensive and an invasion only in the political spectrum. Although the press and even the top military minds used the term invasion quite frequently in the North, there is nothing in the Confederate strategic framework of 1862, that fit the definition of invasion, Lee himself in a letter to Jefferson Davis on September 4, used the term expedition implying that his foray had a specific purpose and would be short. 93 Due to logistics alone, Confederate forces across the board could not sustain the long-term goals of an invasion. However, the Clausewitzian maxim of a "strategical attack" was within reach and achievable according to the conditional logistical framework. Much of the success for the Confederates relied on the superiority of its troops, and the avoidance of exhausting itself with an over achievement of objectives. 94 The window of opportunity was narrow, operationally because of logistics, but more importantly, because of politics. The two most significant benefits afforded to the Southern cause in 1862 were the Congressional fall elections and European superpowers. If Confederate forces could score a major political victory in the east, and both a strategic reversal coupled with a political coup in the west, then perhaps Northern voters would come to resent the war and vote for "Peace Democrats" in November, and more advantageously draw England and France in as mediators or some other influential role, to end the war. It is apparent that the pressure to act decisively if not at least aggressively before November was of paramount importance. While it is debated as to how far the European powers would intercede, what is certain is that the Confederacy banked part of its strategic decisions both politically and militarily on intervention. 95 Just as apparent was the frustration and delicate invasion, yet when looking at that particular army's logistics and Lee's strategic goals only the Jominian maxim of offensive fits the framework. 93 OR, vol 16, 2: 591-592. 94 Clausewitz, 601. 95 McPherson, 534-535. 42 statesmanship which had to be executed on behalf of the Union to convince the English mainly that the war was nothing more than a rebellion that the Republic could put down on its own. 96 However, this did not appear to be the scene in the late summer of 1862 with Union defeats and setbacks continually piling up. Lee retained the initiative by keeping the enemy guessing what his next move and true objective was. According to Henry McClellan, J.E.B. Stuart's adjutant, that as late as September 13, Federal forces maintained the: "utmost uncertainty regarding Lee's movements and intentions." 97 Lee designed his army's movements to draw out the Federals from Washington. By crossing at Leesburg, his army was initially east of the Catoctin Mountains and a direct threat to Washington and Baltimore, it was this crossing point that directly forced the disorganized Army of the Potomac to leave the defenses prematurely, and more importantly to force Lincoln's hand in placing McClellan back in overall command. 98 The key to the Army of Northern Virginia's movements was speed and mobility, thus the reasoning for Lee's series of orders, which included provisions for shoeless Confederates to remain at Winchester, a lightening of supplies, and an insistence that straggling be strictly forbidden. Lee's next major objective after crossing the Potomac River was to move on Frederick. A Confederate presence in a substantial pro-Union area was a direct insult to the North, and would only further press the Army of the Potomac to hurry faster in order to "repel the invasion" and "save the nation"; while most importantly for the Confederates, continually limit the progress of McClellan organizing his army into a capable force on the battlefield. 96 Nelson, 163-168. 97 H.B. McClellan, The Life and Campaigns of Major-General J.E.B. Stuart: Commander of the Cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia, Edison: The Blue & Grey Press, 1993. 113. 98 Harsh, 98; OR, vol 16, 2: 604-605. Letter from Lee to Davis on September 12 justifying is reasoning for crossing his army east of the mountains. 43 Lee's grand strategy was working so far; his movements northward from Richmond had stripped the Atlantic states of their Union occupiers to concentrate on Lee's Confederate force, while at the same time sending the Federal strategy of war into complete chaos as they scrambled to deal with the offensive. Lee believed that if he launched an unrelenting offensive, the Federals would be compelled to abandon their widely scattered smaller campaigns, which were gradually eating away the frontiers of the Confederacy; and, as a result, be forced to concentrate their columns in response to his initiatives. 99 Lee's movement into the western part of the state, via Frederick and into the Middleton and Pleasant valleys, opened the Shenandoah Valley up momentarily, which assisted Loring's advance in western Virginia, by isolating the small Federal commands in that region. In addition to freeing up Loring to make an offensive, Lee's army in western Maryland split the Federal war effort in half. The Army of the Potomac was now confined in environs around Washington, while Federal forces in the Western Theater had no direct route to reinforce McClellan. 100 The simultaneous advance of Lee, Loring, Marshall, Smith, and Bragg effectively drove a wedge between the Union field armies, while Price and Van Dorn's forces kept Grant fixed at Corinth. 101 Bragg and Smith's columns made their march through eastern and middle Tennessee and into Kentucky at an incredible speed, leaving Buell's army to have to hustle to catch up. 102 Kirby Smith realized the opportunity in front of him early on and moved his men forward roughly the same time Lee's men were preparing to destroy John Pope's forces near Manassas, beginning the Kentucky Campaign. Union Brigadier General George W. Morgan's command held the vital Cumberland Gap, which historian Earl Hess christened the "Gibraltar of the West." 99 Harsh, 116. 100 Hartwig, 162-163. 101 Harsh, 96-97; Hess, 31-35. 102 Hess, 57,62,64. 44 The Gap itself served as a platform for the Federals to invade East Tennessee, and as long as it remained in Federal hands, the Deep South, particularly Chattanooga and Atlanta, would be under constant threat. 103 Reducing this garrison was the first lynchpin in breaking Federal control and regaining Tennessee for the South. Smith, now free to maneuver feinted around the gap and threatened the supply lines, forcing a Federal withdrawal; he then turned his legions northward and moved into Kentucky. Smith moved through the eastern part of the state and pushed Heth's division as far as Covington, directly across from Cincinnati, sending that city and southern Ohio into a panic. 104 With Smith's small army running almost unmolested in Kentucky, Bragg's larger army moved through Middle Tennessee via Sparta feinting towards Nashville, forcing the Federals to concentrate there, while strategically widening the gap between Buell's command and Southern forces in Kentucky. Bragg, before departing to Chattanooga, left behind roughly 35,000 men in two separate commands under generals Stirling Price and Earl Van Dorn. These commands had a twofold objective. Their primary objective was to contain the Army of the Tennessee at Corinth, and once Bragg and Smith were in position, launch an offensive of their own against Grant, defeat him, and then rapidly march to connect with Bragg's army. 105 Bragg and Smith exposed the weakness in the Federal policy of limited war with its preoccupation of taking landmarks and reliance on cumbersome supply lines and within less than a months' time-reversed almost a year of Union progress in the west, in respect to subjugating the Upper South. Unlike John Bell Hood's offensive into Tennessee in late 1864, which, while certainly an emergency, did not deviate Sherman from his plans of marching to the sea. 106 In 103 Hess, 7-8. 104 Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground", 141. 105 Noe, 29. 106 Eric A. Jacobson and Richard A. Rupp, For Cause and for Country: A Study of the Affair at Spring Hill and the Battle of Franklin, Eric A. Jacobson, 2013. 42. 45 1862, this simply was impossible for Federal forces. Sherman operated under a "hard war" doctrine that allowed him to subsist off the land and changed his objective from key city centers to making war on the Southern people, through the destruction of their local economy, food subsistence, and ability subsist in a normal capacity. 107 Sherman effectively narrowed the war to the immediate doorstep of the Southern People. As a result the individual citizen was forced to deal with their own survival, and naturally the bigger picture of the Confederacy became less important. Union forces in 1862 did not have the same conditional framework, and by default, would be forced to pursue any Confederate force and meet it on the battlefield. Even though the fall of 1862 didn't produce the hoped-for victory conditions, strategically, the Confederates were more successful in this period than at any other part of the war. The results of this success were more apparent in the Western Theater than in the east. However, certain components in the Eastern Theater changed as well. The most significant measurable success emerged in time bought for the Confederacy, and a prolonged timetable for the Northern plan of war. In the summer, Federal plans in the west called for the capture of Vicksburg and Chattanooga, the latter of which was in progress when the offensive started. 108 It is highly probable that if able, the Federal forces would have moved on Vicksburg in the summer of 1862, and perhaps forced its capitulation much sooner. 109 However, this is only speculation, yet, the reality is this operation was certainly delayed by the events that occurred in Kentucky and the aggressive nature of Price and Van Dorn. Kentucky was only one variable in stymieing the Federal drive toward Vicksburg. Just as important were the aggressiveness of Price and Van Dorn at the battles of Iuka and Corinth in October. Although Confederate defeats, the outcome of 107 Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc. 321-328. 108 McPherson, 511-512. 109 Woodworth, Nothing but Victory, 243-244. 46 these battles managed to temporarily check the Federals, prompting an end to any realistic campaign season in Mississippi. At least for the foreseeable future, the Mississippi River remained open by way of Vicksburg, and Union strategy incomplete, in which case was Price and Van Dorn's big contribution. 110 Bragg and Smith failed to hold Kentucky and or convert her into a Confederate state. However, as the logistic concerns show, the state's complete occupation, with the available forces, was genuinely impossible. In all the engagements that had taken place, the Southerners had the better day. Kirby Smith's army completely routed Federal forces at Richmond in August, and Bragg's army captured the garrison at Munfordville. Before and during the campaign John Hunt Morgan's cavalry had wreaked havoc in Kentucky, capturing supplies, disrupting communications, and pushing to the Ohio River virtually unchallenged. 111 Even Kentucky's principle battle at Perryville was the better day tactically for the Confederates. More than anything, Kentucky showed the weakness of Buell, limited war, and the Union's inability to protect vital territory adequately under a conciliation policy. While in the end Bragg and Smith left, they did so generally unmolested, which showed Buell's unwillingness to fight another pitched battle. Therefore, this aftermath was certainly nothing for the Union to be proud of. In truth Buell did not drive Bragg and Smith out of Kentucky, rather the limitations of logistics and the realization of strategic objectives forced the Confederates back to Tennessee. 112 Although Braxton Bragg is surrounded by much controversy and sharp opinions on his leadership capabilities, one must look past emotion and see the facts as they present in the strategic element. While indeed, the Confederates failed to hold Kentucky, they did succeed in 110 Woodworth, 239-240. 111 Hess, 12. 112 Noe, 333. 47 regaining portions of Tennessee. In particular, Middle Tennessee by way of Murfreesboro, which sat astride the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and was seen as the key to the wealthy Stone, Duck, and Elk River valleys. 113 Historian Thomas Connelly pointed out, which was already previously noted, that Tennessee was by far the most critical state in terms of manufacturing to the South. Although the entire state wasn't in Confederate hands, over two-thirds of it was, and most importantly, the opportunity to secure the very vital Nashville and Mississippi River corridor remained a possibility for a future campaign. 114 The primary focal point in the interpretation of the Kentucky Campaign is the Confederate failure to remain within that state. However, the key phrase narrows down to opportunity and potential. If taken in this context, the Confederate forces in July were backed into a corner. However, come October, these same forces had managed to throw the Federal forces off balance and regain a significant portion of lost territory, changing the entire atmosphere and flow of the Western Theater. In short, the success of the Kentucky Campaign is that it allowed the Confederates to move from the verge of defeat to a position where the fate of the Western Theater was up in the air, which only a decisive campaign would bring to a conclusion. 115 The fall of 1862 was the last chance the Confederates had at securing Tennessee permanently during the war. While the Western Theater was more significant in terms of strategic gain and leverage, the Eastern Theater added its own momentous shift in the flow of events. Unlike the west, the Eastern Theater was very narrow, as it existed in the space between Richmond and Washington. In strategic terms, the region was harrowing regarding maneuvering room and logistical sustainment. In one sense, Lee and his army were successful in pushing the Army of the Potomac 113 Peter Cozzens, No Better Place to Die: The Battle of Stones River, Chicago: University of Illinois, 1990. 8. 114 Connelly, 16-22. 115 Cozzens, No Better Place to Die, 12-14; Hess, 116. 48 away from the gates of Richmond, along with wrecking the Army of Virginia, while lastly temporarily clearing the smaller theaters, such as the coast and Shenandoah Valley of Federal forces. 116 While this situation may have provided an opportunity in the west, it meant little or nothing in the east. The fact is, Lee understood his primary objective either consisted of breaking the Northern will to fight through battlefield victory or by the complete destruction of the Union army. 117 Lee's primary objective in Maryland was to bate the Federal forces into a showdown fight. He was successful in this mission by just crossing over the Potomac River. The location of Washington in the southern portion of Maryland across from Alexandria made an incursion in Maryland a threat for the Federal government. 118 Unlike the west, where a fair amount of effort was required for Bragg and Smith to march their armies the distance required to Kentucky, the Army of Northern Virginia did not have to move far to accomplish its mission. Another key component to Lee's strategic objective was the lack of overhead in its long-term goal. Unlike the Western Theater, there was no pressure for Lee to specifically secure any particular region, as the Confederacy in the east had not lost any of its production capabilities nor any significant amount of land to Federal occupation. Therefore, the Confederate movements' direction wasn't necessarily guided by a specific purpose, but rather by the necessity of strategic gains which were designed to draw out the Army of the Potomac in a state of haste and unpreparedness. However, whereas the Kentucky Campaign had different aspects of measurable success, the 116 Harsh, 19-20. 117 Murfin, 63-64. 118 Harsh, 23; Murfin, 36-40; McPherson, 555-556. All the major historians who focus on the Maryland Campaign point to this as a major component to deterring the outcome and purpose of Lee's strategy. 49 Maryland Campaign had none, only a single purpose that demanded a climactic clash to determine its outcome. 119 At no other point in the war did Lee have such an advantage and control of the initiative. Arguably, his combination of subordinate officers was the best in their position as a whole than at any other point. His army was operating off a long track of victory, the length of which they would not experience again. 120 And most importantly, the Maryland Campaign was truly the only time in which Lee would have direct control of the flow of events; in Richmond, he had acted out of desperation, in Northern Virginia, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, the Overland Campaign and Petersburg he counteracted his opponents moves, and at Gettysburg, he committed to a battle that was dictated by the Federals. In September of 1862, Lee was the composer of the campaign and the master of ceremonies, he and he alone decided when and where the climactic battle would be fought. 121 All too often, the argument arises that the Army of the Potomac moved quicker than Lee expected, and caught him off guard, forcing him to settle and fight an unprepared battle at Sharpsburg. This theory would make sense if Lee's strategic objectives were multilayered like Bragg or Smith. Nevertheless, this theory doesn't match up to his sole objective of a decisive engagement. As seen with logistical circumstances, Hagerstown was likely the limit for the army in terms of range, Lee, therefore, had decided to make the principle stand somewhere in that area. 122 Two factors make this apparent, the choice to reduce Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg, which are necessary for military doctrine, and the choice to have the army lay around Frederick 119 OR, vol 16, 2: Correspondence between Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis, September 8, 1862; Harsh, 119; Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy, 139. 120 Hartwig, 126-127. 121 Harsh, 57-59. 122 Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. I ,108-111; Harsh, 190; Hartwig, 116-117; Murfin, 113. All of these sources for reasons ranging from realistic logistical concerns to Lee's strategic initiative point towards the area of Hagerstown as the realistic goal of the Confederate offensive. 50 for several days. 123 If the plan had been to fight somewhere else or keep the Federals at a distance, these two factors fit the mold. The truth is that Lee wanted a fight, and he wanted it quick, the geography of Western Maryland affords a great opportunity to a defending army, which was Lee's primary tactical vision. 124 Looking at the scope of the Army of Northern Virginia's movements in the campaign, there a few abundantly clear facts that warrant Lee's strategic designs. It's already been stated that Lee's intention was to draw out the Army of the Potomac, which he did by simply crossing into Maryland, and ushered the emergency by crossing east of the mountains. 125 The next key was the layover or taunting of the Federals by having his army remain in Frederick for several days. The decision to reduce the Harpers Ferry garrison, while militarily necessary, also doubly acted as part of the "national emergency" which further put pressure on McClellan and his army to move with haste. 126 The battle of South Mountain, while a Confederate defeat, opened the way for the Federals to move over the range and meet Lee on the ground of his choosing. 127 South Mountain is interesting, particularly for strategic reasons. The choice to leave one division under D.H. Hill to hold the three passes stretched over ten miles indicates that Lee didn't intend to stop the Federals there and expected them to take the position. A decisive battle along the South Mountain range would not have been beneficial for Lee to meet his objectives. His army would not have been able to counterattack effectively due to terrain, and maneuvering room would have been limited. Although Lee initially considered scrapping the campaign due to the longer than expected siege of Harpers Ferry, once the garrison did fall, he was able to 123 Harsh, 147-150; Hartwig, 211-212, OR, vol 16, 2, 603 (Special Orders 191) 605-608. 124 Allan, 201-205; Harsh, 98-99; Marshall, 148-150. 125 Marshall, 146. 126 Brian Matthew Jordan, Unholy Sabbath: The Battle of South Mountain in History and Memory September 14, 1862, New York: Savas Beatie, 2012. 80-85. 127 Jordon, Unholy Sabbath, 301. 51 concentrate his forces in the area of Sharpsburg. 128 It may not be that Lee specifically wanted to fight at Sharpsburg, but the lay of the land and the tactical and strategic components of it, offered natural terrain on which to fight a decisive battle. 129 The Antietam battlefield offered several very strong defensive opportunities. First was the Antietam Creek, which was wide and deep enough to stop infantry from crossing unless over a bridge. The terrain, particularly on the southern end of the battlefield, is very suitable for a defending force, along with the ground near the center of the battlefield. On the northern end, the terrain is its weakest for defense; however, the entire battlefield, especially the northern end, is very suitable for artillery employment. Lee's position at Antietam Creek was without question formidable. 130 Whereas the events in Kentucky were one of maneuver, Maryland hinged on the tactical climax. Therefore, both forces needed to clash and soundly defeat the other to end the campaign. The battle of Antietam itself ended in a draw, and the opposing lines virtually remained the same. 131 Having realized the day after the engagement that McClellan wasn't likely to attack again, and understanding that his position offered no benefits for his army to attack, Lee promptly withdrew back into Shepherdstown, Virginia, (West Virginia) intending to regroup his army and re-crossing the Potomac River near Williamsport to again sue for a decisive battle. The Confederate's were blocked by several determining factors though, the two primary factors being McClellan's choice to move the VI Corps north towards Hagerstown to block a crossing, and a large amount of straggling that has taken place since the start of the 128 Allan, 320. 129 Harsh, 301-303. 130 Phillip Thomas Tucker, Burnside's Bridge: The Climatic Struggle of the 2nd and 20th Georgia at Antietam Creek, Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2000. 47-54. 131 Ezra Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. 2: Antietam. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 501. 52 campaigning that had severely reduced Lee's army from upwards of 70,000 men down to roughly 45,000. 132 While Lee did not thrash McClellan's army at Antietam to the extent his strategic objectives called for, the opportunity for a Confederate political victory was not entirely gone. In fact, Lee's offensive convinced Britain and France that Northern armies could never restore the Union, and they contemplated mediation, which would have constituted de facto recognition of the Confederacy. 133 Moving away from the narrow view of Lee and Maryland it is important to note that Bragg's army had achieved a significant victory on September 17 at Munfordville the same day the battle of Antietam was raging. While Lee's army was more or less locked in a stalemate in Maryland, the western Confederate forces still very much retained the initiative in Kentucky. If a successful outcome in Kentucky occurred, perhaps that would be enough to enhance the stalemate at Antietam into a negative outcome for the Union. 134 Lee did not wait in position along Antietam Creek, for events to develop in Kentucky, he didn't have to. By simply moving back across the river and McClellan's inability to pursue for logistical reasons, Lee still very much posed a serious threat, especially with re-crossing into Maryland if need be. Looking at the outcome of the Maryland Campaign and the factors involved in the forces' genetic composition, Lee's army achieved all that could reasonably be expected of it. Certainly, due to its size, it would be impossible to annihilate the Army of the Potomac, yet, by remaining together and gaining the tactical victory, that would have to be enough. 135 132 Murfin, 306. 133 McPherson, 546. 134 Earl J. Hess, Braxton Bragg: The Most Hated Man in the Confederacy, University of North Carolina Press, 2016. 63. 135 Ezra Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Vol. III: Shepherdstown Ford and the End of the Campaign. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 20-21. 53 Truly then the lynchpin of the 1862 Confederate offensive rested on the shoulders of Bragg and Smith. 136 Lee's offensive and climatic battle of Antietam would have held little or no importance if the events west of the Appalachian's hadn't been taking place in the manner they were. The ultimate failure of Bragg and Smith in Kentucky was their inability to link their armies together. The process involved in making this happen didn't occur until it was too late. 137 Regardless of why this juncture of uniting these armies didn't occur, the important point was that they retained the initiative until the battle of Perryville. Unlike Lee, Bragg and Smith didn't necessarily have to defeat Buell or Wright's local forces, but rather they just needed to exist in Kentucky. Smith's forces had cleared out Morgan and what pitiful resistance Wright was able to scrape together. Buell's army lingered exhausted and timidly in the western part of the state. Bragg and Smith controlled in theory over two-thirds of the state in the last weeks of September into October. 138 The high tide of the Confederacy occurred not at Antietam, but in the days before Perryville. Up until this date, the South had been successful in relieving Richmond, Chattanooga, Vicksburg, the Carolina coast, Shenandoah Valley, western Virginia, and Northern Virginia of any significant Federal occupation, or military operations. The Confederate armies were at its maxim of manpower, at least in theory, if not in actual employment and contained men who were wholly more experienced than their counterparts. Most importantly, the South had been successful universally of maintaining a Confederate wide offensive initiative. When looking at the battles of South Mountain, Richmond, Munfordville, Antietam, and Harpers Ferry, only 136 Hess, Braxton Bragg, 64. 137 Noe, 328-329. 138 Daniel, 128-129; Hess, 62-64; Noe, 104. 54 South Mountain had been a Federal victory and Antietam a draw, while the rest were complete decisive Confederate victories. The battle of Perryville long considered the principal battle of the Kentucky Campaign was neither decisive nor climatic. 139 The battle itself was fought only by portions of the armies, on ground that held no real strategic value to the overall goals of the campaign. However, the legacy of Perryville resides in Bragg's choice to withdraw his army from Kentucky in its aftermath. Leaving aside Bragg's personality, leadership issues, and his subordinates, the important aspect to look at is what was actually accomplished by his army. It's already been stated that Bragg and Smith's offensive knocked the Federal plan of war back a few pegs and opened up at two-thirds of Tennessee for the foreseeable future. Confederate goals upon entering Kentucky were unclear and varied in design between Bragg and Smith. 140 Perhaps the largest draw was establishing the state as Confederate, which they quickly understood wasn't a popular option amongst the people. That being the case, Confederate field armies could only subsist for so long in hostile territory until they would, by necessity, be forced to withdraw to friendly Tennessee. 141 Therefore, without the support of the majority of Kentuckians to endorse a Confederate government, the continuation of a Southern army within the state offered no benefit to the Confederacy. 142 Bragg and Smith's only true strategic failing was their inability to link together and deliver a decisive blow against Buell. If looked at in the context of the genetics of an ocean wave, the advance into Kentucky was the last little bit of the wave that rolls into the edge of the beach. It neither has the momentum nor the power to damage anything of significant strength. However, the break or 139 Noe, 343. 140 Hess, 56-57. 141 Connelly, 228; Noe, 334. 142 Noe, 336. 55 impact of the wave that occurs just before hitting shore tends to denote the power of the temporary effects inflicted within that particular wave's life span. Sticking with the ocean wave analogy, the Confederate wide offensive in the fall of 1862 was the last ocean wave before the tide changed. The lifespan of the Confederacy would perish in the calm time between the next high tide. Conclusion: The interpretations of the Civil War, its key moments, critical players, and even the purpose of the conflict, vary in many different extremes, platforms, and algorithms. Surely there were other critical moments of the war, in which the Confederacy could have theoretically changed the outcome or moments in which Union forces could have ended the war much sooner. The progress of the war is a fascinating storyline of complete unpreparedness through a series of excruciating growing pains that led to the high efficiency of conducting war. Looking at the grand scope of the conflict, particularly the logistics of the opposing sides, even the most novice student of the struggle can recognize that the Confederacy was severely behind in every aspect and shouldn't have waged war. 143 However, the fact remains they did, and the reality is any Southern hope for victory resided in the slowness, unpreparedness, and political deadlock of the North's ability to wage war. The true window in which to view why the fall of 1862 was the Southern high tide occurs in the aftermath of the campaigns themselves. The first and most critical component was the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation. The bold political move forever changed the direction and intent of the war. For the South, it had devastating consequences, as it eliminated 143 McPherson, 312-316. 56 any dream of European intervention, and essentially made the Confederacy an island left to its own. The proclamation also bled into the second crucial component, which truly had its roots at the beginning of 1862; however, it had become fully developed by the closing days of 1862, and that is the abandonment of "limited war" principals and the acceptance of "hard war" doctrine. 144 Militarily the South would never mount such a broad offensive again nor one with so much potential to gain from it. Lee's Pennsylvania Campaign in 1863, while more famous, did not have the potential as nine months prior when he crossed into Maryland. 145 Lee in June of 1863 was acting independently, while Confederate armies in the west were giving ground rapidly and losing Vicksburg. 146 Even with Confederate victory at Chickamauga, Bragg nor his predecessors could ever mount an effective counterthrust to regain vital Tennessee. 147 Hood's Tennessee Campaign in 1864 offered the closest opportunity; however, his cause was pyrrhic and traded the destruction of Georgia for the hope of gaining Tennessee. 148 The commencement of the Overland Campaign in 1864 saw the end of Lee's ability to mount a counterattack that had won for him on previous battlefields. With his numbers dwindling, and the Union's production capabilities at its height, continuing supply of reinforcements, and Grant's power to coordinate multiple armies upon Lee, forced the Confederate leader to dance to the tune of Grant's strategy. 149 144 McPherson, 567. 145 Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, 4-8. 146 Edwin C. Bearss and J. Parker Hills, Receding Tide: Vicksburg and Gettysburg the Campaigns that Changed the Civil War, National Geographic Society, 2010. 266. 147 Steven Woodworth, Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. 144. 148 Jacobson, For Cause and for Country, 524. 149 Gordon C. Rhea, The Battle of the Wilderness May 5-6, 1864, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994. 9-10, 12-13, 22. 57 The Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns were episodes that the Union could not afford to lose. Certainly, Union armies, especially in the east, met multiple setbacks, defeats, and disasters throughout the war; however, a loss at this critical juncture in each theater would have produced devastating consequences from which the North could not recover. The brilliance of these campaigns resides in the fact that neither side could afford a negative outcome, and a victorious outcome for either side had the power and capabilities to change the entire trajectory of the war. The Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns do not have a true decisive victor in respect to the definition, yet, the rate at which the Union declared victory and the rapidity with which it instituted new measures both politically and militarily showed the emergency the events in the fall of 1862 produced for the North. 150 An acceptance of that notion coupled with political density, logistical pitfalls, organizational hurtles, and strategic objectives, will clearly indicate that the fall of 1862 in the course of the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns, along with their supporting offenses was the high tide of the Confederacy, and the moment the Civil War changed trajectory in both political and military senses, which was the beginning of the Confederacy's defeat. 150 Muehlbauer, Ways of War, 197-200. 58 Bibliography Secondary Sources: Anderson, Nancy Scott and Dwight Anderson. The Generals: Ulysses. S. Grant and Robert E. Lee. Avenel: New Jersey, 1987. Bearss, Edwin C. and J. 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