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'The UK's Human Rights Act has become a political football'. Behind this lament - one that is voiced by people of all political persuasions, including both supporters and critics of the Act - lies the assumption that human rights thrive outside of politics, or at least should do. But this view of human rights obscures both their origin and purpose. The idea of human rights arose through political struggle, and the ways in which we understand its meaning continue to be shaped by politics. Its aim is both to right individual wrongs and to create a better society, if not world. And if human rights are not viewed within their political context their meaning becomes opaque. Whilst they must of course be capable of legal expression, they are not in themselves law: they are a means of evaluating the legitimacy of laws and policies. Nor are human rights a substitute for other ideologies or perspectives: they are an 'ethical guide' for interpreting and exercising them. In my book A Magna Carta for All Humanity: homing in on human rights, published in June to coincide with the 800th anniversary of the Magna Carta, I argue that it is also misleading to characterise the modern incarnation of human rights as simply the continuation of a Western, neo-imperialist world view. Contemporary human rights stem from the post-war project to address the limitations of Enlightenment thinking. They can be traced to the ethical framework reflected in the UN's 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which drew from the wide range of political, philosophical and religious beliefs of its diverse drafters, stirred by the 'barbaric acts' that had so recently taken place in democratic, 'enlightened', Europe.1 It is the text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, interpreted and developed by more recent global debates and practices, which give human rights their distinctiveness and traction in our current world. Yet it was not until the Berlin wall came down that the 'politics of human rights' was liberated from the sterile polarisation of the Cold War, which had kept them petrified for forty years. It was only then that the idea of human rights began to take root amongst those whose dreams of revolution and liberation had been tarnished, and who saw in the language of human rights a more humane route to a better world. Those who wished to believe that this would usher in the 'happy end of the story' - just like those who believed in 'the end of history' more generally - have been caught out. The very notion of universal human rights remains contested and challenged in the west as elsewhere; including, as we are currently witnessing, in 'the land of the Magna Carta'. Adapted from the source document.

Языки соседних стран входили в армянский мир как средство политического и дипломатического общения. Догматические разногласия сделали греческий язык, как впоследствии и грузинский, еще и маркером конфессиональной принадлежности. Но эти языки, входя в употребление армян-халкидонитов, не вытесняли армянский и служили культурной, а не этнической трансформации. Источниковедческий анализ двух армянохалкидонитских источников показывает, что армянский лингвистический субстрат проявляется и в произведении Анонима, жившего в VII в. в Армении, и в Типике Григория Пакуриана для его монастыря на Балканах, построенного в XI в. Эти наблюдения могут заметно поколебать априорно принятое утверждение о денационализации представителей армяно-халкидонитской общины, в особенности на территории Византийской империи за пределами Армении.The Armeno-Chalcedonian community could not emerge prior to the Council of Chalcedon (451). If we take into account the almost century-long lacuna between this Council and the perception of its decisions in Armenian Church and society, then we have to assign its emergence to an even later date. It was only at the turn of the 7th century that the non-Chalcedonian Armenian Church worked out its distinctive doctrine. The unity of the ethnic conscience of the Armenians was secured by their common origins, the common territory, historical memories, everyday life, culture and beliefs shared by them, but first and foremost by their common language. Armenia was not characterized by the linguistic pluralism of the great empires; however, its contacts with the neighboring states introduced into communication their respective languages, among which the most significant were Greek and Georgian. They were penetrating into the Armenian world as means of political, diplomatic, administrative, cultural and confessional communication. From the end of the 10 th century onwards the Armeno-Chalcedonians referred to themselves as not only Armenians ethnically, but also as Romaioi or Iberoi denominationally. Orthodox Armenians which formed a significant part of the Armenian ethnos emerged as a result not of ethnic, but of cultural transformations. These transformations, however, had their own linguistic boundaries. The Greek and Georgian languages, entering Armeno-Chalcedonian culture through liturgical books, secular literature and even through everyday communication, did not push Armenian to the periphery. An analysis of two Armeno-Chalcedonian sources demonstrates that the Armenian linguistic substratum showed itself both in the anonymous work of an author who lived in Armenia in the 7 th century and in the Typicon by Gregory Pakurian, written for his monastery in the Balkans which was built in the 11 th century. These observations could noticeably undermine the a priori assumption that the members of the Armeno-Chalcedonian community were Hellenized, especially outside the boundaries of Armenia proper, on the territory of Byzantine Empire.

Over the last two decades a spate of books, led by the ones cited in this essay, have illuminated and debated the bristly questions confronting contemporary "humanitarianism." The definitional or, one might say, foundational question is whether the adjective "humanitarian" should be limited to only those independent agencies that are engaged (without reference to a political context) in the impartial delivery of emergency relief to all those in existential need—or, in the unique case of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), engaged in monitoring the application of the Geneva Conventions to armed conflict. An answer in the affirmative could be considered the "classic" position of the humanitarian, and one still championed by the ICRC. Today, however, many NGOs, such as CARE, OXFAM, and Catholic Relief Services, which certainly regard themselves as humanitarian agencies, engage in a broad range of rehabilitative and developmental activities and continue to deliver emergency relief, and they are prepared to do so under circumstances where their work has conspicuous political implications. The same is true of such UN agencies as UNICEF, UNHCR, and the World Food Programme, which are not infrequently involved in complex peace operations that have clear political goals as specified by the Security Council. Further, well-known humanitarian activists and writers, notably Bernard Kouchner and Samantha Power, also reject the ICRC's definitional canon. The unsettled boundaries of what properly constitutes humanitarianism brings a number of difficult questions to the surface, including:
•Should relief be provided even if it could prolong a conflict, or could indirectly assist a belligerent, or possibly identify the relief giver with a government's political ends? And should the nature of those ends influence relief efforts?•Should relief agencies also assist in addressing the causes of humanitarian emergencies by joining in efforts to resolve a conflict, foster economic development, rebuild state institutions, and strengthen the protection of human rights?•Should such agencies accept funds from governments where governments specify how the funds are to be used?•Where necessary, should they advocate armed intervention to protect their personnel as well as the recipients of their aid?•In terms of the way they organize and structure themselves, should nonprofit agencies dedicated to humanitarian relief follow private-sector models?•Can organizations dedicated to the effective provision of emergency relief pursue that end without creating a culture of dependence, without discouraging local initiative, and without violating the liberal "right" to participate in life-shaping decisions?•Finally, how does humanitarianism relate to human rights, the other leading expression of what I would call "the humanitarian impulse"?

Award announcement, including a biography of Brooks Hays, for the Brooks Hays Memorial Christian Fellowship Award ; Brooks Hays Brooks Hays was one of Arkansas's most honored sons. His career was very nearly unique in its application of Christian principles and Christian faith to a life of public service in government. Hays was an influential member of Congress who fell [a] casualty in the general election of 1958 to the tide of unreason that was sweeping the South in resistance to school desegregation. He was defeated after he undertook the role of mediator between President Eisenhower and Governor Faubus in the Little Rock school crisis, but in adversity he fashioned a second career more illustrious than the first. He became an advisor to presidents (Kennedy and Johnson), a distinguished lecturer at leading universities including Rutgers and Wake Forest, in a symbol of courage in the service of his country and his fellow man. He was himself a "profile in courage" perfectly suited to the pattern of heroes commemorated in the book that John F. Kennedy had written as a young man. The career of Brooks Hays was remarkable in a number of ways, including the place of honor he earned in the service of both church and state. He was a Southern Baptist—indeed, at that time, the only layman to have become president of the Southern Baptist Convention (he served two terms in this position). He was a member of the Second Baptist Church in Little Rock during his years in the House of Representatives. A Sunday School class at Second Baptist still bears his name, although, with the wit that made him nationally famous as a humorist, he once remarked that he was the only member of Congress to have been "named after a Sunday School." Hays died in 1981, 23 years after the end of his first career in the 1958 election. He was widely eulogized in editorials and in commentary by public figures about the country. The Washington Post described him as "one of the gentlest spirits in this hard-boiled town—a stead-fast and courageous man." In his home state, the Arkansas Gazette said in a moving editorial: "So it was that Brooks Hays remained loyal to the end to the constituency that had turned against him in an aberration that was characteristic of the time. He was a man of extraordinary gentleness, particularly for a figure who almost innocently became embroiled in so many roaring controversies. And he knew that government is by consent of the governed, even as he made his own appeals for reason and law, for equality and brotherhood. He knew, in the secular as well as the religious context, whence power derived and he never sought to question the source."

This book is a political economy study that tackles the relationship between public finance and politics in Egypt during the period 1981-2003. It analyzes how the authoritarian regime of Hosni Moubarak has adapted to its fiscal crisis and how this crisis has affected the relationships between state and society and between the different parts and levels of the state. Political economy studies on Egypt have maintained that the reproduction of authoritarianism in this country has mainly been achieved through state control of huge economic resources. The rentier type of the Egyptian state ¬¬– its dependence on non-fiscal resources like foreign aid, workers' remittances, oil, and Suez Canal tolls – has made possible the successful survival of authoritarian politics. Economic rent has given the regime the possibility to buy off the population's political passivity and to avoid having recourse to taxing economic actors. However, the decline of the rentier elements of the Egyptian state and its mounting fiscal crisis haven't destabilized the regime. This study explains how the fiscal crisis has transformed the distribution of resources within the state. The transformation is dealt with on three levels: the ministerial, the central/local, and the regional. The 1990s witnessed a declining share of some institutions like the ministries of Defense and of Supply and a rising share of the ministries of Interior, Culture, Education and Religious affairs. This transformation is explained by the necessities of responding to the political challenges facing the regime. During the same period, the central state apparatus increased its share of public resources at the expanse of the local administrations, but at the price of reducing the functions these local administrations have to fulfill and by giving some de facto freedom to local units to mobilize resources from the population. Thus, during the 1990s, the regime tended to increase Upper-Egypt's share of public resources in order to combat the rise of the armed Islamic movement in this region. This tendency has been, however, defeated by the persistence of the centralized bias imbedded in state institutions, in particular those institutions created by the Nasser regime and kept in place by Sadat and Mubarak. The book argues that the Egyptian state is undergoing a process of 'normalization' in which 'normal' fiscal revenues will replace exceptional rentier revenues. Strategies of increasing the tax burden without enhancing the political resistance of social groups are analyzed. The study explains why the "no taxation without representation" demand was not raised against the authoritarian regime and why the Egyptian population has been subjected to the paradox of "more taxation and less representation". The role played by the judiciary in solving political crises (what could be called the 'judiciarization' of politics) is emphasized to explain this paradox. This study argues that the endurance of the authoritarian regime despite the decline of its rentier revenues can be explained by two factors: first, the fiscal crisis was interrupted by a period of extraordinary influx of rentier resources (1990-1994); second, the regime's survival strategy of "institutional stagnation" and "fragmented adaptation" has been successful in inhibiting political aggregations of economic and social demands. The regime has been firm on maintaining the formal institutional configuration of the state intact and at the same time it has adapted to the fiscal crisis with fragmented and informal institutional arrangements. Egyptian politics is thus undergoing a certain change. This change is, however, very slow, fragmented and not easily visible. The Egyptian case is one of the success of a regime and the failure of a state. The regime has succeeded since it has reproduced itself. But the state has failed because it is unable to facilitate capitalist development in the country. This book tries to show how the success of the regime has produced the failure of the state in Egypt. ; Cette thèse traite du rapport entre les finances publiques et la politique en Égypte durant la période de 1981-2003. Elle analyse comment le régime autoritaire de Hosni Moubarak s'est adapté à la crise financière de l'État et comment cette crise a affecté, d'une part, les rapports entre l'État et la société et, d'autre part, les différentes institutions de l'État. Les recherches en économie politique sur l'Égypte s'accordent sur le fait que la reproduction de l'autoritarisme dans ce pays est principalement due au contrôle étatique des ressources économiques. La nature rentière de l'État égyptien, c'est-à-dire sa dépendance vis-à-vis des ressources abondantes non fiscales comme les recettes du pétrole ou l'aide étrangère, ont permis au régime d'acheter la passivité politique de la population tout en maintenant un faible taux d'imposition fiscale sur les acteurs économiques. Pourtant, alors que les ressources de la rente rétrécissent, et que la crise financière ne cesse de prendre de l'ampleur, le régime égyptien reste un modèle de stabilité dans la région. La thèse s'appuie sur les théories classiques et récentes traitant du rapport entre les finances publiques et la politique pour enrichir la théorie simpliste de l'État rentier selon laquelle l'origine des revenus de l'État détermine sa nature politique. Ainsi selon cette théorie, l'État rentier est forcément autoritaire et la disparition de la rente ouvre la voie à la démocratisation. L'approche adoptée dans cette thèse est influencée par le néo-institutionnalisme historique et « la nouvelle économie politique » qui met l'accent sur les institutions étatiques dans l'étude de la transformation des politiques publiques et dans les changements politiques. L'étude montre comment la crise budgétaire a transformé la distribution des ressources au sein de l'État. Cette transformation est abordée sur trois axes : entre les différents ministères, entre les autorités centrales et locales et entre les différentes régions. Les années 1990 ont vu la baisse des ressources de quelques institutions dont le ministère de la Défense, de l'Approvisionnement. D'autres ministères ont vu croître leurs ressources, notamment l'Intérieur, la Culture, l'Éducation et les Affaires religieuses. J'analyse les changements dans la distribution des ressources en termes de réponse aux défis politiques imposés au régime égyptien dans les années 1990. Durant la même période, le niveau central de l'État a vu croître sa part des ressources publiques au détriment du niveau local, mais au prix de la contraction des fonctions que ce niveau local doit jouer et d'une liberté accrue donnée aux unités locales pour mobiliser les ressources auprès de la population. Durant les années 1990, le régime décida d'augmenter la part de la Haute Égypte (le Sud) dans les ressources publiques pour y combattre la montée en puissance du mouvement islamiste armé. Pourtant, en raison des « biais institutionnels » (concept formulé par l'école du néo-institutionnalisme historique), la distribution des ressources n'a pas été corrigée, le centralisme subsiste et le Sud resta marginalisé. Cette thèse défend l'idée que l'État égyptien est entré dans un processus de « normalisation » dans lequel les recettes fiscales normales doivent substituer aux recettes rentières exceptionnelles. Le dilemme du régime est alors d'augmenter le fardeau fiscal sur la société sans produire de résistance politique. L'étude contredit la maxime « no taxation without representation » (pas d'impôt sans représentation) et montre comment, la situation en Égypte aujourd'hui doit être plutôt qualifié de « more taxation and less representation » (plus d'impôts et moins de représentation). Le rôle joué par l'appareil judiciaire dans l'allègement des crises politiques du régime de Moubarak est proposé pour expliquer ce paradoxe. Ce rôle a affaibli toute politisation et agrégation des résistances face à l'impôt. La Justice a effectivement supprimé plusieurs impôts du fait de leur nature non constitutionnelle. Les données quantitatives avancées révèlent une implication croissante de la Justice dans la résolution des conflits entre l'État et la société dans ce domaine. Un fait qui a produit une « juridisation » des conflits. L'étude suggère que la reproduction du régime autoritaire malgré la chute structurelle de ses revenus rentiers tient à la stratégie de la survie du régime, basée sur « la stagnation institutionnelle » et « l'adaptation fragmentée ». Cette stratégie a été efficace dans la neutralisation des revendications économiques et sociales. Le régime a insisté à maintenir la configuration institutionnelle et constitutionnelle de l'État intacte et, dans le même temps, il s'est adapté à sa crise budgétaire par des aménagements institutionnels informels et fragmentés. La politique égyptienne est en train de changer, mais ce changement est lent, fragmenté et difficilement visible. Le cas égyptien est celui du succès d'un régime et l'échec d'un État. Le régime a réussi puisqu'il est parvenu à se reproduire, mais l'État a échoué puisque il n'est pas en mesure de faciliter le développement capitaliste dans ce pays. Cette thèse essaie de montrer comment le succès du régime a produit l'échec de l'État en Égypte. L'utilisation conjointe dans cette étude des concepts de l'État et du régime avait pour objectif d'inclure dans l'analyse, à la fois, d'une part les structures objectives et les stratégies des acteurs, et d'autre part les contraintes d'un système et la liberté relative des acteurs.

For the past several years now, a phalanx of defense officials and retired senior officers have been lamenting the dearth of people willing to serve in the U.S. military. The problem is particularly acute for the Army, the largest of the U.S. forces, which fell short of its target by 25,000 recruits over the past two years. The situation is so grave that experts claim it imperils the all-volunteer force, an institution that has provided manpower for the American military for half a century. Why does the Army, an organization that prides itself on achievement, fail at this fundamental task? Excuses tend to focus on market dynamics such as shrinking recruiting pools, lack of knowledge among American youth about service opportunities, and impacts from COVID 19. These factors are undoubtedly relevant, but are they the actual cause of the Army's failure? Current officials seem to think so. After failing in 2022, the Army increased its efforts to convince young people to serve. This, combined with a campaign to overcome "misperceptions" about life in the military, was a primary focus of the branch's $104 million advertising budget in 2023. Additionally, the Army estimated it invested over $119 million in the future soldier preparatory course. This new program enabled young Americans, initially disqualified because of low aptitude scores or high body-fat results, the opportunity to improve their marks. The Army claimed over 8,800 recruits completed the course and moved on to basic combat training. In the end, however, none of these initiatives enabled the force to achieve its quotas. If market dynamics are not the underlying cause of the crisis, what is? I believe that the Army fails to meet its recruiting goals not because of a challenging market environment, but rather because a sizable portion of the American public has lost trust in it and no longer sees it as an institution worthy of personal investment. Professor of sociology Piotr Sztompka defines trust as "a bet about the future contingent actions of others." He presents the concept of trust in two components: beliefs and commitment. Essentially, a person trusts when they believe something about the future and they act in accordance with this belief. This is directly relevant to recruiting: in a high trust environment, people are more likely to enlist because they have a reasonable expectation of future benefit. Unfortunately, anyone considering service today can look to myriad examples of the Army failing to meet their end of the bargain. Whether it is a lack of adequate and safe housing for soldiers and their families, the persistence of sexual assault, an inability to address suicide rates or to accurately account for property and funds — or even to develop a comprehensive physical fitness test — the Army, and the Department of Defense more broadly, consistently fail to achieve results. But these shortcomings, while disastrous, pale in comparison to the Army's ultimate failure: the failure to win wars. In his book, "Why America Loses Wars," Donald Stoker reminds us that winning in war means, "the achievement of the political purpose for which the war is being fought." Judging by this standard, the Army has clearly failed at its raison d'être, to fight and win the nation's wars, over the past two decades. This failure has come at catastrophic cost: the loss of over 900,000 lives, the death of over 7000 U.S. service members, and the depletion of eight trillion dollars. Additionally, on the international scene, the U.S. has bled influence, and levels of violence are on the rise. Considering the wreckage listed above, it is little wonder that the American people have markedly lost confidence in the institution and its leaders in recent years and could explain the unwillingness to volunteer for service. Essentially, signing up for the military is starting to look like a really bad bet. Adding insult to injury, a recent survey of military members indicates their enthusiasm to recommend military service has also declined significantly. While quality of life issues are highlighted as a concern, one cannot ignore the impact of failed wars on this trend. The 2021 Afghanistan withdrawal, leaving the Taliban in control of the country after 20 years, has left veterans feeling betrayed and humiliated, and naturally, unlikely to encourage others to follow their path in life. Instead of flailing about trying to overcome challenging market dynamics, therefore, the Army should immediately commit to fixing itself. It can start by admitting its significant failures and its baffling inability to be honest with the American public about them. There are plenty of retired officers who have had public epiphanies about these systematic failures, but this kind of candor and responsibility needs to propagate among currently serving senior officials across the defense enterprise and the political establishment.Once honesty is re-established as a core value, and the Army has come to grips with the fact that it failed, it can then begin to explore the reason why. Simply put, the Army fails because it is set up to fail. It was asked to accomplish objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq that it could not possibly hope to achieve. Professors Leo Blanken and Jason Lapore point out what every senior defense official should clearly understand by now: that despite its impressive capabilities, the U.S. military is of limited utility in the type of non-existential conflicts we have fought in the past two decades. This is because the U.S. military is built for and excels at "battlefield dominance," yet it was saddled with conducting counterinsurgency, reconstruction and building democratic institutions, tasks it was not trained for or prepared to accomplish.These revelations are not new, senior defense officials should have understood these dynamics all along, and speaking frankly, they did. From General Shinseki's ignored warnings about the number of troops at the beginning of the Iraq invasion, to ongoing assessments throughout both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, it seems that it was clear throughout the defense establishment (at least behind closed doors) that the U.S. military could not and would not achieve the nation's political objectives. Yet despite this, top defense officials assured the American public that the U.S. military was "making progress" towards its goals, right up to the point that it was manifestly evident that they were not. And yet, at precisely the moment the American public is looking for accountability, many of the same senior officials who failed to achieve results for the nation, are instead rewarded with lucrative positions in the defense industry and with foreign countries. Seeing that the military refuses to hold itself accountable, it is unsurprising that by withholding their most precious resources, their sons and daughters, the American public is. The service's leadership handbook states that "trust is the foundation of the Army's relationship with the American people, who rely on the Army to ethically, effectively and efficiently serve the Nation."To earn back the trust of the American people and solve the recruiting crisis, the Army is going to have to do what everyone else has to do when relationships are broken: accept responsibility and begin to show, by deeds not words, a commitment to change. Senior Army officials could immediately improve by critically examining the "unquestioned assumptions that form the basis of…American grand strategy," reevaluating military officer professional development models, and understanding how misaligned military incentive structures work against achieving policy goals. Regardless of the approach, it should be laser-focused on delivering the ethical, effective and efficient service to the nation mentioned above.If the Army lets this opportunity pass them by, however, claims that the military and the broader defense establishment are in a position to decisively win the nation's wars lack credibility, as the American public will understandably remain uneasy about making a personal investment in the Army.

1. Introduction -- 2. Do capital inflows relieve banks' credit constraints and boost credit growth? Evidence from credit conditions and bank credit risk -- 3. Credit conditions and the amplification of macroeconomic responses to unexpected shocks: Implications for monetary policy -- 4. Output and inflation responses to single and double credit threshold effects in South Africa -- 5. Do contractionary fiscal shocks transmitted via GDP growth dampen credit growth? -- 6. Do synchronised credit and house price booms impact the monetary policy reaction to inflationary pressures? -- 7. Do synchronised boom and non-boom episodes in credit, commodity and equity prices impact the response of the repo rate to positive inflation shocks? -- 8. To what extent do capital inflows impact response of South African economic growth to positive SA-US interest rate differential shocks? -- 9. Is there a compelling case to increase the SARB holdings of government securities to supplement interest income and neutralize loses due foreign investments and foreign currency reserves accumulation? -- 10. Are the amplification effects of positive shocks to SARB assets and forex reserves on long-term yields dependent on government debt regimes? -- 11. Foreign Currency Reserves: Do they contribute to GDP and employment growth? -- 12. What is the impact of large-scale asset purchases and banks' balance sheets? -- 13. Is the interest rate corridor an effective instrument to dampen the accumulation of excess reserves and inter-bank rate volatility? -- 14. Is the impact of the unexpected positive required reserves ratio shock on inflation expectations different to that due to positive excess LAH and forex reserves shock? -- 15. How potent is the required reserves impact tightening shock on funding and consumer interest rates? -- 16. The impact of large-scale asset purchases on non-resident purchases of South African assets -- 17. Large scale asset purchases and activity in the primary and secondary share and bond markets -- 18. The stock and flow effects of large-scale asset purchases: Evidence from persistent vs transitory shocks -- 19. Has the inflation target band impacted the natural rate of unemployment in South Africa? Evidence from the accelerationist Philips curve -- 20. Do regulatory tools impact the transmission of capital inflow shocks into credit extension and induce the reallocation of sectoral credit shares? -- 21. What role do non-performing loans play in propagating the excess LAH shock effects on sectoral credit re-allocation? -- 22. Is excess CAR beneficial in neutralising excessive credit growth and inflationary pressures? What are the implications for monetary and financial policy? -- 23. Do non-performing loans propagate the transmission of monetary policy tightening shocks to sectorial credit? -- 24. How effective is the relaxation of the countercyclical capital buffer at a time when other residential macro-prudential tools are tight? -- 25. Revisiting the role of money demand function: Does the short fall in money demand impact the inflation responses of rand depreciation shocks? -- 26. Do the shortfalls and overhangs derived from money demand in South Africa augmented with portfolio balances impact inflation dynamics? -- 27. Do the exchange rate depreciation and volatility shocks impact money demand in South Africa? -- 28. Does economic policy uncertainty impact real money demand in South Africa? -- 29. Is a single sectorial credit growth threshold too restrictive? Evidence from the output and inflation -- 30. Does the threshold for household debt growth matter for GDP growth and response of monetary policy to inflation shocks? -- 31. How does a positive repo rate shock affect the household sector intermediation? Evidence from households' flow-of-funds data -- 32. To what extent are the public and private's sector financial asset flows impacted by monetary policy tightening shock?.

Barry Eichengreen, Ricardo Hausmann and Ugo Panizza (2007), 'Currency Mismatches, Debt Intolerance, and Original Sin: Why They are Not the Same and Why it Matters', in Sebastian Edwards (ed) (ed.), Capital Controls and Capital Flows in Emerging Economies: Policies, Practices, and Consequences, Chapter 3, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 121-64 -- Charles P. Kindleberger (1996), 'Conclusion: The Lessons of History', 'Appendix A' and 'Appendix B', in Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, Chapter 12 and Appendices A and B, Third Edition, London: Macmillan, 190-97, 198-202, 203-12, notes -- Robert J. Shiller (2001), 'Speculative Volatility in a Free Society', in Irrational Exuberance, Chapter 11, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 203-33, notes -- Jan Kregel (2007),'The Natural Instability of Financial Markets', Levy Economics Institute Working Paper, No. 523, December, i, 2-28 -- John Kenneth Galbraith ([1954] 1992), 'Cause and Consequence', in The Great Crash, 1929, Chapter X, London: Penguin Books in association with Hamish Hamilton, 186-210 -- Martin H. Wolfson (1994), 'A Business-Cycle Model of Financial Crises' in Financial Crises: Understanding the Postwar U.S. Experience, Chapter 11, Second Edition, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 143-50 -- E.P. Davis (1992), 'The Economic Theory of Systemic Risk', in Debt, Financial Fragility, and Systemic Risk, Chapter 5, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 117-46 -- Hyman P. Minsky (1982), 'The Financial-Instability Hypothesis: Capitalist Processes and the Behavior of the Economy', in Charles P. Kindleberger (ed) and Jean-Pierre Laffargue (ed) (eds), Financial Crisis: Theory, History, and Policy, Chapter 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 13-39 -- Philip Arestis and Murray Glickman (2002), 'Financial Crisis in Southeast Asia: Dispelling Illusion the Minskyan Way', Cambridge Journal of Economics, 26 (2), March, 237-60 -- Josef Steindl (1989), 'Saving and Debt', in Alain Barrère (ed) (ed.), Money, Credit and Prices in Keynesian Perspective. Proceedings of a Conference held at the University of Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne, Chapter 4, London: Macmillan, 71-8 -- Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler (1989), 'Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations', American Economic Review, 79 (1), 14-31 -- Robert J. Shiller (1993), 'Mechanisms for Hedging Long Streams of Income', 'National Income and Labor Income Markets' and 'Making It Happen', in Macro Markets: Creating Institutions for Managing Society's Largest Economic Risks, Chapters 3, 4, 9 and notes, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 31-51, 52-77 and 201-14, 217-21, 226-7, references -- Jan Toporowski (2009), 'The Economics and Culture of Financial Inflation', Competition and Change, 13 (2), June, 145-56

Conservative/neoliberal policies have tried, throughout the history of the initial level, to depoli­ticize it and to empty it of the philosophical, politi­cal and pedagogical debates that have gone through it since its inception. Sometimes, putting the garden in the place of the caretaker and the teacher as the caretaker, giving the teacher as a gardener an aseptic function, considering that the best teacher would be the one who knows very well the stages of child de­velopment and carries out actions so that it is carried out as close as possible to "normality". This perspec­tive produced a psychologization of the teaching task and the intensification of the neutrality and apolitici­sm of the teaching role, sharpening the dissociation between theory and practice. On the other hand, at times, the focus has been on classroom teaching, re­ducing it exclusively to the technical-instrumentalist dimension of didactics, centralizing the discussions from the initial level to the classroom work modali­ty, necessary and important aspects but not excluding other dimensions such as the political, pedagogical, social and ethical. In the development of this article we will raise the need to recover the political dimension of the teaching role and the pedagogization of the initial level, under­standing that education is a practice that cannot be neutral: its actions, its methods, its objectives always obey a vision of social subject crossed by its context. In other words, we start from the recognition that all institutional and classroom decisions are based on pedagogical assumptions that are in turn the product of social, cultural and ideological determinants. We believe it is relevant to address this issue in ho­mage to Dr. Miguel Ángel Zabalza since he has been a reference point in the field of Early Education Peda­gogy, being significant for our own training and the current training of new generations of teachers. ; Las políticas conservadoras/neoliberales han intentado, a lo largo de la historia del nivel inicial, despolitizarlo y vaciarlo de los debates filosóficos, políticos y pedagógicos que lo han atravesado desde su inicio. En ocasiones, poniendo al jardín en el lugar de guarda y al docente de cuidador, adjudicándole a la maestra jardinera una función aséptica, considerando que la mejor docente sería aquella que conoce muy bien las etapas del desarrollo infantil y realiza acciones para que el mismo se lleve a cabo lo más ajustado posible a la normalidad. Esta perspectiva produjo una psicologización de la tarea docente y la intensificación de la neutralidad y apoliticidad del rol docente, agudizando la disociación entre la teoría y la práctica. Por otra parte, en ocasiones, se ha puesto el foco en lo didáctico-áulico, reduciéndolo exclusivamente a la dimensión técnico-instrumentalista de la didáctica, centralizando las discusiones del nivel inicial en la modalidad de trabajo áulico, aspectos necesarios e importantes pero no excluyentes de otras dimensiones como lo político, lo pedagógico, lo social y lo ético. En el desarrollo de este artículo plantearemos la necesidad de recuperar la dimensión política del rol docente y la pedagogización del nivel inicial, entendiendo que la educación es una práctica que no puede ser neutral: sus acciones, sus métodos, sus objetivos siempre obedecen a una visión de sujeto social atravesado por su contexto. Partimos del reconocimiento que todas las decisiones institucionales y áulico-didácticas se fundamentan en supuestos pedagógicos que a su vez son producto de determinantes sociales, culturales e ideológicos.

[spa] Con la aparición de las vanguardias históricas y la consagración en el campo artístico de las performances, de las instalaciones, y del arte conceptual, la discusión sobre el estatuto artístico de una obra es cada vez más cuestionable por una parte de la crítica, como también por la sociedad civil. Las experimentaciones dadaístas que incorporaron la visita a lugares banales de la ciudad como una forma estética en clave antiartística, abrieron un camino que décadas más tarde el movimiento situacionista recuperó con una evidente voluntad política. Sin embargo, en una economía global de mercado como la que caracteriza nuestra sociedad, las propuestas artísticas de la Internacional Situacionista encuentran en sus manifestaciones contemporáneas muchos elementos contradictorios, signados, sobre todo, por la asimilación contracultural por parte del capitalismo. El propósito de esta tesis es proponer un modelo, a la vez que una reflexión conceptual, sobre la posibilidad de llevar a cabo una experimentación artística-lúdica- política que recupere el gesto radical de la tradición situacionista en el escenario de nuestras ciudades contemporáneas. De este modo, emerge lo que he llamado el gesto peripoético (GPP). Su formulación contiene en sí misma un germen anticanonizante y supone a su vez, la posibilidad de distinguir diferentes tipos de prácticas artísticas y estimar cuáles están más en sintonía con el ideario que el programa situacionista formuló a mediados del siglo XX. La constatación de que, como señaló la IS, "no existe un gesto lo suficientemente radical", por un lado, nos confirma el triunfo de la sociedad del espectáculo, pero por otro, nos deja pequeños umbrales heterotópicos por los que se puede seguir experimentando y expandiendo una disidente forma de habitar, encontrarse, y apropiarse del paisaje urbano. ; [eng] With the appearance of the historical avant-gardes and the consecration in the artistic field of performances, installations, and conceptual art, the discussion about the artistic status of a work is increasingly questionable by a part of critics, as well as by the civil society. The Dadaist experiments that incorporated the visit to banal places in the city as an aesthetic form, opened a path that decades later the Situationist movement recovered with an evident political will. However, in a global market economy such as the one that characterizes our current society, the International Situationist's (IS) artistic proposals find in its contemporary manifestations many contradictory elements, marked, above all, by the countercultural assimilation on the part of capitalism. The purpose of this thesis is to propose a model, as well as a conceptual reflection, on the possibility of carrying out an artistic-playful-political experimentation that recovers the radical gesture of the situationist tradition on the stage of our contemporary cities. In this way, what I have called the peripoetic gesture (PPG), emerges. Its formulation contains in itself an anti-canonizing germ and supposes, in turn, the possibility of distinguishing different types of artistic practices and evaluate which ones are more in tune with the ideology that the situationist program formulated in the middle of the 20th century. The finding that, as the IS pointed out, "there is not a sufficiently radical gesture", on the one hand, confirms the triumph of the society of the spectacle, but on the other hand, it leaves us with small heterotopic thresholds through which it is possible to continue experimenting and expanding a dissident way of inhabiting, meeting, and appropriating the urban landscape.

Post-mortem tissues samples are a key resource for investigating patterns of gene expression. However, the processes triggered by death and the post-mortem interval (PMI) can significantly alter physiologically normal RNA levels. We investigate the impact of PMI on gene expression using data from multiple tissues of post-mortem donors obtained from the GTEx project. We find that many genes change expression over relatively short PMIs in a tissue-specific manner, but this potentially confounding effect in a biological analysis can be minimized by taking into account appropriate covariates. By comparing ante- and post-mortem blood samples, we identify the cascade of transcriptional events triggered by death of the organism. These events do not appear to simply reflect stochastic variation resulting from mRNA degradation, but active and ongoing regulation of transcription. Finally, we develop a model to predict the time since death from the analysis of the transcriptome of a few readily accessible tissues. ; We acknowledge and thank the donors and their families for their generous gifts of organ donation for transplantation and tissue donations for the GTEx research study. The Genotype-Tissue Expression (GTEx) project was supported by the Common Fund of the Office of the Director of the National Institutes of Health (commonfund.nih.gov/GTEx). We thank Anabela Nunes for help on image edition. This work was supported by the following grants and contracts: 1) From the US NIH: Contract HHSN261200800001E (Leidos Prime contract with NCI); Contracts 10XS170 (NDRI), 10XS171 (Roswell Park Cancer Institute), 10 × 172 (Science Care Inc.), and 12ST1039 (IDOX); Contract 10ST1035 (Van Andel Institute); Contract HHSN268201000029C (Broad Institute); R01 DA006227-17 (U Miami Brain Bank) 2) Ipatimup and i3s are partially funded by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT); FEDER funds through the COMPETE 2020—Operacional Programme for Competitiveness and Internationalization (POCI), Portugal 2020, and by Portuguese funds through FCT/MCTES in the framework POCI-01-0145-FEDER-007274; 3) NORTE-01-0145-FEDER-000029, supported by NORTE 2020, under the PORTUGAL 2020 Partnership Agreement, through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF); 4) FCT Fellowships SFRH/BPD/89764/ 2012 to PO, PD/BD/128007/2016 to AS; Salary support to PGF by POPH—QREN Type 4.2, European Social Fund and MCTES, program Investigador FCT, IF/01127/2014. 5) BIO2014-57291-R from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and "Plataforma de Recursos Biomoleculares y Bioinformáticos" PT13/0001/0007 from the ISCIII, and EU H2020-INFRADEV-1-2015-1 ELIXIR-EXCELERATE (ref. 6,676559) Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, 'Centro de Excelencia Severo Ochoa 2013-2017' and CERCA Programme/Generalitat de Catalunya, 7) Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte, under the FPU programme (Formación de Profesorado Universitario) with pre-doctoral fellowship FPU15/03635 to MMA. 8) Award Number 1R01MH101814 and 3R01MH101814-03S1 from the National Human Genome Research Institute. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Human Genome Research Institute or the National Institutes of Health. European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC grant agreement RNA-MAPS_294653, Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad, referencia MEIC BIO2015-70777-P y los Fondos Estructurales de la Unión Europea (FEDER) and ISCIII del Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, referencia PT13/0001/0021 cofinaciada por el Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional (FEDER). 9) MS received funding from CNPq (grant 310132/2015-0 and 427541/2016-6), and from FAPERJ (grant E_06/2015).

Journal of High Energy Physics 2016.2 (2016): 145 reproduced by permission of Scuola Internazionale Superiore di Studi Avanzati (SISSA) ; Artículo escrito por muchos autores, sólo se referencian el que aparece en primer lugar, el nombre del grupo de colaboración y los autores que firman como pertenecientes a la UAM ; A search for a massive resonance decaying into a standard-model-like Higgs boson (H) and a W or Z boson is reported. The analysis is performed on a data sample corresponding to an integrated luminosity of 19.7 fb−, collected in proton-proton collisions at a centre-of-mass energy of 8 TeV with the CMS detector at the LHC. Signal events, in which the decay products of Higgs, W, or Z bosons at high Lorentz boost are contained within single reconstructed jets, are identified using jet substructure techniques, including the tagging of b hadrons. This is the first search for heavy resonances decaying into HW or HZ resulting in an all-jet final state, as well as the first application of jet substructure techniques to identify H → WW∗ → 4q decays at high Lorentz boost. No significant signal is observed and limits are set at 95% confidence level on the production cross sections of W' and Z' in a model with mass-degenerate charged and neutral spin-1 resonances. Resonance masses are excluded for W' in the interval [1.0, 1.6] TeV, for Z' in the intervals [1.0, 1.1] and [1.3, 1.5] TeV, and for mass-degenerate W' and Z' in the interval [1.0, 1.7] TeV ; Finally, we acknowledge the enduring support for the construction and operation of the LHC and the CMS detector provided by the following funding agencies: BMWFW and FWF (Austria); FNRS and FWO (Belgium); CNPq, CAPES, FAPERJ, and FAPESP (Brazil); MES (Bulgaria); CERN; CAS, MoST, and NSFC (China); COLCIENCIAS (Colombia); MSES and CSF (Croatia); RPF (Cyprus); MoER, ERC IUT and ERDF (Estonia); Academy of Finland, MEC, and HIP (Finland); CEA and CNRS/IN2P3 (France); BMBF, DFG, and HGF (Germany); GSRT (Greece); OTKA and NIH (Hungary); DAE and DST (India); IPM (Iran); SFI (Ireland); INFN (Italy); MSIP and NRF (Republic of Korea); LAS (Lithuania); MOE and UM (Malaysia); CINVESTAV, CONACYT, SEP, and UASLP-FAI (Mexico); MBIE (New Zealand); PAEC (Pakistan); MSHE and NSC (Poland); FCT (Portugal); JINR (Dubna); MON, RosAtom, RAS and RFBR (Russia); MESTD (Serbia); SEIDI and CPAN (Spain); Swiss Funding Agencies (Switzerland); MST (Taipei); ThEPCenter, IPST, STAR and NSTDA (Thailand); TUBITAK and TAEK (Turkey); NASU and SFFR (Ukraine); STFC (United Kingdom); DOE and NSF (U.S.A.). Individuals have received support from the Marie-Curie programme and the European Research Council and EPLANET (European Union); the Leventis Foundation; the A. P. Sloan Foundation; the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation; the Belgian Federal Science Policy Office; the Fonds pour la Formation `a la Recherche dans l'Industrie et dans l'Agriculture (FRIA-Belgium); the Agentschap voor Innovatie door Wetenschap en Technologie (IWT-Belgium); the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS) of the Czech Republic; the Council of Science and Industrial Research, India; the HOMING PLUS programme of the Foundation for Polish Science, cofinanced from European Union, Regional Development Fund; the Compagnia di San Paolo (Torino); the Consorzio per la Fisica (Trieste); MIUR project 20108T4XTM (Italy); the Thalis and Aristeia programmes cofinanced by EU-ESF and the Greek NSRF; and the National Priorities Research Program by Qatar National Research Fund

Hannah Arendt noted that the disappearance of authority from the public domain, as conceived and practiced by ancient Romans, has been the cause of the current political crisis in the West, highlighting the American Revolution (Independence of the United States) as the only successful event in the modern world that was closer to its exercise. This Arendtian perspective serves as the basis to inquire into the possibility of rescuing authority for the modern world, as a way not only to ratify Arendt's judgment and to draw conclusions on the unlikelihood of achieving such a recovery and on the failure of modern revolutions, but also to reveal, as a consequence of such loss, the appearance of bureaucracy and, consequently, of the transmutation of citizens into civil servants, with the concomitant emergence of the banality of evil, and the good as the other side of the same coin. Bureaucracy whose efficient instrumental condition has contributed to the exacerbation of capitalism in his globalizing expression, which has led to ruin the scheme of nation-State on which was based the hope of revolutions, understood as the return to a point which is not must start from the latter. The only possibility for the man who rescue it from its status as a tool of work and consumption, agent for the increase of the global capital of corporations, will be done through political action through the cultivation of humanity, what Derrida has called worldisation, in opposition to globalization, whose most propitious Stadium, in his view, area from which contribute to the recognition of the man in its plural condition, to make it thinking the man as an itself same. ; Hannah Arendt señala que la desaparición de la autoridad del ámbito público, como fue concebida y ejercitada por los romanos antiguos, ha sido la causa de la actual crisis política de Occidente, y destaca a la revolución norteamericana (la independencia de Estados Unidos) como el único evento exitoso que en el mundo moderno estuvo más cercano a su ejercicio. Desde esta premisa se indaga, en clave arendtiana, sobre la posibilidad de rescatar la autoridad para el mundo moderno, búsqueda que, además de ratificar el juicio de Arendt y de concluir sobre lo imposible de lograr tal recuperación y del fracaso de las revoluciones modernas, desvela, como una consecuencia de tal pérdida, la aparición de la burocracia y, en consecuencia, la transmutación del ciudadano en funcionario, con la concomitante emergencia de la banalidad del mal y del bien como la otra cara de la misma moneda. Se trata de una burocracia cuya eficiente condición instrumental ha contribuido a la exacerbación del capitalismo en su expresión globalizante, que ha llevado al traste el esquema de estado-nación sobre lo cual se fundaba la esperanza de las revoluciones, entendidas como el regreso a un punto del cual no se debió partir. La única posibilidad del hombre de escapar de su condición de instrumento al servicio del trabajo y del consumo, agente útil para el incremento del capital global de las corporaciones, será la acción política mediante el cultivo de la humanidad, a lo que Derrida ha denominado la mundialización, en oposición a la globalización, cuyo estadio más propicio, a su juicio, es la universidad, ámbito desde el cual se pueda contribuir al reconocimiento del hombre en su condición plural, para que sea pensado como un fin en sí mismo.

Gegenstand der vorliegenden Untersuchung ist eine handlungstheoretische und arbeitssoziologische Analyse der 'ärztlichen Kunst' sowie ihres Stellenwerts und ihrer Relevanz in der ökonomisierten "High-Tech-Medizin". Eine inhaltliche und empirische Präzisierung und Fundierung des Konzepts jenseits der geflügelten Worte 'Ärztlicher Blick' und 'Ärztliche Intuition' – erst recht unter den gewandelten Bedingungen einer verwissenschaftlichten, technisierten und ökonomisierten Medizin - fehlt bislang. Die Untersuchung nähert sich von verschiedenen Seiten dem Phänomen 'ärztliche Kunst'. Zunächst werden im Rahmen einer Konturierung der ärztlichen Praxis sowohl historische Betrachtungen des Arztes und aktuelle empirische Untersuchungen zum ärztlichen Wissen und Handeln wie auch grundlegende handlungstheoretische Konzeptionen jenseits eines rationalen Handlungsbegriffs berücksichtigt. Einzubetten ist die Näherbestimmung des Wesens und der Beschaffenheit ärztlichen Handelns im Sinne einer 'ärztlichen Kunst' in den Wandel der Rahmenbedingungen des ärztlichen Handlungsfelds. Der gesellschaftliche Bereich der gesundheitlichen Versorgung und speziell das System der Medizin stellt sich in den vergangenen drei Jahrzehnten als in besonders durchdringender Form von Prozessen der Verwissenschaftlichung, Technisierung und Ökonomisierung und (als deren Konsequenz) auch Standardisierung berührt dar. Etabliert hat sich infolgedessen ein neues Leitbild des Arztes im Sinne einer wissenschaftlich-technischen und auch ökonomischen Rationalität, das zur Orientierungsgröße für die gesundheitspolitische Arbeitsgestaltung sowie die gesellschaftliche Erwartung an den Arzt wurde. Der Legitimationsverlust des Kunst-Konzepts kann anhand dieses Wandels der makrostrukturellen Rahmenbedingungen veranschaulicht bzw. durch deren Zusammenwirken im Sinne einer Formalisierung und Objektivierung ärztlichen Handelns verursacht aufgezeigt werden. Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, darzulegen und empirisch zu begründen, dass sich ärztliches Handeln nur unvollständig als objektivierendes Handeln im Sinne eines wissenschaftlich und ökonomisch rationalen Handelns fassen lässt. Zur Analyse der Grenzen objektivierenden Handelns bei der ärztlichen Tätigkeit wird die Kategorie 'ärztliche Kunst', durch die Anbindung an das Konzept des subjektivierenden Handelns erschlossen und handlungstheoretisch informiert. Abschließend werden die eingangs dargestellten Makrotendenzen als Rahmenbedingungen ärztlichen Handelns bzw. die These einer hierdurch induzierten Verdrängung der ärztlichen Kunst mit den empirischen Befunden der vorliegenden Untersuchung konfrontiert, in diesem Zusammenhang aktuelle Problemfelder benannt. Ausgehend von der Analyse der ärztlichen Tätigkeit ist eine Kritik der makrostrukturellen Entwicklungstendenzen ableitbar, die die bekannten, im Rahmen der Darstellung der Kontextbedingungen ärztlichen Handelns aufgegriffenen Betrachtungen durch ihren direkten Bezug zur ärztlichen Tätigkeit erweitert. Die empirische Untersuchung verweist nachhaltig darauf, dass das professionelle Fähigkeitsensemble der 'ärztlichen Kunst' nicht als vormoderner, traditioneller Restbestand zu betrachten ist, der durch immer intelligentere Formen des Wissenstransfers und der betriebswirtschaftlichen Steuerung ersetzt und optimiert werden kann. Handlungsweisen, die als subjektivierendes Handeln der 'ärztlichen Kunst' zuzurechnen sind, können nicht nur als durch das systemische Leitbild "bedroht", sondern darüber hinaus als zentrale Elemente professionellen ärztlichen Handelns in Bezug auf zukünftige Herausforderungen einer ökonomischen und bedarfsgerechten Gesundheitsversorgung als bewahrens- und fördernswert aufgezeigt werden. ; Subject of the study is an analysis of the historical concept of "the art of medicine" and its relevance in present day medicine in a perspective of sociological theories of action. Besides the well-known idea of the doctor's "intuition" and the phenomenon of the "visual diagnosis" the methods of medical practice and the doctor's way of thinking and acting are rarely questioned or critically challenged – even more have they not yet been subject of essential empirical analysis. Further, the category of "art" to describe the practice of medical work seems - regarding highly specialised scientific experts - out-of-time and rather unattractive. Taking a closer look on the current developments in present day medicine (scientification, mechanization of the doctor's workfield, marketization of the German health care system, further the tendency of standardization of work processes) the core argument can be developed. This is to discover that all of the tendencies described have one common effect in supporting the "objective" aspects of medical work by at the same time suppressing or even eliminating the "subjective" elements in the doctor's processes of acting and perceiving. In the general consideration, good medical practice must be transferrable in objective processes. Therefore, methods associated with "the art of medicine" lose acceptance or even legitimation. One central goal of the study is to show that this is a misconception. The empirical study unfolds consequences, shortcomings and problems of the general idea of the doctor as a scientific expert on the one hand and on the other hand of the conception of the medical workfield as entirely structurable by formal processes. The detailed focus on the character of doctors' actions allows to conclude that "the art of medicine" is even though it may be an anachronistic term an etiquette to describe competences and professional knowledge still essential and indispensable even - and potentially more than ever - in modern scientific medicine.

The Meccan prison of 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr and the imprisonment of Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyya / Sean W. Anthony -- Fragments of three Umayyad official documents / Fred M. Donner -- Single isnads or riwayas quoted books in Ibn 'Asakir's tarjama of Tamim al-dari / Jens Scheiner -- Friendship in the service of governance: makarim al-akhlaq in Abbasid political culture / Paul l. Heck -- Prinzen, Prinzessinnen, Konkubinen und Eunuchen am fatimidischen Hof / Heinz Halm -- A new Latin-Arabic document from Norman Sicily (November 595 h/1198 -- Ce) / Nadia Jamil and Jeremy Johns -- Religion, law, and Islamic thought: The rhetorical Qur'an or orality as a theologumenon / Angelika Neuwirth -- The "shearing of forelocks" as a penitential rite / Marion Holmes Katz -- Authority in Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani's Kitab al-nawadir wa-l-ziyadat: 'Ala ma fi l-mudawwana min ghayriha min al-ummahat: the case of "the Chapter of judgments" (kitab al-aqdiya) / Mohammad Fadel -- A segment of the genealogy of sunni hadith criticism: the mysterious relationship between al-Khatib al-Baghdadi and al-Hakim al-Naysaburi / Jonathan Brown -- Al-hakim al-Naysaburi and the companions of the Prophet: an original Sunni voice in the Shi'i century / Scott C. Lucas -- Ibn Rushd and Thomas Aquinas on education / Sebastian Gunther -- Teaching the learned: Jalal al-Din al-Dawani's ijaza to mu'ayyadzada : 'Abd al-Rahman Efendi and the circulation of knowledge between Fars and the Ottoman empire at the turn of the sixteenth century / Judith Pfeiffer -- Scholars in networks: 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi and his travels / John O. Voll -- Rhetorics of revival: al-Ghazali and his modern heirs / Kenneth Garden -- Language, literature, and heritage -- Grammarians on the af'al al-muqaraba: steps in the sources towards a subdivision of operants / Ramzi Baalbaki -- Reflections on the lives and deaths of two Umayyad poets: Layla al-Akhyaliyya and Tawba b. al-Humayyir / Aram A. Shahin -- Literature and thought: re-reading al-Tawhidi's transcription of the debate between logic and grammar / Wen-chin Ouyang -- The play of genre: a maqama of "ease after hardship" from the eighth/fourteenth century and its literary context / Maurice A. Pomerantz -- What's in a Mamluk picture? the hall of portraiture at the cairo Citadel remembered / Guo -- In defense of the use of Qur'an in adab: Ibn Abi l-Lutf's raf' al-iltibas 'an munkir al-iqtibas / Bilal Orfali -- Modes of existence of the poetry in the Arabian Nights / Wolfhart Heinrichs -- Modern Arabic literature and Islam / Stefan Wild -- Abraham and the sacrificial son: transtextual strategies in Jose Saramago's the gospel according to Jesus Christ and Elias Khoury's As though she were sleeping / Maher Jarrar -- The ideological and epistemological: contemporary readings in Arabo-Islamic classical heritage (turath) / Ridwan al-Sayyid (translated by Eman Morsi)