The Culture of Jihad in the 21st Century
In the 15-years I have served in the United States Army, the focal point of my tactical and academic study has been almost entirely centered on the Middle East and its unique cultural complexities. As an Infantryman, I was embroiled in the early efforts to prevent a Sunni-Shia civil war in post-invasion Iraq, while also hunting down al-Qaeda operatives under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. A year later, during General Patraeus's troop surge, I was in the urban sprawl of Northwest Baghdad fighting not only a Sunni insurgency, but also the Iranian-backed Jaysh al-Mahdi, comprised of local Shia militia groups. In 2010, I led a battalion reconnaissance team in the Arghandab River Valley of Afghanistan against the Taliban near the very birthplace of their Salafi-jihadist movement. In subsequent years, following my graduation from the Special Forces Qualification Course, I served in the 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) on a variety of missions in support of Operation Inherent Resolve in Turkey and Syria. As a fluent Arabic speaker, I was heavily involved in early efforts to train and equip the Free Syrian Army for its fight against the Islamic State. Following this deployment, I served as a liaison officer to the United States Embassy and Turkish General Staff in Ankara, having daily interaction with foreign dignitaries, defense attachés, and military officials in strategic level planning and coordination efforts. I culminated my time with 5th SFG as the assistant operations sergeant of a detachment fighting the Islamic State in Syria. My understanding of the culture of jihad, the various jihadist groups operating throughout the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, and the intricacy of Middle Eastern problem sets as a whole, has come from years of dedicated cultural analysis, in-depth study of Sunni and Shia Islam, and field experience from the strategic to the tactical level. It is because of this experience that I am compelled to discuss the culture of jihad in the 21st Century. ; Winner of the 2020 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the College of Graduate and Continuing Studies Degree Completion category. ; 1 The Culture of Jihad in the 21st Century Michael J. Bearden Norwich University SOCI401: Cultural and Anthropology Studies Dr. Timothy Maynard April 30, 2020 2 The Culture of Jihad in the 21st Century In the 15-years I have served in the United States Army, the focal point of my tactical and academic study has been almost entirely centered on the Middle East and its unique cultural complexities. As an Infantryman, I was embroiled in the early efforts to prevent a Sunni-Shia civil war in post-invasion Iraq, while also hunting down al-Qaeda operatives under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. A year later, during General Patraeus's troop surge, I was in the urban sprawl of Northwest Baghdad fighting not only a Sunni insurgency, but also the Iranian-backed Jaysh al-Mahdi, comprised of local Shia militia groups. In 2010, I led a battalion reconnaissance team in the Arghandab River Valley of Afghanistan against the Taliban near the very birthplace of their Salafi-jihadist movement. In subsequent years, following my graduation from the Special Forces Qualification Course, I served in the 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) on a variety of missions in support of Operation Inherent Resolve in Turkey and Syria. As a fluent Arabic speaker, I was heavily involved in early efforts to train and equip the Free Syrian Army for its fight against the Islamic State. Following this deployment, I served as a liaison officer to the United States Embassy and Turkish General Staff in Ankara, having daily interaction with foreign dignitaries, defense attachés, and military officials in strategic level planning and coordination efforts. I culminated my time with 5th SFG as the assistant operations sergeant of a detachment fighting the Islamic State in Syria. My understanding of the culture of jihad, the various jihadist groups operating throughout the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, and the intricacy of Middle Eastern problem sets as a whole, has come from years of dedicated cultural analysis, in-depth study of Sunni and Shia Islam, and field experience from the strategic to the tactical level. It is because of this experience that I am compelled to discuss the culture of jihad in the 21st Century. 3 Since its beginning in circa 610 CE, when the prophet Muhammad ibn Abdullah was visited by the angel Gabriel in a cave near Mecca, Islam has shaken the foundations of the Middle East and remained in a state of near-perpetual conflict with the Western world. Islam is an Arabic term most closely relating to the English words submission or surrender. Mujahedeen, or holy warriors, spread this new religion by the sword throughout Asia, forcing the "submission" of thousands, and have hardly been at peace with their neighbors since. Centuries later, in the two decades following the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the United States, radical Islam's stance against the West has altered the diplomatic landscape between the world's great powers, fundamentally changed the United States' national strategic direction, and caused youth from all walks of life to sacrifice the best years of their lives in holy war to protect the supra-national community of Islam. From the invasion of Afghanistan to the subsequent invasions of Iraq and Syria to the ongoing peace talks with the Taliban, diplomatic and military efforts to eradicate jihadists from the Middle East have to-date been nearly ineffectual. Not only have these efforts failed to contain or defeat jihad, but at times have served to strengthen Islamic extremists' resolve in their call to arms against the West. Because jihad is such a fundamental part of the Islamic faith, it can never be "defeated" in the sense of traditional military eradication of an enemy force, but it can be confronted, contained, or refocused, as this paper will address. I argue that enabling local solutions and promoting education, alongside tailored surgical strike and security cooperation operations where necessary, are the keys to confronting, containing, and countering jihad. 4 Background Defining Jihad and Salafism Jihad is a transliterated form of the Arabic word meaning to struggle or to strive. In the traditional teachings of the Islamic faith, jihad is broken into two distinct categories: Greater jihad and lesser jihad. Greater jihad includes the personal struggle against selfish desires, emphasizing discipline and morality, as well as the struggle against Satan and the forces of evil. It includes jihad of the heart, jihad of the mind, and jihad of the tongue, involving praise for those who follow the will of Allah and correction for those who have gone astray (Gorka, 2016). The second category, lesser jihad, is viewed as the struggle against the enemies of Islam and the defense of its people. Lesser jihad is commonly referred to as Jihad of the Sword. Gorka (p. 60) reveals that, over time, this category of jihad has been used as justification for at least seven different subsets of holy war: 1. Using holy war to build an empire 2. Going after apostate regimes or individuals 3. Revolting against non-pious Muslim leaders 4. Fighting against the forces of imperialism in Muslim lands 5. Countering the West's pagan influence 6. Guerrilla warfare against a foreign invader 7. Using jihad as justification for terrorist attacks against civilian targets In a broad sense, lesser jihad can be viewed as offensive or defensive martial action. On the offensive side, jihadists use religion to justify building an empire, such as the Islamic State, attack apostate regimes, like those of the Taliban against Afghan government forces, and use terrorism against civilians, like the attacks on the World Trade Center. This offensive action 5 often takes jihadists beyond the borders of the ummah, or the people of Islam, striking fear into hearts of unbelievers around the globe. The defensive variety, especially in recent history, has most often correlated directly with the use of guerrilla warfare against foreign invaders, such as al-Qaeda's attacks on the international military coalitions that invaded Afghanistan and Iraq. This radical view of Islam is mostly practiced by those who follow the way of the Salafi, or the pious predecessors from the time of Muhammad, who experienced Islam in its purest form. It is believed that the first three generations who practiced the teachings of the prophet Muhammad are the ones who all Muslims thereafter should try to emulate. Themes of Salafism focus on complete adherence to sharia law, the fight against apostate Muslim regimes, and the spread and protection of Islam and its followers. At its core, Salafism is a very traditionalist view of Islam and has been practiced by multiple 21st Century terrorist organizations. The terms jihad and Salafi have shared such a close relationship in the last few decades that they have become nearly synonymous, at times described as Salafi-Jihadism or Jihadi-Salafism (Gorka, 2016; Nilsson, 2019) What Cultural Influences Lead One to the Path of Jihad? Before the attacks on 9/11, the largest call to jihad answered by the international Muslim community was in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Stopping the spread of communism and defending the ummah against the atrocities of Russian ground forces was seen as a noble and just cause for young Muslim men, and not just among Muslims (Gorka, 2016; Nilsson, 2019). Many nations, including the United States, funded, equipped, and trained the Afghan mujahedeen (those who conduct jihad) for the fight against the Soviet empire. Jihad in the 21st Century has been viewed in a much different light, as it is most closely associated with acts of extreme violence against Western nations. While the piles of rubble that used to be the 6 World Trade Center smoldered, and a gaping hole scarred the wall of the Pentagon, people of the world were forced to ask themselves, "How could a person do this? Why would someone take their own lives and thousands of others in the name of Allah?" Religious Justification for Jihad. Though jihad has become almost entirely associated with Islamic holy war, the term itself is still simply the Arabic word for striving. Struggling against one's selfish desires, striving to maintain traditional values, and defending a community against a common enemy are not just Islamic concepts, they are universal to most tightly-knit cultures. Similarly, Christians and Jews are taught self-discipline, adherence to moral codes, and defending their belief against enemies of their faith. So, why has the Islamic flavor of this common cultural theme become so violent, causing deep unrest around the world in our modern era? Verses from the Qur'an can begin to unpack why horrific public executions, suicide bombings, and advocating for generalized violence against non-Muslims may be justifiable in jihadist culture. The Qur'an (2015) lays out the following decree in chapter 9, verse 29: Fight those from among the People of the Book who believe not in Allah, nor in the Last Day, nor hold as unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have declared to be unlawful, nor follow the true religion, until they pay the tax with their own hand and acknowledge their subjection (p. 208). My personal study of Islam and conversations with Muslims in the field revealed that this bit of prose has been used as motivation and justification for jihad by groups like al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the Islamic State, and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham of our modern age. Some of the following themes are evident in the translation: 7 • Jews and Christians are recognized as People of the Book, but are required to accept the following—Allah as the one true god, sharia as the acceptable law, and Islam as the one true religion. • If Jews and Christians refuse to accept these statutes, they must pay a tax called the jizyah to show their subjugation. • If they refuse to do either of these, they are to be put to the sword (p. 208). Salafi-jihadist groups such as the Taliban and Islamic State have tried to revive the jizyah tax in areas under their control. Likewise, hundreds of Christians, Jews, and even Muslims who refuse to adhere to strict sharia law have been publicly executed. This vehement enforcement of arcane Islamic law is seen as a return to the purest form of Islam, as pious as the first few generations who followed the Prophet Muhammad. Another common religious cultural theme that ties these jihadist organizations together is a message of religious oppression. They preach to young Muslims that the Islamic world is under siege by the West and that their god, their value systems, and their way of life are being threatened by the evils of capitalism and democracy (Venhaus, 2010). In joining organizations like al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, young men from across the globe find a sense of purpose and direction in their cause to protect the ummah. This theme is manifested in the teachings of Anwar al-Awlaki, the spiritual leader of al-Qaeda and the father of home-grown terrorism in the United States. He calls on Muslims living among those in the West: How can your conscience allow you to live in peaceful coexistence with a nation that is responsible for the tyranny and crimes committed against your own brothers and sisters? How can you have your loyalty to a government that is leading the war against Islam and Muslims? Hence, my advice to you is this, you have two choices: either hijra [migration 8 to an Islamic land] or jihad. You either leave or you fight. You leave and live among Muslims or you stay behind and fight with your hand, your wealth, and your word. I specifically invite the youth to either fight in the West or join their brothers on the fronts of jihad: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia (as cited in Gorka, 2016). This way of thinking is also captured in chapter 9, verse 5 of the Qur'an (2015): Kill the idolaters wherever you find them and take them prisoners, and beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they repent and observe Prayer and pay the Zakat, then leave their way free (p. 204). When taken literally, as they are by followers of Salafi-jihad, scriptures such as these leave no choice. To these men who have committed themselves fully to the ways of the pious ones, they are compelled to become shahid, or martyrs in the protection of the ummah. The Qur'an promises paradise for those who do: Surely, Allah has purchased of the believers their persons and their property in return for the Garden they shall have; they fight in the cause of Allah, and they slay and are slain—a promise the He has made incumbent on Himself in the Torah, and the Gospel, and the Qur'an. And who is more faithful to his promise than Allah? Rejoice, then, in your bargain which you have made with Him; and that it is which is the supreme triumph (p. 222). The concept of becoming a martyr in the struggle for Islam is romanticized by jihadist groups, like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, and even state governments in local programming. In Lebanon, Mothers of Martyrs are interviewed to share the stories of their sons' glorious end while fighting abroad against the infidels (Venhaus, 2010). The Qur'an itself calls this sacrifice the supreme triumph for a jihadist, striving for the glory of Allah. 9 Though enforcing the jizyah, publicly executing those who do not follow sharia law, and seeking opportunities to kill infidels through suicide attacks represent a very small, extremist cultural sect of Islam, each of these practices is still justifiable if one looks to the Qur'an. This could be viewed as no different than a rural Pentecostal church in the Deep South who maintains strict standards for how women must dress and act: it all comes down to interpretation and a community's willingness to subjugate themselves to these standards. Spiritual leaders of jihadist groups in the 21st Century have used the Qur'an as continued justification for a variety of cruel, inhumane, and brutal actions that served to shock the West. The holy book of Islam acts as the essential glue, binding together all facets of Arab and Islamic culture. Artistic Inspiration for Jihad. A far cry from the harsh proclamations of the Qur'an, Arabic poetry predates Islam by centuries and serves as a bedrock of Arabic culture across the Middle East. Early desert nomads composed poems mostly in mono-rhyme and in one of sixteen standard canonical measures, which made them easy to commit to memory (Creswell & Haykel, 2015). Naturally, this beautiful form of cultural expression has found a home in the modern jihadist movement, where it has become an inspiration for new recruits to join the cause and crucial in the sustainment of those already fighting infidels abroad. Creswell and Haykel assert that although analysts have generally ignored this facet of jihadist culture, it is woven deeply into the fabric of modern Islamic extremism. Osama bin Laden, most recognized as the former head of al-Qaeda, was also a highly-celebrated jihadist poet. Without question, his lyrical genius inspired young Arabs with stories of a return to the heroic and chivalrous past of Islam. One of his most famous works celebrates the martyrdom of the 9/11 hijackers. This is a theme among modern jihadist poetry, which preserves the tales of suicide bombers, the conquered apostate regimes of Iraq and Syria, and the glories of jihadist heroes (Creswell & Haykel). Likewise, in a 10 group of individuals who have each traveled far from home to defend Islam against the kuffar, these poems help to establish a sense of cultural identity, strengthening their wartime bond and solidifying their resolve. In seeing the videos of the Islamic State as they carved a path of destruction across large swathes of Iraq in early 2014, it may be difficult for one to believe that its members were motivated by the rhythmic lines of jihadist poetry. It is hard to accept that the same young fighter who is willing to behead an infidel for all the free world to see, could also be found passionately reciting lines celebrating the glorious return of an Islamic caliphate. During its rise, the Islamic State capitalized on the lyrical talent of a Damascus-born woman named Ahlam al-Nasr. In her first broadcast, called the Blaze of Truth, she sang each one of her 107 works a cappella, in accordance with the Islamic State's ban on musical instruments. The video was uploaded to Youtube, receiving thousands of views and further shares on multiple social media platforms (Creswell & Haykel, 2015). In the early days of the group's brutal campaign in Iraq, al-Nasr celebrated victory in Mosul as a new dawn for the country: "Ask Mosul, city of Islam, about the lions— how their fierce struggle brought liberation. The land of glory has shed its humiliation and defeat and put on the raiment of splendor" (as cited in Creswell & Haykel, 2015). Her choice of words helps one sense her deep passion for jihad, hidden within the lines. Mujahedeen are called lions and liberators. Mosul is called both a city of Islam and a land of 11 glory that, because of its liberation, has been released from the chains of shame and can now live in the splendor and pride of its former renown. Poetry has succored those serving in times of war for hundreds, even thousands of years. In the same manner, this key element of artistic cultural expression has helped bind together the modern jihadi movement, capturing the heroic deeds of martyrs who would otherwise remain nameless and unrecognized by the outside world. Serving in lands far away from home, young jihadists find inspiration, strength, and a renewed sense of identity in these haunting bits of rhyme. Social Pressure to Join Jihad. Abdullah Anas was an Algerian who served as one of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan in the 1980s and spent several years studying under Abdullah Azzam, the Palestinian "Father of Resistance to the Soviets" (Gall, 2020). Working to help Algerians achieve nonviolent change in their government, Anas, now in his 60s, has spent a life living and working among jihadists. To Anas, jihad is a fundamental principle of Muslim culture through which mujahedeen receive rewards in heaven: "I will never denounce jihad. As a Muslim, I know this to be a noble deed—where man can be the most beastly" (Gall). In a study of three Swedish jihadists, with experiences ranging from 1980s Afghanistan to the modern fight in Syria, Nilsson (2019) suggests that one of the fundamental social justifications for joining jihad is the sense that Islam and Muslims are collectively under attack. This, again, is a theme that applies to more than just the modern jihadist movement: Americans lined up in droves outside recruiting stations following the attacks on Pearl Harbor and decades later after September 11, 2001. Following the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, many Muslims from around the world began to see this not as just the West going after the 9/11 conspirators, but as a global attack on Islam. Each day, fresh news stories of coalition soldiers' crimes against 12 Muslim civilians and pictures of burning villages continued to motivate men to join the fight to protect the ummah from the foreign invaders. Nilsson contends that since most jihadists are very young, in their teens and early twenties, they are very susceptible to the influences of close friends and social groups. Safet, a young Muslim living in Sweden, was pressured by a friend to join the Islamic State in Syria, saying that he became convinced by his friend Ahmed that the group was fighting to protect Muslims (Nilsson). However, after realizing that the Islamic State was actually killing other Muslims in a practice called takfir, or excommunication, Safet became disillusioned and returned to Sweden (Nilsson). From the fight against the foreign invaders in the early 2000s in Afghanistan and Iraq, to the struggle for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in 2015, it seems jihadists have most often been motivated by the need to protect the international Muslim community. Aside from the social responsibility of defending their faith and people, the need for adventure also seems to permeate the ideations of young men seeking to join a jihadist group. One of Nilsson's (2019) most interesting theories is that jihad is not the radicalization of Islam, but rather the Islamization of radicalism. Individuals who are already naturally predisposed to such adventurous or nihilistic behavior get caught up in the social dynamics of their time, ending up in a jihadist movement. Venhaus (2010) explains that in interviews with over 2,000 al-Qaeda prisoners from Iraq to Guantanamo Bay, he found that young Muslim men sought the cause of jihad for a number of normal social pressures felt by normal teens worldwide: "Revenge seekers need an outlet for their frustration, status seekers need recognition, identity seekers need a group to join, and thrill seekers need adventure" (Venhaus). The Effects of Social Media and Technology on Jihad. In the modern era, news is no longer bound by the time it takes for an article to be published, printed, and distributed across 13 great distance in a community. Social media platforms like Facebook, Youtube, Twitter, and Instagram have made sharing news instantaneous. Additionally, the advent of the smartphone, which acts simultaneously as a hand-held computer, high definition camera, and telephone with nearly world-wide coverage has forever changed the media landscape. In the era of modern jihad, one can post a single video that moves the minds of thousands in a matter of seconds. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein's regime, news stories of atrocity among the efforts of coalition troops over the next decade served to further the cause of local and foreign jihadists to protect the ummah from these invaders. Accidental bombing of civilians, mistreatment of the prisoners at Abu Ghraib, and a general ignorance toward Muslim culture were fueled by social media and smartphone technology. Venhaus (2010) claims that throughout this early phase of the war in Iraq, al-Qaeda very rarely had to actively recruit, their global brand was aggressively promoted through satellite television, internet chat rooms, and social media platforms; willing candidates sought them out. This use of media continued to be perfected by jihadist organizations like the Islamic State, who published a digital magazine called Dabiq, named for the ideological capital of the proposed caliphate, which rallied Muslims to jihad through stories of glory and heroism in the cause for Islam. The Islamic State also posted grisly execution videos, with stunning music and production value, including super high-definition shots of their brutality. Publications and videos such as these could be copied, saved, shared, and re-shared before any sort of government intervention could stop them. Creswell and Haykel (2015) reveal that jihadists were running a massive, secret network of social media websites and fake accounts that could be rapidly assembled and dissembled by hackers. The effects of social media and technology on modern jihadist culture are easy to understand, but challenging to measure in scope and reach. Just as easily as videos of Islamic 14 State propaganda or poetry can be shared, so too can stories of coalition force atrocities in Afghanistan and Iraq. This has put strategists in a unique position, where it is nearly impossible to control the narrative. Unfortunately, the story that breaks first is still the one that is liked and shared the most, even if the truth comes out after. Effects of Western Culture on Jihad. Rapid globalization, including the widespread diffusion of the internet and technology into the Middle East in the last two decades has continued to foment jihadist hatred for the West. Personal conversations with multiple Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan revealed that the decadence, lavish richness, and sinful lifestyles portrayed by Western movies and media served to fuel the fires of disdain among the pious Salafi-jihadists. Additionally, Muslim men living in Western nations following the attacks on the World Trade Center were ostracized and feared by society, often leading them to an eventual radicalization process. Being denied a peaceful coexistence because of continued Western misperception, caused many young Muslims to become angry and seek community and brotherhood among other Muslims experiencing the same problems. Venhaus (2010) notes that out of the over 2,000 captured jihadists interviewed, more than 30 per cent of them sought al-Qaeda because they were angry. Under the tutelage of local al-Qaeda mentors, the frustrations of these young men were then turned upon their neighbors through careful instruction and manipulation. They were taught to see the West as the enemy of Islam, with hundreds of the ummah being harmed by their military coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq each day. They were instructed in the ways of the pious ones who came before them, inspiring them to turn from the sinfulness of their Western neighbors and take pride in their newfound self-discipline and righteousness in the eyes of Allah. Eventually, many of these young men would travel to their 15 ancestral homelands to join the struggle, or conduct terrorist attacks on their own Western communities. Analysis A Unique Challenge Given the litany of reasons one might join jihad, the incredibly complex cultural and social environment, and the fluidity of the modern jihadist movement, how can the United States begin to contain this problem? The reasons one individual might join a jihadist cause are as various and sundry as why one might choose to join any movement or profession over another. As Nilsson (2019) and Venhaus (2010) have detailed, there appears to be no singular marker: one could be an extremely religious or a passive Muslim, rich or poor, single or married with a family, have a completely stable social life or be isolated with no friends. Jihadists can be from any country, any walk of life, and usually do not widely broadcast their intentions prior to taking part in acts of violence for the cause of Islam. It is because of the near-impossibility of clearly identifying a pattern of distinguishable cultural markers that make it such a challenge for the United States government and its allies to address the threat of jihad. Targeting an individual before they become a jihadist or before they commit a terrorist act has been one of the most formidable challenges of our time for military and law enforcement professionals alike. Usually, the much simpler job is finding a jihadist who has allowed their communications discipline to slip before an act, or catching them in a pitched battle on foreign soil. In order to protect citizens of the West and East alike against jihadists' aims, the United States Government must be prepared to confront, contain, and counter the jihadist narrative "left of bang," before an attack occurs. 16 The Global War on Terrorism: Taking the Fight to the Jihadists. In the months that followed September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush deployed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paramilitary officers and US Special Operations Forces (SOF) to find, fix, and finish pockets of al-Qaeda militants being harbored by the Taliban in Afghanistan. A fierce campaign of relentless aerial bombardment and mounted assaults by the forces of the Afghan Northern Alliance led to a swift and decisive defeat of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. With Kabul and Kandahar in allied hands, and an interim government established under the leadership of the Pashtun Hamid Karzai, the future of a free and prosperous Afghanistan seemed assured, but what came to be known as The Long War had only just begun. Trillions of dollars, thousands of lives, and 19 years later, the United States and its allies have been forced to the negotiating table with the Salafi-jihadist Taliban. Likewise, after Saddam Hussein's continued disregard for international law, threats against the United States, and open violence against his own people, the administration of President Bush decided again to pursue a military option. Much like Afghanistan, the coalition was led by CIA operatives and SOF operators, coordinating airstrikes on key positions in a tactical display of American firepower affectionately titled Shock and Awe. However, unlike Afghanistan, a massive conventional invasion followed the bombing campaign, bent on toppling the Baathist regime and finding Saddam's chemical weapons stockpiles. What followed was a series of policy failures, leading to a steady influx of jihadists partnering with local insurgents seeking to oust the foreign invaders and protect the ummah from the atrocities of the kuffar. In my professional opinion, Iraq is still recovering from the decade-long military occupation, cleaning up the destruction left by the Islamic State, and on the brink of civil war due to concerns about being an Iranian puppet state. 17 Ineffective Military Methods to Combat Jihad Operation Iraqi Freedom. During my first combat rotation as an Infantryman in the Triangle of Death in southern Iraq in 2005-2006, I experienced the initial rumblings of a civil war between the Sunni and Shia Muslims in Iraq, each wrestling for power in a post-Saddam world. I was also witness to the inundation of foreign jihadists, joining the ranks of al-Qaeda in Iraq under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who at times headquartered in my area of operations. As I analyze our highly-kinetic and aggressive initial campaigns years later, I can see that the coalition's fight, first against Saddam, then against al-Qaeda, only bolstered jihadist motivation. In being a foreign invader, we inadvertently created a jihadist resistance movement, bent on the removal of their occupiers. Kilcullen (2010) explains this dilemma by explaining that focusing on the wrong metrics in a fight against insurgents can be deceptive: If you kill 20 insurgents, they may have 40 relatives who are now in a blood feud with your unit and are compelled to take revenge. Again in 2007-2008, I was deployed to Iraq as an Infantry squad leader to the sacred city of Khadimiyah in Northwest Baghadad. This was during the famous troop surge, meant to fix the ongoing problems with stability throughout the country. Being in the home of the beautiful Shrine of the Seventh Imam, it was a predominantly Shia area. Over the course of 15 months, my unit fought several engagements against Iranian-backed Shia militias and worked on project after project to strengthen local civil infrastructure, all while maintaining the utmost discretion against damaging homes or creating civilian casualties. Yet again, although we had conducted a nearly perfect counterinsurgency fight, it seemed that Kilcullen's insurgent math still applied: Fighting the jihadists only served to create more unrest within the population, no matter if we were restoring essential services and reducing damage to homes or not. 18 Operation Enduring Freedom. Nearly a decade after the fall of al-Qaeda and its Taliban hosts, I was deployed to the mountains of Afghanistan from 2010-2011. Stationed along the Arghandab River, just north of Kandahar, we were in the heart of the Pashtun Taliban. Again, the same story remained true: We fought the Taliban jihadists almost daily, but could not seem to win over the true key terrain in a counterinsurgency fight: The hearts and minds of the people. The Taliban would harass our unit's base of operations with a few pop shots as we called them, which would unleash a massive response in firepower and resources. Thousands of rounds of machine gun ammunition would be fired into the farm fields surrounding our Combat Out Post (COP), squads would be sent in pursuit of the attackers, and helicopters would spend hours scouring the terrain in an attempt to heap justice on the insurgents. This massive effort against so few served to erode the unit's motivation, exhaust our supplies, and alienate the civilian population whose homes and fields had been damaged in the process. Reflections on Personal Combat Experience. After years of combat experience and deeply studying Muslim culture, I can now see how the mistakes the coalitions made early-on in both operations only fueled the fires of insurgency, resistance to foreign occupiers, and generalized hatred for the West. Porch (2013) argues brilliantly that US counterinsurgency doctrine made the same mistake as its imperialistic predecessors of centuries before: Believing that military action was a proper vehicle for providing Middle Easterners with Western values, as well as a foundation for governance, social programs, and economic transformation in a region. This became evident in my own experience, realizing that no matter what sort of social, infrastructure, or economic programs ran alongside our military efforts, the people of both Afghanistan and Iraq felt the enormous social weight of being occupied by a foreign power, rendering these efforts nearly ineffectual. On the contrary, local and foreign jihadist movements 19 capitalized on each and every mistake of coalition forces, increasing their recruitment and resolve against the West. Though our military may have been winning every major battle against the jihadists, our policy makers and field commanders made the fundamental mistake of believing that these non-Western nations lived in some sort of time-warp, in which the adoption of Western democracy, rule of law, and capitalism would allow them to thrive as a nation (Porch). Effective Military Methods to Combat Jihad Surgical Strike and Precision Targeting. A unique feature of the Global War on Terrorism was the US military's continued perfection of covert strike operations with surgical precision deep into enemy safe havens. This was put on display in the rout of al-Qaeda by CIA and SOF in Afghanistan, in the kill/capture missions against the Baathists in the deck of cards in Iraq, and later in the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and Sheik Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Iraq. Having the ability to appear out of nowhere in the middle of the night, kill or capture an intended target with zero damage to infrastructure or civilian casualties, and leave within minutes of arrival struck fear into the hearts and minds of jihadists across the globe. The success and efficacy of this type of operation was acknowledged in the 2015 National Military Strategy, which stated: "The best way to counter VEOs [violent extremist organizations] is by way of.military strengths such as ISR, precision strike [emphasis added], training, and logistical support" (p.11). Likewise, President Obama's massive expansion of the use of drones, which could watch individuals for days and execute a precise strike that only touched the intended target, has continued to sow fear and deny jihadists' freedom of maneuver on a global scale. The US military and its allies have only continued to master these types of operations throughout the 20 fights in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other locations. The jihadists know this, and realize that one wrong move at any time could mean disaster. Security Cooperation. An additional theme that has spelled the end for jihadists throughout the globe has been the training, advising, and equipping of security forces and partners within Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other nations. Enabling the host-nation military to handle jihadist movements on their own helps the United States military work itself out of a job. US Army Special Forces are uniquely suited to accomplish this mission: With specialized training, language capability, and cultural understanding, they are able to train foreign security forces through a variety of Principle Tasks. These tasks include Foreign Internal Defense, which focuses on a holistic approach to internal security and protection of citizens against lawlessness and insurgency, and Security Force Assistance, which can be focused internally or externally against threats to a nation's stability and security. The success of these mission sets was evident in 2014, during my own experience with the Afghan Commando Kandaks' continued fight against the Taliban and in closely following the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service's efforts against the Islamic State. Both of these forces, built from the ground-up by US Army Special Forces have continually fortified weak conventional military force operations against jihadist groups in their respective nations. Muslim Youth Efforts Against Jihad Globalization, though it has been proven to bolster the jihadists' narrative against the West, has also been beneficial to the movement against jihad itself. Because youth of the world have access to technology that allows them to see the atrocities and lies associated with global jihadist organizations, they are beginning to turn the tide. During the Islamic State's rise to power in Iraq and Syria, Muslim youth from across Europe travelled to join the jihadists in their 21 fight against the West. However, groups of Muslim youth also spoke up to counter this narrative. In 2015 the Muslim Youth League, an anti-Islamic State cultural movement, declared a holy war against all extremist organizations (Dearden, 2015). The group called on all Muslims to stand united against those who have hijacked Islam and misrepresented the faith. Through engagement work in schools and communities, as well as a robust online campaign, the Muslim Youth League is fighting back against jihadist propaganda that bids young Muslims join the Islamic State and other extremist groups (Dearden). Since the time of this publication, the Muslim Youth League has spread to several countries throughout the Middle East, Asia, and Europe, each with their own social media presence, outreach programs, community events, and websites. Local Government Efforts Against Jihad In the years following the Islamic State's spread across Iraq and Syria, the United Kingdom has developed a robust strategy to help at-risk Muslims avoid the radicalization process. The program itself is called Contest, and includes four distinct categories: Prevent, Prepare, Protect, and Pursue (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2017). Police departments and social organizations have built relationships with doctors, faith leaders, teachers and others, who are required to report suspicious persons to the proper authorities. In response to these reporting requirements and recommendations, over 7,500 reports were filed between 2015-2016, with one in 10 being actionable intelligence for government and police forces (BBC). In 2015 alone, over 150 people, including 50 children, were kept from traveling to conflict zones in Iraq and Syria (BBC). The strategy has of course drawn criticism, for fear that it will further alienate Muslims from their local communities, but it presents as an excellent plan of action for identifying individuals who are at risk beyond just using traditional signals intelligence and 22 surveillance techniques. It does more than just target the individual, it also seeks to reform them through education, outreach, and community programs. Counterarguments You Can Kill an Idea. I have heard the opinion throughout my time in the military that jihad and the idea of Islamic supremacy can be completely eradicated. The example most often given is that Nazism, including the idea that the Aryan race was superior to all others, was effectively destroyed by a global military campaign. This argument is weak. The Nazis represented a very small portion of German culture, including among those serving in the military, so it was relatively easy to contain once there was an overwhelming military victory by the Allies. However, although the German Army of the 1940s was defeated militarily, the idea of white supremacy lives on in small social groups throughout the world to this day. The Ongoing Taliban Peace Talks. I have colleagues throughout the military who are convinced that the current negotiations with the Taliban are a key indicator of success in our two decades at war against the Salafi-jihadist group. The issue with this is that temporary cease fires have already been violated several times, leading one to believe that the strategic level leadership's messages are simply not reaching their subordinates or that local factions are not adhering to the agreement. Trusting that radical Muslim extremists will not allow Afghanistan to become a future safe haven for other jihadists, as it has in the past, is simply unrealistic. Believing some sort of quasi peace deal is going to miraculously pacify an organization that hates everything the West stands for is misguided. My own experiences throughout the Middle East have proven that the spirit of jihad and hatred will live on in Afghanistan. The Islamic State is Nearly Defeated. Multiple global media outlets continue to run stories about the dismantling of the Islamic State, as though the battle is won. Though Sheik Abu 23 Bakr al-Baghdadi has been killed, and the proposed Islamic caliphate was never fully realized, it would be naïve to think that the Islamic State's jihad is over. The movement will metastasize and take on new forms in other parts of the globe: It is already happening. Jihadists are continually leaving the battlefields of Iraq and Syria, headed back to their former homes in mainland Europe. As these individuals reenter the diaspora, the concern is that they will radicalize other individuals and conduct terrorist attacks within the continent. Conclusion The reasons an individual seeks to join a jihadist movement are deeply rooted in personal social dynamics, the security situation of their country, and a multitude of other religious, cultural, and economic factors. I agree with Venhaus (2010) and Gorka (2016) who assert that there is no singular military operation or strategy that can bring about a decisive victory against something so intangible as why one might join the modern jihadist movement. Use of the US military as a vehicle for the establishment of Western democracy and nation-building efforts in tribal nations like Afghanistan and Iraq only served to invigorate the jihadists' call to arms. Jihad is not something that can be eradicated completely by military force. Jihad must be confronted, contained, and countered through a comprehensive approach that empowers state and non-state actors to develop local solutions and directs expeditious military applications only where completely necessary. Recommendations Promote and Protect the Muslim Youth Leagues In order to truly create a cultural paradigm shift in Muslim youth at risk of radicalization, groups like the Muslim Youth League (BBC, 2017) should be promoted by governments worldwide as a bastion of true and peaceful Islam. While they should no doubt be supported, 24 governments must also protect these organizations from becoming targets for violent acts of terrorism or influence operations by jihadists. Through a combination of deep cultural understanding and positive messaging, the Muslim Youth League has already shown its effectiveness in the United Kingdom and beyond. Because the youth of each nation understand the social pressures and cultural influences that may lead one to seek jihad, they can effectively develop tailored, local solutions to persuade at-risk individuals. The Muslim Youth Leagues are on the front lines of countering the jihadist worldview, taking a stand and declaring war on jihad and its misrepresentations of Islam. Enable Local Solutions for Local Problems This should be accomplished through unified government action that involves all the United States' instruments of national power including diplomacy, information sharing, military action where necessary, and economic stimulus as needed. The specific issue with efforts like these, is that they cannot be accomplished during what is perceived by locals as a military occupation. This was proven true in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. Despite massive efforts to rebuild infrastructure, aid in agricultural processes, build schools, and organize community projects, the United States and its allies were still viewed as pushing Western values and democracy on nations through military occupation. As much as possible, we must limit our military presence in areas that are ripe for developing a jihadist movement, or in ones that are recovering. I have seen firsthand that government efforts against jihadist organizations or at-risk communities have often been fragmented, poorly staffed, and uncoordinated. Venhaus (2010) suggests the creation of an agency that is staffed, trained, funded, enabled, and equipped for strategic communications, calling it the United States Strategic Communications Agency. An 25 agency like this could ensure that a comprehensive national communications strategy is developed and achieved, with a focus on enabling local community efforts to counter the jihadist narrative. By promoting social outreach, religious education, and community programs, this agency could bolster the efforts of community leaders and stifle jihadist aims in their areas. Support Religious Education and Reintegration Reintegration programs in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Singapore and elsewhere have successfully rehabilitated former jihadists through religious education (Venhaus, 2010). Countering the apocalyptic world view of jihadist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State requires local religious leaders who understand their community's issues to band together and refute the extremist narrative. Through careful, patient, and individually-tailored instruction, Muslim religious leaders can invalidate each and every one of the extremists' claims. Individuals who turn to jihad are often seeking this type of direction, they just find it in the wrong places. Counter Threats with Tailored Military Force Packages Continued themes among the military failures in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations during the early years of the Global War on Terrorism are indiscriminate use of force, lack of cultural understanding, and hyper-focus on tactical gains while failing at the strategic level. US government nation-building efforts on the backs of the military cost our country trillions of dollars, thousands of lives, and years of frustration, bogged-down in an endless quagmire of misunderstanding. US Army Special Forces are selected, trained, equipped, and enabled to clandestinely handle complex problem sets in denied or politically-sensitive environments. Each Special Forces Group is regionally-aligned, with Operational Detachments developing deep cultural understanding through Area Studies and continuous relationship-building with regional state and 26 non-state actors. Special Forces operators understand the complex cultural and security situations in their areas of responsibility and have the language capability and strategic understanding to operate with complete independence of outside support. Frankly, if given the authority and autonomy to do their jobs, Special Forces can coerce, disrupt, or overthrow jihadist organizations unilaterally, or train, advise, and equip foreign security forces to accomplish this task on their own. This can all be done independent of a large, slow, and expensive conventional military occupation. Organizations like al-Qaeda must be kept in a state of constant fear and uncertainty. US Special Operations Forces are uniquely suited to this task. Through structured, rapid application of military force, SOF can find, fix, and finish intended targets with surgical precision. This has proven true in the capture of Saddam Hussein and the elimination of Osama bin Laden and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, among numerous other targets throughout the Global War on Terrorism. Continuing to deny safe havens through short, precise applications of combat power is crucial and does not rely on a conventional military occupation of the target area. Operations such as these, characterized by discriminate use of force and strategic impact, should be the main avenue for denying the relative safety, security, and freedom of maneuver of jihadist organizations. 27 References British Broadcasting Corporation (2017, June 4). Reality check: What is the prevent strategy? Reality Check. https://www.bbc.com/news/election-2017-40151991. Creswell, R., & Haykel, B. (2015, June 1). Battle lines: Want to understand the jihadis? Read their poetry. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/08/battle-lines-jihad-creswell-and-haykel. Dearden, L. (2015, March 21). 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