Suchergebnisse

The Situation In The Middle East ; United Nations S/PV.8260 Security Council Seventy-third year 8260th meeting Wednesday, 16 May 2018, 10 a.m. New York Provisional President: Ms. Wronecka. . (Poland) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Djédjé Equatorial Guinea. . M. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Russian Federation. . Mr. Polyanskiy Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Ms. Eckels-Currie Agenda The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-14999 (E) *1814999* S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 2/12 18-14999 The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East The President: In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary- General for Syria, to participate in this meeting. Mr. De Mistura is joining today's meeting via video-teleconference from Geneva. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I give the floor to Mr. De Mistura. Mr. De Mistura: When I last briefed the Security Council on 9 April, it was at an emergency meeting (see S/PV.8225). On that occasion, I warned of the threats to regional and international peace and security arising from developments in or related to Syria. I know that today it is not an emergency meeting. However, the circumstances of an emergency very much remain. I do not need to remind members that tensions are high and regional and international confrontations have occurred several times. Allow me to highlight some recent events since 9 April. On 13 April, the United States, France and the United Kingdom conducted missile strikes in response to the allegations of the use of chemical weapons in eastern Ghouta. Those countries say that the strikes targeted three research and production facilities near Damascus and Homs. On 29 April, strikes were reported on Syrian Government military facilities in Hamah and Aleppo. Some media outlets attributed those strikes to Israel, alleging that those killed included Iranian personnel. Neither Israel nor Iran responded to those claims. On 8 May, strikes were reported just south of Damascus. Syrian State media attributed those strikes to Israel. Israel did not confirm that claim. Israel then said that it had detected "irregular Iranian activity" in the occupied Golan, which it put on high alert. Between 9 and 10 May, Israel carried out dozens of strikes against presumed Iranian and Syrian Government military targets across southern Syria. The Israeli authorities claim that they were responding to Iranian forces firing rockets from Syrian territory at Israeli military targets in the occupied Syrian Golan. Iran condemned the Israeli strikes and denied those claims. We are not is a position to independently verify every aspect of those incidents. However, even an incomplete picture shows the troubling trajectory of the increasingly frequent and ever more intense international confrontations over Syria, unprecedented since 1973. As the Security Council knows, the Secretary- General has followed those developments with great concern and called for restraint by all parties in order to avoid any acts that could escalate the situation and worsen the suffering of the Syrian people. The Secretary-General stressed that the United Nations has a "duty to remind Member States that there is an obligation, particularly when dealing with matters of peace and security, to act consistently with the Charter of the United Nations, and with international law in general." (S/PV.8233, p. 2) On the issue of chemical weapons, let me again echo the Secretary-General's call for the Security Council to "agree on a dedicated mechanism for ensuring effective accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria" (ibid.). As the Council well knows, as of now, we await the results of the ongoing investigation by the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons following its visit to Douma, with a report to be issued to States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, we have also seen worrying developments elsewhere in Syria. Evacuations from eastern Ghouta were similarly repeated in the eastern Qalamoun area, southern Damascus and northern rural Homs. First, on the military escalation, the pattern has been one of incoming air strikes and artillery and outgoing mortars and rockets towards Damascus. Then there was a negotiation, followed by an agreement for the evacuation of those civilians and fighters unwilling to remain under Syrian Government control or Russian Federation protection guarantees. We have also seen similar evacuation agreements 16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 3/12 being discussed in Idlib province but in a completely different format — the reverse format. This time we are talking about civilians and fighters in Government-controlled areas, namely, Kafraya and Fo'ah, while considering evacuations — beginning with medical evacuations — following the three-year siege and intermittent attacks from armed groups surrounding that area.Let me share with the Council a recurrent concern that I know that all members have. If civilians and fighters are simply funnelled into northern Syria — mostly into Idlib — then that might only postpone another conflict affecting many additional people, which I will discuss later. Therefore, it is important to keep close watch on future developments in Idlib province. Meanwhile, civilians continue to pay a terrible price. To be precise, 110,000 people have been evacuated to north-western Syria and Operation Euphrates Shield areas in the past two months. Many of them are reportedly traumatized and in urgent need of assistance and protection. Humanitarian partners are overwhelmed and stretched quite thin by the scale of those evacuations, but continue to do their utmost to respond to the growing needs, with the Council's assistance.Returning to the topic of Idlib, if a Ghouta scenario were to play out there, the situation could be six times worse, affecting 2.3 million people, half of whom are already internally displaced and would have nowhere else to go. But that is not purely a question of the Syrians' suffering. We fear that any substantial escalation in Idlib, Dar'a or in the north-east might also result in risks not only to Syrian civilians, but also for international peace and security. As we know, many of those areas contain external and international forces. Conflict there might entail confrontations with those forces, thereby leading us down a slippery slope towards regional or potential international conflict. Therefore, discussions at the international level on how to prevent that and on de-escalation are needed, and, although they are taking place, they also need to be very intensive.I was therefore very encouraged to see concrete discussions on de-escalation when I attended the ninth high-level Astana meeting yesterday, which covered the issue of Idlib in particular, as the three guarantors have a say and the means to avoid it. That round of discussions in Astana saw constructive discussions on how that might be achieved. While fully stressing the need to respect Syria's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, we saw at first-hand the parties engage actively on how to avoid a worst-case scenario in Idlib. Moreover, the working group, of which the United Nations is a member and a proactive supporter — as hundreds of thousands of people in Syria expect of us — held its second meeting on the release of detainees, abductees and bodies, and on the identification of missing persons. The members of the working group held constructive discussions on practical and concrete steps to address that key humanitarian issue. The guarantors informed us that they have secured the parties' support — which, if confirmed, is good news — for the activities taking place under the auspices of the working group, which is a positive development. As it is a matter of preliminary discussions, I hope that we will see progress with regard to that complex issue at the working group's next meeting, which we understand will be held in Ankara.De-escalation is indispensable, as the Syrians themselves are telling us, but it is only one of the ingredients necessary to move forward the political process. We also need to overcome concrete challenges to meaningfully follow through with the Geneva process so as to implement resolution 2254 (2015). As instructed by the Secretary-General, I have consulted with a broad spectrum of relevant stakeholders and proactively identified options for a meaningful relaunch of the United Nations-facilitated Geneva process. Over a period of two weeks, I conducted an exhaustive tour of consultations with members of the League of Arab States; representatives of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq; the European Union (EU) High Representative; representatives of several key European countries, Turkey, the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran; and all members of the Council, during what I believe was a very productive and useful retreat in Sweden; United States authorities during my visit to meet with them in Washington, D.C., several days ago; and also the Syrian Government and the opposition, with whom I had constructive discussions on the sidelines of the Astana meeting over the past two days. My deputy, Mr. Ramzy, was also in the region this past weekend in continuous political contact with regional stakeholders, and my chief of political affairs, Mr. Robert Dann, is visting China as we speak to exchange views with officials of that important member of the Security Council.What did I learn from that long tour? Not surprisingly, I returned to Geneva with a mixed picture. S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 4/12 18-14999 Clearly, significant differences remain, but there is also much common ground and interest on the need, first, to de-escalate, secondly, to form a constitutional committee under the auspices of the United Nations, thirdly, to facilitate the establishment of a safe, calm and neutral environment — leading to our shared goals in the political process — and, fourthly, to respect Syria's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. However, those commonalities risk getting glossed over, especially in the absence of serious international dialogue. I will say more on that later. During my tour, my message to all was the need — now more than ever — for robust, strong, proactive and urgent dialogue and consensus at the international level to create the minimum conditions necessary for a realistic and credible political process. As we know, much water has flowed under the bridge and much has happened since resolution 2254 (2015) was adopted. We are therefore becoming increasingly realistic and know that we need a credible political process that takes into account the current situation and does not forget resolution 2254 (2015).As the Secretariat, we are not sitting idle in that regard. We are assessing a number of creative options to update, revive and advance the Geneva-based political process. Let me state for the record that the United Nations remains ever-mobilized and -ready to work on the formation of a constitutional committee in accordance with the final statement of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi. I therefore welcome the intention of the Astana guarantors to actively and regularly engage with the United Nations in Geneva so as to see through a concrete follow-up to the statement since its adoption three and a half months ago.I was also pleased to see a significant number of Member States reaffirm the primacy of the United Nations-led Geneva process, in general, and the need for a constitutional committee working under United Nations auspices, when I was at the EU-United Nations Brussels conference from 24 to 25 April. Those at the conference nearly unanimously reiterated the message that the only solution to the crisis will be political and that only such a political solution will pave the way for reconstruction efforts. Also in Brussels, we saw the entire United Nations system highlight the increasing needs of millions of Syrians, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) and neighbouring countries hosting refugees.Let me also note the important contribution of Syrian civil society in Brussels, in particular during a side event organized by the EU and my own Office. Those present did not shy away from debating with one another constructively and intensively on complex issues, such as transitional justice and sanctions. They all demanded the release of all detainees, abductees and missing persons. They all affirmed that any political solution must protect the right of refugees and IDPs. Despite their differences, Syrians — Syrian civil society — displayed a genuine commitment to dialogue and a spirit of negotiation that I hope can be replicated in the formal negotiations.In Brussels I also met with a group of Syrian women activists who stressed that not enough has been done to secure the direct participation of Syrian women in the political process. I committed to translating our collective commitment to that inclusion into concrete measures, and I will count on the Council's support to keep that promise. For instance, in future intra-Syrian talks, I will insist that the relevant number of seats be reserved exclusively for Syrian women. When I am criticized, I hope that the Council will support me. I know it will not be popular, but it needs to be done.Let me briefly touch on an issue that was raised by the civil society in Brussels and by many Syrians elsewhere who have been writing to us, that is, the possible implications of the newly adopted Law No. 10. We are quite aware of the concerns surrounding that law. We, as well as other United Nations partners, are seeking clarifications on the law's goals and repercussions, especially for refugees and IDPs who do not have access to legal documentation.Let me conclude with two bottom lines.First, de-escalation is critical between the Syrian and international stakeholders, both regional and global. We hope that the relevant players can re-establish some overarching rules of the road in that regard. We stand ready to facilitate such a discussion, with focused support from the Council and key countries for the good offices of the Secretary-General and myself.Secondly, we must revive the political process in terms of the constitutional committee, as well as in terms of some initial steps towards the establishment of a safe, calm and neutral environment. We stand ready to facilitate discussions on both. Let me stress that a critical component of either aspect of the political process is active, continuous and positive United 16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 5/12 Nations engagement with the Syrian parties. I repeat once again that we stand ready, today as always, to engage with the Syrian Government in Damascus. We will also continue our contacts with the opposition and Syrian civil society.To unlock and lock those two aspects, careful diplomacy is required more than ever — careful, but proactive diplomacy, including at a high level. Hence, we look with interest to the forthcoming visits to Moscow and meetings of Chancellor Merkel and, later on, President Macron with President Putin, which undoubtedly will not avoid the issue of a political process in Syria. The United Nations believes that there is an urgent need for high-level diplomacy to support de-escalation, avoid any miscalculation and ensure a genuine communication system about a sustainable end to the conflict. With the support of the Secretary-General, we will increase our own efforts to contribute to that endeavour, including by offering further ideas and —if required, which we hope it will be — bridging proposals.The President: I thank Mr. De Mistura for his briefing.I shall now give the floor to the members of the Security Council who wish to make statements.Ms. Eckels-Currie (United States of America): Since this is my first opportunity to congratulate you upon assuming the presidency, Madam President, I would like to do so at this time. I also thank Staffan for his briefing.Last week the world witnessed a new and extremely dangerous escalation in Syria. It should not surprise anyone on the Security Council that Iran was responsible. Iranian forces operating from Syrian territory launched a rocket attack against Israeli citizens — citizens of a sovereign State Member of the United Nations. The United States strongly supports Israel's right to act in self-defence. Iran's reckless and provocative acts last week prove what we have been saying: wherever Iran shows up in the Middle East, chaos follows. Last week's rocket attack against Israel is the latest in a pattern of destabilizing behaviour that is a dire threat to the region's stability.Iran's rocket attack against Israel shows something else too. It puts to bed any myths about why Iran is present in Syria, or what its true objectives might be. The fact is that Iran has installed offensive rocket and missile systems in Syria aimed at Israel. Iran has introduced those threats that were not present in Syria before the conflict; they are now. Iran, together with Hizbullah and other militias, is taking advantage of Syrian territory to establish bases and training camps. They are moving ever closer to Israel. The United States calls on Iran, Hizbullah and their other proxies to take no further provocative steps. If they do, Iran will bear full responsibility for its actions.It is also important to emphasize that Iran's actions do not serve the interests of the Iranian or the Syrian people. The Syrian people get no say in whether Iran threatens war against Syria's neighbours, but it is they who have to live with the consequences.All of us on the Security Council have an important choice to make: we can stay quiet and watch as Iran builds up the infrastructure to create another Hizbullah in Syria, or we can speak up and take steps to put real pressure on Iran to stop. For our part, the United States refuses to stay quiet. Russia in particular has a special responsibility here. Its troops are on the ground, sometimes alongside Iran's. Russia must know that Iran's provocative actions do nothing to help resolve the war in Syria. Russia must know that Iran's actions do just the opposite. They only inflame, prolong and widen the conflict.We heard once again from Staffan today that there has been very little progress on the political track. There has been no progress at all in Geneva, or following Russia's own conferences in Astana and Sochi. Since January, the United Nations was supposed assemble a new constitution drafting committee that would help kick off a new round of talks. The United Nations was supposed to have the ability to choose which people would serve on the committee, and the United Nations was supposed to be empowered to facilitate those talks. Instead, the Al-Assad regime has backtracked, stalled and then refused to cooperate.At the same time, the Syrian regime escalated its brutal military campaign. It seized eastern Ghouta, at the cost of thousands of lives and tens of thousands displaced. It used chemical weapons in Douma. Just yesterday, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission released a report determining that chlorine was used during attacks on 4 February in Saraqib.As reported by the Fact-finding Mission, the facts of that chemical-weapons attack bear the hallmarks S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 6/12 18-14999 of similar attacks conducted by the Al-Assad regime. As we have said before, the United States assesses that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons well over 50 times since the start of the civil war. The Al-Assad regime, with Iran's and Russia's full support, is choosing to pursue a military solution instead of a political solution, and that goes against everything we should stand for as the Security Council.In the aftermath of eastern Ghouta, the need for a real ceasefire could not be more obvious. Already, we see the Al-Assad regime launching new attacks in Idlib and the south-west. As Staffan noted, a Ghouta scenario in Idlib would be six times worse than the horror we saw in recent months in Ghouta. Air strikes in the south-west have tripled in the last month, even though that area is part of a de-escalation zone. Russia is supposed to be a sponsor of that zone. It must urgently meet its commitments to prevent the regime from carrying out attacks and stop Iranian militias from expanding their foothold in the south.Members of the Security Council — all of us — must push the political process forward. There is Council unity behind that goal. There is a clear blueprint for a political solution in resolution 2254 (2015), which we adopted unanimously. We have to send a clear message to the Al-Assad regime and its backers: the end of the conflict can be reached only via the United Nations-led political process. There must be constitutional reform and free and fair elections under United Nations supervision. If the Al-Assad regime does not comply, we need to be prepared to impose real costs on it for its years of defiance and the devastation it has wrought in Syria. If we take those steps, we can start to change the calculus of the Al-Assad regime and its allies in Syria. We can show them that further conflict is not in their interests and that it is time for them to genuinely commit to a political solution. But as we saw last week, the longer we wait, the greater the risk of confrontation. Now is the time to act to reduce tensions and address Iran's designs in Syria. That is how we can prevent further escalation and even worse suffering. There is no time to waste.Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. De Mistura for his briefing. We can see that his personal participation in the meeting on Syria in Astana enabled him to make it a substantive one. We appreciated his call for active diplomacy, which Russia has advocated for from the very beginning. We continue to make significant efforts to facilitate a political settlement in Syria despite the undermining effects of the aggressive action by the United States, the United Kingdom and France in April against a number of civilian structures in Syria. I discerned no sympathy about what happened there in the statement by my United States colleague, despite the fact that it was a blatant breach of international law and did absolutely nothing to advance any kind of a settlement. Furthermore, her statement had an odd, confrontational tone that I felt certainly did not correspond to the message that Mr. De Mistura wanted to convey to all of us today, which is that it will be important for diplomacy to function if the peace that the Syrians have awaited for so long is to finally be established on the ground.Unlike some Security Council member States, which prefer taking unilateral measures to finding ways to solve problems, Russia is focusing on steps to genuinely improve the situation on the ground and advance the prospects for a political settlement. As Mr. De Mistura already noted, the ninth meeting of the participants in the Astana process concluded yesterday in the capital of Kazakhstan, and the guarantors adopted a joint statement. We are grateful to the leadership of Kazakhstan for its steadfast support. The meeting in Astana considered concrete measures for resolving a number of political and humanitarian issues and analysed the situation in the de-escalation zones, which play a key role in maintaining the ceasefire regime, reducing the level of violence and generally stabilizing the situation in Syria. The importance was noted of increasing efforts to help all Syrians and restore normal civilian life and, to that end, of providing fast, safe and unhindered humanitarian access and essential humanitarian and medical assistance, and creating the conditions needed to enable the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes, as well as people's freedom of movement.A second meeting was held of the working group on the liberation of detainees and hostages to discuss the handover of the bodies of the dead and the search for missing persons, with the participation of experts from the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The importance of continuing joint efforts with the aim of building trust among the conflicting parties in Syria was emphasized. The Syrian Government declared its willingness to engage with the working group and decided to appoint a special representative on issues related to its work.16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 7/12 In line with the provisions of resolution 2254 (2015), the meeting affirmed its determination to continuing to promote a political settlement by helping to implement the recommendations of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress held in Sochi. The consultations with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General and the Syrian parties will continue, with a view to establishing the conditions conducive to starting the work of a constitutional committee in Geneva as soon as possible, whose parameters will have to be agreed on by the Syrians themselves. We will get nowhere without their consensus, so there is no point in proposing artificial frameworks for the process, especially if they are based on provisional plans of some kind. Thanks to the Astana process, we have succeeded in generating momentum for a political process based on intra-Syrian talks under the auspices of the United Nations, although, as we have noted, the triple alliance's aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic has significantly limited the room for manoeuvre in that regard.Concerted efforts by the guarantor countries are bringing us steadily closer to eliminating the presence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Jabhat Al-Nusra and other terrorist groups altogether. The recent situation in Syria has continued to be difficult. The guarantor countries' efforts are certainly not being helped by provocative initiatives from external actors, which merely strengthen radical sentiments among groups opposing the legitimate Government and fuel their reluctance to work for negotiated solutions.In Damascus, the operation to liberate the southern regions and suburbs of the capital from ISIL-affiliated groups continues, but Yalda, Babila and Bayt Saham are now fully under the Syrian authorities' control and civilian life there is returning. Russian specialists are helping the Syrian authorities to restore civilian infrastructure. Mines are being cleared, socially significant facilities are being rebuilt and electricity and water services are being restored. In eastern Ghouta, some 65,000 residents previously evacuated from the area have returned to their homes. However, in some other regions where the Syrian Government lacks access, the situation has continued to deteriorate. That is especially true of the Rukban and Al-Tuwaihina refugee camps, as well as the former ISIL capital, Raqqa, where the humanitarian situation is disastrous. Measures must be taken to rectify it without delay. The solution is simple — restore Damascus's sovereignty over those territories as soon as possible.Government forces and Palestinian volunteers, with aerial and artillery support, have continued to combat fierce resistance from terrorist detachments in the Palestinian refugee camp in Yarmouk. The militias wounded several dozen civilians in mortar strikes on residential areas in the north-east area of the camp. In the past week, the territory held by the illegal armed groups in Yarmouk has been significantly reduced.The Syrian army's assault on ISIL positions in Deir ez-Zor province has also been ramped up. ISIL's adherents have incurred considerable losses in manpower and equipment and have been driven out of an area of about 1,500 square kilometres. A large-scale operation to eliminate ISIL is being conducted in the eastern part of Syria with the aim of completely defeating the terrorists based in hard-to-reach desert areas, who have been increasing their attacks on Government forces in the Euphrates region and Homs province.We will continue the difficult work of restoring peace in Syria. Frankly, we are disturbed by some international and regional actors' disrespectful attitude to the issue of Syrian sovereignty, of which we have recently seen alarming manifestations. It is important to understand that this will not help to normalize the situation in Syria or the region as a whole. It fuels the conflict and reduces the prospects for a political settlement. For example, how can we be sure that reckless and illegal actions similar to those that occurred a month ago will not be repeated on some other trumped-up pretext? The reckless conduct of a number of international and regional players who claim to have common sense has considerably slowed progress regarding a settlement of the situation in Syria. If they cannot or will not help us with that, they should at least not interfere.In conclusion, I would like to touch briefly on the remarks by my American colleague. Basically, more than half of her statement was about Iran, not Syria, and Syria is the item on our agenda today, after all. I would also like to ask the Americans some questions we have about that. Before they blame Russia or Iran, I would like to ask what the reason is for the presence of United States forces in Syria and what their real objective is. The territories under their control have become grey areas where extremists of various stripes and real terrorists roam freely. In particular, what is going on with the several hundred ISIL followers who are being held by forces loyal to the United States under United States oversight in the region beyond the S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 8/12 18-14999 Euphrates? They are not being investigated, and nor are they being returned to their countries of origin. We are worried that ISIL will re-emerge in those areas when the United States withdraws from them, which it must do sooner or later.In conclusion, I would like to once again assure the Council of Russia's willingness to support any diplomatic efforts that can bring an end to the miseries of the Syrian people and peace to that long-suffering land.Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): I would like to begin by thanking Mr. De Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, for his briefing. I appreciate his tireless efforts to find a political solution to the conflict.In recent weeks various members of the international community have made tremendous efforts to restore momentum in the political process. China welcomes the latest round of Astana talks and its joint communiqué, and salutes Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkey and Iran for their efforts. We hope that this dialogue will continue to play a positive role in helping to maintain a ceasefire in Syria and advance the Geneva negotiations.China has always maintained that a political solution is the only possible option where the issue of Syria is concerned, and that achieving that goal will require efforts on the international, regional and national fronts. First, the international community should continue to give its support to the United Nations, as the main channel for mediation, and to Mr. De Mistura's efforts to relaunch the Geneva negotiations as soon as possible, on a basis of full respect for Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity and with a view to helping the conflicting parties to engage in negotiations on political governance, the Constitution, elections and counter-terrorism. The Council should remain united in moving the Syrian political process forward.Secondly, the countries involved in the region should take the country's long-term interests and stability into consideration and play a constructive role in helping to find a political solution. China notes that there have been attacks on targets inside Syria. We hope that the parties concerned will remain calm, show restraint and work together to maintain regional peace and stability.Thirdly, both the Syrian Government and the opposition, based on concern for the future of their country and the fundamental interests of their people, should proceed to participate in the Geneva negotiations without preconditions, in accordance with the principle of a dialogue that is Syrian-owned and -led, and on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015), with a view to actively engaging in gradual efforts to reach a settlement that is acceptable to all the parties.For its part, China has been working relentlessly to find a solution. On 13 and 14 May, in the first instance of such an event being held on Syria in China, we hosted an international symposium in Shanghai on the prospects for a political settlement to the Syrian issue. It was attended by Xie Xiaoyan, China's Special Envoy for Syria, a representative of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, and the Special Envoys of the United Kingdom and France for Syria, as well as experts and scholars from many countries. Participants held in-depth discussions on the prospects for a solution, the factors bearing on a political settlement and the role of the international community. Our Special Envoy remains in close contact with the parties concerned in his continuing efforts to help reach a solution. Together with the rest of the international community, China stands ready to continue to play a positive and constructive role in finding a political solution to the issue.Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): We thank the Special Envoy for Syria, Mr. De Mistura, for his update, and we were glad to hear some encouraging notes of optimism in his briefing.Despite the numerous problems on the humanitarian and political fronts in Syria, Kazakhstan believes that it is imperative to continue to promote a settlement of the crisis while implementing resolution 2254 (2015). We are glad that at their meetings held on 14 and 15 May in Astana, the representatives of Syria's Government and opposition, along with those of the guarantor States, unanimously confirmed the importance of continuing the process. Among other issues, they addressed the importance of increasing efforts to ensure compliance with the various agreements reached during the previous eight rounds of the Astana talks. On the other hand, they also agreed that Geneva should remain the main international platform from which to seek and implement a political settlement of the Syrian crisis. It will also be important to continue to support the aims of the Astana talks and further Geneva negotiations, while ultimately merging those important platforms with the aim of achieving positive results.16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 9/12 We thank the Special Envoy for his consultations with various Foreign Ministers at the recent summit of the League of Arab States, as well as with Ms. Federica Mogherini, the European Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. His high-level meetings in Moscow, Tehran, Riyadh and Ankara, as well as his consultations with several European ministers and senior representatives of the United States, are also commendable. We are encouraged by his summary today of his meetings and the outcomes of the Astana process, and we note his hopes for progress and his readiness to increase his own efforts and those of several of the principal stakeholders to revive the political process.We can all see that de-confliction and the precautionary measures to safeguard protected sites under humanitarian law are working. So far this year, 500 additional sites have been de-conflicted, as the process is known. Their coordinates have been voluntarily submitted through the United Nations, and today the total number of sites stands at 661.We are hearing a number of continuing questions and concerns about the outlook for Idlib, which should certainly be our top priority, simply because it has such a large population of vulnerable ordinary citizens. We agree with Mr. De Mistura that since Idlib is six times larger than eastern Ghouta, and therefore has six times more civilian residents, it is in an extremely vulnerable position. We cannot afford a war in Idlib and we therefore call on the main stakeholders with an influence on the conflicting parties to hold negotiations at the national and local levels and in the wider region in order to mitigate the potential tensions.We are impressed by the courageous stance of and the sacrifices made by the United Nations, the Red Crescent, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Norwegian Refugee Council, which are serving under the most challenging circumstances.To conclude, we also hope that the Brussels Conference, held on 24 and 25 April, will help to generate conditions conducive to the peaceful resolution of the Syrian crisis.Finally, we emphasize once again that the most important condition for the settlement of the Syrian crisis is a political process, through direct dialogue and the use of confidence-building measures among the parties, without which there can be no lasting results. We should not forget that it is the Syrians themselves who should begin to shape the future political system of the Syrian State, with the necessary legislative reforms, its territorial and administrative structure, and presidential and parliamentary elections, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015).Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We express our gratitude for the briefing that we heard from Mr. Staffan de Mistura, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, to whom we reiterate our support in the discharge of his duties.Once again we cannot but express our sorrow at the fact that this conflict has gone on for six years now and we are still witnessing the ongoing siege and violence suffered by the Syrian people, mainly children, who, in addition to living with the psychological aftermath of the situation, are also in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. We deplore any act of violence that puts human lives at risk and therefore call for an end to the violence and urge the parties to refrain from any hostile, provocative or unilateral actions, in order to prevent any further suffering of the Syrian people and any further destabilization of the region.We welcome the holding of the summit of the three ceasefire guarantors in Ankara, Turkey, in March. We will be focusing closely on the next summit, which will be sponsored by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Likewise, we welcome the recent Astana meeting. We deem its outcome positive, as were the agreements reached one year ago exactly, when the important de-escalation zones were established. We believe that that international initiative has served to reduce the level of violence and has facilitated, and will continue to facilitate, the path to peace and stability in Syria.We therefore call for greater coordination among the local authorities within the de-escalation zones, humanitarian agencies and the Syrian Government, which will make it possible to improve the living conditions of the local population, with a view to contributing to international efforts to end the conflict in Syria.We call once again for efforts to continue with respect to the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), so as to ensure safe, sustained and unhindered humanitarian access to all those who require it. The protection of the civilian population and civilian infrastructure must also be a priority within the S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 10/12 18-14999 framework of respect for international law and international humanitarian law.We deem imperative the voluntary return of internally displaced persons in a safe and dignified manner, as soon as the situation permits. For that to happen, demining will be vital in those areas where it is necessary. We would urge that the political dialogue agenda continue to focus on the release of detainees and abductees, as well as on the identification of missing or deceased persons.We stress the efforts made towards the voluntary return of thousands of people to eastern Ghouta and other cities north and south of Damascus and their subsequent full return. My delegation would draw the attention of the Security Council to the need to protect thousands of innocent civilians, including children and the elderly, and move them to Idlib. It is urgent and pressing that peace be maintained and any escalation of violence avoided in that area, as the aftermath could be tragic.We believe that measures must continue to be taken to reduce the level of violence on the ground, promote confidence among the parties involved, alleviate the humanitarian situation and promote ongoing initiatives aimed at finding a peaceful political solution. The process must take place on the basis of the various initiatives taken and meetings held at different levels. We therefore underscore once again the commitments made at the Syrian National Dialogue Congress, held in Sochi on 30 January, with a focus on strengthening the United Nations-led political process in the framework of the road map set out in resolution 2254 (2015), in particular through the drafting of a new constitution and the establishment of a constitutional committee, which we believe must be representative and impartial. We hope that the work of that committee, in Geneva, should start as soon as possible and should be active and dynamic and include the participation of all parties to the conflict.We welcome the good offices and mediation of the Secretary-General and his close collaboration with the members of the Security Council in the quest for a peaceful solution to the crisis in Syria.To conclude, we reject any attempt to divide or fragment Syria along ethnic lines or to foster sectarianism there. It is the Syrian people themselves who must freely decide their future and their political leadership, in the framework of their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, without any external pressure or interference.We reiterate that the only way to resolve the conflict in Syria is through a Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process that is inclusive and based on consultation and dialogue and that will allow for a peaceful solution to be reached among all the parties involved.Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I had not intended to speak today in the Chamber, but I wanted to respond to some of the things that we have just heard. I will therefore take this opportunity to thank Staffan de Mistura and his team for all their work, which is not proving as fast or as productive as all of us would like, but I think that we are very grateful to Staffan for all his efforts. I was also interested to hear the Chinese account of the work of their envoy.We all know what needs to be done. We have had very many discussions in this Chamber and in the Consultations Room about Syria. I think that what we struggle with is how to get it done and how to take the next step, so I hope that when we leave the Chamber and go next door into closed consultations, we can actually have a proper discussion, without polemics, about what it will take to get the constitutional committee up and running; what are the concrete steps that need to be taken and how we as the Council can best facilitate and support that; and what it takes to get Idlib protected. Lots of speakers today have referred to Idlib; I think that we all know its importance, scale and significance. I would urge those Astana progenitors to do what they can to ensure that on the ground, people in Idlib are safe and that we avert a humanitarian catastrophe there. But I would like to have a proper discussion next door about how the Council can actually support that.I wanted to turn to the issue of the Syrian Government engaging with the United Nations. The Russian representative referred to backsliding from a political settlement and entrenching Syrian unwillingness for a negotiated solution. I think that those two statements are very damning, but they are not damning about us; they are damning about the Syrian regime. We really need all those with influence on Syria, including Russia and Iran, to encourage it to set aside a military strategy as a way to resolve the conflict and to engage with the United Nations across the board, so that we can get back to Geneva and to a political settlement. It is not we in the West who are stopping 16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 11/12 that happening. The onus is truly on Syria to follow the will of the Security Council and its resolutions and to allow the United Nations to do its work to help the people of Syria. Those are the main things I wanted to say, but I would like to touch on three more points as well, if I may.We support what the Special Envoy said about bringing women in, which I think is long overdue, and he can count on the United Kingdom's full support for that. I would also like to refer to Iran and the strikes on Israel from Syrian territory, on which we are in full agreement with the United States representative's comments and have been very vocal about in public. I also want to comment on the Russian representative's remarks about the air strikes. I will not rehearse why France, the United States and the United Kingdom took the action we did, except to say that we did it to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, and in doing so we helped to protect civilians on the ground, deterred and degraded Syria's ability to use chemical weapons and thereby upheld the global prohibition on weapons of mass destruction.While I think those things remain very important, they should not be used by anyone on the Council as a reason to let the Syrian Government off the hook where engaging with the United Nations on the political process is concerned. The political process has been essential since 2012, when the Geneva talks were started. It has been increasingly essential since then, and it continues to be essential now. I therefore hope that when we go next door we can have a very detailed discussion about how we as the Council can get back to the spirit of Sweden and actually help Staffan de Mistura and his team do something concrete to achieve that, and have no more mud-slinging.The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting.I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.Mr. Mounzer (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): To begin with, the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom have tried to promote false claims justifying their aggression against sovereign States, particularly my country, Syria, with the aim of concealing their direct involvement in terrorism and their part in the responsibility for the bloodshed in Syria. I would like to say to them that the testimony, as cited in the media, of the thousands of Syrians who have escaped the blockades of armed terrorist groups in eastern Ghouta, has proved that those countries have been involved in making those citizens suffer through their support of those terrorist groups. Through their positions, their malicious acts and their illegal occupation of various areas of Syria, they have shown that, contrary to their claims, they cannot let go of their history of greed, occupation and imperialism. When speaking in the Council, they claim falsely that they are trying to find a political solution to the situation in Syria, but let me point out, briefly, that we have been able to defeat their agenda in Aleppo and eastern Ghouta, and we will be able to ensure that they cannot win in any part of my country.For the past seven years, since the beginning of the terrorist war in Syria, the United States, Britain and France have been working relentlessly to support and help conduct that war. They have also used the United Nations as a political tool to put pressure on the Syrian Government to implement their hegemonic agenda, interfere in our internal affairs and destabilize my country. They have not used the United Nations to fight terrorism and its sponsors or to help Syria overcome the suffering inflicted on it by armed terrorist groups, which should have been the goal.The Special Envoy devoted part of his statement to discussing the humanitarian situation. In that regard, I want to reiterate that the Syrian Government gives priority to providing every kind of humanitarian assistance to all Syrians in need, wherever they are in Syria. That is our duty, and we are doing our duty. The legal and constitutional obligations established under international decisions and Security Council resolutions on combating terrorism obliged my Government to undertake military operations in eastern Ghouta in order to rescue civilians from the armed terrorist groups holding them hostage and using them for years as human shields. In that regard, I want to state that contrary to some false narratives, the successful military operations conducted by the Syrian Arab Army and its allies against the armed terrorist groups controlling a number of areas that the United Nations has classified as besieged or hard to reach — along with the settlement and reconciliation agreements — have all mitigated civilians' suffering, reduced the numbers of those areas and facilitated humanitarian access to them, including eastern Ghouta.S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 12/12 18-14999 We deplore the fact that the United States speaks of its eagerness to reach a political agreement while it has been committing acts of aggression against my country based on lies, simply because it is working to give support to the armed groups because they have suffered losses in eastern Ghouta. It was the United States that supported Israel's aggression on 9 May when Israel was unable to protect its own proxy terrorist groups and implement its conspiracy against my country's unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Israel has continued its dangerous acts of aggression, which would not have been possible without the continuing unstinting support of the United States Government, because it enjoys impunity as a result of the support it has from the United States in the Security Council, enabling Israel to continue its terrorist acts threatening international peace and security in the region and the world. The Syrian Arab Republic reaffirms that through its military and armed forces it is able and ready to fend off all acts of aggression against its sovereignty and independence. However, we want to reiterate that any attempts to support this failing terrorism will not work. Such flagrant violations will not present obstacles to us in combating terrorism throughout Syrian territory.Yesterday we concluded round nine of the Astana process, and we are pleased with the results. We thank the delegations of Russia, Iran and the host country, Kazakhstan, for making the Astana process a success with regard to combating terrorism. The outcome document of the meeting stresses the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic against any external entities that attempt to violate them.In cooperation with our friends and allies, the Syrian army has succeeded in liberating eastern Ghouta and the southern area of Damascus, making the capital and its surrounding areas safe. With the cooperation of our friends and brothers, we have also expelled the terrorists from the northern area of Homs and the southern area of Hama. Today we reaffirm that we will continue to fight terrorism and to work to liberate each and every part of our territory from terrorism and from countries that seek to undermine our sovereignty.In conclusion, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic will spare no effort to support all genuine efforts to arrive at a political solution whereby Syrians, and only Syrians, will decide their future and make choices aimed at safeguarding Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity.The President: The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor to make a further statement.Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I just wanted to comment on the Syrian representative's last statement, in which he said that the Syrian Arab Republic will spare no effort to arrive at a political solution. That is obviously a welcome statement. I would like to ask him if he could tell the Council, or is willing to say today, that Syria will put the same amount of effort into engaging with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria and with the Council in order to take concrete steps to get the Geneva process to work and to get a constitutional committee off the ground. If Syria were able to make that commitment today in the Chamber, I believe that would unlock a lot of things for the Council.The President: The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic has asked for the floor to make a further statement. I now give him the floor.Mr. Mounzer (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): We have said time and again that we are working with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria. A delegation from the Syrian Arab Republic is working directly with him. We are eager, as we have said repeatedly, to find a peaceful, Syrian-led solution to the Syrian crisis.The President: There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.

The Situation In The Middle East This Record Contains The Text Of Speeches Delivered In English And Of The Translation Of Speeches Delivered In Other Languages. ; United Nations S/PV.8260 Security Council Seventy-third year 8260th meeting Wednesday, 16 May 2018, 10 a.m. New York Provisional President: Ms. Wronecka. . (Poland) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Djédjé Equatorial Guinea. . M. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Russian Federation. . Mr. Polyanskiy Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Ms. Eckels-Currie Agenda The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-14999 (E) *1814999* S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 2/12 18-14999 The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East The President: In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary- General for Syria, to participate in this meeting. Mr. De Mistura is joining today's meeting via video-teleconference from Geneva. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I give the floor to Mr. De Mistura. Mr. De Mistura: When I last briefed the Security Council on 9 April, it was at an emergency meeting (see S/PV.8225). On that occasion, I warned of the threats to regional and international peace and security arising from developments in or related to Syria. I know that today it is not an emergency meeting. However, the circumstances of an emergency very much remain. I do not need to remind members that tensions are high and regional and international confrontations have occurred several times. Allow me to highlight some recent events since 9 April. On 13 April, the United States, France and the United Kingdom conducted missile strikes in response to the allegations of the use of chemical weapons in eastern Ghouta. Those countries say that the strikes targeted three research and production facilities near Damascus and Homs. On 29 April, strikes were reported on Syrian Government military facilities in Hamah and Aleppo. Some media outlets attributed those strikes to Israel, alleging that those killed included Iranian personnel. Neither Israel nor Iran responded to those claims. On 8 May, strikes were reported just south of Damascus. Syrian State media attributed those strikes to Israel. Israel did not confirm that claim. Israel then said that it had detected "irregular Iranian activity" in the occupied Golan, which it put on high alert. Between 9 and 10 May, Israel carried out dozens of strikes against presumed Iranian and Syrian Government military targets across southern Syria. The Israeli authorities claim that they were responding to Iranian forces firing rockets from Syrian territory at Israeli military targets in the occupied Syrian Golan. Iran condemned the Israeli strikes and denied those claims. We are not is a position to independently verify every aspect of those incidents. However, even an incomplete picture shows the troubling trajectory of the increasingly frequent and ever more intense international confrontations over Syria, unprecedented since 1973. As the Security Council knows, the Secretary- General has followed those developments with great concern and called for restraint by all parties in order to avoid any acts that could escalate the situation and worsen the suffering of the Syrian people. The Secretary-General stressed that the United Nations has a "duty to remind Member States that there is an obligation, particularly when dealing with matters of peace and security, to act consistently with the Charter of the United Nations, and with international law in general." (S/PV.8233, p. 2) On the issue of chemical weapons, let me again echo the Secretary-General's call for the Security Council to "agree on a dedicated mechanism for ensuring effective accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria" (ibid.). As the Council well knows, as of now, we await the results of the ongoing investigation by the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons following its visit to Douma, with a report to be issued to States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, we have also seen worrying developments elsewhere in Syria. Evacuations from eastern Ghouta were similarly repeated in the eastern Qalamoun area, southern Damascus and northern rural Homs. First, on the military escalation, the pattern has been one of incoming air strikes and artillery and outgoing mortars and rockets towards Damascus. Then there was a negotiation, followed by an agreement for the evacuation of those civilians and fighters unwilling to remain under Syrian Government control or Russian Federation protection guarantees. We have also seen similar evacuation agreements 16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 3/12 being discussed in Idlib province but in a completely different format — the reverse format. This time we are talking about civilians and fighters in Government-controlled areas, namely, Kafraya and Fo'ah, while considering evacuations — beginning with medical evacuations — following the three-year siege and intermittent attacks from armed groups surrounding that area.Let me share with the Council a recurrent concern that I know that all members have. If civilians and fighters are simply funnelled into northern Syria — mostly into Idlib — then that might only postpone another conflict affecting many additional people, which I will discuss later. Therefore, it is important to keep close watch on future developments in Idlib province. Meanwhile, civilians continue to pay a terrible price. To be precise, 110,000 people have been evacuated to north-western Syria and Operation Euphrates Shield areas in the past two months. Many of them are reportedly traumatized and in urgent need of assistance and protection. Humanitarian partners are overwhelmed and stretched quite thin by the scale of those evacuations, but continue to do their utmost to respond to the growing needs, with the Council's assistance.Returning to the topic of Idlib, if a Ghouta scenario were to play out there, the situation could be six times worse, affecting 2.3 million people, half of whom are already internally displaced and would have nowhere else to go. But that is not purely a question of the Syrians' suffering. We fear that any substantial escalation in Idlib, Dar'a or in the north-east might also result in risks not only to Syrian civilians, but also for international peace and security. As we know, many of those areas contain external and international forces. Conflict there might entail confrontations with those forces, thereby leading us down a slippery slope towards regional or potential international conflict. Therefore, discussions at the international level on how to prevent that and on de-escalation are needed, and, although they are taking place, they also need to be very intensive.I was therefore very encouraged to see concrete discussions on de-escalation when I attended the ninth high-level Astana meeting yesterday, which covered the issue of Idlib in particular, as the three guarantors have a say and the means to avoid it. That round of discussions in Astana saw constructive discussions on how that might be achieved. While fully stressing the need to respect Syria's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, we saw at first-hand the parties engage actively on how to avoid a worst-case scenario in Idlib. Moreover, the working group, of which the United Nations is a member and a proactive supporter — as hundreds of thousands of people in Syria expect of us — held its second meeting on the release of detainees, abductees and bodies, and on the identification of missing persons. The members of the working group held constructive discussions on practical and concrete steps to address that key humanitarian issue. The guarantors informed us that they have secured the parties' support — which, if confirmed, is good news — for the activities taking place under the auspices of the working group, which is a positive development. As it is a matter of preliminary discussions, I hope that we will see progress with regard to that complex issue at the working group's next meeting, which we understand will be held in Ankara.De-escalation is indispensable, as the Syrians themselves are telling us, but it is only one of the ingredients necessary to move forward the political process. We also need to overcome concrete challenges to meaningfully follow through with the Geneva process so as to implement resolution 2254 (2015). As instructed by the Secretary-General, I have consulted with a broad spectrum of relevant stakeholders and proactively identified options for a meaningful relaunch of the United Nations-facilitated Geneva process. Over a period of two weeks, I conducted an exhaustive tour of consultations with members of the League of Arab States; representatives of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq; the European Union (EU) High Representative; representatives of several key European countries, Turkey, the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran; and all members of the Council, during what I believe was a very productive and useful retreat in Sweden; United States authorities during my visit to meet with them in Washington, D.C., several days ago; and also the Syrian Government and the opposition, with whom I had constructive discussions on the sidelines of the Astana meeting over the past two days. My deputy, Mr. Ramzy, was also in the region this past weekend in continuous political contact with regional stakeholders, and my chief of political affairs, Mr. Robert Dann, is visting China as we speak to exchange views with officials of that important member of the Security Council.What did I learn from that long tour? Not surprisingly, I returned to Geneva with a mixed picture. S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 4/12 18-14999 Clearly, significant differences remain, but there is also much common ground and interest on the need, first, to de-escalate, secondly, to form a constitutional committee under the auspices of the United Nations, thirdly, to facilitate the establishment of a safe, calm and neutral environment — leading to our shared goals in the political process — and, fourthly, to respect Syria's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. However, those commonalities risk getting glossed over, especially in the absence of serious international dialogue. I will say more on that later. During my tour, my message to all was the need — now more than ever — for robust, strong, proactive and urgent dialogue and consensus at the international level to create the minimum conditions necessary for a realistic and credible political process. As we know, much water has flowed under the bridge and much has happened since resolution 2254 (2015) was adopted. We are therefore becoming increasingly realistic and know that we need a credible political process that takes into account the current situation and does not forget resolution 2254 (2015).As the Secretariat, we are not sitting idle in that regard. We are assessing a number of creative options to update, revive and advance the Geneva-based political process. Let me state for the record that the United Nations remains ever-mobilized and -ready to work on the formation of a constitutional committee in accordance with the final statement of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi. I therefore welcome the intention of the Astana guarantors to actively and regularly engage with the United Nations in Geneva so as to see through a concrete follow-up to the statement since its adoption three and a half months ago.I was also pleased to see a significant number of Member States reaffirm the primacy of the United Nations-led Geneva process, in general, and the need for a constitutional committee working under United Nations auspices, when I was at the EU-United Nations Brussels conference from 24 to 25 April. Those at the conference nearly unanimously reiterated the message that the only solution to the crisis will be political and that only such a political solution will pave the way for reconstruction efforts. Also in Brussels, we saw the entire United Nations system highlight the increasing needs of millions of Syrians, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) and neighbouring countries hosting refugees.Let me also note the important contribution of Syrian civil society in Brussels, in particular during a side event organized by the EU and my own Office. Those present did not shy away from debating with one another constructively and intensively on complex issues, such as transitional justice and sanctions. They all demanded the release of all detainees, abductees and missing persons. They all affirmed that any political solution must protect the right of refugees and IDPs. Despite their differences, Syrians — Syrian civil society — displayed a genuine commitment to dialogue and a spirit of negotiation that I hope can be replicated in the formal negotiations.In Brussels I also met with a group of Syrian women activists who stressed that not enough has been done to secure the direct participation of Syrian women in the political process. I committed to translating our collective commitment to that inclusion into concrete measures, and I will count on the Council's support to keep that promise. For instance, in future intra-Syrian talks, I will insist that the relevant number of seats be reserved exclusively for Syrian women. When I am criticized, I hope that the Council will support me. I know it will not be popular, but it needs to be done.Let me briefly touch on an issue that was raised by the civil society in Brussels and by many Syrians elsewhere who have been writing to us, that is, the possible implications of the newly adopted Law No. 10. We are quite aware of the concerns surrounding that law. We, as well as other United Nations partners, are seeking clarifications on the law's goals and repercussions, especially for refugees and IDPs who do not have access to legal documentation.Let me conclude with two bottom lines.First, de-escalation is critical between the Syrian and international stakeholders, both regional and global. We hope that the relevant players can re-establish some overarching rules of the road in that regard. We stand ready to facilitate such a discussion, with focused support from the Council and key countries for the good offices of the Secretary-General and myself.Secondly, we must revive the political process in terms of the constitutional committee, as well as in terms of some initial steps towards the establishment of a safe, calm and neutral environment. We stand ready to facilitate discussions on both. Let me stress that a critical component of either aspect of the political process is active, continuous and positive United 16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 5/12 Nations engagement with the Syrian parties. I repeat once again that we stand ready, today as always, to engage with the Syrian Government in Damascus. We will also continue our contacts with the opposition and Syrian civil society.To unlock and lock those two aspects, careful diplomacy is required more than ever — careful, but proactive diplomacy, including at a high level. Hence, we look with interest to the forthcoming visits to Moscow and meetings of Chancellor Merkel and, later on, President Macron with President Putin, which undoubtedly will not avoid the issue of a political process in Syria. The United Nations believes that there is an urgent need for high-level diplomacy to support de-escalation, avoid any miscalculation and ensure a genuine communication system about a sustainable end to the conflict. With the support of the Secretary-General, we will increase our own efforts to contribute to that endeavour, including by offering further ideas and —if required, which we hope it will be — bridging proposals.The President: I thank Mr. De Mistura for his briefing.I shall now give the floor to the members of the Security Council who wish to make statements.Ms. Eckels-Currie (United States of America): Since this is my first opportunity to congratulate you upon assuming the presidency, Madam President, I would like to do so at this time. I also thank Staffan for his briefing.Last week the world witnessed a new and extremely dangerous escalation in Syria. It should not surprise anyone on the Security Council that Iran was responsible. Iranian forces operating from Syrian territory launched a rocket attack against Israeli citizens — citizens of a sovereign State Member of the United Nations. The United States strongly supports Israel's right to act in self-defence. Iran's reckless and provocative acts last week prove what we have been saying: wherever Iran shows up in the Middle East, chaos follows. Last week's rocket attack against Israel is the latest in a pattern of destabilizing behaviour that is a dire threat to the region's stability.Iran's rocket attack against Israel shows something else too. It puts to bed any myths about why Iran is present in Syria, or what its true objectives might be. The fact is that Iran has installed offensive rocket and missile systems in Syria aimed at Israel. Iran has introduced those threats that were not present in Syria before the conflict; they are now. Iran, together with Hizbullah and other militias, is taking advantage of Syrian territory to establish bases and training camps. They are moving ever closer to Israel. The United States calls on Iran, Hizbullah and their other proxies to take no further provocative steps. If they do, Iran will bear full responsibility for its actions.It is also important to emphasize that Iran's actions do not serve the interests of the Iranian or the Syrian people. The Syrian people get no say in whether Iran threatens war against Syria's neighbours, but it is they who have to live with the consequences.All of us on the Security Council have an important choice to make: we can stay quiet and watch as Iran builds up the infrastructure to create another Hizbullah in Syria, or we can speak up and take steps to put real pressure on Iran to stop. For our part, the United States refuses to stay quiet. Russia in particular has a special responsibility here. Its troops are on the ground, sometimes alongside Iran's. Russia must know that Iran's provocative actions do nothing to help resolve the war in Syria. Russia must know that Iran's actions do just the opposite. They only inflame, prolong and widen the conflict.We heard once again from Staffan today that there has been very little progress on the political track. There has been no progress at all in Geneva, or following Russia's own conferences in Astana and Sochi. Since January, the United Nations was supposed assemble a new constitution drafting committee that would help kick off a new round of talks. The United Nations was supposed to have the ability to choose which people would serve on the committee, and the United Nations was supposed to be empowered to facilitate those talks. Instead, the Al-Assad regime has backtracked, stalled and then refused to cooperate.At the same time, the Syrian regime escalated its brutal military campaign. It seized eastern Ghouta, at the cost of thousands of lives and tens of thousands displaced. It used chemical weapons in Douma. Just yesterday, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission released a report determining that chlorine was used during attacks on 4 February in Saraqib.As reported by the Fact-finding Mission, the facts of that chemical-weapons attack bear the hallmarks S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 6/12 18-14999 of similar attacks conducted by the Al-Assad regime. As we have said before, the United States assesses that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons well over 50 times since the start of the civil war. The Al-Assad regime, with Iran's and Russia's full support, is choosing to pursue a military solution instead of a political solution, and that goes against everything we should stand for as the Security Council.In the aftermath of eastern Ghouta, the need for a real ceasefire could not be more obvious. Already, we see the Al-Assad regime launching new attacks in Idlib and the south-west. As Staffan noted, a Ghouta scenario in Idlib would be six times worse than the horror we saw in recent months in Ghouta. Air strikes in the south-west have tripled in the last month, even though that area is part of a de-escalation zone. Russia is supposed to be a sponsor of that zone. It must urgently meet its commitments to prevent the regime from carrying out attacks and stop Iranian militias from expanding their foothold in the south.Members of the Security Council — all of us — must push the political process forward. There is Council unity behind that goal. There is a clear blueprint for a political solution in resolution 2254 (2015), which we adopted unanimously. We have to send a clear message to the Al-Assad regime and its backers: the end of the conflict can be reached only via the United Nations-led political process. There must be constitutional reform and free and fair elections under United Nations supervision. If the Al-Assad regime does not comply, we need to be prepared to impose real costs on it for its years of defiance and the devastation it has wrought in Syria. If we take those steps, we can start to change the calculus of the Al-Assad regime and its allies in Syria. We can show them that further conflict is not in their interests and that it is time for them to genuinely commit to a political solution. But as we saw last week, the longer we wait, the greater the risk of confrontation. Now is the time to act to reduce tensions and address Iran's designs in Syria. That is how we can prevent further escalation and even worse suffering. There is no time to waste.Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. De Mistura for his briefing. We can see that his personal participation in the meeting on Syria in Astana enabled him to make it a substantive one. We appreciated his call for active diplomacy, which Russia has advocated for from the very beginning. We continue to make significant efforts to facilitate a political settlement in Syria despite the undermining effects of the aggressive action by the United States, the United Kingdom and France in April against a number of civilian structures in Syria. I discerned no sympathy about what happened there in the statement by my United States colleague, despite the fact that it was a blatant breach of international law and did absolutely nothing to advance any kind of a settlement. Furthermore, her statement had an odd, confrontational tone that I felt certainly did not correspond to the message that Mr. De Mistura wanted to convey to all of us today, which is that it will be important for diplomacy to function if the peace that the Syrians have awaited for so long is to finally be established on the ground.Unlike some Security Council member States, which prefer taking unilateral measures to finding ways to solve problems, Russia is focusing on steps to genuinely improve the situation on the ground and advance the prospects for a political settlement. As Mr. De Mistura already noted, the ninth meeting of the participants in the Astana process concluded yesterday in the capital of Kazakhstan, and the guarantors adopted a joint statement. We are grateful to the leadership of Kazakhstan for its steadfast support. The meeting in Astana considered concrete measures for resolving a number of political and humanitarian issues and analysed the situation in the de-escalation zones, which play a key role in maintaining the ceasefire regime, reducing the level of violence and generally stabilizing the situation in Syria. The importance was noted of increasing efforts to help all Syrians and restore normal civilian life and, to that end, of providing fast, safe and unhindered humanitarian access and essential humanitarian and medical assistance, and creating the conditions needed to enable the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes, as well as people's freedom of movement.A second meeting was held of the working group on the liberation of detainees and hostages to discuss the handover of the bodies of the dead and the search for missing persons, with the participation of experts from the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The importance of continuing joint efforts with the aim of building trust among the conflicting parties in Syria was emphasized. The Syrian Government declared its willingness to engage with the working group and decided to appoint a special representative on issues related to its work.16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 7/12 In line with the provisions of resolution 2254 (2015), the meeting affirmed its determination to continuing to promote a political settlement by helping to implement the recommendations of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress held in Sochi. The consultations with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General and the Syrian parties will continue, with a view to establishing the conditions conducive to starting the work of a constitutional committee in Geneva as soon as possible, whose parameters will have to be agreed on by the Syrians themselves. We will get nowhere without their consensus, so there is no point in proposing artificial frameworks for the process, especially if they are based on provisional plans of some kind. Thanks to the Astana process, we have succeeded in generating momentum for a political process based on intra-Syrian talks under the auspices of the United Nations, although, as we have noted, the triple alliance's aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic has significantly limited the room for manoeuvre in that regard.Concerted efforts by the guarantor countries are bringing us steadily closer to eliminating the presence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Jabhat Al-Nusra and other terrorist groups altogether. The recent situation in Syria has continued to be difficult. The guarantor countries' efforts are certainly not being helped by provocative initiatives from external actors, which merely strengthen radical sentiments among groups opposing the legitimate Government and fuel their reluctance to work for negotiated solutions.In Damascus, the operation to liberate the southern regions and suburbs of the capital from ISIL-affiliated groups continues, but Yalda, Babila and Bayt Saham are now fully under the Syrian authorities' control and civilian life there is returning. Russian specialists are helping the Syrian authorities to restore civilian infrastructure. Mines are being cleared, socially significant facilities are being rebuilt and electricity and water services are being restored. In eastern Ghouta, some 65,000 residents previously evacuated from the area have returned to their homes. However, in some other regions where the Syrian Government lacks access, the situation has continued to deteriorate. That is especially true of the Rukban and Al-Tuwaihina refugee camps, as well as the former ISIL capital, Raqqa, where the humanitarian situation is disastrous. Measures must be taken to rectify it without delay. The solution is simple — restore Damascus's sovereignty over those territories as soon as possible.Government forces and Palestinian volunteers, with aerial and artillery support, have continued to combat fierce resistance from terrorist detachments in the Palestinian refugee camp in Yarmouk. The militias wounded several dozen civilians in mortar strikes on residential areas in the north-east area of the camp. In the past week, the territory held by the illegal armed groups in Yarmouk has been significantly reduced.The Syrian army's assault on ISIL positions in Deir ez-Zor province has also been ramped up. ISIL's adherents have incurred considerable losses in manpower and equipment and have been driven out of an area of about 1,500 square kilometres. A large-scale operation to eliminate ISIL is being conducted in the eastern part of Syria with the aim of completely defeating the terrorists based in hard-to-reach desert areas, who have been increasing their attacks on Government forces in the Euphrates region and Homs province.We will continue the difficult work of restoring peace in Syria. Frankly, we are disturbed by some international and regional actors' disrespectful attitude to the issue of Syrian sovereignty, of which we have recently seen alarming manifestations. It is important to understand that this will not help to normalize the situation in Syria or the region as a whole. It fuels the conflict and reduces the prospects for a political settlement. For example, how can we be sure that reckless and illegal actions similar to those that occurred a month ago will not be repeated on some other trumped-up pretext? The reckless conduct of a number of international and regional players who claim to have common sense has considerably slowed progress regarding a settlement of the situation in Syria. If they cannot or will not help us with that, they should at least not interfere.In conclusion, I would like to touch briefly on the remarks by my American colleague. Basically, more than half of her statement was about Iran, not Syria, and Syria is the item on our agenda today, after all. I would also like to ask the Americans some questions we have about that. Before they blame Russia or Iran, I would like to ask what the reason is for the presence of United States forces in Syria and what their real objective is. The territories under their control have become grey areas where extremists of various stripes and real terrorists roam freely. In particular, what is going on with the several hundred ISIL followers who are being held by forces loyal to the United States under United States oversight in the region beyond the S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 8/12 18-14999 Euphrates? They are not being investigated, and nor are they being returned to their countries of origin. We are worried that ISIL will re-emerge in those areas when the United States withdraws from them, which it must do sooner or later.In conclusion, I would like to once again assure the Council of Russia's willingness to support any diplomatic efforts that can bring an end to the miseries of the Syrian people and peace to that long-suffering land.Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): I would like to begin by thanking Mr. De Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, for his briefing. I appreciate his tireless efforts to find a political solution to the conflict.In recent weeks various members of the international community have made tremendous efforts to restore momentum in the political process. China welcomes the latest round of Astana talks and its joint communiqué, and salutes Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkey and Iran for their efforts. We hope that this dialogue will continue to play a positive role in helping to maintain a ceasefire in Syria and advance the Geneva negotiations.China has always maintained that a political solution is the only possible option where the issue of Syria is concerned, and that achieving that goal will require efforts on the international, regional and national fronts. First, the international community should continue to give its support to the United Nations, as the main channel for mediation, and to Mr. De Mistura's efforts to relaunch the Geneva negotiations as soon as possible, on a basis of full respect for Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity and with a view to helping the conflicting parties to engage in negotiations on political governance, the Constitution, elections and counter-terrorism. The Council should remain united in moving the Syrian political process forward.Secondly, the countries involved in the region should take the country's long-term interests and stability into consideration and play a constructive role in helping to find a political solution. China notes that there have been attacks on targets inside Syria. We hope that the parties concerned will remain calm, show restraint and work together to maintain regional peace and stability.Thirdly, both the Syrian Government and the opposition, based on concern for the future of their country and the fundamental interests of their people, should proceed to participate in the Geneva negotiations without preconditions, in accordance with the principle of a dialogue that is Syrian-owned and -led, and on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015), with a view to actively engaging in gradual efforts to reach a settlement that is acceptable to all the parties.For its part, China has been working relentlessly to find a solution. On 13 and 14 May, in the first instance of such an event being held on Syria in China, we hosted an international symposium in Shanghai on the prospects for a political settlement to the Syrian issue. It was attended by Xie Xiaoyan, China's Special Envoy for Syria, a representative of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, and the Special Envoys of the United Kingdom and France for Syria, as well as experts and scholars from many countries. Participants held in-depth discussions on the prospects for a solution, the factors bearing on a political settlement and the role of the international community. Our Special Envoy remains in close contact with the parties concerned in his continuing efforts to help reach a solution. Together with the rest of the international community, China stands ready to continue to play a positive and constructive role in finding a political solution to the issue.Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): We thank the Special Envoy for Syria, Mr. De Mistura, for his update, and we were glad to hear some encouraging notes of optimism in his briefing.Despite the numerous problems on the humanitarian and political fronts in Syria, Kazakhstan believes that it is imperative to continue to promote a settlement of the crisis while implementing resolution 2254 (2015). We are glad that at their meetings held on 14 and 15 May in Astana, the representatives of Syria's Government and opposition, along with those of the guarantor States, unanimously confirmed the importance of continuing the process. Among other issues, they addressed the importance of increasing efforts to ensure compliance with the various agreements reached during the previous eight rounds of the Astana talks. On the other hand, they also agreed that Geneva should remain the main international platform from which to seek and implement a political settlement of the Syrian crisis. It will also be important to continue to support the aims of the Astana talks and further Geneva negotiations, while ultimately merging those important platforms with the aim of achieving positive results.16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 9/12 We thank the Special Envoy for his consultations with various Foreign Ministers at the recent summit of the League of Arab States, as well as with Ms. Federica Mogherini, the European Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. His high-level meetings in Moscow, Tehran, Riyadh and Ankara, as well as his consultations with several European ministers and senior representatives of the United States, are also commendable. We are encouraged by his summary today of his meetings and the outcomes of the Astana process, and we note his hopes for progress and his readiness to increase his own efforts and those of several of the principal stakeholders to revive the political process.We can all see that de-confliction and the precautionary measures to safeguard protected sites under humanitarian law are working. So far this year, 500 additional sites have been de-conflicted, as the process is known. Their coordinates have been voluntarily submitted through the United Nations, and today the total number of sites stands at 661.We are hearing a number of continuing questions and concerns about the outlook for Idlib, which should certainly be our top priority, simply because it has such a large population of vulnerable ordinary citizens. We agree with Mr. De Mistura that since Idlib is six times larger than eastern Ghouta, and therefore has six times more civilian residents, it is in an extremely vulnerable position. We cannot afford a war in Idlib and we therefore call on the main stakeholders with an influence on the conflicting parties to hold negotiations at the national and local levels and in the wider region in order to mitigate the potential tensions.We are impressed by the courageous stance of and the sacrifices made by the United Nations, the Red Crescent, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Norwegian Refugee Council, which are serving under the most challenging circumstances.To conclude, we also hope that the Brussels Conference, held on 24 and 25 April, will help to generate conditions conducive to the peaceful resolution of the Syrian crisis.Finally, we emphasize once again that the most important condition for the settlement of the Syrian crisis is a political process, through direct dialogue and the use of confidence-building measures among the parties, without which there can be no lasting results. We should not forget that it is the Syrians themselves who should begin to shape the future political system of the Syrian State, with the necessary legislative reforms, its territorial and administrative structure, and presidential and parliamentary elections, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015).Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We express our gratitude for the briefing that we heard from Mr. Staffan de Mistura, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, to whom we reiterate our support in the discharge of his duties.Once again we cannot but express our sorrow at the fact that this conflict has gone on for six years now and we are still witnessing the ongoing siege and violence suffered by the Syrian people, mainly children, who, in addition to living with the psychological aftermath of the situation, are also in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. We deplore any act of violence that puts human lives at risk and therefore call for an end to the violence and urge the parties to refrain from any hostile, provocative or unilateral actions, in order to prevent any further suffering of the Syrian people and any further destabilization of the region.We welcome the holding of the summit of the three ceasefire guarantors in Ankara, Turkey, in March. We will be focusing closely on the next summit, which will be sponsored by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Likewise, we welcome the recent Astana meeting. We deem its outcome positive, as were the agreements reached one year ago exactly, when the important de-escalation zones were established. We believe that that international initiative has served to reduce the level of violence and has facilitated, and will continue to facilitate, the path to peace and stability in Syria.We therefore call for greater coordination among the local authorities within the de-escalation zones, humanitarian agencies and the Syrian Government, which will make it possible to improve the living conditions of the local population, with a view to contributing to international efforts to end the conflict in Syria.We call once again for efforts to continue with respect to the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), so as to ensure safe, sustained and unhindered humanitarian access to all those who require it. The protection of the civilian population and civilian infrastructure must also be a priority within the S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 10/12 18-14999 framework of respect for international law and international humanitarian law.We deem imperative the voluntary return of internally displaced persons in a safe and dignified manner, as soon as the situation permits. For that to happen, demining will be vital in those areas where it is necessary. We would urge that the political dialogue agenda continue to focus on the release of detainees and abductees, as well as on the identification of missing or deceased persons.We stress the efforts made towards the voluntary return of thousands of people to eastern Ghouta and other cities north and south of Damascus and their subsequent full return. My delegation would draw the attention of the Security Council to the need to protect thousands of innocent civilians, including children and the elderly, and move them to Idlib. It is urgent and pressing that peace be maintained and any escalation of violence avoided in that area, as the aftermath could be tragic.We believe that measures must continue to be taken to reduce the level of violence on the ground, promote confidence among the parties involved, alleviate the humanitarian situation and promote ongoing initiatives aimed at finding a peaceful political solution. The process must take place on the basis of the various initiatives taken and meetings held at different levels. We therefore underscore once again the commitments made at the Syrian National Dialogue Congress, held in Sochi on 30 January, with a focus on strengthening the United Nations-led political process in the framework of the road map set out in resolution 2254 (2015), in particular through the drafting of a new constitution and the establishment of a constitutional committee, which we believe must be representative and impartial. We hope that the work of that committee, in Geneva, should start as soon as possible and should be active and dynamic and include the participation of all parties to the conflict.We welcome the good offices and mediation of the Secretary-General and his close collaboration with the members of the Security Council in the quest for a peaceful solution to the crisis in Syria.To conclude, we reject any attempt to divide or fragment Syria along ethnic lines or to foster sectarianism there. It is the Syrian people themselves who must freely decide their future and their political leadership, in the framework of their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, without any external pressure or interference.We reiterate that the only way to resolve the conflict in Syria is through a Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process that is inclusive and based on consultation and dialogue and that will allow for a peaceful solution to be reached among all the parties involved.Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I had not intended to speak today in the Chamber, but I wanted to respond to some of the things that we have just heard. I will therefore take this opportunity to thank Staffan de Mistura and his team for all their work, which is not proving as fast or as productive as all of us would like, but I think that we are very grateful to Staffan for all his efforts. I was also interested to hear the Chinese account of the work of their envoy.We all know what needs to be done. We have had very many discussions in this Chamber and in the Consultations Room about Syria. I think that what we struggle with is how to get it done and how to take the next step, so I hope that when we leave the Chamber and go next door into closed consultations, we can actually have a proper discussion, without polemics, about what it will take to get the constitutional committee up and running; what are the concrete steps that need to be taken and how we as the Council can best facilitate and support that; and what it takes to get Idlib protected. Lots of speakers today have referred to Idlib; I think that we all know its importance, scale and significance. I would urge those Astana progenitors to do what they can to ensure that on the ground, people in Idlib are safe and that we avert a humanitarian catastrophe there. But I would like to have a proper discussion next door about how the Council can actually support that.I wanted to turn to the issue of the Syrian Government engaging with the United Nations. The Russian representative referred to backsliding from a political settlement and entrenching Syrian unwillingness for a negotiated solution. I think that those two statements are very damning, but they are not damning about us; they are damning about the Syrian regime. We really need all those with influence on Syria, including Russia and Iran, to encourage it to set aside a military strategy as a way to resolve the conflict and to engage with the United Nations across the board, so that we can get back to Geneva and to a political settlement. It is not we in the West who are stopping 16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260 18-14999 11/12 that happening. The onus is truly on Syria to follow the will of the Security Council and its resolutions and to allow the United Nations to do its work to help the people of Syria. Those are the main things I wanted to say, but I would like to touch on three more points as well, if I may.We support what the Special Envoy said about bringing women in, which I think is long overdue, and he can count on the United Kingdom's full support for that. I would also like to refer to Iran and the strikes on Israel from Syrian territory, on which we are in full agreement with the United States representative's comments and have been very vocal about in public. I also want to comment on the Russian representative's remarks about the air strikes. I will not rehearse why France, the United States and the United Kingdom took the action we did, except to say that we did it to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, and in doing so we helped to protect civilians on the ground, deterred and degraded Syria's ability to use chemical weapons and thereby upheld the global prohibition on weapons of mass destruction.While I think those things remain very important, they should not be used by anyone on the Council as a reason to let the Syrian Government off the hook where engaging with the United Nations on the political process is concerned. The political process has been essential since 2012, when the Geneva talks were started. It has been increasingly essential since then, and it continues to be essential now. I therefore hope that when we go next door we can have a very detailed discussion about how we as the Council can get back to the spirit of Sweden and actually help Staffan de Mistura and his team do something concrete to achieve that, and have no more mud-slinging.The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting.I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.Mr. Mounzer (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): To begin with, the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom have tried to promote false claims justifying their aggression against sovereign States, particularly my country, Syria, with the aim of concealing their direct involvement in terrorism and their part in the responsibility for the bloodshed in Syria. I would like to say to them that the testimony, as cited in the media, of the thousands of Syrians who have escaped the blockades of armed terrorist groups in eastern Ghouta, has proved that those countries have been involved in making those citizens suffer through their support of those terrorist groups. Through their positions, their malicious acts and their illegal occupation of various areas of Syria, they have shown that, contrary to their claims, they cannot let go of their history of greed, occupation and imperialism. When speaking in the Council, they claim falsely that they are trying to find a political solution to the situation in Syria, but let me point out, briefly, that we have been able to defeat their agenda in Aleppo and eastern Ghouta, and we will be able to ensure that they cannot win in any part of my country.For the past seven years, since the beginning of the terrorist war in Syria, the United States, Britain and France have been working relentlessly to support and help conduct that war. They have also used the United Nations as a political tool to put pressure on the Syrian Government to implement their hegemonic agenda, interfere in our internal affairs and destabilize my country. They have not used the United Nations to fight terrorism and its sponsors or to help Syria overcome the suffering inflicted on it by armed terrorist groups, which should have been the goal.The Special Envoy devoted part of his statement to discussing the humanitarian situation. In that regard, I want to reiterate that the Syrian Government gives priority to providing every kind of humanitarian assistance to all Syrians in need, wherever they are in Syria. That is our duty, and we are doing our duty. The legal and constitutional obligations established under international decisions and Security Council resolutions on combating terrorism obliged my Government to undertake military operations in eastern Ghouta in order to rescue civilians from the armed terrorist groups holding them hostage and using them for years as human shields. In that regard, I want to state that contrary to some false narratives, the successful military operations conducted by the Syrian Arab Army and its allies against the armed terrorist groups controlling a number of areas that the United Nations has classified as besieged or hard to reach — along with the settlement and reconciliation agreements — have all mitigated civilians' suffering, reduced the numbers of those areas and facilitated humanitarian access to them, including eastern Ghouta.S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018 12/12 18-14999 We deplore the fact that the United States speaks of its eagerness to reach a political agreement while it has been committing acts of aggression against my country based on lies, simply because it is working to give support to the armed groups because they have suffered losses in eastern Ghouta. It was the United States that supported Israel's aggression on 9 May when Israel was unable to protect its own proxy terrorist groups and implement its conspiracy against my country's unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Israel has continued its dangerous acts of aggression, which would not have been possible without the continuing unstinting support of the United States Government, because it enjoys impunity as a result of the support it has from the United States in the Security Council, enabling Israel to continue its terrorist acts threatening international peace and security in the region and the world. The Syrian Arab Republic reaffirms that through its military and armed forces it is able and ready to fend off all acts of aggression against its sovereignty and independence. However, we want to reiterate that any attempts to support this failing terrorism will not work. Such flagrant violations will not present obstacles to us in combating terrorism throughout Syrian territory.Yesterday we concluded round nine of the Astana process, and we are pleased with the results. We thank the delegations of Russia, Iran and the host country, Kazakhstan, for making the Astana process a success with regard to combating terrorism. The outcome document of the meeting stresses the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic against any external entities that attempt to violate them.In cooperation with our friends and allies, the Syrian army has succeeded in liberating eastern Ghouta and the southern area of Damascus, making the capital and its surrounding areas safe. With the cooperation of our friends and brothers, we have also expelled the terrorists from the northern area of Homs and the southern area of Hama. Today we reaffirm that we will continue to fight terrorism and to work to liberate each and every part of our territory from terrorism and from countries that seek to undermine our sovereignty.In conclusion, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic will spare no effort to support all genuine efforts to arrive at a political solution whereby Syrians, and only Syrians, will decide their future and make choices aimed at safeguarding Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity.The President: The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor to make a further statement.Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I just wanted to comment on the Syrian representative's last statement, in which he said that the Syrian Arab Republic will spare no effort to arrive at a political solution. That is obviously a welcome statement. I would like to ask him if he could tell the Council, or is willing to say today, that Syria will put the same amount of effort into engaging with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria and with the Council in order to take concrete steps to get the Geneva process to work and to get a constitutional committee off the ground. If Syria were able to make that commitment today in the Chamber, I believe that would unlock a lot of things for the Council.The President: The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic has asked for the floor to make a further statement. I now give him the floor.Mr. Mounzer (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): We have said time and again that we are working with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria. A delegation from the Syrian Arab Republic is working directly with him. We are eager, as we have said repeatedly, to find a peaceful, Syrian-led solution to the Syrian crisis.The President: There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.

Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation? Wilsonian ideals influenced the AEF's actions in the First World War because most American leaders and soldiers shared Wilson's concepts of Progressivism and believed that the United States should play a role in saving Europe. Even if some did not agree with Wilson's politics, most doughboys shared his ideas of American Exceptionalism, and these views affected United States involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. In merging the two topic areas of Wilson's ideologies and AEF involvement in the war, this essay will attempt to answer how the American doughboy found motivation in the same principles that guided President Wilson. ; Master of Arts in Military History ; Week 11 Final Paper Wilsonianism in the First World War: Progressivism, American Exceptionalism, and the AEF Doughboy Brian P. Bailes A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Military History Norwich University MH 562B Dr. John Broom August 16, 2020 Bailes 2 While the duration of American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) involvement in First World War combat operations remained short compared to the armies of the European powers, the experience had a lasting impact on the United States' status as a global power. President Woodrow Wilson's mediation in the European affair throughout American neutrality, his integration of the AEF into Allied operations, and his contribution to the post-war peace process cast him as a central figure of the conflict as well as a harbinger of United States interventionist foreign policy. Through the more than a century since the end of the war, historians have analyzed and debated various facets of United States belligerency. Historians have explored President Wilson's ideologies and the decision making that ultimately led to him making his April 1917 appeal to Congress for American belligerency. Additionally, historians have expanded on AEF actions in Europe and argued how General Pershing's adamancy on maintaining an independent American command created tension with the Allied leaders. Historians have not connected these two topics to analyze how a reader can conceptually link Wilson's ideas and doughboy exploits in Europe. Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation? Throughout the historiography of United States involvement in the First World War, specific themes reoccur as significant areas of consensus. The historiography presents two primary arguments in which historians agree. Historians agree that Wilson's peace objectives drastically differed from those of the Allies, and historians agree that these differences motivated Wilson's decisions regarding how the United States would enter the war. Historians also agree that friction existed between General Pershing and the Allied Commanders once the AEF arrived in Europe and began combat operations. These two commonalities in the historiography remain Bailes 3 relatively constant throughout the past 50 years of historical research, and even when portraying more positive sentiments expressed between AEF and Allied soldiers, historians still note some tension between Pershing and the Allied commanders. Historians agree that Wilson's peace objectives differed significantly from those of the Allies. David Woodford argues that the gap between British imperial interests and Wilson's peace objectives affected the alliance between the United States and England throughout the war.1 William Widenor argues that Wilson failed in achieving his goals during the Versailles Peace Settlement because he attempted to make too many concessions for enduring peace, and he claims that Wilson grew at odds with the Allied leaders at the peace conference.2 George Egerton argues that British policymakers were closely monitoring the dispute within the United States Senate during the Treaty of Versailles conference, and he suggests that British leadership remained skeptical of Wilson's League of Nations.3 Historians capture Wilson's opposing peace aims throughout the European conflict, and they seemingly agree on how these aims influenced Wilson's policies and actions. Some historians cite the most significant gap in peace aims as existing between the United States and France. David Stevenson argues that French leaders were continually at odds with Wilson throughout the war as the French war aims focused much more on their national security, which they saw as requiring the destruction of Imperial Germany.4 Stevenson points out that while Wilson's peace aims differed from England as well as France, many French objectives 1 David R. Woodward, Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917-1918 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1993), 7-25, 35-43, 77-80, 125-9, 208-20. 2 William C. Widenor, "The United States and the Versailles Peace Settlement," Modern American Diplomacy, eds. John M. Carroll and George C. Herring (Lanham: SR Books, 1996), 46-59. 3 George W. Egerton, "Britain and the 'Great Betrayal': Anglo-American Relations and the Struggle for United States Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919-1920," The Historical Journal 21, no. 4 (December 1978): 885-911, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638973. 4 David Stevenson, "French War Aims and the American Challenge, 1914-1918," The Historical Journal 22, no. 4 (December 1979): 877-894, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638691. Bailes 4 were more aggressive against Germany as they involved reclaiming land lost to Germany in previous wars, specifically the 1870 Franco-Prussian War.5 Stevenson highlights the fact that Wilson could not get French officials to see the "two Germanys" concept that prevailed in American thinking at the time. While the American public generally saw two Germanys – the autocratic ruling party dominated by the Prussian elite and the German people living under that oppressive regime – Stevenson argues that France only saw Imperial Germany as a total enemy.6 Robert Bruce explains that during the post-war occupation period, the American doughboys perceived Frenchmen as distrustful and hateful toward German soldiers, and this sullied the alliance between France and the United States.7 In line with Wilson's ideology, historians cite Wilson's desire for Europe to achieve a "peace without victory" as he attempted to serve as a mediator during the United States period of neutrality. These historians ultimately conclude that Wilson believed any of the European powers achieving their aims through victory would lead to a continuation of balance of power politics in Europe. They argue that Wilson thought merely putting an end to the fighting would be the only way to achieve lasting peace. Ross Gregory argues that Wilson acted as a persistent mediator throughout the war as he strove for a "peace without victory."8 Arthur Link explains that Wilson believed a "peace without victory" and a "draw in Europe" proved the best solution for establishing a new system to replace the broken power structure in Europe.9 Ross Kennedy portrays Wilson as advocating the United States as a neutral mediator striving for a "peace 5 Stevenson, 884, 892-4. 6 Stevenson, 885. 7 Robert B. Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms: America & France in the Great War (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2003), 286-95. 8 Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1971), 115-6. 9 Arthur Link, "Entry into World War I," Progress, War, and Reaction: 1900-1933, eds. Davis R.B. Ross, Alden T. Vaughan, and John B. Duff (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1970), 141. Bailes 5 without victory" before the U.S. entered the war, then as an advocate of "just peace" after they entered the war.10 Kennedy argues that Wilson blamed the international system that led to power politics and wanted to have a separate voice in the peace process to shape a new diplomatic and global political order.11 Historians point to Wilson's ideology as a reason for his differing peace objectives, and historians point to Wilson's Christian faith as a significant motivation for his progressive philosophy. Lloyd Ambrosius highlights Wilson's four tenets of national self-determination, open-door economic globalization, collective security, and progressive history as the framework in which he envisioned a global order shaped by American democratic ideals that would bring the world to peace.12 Ambrosius examines Wilson's embrace of "American Exceptionalism" and looks at how his Anglo-American bias clouded his vision and prevented him from seeing the various cultural factors throughout the world.13 Ronald Pestritto examines Wilson's progressive form of history while arguing that Wilson saw democracy emerging within society as a phenomenon only natural to specific groups of people, and he only saw a few civilizations as "progressed."14 Pestritto notes Wilson's Christian inspiration, referencing early manuscripts written by Wilson titled "Christ's Army" and "Christian Progress."15 William Appleman Williams argues that Wilson maintained a Calvinist idealism that intensified the existing doctrine 10 Ross A. Kennedy, "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American National Security," Diplomatic History 25, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 15, 29, https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00247. 11 Kennedy, "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American National Security," 2-3. 12 Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 2-47. 13 Ambrosius, Wilsonianism, 125-34; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 33-49; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, "World War I and the Paradox of Wilsonianism," The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 17 (2018): 5-22, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537781417000548. 14 Ronald J. Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 6-61. 15 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 23, 40. Bailes 6 based on God's supposed ordination of American influence and expansion in the world.16 Richard Gamble explains that Wilson's vision and rhetoric nested with many of the Christian messages of progressive religious leaders in the United States during the First World War who saw the war as a Christian crusade to spread American ideals.17 Historians seem in unanimous agreement that Wilson's separate peace aims formed the primary impetus for him seeking an independent American presence in the war effort. David Esposito argues that Wilson wanted to have an American presence in the war because he realized that to establish a dominant American voice in the post-war peace talks, the United States needed to make a significant contribution to Allied victory.18 Edward Coffman details the United States' experiences in the First World War by explaining Wilson's desire to gain an independent voice in the peace process.19 David Trask maintains that Wilson wanted to "remain somewhat detached from the Allies" in defeating Imperial Germany to provide Wilson leverage so that he could directly influence the post-war peace process.20 Arthur Link explains that Wilson did see the benefit of not joining the Entente but keeping the United States independent of "any political commitments" with the Allies as providing a chance to ensure an American presence at the peace conference.21 Thomas Knock argues that Wilson faulted the "balance of power" politics of Europe and saw the United States as the actor to save Europe and create a new system of 16 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1959; New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), 67-112. Page references are to the 2009 edition. 17 Richard M. Gamble, The War for Righteousness: Progressive Christianity, the Great War, and the Rise of the Messianic Nation (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2003), 22-3, 86-208, 254-5. 18 David M. Esposito, "Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the AEF," Presidential Studies Quarterly 19 no. 1 (Winter 1989): 127-38, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40574570. 19 Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1968), 5-8. 20 David F. Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918 (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1993), 2-6. 21 Link, "Entry into World War I," 141. Bailes 7 diplomacy.22 Overall, historians agree that President Wilson desired very different peace outcomes for a post-war Europe, and this influenced him as he made decisions regarding United States actions throughout the war. In addition to the agreement that Wilson's peace aims differed from the Allies, historians also agree that once the United States did enter the war and the AEF arrived in Europe, friction quickly developed between General Pershing and the Allied commanders. David Trask argues many instances of "increasing friction" existed between Pershing and the French and British command. Trask includes a case where the Allies "attempted to bypass Pershing" by working directly with Wilson even though Wilson had appointed Pershing as Commander in Chief of the AEF.23 Trask argues that Pershing believed that the preceding few years of trench warfare had "deprived the French and even the British of offensive spirit," and he maintains that with Pershing's "open warfare" tactics, his methods of training drastically differed from the Allies.24 Michael Adas cites disagreement between Pershing and the Allied commanders immediately after Pershing arrived in France due to Pershing's unwillingness to listen to the experienced French and British leaders as they tried to suggest ways to employ the AEF.25 Adas argues that Pershing's desire to pursue "open warfare" did not take into account the realities of trench warfare and resulted in costly casualties.26 Russell Weigley cites frequent tensions between Pershing and the Allied commanders, including an example in September of 1918 in which AEF 22 Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest For a New World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 30-69. 23 Trask, AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 38-9. 24 Trask, AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 19. 25 Michael Adas, "Ambivalent Ally: American Military Intervention and the Endgame and Legacy of World War I," Diplomatic History 38 no. 4 (September 2014): 705-7, http://doi.org/10.1093/dh.dhu032. 26 Adas, "Ambivalent Ally," 710. Bailes 8 "traffic congestion" caused a significant disturbance in a visit from Georges Clemenceau.27 Weigley explains that Pershing's belief in "open warfare" would not work due to the enormous American divisions built for the trenches, arguing that Pershing would need "smaller, maneuverable divisions" if he wanted his open warfare to work.28 All historians agree that the issue of AEF amalgamation with the French and British forces served as the primary reason for the friction between the military leaders. David Woodford cites the notion that AEF amalgamation would "undermin[e] the significance of the American military role." Hence, Pershing remained adamant in his stance not to let the Allies use American soldiers to fight under French or British flags.29 Woodward notes that Pershing felt his AEF superior to the Allies as he "believed that the Americans had almost nothing to learn from French and British officers."30 Woodford explains that war aims and peace objectives formed the basis of a fractured Anglo-American relationship that finally crumbled during the peace conference.31 Mitchell Yockelson argues that despite tension between Pershing and the Allied leaders regarding the question of amalgamation, the 27th and 30th Divisions contributed significantly to the Allied effort under British command. Yockelson highlights a fascinating illustration of Pershing's stubbornness in noting that Pershing did not follow the exploits of these divisions even though they proved instrumental in the offensive against the Hindenburg Line.32 As an enduring theme throughout the amalgamation debate, historians point to Pershing's desire for the United States to deliver the decisive blow against Germany with an independent 27 Russell F. Weigley, "Strategy and Total War in the United States: Pershing and the American Military Tradition," Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, eds. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 333. 28 Weigley, "Pershing and the American Military Tradition," 341-2. 29 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 57-8. 30 Woodward, 88. 31 Woodward, 7-80, 112-220. 32 Mitchell A. Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers: Americans Under British Command, 1918 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 92-228. Bailes 9 American army. Allan Millett argues that Wilson gave Pershing the explicit directive to keep the AEF separate from the Allies and allowed Pershing the freedom to make decisions on how to integrate the AEF.33 Millett cites Pershing's initial plan to use an AEF offensive on Metz as the critical blow that would decide the war and establish an American contribution to defeating Imperial Germany. Pershing would not have his AEF ready to carry out this offensive until 1919, and his stubbornness in dealing with the requests for amalgamation in the interim "frustrated the Allies."34 Bullitt Lowry narrates Pershing's attempt to shape the post-war peace terms by arguing that Pershing wanted to force Germany into an "unconditional surrender." While Lowry concludes that Pershing's effort to influence the political realm failed, he believed that the only way to "guarantee victory" would be to crush Germany in battle.35 David Woodward argues that Pershing believed that the AEF would decide the war by becoming "the dominant role in the war against Germany."36 Woodward cites Pershing's ideas regarding "the aggressive American rifleman, whose tradition of marksmanship and frontier warfare" could rid the Western Front of trench warfare and execute a great offensive against Germany.37 Historians cite the notion throughout the ranks of the AEF that the United States should remain independent from the Allies, and historians point to the fact that many doughboys saw themselves as superior soldiers to the Allies. Robert H. Zieger argues that "virtually the entire military establishment" agreed with Pershing's desire to have an independent American 33 Allan R. Millett, "Over Where? The AEF and the American Strategy for Victory, 1917-1918," Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present, eds. Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts (Westport: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1986), 237. 34 Millett, "Over Where?," 239. 35 Bullitt Lowry, "Pershing and the Armistice," The Journal of American History 55 no. 2, (September 1968): 281-291, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1899558. 36 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 81. 37 Woodward, 89, 207. Bailes 10 command.38 Still, Zieger does note that this separate American command relied heavily on the Allies for logistics support, and the AEF "misunderstood the military dynamics of the Western Front."39 Richard Faulkner argues that Pershing's doctrine rested on his belief that the "superior American rifle marksmanship, aggressiveness, and skilled maneuvering" could win the fight for the Allies.40 Faulkner argues that American soldiers saw themselves as intervening in the war effort to help the failing French and British, taunting their British partners by claiming AEF stands for "After England Failed." He devotes a chapter named as such to explain the AEF belief in the superiority of the American fighting man.41 Harold Winton argues that Pershing believed that the United States soldier was superior to his European counterpart.42 Jennifer Keene argues that issues such as the treatment of African-American soldiers and disagreements about which nation contributed the most to the Allied victory created rifts between the two allies.43 In her full text, Keene narrates AEF interactions with their French Allies, and she claims that doughboys saw themselves as superior fighters who could help turn the tide of war.44 Michael Neiberg explains that United States citizens and soldiers came away from the conflict with the belief in the "inherent superiority" of the American system over that of Europe.45 38 Robert H. Zieger, America's Great War: World War I and the American Experience (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 92-102. 39 Zieger, America's Great War, 96. 40 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders: The American Soldier in World War I (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017), 285. 41 Faulkner, 281-304. 42 Harold Winton, "Toward an American Philosophy of Command," The Journal of Military History 64, no. 4 (October 2000): 1059, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2677266. 43 Jennifer D. Keene, "Uneasy Alliances: French Military Intelligence and the American Army During the First World War," Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (January 2008): 18-36, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432461. 44 Jennifer D. Keene, Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 105-11. 45 Michael S. Neiberg, The Path to War: How The First World War Created Modern America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 23. Bailes 11 Even when historians convey a more positive relationship between the AEF and their Allied counterparts, they still address the tension between Pershing and Allied leadership. Robert Bruce portrays a much more positive partnership between the doughboy and his French ally. Bruce documents Marshal Joseph Joffre's visit to the United States after Congress declared war against Germany to muster American support for the French. By comparing France's visit to Britain's, Bruce argues that Joffre established the framework for an intimate Franco-American partnership.46 Bruce maintains that the French respected the American soldier and viewed the entry of the AEF into the war as the saving grace of the Allies. Bruce narrates a bond between doughboys and French troops that increased as they trained and fought together.47 Despite this positive portrayal by Bruce of the French and AEF bond, Bruce still highlights the tension in Pershing's interactions with French commanders as well as noting the general perception amongst French commanders that Pershing thought "he knew everything there was to know about modern warfare."48 Bruce adds that different peace aims and post-war sentiments towards Germany created disagreements amongst American and French soldiers that fractured the relationship built during the war.49 Of note, Bruce suggests that the doughboys harbored what they saw as a "perceived lack of aggressiveness in the French."50 After synthesizing the historiography, the question remains regarding how these two arguments can be linked. Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale 46 Robert B. Bruce, "America Embraces France: Marshal Joseph Joffre and the French Mission to the United States, April-May 1917," Journal of Military History 66 no. 2 (April 2002): 407-441, http://doi.org/10.2307/3093066; Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 32-59. 47 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 86-121. 48 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 128, 143. 49 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 286-95. 50 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 122. Bailes 12 coalition operation? Wilsonian ideals influenced the AEF's actions in the First World War because most American leaders and soldiers shared Wilson's concepts of Progressivism and believed that the United States should play a role in saving Europe. Even if some did not agree with Wilson's politics, most doughboys shared his ideas of American Exceptionalism, and these views affected United States involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. In merging the two topic areas of Wilson's ideologies and AEF involvement in the war, this essay will attempt to answer how the American doughboy found motivation in the same principles that guided President Wilson. Perhaps a reader will identify that the AEF demonstrated trends in Europe that highlight an "American way of war" that still resonates in United States coalition operations today. When President Wilson brought the United States into the First World War in April of 1917, he sold it as an effort to make the world safe for democracy. In Wilson's war address to Congress, Wilson called Imperial Germany's resumption of their unrestricted submarine campaign "warfare against mankind."51 Wilson maintained that Imperial Germany had given the United States no other choice but to declare war when they resumed their submarine attacks on merchant ships in the early spring of 1917. Still, Wilson furthered his justification for war by appealing to the broader ideal of fighting to defeat the Imperial German autocracy. Wilson described the "selfish and autocratic power" against which a free people needed to wage war.52 Later in his address, Wilson stated that he found hope in what he saw as the restoration of power to the people demonstrated in the Russian Revolution. Wilson saw a pre-Lenin revolution as 51 Woodrow Wilson, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress Calling for a Declaration of War" in "President Wilson," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, ed. Mario R. DiNunzio (New York: NYU Press, 2006): 399, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.15. 52 Wilson, "Declaration of War," 400. Bailes 13 bringing democracy to the people of Russia, and it opened the door for the realization that the Allies fought because "the world must be made safe for democracy."53 Arthur Link comments on Wilson's initial optimism on hearing of the Russian Revolution overthrowing Czar rule.54 While the Russian Revolution took a different turn in the following years, the initial news of the Russian people revolting against the Czar gave Wilson confidence that democracy could spread in Europe since now the Allies truly represented a democratic system. Wilson had spent the first years of the war trying to mediate peace in Europe through United States neutrality, and he tried to negotiate an end to the fighting without a victory for any of the imperial belligerents. Wilson did not see a lasting peace coming to Europe if any of the imperial powers achieved their peace objectives, so he attempted to mediate a truce. Kendrick Clements narrates how Wilson's desire to keep the United States neutral grew at odds with his economic support for the Allies. War for the United States rose to be more likely as Imperial Germany became increasingly aggravated with the United States for supplying aid to France and Britain while professing neutrality.55 Fraser Harbutt argues that at the initial outbreak of war in Europe, leaders as well as citizens of the United States concerned themselves with the economic impacts of the war primarily, and the United States benefited economically by supporting the Allies, specifically in the steel trade.56 Imperial Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, as well as the capture of Germany's Zimmerman Telegram in January 1917, soliciting an alliance with Mexico, prompted Wilson to support waging war on Imperial Germany. Now American entry into the conflict presented Wilson with some new options for shaping the post- 53 Wilson, "Declaration of War," 401-2. 54 Link, "Entry into World War I," 122-3. 55 Kendrick A. Clements, "Woodrow Wilson and World War I," Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 1 (March 2004: 62-82, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27552564. 56 Fraser J. Harbutt, "War, Peace, and Commerce: The American Reaction to the Outbreak of World War I in Europe 1914," An Improbable War? The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture Before 1914, eds. Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 320-1. Bailes 14 war world. Thomas Knock describes how even though the United States entry into the war meant the essential failure of Wilson's "Peace Without Victory," the international community had seemingly bought into Wilson's concept of "collective security."57 In the previous few years of American neutrality, Wilson had advocated for creating a collection of democratic nation-states to band together to prevent war, and by 1917 the international community seemed interested. Wilson would use American belligerency to shape his new world order for peace. Russia's withdrawal from the war in March of 1918 made the need for a United States presence all the more significant for the Allies. The American soldier would be a crusader of sorts, attempting to cure Europe of the diplomacy of old that had brought her to destruction. The European July crisis of 1914 that erupted in a full-scale war the following month proved to be the culmination of decades of the European balance of power diplomacy that led to rival alliances and an armament race between the feuding dynasties.58 European power politics had dominated the continent for centuries, which inevitably escalated into a world war, and the United States soldier would have the opportunity to save the nations from which most of their ancestors had descended. Michael Neiberg argues that by 1917, the American people felt an obligation to enter the war to save Europe. While the people of the United States supported neutrality initially, Neiberg explains that public opinion swayed over time toward a desire to save Europe from the terror of Imperial Germany.59 The United States Secretary of War from 1916-1921, Newton Baker, published a text almost two decades after the armistice in which he maintained that the United States went to war to stop Imperial Germany and make the world safe for democracy. Baker took issue with the 57 Knock, To End All Wars, 115. 58 James Joll and Gordon Martel, The Origins of the First World War, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 9-291. 59 Neiberg, The Path to War, 7-8, 31-3, 235. Bailes 15 historians of the 20s and 30s who claimed that economic interest influenced the United States entry into the war, and he argued they ignored the necessity of U.S. involvement to stop Germany. Baker explained that the American public remained overwhelmingly critical of the German autocracy and desired to intervene to save the European people.60 Private Alexander Clay of the AEF's 33rd Division demonstrated this sense of duty as he wrote regarding his 1918 deployment to France. As Clay's ship passed the Statue of Liberty while leaving the New York harbor, he thought to himself of the French leader Lafayette's role in securing United States victory during the American Revolution. He wrote that the AEF went to France to "repay the debt of our gratitude to your country for your country's alliance with our country in obtaining liberty from an oppressor England."61 For the United States to effectively reshape the world, there needed to be an independent American command that would ensure the United States contributed to the victory over Imperial Germany, which would give Wilson his seat at the post-war peace talks. In a January 22, 1917 address to the Senate in which he articulated his vision for peace in Europe, Wilson claimed that the warring European nations could not shape a lasting peace. While Wilson still did not advocate for United States intervention at this point, he did state that to achieve peace "[i]t will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or withstand it."62 In this speech, Wilson advocated for a "peace without victory" because he did not envision a peaceful 60 Newton D. Baker, Why We Went to War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1936), 4-10, 20, 160-3. 61 Private Alexander Clay in American Voices of World War I: Primary Source Documents, 1917-1920, ed. Martic Marix Evans (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2001; New York: Routledge, 2013), 19, Kindle. 62 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe" in "President Wilson," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, 393. Bailes 16 outcome if any of the imperial powers achieved victorious peace terms.63 Wilson reiterated his stance that the United States should play a decisive role in shaping post-war Europe and ensuring that "American principles" guided the rest of the world.64 When the United States declared war against Imperial Germany a few months after this speech, it essentially put Wilson's vision into motion. Diplomatic historian William Widenor argues that Wilson realized that the United States needed to participate in the war "rather than as an onlooker" to achieve his visions for peace.65 Widenor notes Wilson's desire for the United States to enter the war as an "associate" to the Entente as opposed to an "ally," and Widenor maintains that Wilson desired to change the world and "democratize and also, unfortunately, to Americanize it."66 The late international historian Elisabeth Glaser captures the Wilson administration's balancing between maintaining an economic relationship with the Entente powers while attempting to remain "an independent arbiter in the conflict."67 Wilson appointed General Pershing to lead the American effort, and Wilson gave him the simple instruction to keep the American Expeditionary Forces as a command separate from the Allies. In 1928, the Army War College published The Genesis of the American First Army, which documented the details surrounding how the War Department created an independent army of the United States. The text includes a caption from Secretary of War Baker's memorandum to Pershing. Baker informed Pershing of Wilson's order to "cooperate with the forces of the other countries employed against the enemy; but in so doing the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate and distinct component of 63 Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 394. 64 Wilson, 396-7. 65 William C. Widenor, "The United States and the Versailles Peace Settlement," 42. 66 Widenor, 42-3. 67 Elisabeth Glaser, "Better Late than Never: The American Economic War Effort, 1917-1918," Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, eds. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 390. Bailes 17 the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved."68 The President did give Pershing the authority to decide how the AEF would integrate into Allied operations. Upon Pershing's June 13, 1917 arrival in Paris, he began making decisions regarding AEF employment as it pertained to logistics, training, and an initial American area of operations on the Western Front. With a plan of achieving a force of 1,328,448 men in France by the end of 1918, Pershing needed to ensure his troops were able to build combat power and prepare for war while simultaneously ensuring that he maintained a distinct American command.69 The following 17 months of conflict with American boots on the ground in Europe saw significant political and diplomatic friction between Pershing and the Allied commanders. Pershing attempted to keep his AEF intact while satisfying Allied requests for American soldiers to replace French and British casualties, especially when Germany launched their Spring 1918 offensives. Pershing described in his memoirs that the French and British requested American soldiers to fill their gaps on the front lines when they had each sent diplomatic missions to America shortly after the United States entered the war. Pershing maintained his adamancy against the United States "becoming a recruiting agency for either the French or British," and he recounted that the War Department retained his position as well.70 While Allied leaders ostensibly supported having an independent American army participate in the war effort, the need to replace casualties in the trenches proved to be their immediate concern. Russia withdrawing from the conflict allowed Germany to reinforce their strength on the Western Front and mount a series of offensives. Germany knew they had a limited window of time for victory 68 Army War College (U.S.) Historical Section, The Genesis of the American First Army (Army War College, 1928), Reprints from the collection of the University of Michigan Library (Coppell, TX, 2020), 2. 69 The Genesis of the American First Army, 2-9. 70 John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 1 (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1931), 30-3. Bailes 18 with the United States continuing to build combat power, so they surged in the early months of 1918. Pershing faced a strategic dilemma of trying to support the Allies and get his troops in the fight while simultaneously attempting to build an independent American army. Ultimately, Pershing gave the Allies some of his army divisions as much needed replacements, and he made an effort to ensure that these divisions remained as intact as possible. Pershing endeavored to organize these divisions under a U.S. corps level command, but this corps command proved mostly administrative rather than tactical.71 By the time Pershing activated his independent American First Army, it only spent a few months in combat. The temporarily amalgamated doughboys Pershing gave to the Allies to meet their requests had contributed more to the defeat of Imperial Germany than Pershing's independent army. Mostly because Pershing had interspersed his divisions throughout the French and British fronts to meet the Allied requests for replacements, the American First Army did not activate until August of 1918. The September 20-25 Meuse-Argonne offensive would be the first significant operation for Pershing's independent army.72 David Trask concludes his critique of Pershing by recognizing the contribution that the American soldier played in providing manpower to the Allies. Trask commends the bravery of the American doughboy, but he argues that the amalgamated U.S. divisions contributed more to victory than the American First Army.73 In a similar vein, Mitchell Yockelson contends that the 27th and 30th Divisions who remained under British command throughout the war benefited over the rest of the AEF from extensive training led by the experienced British troops, and they contributed significantly to the Allied 71 The Genesis of the American First Army, 9-46. 72 John J. Pershing, Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing: Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), 37-8; The Genesis of the American First Army, 45-58. 73 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 174-7. Bailes 19 victory.74 Pershing detailed his plans to capitalize on the initiative gained with his Meuse-Argonne offensive to deliver his decisive blow against Germany. The November 11 armistice came before he could achieve his grand vision.75 While the American doughboy played a critical role in providing an Allied victory over Imperial Germany, Pershing never realized his concept of an independent American command autonomously crushing the German army. The American soldier contributed most significantly to the Allied victory by taking part in offensives planned and conducted under the control of French and British Generals. Understanding American motivation during the war effort requires understanding the Progressive Movement taking place in the early-twentieth-century United States. Michael McGerr writes a detailed account of the cause and effect of the Progressive Movement. McGerr describes the wealth disparity brought about by Victorian society and the Gilded Age, and the class conflict emerging from this gave birth to a social and political movement that attempted to enact massive change in the American system.76 McGerr claims that the Progressive Movement attempted such major reform that no social or political action since has tried "anything as ambitious" due to the adverse reactions of such massive change.77 The Progressive Movement engulfed American society and brought about changes in family structures, race relations, and governmental powers. Herbert Croly illustrated the drive for monumental change rooted in the Progressive Movement with his text Progressive Democracy. In his narrative, Croly advocated for a complete overhaul of the American system to achieve freedom and alleviate wealth disparity. Croly saw governmental reform as the method for spreading democracy to all 74 Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers, 213-23. 75 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 2, 355-87. 76 McGerr, A Fierce Discontent, 3-146. 77 McGerr, 315-9. Bailes 20 citizens.78 In describing American public opinion during the time of United States entry into World War I, David Kennedy argues that for those Americans who championed progressive ideals, "the war's opportunities were not to be pursued in the kingdom of commerce but in the realm of the spirit."79 While the United States maintained a formidable economic link with the Allies throughout American neutrality, Wilson appealed to American ideals to garner public support for the war. United States entry into the war did not come as the natural development of the Progressive Movement. Still, the American public's reason for supporting the war certainly borrowed progressive sentiments. Wilson championed progressive initiatives that had ingrained themselves in the national mood of early-twentieth-century America. Wilson ran for President in 1912 on the principles he codified the following year in his text The New Freedom. Wilson argued that the Jefferson era of United States democracy had long ended. Wilson maintained that because of the new complexities found in American society, a "reconstruction in the United States" needed to occur to achieve real economic and social freedom.80 Ronald Pestritto articulates Wilson's vision for a governmental system as it relates to a society's history and progress. According to Wilson, the method of government that works for people depends on how far that population has progressed. In that manner, the government should always change to reflect the progression of its people best.81 Pestritto argues that a major theme found in Wilson's 1908 text Constitutional Government in the United States rests in the idea that: [T]here are four stages through which all governments pass: (1) government is the master and people are its subjects; (2) government remains the master, not through 78 Herbert Croly, Progressive Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1914; New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers; Second printing 2006), 25, 103-18. 79 David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 39. 80 Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom: A Call for the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People (New York and Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1913), www.philosophical.space/303/Wilson.pdf. 81 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 34-42. Bailes 21 force but by its fitness to lead; (3) a stage of agitation, when leaders of the people rise up to challenge the government for power; and (4) the final stage, where the people become fully self-conscious and have leaders of their own choosing.82 Wilson epitomized the Progressive Movement's ideals regarding the government adapting to the changes of the people to create a more representative system of government. He would appeal to these principles in advocating for United States intervention in Europe. An underlying sentiment existed within the Progressive Movement that sought to bring about massive change, and this energy extended into the war effort. Lloyd Ambrosius explains the rise of the United States as an imperial power during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. The outcome of the American Civil War created a more powerful central government, and economic growth during the following decades allowed more opportunity for global expansion.83 As the United States extended its global presence, the ideals that formed the nation began to influence foreign policy. David Kennedy writes about the shift in prominent progressives toward support of the war effort. Kennedy references John Dewey as a significant advocate for utilizing the war to satisfy progressive initiatives. According to Kennedy, progressives found appeal in Wilson's reasons for American belligerency in Europe as "a war for democracy, a war to end war, a war to protect liberalism, a war against militarism, a war to redeem barbarous Europe, a crusade."84 Michael McGerr states that the First World War "brought the extraordinary culmination of the Progressive Movement."85 Regardless of the typical progressive view of war, progressives could find merit in Wilson's justification for United States involvement. 82 Pestritto, 37. 83 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 26-32. 84 Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society, 50-3. 85 McGerr, A Fierce Discontent, 280. Bailes 22 Even though a vast segment of the United States population did not support going to war in Europe, the notion of saving Europe still permeated throughout American society. In a series of essays published in the July 1917 edition of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, multiple thinkers of the time expressed the necessity of the United States entering the war to save Europe. Miles Dawson argued the importance of the United States' mission in the war by documenting the five "fundamentals" that made the United States unique, and he explained the importance of spreading those principles globally. Dawson advocated for the spreading of American ideals throughout the rest of the world.86 George Kirchwey argued that the United States must go to war to defeat Imperial Germany and secure peace. Kirchwey suggested that the war was a fight against an autocratic empire and a crusade to make the world safe for democracy. Kirchwey maintained that the United States needed to lead the effort in creating a world order for peace.87 Samuel Dutton saw the purpose of the United States as transcending party lines. Dutton suggested that the aim of defeating autocratic Imperial Germany needed to be a united American mission.88 Emily Greene Balch wrote that the United States "enters the war on grounds of the highest idealism, as the champion of democracy and world order."89 Walter Lippman argued that once the United States entered the war, they were obligated to fight to make the world safe for democracy. Lippman placed the blame for the war squarely on Germany and their aggression in Belgium and unrestricted submarine warfare. Similar to Wilson in his war address, Lippman drew parallels to the Russian Revolution and the 86 Miles M. Dawson, "The Significance of Our Mission in This War," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 10-13, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013639. 87 George W. Kirchwey, "Pax Americana," Annals, 40-48, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013645. 88 Samuel Dutton, "The United States and the War," Annals, 13-19, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013640. 89 Emily Greene Balch, "The War in Its Relation to Democracy and World Order," Annals, 28-31, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013643 Bailes 23 importance of it signaling that the Allies truly represented democracy.90 Wilson's reasons for war had found a voice in the academic circles of the United States, and they nested well with the progressive message. Wilson's goals for peace illustrate how Progressive initiatives manifested into the global sphere. In his August 18, 1914 address advocating for the American population to remain neutral during the European conflict, Wilson maintained that the United States held a responsibility "to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend."91 Similarly, when addressing the Senate over two years later communicating his persistent intent of mediating peace in Europe through American neutrality, Wilson criticized the demands for peace submitted by the Entente that sought revenge over Imperial Germany rather than a lasting peace. Wilson instructed that "peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again."92 In line with his progressive ideology, Wilson believed in United States intervention in the European conflict that would fundamentally improve their diplomatic system entirely. The United States would intervene in Europe to not only end the conflict but restructure the political climate in a more peaceful, progressive manner. Kendrick Clements argues that Wilson's economic and diplomatic decisions throughout United States neutrality drew him into the war gradually as he continued to side with the Allies. Wilson attempted to maintain his ideals for peace as the United States continued to get closer to belligerency.93 When the United States entry into the war proved virtually inevitable, Wilson 90 Walter Lippman, "The World Conflict in Its Relation to American Democracy," Annals, 1-10, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013638. 91 Woodrow Wilson, "An Appeal for Neutrality in World War I," 390. 92 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 392. 93 Clements, "Woodrow Wilson and World War I," 63-81. Bailes 24 ensured that the reasons for fighting aligned with the progressive energy that moved within American society. A religious vigor inspired military action that can be seen as a product of the Progressive Movement as well. Richard Gamble narrates the origin of the opinion that the United States represented a light for the rest of the world, and he describes how this concept brought the nation into the war. Gamble argues that these Christian ideals drove the political climate as Wilson's vision echoed the religious sentiment, and they prompted men to fight.94 Gamble describes the "social gospel" movement that had energized progressive Christians in the United States as extending into the international realm. The same energy that had influenced Christians to enact domestic change had transcended into a desire to improve the world, and Wilson ensured these sentiments carried over into United States foreign policy.95 Ronald Pestritto argues Wilson's religious conviction and explains that Wilson linked his faith with his duty to help shape the rest of the world. Pestritto explains the belief that "America was a key battleground in the victory of good over evil."96 Richard Gamble's mention of literature such as Washington Gladden's 1886 "Applied Christianity" highlights the popular message of progressive faith that nests with Pestritto's argument.97 Wilson illustrated the linkage of religion and progressive reform when he spoke in Denver, Colorado, in a 1911 build-up to his run for the Presidency. Wilson commented that "liberty is a spiritual conception, and when men take up arms to set other men free, there is something sacred and holy in the warfare."98 Wilson went on to champion the necessity of finding truth in the Bible's message, and he concluded by warning against believing "that 94 Gamble, The War for Righteousness, 5-87. 95 Gamble, 69-87. 96 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 40-3. 97 Gamble, The War for Righteousness, 49-67. 98 Woodrow Wilson, "The Bible and Progress" in "On Religion," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.7, 54. Bailes 25 progress can be divorced from religion."99 To Wilson, Christianity taught the spiritual duty of working toward social progress, and most progressive men of faith believed in these same sentiments which carried over toward United States actions in France. At the core of this Progressive energy and Wilson's peace aims were the sentiments surrounding an idea of American Exceptionalism. Many of the same ideas found in the religious aspect of the need to work for social progression catered to a sense of American Exceptionalism. In the same May 7, 1911 address in Denver, Colorado, Wilson spoke of the greatness of the United States as a direct correlation to the religious zeal and Biblical principles with which the founders had established the nation. According to Wilson, "America has all along claimed the distinction of setting this example to the civilized world."100 Wilson believed that the United States should serve as the model of Christian values for the rest of the world as "America was born to exemplify that devotion to the elements of righteousness which are derived from the revelations of Holy Scripture."101 In his text In Search of the City on a Hill, Richard Gamble describes how the United States narrative utilized an interpretation of divine providence to create an image of a nation built on religious principles that should serve as an example for the rest of the world.102 Lloyd Ambrosius describes the prevalent belief in the early twentieth-century United States that considered the United States a "providential nation" as citizens attempted to justify global expansion.103 If the United States existed as a providential manifestation of God's will, then that could rationalize the spread of the American system into the international realm. 99 Wilson, "The Bible and Progress," 53-9. 100 Wilson, 56. 101 Wilson, 59. 102 Richard M. Gamble, In Search of the City on a Hill: The Making and Unmakng of an American Myth (London: Continuum International Publishng Group, 2012), 6-119. 103 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and Ameriam Internationalism, 33. Bailes 26 Men of faith found a divine message in the need for the United States to intercede in the global sphere to mold the world in her image. Wilson's brand of progressive history nested well with his idea of American Exceptionalism. Lloyd Ambrosius explains Wilson's fundamental belief that "primitive peoples moved toward greater maturity over the generations."104 Wilson applied this to the history of the United States. As Ronald Perstritto describes, Wilson believed that "the history of human progress is the history of the progress of freedom."105 As people progressed, they, in turn, developed a governmental system that allowed for more representation for its citizens. According to Ambrosius, Wilson believed that "the United States represented the culmination of progressive historical development."106 The American people had achieved real progression in Wilson's historical model, and democracy achieved through the American Revolution solidified his theory. Wilson certainly made this point evident in his writings regarding history. Wilson suggests that "the history of the United States demonstrates the spiritual aspects of political development."107 The United States embodied the ideal form of Wilson's progressive history. Wilson saw it as the responsibility of the United States to spread its exceptional personification of progressive history with the rest of the world. Wilson acknowledged his views on the uniqueness of the United States in his New Freedom. While arguing for progressive reform in the states, Wilson stated that "[t]he reason that America was set up was that she might be different from all the nations of the world."108 Indeed, Wilson believed in the providential nature of the United States, and he desired to shape the rest of the world. 104 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 236. 105 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 37. 106 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 236. 107 Woodrow Wilson, "The Historian," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, 216, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.10. 108 Wilson, The New Freedom, 16. Bailes 27 Early in the war during the period of United States neutrality, Wilson's reasons for remaining neutral stemmed from his belief in the exceptional nature of the American system and his desire for the United States to stay clear of European affairs. Even in American neutrality, Wilson still sought to mediate a peace in Europe because he perceived a chance to spread the democracy of the United States to Europe. Wilson believed that he needed to mediate in the European conflict because "mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves," and he questioned whether the Entente and Central powers fought "for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power."109 Wilson's peace aims were in sharp contrast to the Allied leaders, which illustrated his emphasis that the United States should mold a post-war Europe, and this tied directly to American Exceptionalism. While the British leadership concerned themselves with imperial interests, the French sought revenge on Germany from the 1870 Franco-Prussian War. Wilson made it clear in his war address that the United States had "no quarrel with the German people."110 Wilson's vision for a post-war world remained focused on a lasting peace rather than what he perceived as selfish imperial gains or senseless revenge. American Exceptionalism formed the foundation for the interventionist foreign policy of the Progressive Era, and it profoundly motivated Wilson as well as the bulk of American society. Diplomatic historian William Appleman Williams details the rise of the United States as a global power. Williams argues that most Americans in the early twentieth-century United States agreed not only with "Wilson's nationalistic outlook," but they also agreed that the nation should serve as an example for the rest of the world.111 As mentioned previously, Miles Dawson contributed 109 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 393. 110 Woodrow Wilson, "Declaration of War," 401. 111 Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 86. Bailes 28 to the July 1917 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science to voice the justification of United States intervention in France. In his text, Dawson defined the five uniquely American fundamentals as: 1. The inalienable right of every man to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness – not as a mere dead saying, but as a living reality. 2. The right of local self-government, within territories possessing or entitled to claim such right, embracing every power of government not expressly granted to the union. 3. The guaranty to each state of a forum for the redress of grievances of one state against another with full power to enforce the verdict of that forum. 4. The guaranty of a republican form of government to each constituent state. 5. The right and duty to maintain the union.112 To thinkers like Dawson, this unique set of traits not only provided United States citizens with a system of government that separated them from the rest of the world, but it inherently gave them a duty to spread the American ideology to the rest of the world. Fundamentally, the idea that the world should take the lead from the United States exemplified the broad theme of American Exceptionalism inspiring AEF actions in the war. With Progressivism and American Exceptionalism at the root of the war effort, the citizen-soldier of the AEF found inspiration in the same rhetoric. Nelson Lloyd described the "melting-pots" of the army cantonment areas in which soldiers who were born outside of the United States "have become true Americans. They have learned the language of America and the ideals of America and have turned willing soldiers in her cause."113 Michael Neiberg argues that a lasting legacy of United States involvement in the war became a unified American mission superseding any cultural allegiance, and "disagreements would no longer be based on ethnicity 112 Dawson, "The Significance of Our Mission in This War," 11. 113 Newson Lloyd, How We Went to War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922), 58, https://archive.org/details/howwewenttowar00lloyrich/page/n7/mode/2up. Bailes 29 or religion."114 United States entry into the war gave the American citizen-soldier a reason for fighting to preserve a democratic system in Europe, and Wilson's belief that the United States would play a central role became widespread amongst the ranks of the AEF. Lieutenant Willard Hill of the Transport Division and 94th Aero Pursuit Squadron claimed when hearing of the United States entry into the war "that this war is not over yet and that the U.S. troops will play a very decisive factor."115 The purpose of United States entry into the war inspired an idealism that would unify soldiers and champion a belief that the AEF would save Europe from the autocracy of Imperial Germany. Private Willard Newton of the 105th Engineers, 30th Division, exclaimed his joy during the September offensives by stating, "[a]t last we are at the beginning of a real battle between Prussianism and Democracy! And we are to fight on the side of Democracy that the world may forever be free from the Prussian peril!"116 The sentiments of these soldiers expressed a voice that echoed Wilson's desire to utilize an American army to bring peace to Europe, and Pershing dutifully followed his instructions. Pershing's stubbornness in not giving in to the Allies' request to amalgamate troops remained the most significant source of friction between him and the Allied military leaders. Still, Pershing's belief that the doughboy remained a superior warrior to the French and British soldier intensified Pershing's negative feelings toward his Allied counterparts. Pershing did not hide his views regarding coalitions when he wrote early in his memoirs that "[h]istory is replete with the failures of coalitions and seemed to be repeating itself in the World War."117 Russell Weigley argues that Pershing believed "that only by fighting under American command would 114 Michael S. Neiberg, "Blinking Eyes Began to Open: Legacies from America's Road to the Great War, 1914-1917," Diplomatic History 38, no. 4 (2014): 812, https://doi:10.1093/dh/dhu023. 115 Lieutenant Willard D. Hill (Cleburne, Texas) in American Voices of World War I, 47. 116 Private Willard Newton (Gibson, North Carolina) in American Voices of World War I, 140. 117 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 1, 34. Bailes 30 American soldiers retain the morale they needed to fight well."118 This assertion proved incorrect as those American doughboys who fought under French and British command performed extraordinarily.119 David Trask maintains that Pershing's "presumption that the American troops were superior to others in the war helps explain his stubborn insistence on an independent army even during the greatest crisis of the war."120 Although the German Spring Offensives of 1918 put the Allies in desperate need of replacements, Pershing held his ground in resisting amalgamation. He only agreed to temporary amalgamation after much deliberation. Pershing's plan required maintaining a separate and distinct American force if the United States was to play a critical role in defeating Imperial Germany. This plan did not always synchronize with General Foch's overall plan for the Allied strategy for defeating Imperial Germany. Mitchell Yockelson describes an instance in late September 1918 in which a newly established AEF officers' school near Pershing's headquarters pulled a bulk of American officers from the front lines, which "affected the AEF First Army divisions that were about to attack in the Meuse-Argonne operation."121 United States political leadership back home undoubtedly noticed the friction between Pershing and the Allied leaders. David Woodward mentioned that at one point, Wilson and Secretary Baker intervened to plead with Pershing to be more accommodating to the Allies. According to Woodward, "Pershing proved as immovable as ever when it came to wholesale amalgamation and introducing Americans to trench warfare before he deemed them ready for combat."122 118 Weigley, "Pershing and the U.S. Military Tradition," 335. 119 Weigley, 335. 120 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 61. 121 Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers, 127. 122 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 168-9. Bailes 31 Pershing's doctrine of "open warfare" proved predicated on a firm belief in the exceptional quality of the American fighting man. In his memoirs, Pershing documented his view that the results of the Battle of the Marne had placed the opposing forces in a trench defensive that had taken away their aggression and ability to fight an offensive battle. Pershing maintained that "victory could not be won by the costly process of attrition, but it must be won by driving the enemy out into the open and engaging him in a war of movement."123 Sergeant-major James Block of the 59th Infantry, 4th Division, wrote after an offensive near Belleau Wood that his troops "had proven to ourselves that we were the Hun's master, even in our present untrained condition. The Hun could not stand before us and battle man to man."124 David Trask argues that Pershing's reliance on the rifle and bayonet under his open warfare doctrine limited the AEF's ability to adapt to the combined arms fight as quickly as did the French and British.125 In his Final Report, Pershing praised the Allied training system that prepared his inexperienced troops for combat on the Western Front. Although he admitted that his soldiers needed to learn from the experiences of the combat tested French and British, he stated that "[t]he long period of trench warfare had so impressed itself upon the French and British that they had almost entirely dispensed with training for open warfare."126 Pershing relied heavily on his infantrymen, and he saw the rifle and the bayonet as the superior weapon. He did not factor advances in the machine gun, tanks, and artillery to integrate all lethal assets onto the battlefield. According to Richard Faulkner, Pershing planned on using his troops – who he believed were 123 Pershing, 151-4. 124 Sergeant-major James W. Block (Marquette, Michigan) in American Voices of World War I, 108. 125 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 19. 126 Pershing, Final Report, 13-5. Bailes 32 better suited for offensive warfare – to "force the Germans from their trenches into open terrain where the Allies' greater resources would then destroy the unprotected enemy army."127 Perhaps nothing exhibited Pershing's obtuse attitude toward his Allied counterparts more than his desire to beat the French in seizing Sedan from the Germans. Pershing outlined his wishes that his "troops should capture Sedan, which the French had lost in a decisive battle in 1870."128 Russell Weigley comments on Pershing's intent "to try to snatch from the French army the honor of recapturing the historic fortress city of Sedan, where the Emperor Napoleon III had surrendered to the Prussians on September 1-2, 1870."129 Sergeant-major Block described the fierce German resistance during the late September Allied offensives. Still, he claimed that "[o]nce the Americans penetrated that line, their advance northward would be comparatively easy. Sedan would fall next."130 The AEF performed well during the offensives in early November, and the crumbling Imperial German army made Sedan easily attainable for either Pershing's Second Army or the Franco-American armies.131 David Trask points out the diplomatic issue that would ensue if Pershing were to "deprive the French army of this honor."132 The new commander of the American First Army, General Liggett, ultimately did not carry out the attack, which undoubtably prevented a political and diplomatic disaster.133 Russell Weigley maintains that Liggett changed plans after "the offended French" updated him of Pershing's plans on November 7.134 The idea that Pershing wished to take away French retribution by giving 127 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders, 285. 128 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 2, 381. 129 Weigley, "Pershing and the U.S. Military Tradition," 342. 130 Sergeant-major Block in American Voices of World War I, 135. 131 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 282-3. 132 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 174. 133 Trask, 174, 134 Weigley, 343. Bailes 33 his troops a decisive victory and morale boost demonstrated his disconnect from the sentiments of his Allied counterparts. Pershing's belief in the superiority of the American soldier to his French and British counterpart extended to the lower ranks of the AEF. While perhaps sensationalizing his account, Scout Corporal Edward Radcliffe of the 109th Infantry, 28th Division wrote regarding actions around St Agnon "that the French of the 10th or 6th army had fallen back, their officers being shot by our men when they ordered them to retreat."135 In a post-World War I survey, Sergeant Donald Drake Kyler of the 16th Infantry, 1st Division answered a question about what he learned about America and Americans from the war. Sergeant Kyler stated that "Americans are inclined to brag about their systems and accomplishments which may or not be superior to those of other peoples or cultures."136 In many of the accounts of AEF actions in Europe, General Pershing and his doughboys showcased American Exceptionalism. Richard Faulkner devotes a chapter of his text to argue that most of the AEF doughboys perceived inferiority in the French way of life compared to the United States. The majority of white AEF soldiers came away from the war, believing that, in terms of technology as well as general health and welfare, American society remained superior to that of France and England.137 Faulkner makes note that "with the notable exception of the African Americans, the soldiers generally believed that their society was markedly superior to anything they encountered in Europe."138 Sergeant-major Block wrote a letter home to his parents during the post-war occupation period. He wrote of the perception that "Paris makes up for the backwardness of the rest of France."139 135 Corporal Edward Radcliffe in American Voices of World War I, 94. 136 Sergeant Donald Drake Kyler (Fort Thomas, Kentucky) in American Voices of World War I, 196. 137 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders, 188-93. 138 Faulkner, 189. 139 Sergeant-major Block in American Voices of World War I, 191. Bailes 34 While the bond formed between the French and British soldiers and the AEF doughboy proved strong, there still seemed to be a sentiment of American superiority amongst the AEF ranks. Tasker H. Bliss, who served as Army Chief of Staff from September 1917 to May 1918, documented the challenge of absent unified Allied command in a 1922 essay. Bliss wrote a detailed piece in which he criticized the lack of a unified Allied mission while praising General Foch and championing his eventual selection as "Allied Commander-in-Chief."140 Bliss condemned the Allied leaders for waiting so long before establishing any sort of unified command, and he argued that for the first years of the war, they fought for their national goals only. Bliss maintained that this hindered United States integration into the war effort as well.141 Charles Pettit wrote an account of his time on the Western Front. Initially serving in the British army, Pettit joined the AEF once they arrived and concluded his 42 months of combat with the Rainbow Division. Pettit commented that "[w]e know why the French and English didn't win the War. They was waiting for us."142 Robert Bruce expands on the relationship between the American and French soldiers during the post-war occupation period. The doughboys believed that the Allied victory had eliminated the threat of autocratic Imperial Germany. At the same time, the French soldiers still demonstrated distrust of the German for fear of a future war. According to Bruce, "Americans did not want to hear about the need to prepare for a future war with Germany. They believed that victory in the Great War and the conversion of Germany to a democracy was enough to end the menace; Americans were unwilling to do more."143 For the AEF doughboy, the United States' actions in the war had saved Europe from the threat of the 140 Tasker H. Bliss, "The Evolution of the Unified Command," Foreign Affairs 1, no. 2 (December 1922): 1-30, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20028211. 141 Bliss, 7-30. 142 Charles A. Pettit in Echoes From Over There: By the Men of the Army and Marine Corps who Fought in France, eds. Craig Hamilton and Louise Corbin (New York City: The Soldiers' Publishing Company, 1919), 107-9. 143 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 289. Bailes 35 Imperial German autocracy. United States' involvement in its first large-scale coalition operation had solidified the dominance of the American soldier and the system for which he fought. The American doughboy contributed significantly to the Allied victory over Imperial Germany. Without American boots on the ground in France, Imperial Germany may have defeated the Allies. Allan Millett argues that Pershing's independent army did not achieve all that Pershing had hoped. Still, Millett maintains that an accurate assessment of the war would be that the "Allies might have lost the war without the American Expeditionary Forces."144 With the Russian withdrawal from the war and Germany's surge in the Western Front in the Spring of 1918, the Allies desperately needed more boots on the ground. AEF actions in Cantigny, Belleau Wood, and the attack on the Hindenburg line proved the value of the doughboys to the Allied victory over Imperial Germany and the Central Powers. Acknowledging the contribution of the American soldier to the Allied victory should remain a critical focus of any study of United States involvement in the war. While the presence of American troops on the ground benefited the Allies and did give Wilson his seat at the post-war peace talks, Pershing did not realize his grand vision of an independent American army crushing Imperial Germany. Bullitt Lowry documents Pershing's desire to capitalize on increasing the United States combat power to continue pressing a weakening German army and deliver a crushing blow.145 The Germans signed the armistice before Pershing could make this happen. While Wilson gained his seat at the peace conference and Pershing did not get his chance to win a tactical victory, the French and British still received their original desires and delivered Germany "harsh armistice terms."146 144 Millett, "Over Where?," 251. 145 Lowry, "Pershing and the Armistice," 286-91. 146 Lowry, 291. Bailes 36 With the eventual collapse of the League of Nations, Wilson never achieved his vision of a new world order for peace. Still, the United States government had established its importance and commenced its entry into the realm of global powers. United States involvement in the First World War helped solidify a national identity as well as establish an American presence on the international stage. Theodore Roosevelt Jr. wrote a letter on May 15, 1919, in which he documented the benefit of the war and what he saw as "Americanizing and democratizing" the soldiers through military service.147 Roosevelt commented that through service in support of the war effort, "love of the men for their country has been deepened, that their sense of real democracy has been sharpened and steadied and that insofar as any possible bad effect goes, the men are more than ever ready and determined to see order and fair play for all."148 In a similar vein, Italian born AEF Sergeant Morini wrote that the war provided him a chance "to make good on my Americanism."149 To Morini, fighting in the war provided him with "the right to the name Yankee all right."150 While the United States' efforts in the war were in support of the Allies, the war became a chance for the nation to claim its identity. A country that had been torn apart by civil war half a century before utilized the war effort to continue to unify and recover its self-proclaimed providence. The war ostensibly became an effort to Americanize its own citizens. The historiography of United States involvement in the First World War presents various arguments. Some historians such as David Trask and Russell Weigley remain critical of General Pershing and his decision making. While some scholarly history shows a narrative less scathing of Pershing, most of the description found in popular history showcases valiant actions of 147 Theodore Roosevelt in Echoes From Over There, 95. 148 Roosevelt, 95. 149 Sergeant Morini in Echoes From Over There, 115. 150 Morini, 115. Bailes 37 Pershing and his efforts in maneuvering the American Expeditionary Forces to achieve victory for the Allies against Imperial Germany. The fact remains that while the doughboys contributed significantly to the Allied victory, they helped the most when they were not fighting Pershing's fight. In his Final Report, Pershing highlights the benefit that the Allies provided to the American forces. In terms of training as well as logistics, the Allies provided the doughboys with the resources they needed to defeat Imperial Germany and the Central Powers effectively.151 Pershing recognized what the Allies had supplied him and his men, but his stubbornness and arrogance still clouded his vision to a degree. While Pershing did build a trusting relationship with the Allied commanders, and his troops were efficient, he did not always operate per their same vision. At times, Pershing's desire to maintain an independent American army superseded his desire to enable the Allied strategy. Pershing strived to meet Wilson's intent of keeping a distinct American command. The question remains if, in carrying out his President's instructions, Pershing prolonged the war and delayed the defeat of the Central Powers. Secondary and primary source literature from the First World War showcases both Wilson's peace aims – which were shaped by his ideology – as well as General Pershing and AEF actions while attempting to remain an independent command in the war. When war broke out in August 1914 in Europe, Wilson tried to mediate a peace while maintaining United States neutrality. When continued trade with the Allies brought the United States into the war in April of 1917, he seized the chance to shape a new world order by establishing an independent American command to defeat Imperial Germany. Primarily because of the Progressive Movement in the United States and the concepts surrounding American Exceptionalism, the American soldier embraced Wilson's ideologies for fighting and fought valiantly to defeat the 151 Pershing, Final Report, 90. Bailes 38 Imperial German autocracy. The Progressive Movement had established itself in American society by the time the citizen-soldier went to war in France, and the principles of American Exceptionalism permeated in virtually every facet of American culture. The American doughboy carried both of these concepts with him to France. Despite Pershing not attaining his decisive blow against the German army, and Wilson not achieving his vision for a new world order, the United States still met a significant amount of Wilson's original intent for entering the war. Wilson's ideologies influenced how the AEF fought in France. As the First World War shaped the United States standing as a global power, it also demonstrated the critical nature of maintaining relationships with coalition partners. Hew Strachan begins the conclusion to his history of the war by stating that "[t]he First World War was a coalition war."152 The American doughboy established a positive relationship with his French and British counterparts. The ability of the American soldier to learn from the experiences of the combat tested Allies, to adapt to the rigors of trench warfare, and to perform well in battle fighting beside his international partners shows the success of the AEF's performance in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. Despite these successes, the AEF doughboy exhibited American Exceptionalism in the First World War. As the United States built its presence in the international realm over the following century, and the need for maintaining partnerships with allied nations continued to increase, the precedent set by the AEF in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation would be essential. 152 Hew Strachan, The First World War (New York: Viking Penguin, a member of Penguin Group, 2004; New York: Penguin Group, 2013), 303. Bailes 39 Bibliography Secondary Sources Adas, Michael. "Ambivalent Ally: American Military Intervention and the Endgame and Legacy of World War I." Diplomatic History 38 no. 4 (September 2014): 700-712, http://doi.org/10.1093/dh.dhu032. Ambrosius, Lloyd E. Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Ambrosius, Lloyd E. Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Ambrosius, Lloyd E. "World War I and the Paradox of Wilsonianism." The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 17 (2018): 5-22, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537781417000548. Bruce, Robert B. A Fraternity of Arms: America and France in the Great War. Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2003. Bruce, Robert B. "America Embraces France: Marshal Joseph Joffre and the French Mission to the United States, April-May 1917." Journal of Military History 66 no. 2 (April 2002): 407-441, http://doi.org/10.2307/3093066. Clements, Kendrick A. "Woodrow Wilson and World War I." Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 1 (March 2004): 62-82. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27552564. Coffman, Edward M. The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1968. Egerton, George W. "Britain and the 'Great Betrayal': Anglo-American Relations and the Struggle for United States Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919-1920." The Historical Journal 21, no. 4 (December 1978): 885-911. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638973. Esposito, David M. "Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the AEF." Presidential Studies Quarterly 19 no. 1 (Winter 1989): 127-140, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40574570. Faulkner, Richard S. Pershing's Crusaders: The American Soldier in World War I. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017. Gamble, Richard M. In Search of the City on a Hill: The Making and Unmaking of an American Myth. London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012. ———. The War for Righteousness: Progressive Christianity, the Great War, and the Rise of the Messianic Nation. Wilmington: ISI Books, 2003. Bailes 40 Glaser, Elisabeth. "Better Late than Never: The American Economic War Effort, 1917-1918." Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, edited by Roger Chickering and Stig Förster. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000: 389-407. Gregory, Ross. The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1971. Harbutt, Fraser J. "War, Peace, and Commerce: The American Reaction to the Outbreak of World War I in Europe 1914." An Improbable War? The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture Before 1914, edited by Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson. New York: Berghahn Books, 2007: 320-334. Joll, James and Martel, Gordon. The Origins of the First World War. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge, 2013. Keene, Jennifer D. Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. Keene, Jennifer D. "Uneasy Alliances: French Military Intelligence and the American Army During the First World War." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (January 2008): 18-36. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432461. Kennedy, David M. Over Here: The First World War and American Society. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. First published 1980 by Oxford University Press (New York). Kennedy, Ross A. "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American National Security." Diplomatic History 25, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 1-31. https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00247. Knock, Thomas J. To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest For a New World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019. First published 1992 by Oxford University Press (Oxford). Link, Arthur S. "Entry into World War I." Progress, War, and Reaction: 1900-1933, edited by Davis R.B. Ross, Alden T. Vaughan, and John B. Duff. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1970: 108-148. Lowry, Bullitt. "Pershing and the Armistice." The Journal of American History 55 no. 2, (September 1968): 281-291. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1899558. McGerr, Michael. A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Millett, Allan R. "Over Where? The AEF and the American Strategy for Victory, 1917-1918." Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present, edited by Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts. Westport: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1986: 235-256. Bailes 41 Neiberg, Michael S. "Blinking Eyes Began to Open: Legacies from America's Road to the Great War, 1914-1917." Diplomatic History 38, no. 4 (2014): 801-812. https://doi:10.1093/dh/dhu023. ———. The Path to War: How the First World War Created Modern America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pestritto, Ronald J. Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005. Stevenson, David. "French War Aims and the American Challenge, 1914-1918." The Historical Journal 22, no. 4 (December 1979): 877-894. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638691. Strachan, Hew. The First World War. New York: Viking Penguin, a member of Penguin Group, 2004. Reprinted with a new introduction. New York: Penguin Group, 2013. Page references are to the 2013 edition. Trask, David F. The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918. Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1993. Weigley, Russell F. "Strategy and Total War in the United States: Pershing and the American Military Tradition." Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, edited by Roger Chickering and Stig Förster. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000: 327-345. Widenor, William C. "The United States and the Versailles Peace Settlement." Modern American Diplomacy, edited by John M. Carroll and George C. Herring. Lanham: SR Books, 1996: 41-60. Williams, William Appleman. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1959. Reprinted for Fiftieth Anniversary with a foreword by Lloyd C. Gardner and afterword by Andrew J. Bacevich. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009. Page references are to the 2009 edition. Winton, Harold R. "Toward an American Philosophy of Command." The Journal of Military History 64, no. 4 (October 2000): 1035-1060. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2677266. Woodford, David R. Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917-1918. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1993. Yockelson, Mitchell A. Borrowed Soldiers: Americans Under British Command, 1918. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008. Zieger, Robert H. America's Great War: World War I and the American Experience. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000. Bailes 42 Primary Sources Army War College (U.S.) Historical Section. The Genesis of the American First Army. Army War College, 1928. Reprints from the collection of the University of Michigan Library Coppell, TX, 2020. Baker, Newton D. Why We Went to War. New York: Harper & Brothers for Council on Foreign Relations, 1936. Balch, Emily Greene. "The War in Its Relation to Democracy and World Order." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 28-31. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013643. Bliss, Tasker H. "The Evolution of the Unified Command." Foreign Affairs 1, no. 2 (December 1922): 1-30. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20028211. Croly, Herbert. Progressive Democracy. New York: Macmillan, 1914. Second printing in 2006 of new material edition with an introduction by Sidney A. Pearson, Jr. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998. Page references are to the 2006 edition. Dawson, Miles M. "The Significance of Our Mission in This War." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 10-13. http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013639. Dutton, Samuel T. "The United States and the War." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 13-19. http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013640. Echoes From Over There: By the Men of the Army and Marine Corps Who Fought in France. Edited by Craig Hamilton and Louise Corbin. New York City: The Soldiers' Publishing Company, 1919. Evans, Martin Marix, ed. American Voices of World War I: Primary Source Documents 1917-1920. New York: Routledge, 2013. Kindle. Kirchwey, George W. "Pax Americana." The Annals of the American Academy for Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 40-48. http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013645. Lippmann, Walter. "The World Conflict in Its Relation to American Democracy." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 1-10. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013638. Lloyd, Newson. How We Went to War. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922. https://archive.org/details/howwewenttowar00lloyrich/page/n7/mode/2up. Pershing, John J. Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing: Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces.Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919. ———. My Experiences in the World War. 2 vols. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1931. Bailes 43 Wilson, Woodrow. Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President. Edited by Mario R. DiNunzio. New York: NYU Press, 2006. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.1-18. ———. The New Freedom: A Call For the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People. New York and Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1913. www.philosophical.space/303/Wilson.pdf.

             Previously posted on May 10/22 and Jan 30/23            Kissinger in Washington, May 7, 2022Henry Kissinger will be one hundred years old in a few weeks and has published five books since he turned ninety. Along with President Nixon, he futilely prolonged and escalated the Vietnam War for four years when defeat was already inevitable. But he also received the Nobel Peace Prize precisely for negotiating the ceasefire for that same war.     His doctrine also has these two faces. On the one hand, he conceives international politics as the interaction between states seeking power. On the other hand, he favors the balance of powers so that no one is able to fully impose its dominance on the others.   In the academic literature, Kissinger's approach is called "realism" and is widely accepted. The main alternative is the so-called "liberal" approach, which trusts in the ability of institutions to prevent wars and keep peace. From there arose the League of Nations, which failed, and the United Nations and its specialized organizations, which have had significant success on many issues, but are also currently showing their insufficiency.    The most accurate postulate of the realists is that the world is more peaceful when there are multiple powers than when there are only two, as in the Cold War, or a single super-dominant one, as seemed to be the case with the United States after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.   The success of the formula requires that the multilateral equilibrium could only be overthrown by an effort of a magnitude too difficult to mount. As a historical example, Kissinger has analyzed and praised the so-called Concert of Europe that was formed, after the defeat of Napoleon's France, by Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and also recovered France. According to his interpretation, the Concert "came close to constituting the government of Europe" and achieved a long period without European-wide wars. The balance was upset by the unification of Germany at the end of the 19th century and its consequent aggressive expansionism, which led to the absurd and catastrophic First World War. Taking a similar approach, Kissinger continues to praise the construction of the European Union, which has prevented new general wars on the continent.    During his time in government, the biggest concern was that communism would end up dominating the world according to the domino theory, whereby the fall of a piece like Indochina would be followed by Burma and Thailand, as well as Indonesia (which, in fact, was very close), and from there, India, Japan, the Middle East... That's why the Vietnam war extended to Laos and Cambodia. But this is also the reason for the diplomatic opening to China, to break the Sino-Soviet bloc and achieve a certain multilateral balance.    The current interest of the discussion is that the role of the United States as the only superpower may be less exclusive and exclusionary than it seemed. A version of political realism in academia tends to analyze international relations "after hegemony" as a ground for "anarchy", that is, destructive conflicts and wars. However, the changes around the Ukrainian war can be read as a new opportunity for multilateral cooperation.    The United States has the initiative and many economic and military resources, but, paradoxically, it may have a good opportunity to expand pluralism. In the new situation of divided government between the Presidency and Congress, the most ambitious projects in domestic policy are paralyzed, so Joe Biden can focus on foreign policy, where he has more power, and expand multilateral cooperation.    The European Union is beginning to develop, for the first time, a spirited common international policy, in contrast to the dissent during the Iraq war, when the governments of Britain and Spain were on one side and those of France and Germany on the other. The rulers of China and India, which are rivals to each other, have told Russia that the world is not ready for war.    This configuration with more than three major powers points to a balance of powers capable of avoiding polarization, since, otherwise, a coalition of two-to-one preludes conflict.     Specifically, the Group of Seven, which is the nucleus of a latent world government, needs to work more closely with some members of the Group of Twenty, which includes India and China, so that its decisions are widely accepted and effective.    Negotiations between the US and the EU for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), in which substantive agreements had been reached, were paralyzed by Trump, and could now be revived.    The Trans-Pacific Agreement for Economic Cooperation was also abandoned by Trump, but the other eleven initial countries went ahead on their own and ended up signing the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), to which China has presented its candidacy. Many in the United States are clamoring for re-entry in what had been its own initiative.    And after the war in Ukraine, a new international structure will have to be defined, especially for Central and Eastern Europe, in which, as Kissinger said in a recent interview, "Russia should find a place."    Realism shows that the seeking for power explains many things, and the balance of power can prevent a general war. But when there is neither a single dominant power nor a confrontation between two, "liberal" rules and institutions may be the best mechanism for peace and multilateral cooperation.Also in Spanish in the daily La Vanguardia-click       While President Biden is not clear, and sometimes he is confusing about how the war in Ukraine could end, some other voices in Washington can speak and suggest more clearly. Several of them did it a few days ago at the Financial Times Weekend Festival, which was held, for the first time outside England, at the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington.The first surprisingly constructive intervention was from William J. Burns, the current CIA Director. Just a year ago, he came from retirement after a long career as a diplomat, and as such, in his presentation, the conversation with an FT journalist, and the dialogue with the audience, he showed a broader vision than the usual spies. When he was Ambassador in Boris Yeltsin's Moscow in the mid-1990s, Burns already felt that the NATO expansion until the borders of Russia was "premature at best, and needlessly provocative at worst." More specifically, to push for NATO membership of Ukraine and Georgia was "a serious strategic mistake that did indelible damage" –an opinion that at the time was shared by the governments of France and Germany. In an official encounter, Putin had told him that Ukraine in NATO "would be a hostile act toward Russia."Burns emphasized, of course, that there is "absolutely no justification for the invasion of Ukraine." Yet, he resumed that kind of strategic explanation while dismissing the ideological elaborations that pretend either justify or condemn the attack. In short: Russia has "pushed back" after Ukraine moved westward away from Russian influence.In his view, nevertheless, Putin miscalculated regarding the power of the Russian Army (which was sent to a "special operation" not planned by its generals), about Ukrainian resistance, and with the supposition that the West would be distracted by elections in Germany and France. He tried to explain the recent candidacies of Sweden and Finland to NATO as a deterrent against Putin's other potential attacks in the future. But the Director of the CIA did not utter a word that could be interpreted as supporting Ukraine's NATO membership.Even more thrilling was the participation of Henry Kissinger on "the new world disorder." The former Secretary of State is 99 years old this month, announced a new book of immediate publication, and for nearly one hour was focused, clear, and insightful, also in a dialogue with the audience. Kissinger started by using his academic background and remarking that the foreign policy's main priority of Russia, which is the largest country in the world, has always been to protect its huge territory from invasions. From this perspective, after the Cold War, the country's leadership was "offended" by NATO's absorption of Eastern Europe.Now –he noted— public discussion on Ukraine is all about confrontation, but by reflecting on the previous failures of the several governments he advised, he lamented that, again, nobody knows where we are going. Kissinger had already opposed Ukraine's candidacy to NATO when President Bush and Vice-president Cheney launched it in 2008. Six years later, at the Russian occupation of Crimea, he warned that Ukraine should not join either the East or the West, but it should function as "a bridge" between the two. He had predicted that otherwise, "the drift toward confrontation would accelerate."Most striking was his warning about the use of nuclear weapons. "I would not make Ukraine's membership to NATO a key issue," he remarked at the Kennedy Center. It would be "unwise to take an adversarial position," mainly because of the horrible danger of a nuclear war. His approach was certainly in contrast with that in the 1970s, of which he was reminded, when the gibberish theory of the "domino" was used to attack one country after another. Bush and Cheney still used that approach in the early 2000s to justify "preventive wars." I got the impression that with aging, intelligent people like Kissinger may feel that it is not worth trying to deceive himself again, and despite his physical frailness (or perhaps because of that), his more mature brain moves in the direction of more honest and clear thinking. His main argument was that in the past, although confrontation was addressed to "preserve the balance of power" between the US and the Soviet Union, at the same time, he also promoted agreements for nuclear arms reduction and control. Nowadays, modern technology would produce much worse destruction, so he claimed for a "new era" in which the governments should take more care about the consequences of nuclear arms and favor diplomacy above all. Kissinger reminded the audience that, in the past, nuclear countries such as the Soviet Union and the United States accepted military defeats from non-nuclear countries, such as in Vietnam and (both) in Afghanistan. Even more now, "we have to deescalate to conventional arms and learn to live with adversarial relations." Kissinger has met Putin more than twenty times and asserted that "there is still room for negotiation" with him. In Spanish in the daily La Vanguardia

Dottorato di ricerca in Storia d'Europa: società, istituzioni e sistemi politici europei,19.-20. secolo ; Per comprendere appieno come sia nata la proposta francese di una Comunità Europea di Difesa (CED) rivolta ai paesi dell'Europa occidentale, è necessario ricostruire il quadro storico alla fine della seconda guerra mondiale, con particolare riferimento ai rapporti tra le potenze alleate e al nuovo assetto territoriale della Germania. Il primo capitolo analizza le decisioni del secondo dopoguerra (a partire dall'accordo franco-sovietico di Mosca del dicembre 1944 in funzione anti-tedesca) tese a garantire la demilitarizzazione tedesca fino al mutamento strategico conseguente alla contrapposizione tra il blocco occidentale e l'Unione sovietica: lo scopo centrale di questa parte del testo è di analizzarne il punto di svolta, con l'inversione dell'atteggiamento alleato nei riguardi della Germania sconfitta. L'intera ricerca si poggia su un'analisi di tipo storiografico, sia di storia delle istituzioni che delle relazioni internazionali, che vuole mettere alla prova comparata delle fonti d'archivio americane e francesi (con particolare riferimento ai fondi transalpini solo ora disponibili alla consultazione, a 60 anni dalla conclusione della vicenda CED) le principali tesi prodotte dalla letteratura sul riarmo della Germania e sull'esercito europeo. Si descrive quindi il processo decisionale che autorizzò, da parte degli Stati Uniti, della Francia e della Gran Bretagna durante la Conferenza di Londra, l'utilizzo delle risorse economiche e industriali della Germania occidentale occupata per il consolidamento dello sforzo difensivo atlantico; attraverso l'esame di fonti primarie transalpine è stata inoltre analizzata la percezione, da parte francese, del contrasto in atto tra i due dicasteri americani degli Esteri e della Difesa in merito al possibile concorso tedesco alle forze di difesa, con le proposte che filtravano dall'alto commissario statunitense Mc Cloy e dal suo staff. Le proposte lanciate dalla tribuna dell'Assemblea consultiva del Consiglio d'Europa, prima da Bidault e poi da Churchill in merito alla necessità di creare un esercito europeo, mettevano quindi in luce un cambiamento decisivo negli obiettivi strategici delle potenze occidentali: fino allo scoppio della guerra di Corea la preoccupazione maggiore nello scacchiere europeo era d'impedire che la Germania potesse riguadagnare uno status tale da minacciare la pace nel mondo; dopo l'apertura delle ostilità nel lontano continente asiatico, l'attenzione dei governi 2 dell'alleanza atlantica si era focalizzata sulle modalità per accrescere l'apparato difensivo atlantico nell'Europa continentale, per far fronte alla minaccia sovietica. Alcuni Stati, come la Francia e gli altri paesi occidentali che avevano subito in passato le invasioni delle armate tedesche, continuavano però a percepire come maggiormente attuale il pericolo di una rinascita della potenza militare ed economica della Germania, se pur divisa: queste le due visioni destinate a determinare un confronto molto aspro tra i principali alleati atlantici durante l'estate e l'autunno del 1950, che portò alla formulazione di due distinti e contrapposti piani di riarmo della Germania Occidentale. Nel secondo e nel terzo capitolo si descrivono conseguentemente, anche mediante una revisione completa e approfondita della letteratura scientifica al riguardo, i due distinti piani di riarmo, successivi cronologicamente e legati da un rapporto di causa ed effetto: l'evoluzione della posizione dell'amministrazione Truman, a partire dalle due diverse proposte del Pentagono e della Segreteria di Stato sulla politica nei confronti della Germania, per arrivare poi alla decisione finale di presentare un piano denominato "one package" agli alleati francesi e inglesi a New York il 12 settembre 1950; questa proposta del segretario di Stato Acheson ebbe come conseguenza un periodo di profonda riflessione nell'esecutivo francese, che portò alla formulazione del "piano Pleven" per la creazione di un esercito europeo. L'obiettivo di questi due capitoli centrali è quindi di mostrare prima come le mutate condizioni strategiche avessero condotto l'amministrazione Truman a chiedere agli alleati atlantici un poderoso rafforzamento del dispositivo militare in Europa che comprendesse anche forze militari tedesche e poi evidenziare che solo in reazione a questo piano americano, non quindi per un'autonoma volontà politica, il governo francese avesse elaborato una contro-proposta, che sarebbe stata la base da cui elaborare l'esercito europeo e la sovrastruttura istituzionale destinata a garantirne il funzionamento, la Comunità europea di Difesa. Il quarto e ultimo capitolo è dedicato interamente alla ricostruzione delle trattative diplomatiche che portarono alla firma del trattato CED, mediante il confronto sistematico dei principali fondi francesi e americani: partendo dall'analisi dei rigurgiti isolazionisti negli USA, si descrivono prima i lavori della Conferenza di Parigi con la stesura del Rapport Intérimaire e poi le attività della Conferenza per l'organizzazione di una Comunità europea di Difesa fino alla firma del trattato CED del 27 maggio 1952; la stesura del capitolo rende conto anche dell'importanza di alcune figure fondamentali (come i diplomatici McCloy e Bruce o come Eisenhower, nella duplice veste di Comandante supremo atlantico e poi di presidente) o di alcuni snodi determinanti, come la svolta federalista della delegazione italiana alla Conferenza. 3 Questo lavoro di ricerca sulla Comunità europea di Difesa vuole quindi ripercorrere una vicenda fondamentale per la nascita delle istituzioni europee, dalle sue origini radicate al termine del secondo conflitto mondiale e fino alla firma del trattato di Parigi, che sembra di profonda attualità nell'attuale dibattito sulla cessione di sovranità dagli Stati nazionali all'Unione europea, nel campo della Difesa e della politica estera. Il confronto tra i fondi americani e francesi, in particolare quelli di recente apertura alla consultazione dei ricercatori, ha permesso di aggiungere alcuni elementi di originalità alla descrizione del processo di riarmo della Germania e delle trattative tra gli alleati per la nascita dell'esercito europeo. ; The Second World War ended with an onerous legacy for the European Continent: the conflict has brought damage, poverty and the spectre of a new fight between Western countries and the Soviet Union. In that period, the USSR maintained the mobilization of the Armed Forces while the Russian soldiers were settled in Germany. This opposition has divided post-war Europe into two different blocs or coalitions: on the one hand Western Europe countries, which were starting a difficult recovery assisted by American aid, and on the other hand Eastern Europe under Soviet hegemony. In this complex scenario, the German role became increasingly central. Within this historical background, the first important attempt to build a European policy was focused on common defence, through the Treaty instituting the European Defence Community (EDC). In the light of this premise, the EDC affair seems paradigmatic for the analysis of the European dawn: on one side the founding fathers have looked for a solution to the divisions in the continent, but on the other side national self-interests have affected the path for ratifying the EDC Treaty, till the French refusal to ratify, by the French Assembly on 1954, August 30th. The aim of my Doctoral Research Thesis is divided in four different chapters: - in the first one, the object is related to the study and the description of the German role in post-war Europe and its rearmament, from the end of WWII to the mid 1950s, when the United States urged Western allies to use the German industrial and military potential; - secondly, the American proposal called 'one package', presented by Acheson on September 1950, is illustrated with regard to the existing international literature and primary sources; 2 - the third chapter deals with the French proposal to control German rearmament, the 'Pleven Plan', and the Petersberg talks; - finally, the agenda and the deliberations of the Paris Conference regarding the EDC, which started the 15th February 1951 up to 27th May 1952, when the EDC Treaty was signed. I am also researching an original aspect in my thesis, with regard to the state of the art in EDC studies: a synchronic comparison of EDC events in France and the USA based on the original documents preserved in different Archives in the United States and in France: in the recent past, 60 years after the "defeat" of the EDC, other primary sources were declassified, mostly in Paris. The research has focused on the studies that put this issue in the perspective of historiography. Several French works about the EDC could be cited, such as the texts by Clesse A.(Le projet de C.E.D. du Plan Pleven au "crime du 30 août. Histoire d'un malentendu européen, 1989), by Aron R., Lerner D. eds. (La querelle de la C.E.D. essais d'analyse sociologique, 1956), by Moch J. (Histoire du réarmement allemand depuis 1950, 1965), by Fabre-Luce A. (Lettre sur la CED, 1954) and the essays by Vial P. (Redécouvrir la CED, 1992), by Poidevin R. (La France devant le problème de la CED: incidences nationales et internationales - été 1951 à été 1953, 1983), by Guillen P. (Les chefs militaires français, le réarmement de l'Allemagne et la CED 1950-1954, 1983), by Vaïsse M. (Le général de Gaulle et la défense de l'Europe, 1947-1958, 1992), by Rioux J. P. (L'opinion publique française et la CED: querelle partisane ou bataille de la mémoire?, 1994). With regard to Italian works, studies which stand out for their significance are the studies by Preda D. (Storia di una speranza: la battaglia per la CED e la Federazione europea nelle carte della Delegazione italiana 1950-1952, 1990), by Preda D. (Sulla soglia dell'Unione: la vicenda della Comunità Politica Europea 1952-1954, 1994), by Ballini P. L. ed. (La Comunità Europea di Difesa (CED), 2009), by Bertozzi S. (La Comunità Europea di Difesa. Profili storici, istituzionali e giuridici, 2003), by Caviglia D., Gionfrida A. (Un'occasione da perdere. Le Forze Armate italiane e la Comunità Europea di Difesa 1950-54, 2009). Finally, a series of American and British studies concerning the European Defence Community and the "German question" were appraised, such as the works by Fursdon E. (The European Defence Community: a history, 1980), by Ruane K. (The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community, Anglo-American Relations and the crisis of European Defence 1950-55, 2000), by Lundestad G. (Empire by integration: The U.S. and European Integration, 1945-1997, 1998) by Armitage D. T. jr. (A comparative analysis of U.S. policy toward European defense autonomy. Enduring 3 Dilemmas in Transatlantic Relations, 2008), by Risso L. (Divided we stand: the French and Italian political parties and the rearmament of West Germany 1949-1955, 2007), by Hunter R. E. (The European Security and Defence Policy, NATO's Companion – or Competitor?, 2002), by Hitchcock, W. I. (France restored: Cold War diplomacy and the quest for leadership in Europe, 1944-1954, 1998), by McAllister, J. (No Exit: America and the German problem, 1943-1954, 2002). With regards to the methodology, the research has been conducted following the comparative approach as described by Bloch M. (Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés européennes, 1923), by Braudel F. (Civiltà e imperi del Mediterraneo nell'età di Filippo II, 1976), by Haupt H. G. (European History as Comparative History, 2004 and Comparative History – a Contested Method, 2007).

Durante los últimos años, la disciplina de las relaciones internacionales ha venido incorporando con gran rapidez algunos de los avances tecnológicos más variados. El rápido crecimiento y difusión del internet ha sido un elemento clave en la nueva forma de estudiar y hacer relaciones internacionales. La interconexión casi instantánea de distintas partes del planeta ha permitido que la información (ya sea en forma de texto, imagen o audio) se vuelva un recurso disponible de manera continua y, en gran parte, de forma gratuita o a muy bajo costo. En este contexto, el estudio de las relaciones internacionales ha incorporado en el último tiempo el fenómeno de los blogs y las redes sociales. Esta suerte de "diarios personales" online han crecido exponencialmente sobre todo en los Estados Unidos, donde profesores, académicos y hasta incluso estadistas pueden "postear" en cualquier momento sus opiniones o pensamientos con respecto a temas de la política o la economía internacionales. Asimismo, van más allá de la mera publicación de avisos, comentarios y opiniones, y constituyen un espacio descontracturado y más informal para probar el grado de aceptación de algunas nuevas (y hasta a veces algo alocadas) ideas. En esta oportunidad, analizaremos algunas de las más llamativas de estas nuevas conjeturas publicadas en blogs de académicos y profesores de nuestra disciplina. En especial, vamos a concentrarnos en una cierta moda de los últimos años que se basa en presentar novedosas "teorías" de relaciones internacionales haciendo analogías con series de televisión, personajes de comic, géneros de películas, y hasta incluso con el más vulgar conocimiento popular. Por último, haremos una revisión crítica de la utilidad y propósito de este creciente fenómeno en nuestra disciplina. I Para el estudiante de las relaciones internacionales, ser un conocedor de la "@" y la "www" se ha vuelto algo indispensable. Hoy en día, es casi imposible mantenerse informado de los sucesos del mundo sin el acceso a una buena computadora y una aceptable conexión de internet. No obstante, el poseer la tecnología aún no se equipara con el saber utilizarla; o mejor debiera decir "saber utilizarla bien". Una rápida consulta a un sitio web confiable y consistente nos puede ahorrar cientos de horas de (mal) búsqueda y (mala) lectura. En lo que respecta a la teoría de las relaciones internacionales, un fenómeno reciente ha sido el auge de ciertas nuevas conjeturas teóricas apoyadas en analogías y comparaciones algo superficiales de conocimiento convencional. Estas "teorías bloggeras", como bien podríamos llamarlas, son la moda del momento. Por ello, merecen un análisis cuidadoso y certero de sus fortalezas y debilidades. Comencemos primero por tomarnos los argumentos con la misma seriedad de quienes las postulan, e intentemos luego sopesar los argumentos más en perspectiva. A comienzos del 2009, la revista Foreign Policy abrazó esta nueva tendencia creando una sección especial en su sitio web oficial para que algunos de los más reconocidos académicos y políticos norteamericanos pudieran mantener día a día un registro de sus opiniones y pensamientos. Con la creación oficial de estos blogs de relaciones internacionales, dentro del marco de la revista, no sólo se buscó la promoción comercial de Foreign Policy en sí sino también el entablar un contacto algo más informal y participativo entre los lectores y algunos de sus mayores exponentes. En este marco, Daniel W. Drezner, un reconocido analista internacional y profesor de la Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, en la Tuft University, abrió una caja de pandora en el mes de agosto pasado al publicar una hilarante aplicación de la teoría de relaciones internacionales para entender un hipotético escenario en donde los zombies fuesen reales. En su ensayo, titulado "Teoría de la Política Internacional y los Zombies", Drezner, fiel a su sarcástica pero punzante forma de escribir, lleva casi al extremo algunas de las principales hipótesis neorrealistas, liberales y constructivistas para aventurar cómo verían al mundo cada una de estas escuelas teóricas luego de una invasión zombie. En su ensayo, si bien Drezner se apoya en un estudio matemático realizado por una universidad canadiense con meros fines "explorativos", no existe la más mínima intención de plantear conclusiones con gran seriedad sino más bien de escribir un artículo provocador y bastante divertido. Quienes navegan la web, sin embargo, parecen no haber entendido este último pero crucial punto. Los comentarios al post original de Drezner, por ejemplo, rápidamente fueron subiendo de tono y terminaron generando un exagerado debate (un ya clásico "debate bloggero") que sobrepasa en extensión al ensayo inicial de Drezner. Como el mismo autor lo ha planteado, lo que comenzó como un simple post mañanero ha terminado tomando una vida propia. En los meses subsiguientes, Drezner atendió a los pedidos de sus lectores y de los directivos de Foreign Policy, y preparó un artículo algo más extenso y elaborado que finalmente salió a fines de agosto en el nro. oficial de la revista. Para fines de 2010, Drezner ya ha acordado con Princeton University Press la publicación del libro. Otro de los casos-web más resonantes entre quienes estudian las teorías de relaciones internacionales, es la "teoría geopolítica de Linterna Verde" [sic] propuesta por Matthew Yglesias, un reconocido "bloggero", egresado de Harvard, y devenido en comentarista político online para The Atlantic y The American Prospect. Esta intrigante "teoría" se basa en una analogía con el famoso superhéroe de los comic "Linterna Verde", quien según la historieta conforma un cuerpo interestelar de mantenimiento de la paz. Estos pacificadores son pertrechados con un "anillo del poder" (el arma más poderosa del Universo) para poder llevar a cabo sus misiones. Según relata Yglesias, estos anillos otorgan un poder casi absoluto a quienes los portan. Los límites a su poder se encuentran sólo en los límites de imaginación del portador. Por ello es que se vuelve indispensable que quien porta el anillo posea la capacidad de sobrepasar sus propios miedos. En defintiva, el artículo de Yglesias es un análisis altamente crítico de la forma de entender el mundo durante los años de George Bush hijo. Según el autor, se ha vuelto muy común entender en una misma sintonía a la del "anillo de poder" de Linterna Verde a la actual posición norteamericana de hegemonía global y a los posibles usos de su poder militar. Esta peculiar perspectiva a generado numerosas repercusiones para las finanzas y la economía internacional (por ejemplo, ver aquí y aquí). La gran diferencia entre Drezner e Yglesias, más allá de las credenciales profesionales, es que Drezner no escribió su ensayo con seriedad sino como un divertimento para los entendidos, algo así como un "inside joke". El post de Yglesias, así como el de muchos otros (y que por cuestiones de espacio no veremos aquí) parten del supuesto de que estas "teorías bloggeras" merecen ser estudiadas con profundidad y seriedad. En base a ello, se toman posturas a favor o en contra (generalmente en términos extremos), y se desarrollan largas discusiones online. Sin embargo, aún nadie se ha replanteado cuán útil son estas nuevas conjeturas (más allá de una divertida y corta lectura al paso) para la disciplina de las relaciones internacionales. Es decir, si constituyen un fenómeno constructivo, o si son más bien una pérdida de tiempo. II A la hora de aproximar un análisis crítico de este novedoso (aunque popular) fenómeno de las "teorías bloggeras" de la política internacional, trataremos de no caer exclusivamente en definiciones igualmente extremas tanto a favor como en contra. Veamos también cuáles son los incentivos y los limitantes. En primer lugar, debemos mencionar que, a diferencia de un libro o un artículo académico, la extensión del formato blog es muy limitada. Por ello, las ideas sólo pueden ser presentadas de manera esquemática y reducida, a veces incluso de manera caricaturizada. En este contexto, entonces, no es difícil entender el porqué de la popularidad en el uso de figuras conocidas como superhéroes de los comics, ya que ello ayuda en gran parte a presentar ideas medianamente complejas de manera rápida y efectiva. La tentación pasa, así, por querer evitar las largas pero necesarias explicaciones sobre moralidad y la necesidad de la prudencia en la política internacional, y reemplazarlo todo por una buena cita del Hombre Araña: "con todo gran poder, viene una gran responsabilidad". En segundo lugar, para quienes ocupan un rol semi-institucional en la web, como los mencionados expertos que contribuyen en el blog de Foreign Policy, la presión de escribir dentro de determinados lapsos de tiempo, como por ejemplo: una vez cada tres días, genera un potencial agotamiento de los temas sobre los cuales escribir. No sólo debe uno prestar cuidado a lo que escribe, sino a cómo lo hace. Los tiránicos plazos de tiempo de la web claramente conspiran contra la calidad de muchos de los posts de relaciones internacionales. Al constante apuro de publicación, debe sumársele el corto tiempo para procesar los argumentos y sopesar las conclusiones que ello mismo conlleva. Por lo general, un buen argumento o hipótesis necesitan de un profundo proceso de peer-review antes de salir al mundo. De esa manera, nacen con más solidez y aumentan su calidad académica ya que atienden las potenciales críticas con anticipación. El caso de Drezner merece ser tenido en cuenta porque es, indiscutiblemente, el caso paradigmático de esta nueva tendencia. De un simple post, a un artículo, y próximamente a formato libro, su "teoría" es una primera experimentación en la posible utilidad didáctica (tal vez) de ejercitar con las teorías tradicionales de la disciplina. Sin embargo, no debe olvidarse que si hay algo que justifica la existencia de la "teoría de relaciones internacionales", ello es que debe ayudar a quienes toman decisiones en nombre del Estado. Dudo mucho que la publicación de un libro sobre "la problemática zombie en las relaciones internacionales" ayude a alguien más que a su autor, financieramente. En definitiva, creo que esta nueva oleada de conjeturas teóricas en clave popular si bien es un ejercicio muy didáctico, divertido y algo descontracturante para quienes estudiamos estos temas día a día, no debe tomarse muy en serio. Tampoco debieran disparar, por ejemplo, largos debates desde posturas extremas o, ni mucho menos, en términos absolutos, como ya lo ha dicho Obi-Wan Kenobi. Si de hacer analogías se trata, creo que difícilmente pueda uno encontrar una mejor fuente de creatividad e inspiración, e incluso de fuentes didácticas, que la infalible literatura. El señor de las moscas de William Golding, Rebelión en la granja, de George Orwell, o El hombre que era jueves, de Gilbert Chesterton, por ejemplo, vienen a la mente. Las modas, en definitiva, son sólo eso: indicadores de tendencia y cosas pasajeras. Sin embargo, la teoría debe basarse en la esencia de las cosas, en lo perdurable. Por todo ello, sigo sosteniendo, no hay nada como los clásicos. *Profesor, Universidad Abierta Interamericana (UAI), Buenos Aires. Maestría en Estudios Internacionales,Universidad Torcuato di Tella (Tesista).

Epic, historic, momentous, transformational. In a word- saturated environment, it is hard to find a term powerful enough to describe the significance of this election for the American psyche. A few vignettes from history may help us grasp this idea better than any hyperbolic epithets. When Frederick Douglass came to the White House, which had been opened to the public to celebrate President Abraham Lincoln's second inauguration in 1865, he was not allowed in. The freed slave, by then a well-known author, abolitionist, activist and orator, sent his card in to the President, who immediately ordered him admitted. In 1901 President Theodore Roosevelt was severely criticized for inviting writer Booker T. Washington to a private dinner at the White House. Thirty years later, his niece, first lady Eleanor Roosevelt received the same vociferous criticism for hosting several African Americans as guests in the White House, including soprano Marion Anderson in 1939. Of course, the practice of receiving black guests in the presidential residence became much more accepted as African Americans were elected to high office in the sixties and seventies. But the journey for the inclusion of the black race has been a long and arduous one for this country, and it will culminate in poetic symbolism this coming January, as Barack and Michelle Obama and their two daughters make the White House their residence. This is a remarkable achievement that all Americans are proud of, and a powerful unifying force for the nation, as mentioned by John McCain in his gracious concession speech on Tuesday night. Barack Obama ran a brilliant, disciplined campaign which will be analyzed for years to come for its innovative use of technology, its break with traditional funding methods and the pervasive influence of the leader 's personality which set a positive tone, an optimistic aura that trickled down to millions of volunteers and contributors. Obama captured the spirit of the times, anticipated the extent to which the country was ready for a change before anyone else did, and proposed a vision that mobilized millions behind him. He was the only one able to take the pulse of the nation and grasp its mood. Eight years of unresponsive and irresponsible leadership, of a lingering war that could not be won, of unimaginable depredation of their cherished values and foundational ideals, had brought Americans to the verge of a nihilistic self-hate. If Obama's intelligence enabled him to perceive this mood, his audacity propelled him forward to seek the higher office in order to change it. Because he believes in the resilience of the country himself, he was able to spark the last bit of fire and illusion left at the bottom of the American heart. He spoke of unity and human dignity; of changing the distorted image the rest of the world has of America, of using diplomacy rather than force, of consulting with allies and talking to enemies. Leaving ideologies aside, he focused on what we all have in common and not on what divides us. And America heard him. His campaign was mainly geared toward the digital generation, and that is where he found his base. Building on Howard Dean's use of the Internet for financing and organizing his own grassroots campaign during the 2003 Democratic primary election, he perfected a technological platform from which he reached millions of citizens. His email list for daily announcements had eight million addresses, eight hundred thousand people registered in mybarackobama.com to get direct information from the campaign and the candidate himself into their mobile phone text messaging systems, and thirteen million people contributed money through the internet. He had one million and a half cyber volunteers who got special training and connected with affinity groups already in existence, such as Democracy for America and the more radical Moveon.org. His field volunteers could choose between training at local headquarters and attending "night school" on the web. By September 1st, the date of the official start of the presidential campaign once both conventions were over, he had amassed four times more money than his opponent. That led him to opt out of public financing, being the first candidate to take this decision since federal funding was established in the 1970s. He took a gamble and won: in September alone, he was able to raise 153 million from small donors on the internet, while McCain, who stopped accepting donations in order to be eligible for public funds, had to content himself with the $84 million received under that program. The contagious optimism and low-key approach that characterize the candidate was also found in every field office, every phone bank volunteer, and every neighborhood canvassing team. The lack of internal disputes and the positive atmosphere earned his campaign the nickname of "No Drama Obama" and the candidates as well as his close team of advisers deserve full credit for it. He started with a small circle of inner political advisors who had worked with him during his Senate run. Talent and serenity, no prima donnas and no big egos, were the main qualifications. In a new version of J.F. Kennedy's The Best and the Brightest, he drew on his friends from Harvard and Columbia, and his colleagues and students from the University of Chicago as the next circle of supporters and advisors. They helped him recruit five hundred paid political operatives among the best in the business, and an army of volunteers. They mounted a huge voter registration operation and a get- out -the vote campaign that would pay off immensely on Election Day. In difficult times during the campaign, David Axelrod, his chief strategist says, Obama and his team would regain their motivation focusing on what he would be able to achieve once in the White House. During the lowest point of his campaign, the Reverend Jeremy White controversy, after brainstorming for a while, Obama decided to make a speech on race as he saw it, based on his own experience and perspective. If he could not persuade Americans of his good faith, he would lose and go back to the Senate, he told his closer advisors with his usual cool detachment that belies a disciplined tenacity and a passion for his call of service to the country. That speech was hailed as exceptional, and was well-received by all races and creeds; it generated a consensus seldom forthcoming on such a divisive topic. The result of these efforts, from the vision that inspired it all to the organizational strengths, was reaped on election night, when he won over 61% of the youth vote, 98% of the African American vote, 67% of the Hispanic vote, 56% of the women's vote, 47% of white men. He also won the Independents vote, as well as the Catholic and even some of the Evangelical vote. This broad based coalition is also reflected in a geographical shift, with the inroads he made into Republican territory by winning Virginia, North Carolina, Indiana, Ohio, Nevada and Colorado as well as Florida. There is no denying that this represents a major political realignment, even if it is too early to evaluate whether these demographic and geographical changes are permanent. But they do reflect changes in the economy, with economic power flowing away from major urban centers and into new states such as Virginia and Colorado. This transfer of economic power brings about demographic change and, ultimately, a shift in political power. Obama put it with subtlety when he said: "There are no red states and blue states; there is the United States of America." Now the major question being posed these days is whether President Obama will be able to govern as flawlessly as he campaigned and whether he will make good on his promise of bipartisanship. He has quite a few good options to do this when choosing his cabinet: moderate Republican Robert Gates could, for example, be asked to stay on as Secretary of Defense, or Chuck Hagel, a Republican Senator that was outspoken on his opposition to the Iraq war could replace him. Colin Powell's name has been suggested for Secretary of Education. Obama has already announced that his first measures will be on the economy, namely, a stimulus package to spur employment, extension on unemployment benefits and more attention to the implementation of legislation already passed on mortgage foreclosures. Given the economic crisis and the huge bailout package that will have to be administered by the incoming administration, the Treasury Secretary will be the most important cabinet member. Here Obama will probably choose a Democrat such as former Clinton Secretary Treasurers Larry Summers or Bob Rubin, or perhaps younger Timothy Geithner, President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank. A larger question is whether Obama will be bold or cautious in his first decisions. President Reagan was of the idea that what a president does not get done during the first year of his tenure, goes into oblivion and does not get done at all. Since the center of the political spectrum decided the election and gave him a strong mandate, he will need to address their concerns first. For example, by giving the middle class the promised tax cuts, and financing those by letting Bush's tax cuts on the wealthy elapse. Health care reform is also a possibility, to demonstrate his commitment to voters, but one that would cost a lot and take time to implement. The main difficulty he faces lies in the conundrum of how to do something bold without enlarging the trillion dollar budget deficit he is inheriting, and all without raising taxes. A neo-Keynesian approach is likely, with, for example, the government ignoring the deficit for a while, and investing in a huge renewable energy program, thereby creating thousands of green jobs and meeting two campaign promises with one bold stroke. He could also opt for highly symbolic actions, such as closing Guantánamo and delivering the prisoners to the US regular court system. Politically, he has a mandate for this, but there may be some legal sticking points that might protract the process and thus not render it so symbolically effective. Whatever he decides to do, the transition period will set the tone for the rest of his administration. He thus needs to do it right, lay out his vision of a national purpose and work towards it in a bipartisan and transparent way, avoiding the temptation of governing with the Democratic legislature only, to the exclusion of the Republican minority. The same mobilized digital-age generation that gave him this victory will be monitoring his every move, assessing the results and sharing their opinions on blogs and chat rooms. Since Obama has his sights set on the long-term, he will try his best not to disappoint. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

de 2002 à novembre 2007 since 2002 to 2007 (november) ; Since 1948, the Middle Eastern conflict is an important issue in international relationships and Law. During that year, the British mandate on Palestine collapsed and the State of Israel was created. But, yet, at the beginning, a war between Sionists, Arabic countries, and Palestinians fixes « borders » between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Moreover, in 1967, a new issue appears, the relationships with the Occupied Territories. Consequently, Israel has two questions about its borders to manage : the classical question of borders between States and an internal question with the Palestinians about a new State. This research tries to demonstrate the ways used by local and international partners to find a solution to this legal question, cause of the local instability and widely. This work is founded on Law, History, Political Science (particularly, the study of Arabist and Sionist ideologies during the XXth century) and international relationships. All these elements will permit us to find a coherence about failures and successes since 1948 in the story of the Middle East and the fact that the State of Israel has only two borders internationally recognized with Jordan and Egypt, more than 50 years after its birth. ; La question moyenne-orientale est dans l'actualité depuis 1948. C'est en cette année que se crée l'Etat d'Israël sur les décombres du mandat britannique en Palestine. Dès le commencement, la guerre va commencer à fixer les frontières entre Israël et ses voisins arabes. Cependant, après 1967, une nouvelle question va apparaître, celle des relations avec les Territoires occupés. En conséquence, l'Etat d'Israël aura deux questions frontalières à gérer : la question interétatique classique et la question interne avec les Palestiniens. Cette recherche tente de démontrer les voies employées par les différents acteurs régionaux et internationaux pour trouver une solution à cette question juridique qui cause l'instabilité régionale. On s'appuiera sur le droit, l'Histoire, la science politique (en particulier, l'étude des idéologies sioniste et arabiste) et les relations internationales pour trouver une cohérence aux réussites et aux échecs qui ont émaillé l'histoire du Moyen-Orient depuis 1948 et le fait qu'Israël n'ait encore que deux frontières internationalement reconnues, une avec l'Egypte et l'autre avec le royaume de Jordanie.

International audience ; Au département "idées et philosophie politique" du Monde des Lettres, Joseph de Maistre semble devoir incarner pour longtemps encore le profil illuminé archétype du polémiste contre-révolutionnaire que l'on sait, doublé d'un papiste non moins convaincu. Même si de telles étiquettes, toutes commodes qu'elles soient parfois, dans leur outrance didactique, rendent en réalité fort mal compte du caractère beaucoup plus singulier, de l'essence autrement multiforme d'une proposition intellectuelle que ce qu'en a retenu le sens commun, ainsi que nous le montrent les études récentes, peu à peu dégagées de toute sédimentation polémique partisane, au fur et à mesure que s'éloigne le souvenir, daté, d'une revendication idéologique de la réception de l'œuvre.Mais l'on oublie trop souvent, jusqu'au sein de la pourtant savante corporation des historiens de feu les États de Savoie, combien il fut également, lui, l'enfant de ce duché berceau de la dynastie éponyme, l'un des observateurs majeurs, à la lucidité souvent visionnaire ès qualité d'acteur d'importance, de ce complexe politique en surcis à l'heure dramatique où la Révolution, comme partout ailleurs en Europe, lui inocule le germe d'une modernité institutionnelle bientôt incompatible avec ses organes ancestraux sinon archaïques. Substitut puis Sénateur auprès le Sénat de Savoie, il entretient dans la décennie 1780, à l'approche de la quarantaine, une correspondance administrative nourrie avec le Cabinet turinois prouvant qu'il est sans doute à la veille d'une promotion aux fonctions d'Intendant en Val d'Aoste, à Nice, ou pourquoi pas en Piémont, lorsque les événements révolutionnaires viennent brouiller ces plans de carrière pour le jeter au contraire sur les routes aventureuses de l'exil. Mi attaché d'ambassade, mi espion agitateur dans la Suisse des années 1790, le voilà maintenant auprès de son souverain, au début de la décennie suivante, du fait de l'avancée des troupes napoléoniennes en Gaule cisalpine de jadis. Mettant à profit la retraite forcée de Sardaigne, il s'attaque donc avec l'énergie du désespoir, sur injonction officielle, languissant de revoir un jour les paysages riants des possessions de Terre Ferme, à la réforme jusqu'alors sans cesse différée du système judiciaire comme à la rédaction des coutumes de l'île. Juste le temps, l'espace de deux années, de dresser un état des lieux et de lancer la lourde machine législative avant que l'on ne l'envoie là bas, aux confins de la Chrétienté, jouer les ambassadeurs aussi poudrés que désargentés d'un prince fantomatique, presque deux décennies durant, dans les salons antichambres du palais impérial du Tsar de toutes les Russies, sa Majesté Alexandre. Puis retour à Turin, pour y mourir un rien amer, en parfait romantique, avec le titre cependant flatteur de Régent de la Grande Chancellerie royale, soit à peu de choses près la qualité de nos actuels Ministres de la Justice et Gardes des Sceaux.Personnage atypique, Joseph de Maistre développe ainsi au cours d'une carrière placée sous le signe exclusif de la fidélité indéfectible à ses princes, essentiellement de manière diffuse, en filigrane d'une œuvre épistolaire à part entière, (si l'on excepte la prose des premiers pamphlets contre-révolutionnaires, ou celle des premiers mémoires techniques de l'épisode helvétique, encore marqués par un évident utilitarisme militant), une analyse institutionnelle et politique passionnée de ces États de Savoie. Analyse raisonnée, souvent véhémente à l'encontre d'un autoritarisme tatillon contreproductif, aux constats sévères par conséquent, mais exercice exempt d'aveuglement sentimental envers le système institutionnel de cette Patrie aujourd'hui évanouie envers laquelle son attachement quasi atavique a été souvent si mal compris. N'est-il pas tentant, dès lors, de tenter une reconstitution de cet exposé développé l'espace d'un demi siècle, sur les milliers de feuillets épars d'une correspondance volumineuse, par l'un des témoins majeurs de la difficile mue à la modernité d'États de Savoie condamnés à disparaître dans le concert des Grandes Nations ?

International audience ; Au département "idées et philosophie politique" du Monde des Lettres, Joseph de Maistre semble devoir incarner pour longtemps encore le profil illuminé archétype du polémiste contre-révolutionnaire que l'on sait, doublé d'un papiste non moins convaincu. Même si de telles étiquettes, toutes commodes qu'elles soient parfois, dans leur outrance didactique, rendent en réalité fort mal compte du caractère beaucoup plus singulier, de l'essence autrement multiforme d'une proposition intellectuelle que ce qu'en a retenu le sens commun, ainsi que nous le montrent les études récentes, peu à peu dégagées de toute sédimentation polémique partisane, au fur et à mesure que s'éloigne le souvenir, daté, d'une revendication idéologique de la réception de l'œuvre.Mais l'on oublie trop souvent, jusqu'au sein de la pourtant savante corporation des historiens de feu les États de Savoie, combien il fut également, lui, l'enfant de ce duché berceau de la dynastie éponyme, l'un des observateurs majeurs, à la lucidité souvent visionnaire ès qualité d'acteur d'importance, de ce complexe politique en surcis à l'heure dramatique où la Révolution, comme partout ailleurs en Europe, lui inocule le germe d'une modernité institutionnelle bientôt incompatible avec ses organes ancestraux sinon archaïques. Substitut puis Sénateur auprès le Sénat de Savoie, il entretient dans la décennie 1780, à l'approche de la quarantaine, une correspondance administrative nourrie avec le Cabinet turinois prouvant qu'il est sans doute à la veille d'une promotion aux fonctions d'Intendant en Val d'Aoste, à Nice, ou pourquoi pas en Piémont, lorsque les événements révolutionnaires viennent brouiller ces plans de carrière pour le jeter au contraire sur les routes aventureuses de l'exil. Mi attaché d'ambassade, mi espion agitateur dans la Suisse des années 1790, le voilà maintenant auprès de son souverain, au début de la décennie suivante, du fait de l'avancée des troupes napoléoniennes en Gaule cisalpine de jadis. Mettant à profit la retraite forcée de Sardaigne, il s'attaque donc avec l'énergie du désespoir, sur injonction officielle, languissant de revoir un jour les paysages riants des possessions de Terre Ferme, à la réforme jusqu'alors sans cesse différée du système judiciaire comme à la rédaction des coutumes de l'île. Juste le temps, l'espace de deux années, de dresser un état des lieux et de lancer la lourde machine législative avant que l'on ne l'envoie là bas, aux confins de la Chrétienté, jouer les ambassadeurs aussi poudrés que désargentés d'un prince fantomatique, presque deux décennies durant, dans les salons antichambres du palais impérial du Tsar de toutes les Russies, sa Majesté Alexandre. Puis retour à Turin, pour y mourir un rien amer, en parfait romantique, avec le titre cependant flatteur de Régent de la Grande Chancellerie royale, soit à peu de choses près la qualité de nos actuels Ministres de la Justice et Gardes des Sceaux.Personnage atypique, Joseph de Maistre développe ainsi au cours d'une carrière placée sous le signe exclusif de la fidélité indéfectible à ses princes, essentiellement de manière diffuse, en filigrane d'une œuvre épistolaire à part entière, (si l'on excepte la prose des premiers pamphlets contre-révolutionnaires, ou celle des premiers mémoires techniques de l'épisode helvétique, encore marqués par un évident utilitarisme militant), une analyse institutionnelle et politique passionnée de ces États de Savoie. Analyse raisonnée, souvent véhémente à l'encontre d'un autoritarisme tatillon contreproductif, aux constats sévères par conséquent, mais exercice exempt d'aveuglement sentimental envers le système institutionnel de cette Patrie aujourd'hui évanouie envers laquelle son attachement quasi atavique a été souvent si mal compris. N'est-il pas tentant, dès lors, de tenter une reconstitution de cet exposé développé l'espace d'un demi siècle, sur les milliers de feuillets épars d'une correspondance volumineuse, par l'un des témoins majeurs de la difficile mue à la modernité d'États de Savoie condamnés à disparaître dans le concert des Grandes Nations ?

Ziele und Befunde der Arbeit Das durchgeführte Forschungsvorhaben zeigt durch einen holistischen, gleichzeitig politikwissenschaftlichen wie auch historischen Ansatz Folgendes: Nämlich, warum und wie das liberale, regelbasierte Weltordnungssystem im Untersuchungsraum der US-Präsidentschaften von Clinton bis Obama kontinuierlich durch ein System der realistischen, kurzfristig wirkenden Durchsetzung vitaler Interessen mittels militärischer Instrumentenpräferenz unter fortlaufender militärischer Optimierung ergänzt bzw. ersetzt wird. Dies erklärt auch, warum die "transaktionale Führung Trumps"(1), die nach dem Untersuchungsraum von 1993 bis 2017 mit Außenwirkung die Reduktion idealistischer "Grand Strategy"-Elemente bzw. wohlwollender Ordnungsmacht unter Kostenabwälzung und Vorteilsverringerung europäischer Nato-Verbündeter vornimmt, in Kontinuität zur ausgeübten Führungsmacht der Amtsvorgänger steht. Ergebnisse dieser Dissertation wie die sich ab 1993 immer nachdrücklicher abzeichnende Auflösung der multilateralen Grundordnung legen damit nahe, Trumps bisherige Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik als deutlich spürbares Krisensymptom und nicht als Ursache dieses Abbaus der nach 1945 eingerichteten Weltordnung einzustufen. Diese Auflösung ist mit einer Erosion des letztlich transatlantisch angestoßenen bipolaren "amerikanischen Systems" gleichzusetzen. Die Implementierung dieses Systems erfolgte als "Lernstunde zweier Weltkriege" auf Basis der mit der Aufklärung und den amerikanischen Gründungskennziffern eingeleiteten neuzeitlichen Ordnungskonzeptionen: Daher ist diese Auflösung auch ein Indikator für das Scheitern neuzeitlicher Ordnungskennziffern, die sich im "American way of life" entfalten konnten. Als ursächlich für die geschilderte Entwicklung wird eine von Clinton bis Obama konstant ansteigende Gesamtbedrohung nachgewiesen, mit der die konsequente Schwächung amerikanischer Vormacht verknüpft ist. Diese fußt u.a. auf der Basis von seit 1979 postulierten Klimawandeleffekten als Bedrohungsverstärker bei erreichter amerikanischer Förderspitze in fossilen Rohstoffen und ansteigendem Ressourcenbedarf im Kontext schrumpfender Rohstoffvorkommen. Weiter sind für den Untersuchungsraum die zunehmende Einwirkung der in den 1980er Jahren begonnenen "US-Konservativen Revolution" auf die Ausübung der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik unter Einflusszugewinn von Konzernen und Lobbygruppen auf beispielsweise policy-Implementierung sowie die neuen Rahmenbedingungen zu addieren. Darunter fallen die sich ausformende Digitalisierung, die hohen Ressourcenverbrauch mit sich bringt, und die ansteigende Weltbevölkerung unter spezifischen demographischen Vorzeichen. Darüber hinaus sind beispielsweise die Beibehaltung des bipolar angewachsenen Rüstungssektors als ökonomische Basis militärischer Vormacht und das langsame Abbröckeln der Dollar-Hegemonie seit etwa 1973 zu berücksichtigen. Durch komplexes Zusammenspiel von "Grand Strategy"-Umsetzung gemäß der Prämisse amerikanischen Führungsmachtausbaus unter neokonservativem bzw. christlich-rechtem Einfluss mit asymmetrischen sowie reaktivierten konventionellen Bedrohungsgegenständen, Bedrohungsverstärkern und neuen Rahmenbedingungen wird der lineare Verlauf der Gesamtbedrohung im Zeitraum von 1993 bis 2017 verständlich: Im Kontext der "Grand Strategy"-Ausführungen erklären insbesondere das Bedrohungsabwehr-, Bedrohungsverstärker- und Marktwirtschaftsverständnis der US-Far Right in komplexer Wechselwirkung mit erstarkenden transnationalen Konzernen, Lobbygruppen, Individuen(2), informellen Netzwerken und staatlichen Akteuren in Bezug auf Bedrohungsgegenstände sowie Bedrohungsverstärker(3) im Zusammenhang mit der post-bipolaren, globalen Verankerung amerikanischer Wirtschafts- und Konsummuster das Folgende: Nämlich die Anpassung der amerikanischen Bedrohungsabwehr - unter Aufbau der "imperial presidency"(4) bzw. Einhegung des Systems von "checks and balances" - samt deren Implikationen auf das bipolare liberale Ordnungssystem. Sodann wird die notwendige Weiterführung in der Nato durch amerikanisch aufgeworfenen Nato-Umbau zur entsprechenden Umsetzung transformierter amerikanischer Bedrohungsabwehr bzw. Legitimierung der systemischen Anpassung begreifbar. Genauso wird nachvollziehbar, dass die so eingerichtete Bedrohungsabwehr nur kurzfristig abwehrt: Stattdessen verstärkt sie asymmetrische und konventionelle Bedrohung wie auch Bedrohungsverstärker - unter Einleitung von Rüstungsspiralen bzw. Demontierung der Rüstungskontrolle - und damit die Gesamtbedrohung. Dies lässt einen Konfliktausbruch jenseits des bisher Vorstellbaren konstant näher rücken. Gleichzeitig ist der dringende Bedarf an Mobilisierung der transatlantischen Zusammenarbeit im Hinblick auf Förderung der globalen Kooperation staatlicher, aber auch nichtstaatlicher Akteure hinsichtlich der Bedrohungswurzeln samt der sich verschlechternden Voraussetzungen illustriert: Denn mit jedem Anstieg der Gesamtbedrohung ist durch die eingeleitete amerikanische sicherheitspolitische Anpassung und deren Weiterführung in der Nato ein Abbau der regelbasierten Basiskennziffern im Untersuchungsraum verknüpft. Dies reduziert in fortlaufender Konsequenz die Grundlage für oben genannte, konstant zentraler werdende Zusammenarbeit, um eine sukzessive Erosion des bipolaren "amerikanischen Systems" unter künftigen Dystopien zu verhindern bzw. zumindest zu begrenzen. Durch die Forschungsergebnisse wird der bisherige Forschungsstand auf den Kopf gestellt, da so beispielsweise gezeigt werden kann, dass mittels der Transformation der Nato keine gleichberechtigte transatlantische Lastenteilung oder eine Weiterentwicklung der Nato gemäß der Nato-Gründungskennziffern erzeugt wird. Dies gilt auch für den europäischen Widerstand gegenüber der tatsächlichen Verankerung der Natotransformationspositionen(5), der auf die Erosion des bipolaren liberalen Ordnungssystems bzw. der US-Vorteilsgewährung sowie so begünstigter Partikularinteressensicherung abhebt. Außerdem wird deutlich, dass eine Kontinuitätslinie in der Bedrohungsabwehr von Clinton bis Obama unter unterschiedlicher Außenwirkung und dem Grundmuster "Battleship America" vorliegt - und eben nicht eine multilateral ausgerichtete Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik unter Clinton, die als Folge von 9/11 in einen unilateralen Pendelausschlag unter G. W. Bush 43 mündet, der durch die Obama-Administration wieder zurückgenommen wird. Die Arbeit basiert auf einer umfassenden Fülle an Literatur, die das aufwendige Literaturverzeichnis widerspiegelt: Darunter fallen vielfältige amerikanische und europäische Publikationen, Monographien und entsprechende Sekundärliteratur, wie Biographien, Veröffentlichungen unterschiedlichster Natur wichtiger Vertreter der transatlantischen Forschungselite, Akteure der entsprechenden Politikplanung und -ausführung und wissenschaftliche Artikel aus Fachzeitschriften zu allen Forschungsbereichen bzw. politikwissenschaftlicher Methodik und Theorie. Weiter wurden u.a. Veröffentlichungen bzw. relevante Dokumente von Regierungen, Außenministerien, Verteidigungsministerien, Regierungsorganen, Denkfabriken, universitären Forschungszentren sowie der Nato verwendet. Struktur der Arbeit Konkret ist die vorliegende Dissertation in zwei Bände sowie einen Anhangsband unterteilt: Band 1 umfasst Schwerpunkt 1, eine Prozessanalyse unter offensiver neorealistischer Verortung, Band 2 den darauf aufbauenden Schwerpunkt 2, einen Vergleich ("structured focussed comparison") unter defensiver neorealistischer Verortung. Im Anhangsband finden sich ergänzende Ausführungen zu Kapitel 1, Band 1 in Bezug auf den Forschungsstand, Literatur und Quellenlage, theoretische Verortung sowie Wahl des Untersuchungsraumes bzw. ausgewählter europäischer Nato-Partner. Weiter sind ein historisches Kapitel als Voraussetzung zum "process-tracing" in Kapitel 2, Band 1 und ein Abbildungs- und Abkürzungsverzeichnis wie auch ein Literaturverzeichnis enthalten. Insgesamt ermitteln die beiden aufeinander aufbauenden Schwerpunkte mittels qualitativer Methoden das Folgende: Nämlich die übergeordnete amerikanische sicherheitspolitische Reaktion auf eine neue Gesamtbedrohung sowie deren Weiterführung und Legitimierungschance in der Nato im Untersuchungsraum von Clinton bis Obama. Auf Basis des ersten Teils der Hypothese wird in Schwerpunkt 1, Band 1 ein Zusammenhang zwischen der Beibehaltung des bipolaren "US-Grand Strategy"-Ziels amerikanischer Führungs- und Ordnungsmacht sowie bipolarer außenpolitischer "Grand Strategy"-Kennziffern bzw. einer sich komplex entwickelnden neuen Gesamtbedrohung, amerikanischer sicherheitspolitischer Anpassung und der notwendigen Weiterführung in der Nato durch Natotransformation mittels amerikanisch aufgeworfener Natotransformationspositionen hergestellt. In Schwerpunkt 2, Band 2 wird auf Basis des zweiten Teils der Hypothese der transatlantische Aushandlungsprozess zur Etablierung der amerikanisch vorgeschlagenen Natotransformationspositionen in Augenschein genommen: Vor diesem Hintergrund wird überprüft, ob diese tatsächliche Verankerung bzw. Konkretisierung des Ausbaus amerikanischen Vormacht am Widerstand der ausgewählten europäischen Nato-Bündnispartner Frankreich, Deutschland und Großbritannien scheitert. Im Gesamtergebnis zeigt sich, dass aufgrund einer sich entwickelnden komplexen, linear ansteigenden Gesamtbedrohung die Chance zum Ausbau amerikanischer Führungsmacht konstant abnimmt. Dies muss mittels amerikanischer sicherheitspolitischer Anpassung kompensiert werden. Die daher erfolgende amerikanische sicherheitspolitische Neuausrichtung auf Basis der eingeleiteten "Revolution im Militärwesen" modifiziert wiederum die Kennziffern bipolarer kollektiver Sicherheitsgewährleistung. Alles wird mittels tatsächlicher Verankerung der amerikanischen Natotransformationspositionen ermöglicht bzw. legitimiert. Das tatsächliche Erreichen der - die sicherheitspolitische amerikanische Anpassung konsequent weiterführenden - Transformation der Nato ermöglicht eine missionsorientierte, reaktionsbeschleunigende, flexible und globale Sicherheitsprojektion. Außerdem ist die Voraussetzung für "alliances of choice" innerhalb der Nato geschaffen. Weiter zementiert die Modifikation der "bipolaren Nato" die mittels sicherheitspolitischer amerikanischer Anpassung eingeleitete Erosion zentraler zivilisatorischer Errungenschaften bzw. Aufgaben bipolarer kollektiver Sicherheitsgewährleistung unter Vorteilsverringerung europäischer Nato-Bündnispartner. Die tatsächliche Verankerung der Natotransformationspositionen erfolgt mittels der Reaktivierung konventioneller Bedrohung im Kontext der Ukraine-Krise von 2014 und der Erweiterung der Nato-Partnerschaftsringe auf globaler Ebene, ohne diesen den Status eines Nato-Mitgliedsstaates zu gewähren. Damit wird der Bündnisfall nicht globalisiert. Der ausgeübte deutsch-französische Widerstand wird besonders intensiv durch den Einbezug der europäischen Gründungsstaaten befördert, dagegen unterbleibt die Ausbildung einer europäischen Führungstroika durch Frankreich, Deutschland und Großbritannien. Darüber hinaus zeigt insbesondere die entsprechende Ursachenermittlung, dass trotz konstanter, aufeinander aufbauender amerikanischer sicherheitspolitischer Reaktion unter unterschiedlicher Außenwirkung sowie tatsächlicher Weiterführung in der Nato die Gesamtbedrohung nicht langfristig abgebremst wird: Dies führt zu einem konstanten Anstieg der Gesamtbedrohung unter fortlaufendem Einflussverlust staatlicher Akteure bzw. Machtdiffusion und -konzentration samt einer sukzessiven Chancenerhöhung reaktivierter konventioneller, nuklearer, Cyber- und ökologischer Zerstörungsszenarien. Auf dieser Basis entsteht die Konsequenz einer immer umfassenderen und die Reaktion beschleunigende Präzisionsabwehr unter ansteigender Versicherheitlichung, um die kontinuierliche Einengung amerikanischer Vormacht auszugleichen. Dies erzeugt im Fortlauf einen konstanten Abbau der Strahlungs- und Schlagkraft des liberalen, regelbasierten, bipolaren "amerikanischen Systems" sowie der Etablierung "idealistischer, liberaler" "Grand Strategy"-Elemente. Weiter ist damit - auf der Grundlage der aufeinander aufbauenden Natotransformationspositionen sowie Obamas "smart power"(6) im Untersuchungsraum - eine zunehmende Vorteilsverringerung der europäischen Nato-Verbündeten bzw. ein ansteigender Bedarf an US-Kostendämpfung verquickt. Zudem entwickelt sich eine immer geringer werdende Chance zur Entfaltung des postbipolar als "nicht verhandelbar" postulierten und global ausgebreiteten amerikanischen Lebensentwurfes in individueller, innerstaatlicher Ausprägung: Deren Artikulation erfolgt beispielsweise mittels zunehmendem Rechtspopulismus, Wahl von Außenseiterkandidaten, Zerfall traditioneller Parteiensysteme, isolationistischen Tendenzen unter ethnischer, regionaler Erstarkung, und Ablehnung von Supranationalität oder religiösem Fundamentalismus. Gleichzeitig ist die fortlaufende Erosion der globalen öffentlichen Güter identifizierbar. Damit ebnet all das oben Genannte den Boden für die Begrenzung amerikanischer wohlwollender Ordnungsmacht bzw. der Handlungsspielräume staatlicher Akteure - und für die Rückkehr zu klassischer Machtpolitik im Kontext entstandener Machtdiffusion bzw. -konzentration. Dies erschwert angesichts der Dringlichkeit einer langfristigen Eindämmung asymmetrischer bzw. konventioneller Sicherheitsbedrohungsgegenstände, -verstärker, -cluster und globalen Rahmenbedingungen folgende Chance: Nämlich die zu transatlantischer Zusammenarbeit in der Nato unter Wiederbelebung der politischen Organisation derselben sowie Erweiterung auf zusätzliche Ebenen und Akteure im Sinne von Vorbeugung bzw. vernetzter Sicherheit zur Erreichung entsprechender globaler Kooperation in Bezug auf Einhegen der Bedrohungswurzeln. Insgesamt wird durch diese Forschungsarbeit transparent, wie und warum die für den Untersuchungsraum von 1993 bis 2017 antizipierte "Friedensdividende" und das durch Präsident Clinton postulierte "age of hope" kaum spürbar wurden. Fußnoten (1) Vgl. Braml, Josef (2018), Trumps transaktionaler Transatlantizismus, in: Jäger, Thomas (Hrsg.), Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Oktober 2018, Volume 11, Ausgabe 4, S. 439-448, Wiesbaden. (2) Vgl. National Intelligence Council (Hrsg.) (2012), Global Trends 2013: Alternative Worlds (NIC 2012-001), https://publicintelligence.net/global-trends-2030/, letzter Zugriff: 12.04.19. Vgl. dazu auch das "international financial leadership, self-selected at Davos" bei McCoy, Alfred W. (2017), In the Shadows of the American Century. The Rise and Decline of US Global Power, Chicago. (3) Vgl. zu Bedrohungsverstärkern beispielsweise Mazo, Jeffrey (2010), Climate Conflict. How global warming threatens security and what to do about it, London, Abingdon. 1990 wurde bereits in Bezug auf den Bedrohungsverstärker Klimawandel für die entstehenden asymmetrischen bzw. konventionellen Bedrohungsgegenstände komplexe Cluster konstatiert: "Over the next half century, the global average temperature may increase by approximately 4 degrees C. (…) All nations will be affected. (…) How much time will there be to confirm the amount of change and then to act? (…) However, many believe that we will have waited too lang to avoid major dislocation, hardship and conflict - on a scale not as yet seen by man". Vgl. Kelley, Terry P. (1990), Global Climate Change. Implications For The United States Navy (The United States Naval War College, Newport, RI), http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/weather/climatechange/globalclimatechange-navy.pdf, letzter Zugriff: 30.03.19. Dies lässt Hinweise auf die sich entwickelnde, konstant ansteigende Gesamtbedrohung im Untersuchungsraum von 1993-2017 zu. (4) Vgl. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. (1973), The Imperial Presidency, Boston. (5) Die amerikanisch vorgeschlagenen Positionen zur Anpassung der Nato, die Nato Response Force sowie die Global Partnership Initiative, werden als "Natotransformationspositionen" bezeichnet: Mit deren tatsächlicher Etablierung war eine Transformation der Nato in konsequenter Weiterführung amerikanisch erfolgter sicherheitspolitischer Anpassung verknüpft. (6) Smart power geht auf Suzanne Nossel, Mitarbeiterin des UN-Botschafters Holbrooke während der Clinton-Administration, zurück: Vgl. Nossel, Suzanne (2004), Smart Power. Reclaiming Liberal Internationalism, http://www.democracyarsenal.org/SmartPowerFA.pdf, letzter Zugriff: 26.08.17. Weiter wird er Joseph Nye im Jahre 2003 als Reaktion auf die unilaterale Konzentration auf das militärische Instrument der G.W. Bush–Ära zugeschrieben. Vgl. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2011), The Future of Power, New York bzw. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2011), Macht im 21sten Jahrhundert. Politische Strategien für ein neues Zeitalter, München. Vgl. Rodham Clinton, Hillary (2010), Leading Through Civilan Power. Redefining American Diplomacy and Development, in: Foreign Affairs, November/December 2010, Vol. 89, No.6, S. 13-24. ; Aims and findings of the dissertation The completed research uses holistic, politological and historical approaches to present how, during the studied period of the administrations of Clinton to Obama, the liberal, rule-based world order system is gradually supplemented and replaced by a system of realist imposition of vital interests that have short-term effects, preferring military means combined with continuous military optimisation. This also explains a continuity between the leading-power policy of administrations in this study (1993-2017) and the subsequent period of the "transactional leadership of Trump"(1), with its recognizable, far-reaching effects of aiming to reduce idealistic Grand Strategy elements and measures of a benevolent order by passing on costs to and reducing the benefits of European NATO allies. The results of this dissertation, such as the increasingly evident dissolution of a multilateral fundamental order, therefore indicate that Trump's foreign and security policy to date should be regarded as a clearly noticeable crisis symptom, rather than the cause of a decline in the world order established after 1945. This decline is synonymous with the erosion of the transatlantically initiated bipolar "American system". Its implementation was the result of the "lesson of two world wars", based on modern concepts of order introduced by the Enlightenment and the founding criteria of the United States: thus its dissolution is also an indicator of the failure of contemporary criteria of order that thrive in the "American way of life". The cause of the described development is shown to be a constantly exacerbating overall threat, from Clinton to Obama, which is connected to the consistent erosion of US supremacy. Among other aspects, this is based on climate change effects postulated in 1979, which multiply the threat while coinciding with American peak production of fossil fuels and increased demand on resources in the context of dwindling raw material resources. Furthermore, during the period of this study, the "US conservative revolution", which began in the 1980s, increasingly affected foreign and security policy, combining with a consolidation in the influence of corporations and lobby groups in fields such as policy implementation and new underlying conditions. They include the onset of digitisation, entailing a high consumption of resources, and a growing world population faced with specific demographic indicators. Additionally, the maintenance of the armaments sector, originally a result of bipolar development, as the economic basis of military supremacy and the slow decline of the Dollar hegemony since around 1973, should also be taken into account. Complex interaction between Grand Strategy implementation according to the premise of expanding US-American dominance under neoconservative and Christian Right-wing influences, as well as asymmetrical and reactivated conventional security threats and threat multipliers clearly indicate the linear development of the overall threat in the period between 1993 and 2017: in the context of Grand Strategy statements, above all the understanding of defence against this threat, of the latter's multiplying factors and the market economy explains the following with respect to the US far-right in a complex interaction with the growth of transnational corporations, lobby groups, individuals(2), informal networks and state actors with respect to objects of threat and threat multipliers(3) in connection with the post-bipolar, global anchoring of US economic and consumer patterns: US adaptation of its reaction to this threat – while consolidating imperial presidency(4) and weakening the system of checks and balances – including its implications of a bipolar liberal order. In this way, the necessary continued leadership within NATO through the US-proposed NATO reform can be seen as an appropriate implementation of transformed threat-reaction measures and the legitimisation of systemic adaptation. It equally becomes clear that the established threat reaction measures only provide a short-term defence: instead, they enhance the asymmetric and conventional threat, as well as threat multipliers – by introducing arms races and breaking down arms control – thereby heightening the overall threat. The consequence is the consistently growing likelihood of a conflict of hitherto unimaginable proportions. At the same time, the urgent need to mobilise transatlantic cooperation with respect to supporting global cooperation between state and non-government actors is illustrated with respect to the roots of the threat and its deteriorating underlying conditions: each increase in the overall threat, the adapted US security policy and its continuation in NATO is connected to an erosion of rule-based underlying criteria during the studied period. This continuously and consistently undermines the basis of the above-stated, ever-increasingly important cooperation, to prevent or at least limit the successive erosion of the bipolar "American system" under future dystopias. The research results completely overturn the state of research to date, since for instance it is possible to show that, by means of NATO transformation findings, no transatlantic sharing of burdens on an equal footing and no NATO reform in accordance with its founding principles can be achieved. The same also applies to European opposition to the actual anchoring of NATO transformation positions(5), which is based on the erosion of the bipolar liberal order system and the maintenance of US advantages as well as the consolidation of particular interests they facilitate. Furthermore, it is apparent that a line of continuity in the threat-reaction measures from Clinton to Obama exists with varying external effects, along with an underlying pattern of "Battleship America" – as opposed to a multilaterally orientated foreign and security policy under Clinton, which merged into a unilateral, radical swing under G. W. Bush 43 following 9/11, but was reverted by the Obama administration. A comprehensive wealth of literature was used of the doctoral thesis, as reflected by the extensive bibliography: they firstly include diverse American and European publications, monographs and relevant secondary literature, including biographies, publications of various kinds of important political planning and implementation, as well as collected volumes and research articles from specialist journals on all fields of research and politological methodology and theory. The same applies to publications by leading European and American institutions, research centres and think tanks. Furthermore, this author used publications and documents by governments, foreign ministries, defence ministries, other government bodies and Nato. Dissertation structure This dissertation is divided into two volumes and one Appendix: Volume 1 discusses Focus 1, namely a process-tracing in the context of offensive neorealist positioning. Volume 2 presents Focus 2, which is based on the preceding focus in making a structured, focussed comparison in the context of defensive neorealist positioning. The Appendix volume contains further discussion of Chapter 1, Volume 1 with respect to the state of research, literature and sources, theoretical positioning and the choice of the region of study and selected European NATO partners. Furthermore, a historical chapter provides underlying information for process-tracing in Chapter 2, Volume 1, an index of images and abbreviations, and a bibliography. The entire dissertation uses qualitative methods to focus on these two mutually supporting, building on each other, themes to investigate the following from a US-perspective: firstly the overriding US security-policy reaction to a new overall threat and secondly, its continuation combined with the opportunity of for enabling and legitimising it within and through NATO during the studied period from Clinton to Obama. Based on the first part of this hypothesis, Focus 1 (Volume 1) establishes a connection between, on the one hand, maintaining the bipolar Grand Strategy target of consolidating the USA as a leading, regulating power, bipolar foreign-policy Grand Strategy indicators and a new overall threat that is developing in a complex way, and, on the other, the necessity of its continued leadership within NATO and the required NATO transformation according to US-proposed NATO transformation positions. Focus 2 (Volume 2) is based on the second part of the hypothesis, investigating the transatlantic negotiation process to establish these US-proposed NATO transformation positions: in this context, Volume 2 investigates whether the attempt to actually secure and consolidate such US supremacy was unsuccessful in the face of resistance from selected European NATO partners, namely France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The overall result shows that due to a complex, developing, linear increase in the overall threat, the chance for the USA to consolidate its status as a leading power is steadily diminishing. This must be compensated by adapting US security policy. The resulting American security-policy realignment based on the initiated "revolution in military affairs" in turn modifies the indicators of bipolar collective security guarantees. Everything is enabled and legitimised by means of actually securing US NATO-transformation positions. The actual implementation of such NATO transformation – representing the consistent adaptation of US security policy – enables a mission-orientated, rapid response, flexible, global security projection. It also creates conditions for "alliances of choice" within NATO. Furthermore, the modification of a "bipolar NATO" exacerbates the erosion of key achievements of civilisation as a result of adapted US security policy, as well as undermining the tasks of bipolar collective security guarantees through diminished benefits to European NATO partners. The actual anchoring of NATO transformation positions is achieved by reactivating the conventional threat in the context of the Ukraine crisis of 2014 and the extension of NATO partnership rings on a global level, without providing them with NATO membership status, thus avoiding globalisation in a mutual defence case. The German and French resistance is particularly intensive through the involvement of European founder states, while the formation of a European leadership triumvirate consisting of France, Germany and the United Kingdom does not take place. Moreover, a relevant investigation of causes particularly shows that despite constant mutually supporting US security reaction measures with varying international effects and actual continued leadership within NATO, the overall threat is not receding: this leads to a constant increase in the overall threat, a loss of influence of state actors, the diffusion and concentration of power and the increased probability of reactive conventional, nuclear, cyber and ecological destruction scenarios. On this basis, the consequence is an increasingly comprehensive and rapidly responding precision defence combined with growing securitization to compensate for the ongoing containment of US supremacy. This developing process steadily diminishes the reach and power of a liberal, rule-based, bipolar "American system" and the establishment of "idealistic, liberal" elements of US-Grand Strategy. This entails a further reduction in benefits for European NATO allies and increasing US cost-cutting demands – based on the successive NATO transformation positions that build on each other and Obama's "smart power"(6) during the period studied in this dissertation. Thus the chance is receding of developing the post-bipolar, globally adopted American way of life with individual national character, which is regarded as "non-negotiable": for instance its articulation is expressed through increasing right-wing populism, the election of outsider-candidates, the dissolution of traditional party systems, isolationist tendencies combined with burgeoning ethnic, regional movements, the rejection of supranationalism, and religious fundamentalism. At the same time, the ongoing erosion of global public goods is apparent. This all paves the way to limiting the benevolent American regulating power and state actors' leverage – and therefore to a return to classic power politics in the context of a resulting diffusion and concentration of power. In view of the urgency of a long-term containment of asymmetrical or conventional threats to security, or aspects that exacerbate such threats or clusters thereof, as well as underlying global conditions, this undermines the ability to achieve the following: to achieve transatlantic cooperation by broadening the range of levels and actors in the spirit of proactive and expanded, networked security to achieve according global cooperation with respect to containing the root causes of threats. Overall, this research work reveals how and why the anticipated "peace dividend" and the notion of an "age of hope", as postulated by President Clinton, were hardly perceptible during the period of study between 1993 and 2017. Notes (1) Cf. Braml, Josef (2018), Trumps transaktionaler Transatlantizismus, in: Jäger, Thomas (Hrsg.), Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Oktober 2018, Volume 11, Ausgabe 4, S. 439-448, Wiesbaden. (2) Cf. National Intelligence Council (Ed.) (2012), Global Trends 2013: Alternative Worlds (NIC 2012-001), https://publicintelligence.net/global-trends-2030/, last accessed: 12.04.19. See also the "international financial leadership, self-selected at Davos" cit. McCoy, Alfred W. (2017), In the Shadows of the American Century. The Rise and Decline of US Global Power, Chicago. (3) In 1990, the threat-enhancing nature of climate change was already postulated with respect to asymmetric objects of threat as well as conventional and complex clusters: "Over the next half century, the global average temperature may increase by approximately 4 degrees C. (…) All nations will be affected. (…) How much time will there be to confirm the amount of change and then to act? (…) However, many believe that we will have waited too long to avoid major dislocation, hardship and conflict – on a scale not as yet seen by man". Cf. Kelley, Terry P. (1990), Global Climate Change. Implications For The United States Navy (The United States Naval War College, Newport, RI), http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/weather/climatechange/globalclimatechange-navy.pdf, last accessed: 30.03.19. Cf. Mazo, Jeffrey (2010), Climate Conflict. How global warming threatens security and what to do about it, London, Abingdon. This supports the thesis of a developing, constant overall threat during the period between 1993 and 2017. (4) Cf. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. (1973), The Imperial Presidency, Boston. (5) In this dissertation, the proposed US positions on NATO adaptation, the NATO Response Force and the Global Partnership Initiative are described as "NATO transformation positions": Their actual establishment was connected to a NATO transformation with the consistent continuation of adapted US security policy. (6) Cf. Nossel, Suzanne (2004), Smart Power. Reclaiming Liberal Internationalism, http://www.democracyarsenal.org/SmartPowerFA.pdf, last accessed: 26.08.17, Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2011), The Future of Power, New York, Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2011), Macht im 21sten Jahrhundert. Politische Strategien für ein neues Zeitalter, München, Rodham Clinton, Hillary (2010), Leading Through Civilan Power. Redefining American Diplomacy and Development, in: Foreign Affairs, November/December 2010, Vol. 89, No.6, S. 13-24.

Batı Afrika'nın ekonomik büyümesini hızlandırmak ve Euro'nun tek bir para birliği olarak elde ettiği başarı, Batı Afrika Devletleri Ekonomik Topluluğu'na (ECOWAS) üye devletler için ortak bir para birimi olarak hizmet etmek üzere "eko" önermesine ilham verdi. Bu tez, önerilen para birimi Birliğini ve yaratılmasının bölgenin ekonomik büyümesini nasıl etkileyeceğini inceledi. Tez, para birliği teorileri doğrultusunda betimsel bir istatistiksel analiz uygulamış ve aynı zamanda ortak bir para birliğinin öncü olan Avrupa da dikkate alınmıştır. Üye ülkeler arasında GSYİH, enflasyon oranı, faiz oranı ve ticaretler arası para birliği tesis eden faktörler göz önünde bulundurulmuştur. Şu ana kadar bazı ülkeler düşük enflasyon, düşük faiz ve döviz kuru gibi bazı yakınsama kriterleri elde edebilmişlerdir. Bir para birliği alanı oluşturmak için gereken ekonomik eğilimleri ve diğer kriterleri inceledikten sonra, Batı Afrika Devletleri Ekonomik Topluluğu önerilen eko para birliğiyle devam etmemeli ve mevcut dengesizlikleri gidermek için döviz kurunu, ticaret gelişimini, ve ayrica para birliğinin parasal egemenliğini ele geçirmeye çalışan Fransa meselesini dikkate almalıdır.to me İÇİNDEKİLER Teşekkür…………………………………………………………………………………………i Özet ………………………………………………………………………………………….….ii Özet …………………………………………………………………………………………….iii Şekiller Listesi………………………………………………………………………………….ix Tablolar Listesi ………………………………………………………………………………….xi Önsöz ………………………………………………………………………………………….xvi BÖLÜM 1 ……………………………………………………………………………………….6 1. Giriş ……………………………………………………………………………………….….1 1.1 Arka Plan …………………………………………………………………………………….1 1.2 Problemin Açıklaması ………………………………………………………………….…….2 1.3 Araştırma Hedefleri …………………………………………………………………….……3 1.4 Araştırma Hipotezi ……………………………………………………………………….….5 1.5 Analiz Yaklaşımı………………………………………………………………………….….5 BÖLÜM 2 ……………………………………………………………………………………….6 2.1 Optımum Para Alanı …………………………………………………………………………6 2.1.1 R. Mundell'in Perspektifi …………………………………………………………….……8 2.1.2 R.I. McKinnon'in Perspektifi ……………………………………………………….……10 2.1.3 Y.Ishiyama'in Perspektifi………………………………………………………………….11 2.1.4 Y.Ishiyama'nın Perspektifi …………………………………………….………………….13 2.1.5 G.S. Tavlas'ın Optimum Para Birliğinin 'Yeni' Teorisine Bakış Açısı………………. 25 2.2 Avrupa Birliği ……………………………………………………………… . ……….28 2.2.1 AB Tarihi …………………………………………………………………………………27 2.2.2 Maastrıcht Anlaşması……………………………………………………………………. 33 2.2.3 Avrupa Para Sistemi Krizi………………………………………………………………. 35 2.2.4 Neden Bazı Ülkeler Euro Kullanmıyor?. 36 2.2.5 Euro'nin Avantajları………………………………………………………………………37 2.2.5.1 Çeşitli Makroekonomik Faydalar …………………………………………………….37 2.2.5.2 Döviz Kuru İstikrarı……………………………………………………………………. 37 2.2.5.3 Daha Düşük Faiz Oranı………………………………………………………………….37 2.2.5.4 Yatırım ve Ticaret……………………………………………………………………….39 2.2.5.5 Uluslararası Para Birimi Olarak Hizmet Etmek………………………………………. 39 2.2.5.3 Daha Düşük Faiz Oranı………………………………………………………………….39 2.2.5.6 AB'de İstikrar, Hareketlilik ve Büyüme……………………………………………….39 2.2.5.7 Şeffaf ve Demokratik Kurumların Oluşturulması,……………………………………. 39 2.2.5.8 Ticareti Geliştirme, İnsani Yardım, Diplomasi ve Güvenlik…………………………. 40 2.2.6. Euro dezavantajları……………………………………………………………………….41 2.2.6.1 Teminat Para Birimi Olarak Euro…………………………………………………….41 2.2.6.2 Bazı Ülkeleri Avantajlı Bir Konumda Yerleştirmek…………………………………. 41 2.2.6.3 Avrupa İçi Ticaretin Düşüşü…………………………………………………………….42 2.2.6.4 Transfer Ödemelerindeki Düzensizlikler……………………………………………….43 2.2.6.5 Euro'nun Maliye Politikasını Kullanamaması………………………………………….43 2.2.6.6 Finansal İstikrarsızlık………………………………………………………………….44 2.2.7 Avrupa Bir Optımum Para Alanı mı?. 44 2.2.7.1 Enflasyon ……………………………………………………………………………….44 2.2.7.2. Döviz Kuru …………………………………………………………………………….46 2.2.7.3 Ticarette Açıklık………………………………………………………………………. 47 2.2.7.4 Ücretler ve Fiyat Esnekliği……………………………………………………………. 52 2.2.7.5 İşgücü Hareketliliği (Euro)……………………………………………………………. 53 2.2.7.6 Seçilmiş Euro Bölgesi Ülkelerinde GSYH'nin Payı Olarak Cari Açıklar…………….54 2.2.7.7 Seçilmiş Euro Bölgesi Ülkelerinde İşsizlik Oranları……………………………………54 2.2.8 Avrupa Birliğinde Dört Özgürlük……………………………………………………….55 2.2.8.1 Malların Serbest Dolaşımı………………………………………………………………55 2.2.8.2 Hizmetlerin Serbest Dolaşımı………………………………………………………….56 2.2.8.3 Euro Bölgesinde İşçilerin Serbest Dolaşımı…………………………………………….57 2.2.8.4 Sermayenin Serbest Dolaşımı 57 2.3 BATI AFRİKA DEVLETLERİ EKONOMİK TOPLULUĞU (ECOWAS)………………59 2.3.1 ECOWAS'a Genel Bakış………………………………………………………………….59 2.3.2 ECOWAS'nin Amaçları ve Hedefleri…………………………………………………….62 2.3.3 ECOWAS ün Temel Prensipleri………………………………………………………….64 2.3.4 ECOWAS'in İşlevleri…………………………………………………………………….65 2.3.5 ECOWAS'nın Başarıları………………………………………………………………….66 2.3.5.1 Siyasi İşler, Barış ve Güvenlik………………………………………………………….67 2.3.5.2 Gine Bissau'de Ekova'nın Rolü………………………………………………………….67 2.3.5.3 Fildişi Sahili'nde ECOWAS'ın Rolü…………………………………………………….68 2.3.5.4 Mali'de ECOWAS'ın Rolü………………………………………………………………69 2.3.5.5 Liberya'da ECOWAS'ın Rolü………………………………………………………….71 2.3.5.6 ECOWAS Yakınsama Konseyi Tarafından Makroekonomik Yakınsama Raporunun Kabulü……………………………………………………………………………………………73 2.3.5.7 ECOWAS Para Enstitüsü'nün kurulması (EMI).……………………………………….74 2.3.5.8 Tüm Devlet Mali İşlemlerinin Geçmiş Kayıtlarının Tutulması İçin Bir Kılavuzun Sağlanması . . .74 2.3.5.9 Sahel Bölgesinde Bölgesel Güvenliği Artırmak İçin Bir Eylem Planının Uygulanması.75 2.3.5.10 Tekdüzen Ticaret Geliştirme Stratejisine Giriş ………………………… …………….75 2.3.5.11 Ekonomik Kalkınma Belgesinin İmzalanması…………………………………………76 2.3.5.12 Ortak bir Dış Tarife Oluşturmak ……………………………. …………… ………….76 2.3.5.13 ECOWAS vatandaşlarının Bölgesel Güvenliği Artırmak ve Serbest Dolaşımını Kolaylaştırmak için Biyometrik Kart Tanıtımı………………………………………………….76 2.3.5.14 Sınır Yönetiminde Kılavuz Olarak Hizmet Verecek Bir El Kitabının Sağlanması……77 2.3.5.15 Ecolink 78 adlı Bölgesel Bağlantı Projesinin Başlatılması……………………………78 2.3.5.16 Tüm Finansal İşlemlerin Kaydını Tutmak için Entegre Finansal Yönetim Sisteminin Başlatılması . . .78 2.3.5.17 Üye Devletlerde Kalkınma için Çevre Yönetişimini, Genel Çevre Korumasını, Kapasite Oluşturmayı ve Sürdürülebilir Kaynak Yönetimini Geliştirmeye Yönelik Yenilenen Çabalar…79 2.3.5.18 Seme-Krake Ortak Sınır Karakolu İnşaatı Sözleşmesinin Yeniden İmzalanması (Benin - Nijerya)………………………………………………………………………………………….79 2.3.5.19 Nijerya ile Kamerun Arasındaki Bemenda Yolu ve Bir Joınt Sınır Karakolu (JBP) ve Mfum Sınırında Bir Sınırın İnşası……………………………………………………………….79 2.3.5.20 Batı Afrika Doğalgaz Boru Hattı Şebekesi Fizibilite Çalışması Sonuçlandı………….80 2.3.5.21 Düzenleyici ve Ekonomik Ortamın Düzenlenmesi İle Bölgesel Elektrik Piyasasının Gelişimi………………………………………………………………………………………….80 2.3.5.22 Yenilenebilir Enerji ve Enerji Verimliliği Teknolojileri ve Hizmetlerinin Teşviki….80 2.3.5.23 ECOWAS Üye Devletinde Enerji Verimliliği Binalarını Teşvik Etmeyi Amaçlayan Enerji Verimliliği Binası (EEB) Üzerine Bir ECOWAS Direktifi Ecree Tarafından Geliştirildi.81 2.3.5.24 Bölgesel Hastalık Merkezinin Kurulması…………………………………………….81 2.3.5.25 Bölgesel Güvenliği Güçlendirmek İçin Bir Eylem Planının Hazırlanması……………81 2.3.5.26 Ortak Pazar, Ticaret Liberalizasyon Şeması (TIS) ve Kişilerin, Malların ve Hizmetlerin Serbest Dolaşımı Protokolünün Uygulanmasının Konsolide Edilmesi………………………….81 2.3.5.27 Dakar-Abidjan Koridoru İçin Yardımcı Kanunun İmzalanması ve Bölgesel Elektrik Projesi için İlk Taşın Döşenmesi. Proje Cote D'ivoire, Gine, Liberya ve Sierra Leone'yi kapsıyor ……………………………………………………………………………………………………81 2.3.5.28 Abidjan-Lagos Koridor Otoyolu Uygulama Birimi……………………………………83 2.3.6. ECOWAS'ün Zorlukları………………………………………………………….………83 2.3.6.1 Ticaret Faktörü ve Üye Devletlerin Ekonomisi…………………………………………83 2.3.6.2 Mali Sektör Eşitsizlikleri ve Kötü Ödeme Sistemi…………………………………….84 2.3.6.3 Altyapı ve Düzenleyici Rejimin Zorlukları…………………………………………….84 2.3.6.4 Siyasi İrade Eksikliği……………………………………………………………………85 2.3.6.5 Yolsuzluk ve Siyasi İstikrarsızlık……………………………………………………….86 2.3.6.6 Koloni Aşılamasından Kaynaklanan Zorluklar…………………………………………86 2.3.7 EKO PARA BİRLİĞİNİN……………………………………………………………….87 2.3.8 FRANSA VS. ECO……………………………………………………………………….89 2.3.9 ECOWAS EKONOMİK GÖRÜNÜM……………………………………………………90 2.3.9.1 GSYİH………………………………………………………………………………….90 2.3.9.1.1 ECOWAS Bütçe Fazlası (+) Veya Açığı (-)………………………………………….92 2.3.9.2 Enflasyon……………………………………………………………………………….93 2.3.9.3 Faiz Oranı……………………………………………………………………………….94 2.3.9.4 Döviz Kurları……………………………………………………………………………96 2.3.9.5 Ticaret………………………………………………………………………………….97 2.3.9.6 Ecowas İstihdam Durumu…………………………………………………………….104 2.3.9.6.1 İstihdam………………………………………………………………………………104 2.3.9.6.2 İşsizlik……………………………………………………………………………….106 2.3.10 Eko ve Optimum Para Alanı……………………………………………………………107 3.BÖLÜM…………………………………………………………………………………….109 3. SONUÇ VE POLİTİKA ÖNERİLERİ…………………………………………………….109 REFERANSLAR………………………………………………………………………………112 --- In an attempt to accelerate the economic growth of West Africa, and the success made by the euro as a single currency inspired the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to propose "the eco" to serve as a common currency for member states. This thesis looked into the proposed currency Union and how its creation will impact on the economic growth of the region. The thesis applied a descriptive statistical analysis in line with the theories of the currency union, and also Europe being the pioneer of a common currency was also taken into consideration. Factors for establishing a currency union such as GDP, inflation rate, interest rate, and inter-trade between member countries were considered. So far, some countries have been able to achieve some convergence criteria like low inflation, low interest and exchange rate. After reviewing the economic trends and other criteria needed for establishing a currency union area, the Economic Community of West African States should not proceed with the proposed eco currency and should consider the exchange rate and trade development to remove the imbalances that exist and also should address the issue of France who is trying to hijack the monetary sovereignty of the currency. CONTENTSAcknowledgementsiAbstractiiÖzetiiiList Of FiguresixList Of TablesxiiPrefacexviiCHAPTER 171.Introductioni1.1 Background 11.2 Statement of the Problem 21.3 Research Objectives 31.4 Research Hypothesis 51.5 Analysis Approach 5CHAPTER 262.1Optımum Currency Area62.1.1 Perspective of R. Mundell……………………………………………………………….82.1.1 Perspective of R. I. McKinnon…………………………………………………….……102.1.1 Perspective of Kenan: An Electic View.…………………………………………………112.1.4 Perspective of Y.Ishiyama 132.1.5 Perspective of G.S. Tavlas On The 'New' Theory Of Optimum Currency Union 252.2 The European Union……………………………………………………………….……….282.2.1 History of the EU 282.2.2 The Maastrıcht Treaty 332.2.3 The European Monetary System Crisis 352.2.4 Why Some Countries are not Using Euro? 362.2.5 Advantages of Euro 372.2.5.1 Diverse Macroeconomic Benefıts 372.2.5.2 Exchange Rate Stability 372.2.5.3 Lower Interest Rate 372.2.5.4 Investment and Trade 392.2.5.5 Serving as an International Currency 392.2.5.3 Lower Interest Rate 392.2.5.6 Stability, Mobilıty And Growth Within the EU 392.2.5.7 Establishment of Transparent and Democratic Institutions 392.2.5.8 Trade Promotion, Humanitarian Aid, Diplomacy and Security 402.2.6. Disadvantages of the Euro 412.2.6.1 Euro As A Fiduciary Currency 412.2.6.2 Placing Some Countries in an Advantaged Position 412.2.6.3 The Decline of Intra-European Trade 422.2.6.4 Irregularities in Transfer Payments 432.2.6.5 Failure of the Euro to the use of Fiscal Policy 432.2.6.6 Financial Instability 442.2.7 Is Europe An Optımum Currency Area? 442.2.7.1 Inflation 442.2.7.2. Exchange Rate 462.2.7.3 Trade Openess 472.2.7.4 Wages And Price Flexibility 522.2.7.5 Labour Mobılıty (Euro) 532.2.7.6 Current Account Deficits as a Share of GDP in Selected Euro Area Countries 542.2.7.7 Unemployment Rates in Selected Euro Area Countrıes 542.2.8 Four Freedoms in the European Union 552.2.8.1 Free Movement of Goods 552.2.8.2 Free Movement of Servıces 562.2.8.3 Free Movement of Workers in the Eurozone 572.2.8.4 Free Movement of Capital 572.3 ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) 592.3.1 Overview Of ECOWAS 592.3.2 Aims and Objectives Of ECOWAS 622.3.3 Fundamentals Prıncıples Of ECOWAS 642.3.4 Functions of ECOWAS 652.3.5 Achievements of ECOWAS 662.3.5.1 Political Affairs, Peace and Security 672.3.5.2 The Role Of Ecowas in Guinea Bissau 672.3.5.3 The Role of ECOWAS in Ivory Coast 682.3.5.4 The Role of ECOWAS in Mali 692.3.5.5 The Role of ECOWAS in Liberıa 712.3.5.6 The Adoption of the Macroeconomic Convergence Report by the ECOWAS Convergence Council 732.3.5.7 Establishment of the ECOWAS Monetary Institute (EMI) 742.3.5.8 Provision of a Guide to Keep a Track Record of all Government Financial Transactions.742.3.5.9 Implementation of an Action Plan to Boost Regional Security in the Sahel Region 752.3.5.10 Introduction of a Uniform Trade Development Strategy………………………….752.3.5.11 Signing of the Economic Development Document 762.3.5.12 Establishing a Common External Tariff…………………………….……………. 762.3.5.13 Introducing a Biometric Card to Boost Regional Security and Smooth the Free Movement of ECOWAS citizens……………………………………………………………762.3.5.14 Provision of a Manual to Serve as a Guide in Border Management 772.3.5.15 Launching of the Regional Link Project called Ecolink 782.3.5.16 Launching of an Integrated Financial Management System to Keep Record of all Financial Transactions.782.3.5.17 Renewed Efforts to Enhance Envıronment Governance, General Environmental Protection, Capacity Building as Well as Sustainable Resource Management for Development in the Member States 792.3.5.18 Re-Award of the Contract for the Construction of the Seme-Krake Joint Border Post (Benin – Nigeria) 792.3.5.19 Bemenda Road Between Nigeria and Cameroon and the Construction of a Joınt Border Post (JBP) and a Border at Mfum Border 792.3.5.20 Feasibility Study for the West African Gas Pipeline Network Concluded 802.3.5.21 Development Of Regıonal Power Market With the Settıng Up of Regulatory and Economic Environment 802.3.5.22 Promotion of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Technologies and Services 802.3.5.23 An ECOWAS Directive On Energy Efficıency Building (EEB) Aimed at Promotıng Energy Efficency Buildings in the ECOWAS Member State has Been Developed By Ecree 812.3.5.24 Establishment of a Regional Centre for Disease 812.3.5.25 Provision of an Action Plan to Strengthen Regional Security 812.3.5.26 Consolidating the Implementation of the Common Market, Trade Lıberalızatıon Scheme (TIS) and the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Goods and Services 812.3.5.27 Signing of the Supplemantary Act on Dakar-Abidjan Corridor, and Laying of the Fırst Stone for the Regional Electrıcıty Project. The Project Covers Cote D'ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone 812.3.5.28 Implementation Unit of the Abidjan-Lagos Corridor Highway 832.3.6. Challenges of ECOWAS 832.3.6.1 The Trade Factor and the Economy of Member States 832.3.6.2 Financial Sector Disparities and Poor Payment System 842.3.6.3 Challenges of Infrastructure and Regulatory Regime 842.3.6.4 Lack of Political Will 852.3.6.5 Corruption And Polıtical Instability . 862.3.6.6 Challenges Emanating from Colonıal Hang-Over 862.3.7 ECO CURRENCY 872.3.8 FRANCE VS. THE ECO 892.3.9 ECOWAS ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 902.3.9.1 GDP 902.3.9.1.1 ECOWAS Budget Surplus (+) Or Deficit (-) 922.3.9.2 Inflation 932.3.9.3 Interest Rate 942.3.9.4 Exchange Rates 962.3.9.5 Trade 972.3.9.6 Ecowas Employment Status 1042.3.9.6.1 Employment 1042.3.9.6.2 Unemployment 1062.3.10 Eco and the Optimum Currency Area 107CHAPTER 31093. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS109REFERENCES113

¿Por qué Irán actúa como actúa? ¿Por qué es tan importante entender sus posibles consecuencias? Partiendo del hecho de que la República Islámica está avanzando hacia su status de Estado nuclear (1), tanto la consecución de su objetivo como todo lo que pueda llegar a suceder en el proceso tendrán relevantes implicancias para la política internacional y regional. Sin embargo, dependiendo de las decisiones que tomen los protagonistas, las consecuencias variarán desde la guerra y la tensión permanente hasta la calma y la estabilidad. Utilizaremos las herramientas teóricas que nos proveen las Relaciones Internacionales para intentar comprender los incentivos de Irán para obtener una bomba atómica (2). El objetivo es profundizar un tema tan presente en los medios como poco comprendido en su profundidad.La primer gran pregunta no es si Irán tiene intenciones de conseguir uranio con fines militares, sino qué quiere hacer con esa bomba nuclear una vez conseguida: si lo primero parecería ser un hecho indiscutible, lo segundo es contestable y opinable . ¿Qué sostienen los representantes de la escuela Realista? Muchos de ellos coinciden en que la razón principal por la cual Irán pretende armarse de capacidad nuclear está relacionada con estabilizar la región en un intento por proteger su supervivencia y, así, su interés nacional más vital, en términos de Raymond Aron (3). Para estos analistas, lo más relevante a entender es que fue Israel quien desestabilizó Medio Oriente primero y, por tanto, lo único que procuran los iraníes es devolver a la región la regla deseada en un sistema anárquico: el equilibrio de poder. La disuasión nuclear, sostiene el teórico de la Universidad de Stanford, Avery Goldstein (4), es acaso un medio para equilibrar fuerzas y hacer que el otro lo piense dos veces antes de hacer algo en tu contra. Cuanto más fuerza tiene "B", más disuadirá a "A" a acercársele.Dicho lo anterior, quien fuese originador de la escuela neorrealista, Kenneth Waltz, ha reaparecido en los medios con un fulgurante titular en la última edición de la revista Foreign Affairs, afirmando "Why Iran should get the bomb" (5), continuando con una seguidilla de polémicas tan subjetivas como relevantes. El debate desatado, antes y después de él –y sobre todo en Estados Unidos- se convirtió en un bestseller brillante en cuanto a la calidad de su reparto así como a la acción e incertidumbre que hubo de desatar en los espectadores.Allí, Waltz sostuvo que entender la conducta iraní era tan sencillo como mirar el mapa: por un lado, Irán está rodeado por Pakistán e India, ambos con poder nuclear. Por otro lado, se encuentran Iraq y Arabia Saudita, dos aliados de Estados Unidos y enemigos íntimos suyos. La bomba serviría, en su opinión, para "balancear los tantos", esto es, fortaleciéndolos allí donde la inseguridad ha reinado desde poco después de finalizada la Segunda Guerra Mundial (6). En otras palabras,"History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers" (7). Vale agregar que en su opinión, China, India y Pakistán son ejemplos de que Irán no se saldrá del molde de la historia. Para ello, Waltz argumenta que dicho país no está liderado por irracionales ideológicamente trastornados, sino por "perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other leaders" (8). En esto es apoyado por otros académicos, como el profesor iraní-israelí de la Universidad IDC de Herzlia, Meir Javedanfar. Sin embargo, hay aquí una diferencia sustancial que es importante remarcar: Javedanfar no ve una raison d'etat en la construcción de la bomba (como basa Waltz su análisis al mejor estilo cardenal de Richelieu (9)), sino la mera existencia de intereses particulares del régimen, particularmente del Ayatolah.Otro tema importante es la proliferación que podría generar en la región el hecho de que un país como Irán accediese a la bomba. Si antes dentro del bando árabe-islámico de la región nadie tenía poder nuclear y ahora uno de ellos sí, ¿Acaso eso no generaría un nuevo desequilibrio que llevará a países como Egipto, Turquía y/o Arabia Saudita a sentirse amenazados por Irán y el nuevo status quo, queriendo también acceder a la bomba? Waltz dice que no. Para él, contestándole a Scott Sagan en un famoso debate publicado en The National Interest (10), "Many more states can make nuclear weapons than do", pero sólo lo han hecho pocos por necesidades de supervivencia, como son el caso de Corea del Norte, China o Pakistán. El análisis del padre del neorrealismo es apoyado por otros analistas, como el Politólogo de la Universidad de Chicago, John Mearsheimer (11). Stephen Walt, de la Universidad de Harvard, también se le puede añadir a esta línea (12). De este lado de la moneda puede ubicarse además a dos ex secretarios de Estado de los Estados Unidos, Zbigniw Brzezinski y Brent Scowcroft que, a pesar de no haber expresado explícitamente su opinión de por qué Irán se conduce de la manera en que lo hace, sí han discutido en un reciente libro (13) que es mucho más peligroso el proceso de construcción de la bomba y todo lo que pueda pasar allí que un Irán nuclear. Pero vale la pena subrayar un punto distinto desde el mismo ángulo de comprensión de las Relaciones Internacionales, sostenido por el Profesor Shlomo Ben Ami (14), ex canciller israelí. Según él, todo el discurso anti israelí por parte de Ahmadinejad y compañía es un disfraz diseñado con el objetivo de desviar la atención de los verdaderos enemigo de Irán: el mundo islámico-sunita y el árabe. Vale decir, Irán puede definirse grosso modo como un país persa y de corriente islámica chiita, razón por la cual se siente tan amenazado que la única forma de lograr la atención de los países árabes y suníes como de conseguir su bomba nuclear sin levantar sospechas es escogiendo y atacando a un chivo expiatorio externo a sus múltiples diferencias y, el más sencillo, lo dice la historia, es Israel. Lo último es posible sostenerlo con dos hechos que han sucedido en el pasado reciente y que pueden ser ilustres al respecto: lo que ha develado Wikileaks sobre las acciones diplomáticas del Rey Saudí para derrocar a la "cabeza de la serpiente" (15) (Irán) y los intentos iraníes por matar al embajador saudí (16). En síntesis, un sector relevante de la academia y de los hacedores de política internacional entienden que esta guerra diplomática sin precedentes en cuanto a la impresionante participación de los medios de comunicación mundiales y de la opinión pública no es lo que parece. Mientras la guerra de los misiles de Cuba de 1962 fue tan silenciosa como manejada prudentemente por las administraciones Kennedy y Kruschev –en pleno clímax de la Guerra Fría-, ahora los protagonistas de esta lucha de narrativas dan entrevistas al New York Times sobre lo que opinan del asunto de la misma manera en que lo hacen sobre el desempleo o la salud. Antoine de Exupery (autor de El Principito) habría hecho bien en cederle a este grupo de analistas su frase de que "lo esencial es invisible a los ojos" para este caso puntal: la percepción y la intención real son dos cosas distintas también en la estrategia de los países a la hora de trazar su política exterior. La estrategia verdadera estaría, desde este lado del entendimiento, escondida detrás de una actuación teatral cuyo escenario vendría a ser el mundo entero, y en donde los discursos enfrentados representarían tan sólo a los libretos de la obra. Eso sí: con actores de primer nivel. En fin, este conjunto para nada conciso de respuestas al por qué de la bomba atómica iraní basa su argumentación, en líneas generales, en que Irán responde a intereses nacionales de forma racional, en el cual la supervivencia en un medio hostil es la premisa básica de su accionar. La piedra angular está en que conforme cuenten con una bomba atómica podrán disuadir mucho mejor a cualquier otro Estado que les quiera hacer daño. Además, dicen que no debería existir proliferación una vez que ellos la consigan y que las verdaderas amenazas que siente Irán no son meramente por parte de Israel, sino de sus vecinos árabes y musulmanes sunitas, aunque en esto no hay un verdadero consenso.Próximamente intentaré esbozar el otro gran grupo de puntos de vistas en una segunda entrega de este análisis: uno que ve en Irán una amenaza radical a la estabilidad y a la paz; en la ideología a la comandante principal de la la razón de estado, la cual la aleja de la benevolencia y la acerca al terror de Hizbolla y Hamas, a la negación del Holocausto y a la reencarnación de Hitler en la figura de Ahmadinejad. (1) Por ejemplo, OIEA. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Board of governors. 08.11.2011. http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/2011/IAEA-Nov-2011-Report-Iran.pdf; HAARETZ. Mossad, CIA agree Iran has yet to decide to build nuclear weapon. 18.03.2012. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/mossad-cia-agree-iran-has-yet-to-decide-to-build-nuclear-weapon-1.419300(2) Sostenemos que existen dos grandes líneas de opinión respecto de las intenciones de Irán. Nos basamos para ello en el siguiente análisis: DALTON, Richard. Gulf Kaleidoscope: reflections on the iranian challenge. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Mayo 2012. p.88. http://csis.org/files/publication/120518_%20Alterman_GulfKaleidoscope_Web.pdf(3) ARON, Raymond. Paz y guerra entre las naciones. 1) Teoría y sociología". Alianza Universidad. p.25-132.Madrid, 1985. (4) GOLDSTEIN, Avery. Deterrence and security in the 21st century. Stanford University. EE.UU., 2000. Además, ver: GREEN, Jerrold; WEHREY, Frederic; WOLF, Charles Jr. Understanding Iran. RAND Corporation. 2009; y MAYER, Charles C. National security to nationalism myth: why Iran wants nuclear weapons. Naval postgraduate school. California, 2004.(5) WALTZ, Kenneth. Why Iran should get the bomb. Foreign Affairs. Julio-Agosto 2012. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137731/kenneth-n-waltz/why-iran-should-get-the-bomb(6) COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS). A Nuclear Iran - Promoting Stability or Courting Disaster? EE.UU., 08/02/2007. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xupuaqu_ruk(7) Waltz, Kenneth. op.cit.(8) Ibídem.(9) KISSINGER, Henry. La diplomacia. Fondo de Cultura Económica. p.51.73. México, 1995.(10) THE NATIONAL INTEREST. It's nuclear zero the best option? The great debate. 2010. http://nationalinterest.org/greatdebate/yes-3950?page=1(11) PBS NEWSHOUR. Nuclear-Armed Iran Would Bring 'Stability' But Risks. 09/07/2012. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/july-dec12/iran2_07-09.html(12) WALT, Stephen. Top ten failures on the Iran war debate. Foreign Policy. 11.03.2012. http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/11/top_ten_media_failures_in_the_iran_war_debate(13) IGNATIUS, David. America and the world. Conversations on the future of American Foreign Policy. Basic Books. p.72-78. EE.UU., 2008.(14) BEN AMI, Shlomo. The basis of Iran's belligerence. Haaretz. 07/09/2006. http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/the-basis-for-iran-s-belligerence-1.196710; The abuse of history and the Iranian bomb. Project Syndicate. 03/05/2010. http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-abuse-of-history-and-the-iranian-bomb(15) LA VANGUARDIA. Arabia Saudí y los países árabes exhortaron a EE.UU. a destruir el programa nuclear iraní. 28.11.10. http://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/noticias/20101128/54077636899/arabia-saudi-y-los-paises-arabes-exhortaron-a-ee.uu.-a-destruir-el-programa-nuclear-irani.html(16) MILANI, Moshen. Iran and Saudi Arabia square off. Foreign Affairs. 11/10/2011. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136409/mohsen-m-milani/iran-and-saudi-arabia-square-off.Sobre el autorEstudiante de Estudios Internacionales.FACS. Universidad ORT Uruguay.

¿Qué explica que dos presidentes de dos partidos distintos –Jorge Batlle y Tabaré Vázquez- hayan compartido el objetivo de firmar un tratado de libre comercio (TLC) con Estados Unidos? ¿Qué explica el fracaso de ambos? Estas son las preguntas que exploro en profundidad en el libro "No voy en tren: Uruguay y las perspectivas de un TLC con Estados Unidos (2000-2010)" publicado en Uruguay por la editorial Random House Mondadori en su colección Debate. A modo de adelanto, a continuación exploro las razones del fracaso, que fue sorprendente en la medida que dos presidentes distintos y de polos opuestos del espectro político —Jorge Batlle y Tabaré Vázquez— impulsaron con fuerza la negociación de un TLC y se encontraron, en más de una instancia, una contraparte ávida de llevar la idea adelante.La explicación del «fracaso persistente» en alcanzar (o al menos comenzar a negociar) un TLC con Estados Unidos radica en que quienes impulsaron un TLC con Estados Unidos —tanto en el gobierno de Batlle como en el gobierno de Vázquez— estaban «remando contra la corriente». En otras palabras, los promotores de un TLC estaban impulsando una idea que era altamente —sino totalmente— contradictoria con dos objetivos que contaban con un importante apoyo en el sistema político uruguayo. Estos objetivos eran, en primer lugar, la necesidad de mantener e idealmente mejorar las condiciones de acceso a los mercados del Mercosur. En segundo lugar, la necesidad de preservar «espacio para implementar políticas» de desarrollo, un espacio que se habría reducido significativamente a raíz de los elementos no comerciales (también llamados «nuevos temas comerciales») que son parte de los tratados de libre comercio que firma Estados Unidos (servicios, compras gubernamentales, propiedad intelectual, etc.)La creencia de que era vital mantener e idealmente mejorar las condiciones de acceso a los mercados del Mercosur era compartida por todo el espectro político uruguayo. Para un segmento importante del sector privado uruguayo —los industriales— esta era prácticamente una cuestión de vida o muerte. Es más, para una parte del Frente Amplio no solo era importante que Uruguay mantuviese y mejorase sus condiciones de acceso al mercado regional: era vital que fuera líder en la mejora y consolidación del Mercosur como proyecto de integración profunda.Además, para una parte importante del Frente Amplio —así como para gran parte de la izquierda uruguaya no formalmente vinculada con el Frente Amplio, como el PIT-CNT y otras organizaciones sociales y un grupo importante de académicos— también era muy importante que Uruguay preservara cierto «espacio para implementar políticas» de desarrollo.La posición del Frente Amplio, además, era crítica, ya que a partir de 1999 el Frente Amplio se convirtió —con la fuerza de sus votos, su disciplina partidaria y su capacidad de coordinar acciones con diversas organizaciones sociales, en particular con el PIT-CNT— prácticamente en un actor con derecho a veto (un veto player) en las grandes decisiones nacionales. Y para una mayoría del Frente Amplio un TLC con Estados Unidos era inaceptable, tanto por lo que representaba respecto a la posición de Uruguay en el Mercosur como por lo que implicaba respecto de la pérdida de «espacio para implementar políticas» de desarrollo. Para un sector minoritario del Frente Amplio un TLC con Estados Unidos también era inaceptable porque era, simplemente, con Estados Unidos. Sin embargo este último elemento estuvo lejos de ser el más determinante.La única circunstancia imaginable en que se hubiera podido vencer la resistencia generada en el Frente Amplio por los efectos que un TLC tendría en la participación uruguaya en el Mercosur y en la reducción de los espacios para implementar políticas de desarrollo habría sido que para Uruguay un TLC con Estados Unidos se tratara de una cuestión «de vida o muerte». De hecho, en su teoría acerca de por qué algunos países buscan negociar tratados de libre comercio con Estados Unidos y otros no lo hacen, el politólogo Kenneth Shadlen dice que en América Latina y el Caribe los países que siguen el camino de los tratados de libre comercio son aquellos que tienen un abrumador interés en asegurar el acceso preferencial de sus productos al mercado de Estados Unidos.* La necesidad de que exista un interés abrumador se deriva de los costos reales que tiene un TLC con Estados Unidos, en particular en lo que se refiere a la pérdida de «espacio para implementar políticas». De acuerdo a Shadlen, este interés abrumador en asegurar el acceso preferencial de sus productos se deriva, por su parte, de tener una canasta exportadora «hiperconcentrada» en el mercado de Estados Unidos, con un flujo exportador «hiperconcentrado» en manufacturas livianas (en general, prendas de vestir) que tienen acceso preferencial al mercado de Estados Unidos a través de sistemas de concesiones de preferencias unilaterales como el Sistema Generalizado de Preferencias (SGP) y la Iniciativa para la Cuenca del Caribe o la Ley de Preferencias Arancelarias de los Países Andinos. La razón por la que las manufacturas livianas son importantes en este caso es porque son las más vulnerables a la competencia de los exportadores asiáticos. Lo que vuelve abrumador al interés en asegurar el acceso preferencia al mercado de Estados Unidos es la posibilidad de que las preferencias arancelarias unilaterales —de las que depende gran parte del comercio del país exportador— no sean renovadas en una de las revisiones periódicas a las que están sujetas, a raíz de un cambio en el clima político en Washington. Shadlen denomina al nivel de exportaciones sujeto a este escenario como el nivel «dependencia comercial política» (political trade dependence). La teoría de Shadlen no solo es lógica y persuasiva, también tiene un gran poder de predicción de lo que sucede en la práctica.Uruguay no cumple con esta descripción. Las exportaciones a Estados Unidos representaron, en promedio, el 6% del total de las exportaciones uruguayas entre 1995 y 2000 y 13% entre 2000 y 2005. Los valores para el Mercosur, por su parte, son 49 y 33% y para la Unión Europea 17 y 19% respectivamente (las exportaciones a Estados Unidos, como se vio en el capítulo 4, tuvieron un pico entre el 2004 y el 2005 cuando representaron respectivamente 21 y 23% del total de exportaciones uruguayas). En segundo lugar, hasta el año 2003 las exportaciones uruguayas a Estados Unidos no estaban «hiperconcentradas» en pocas categorías, y las manufacturas livianas —que efectivamente sufrían en el acceso al mercado de Estados Unidos una importante discriminación— cumplían un rol marginal. Las exportaciones de prendas de vestir, que tenían cierta importancia en 1995, se redujeron significativamente. A principios del año 2003, sin embargo, las exportaciones de Uruguay a Estados Unidos comenzaron a «hiperconcentrarse» en un sector: carne bovina. En el 2003, 2004 y 2005 las exportaciones de carne bovina a Estados Unidos representaron el 44,5%, 60,3% y 61,3% del total de exportaciones a Estados Unidos. Pero Uruguay prácticamente no se beneficia del acceso preferencial al mercado de Estados Unidos. Y la carne bovina —el sector donde las exportaciones estuvieron «hiperconcentradas» durante un tiempo— no se beneficia para nada de un acceso preferencial que pueda ser revocable (dejando de lado, claro, los elementos sanitarios). Por el contrario, el tratamiento preferencial para las exportaciones de hasta 20.000 toneladas está garantizado por el acuerdo que concluyó la Ronda Uruguay del GATT.En definitiva, los esfuerzos de negociar un TLC con Estados Unidos no estaban sostenidos en un imperativo comercial de corto y mediano plazo que doblegara la enorme resistencia política que un TLC generaba. ¿Cómo se explica, entonces, que ante una incompatibilidad tan evidente entre la negociación de un TLC y la coyuntura política uruguaya, dos gobiernos distintos hayan creído que la negociación de un TLC era posible?La explicación es que quienes promovieron la negociación de un TLC en los gobiernos de Jorge Batlle y Tabaré Vázquez cometieron serios errores —o, quizás, horrores— de cálculo político que los llevaron a pensar que la negociación y adopción de un TLC era viable políticamente. El primer error cometido —tanto por Batlle como por Vázquez— fue pensar que el deterioro de la situación del Mercosur hacía que el compromiso político con una participación plena de Uruguay en el bloque disminuyera significativamente. Tanto Batlle como Vázquez pensaron que las imágenes provenientes de Argentina (los cacerolazos en el caso de Batlle, los piquetes en Gualeguaychú en el caso de Vázquez) y la disminución de la importancia del Mercosur como mercado para las exportaciones uruguayas —entre otras cosas— terminarían por convencer a quienes todavía creían que el futuro estratégico de Uruguay pasaba por una integración profunda con sus vecinos. La realidad, sin embargo, es que el compromiso con el proyecto Mercosur y con la idea de la integración latinoamericana está muy arraigado en el Uruguay —y no exclusivamente en el Frente Amplio— Además, como se vio anteriormente, el compromiso con el Mercosur no es exclusivamente político. La dependencia comercial existe y tiene peso. En definitiva, a pesar de todos los problemas del Mercosur, Uruguay no estaba pronto para comenzar a desandar su participación plena en el bloque.El segundo error, cometido también en ambos gobiernos, fue pensar que Uruguay podría obtener de los socios del Mercosur la flexibilización para comenzar a desarrollar una política comercial independiente. Aunque hacia fines de 2009 y comienzos de 2010 comenzó a haber señales de que Brasil empezara a considerar la posibilidad de desistir del Mercosur como unión aduanera (en gran medida por las dificultades que eso le impone a su propia agenda externa), la realidad es que durante los gobiernos de Batlle y Vázquez —y en particular en los períodos cuando la posibilidad de negociar un TLC con Estados Unidos estuvo realmente sobre la mesa—preservar al Mercosur como unión aduanera y principalmente como proyecto político era una prioridad absoluta para Argentina y Brasil. Un TLC Uruguay-Estados Unidos (a diferencia del TLC Uruguay-México) habría atentado contra ese objetivo y por lo tanto nunca hubiera sido aceptado. Para cualquier observador medianamente astuto, la posición de Argentina y Brasil era evidente.Finalmente, durante el gobierno de Vázquez se cometió el error de pensar que Uruguay podría obtener flexibilidades de Estados Unidos que le permitieran negociar un «TLC a la uruguaya» que le permitiera a Uruguay vencer la resistencia interna y regional. Este error —síntoma de un profundo desconocimiento de las características de la política comercial de Estados Unidos y del papel de Uruguay en la política exterior de ese país— es quizás el más grave. El hecho de que el presidente Vázquez y todos los ministros involucrados en el tema pensaran que un «TLC a la uruguaya» era una posibilidad es preocupante porque las señales en sentido contrario eran muchas y estaban a la vista.* Shadlen, Ken. 2008. Globalization, Power and Integration: The Political Economy of Regional and Bilateral Trade Agreements in the Americas. Journal of Development Studies 44 (1). *Licenciado en Estudios Internacionales por la Universidad ORT Uruguay, graduado del Diploma en Economía para no Economistas de la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República, y Magíster y Doctor en Relaciones Internacionales por The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Como ya hemos sugerido hace un par de semanas atrás, el carácter anárquico de los asuntos internacionales constituye un punto de partida fundamental y necesario para el estudio de las relaciones internacionales, en tanto disciplina. Partir desde allí, no sólo es importante porque representa un gran cambio del "principio ordenador" del sistema (de un orden jerárquico, como el doméstico, a uno horizontal o descentralizado, como el internacional), sino porque también se encuentra irradiando continuamente fuerzas e incentivos que afectan con profundidad el comportamiento a largo plazo de los actores internacionales. Estas fuerzas e incentivos, como lo destacara Kenneth Waltz (1), no determinan mecánicamente el comportamiento individual de los estados, pero sí constriñen y moldean ciertos patrones de comportamiento a lo largo del tiempo. Una forma de estudiar el papel de estas fuerzas, si nos abocamos al estudio de la guerra y la paz, es analizar el llamado "dilema de seguridad". En este ensayo, presentaré brevemente en qué consiste este "dilema" y cuál es su importancia a la hora de abordar no sólo las causas de la guerra, sino también las condiciones para la paz.La idea de un "dilema de seguridad", propuesta originalmente por John H. Herz en 1950, generó una revisión profunda en los estudios de seguridad de la disciplina ya que por primera vez se logró demostrar convincentemente que el fenómeno de la recurrencia de la guerra a través de los siglos no puede explicarse sólo mediante la referencia a estados expansionistas, con ansias de conquista, ambiciosos territorialmente, o "revisionistas absolutos"; sino que, además de ello, el tipo decontexto de seguridad en el cual se encuentran los estados juega un papel sumamente importante.(2)Así, por ejemplo, el dilema de seguridad nos ayuda a comprender cómo incluso cuando los estados no pretenden individualmente hacer la guerra entre sí, el frágil contexto de desconfianza, de inseguridad y de incertidumbre, y sobre todo de miedo —junto al factor fundamental de la ausencia de una autoridad política central— es suficiente como para que la guerra pueda abrirse camino de forma recurrente. En otras palabras, la anarquía internacional es una "causa permisiva" de la guerra, o una causa indirecta, porque no provoca el inicio específico de ninguna guerra o conflicto internacional, pero sí permanece impávida frente a ello, no erigiendo ningún tipo de obstáculo o desincentivo a la ocurrencia del conflicto.La condición anárquica del sistema genera incertidumbre, la cual da lugar a la desconfianza, que también provoca un profundo dilema según el cual aquellas personas que toman decisiones en nombre de un estado nunca pueden estar "100% seguros" de si sus cálculos sobre las intenciones futuras de los demás son correctos. Todo ello compele a los estados a desconfiar y a competir (necesariamente) en aras de proveerse seguridad, y prevalecer.(3)Como lúcidamente explica Martin Wight, "[t]he fundamental cause of war is not historic rivalries, nor unjust peace settlements, nor nationalist grievances, nor competitions in armaments, nor imperialism, nor poverty […]. The fundamental cause is the absence of international government; in other words, the anarchy of sovereign states. […] In such a situation, mutual distrust is fundamental, and one power can never have an assurance that another power is not malevolent". Y concluye: "Consequently, with the best will in the world no power can surrender any part of its security and liberty to another power".(4)O como el mismo Herz lo ha expresado: a través de los siglos, siempre que han existido sistemas sociales anárquicos en donde las unidades que los conforman son asimismo las instancias últimas de resolución de sus disputas,"there has arisen what may be called the 'security dilemma' of men, or groups, or their leaders. […] Whether man is by nature peaceful and cooperative, or domineering and aggressive, is not the question. […] Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups or individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious cycle of security and power accumulation in on".(5)Esta situación, por su parte, se asemeja a lo que el historiador británico Herbert Butterfield llamó "miedo hobbesiano", o "trágico elemento del conflicto humano".(6) Al igual que Herz, él comprendía que desde una visión con perspectiva, el historiador goza de la capacidad de ver fríamente los sucesos y tiene el desafío de entender cómo el contexto anárquico en el cual los estados existen es la principal fuente por la que el conflicto puede, en primera instancia, emerger una y otra vez. Por ejemplo, dice Butterfield: "The central fact [.] is a certain predicament, a certain situation that contains the elements of conflict irrespective of any special wickedness in any of the parties concerned [.]. In historical perspective we learn to be a little more sorry for both parties than they knew to be for one another". Y así, concluye Butterfield: "Here is the absolute predicament and the irreducible dilemma [.] here are the ingredients for a grand catastrophe. The greatest war in history could be produced without the intervention of any great criminals who might be out to do deliberate harm in the world".(7)Sin embargo, a pesar del pesimismo al cual fácilmente pudiera llevar esta comprensión del dilema, la historia demuestra claramente que la cooperación y el mantenimiento de la paz sigue siendo posible, aún bajo los efectos de la anarquía.(8)Esta es otra de las comunes confusiones de la literatura. Básicamente: la creencia en que allí donde existe un dilema de este tipo no puede existir la paz o diversos tipos de orden (¡incluso por períodos prolongados de tiempo!). Es, además, esta misma confusión la que lleva —erróneamente— a creer que sólo es posible hablar de "zonas de paz", como actualmente se hace en Sudamérica, a través de la eliminación (más que nada intelectual) del "dilema de seguridad".Ciertamente, la situación de "continua competencia" implícita en la concepción realista de la política internacional no significa que la guerra tenga lugar todo el tiempo y en todo lugar. El dilema de seguridad puede ser mitigado (aunque aún nunca ha sido resuelto), y ello puede incluso generar períodos de paz que a veces alcanzan muchos años de duración. El Concierto Europeo, por ejemplo, creado por las potencias europeas luego de la derrota de Napoleón, es uno de esos casos. Pero justamente es este mismo ejemplo el que sirve para comprender el verdaderodilema: si bien es posible la cooperación y la paz bajo anarquía, y más allá del corto o largo período por el que ello se prolongue, la competencia y el conflicto revertirán en el largo plazo todo esfuerzo cooperativo. Sin la comprensión de estos elementos, es imposible entender cómo es que aún los más fuertes ejemplos de cooperación entre los estados, a lo largo de los siglos, ulteriormente han dejado de existir.De todas formas, si bien el dilema puede ser atenuado o mitigado en el tiempo —aunque no sin gran dificultad—, el mismo no puede ser trascendido de una manera sencilla, ya sea a través de la creación de instituciones o por actos de conciencia individuales.(9) Como tan claramente lo explica Butterfield: "The supporters of the new diplomacy, which has emerged since the opening of the epoch of world-wars, like to tell us that the whole problem we have been discussing does not exist, because it ought not to exist. In any case, there is no Chinese puzzle at all, they say, for, whatever the issue might be, we could easily dispose of it by referring it to a conference or sending it to the United Nations. Against these specialists in wishful thinking it must be asserted that the kind of human predicament which we have been discussing is not merely so far without a solution, but the whole condition is a standing feature of mankind in world-history. [.] And if the issue which divides the world at a given moment were referred to a conference table, then, though many good things might be achieved, we should not have eliminated the predicament which was most crucial—we should merely find it transplanted into the bosom of the conference itself".(10)A la luz de esta discusión, se hace imprescindible para todo aquel abocado al estudio de la seguridad internacional, el comenzar no sólo con adquirir un profundo respeto y comprensión del carácter anárquico de las relaciones internacionales, sino también por analizar los efectos que el dilema de seguridad ejerce por sobre los estados. Un punto central para todo estudiante de estos asuntos es no ceder jamás a la complacencia intelectual de lo que prediquen sus teorías predilectas y, en su lugar, seguir buscando formas inteligentes de mitigar y construir orden en un tan precario, endeble e indiferente contexto como es el de la política internacional.(1) Ver Kenneth N. Waltz, El Hombre, el Estado y la Guerra (Buenos Aires: Nova, 1959); y Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, ma: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979).(2) Ver Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma", pp. 157-180. Ver también Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?", en Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal, pp. 90-121.(3) Una buena explicación de la interconexión entre estos elementos puede encontrarse en Stephen Van Evera, "The Hard Realities of International Politics",Boston Review,Vol. 17, No. 6 (November–December 1992), p. 19; y Mearsheimer,Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2001), cap. 1.(4) Martin Wight, Power Politics, ed. por Hedley Bull y Carsten Holbraad (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, riia), pp. 101-2.(5) Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma", World Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2 (January, 1950), p. 157.(6) Ver Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951), pp. 21, 22, 16, 20. En su Power Politics, Wight también se refiere a esta condición como "Hobbesian predicament", p. 142., o "Hobbesian fear", por ejemplo: "Wars are fought for many different causes […] But all particular causes of war operate within the context of international anarchy and the Hobbesian fear", p. 102.(7) Butterfield, History and Human Relations, pp. 15, 17.(8) Ver Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma", World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited", World Politics, Vol. 50, No. (October 1997), pp. 171-201; Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help", en Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal, pp. 122-63; Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays in International Politics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962); Marc Trachtenberg, "The Problem of International Order and How to Think About It", The Monist, Vol. 89, No. 2, pp. 207-31; y Trachtenberg, "The Question of Realism: An Historian's View", Security Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Autumn 2003), pp. 156-94. Para dos importantes críticas y reformulaciones, cfr.Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias"; y Helen Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique", Review of International Studies Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 1991): pp. 67-85.(9) Ver Butterfield, History and Human Relations, pp. 27-28.(10) Butterfield, History and Human Relations, pp. 31-2. *Tesista de la Maestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, Argentina