In the 15-years I have served in the United States Army, the focal point of my tactical and academic study has been almost entirely centered on the Middle East and its unique cultural complexities. As an Infantryman, I was embroiled in the early efforts to prevent a Sunni-Shia civil war in post-invasion Iraq, while also hunting down al-Qaeda operatives under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. A year later, during General Patraeus's troop surge, I was in the urban sprawl of Northwest Baghdad fighting not only a Sunni insurgency, but also the Iranian-backed Jaysh al-Mahdi, comprised of local Shia militia groups. In 2010, I led a battalion reconnaissance team in the Arghandab River Valley of Afghanistan against the Taliban near the very birthplace of their Salafi-jihadist movement. In subsequent years, following my graduation from the Special Forces Qualification Course, I served in the 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) on a variety of missions in support of Operation Inherent Resolve in Turkey and Syria. As a fluent Arabic speaker, I was heavily involved in early efforts to train and equip the Free Syrian Army for its fight against the Islamic State. Following this deployment, I served as a liaison officer to the United States Embassy and Turkish General Staff in Ankara, having daily interaction with foreign dignitaries, defense attachés, and military officials in strategic level planning and coordination efforts. I culminated my time with 5th SFG as the assistant operations sergeant of a detachment fighting the Islamic State in Syria. My understanding of the culture of jihad, the various jihadist groups operating throughout the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, and the intricacy of Middle Eastern problem sets as a whole, has come from years of dedicated cultural analysis, in-depth study of Sunni and Shia Islam, and field experience from the strategic to the tactical level. It is because of this experience that I am compelled to discuss the culture of jihad in the 21st Century. ; Winner of the 2020 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the College of Graduate and Continuing Studies Degree Completion category. ; 1 The Culture of Jihad in the 21st Century Michael J. Bearden Norwich University SOCI401: Cultural and Anthropology Studies Dr. Timothy Maynard April 30, 2020 2 The Culture of Jihad in the 21st Century In the 15-years I have served in the United States Army, the focal point of my tactical and academic study has been almost entirely centered on the Middle East and its unique cultural complexities. As an Infantryman, I was embroiled in the early efforts to prevent a Sunni-Shia civil war in post-invasion Iraq, while also hunting down al-Qaeda operatives under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. A year later, during General Patraeus's troop surge, I was in the urban sprawl of Northwest Baghdad fighting not only a Sunni insurgency, but also the Iranian-backed Jaysh al-Mahdi, comprised of local Shia militia groups. In 2010, I led a battalion reconnaissance team in the Arghandab River Valley of Afghanistan against the Taliban near the very birthplace of their Salafi-jihadist movement. In subsequent years, following my graduation from the Special Forces Qualification Course, I served in the 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) on a variety of missions in support of Operation Inherent Resolve in Turkey and Syria. As a fluent Arabic speaker, I was heavily involved in early efforts to train and equip the Free Syrian Army for its fight against the Islamic State. Following this deployment, I served as a liaison officer to the United States Embassy and Turkish General Staff in Ankara, having daily interaction with foreign dignitaries, defense attachés, and military officials in strategic level planning and coordination efforts. I culminated my time with 5th SFG as the assistant operations sergeant of a detachment fighting the Islamic State in Syria. My understanding of the culture of jihad, the various jihadist groups operating throughout the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, and the intricacy of Middle Eastern problem sets as a whole, has come from years of dedicated cultural analysis, in-depth study of Sunni and Shia Islam, and field experience from the strategic to the tactical level. It is because of this experience that I am compelled to discuss the culture of jihad in the 21st Century. 3 Since its beginning in circa 610 CE, when the prophet Muhammad ibn Abdullah was visited by the angel Gabriel in a cave near Mecca, Islam has shaken the foundations of the Middle East and remained in a state of near-perpetual conflict with the Western world. Islam is an Arabic term most closely relating to the English words submission or surrender. Mujahedeen, or holy warriors, spread this new religion by the sword throughout Asia, forcing the "submission" of thousands, and have hardly been at peace with their neighbors since. Centuries later, in the two decades following the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the United States, radical Islam's stance against the West has altered the diplomatic landscape between the world's great powers, fundamentally changed the United States' national strategic direction, and caused youth from all walks of life to sacrifice the best years of their lives in holy war to protect the supra-national community of Islam. From the invasion of Afghanistan to the subsequent invasions of Iraq and Syria to the ongoing peace talks with the Taliban, diplomatic and military efforts to eradicate jihadists from the Middle East have to-date been nearly ineffectual. Not only have these efforts failed to contain or defeat jihad, but at times have served to strengthen Islamic extremists' resolve in their call to arms against the West. Because jihad is such a fundamental part of the Islamic faith, it can never be "defeated" in the sense of traditional military eradication of an enemy force, but it can be confronted, contained, or refocused, as this paper will address. I argue that enabling local solutions and promoting education, alongside tailored surgical strike and security cooperation operations where necessary, are the keys to confronting, containing, and countering jihad. 4 Background Defining Jihad and Salafism Jihad is a transliterated form of the Arabic word meaning to struggle or to strive. In the traditional teachings of the Islamic faith, jihad is broken into two distinct categories: Greater jihad and lesser jihad. Greater jihad includes the personal struggle against selfish desires, emphasizing discipline and morality, as well as the struggle against Satan and the forces of evil. It includes jihad of the heart, jihad of the mind, and jihad of the tongue, involving praise for those who follow the will of Allah and correction for those who have gone astray (Gorka, 2016). The second category, lesser jihad, is viewed as the struggle against the enemies of Islam and the defense of its people. Lesser jihad is commonly referred to as Jihad of the Sword. Gorka (p. 60) reveals that, over time, this category of jihad has been used as justification for at least seven different subsets of holy war: 1. Using holy war to build an empire 2. Going after apostate regimes or individuals 3. Revolting against non-pious Muslim leaders 4. Fighting against the forces of imperialism in Muslim lands 5. Countering the West's pagan influence 6. Guerrilla warfare against a foreign invader 7. Using jihad as justification for terrorist attacks against civilian targets In a broad sense, lesser jihad can be viewed as offensive or defensive martial action. On the offensive side, jihadists use religion to justify building an empire, such as the Islamic State, attack apostate regimes, like those of the Taliban against Afghan government forces, and use terrorism against civilians, like the attacks on the World Trade Center. This offensive action 5 often takes jihadists beyond the borders of the ummah, or the people of Islam, striking fear into hearts of unbelievers around the globe. The defensive variety, especially in recent history, has most often correlated directly with the use of guerrilla warfare against foreign invaders, such as al-Qaeda's attacks on the international military coalitions that invaded Afghanistan and Iraq. This radical view of Islam is mostly practiced by those who follow the way of the Salafi, or the pious predecessors from the time of Muhammad, who experienced Islam in its purest form. It is believed that the first three generations who practiced the teachings of the prophet Muhammad are the ones who all Muslims thereafter should try to emulate. Themes of Salafism focus on complete adherence to sharia law, the fight against apostate Muslim regimes, and the spread and protection of Islam and its followers. At its core, Salafism is a very traditionalist view of Islam and has been practiced by multiple 21st Century terrorist organizations. The terms jihad and Salafi have shared such a close relationship in the last few decades that they have become nearly synonymous, at times described as Salafi-Jihadism or Jihadi-Salafism (Gorka, 2016; Nilsson, 2019) What Cultural Influences Lead One to the Path of Jihad? Before the attacks on 9/11, the largest call to jihad answered by the international Muslim community was in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Stopping the spread of communism and defending the ummah against the atrocities of Russian ground forces was seen as a noble and just cause for young Muslim men, and not just among Muslims (Gorka, 2016; Nilsson, 2019). Many nations, including the United States, funded, equipped, and trained the Afghan mujahedeen (those who conduct jihad) for the fight against the Soviet empire. Jihad in the 21st Century has been viewed in a much different light, as it is most closely associated with acts of extreme violence against Western nations. While the piles of rubble that used to be the 6 World Trade Center smoldered, and a gaping hole scarred the wall of the Pentagon, people of the world were forced to ask themselves, "How could a person do this? Why would someone take their own lives and thousands of others in the name of Allah?" Religious Justification for Jihad. Though jihad has become almost entirely associated with Islamic holy war, the term itself is still simply the Arabic word for striving. Struggling against one's selfish desires, striving to maintain traditional values, and defending a community against a common enemy are not just Islamic concepts, they are universal to most tightly-knit cultures. Similarly, Christians and Jews are taught self-discipline, adherence to moral codes, and defending their belief against enemies of their faith. So, why has the Islamic flavor of this common cultural theme become so violent, causing deep unrest around the world in our modern era? Verses from the Qur'an can begin to unpack why horrific public executions, suicide bombings, and advocating for generalized violence against non-Muslims may be justifiable in jihadist culture. The Qur'an (2015) lays out the following decree in chapter 9, verse 29: Fight those from among the People of the Book who believe not in Allah, nor in the Last Day, nor hold as unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have declared to be unlawful, nor follow the true religion, until they pay the tax with their own hand and acknowledge their subjection (p. 208). My personal study of Islam and conversations with Muslims in the field revealed that this bit of prose has been used as motivation and justification for jihad by groups like al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the Islamic State, and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham of our modern age. Some of the following themes are evident in the translation: 7 • Jews and Christians are recognized as People of the Book, but are required to accept the following—Allah as the one true god, sharia as the acceptable law, and Islam as the one true religion. • If Jews and Christians refuse to accept these statutes, they must pay a tax called the jizyah to show their subjugation. • If they refuse to do either of these, they are to be put to the sword (p. 208). Salafi-jihadist groups such as the Taliban and Islamic State have tried to revive the jizyah tax in areas under their control. Likewise, hundreds of Christians, Jews, and even Muslims who refuse to adhere to strict sharia law have been publicly executed. This vehement enforcement of arcane Islamic law is seen as a return to the purest form of Islam, as pious as the first few generations who followed the Prophet Muhammad. Another common religious cultural theme that ties these jihadist organizations together is a message of religious oppression. They preach to young Muslims that the Islamic world is under siege by the West and that their god, their value systems, and their way of life are being threatened by the evils of capitalism and democracy (Venhaus, 2010). In joining organizations like al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, young men from across the globe find a sense of purpose and direction in their cause to protect the ummah. This theme is manifested in the teachings of Anwar al-Awlaki, the spiritual leader of al-Qaeda and the father of home-grown terrorism in the United States. He calls on Muslims living among those in the West: How can your conscience allow you to live in peaceful coexistence with a nation that is responsible for the tyranny and crimes committed against your own brothers and sisters? How can you have your loyalty to a government that is leading the war against Islam and Muslims? Hence, my advice to you is this, you have two choices: either hijra [migration 8 to an Islamic land] or jihad. You either leave or you fight. You leave and live among Muslims or you stay behind and fight with your hand, your wealth, and your word. I specifically invite the youth to either fight in the West or join their brothers on the fronts of jihad: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia (as cited in Gorka, 2016). This way of thinking is also captured in chapter 9, verse 5 of the Qur'an (2015): Kill the idolaters wherever you find them and take them prisoners, and beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they repent and observe Prayer and pay the Zakat, then leave their way free (p. 204). When taken literally, as they are by followers of Salafi-jihad, scriptures such as these leave no choice. To these men who have committed themselves fully to the ways of the pious ones, they are compelled to become shahid, or martyrs in the protection of the ummah. The Qur'an promises paradise for those who do: Surely, Allah has purchased of the believers their persons and their property in return for the Garden they shall have; they fight in the cause of Allah, and they slay and are slain—a promise the He has made incumbent on Himself in the Torah, and the Gospel, and the Qur'an. And who is more faithful to his promise than Allah? Rejoice, then, in your bargain which you have made with Him; and that it is which is the supreme triumph (p. 222). The concept of becoming a martyr in the struggle for Islam is romanticized by jihadist groups, like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, and even state governments in local programming. In Lebanon, Mothers of Martyrs are interviewed to share the stories of their sons' glorious end while fighting abroad against the infidels (Venhaus, 2010). The Qur'an itself calls this sacrifice the supreme triumph for a jihadist, striving for the glory of Allah. 9 Though enforcing the jizyah, publicly executing those who do not follow sharia law, and seeking opportunities to kill infidels through suicide attacks represent a very small, extremist cultural sect of Islam, each of these practices is still justifiable if one looks to the Qur'an. This could be viewed as no different than a rural Pentecostal church in the Deep South who maintains strict standards for how women must dress and act: it all comes down to interpretation and a community's willingness to subjugate themselves to these standards. Spiritual leaders of jihadist groups in the 21st Century have used the Qur'an as continued justification for a variety of cruel, inhumane, and brutal actions that served to shock the West. The holy book of Islam acts as the essential glue, binding together all facets of Arab and Islamic culture. Artistic Inspiration for Jihad. A far cry from the harsh proclamations of the Qur'an, Arabic poetry predates Islam by centuries and serves as a bedrock of Arabic culture across the Middle East. Early desert nomads composed poems mostly in mono-rhyme and in one of sixteen standard canonical measures, which made them easy to commit to memory (Creswell & Haykel, 2015). Naturally, this beautiful form of cultural expression has found a home in the modern jihadist movement, where it has become an inspiration for new recruits to join the cause and crucial in the sustainment of those already fighting infidels abroad. Creswell and Haykel assert that although analysts have generally ignored this facet of jihadist culture, it is woven deeply into the fabric of modern Islamic extremism. Osama bin Laden, most recognized as the former head of al-Qaeda, was also a highly-celebrated jihadist poet. Without question, his lyrical genius inspired young Arabs with stories of a return to the heroic and chivalrous past of Islam. One of his most famous works celebrates the martyrdom of the 9/11 hijackers. This is a theme among modern jihadist poetry, which preserves the tales of suicide bombers, the conquered apostate regimes of Iraq and Syria, and the glories of jihadist heroes (Creswell & Haykel). Likewise, in a 10 group of individuals who have each traveled far from home to defend Islam against the kuffar, these poems help to establish a sense of cultural identity, strengthening their wartime bond and solidifying their resolve. In seeing the videos of the Islamic State as they carved a path of destruction across large swathes of Iraq in early 2014, it may be difficult for one to believe that its members were motivated by the rhythmic lines of jihadist poetry. It is hard to accept that the same young fighter who is willing to behead an infidel for all the free world to see, could also be found passionately reciting lines celebrating the glorious return of an Islamic caliphate. During its rise, the Islamic State capitalized on the lyrical talent of a Damascus-born woman named Ahlam al-Nasr. In her first broadcast, called the Blaze of Truth, she sang each one of her 107 works a cappella, in accordance with the Islamic State's ban on musical instruments. The video was uploaded to Youtube, receiving thousands of views and further shares on multiple social media platforms (Creswell & Haykel, 2015). In the early days of the group's brutal campaign in Iraq, al-Nasr celebrated victory in Mosul as a new dawn for the country: "Ask Mosul, city of Islam, about the lions— how their fierce struggle brought liberation. The land of glory has shed its humiliation and defeat and put on the raiment of splendor" (as cited in Creswell & Haykel, 2015). Her choice of words helps one sense her deep passion for jihad, hidden within the lines. Mujahedeen are called lions and liberators. Mosul is called both a city of Islam and a land of 11 glory that, because of its liberation, has been released from the chains of shame and can now live in the splendor and pride of its former renown. Poetry has succored those serving in times of war for hundreds, even thousands of years. In the same manner, this key element of artistic cultural expression has helped bind together the modern jihadi movement, capturing the heroic deeds of martyrs who would otherwise remain nameless and unrecognized by the outside world. Serving in lands far away from home, young jihadists find inspiration, strength, and a renewed sense of identity in these haunting bits of rhyme. Social Pressure to Join Jihad. Abdullah Anas was an Algerian who served as one of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan in the 1980s and spent several years studying under Abdullah Azzam, the Palestinian "Father of Resistance to the Soviets" (Gall, 2020). Working to help Algerians achieve nonviolent change in their government, Anas, now in his 60s, has spent a life living and working among jihadists. To Anas, jihad is a fundamental principle of Muslim culture through which mujahedeen receive rewards in heaven: "I will never denounce jihad. As a Muslim, I know this to be a noble deed—where man can be the most beastly" (Gall). In a study of three Swedish jihadists, with experiences ranging from 1980s Afghanistan to the modern fight in Syria, Nilsson (2019) suggests that one of the fundamental social justifications for joining jihad is the sense that Islam and Muslims are collectively under attack. This, again, is a theme that applies to more than just the modern jihadist movement: Americans lined up in droves outside recruiting stations following the attacks on Pearl Harbor and decades later after September 11, 2001. Following the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, many Muslims from around the world began to see this not as just the West going after the 9/11 conspirators, but as a global attack on Islam. Each day, fresh news stories of coalition soldiers' crimes against 12 Muslim civilians and pictures of burning villages continued to motivate men to join the fight to protect the ummah from the foreign invaders. Nilsson contends that since most jihadists are very young, in their teens and early twenties, they are very susceptible to the influences of close friends and social groups. Safet, a young Muslim living in Sweden, was pressured by a friend to join the Islamic State in Syria, saying that he became convinced by his friend Ahmed that the group was fighting to protect Muslims (Nilsson). However, after realizing that the Islamic State was actually killing other Muslims in a practice called takfir, or excommunication, Safet became disillusioned and returned to Sweden (Nilsson). From the fight against the foreign invaders in the early 2000s in Afghanistan and Iraq, to the struggle for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in 2015, it seems jihadists have most often been motivated by the need to protect the international Muslim community. Aside from the social responsibility of defending their faith and people, the need for adventure also seems to permeate the ideations of young men seeking to join a jihadist group. One of Nilsson's (2019) most interesting theories is that jihad is not the radicalization of Islam, but rather the Islamization of radicalism. Individuals who are already naturally predisposed to such adventurous or nihilistic behavior get caught up in the social dynamics of their time, ending up in a jihadist movement. Venhaus (2010) explains that in interviews with over 2,000 al-Qaeda prisoners from Iraq to Guantanamo Bay, he found that young Muslim men sought the cause of jihad for a number of normal social pressures felt by normal teens worldwide: "Revenge seekers need an outlet for their frustration, status seekers need recognition, identity seekers need a group to join, and thrill seekers need adventure" (Venhaus). The Effects of Social Media and Technology on Jihad. In the modern era, news is no longer bound by the time it takes for an article to be published, printed, and distributed across 13 great distance in a community. Social media platforms like Facebook, Youtube, Twitter, and Instagram have made sharing news instantaneous. Additionally, the advent of the smartphone, which acts simultaneously as a hand-held computer, high definition camera, and telephone with nearly world-wide coverage has forever changed the media landscape. In the era of modern jihad, one can post a single video that moves the minds of thousands in a matter of seconds. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein's regime, news stories of atrocity among the efforts of coalition troops over the next decade served to further the cause of local and foreign jihadists to protect the ummah from these invaders. Accidental bombing of civilians, mistreatment of the prisoners at Abu Ghraib, and a general ignorance toward Muslim culture were fueled by social media and smartphone technology. Venhaus (2010) claims that throughout this early phase of the war in Iraq, al-Qaeda very rarely had to actively recruit, their global brand was aggressively promoted through satellite television, internet chat rooms, and social media platforms; willing candidates sought them out. This use of media continued to be perfected by jihadist organizations like the Islamic State, who published a digital magazine called Dabiq, named for the ideological capital of the proposed caliphate, which rallied Muslims to jihad through stories of glory and heroism in the cause for Islam. The Islamic State also posted grisly execution videos, with stunning music and production value, including super high-definition shots of their brutality. Publications and videos such as these could be copied, saved, shared, and re-shared before any sort of government intervention could stop them. Creswell and Haykel (2015) reveal that jihadists were running a massive, secret network of social media websites and fake accounts that could be rapidly assembled and dissembled by hackers. The effects of social media and technology on modern jihadist culture are easy to understand, but challenging to measure in scope and reach. Just as easily as videos of Islamic 14 State propaganda or poetry can be shared, so too can stories of coalition force atrocities in Afghanistan and Iraq. This has put strategists in a unique position, where it is nearly impossible to control the narrative. Unfortunately, the story that breaks first is still the one that is liked and shared the most, even if the truth comes out after. Effects of Western Culture on Jihad. Rapid globalization, including the widespread diffusion of the internet and technology into the Middle East in the last two decades has continued to foment jihadist hatred for the West. Personal conversations with multiple Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan revealed that the decadence, lavish richness, and sinful lifestyles portrayed by Western movies and media served to fuel the fires of disdain among the pious Salafi-jihadists. Additionally, Muslim men living in Western nations following the attacks on the World Trade Center were ostracized and feared by society, often leading them to an eventual radicalization process. Being denied a peaceful coexistence because of continued Western misperception, caused many young Muslims to become angry and seek community and brotherhood among other Muslims experiencing the same problems. Venhaus (2010) notes that out of the over 2,000 captured jihadists interviewed, more than 30 per cent of them sought al-Qaeda because they were angry. Under the tutelage of local al-Qaeda mentors, the frustrations of these young men were then turned upon their neighbors through careful instruction and manipulation. They were taught to see the West as the enemy of Islam, with hundreds of the ummah being harmed by their military coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq each day. They were instructed in the ways of the pious ones who came before them, inspiring them to turn from the sinfulness of their Western neighbors and take pride in their newfound self-discipline and righteousness in the eyes of Allah. Eventually, many of these young men would travel to their 15 ancestral homelands to join the struggle, or conduct terrorist attacks on their own Western communities. Analysis A Unique Challenge Given the litany of reasons one might join jihad, the incredibly complex cultural and social environment, and the fluidity of the modern jihadist movement, how can the United States begin to contain this problem? The reasons one individual might join a jihadist cause are as various and sundry as why one might choose to join any movement or profession over another. As Nilsson (2019) and Venhaus (2010) have detailed, there appears to be no singular marker: one could be an extremely religious or a passive Muslim, rich or poor, single or married with a family, have a completely stable social life or be isolated with no friends. Jihadists can be from any country, any walk of life, and usually do not widely broadcast their intentions prior to taking part in acts of violence for the cause of Islam. It is because of the near-impossibility of clearly identifying a pattern of distinguishable cultural markers that make it such a challenge for the United States government and its allies to address the threat of jihad. Targeting an individual before they become a jihadist or before they commit a terrorist act has been one of the most formidable challenges of our time for military and law enforcement professionals alike. Usually, the much simpler job is finding a jihadist who has allowed their communications discipline to slip before an act, or catching them in a pitched battle on foreign soil. In order to protect citizens of the West and East alike against jihadists' aims, the United States Government must be prepared to confront, contain, and counter the jihadist narrative "left of bang," before an attack occurs. 16 The Global War on Terrorism: Taking the Fight to the Jihadists. In the months that followed September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush deployed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paramilitary officers and US Special Operations Forces (SOF) to find, fix, and finish pockets of al-Qaeda militants being harbored by the Taliban in Afghanistan. A fierce campaign of relentless aerial bombardment and mounted assaults by the forces of the Afghan Northern Alliance led to a swift and decisive defeat of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. With Kabul and Kandahar in allied hands, and an interim government established under the leadership of the Pashtun Hamid Karzai, the future of a free and prosperous Afghanistan seemed assured, but what came to be known as The Long War had only just begun. Trillions of dollars, thousands of lives, and 19 years later, the United States and its allies have been forced to the negotiating table with the Salafi-jihadist Taliban. Likewise, after Saddam Hussein's continued disregard for international law, threats against the United States, and open violence against his own people, the administration of President Bush decided again to pursue a military option. Much like Afghanistan, the coalition was led by CIA operatives and SOF operators, coordinating airstrikes on key positions in a tactical display of American firepower affectionately titled Shock and Awe. However, unlike Afghanistan, a massive conventional invasion followed the bombing campaign, bent on toppling the Baathist regime and finding Saddam's chemical weapons stockpiles. What followed was a series of policy failures, leading to a steady influx of jihadists partnering with local insurgents seeking to oust the foreign invaders and protect the ummah from the atrocities of the kuffar. In my professional opinion, Iraq is still recovering from the decade-long military occupation, cleaning up the destruction left by the Islamic State, and on the brink of civil war due to concerns about being an Iranian puppet state. 17 Ineffective Military Methods to Combat Jihad Operation Iraqi Freedom. During my first combat rotation as an Infantryman in the Triangle of Death in southern Iraq in 2005-2006, I experienced the initial rumblings of a civil war between the Sunni and Shia Muslims in Iraq, each wrestling for power in a post-Saddam world. I was also witness to the inundation of foreign jihadists, joining the ranks of al-Qaeda in Iraq under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who at times headquartered in my area of operations. As I analyze our highly-kinetic and aggressive initial campaigns years later, I can see that the coalition's fight, first against Saddam, then against al-Qaeda, only bolstered jihadist motivation. In being a foreign invader, we inadvertently created a jihadist resistance movement, bent on the removal of their occupiers. Kilcullen (2010) explains this dilemma by explaining that focusing on the wrong metrics in a fight against insurgents can be deceptive: If you kill 20 insurgents, they may have 40 relatives who are now in a blood feud with your unit and are compelled to take revenge. Again in 2007-2008, I was deployed to Iraq as an Infantry squad leader to the sacred city of Khadimiyah in Northwest Baghadad. This was during the famous troop surge, meant to fix the ongoing problems with stability throughout the country. Being in the home of the beautiful Shrine of the Seventh Imam, it was a predominantly Shia area. Over the course of 15 months, my unit fought several engagements against Iranian-backed Shia militias and worked on project after project to strengthen local civil infrastructure, all while maintaining the utmost discretion against damaging homes or creating civilian casualties. Yet again, although we had conducted a nearly perfect counterinsurgency fight, it seemed that Kilcullen's insurgent math still applied: Fighting the jihadists only served to create more unrest within the population, no matter if we were restoring essential services and reducing damage to homes or not. 18 Operation Enduring Freedom. Nearly a decade after the fall of al-Qaeda and its Taliban hosts, I was deployed to the mountains of Afghanistan from 2010-2011. Stationed along the Arghandab River, just north of Kandahar, we were in the heart of the Pashtun Taliban. Again, the same story remained true: We fought the Taliban jihadists almost daily, but could not seem to win over the true key terrain in a counterinsurgency fight: The hearts and minds of the people. The Taliban would harass our unit's base of operations with a few pop shots as we called them, which would unleash a massive response in firepower and resources. Thousands of rounds of machine gun ammunition would be fired into the farm fields surrounding our Combat Out Post (COP), squads would be sent in pursuit of the attackers, and helicopters would spend hours scouring the terrain in an attempt to heap justice on the insurgents. This massive effort against so few served to erode the unit's motivation, exhaust our supplies, and alienate the civilian population whose homes and fields had been damaged in the process. Reflections on Personal Combat Experience. After years of combat experience and deeply studying Muslim culture, I can now see how the mistakes the coalitions made early-on in both operations only fueled the fires of insurgency, resistance to foreign occupiers, and generalized hatred for the West. Porch (2013) argues brilliantly that US counterinsurgency doctrine made the same mistake as its imperialistic predecessors of centuries before: Believing that military action was a proper vehicle for providing Middle Easterners with Western values, as well as a foundation for governance, social programs, and economic transformation in a region. This became evident in my own experience, realizing that no matter what sort of social, infrastructure, or economic programs ran alongside our military efforts, the people of both Afghanistan and Iraq felt the enormous social weight of being occupied by a foreign power, rendering these efforts nearly ineffectual. On the contrary, local and foreign jihadist movements 19 capitalized on each and every mistake of coalition forces, increasing their recruitment and resolve against the West. Though our military may have been winning every major battle against the jihadists, our policy makers and field commanders made the fundamental mistake of believing that these non-Western nations lived in some sort of time-warp, in which the adoption of Western democracy, rule of law, and capitalism would allow them to thrive as a nation (Porch). Effective Military Methods to Combat Jihad Surgical Strike and Precision Targeting. A unique feature of the Global War on Terrorism was the US military's continued perfection of covert strike operations with surgical precision deep into enemy safe havens. This was put on display in the rout of al-Qaeda by CIA and SOF in Afghanistan, in the kill/capture missions against the Baathists in the deck of cards in Iraq, and later in the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and Sheik Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Iraq. Having the ability to appear out of nowhere in the middle of the night, kill or capture an intended target with zero damage to infrastructure or civilian casualties, and leave within minutes of arrival struck fear into the hearts and minds of jihadists across the globe. The success and efficacy of this type of operation was acknowledged in the 2015 National Military Strategy, which stated: "The best way to counter VEOs [violent extremist organizations] is by way of.military strengths such as ISR, precision strike [emphasis added], training, and logistical support" (p.11). Likewise, President Obama's massive expansion of the use of drones, which could watch individuals for days and execute a precise strike that only touched the intended target, has continued to sow fear and deny jihadists' freedom of maneuver on a global scale. The US military and its allies have only continued to master these types of operations throughout the 20 fights in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other locations. The jihadists know this, and realize that one wrong move at any time could mean disaster. Security Cooperation. An additional theme that has spelled the end for jihadists throughout the globe has been the training, advising, and equipping of security forces and partners within Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other nations. Enabling the host-nation military to handle jihadist movements on their own helps the United States military work itself out of a job. US Army Special Forces are uniquely suited to accomplish this mission: With specialized training, language capability, and cultural understanding, they are able to train foreign security forces through a variety of Principle Tasks. These tasks include Foreign Internal Defense, which focuses on a holistic approach to internal security and protection of citizens against lawlessness and insurgency, and Security Force Assistance, which can be focused internally or externally against threats to a nation's stability and security. The success of these mission sets was evident in 2014, during my own experience with the Afghan Commando Kandaks' continued fight against the Taliban and in closely following the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service's efforts against the Islamic State. Both of these forces, built from the ground-up by US Army Special Forces have continually fortified weak conventional military force operations against jihadist groups in their respective nations. Muslim Youth Efforts Against Jihad Globalization, though it has been proven to bolster the jihadists' narrative against the West, has also been beneficial to the movement against jihad itself. Because youth of the world have access to technology that allows them to see the atrocities and lies associated with global jihadist organizations, they are beginning to turn the tide. During the Islamic State's rise to power in Iraq and Syria, Muslim youth from across Europe travelled to join the jihadists in their 21 fight against the West. However, groups of Muslim youth also spoke up to counter this narrative. In 2015 the Muslim Youth League, an anti-Islamic State cultural movement, declared a holy war against all extremist organizations (Dearden, 2015). The group called on all Muslims to stand united against those who have hijacked Islam and misrepresented the faith. Through engagement work in schools and communities, as well as a robust online campaign, the Muslim Youth League is fighting back against jihadist propaganda that bids young Muslims join the Islamic State and other extremist groups (Dearden). Since the time of this publication, the Muslim Youth League has spread to several countries throughout the Middle East, Asia, and Europe, each with their own social media presence, outreach programs, community events, and websites. Local Government Efforts Against Jihad In the years following the Islamic State's spread across Iraq and Syria, the United Kingdom has developed a robust strategy to help at-risk Muslims avoid the radicalization process. The program itself is called Contest, and includes four distinct categories: Prevent, Prepare, Protect, and Pursue (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2017). Police departments and social organizations have built relationships with doctors, faith leaders, teachers and others, who are required to report suspicious persons to the proper authorities. In response to these reporting requirements and recommendations, over 7,500 reports were filed between 2015-2016, with one in 10 being actionable intelligence for government and police forces (BBC). In 2015 alone, over 150 people, including 50 children, were kept from traveling to conflict zones in Iraq and Syria (BBC). The strategy has of course drawn criticism, for fear that it will further alienate Muslims from their local communities, but it presents as an excellent plan of action for identifying individuals who are at risk beyond just using traditional signals intelligence and 22 surveillance techniques. It does more than just target the individual, it also seeks to reform them through education, outreach, and community programs. Counterarguments You Can Kill an Idea. I have heard the opinion throughout my time in the military that jihad and the idea of Islamic supremacy can be completely eradicated. The example most often given is that Nazism, including the idea that the Aryan race was superior to all others, was effectively destroyed by a global military campaign. This argument is weak. The Nazis represented a very small portion of German culture, including among those serving in the military, so it was relatively easy to contain once there was an overwhelming military victory by the Allies. However, although the German Army of the 1940s was defeated militarily, the idea of white supremacy lives on in small social groups throughout the world to this day. The Ongoing Taliban Peace Talks. I have colleagues throughout the military who are convinced that the current negotiations with the Taliban are a key indicator of success in our two decades at war against the Salafi-jihadist group. The issue with this is that temporary cease fires have already been violated several times, leading one to believe that the strategic level leadership's messages are simply not reaching their subordinates or that local factions are not adhering to the agreement. Trusting that radical Muslim extremists will not allow Afghanistan to become a future safe haven for other jihadists, as it has in the past, is simply unrealistic. Believing some sort of quasi peace deal is going to miraculously pacify an organization that hates everything the West stands for is misguided. My own experiences throughout the Middle East have proven that the spirit of jihad and hatred will live on in Afghanistan. The Islamic State is Nearly Defeated. Multiple global media outlets continue to run stories about the dismantling of the Islamic State, as though the battle is won. Though Sheik Abu 23 Bakr al-Baghdadi has been killed, and the proposed Islamic caliphate was never fully realized, it would be naïve to think that the Islamic State's jihad is over. The movement will metastasize and take on new forms in other parts of the globe: It is already happening. Jihadists are continually leaving the battlefields of Iraq and Syria, headed back to their former homes in mainland Europe. As these individuals reenter the diaspora, the concern is that they will radicalize other individuals and conduct terrorist attacks within the continent. Conclusion The reasons an individual seeks to join a jihadist movement are deeply rooted in personal social dynamics, the security situation of their country, and a multitude of other religious, cultural, and economic factors. I agree with Venhaus (2010) and Gorka (2016) who assert that there is no singular military operation or strategy that can bring about a decisive victory against something so intangible as why one might join the modern jihadist movement. Use of the US military as a vehicle for the establishment of Western democracy and nation-building efforts in tribal nations like Afghanistan and Iraq only served to invigorate the jihadists' call to arms. Jihad is not something that can be eradicated completely by military force. Jihad must be confronted, contained, and countered through a comprehensive approach that empowers state and non-state actors to develop local solutions and directs expeditious military applications only where completely necessary. Recommendations Promote and Protect the Muslim Youth Leagues In order to truly create a cultural paradigm shift in Muslim youth at risk of radicalization, groups like the Muslim Youth League (BBC, 2017) should be promoted by governments worldwide as a bastion of true and peaceful Islam. While they should no doubt be supported, 24 governments must also protect these organizations from becoming targets for violent acts of terrorism or influence operations by jihadists. Through a combination of deep cultural understanding and positive messaging, the Muslim Youth League has already shown its effectiveness in the United Kingdom and beyond. Because the youth of each nation understand the social pressures and cultural influences that may lead one to seek jihad, they can effectively develop tailored, local solutions to persuade at-risk individuals. The Muslim Youth Leagues are on the front lines of countering the jihadist worldview, taking a stand and declaring war on jihad and its misrepresentations of Islam. Enable Local Solutions for Local Problems This should be accomplished through unified government action that involves all the United States' instruments of national power including diplomacy, information sharing, military action where necessary, and economic stimulus as needed. The specific issue with efforts like these, is that they cannot be accomplished during what is perceived by locals as a military occupation. This was proven true in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. Despite massive efforts to rebuild infrastructure, aid in agricultural processes, build schools, and organize community projects, the United States and its allies were still viewed as pushing Western values and democracy on nations through military occupation. As much as possible, we must limit our military presence in areas that are ripe for developing a jihadist movement, or in ones that are recovering. I have seen firsthand that government efforts against jihadist organizations or at-risk communities have often been fragmented, poorly staffed, and uncoordinated. Venhaus (2010) suggests the creation of an agency that is staffed, trained, funded, enabled, and equipped for strategic communications, calling it the United States Strategic Communications Agency. An 25 agency like this could ensure that a comprehensive national communications strategy is developed and achieved, with a focus on enabling local community efforts to counter the jihadist narrative. By promoting social outreach, religious education, and community programs, this agency could bolster the efforts of community leaders and stifle jihadist aims in their areas. Support Religious Education and Reintegration Reintegration programs in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Singapore and elsewhere have successfully rehabilitated former jihadists through religious education (Venhaus, 2010). Countering the apocalyptic world view of jihadist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State requires local religious leaders who understand their community's issues to band together and refute the extremist narrative. Through careful, patient, and individually-tailored instruction, Muslim religious leaders can invalidate each and every one of the extremists' claims. Individuals who turn to jihad are often seeking this type of direction, they just find it in the wrong places. Counter Threats with Tailored Military Force Packages Continued themes among the military failures in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations during the early years of the Global War on Terrorism are indiscriminate use of force, lack of cultural understanding, and hyper-focus on tactical gains while failing at the strategic level. US government nation-building efforts on the backs of the military cost our country trillions of dollars, thousands of lives, and years of frustration, bogged-down in an endless quagmire of misunderstanding. US Army Special Forces are selected, trained, equipped, and enabled to clandestinely handle complex problem sets in denied or politically-sensitive environments. Each Special Forces Group is regionally-aligned, with Operational Detachments developing deep cultural understanding through Area Studies and continuous relationship-building with regional state and 26 non-state actors. Special Forces operators understand the complex cultural and security situations in their areas of responsibility and have the language capability and strategic understanding to operate with complete independence of outside support. Frankly, if given the authority and autonomy to do their jobs, Special Forces can coerce, disrupt, or overthrow jihadist organizations unilaterally, or train, advise, and equip foreign security forces to accomplish this task on their own. This can all be done independent of a large, slow, and expensive conventional military occupation. Organizations like al-Qaeda must be kept in a state of constant fear and uncertainty. US Special Operations Forces are uniquely suited to this task. Through structured, rapid application of military force, SOF can find, fix, and finish intended targets with surgical precision. This has proven true in the capture of Saddam Hussein and the elimination of Osama bin Laden and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, among numerous other targets throughout the Global War on Terrorism. Continuing to deny safe havens through short, precise applications of combat power is crucial and does not rely on a conventional military occupation of the target area. Operations such as these, characterized by discriminate use of force and strategic impact, should be the main avenue for denying the relative safety, security, and freedom of maneuver of jihadist organizations. 27 References British Broadcasting Corporation (2017, June 4). Reality check: What is the prevent strategy? Reality Check. https://www.bbc.com/news/election-2017-40151991. Creswell, R., & Haykel, B. (2015, June 1). Battle lines: Want to understand the jihadis? Read their poetry. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/08/battle-lines-jihad-creswell-and-haykel. Dearden, L. (2015, March 21). Young British Muslims declare own jihad against ISIS and other terrorists who 'hijack' Islam. Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/young-british-muslims-declare-own-jihad-against-isis-and-other-terrorists-who-hijack-islam-10146534.html. Dempsey, M. (2015). The national military strategy of the United States of America 2015: The United States military's contribution to national security. The Joint Staff. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/UNCLASS_2018_National_Military_Strategy_Description.pdf. Gall, C. (2020, January 31). From armed struggle to peaceful protest, a road still to travel: A veteran of the Afghan jihad working for nonviolent change in Algeria. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/world/middleeast/from-armed-struggle-to-peaceful-protest-a-road-still-to-travel.html. Gorka, S. L. (2016). Defeating jihad: The winnable war. Regnery Publishing. Kilcullen, D. J. (2010). Counterinsurgency. Oxford University Press. Nilsson, M. (2019, 18 June) Motivations for jihad and cognitive dissonance: A qualitative analysis of former Swedish jihadists. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1626091. 28 Porch, D. (2013). Counterinsurgency: Exposing the myths of the new way of war. Cambridge University Press. Qur'an (M. Ali, Trans.; 7th ed.) (2015). Islam International Publications. (Original work published ca. 1537). Venhaus, J. (2010). Why youth join al-Qaeda. Special Report, 236(1), 1-12. https://www.usip. org/sites/default/files/SR236Venhaus.pdf.
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After a half century, Islamism has become the single most disruptive force—both politically and militarily—in the Middle East. It evolved from cells of political activists in the 1970s into mass movements and, for the first time, as a governing force in the late 20th century. Both Sunni and Shiites turned to their faith amid the failure of monarchies and autocracies to deliver political freedoms, economic benefits, stability, or security since the wave of independence from colonial powers began in the mid-20th century. "Islam is the solution" became a common refrain echoed by multiple movements. Islamist political parties competed in democratic elections in North Africa, the Levant, and the Gulf. Meanwhile, diverse militant movements—from Morocco to Egypt, from Lebanon across to the Gulf—turned to hostage-taking and suicide bombs against diplomatic, military and civilian targets to enhance their impact.Islamism expanded in the 21st century—in vastly different ways. Parties willing to run won democratic elections in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, and the Palestinian Authority. Some were short-lived in power. Militants simultaneously became more brazen, whatever the large loss of life among their constituents or the vast destruction. The map of the Middle East changed after huge chunks of territory were seized from Iraq and Syria to create the first modern caliphate. Militias also triggered two devastating wars with Israel in 2006 and 2023. Six PhasesIslamism has played out through six phases across two dozen countries. The first turning point was the 1973 war, when Arabs fought for the first time in the name of Islam. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser code-named Egypt's invasion of Israel "Operation Badr" after the Prophet Mohammed's first victory in 623 AD. In 1979, twin crises—the Iranian revolution ending more than two millennia of dynastic rule, and the bloody, two-week seizure of Saudi Arabia's Grand Mosque by a fundamentalist cell—reflected the rejection of modernization by both Shiites and Sunnis based on Western ways. They sought a more culturally credible form of governance.The second turning point—for both parties and militias—was in the 1980s. Branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni movement, ran in parliamentary elections in Egypt and Jordan and won seats. In Egypt, the group ran under the cover of other opposition parties. But militant Islam also accelerated, especially during the first modern jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Thousands of Sunnis, mainly from the Gulf states, joined the decade-long campaign. The so-called "Afghan Arabs" later transferred their skills and experience to other countries. Among them was Osama bin Laden, the Saudi founder of al Qaeda. In Lebanon, Hezbollah mobilized cells of Shiites in the early 1980s for the first suicide bombings of Israeli troops as well as U.S. Marine peacekeepers and two American embassies in Beirut, and on multiple embassies and business sites in Kuwait. By the end of the decade, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza had launched the Intifada against Israel, which in turn spawned Hamas and further empowered Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Both called for the destruction of Israel and the creation of a state governed by strict Islamic law. The third phase was in the 1990s. Political Islam gained ground in Algeria, when the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) defeated more than 50 parties in the country's first fully democratic election. The final runoff in 1991 was preempted by a military coup that outlawed FIS, imprisoned its leaders, and triggered a more extremist movement that fought government troops for a decade. More than 100,000 Algerians died during the civil war. In Lebanon, Hezbollah evolved from an exclusively clandestine terrorist movement into a registered political party that ran for office in 1992—and won seats.But militant Islamist groups also became more ambitious in the 1990s. Hamas formed its military wing dubbed the Izz ad Din al Qassam Brigades, named after a Palestinian leader who had fought British occupation in the 1930s. The first suicide attack by Hamas on Israel, in 1993, was near the Mehola settlement in the West Bank. Al Qaeda operatives attacked the World Trade Center in 1993, the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen in 2000. The beginning of the fourth phase was marked by brazen al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001. The hijacking of four commercial airlines and bombings of the U.S. financial hub and capital were unprecedented—and a boon to the jihadi movement. Over the next decade, al Qaeda spawned affiliates in North Africa, Syria, the Arabian peninsula, South Asia, and East Africa. But two U.S. wars—launched against the Taliban in Afghanistan, in 2001, and President Saddam Hussein in Iraq, in 2003—also further spurred Islamist movements and spawned new ones. From Lebanon, Hezbollah ran a daring operation into Israel—to increase pressure for the release of Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners—that triggered a 34-day war. It was then Israel's longest war Israel, and it was fought to a stalemate that the Party of God claimed as a political victory. It recouped, rebuilt and ended up with even more weaponry.The fifth phase was marked by the changing political landscape after the 2011 Arab Spring ousted leaders in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, in turn opening the way for long-banned Islamist movements to run for office. They experienced unprecedented peaks but also unprecedented lows. Ennahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice party in Egypt both won pluralities in national elections. Mohammad Morsi of the Brotherhood won the presidency in Egypt, albeit for only a year before the movement was toppled and outlawed in a military coup. But growing instability, politically and economically, also paved the way for the mushrooming Islamic State—an offshoot of al Qaeda with more ruthless tactics—to recruit some 60,000 fighters from throughout the world. The Sunni jihadis seized a third of Iraq and Syria to form the first modern caliphate in 2014. It took a U.S.-led coalition of 83 countries and partners five years to force ISIS to retreat from Iraq in 2017 and from Syria in 2019. But by then, ISIS had franchises still active on three continents. The sixth phase, in the 2020s, initially appeared to reflect the decline of both political and militant Islamism. Ennahda had become the largest party in Tunisia's parliament in 2019 elections. But, amid public protests, the president arrested top officials and closed the party's offices in 2022, then imprisoned its leader in 2023. The two-year global pandemic also complicated recruiting and logistics for militant groups. Yet underlying grievances, built over decades, went unresolved. In 2023, Hamas launched an unprecedented attack—in scope, tactics and casualties—across southern Israel. During the war, both Israel and the Palestinian group faced their greatest existential military challenges. Defining FactorsIslamism covered a wide spectrum that crystalized in the 1990s. "Islamism and jihadism were distinct. Islamists participated in elections, worked within the nation-state framework, and didn't typically excommunicate other Muslims," Alex Thurston, a political scientist at the University of Cincinnati, told The Islamists. They accepted territorial boundaries. "Jihadists, on the other hand, had a highly exclusivist and violent revolutionary outlook that made them a different species altogether." They generally supported the overthrow of modern states and rejected the international order. Islamists and jihadists operated in "fundamentally different frameworks," Thurston said. Even militant jihadis differed. Al Qaeda, founded by bin Laden, argued that his movement had to first convert Muslims to its vision of an Islamic state and create ripe conditions for a modern caliphate to survive long-term. The Islamic State, initially an offshoot that later broke away, argued that it had to create a caliphate first and then force both Muslims and members of other faiths to accept it—under penalty of death. Among Palestinians, Hamas and Islamic Jihad both sought to eliminate Israel. But Hamas was willing to run in elections and participate in governance, while PIJ was only interested in a violent and perpetual state of war with Israel. Hamas even had its own rival factions—among leaders in Gaza, the diaspora in Lebanese refugee camps and political leaders based in Qatar. ISIS fighters in IraqImage CreditAlliances also varied, especially among Shiites and Sunnis. Iran generated, armed, trained and financed allies—Hezbollah in Lebanon, several groups of varying size in Iraq that operated under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces, Houthis in Yemen, and others. Most were Shiite, with the notable exceptions of Hamas and PIJ. Iran's proxies operated in the so-called "Axis of Resistance" that acted on behalf of Iran in varying degrees but catered to their local constituencies. They had diverse local agendas. Al Qaeda was a Sunni movement with branches in North Africa's Magreb, the Arabian Peninsula, and south Asia. They pledged fealty to the original core of leaders but operated more independently and locally, especially since the deaths of bin Laden in 2011 and Ayman al Zawahiri in 2022 in U.S. military operations.FailuresPolitical Islam witnessed a shift during its sixth phase. Islamist political parties were "far less relevant than they were a decade ago," Sarah Yerkes, a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told The Islamists. They were "steadily losing support across the Middle East and North Africa." They needed to "figure out how to both operate in increasingly authoritarian contexts and closed spaces as well as how to re-capture public support in a region where political parties have lost the trust of the people." In general, Islamists were less relevant today than they were a decade ago because "they have often been coopted by the authoritarian regimes," she said. Unable or unwilling to make progress on their political promises, they increasingly lost credibility among followers and voters. In 2022-23, movements promoting Islamic values in society through the political process suffered "severe setbacks" in Tunisia and in Palestine, Nathan Brown, a political scientist at George Washington University, told The Islamists. Tunisia's crackdown on Ennahda and the rise of presidential authoritarianism "shut the political path" and left "no clear path back" for a peaceful party. In Gaza, the military wing of Hamas "plunged the movement into a full confrontation with Israel," Brown added. Hamas won the majority of seats in the last Palestinian election in 2006. Now, "elections will not be at the center or even periphery of Palestinian politics for a while."Political trends globally, with the rise of populism and conservatism, also shifted the momentum away from liberal and progressive movements, which took "the steam out of Islamist groups," Yerkes said. Parties based on giving religion a larger profile in the political sphere were "not able to gain the same levels of public support" they once had. The future The prospects for Islamism—both political and military—were deeply impacted by the war between Hamas and Israel. The conflict "elicited near-universal praise from militant Islamist groups" for Hamas, among both Sunnis and Shiites, Katherine Zimmerman, a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, told The Islamists. Groups called on Palestinians to "seize the moment to rise up" against Israel and the United States, especially as US aircraft carriers, warplanes and forces flowed into the region. One major exception was the Islamic State, which warned against cooperation with Hamas. Its fighters had killed Hamas members and supporters in the past. Overall, however, the violent end of the spectrum appeared "more relevant" than political parties willing to work within traditional state systems at the end of 2023. "The idea that these Islamist movements have moderated has been shattered by the Hamas attack, illustrating that while they might tactically at different points appear to be buying into a broader system, their worldviews are inherently at odds with a liberal democratic order," Aaron Zelin, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told "The Islamists."Yet it became more difficult to "parse" the prospects for both political Islamists and groups willing to use violence, Zimmerman said. Jihadis who employed violence have generally had more success than those working through electoral or other political channels. "The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was elected to power and ousted shortly thereafter, having eschewed violence," Zimmerman noted. But the Houthis, Hezbollah, the Taliban, and Hamas had success through the use force, despite facing much stronger adversaries. "What this means," she noted, "is there seems to be more willingness for Islamist groups to engage across the spectrum using all means at their disposal to achieve their ends."Izz ad Din al Qassam fighters attend a military parade in Khan Yunis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on May 27, 2021Image CreditThe disparate faces of Islamism will also have diverse appeal in different regions, Zelin said. Iran's Axis of Resistance network will be important in the Levant and the Gulf. The offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood network will be key in Egypt and Jordan. Al Qaeda will have pull further afield in Africa. And the Islamic State will be most pertinent to Afghanistan and Africa's Sahel region, he said. Their fates will also all be affected by local, regional and global factors in different ways. So, after a half century of experimenting with the many tactics of change, there was no single algorithm or trajectory for Islamism. Islamists in Government: 2023Image CreditAlgeria: In the 2022 elections, the Movement of Society for Peace, a Sunni Islamist party and offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, won one seat in the 174-member Council of the Nation. It also won 65 seats in the 407-member People's National Assembly, an increase of 31 seats since the 2017 election.Bahrain: The Gulf nation banned opposition movements–includingal Wefaq, a Shiite party–before the 2018 National Assembly Elections. In 2023, no Islamist parties were represented in the 40-member Council of Representatives, the elected legislative body, or the Consultative Council, the 40-member body appointed by the king. Egypt: In the 2020 elections, the Nour Party, a conservative Salafi party backed by President Abdel Fattah El Sisi, won seven seats in the 596-member House of Representatives. It also had two seats in the 300-member Senate, both by presidential appointment. Smaller Islamist parties–including Wasat, the Strong Egypt Party, and Authenticity–boycotted the 2020 elections as a "formality for outside appearances." The Freedom and Justice Party, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood that won the presidency and a parliamentary majority in 2012 elections, was banned from politics after being ousted in a 2013 military coup led by El Sisi, then chief of the armed forces. Former President Mohamed Morsi was tried and sentenced to death, later commuted to life imprisonment, for inciting violence and espionage.Iran: The 1979 revolution created the Islamic Republic of Iran, a Shiite theocracy and the first modern government to blend Islam and democracy. The new constitution stipulated that all laws had to be based on "Islamic criteria" and gave ultimate authority to a the supreme leader. Several parties—including hardline, centrist and reformist factions—reflected divergent views on whether clerics or elected leaders should have more power.Iraq: Sairoon, an alliance led by Shiite cleric Moqtada al Sadr, won 73 out of the 329 seats in the 2021 Council of Representatives election. Despite winning a plurality, Sairoon failed to form a governing coalition. Its lawmakers resigned in 2022 to break the deadlock. State of Law, a coalition led by the Shiite Islamist Dawa Party, won 35 seats in the 2021 election. The Fatah Coalition, dominated by Shiite Islamist parties backed by Iran, won 17 seats. The Coalition of the National State Forces, which included the Shiite Islamist Nasr bloc, won four seats. The Haquq Movement, the political wing of the Kataib Hezbollah militia, an Iran-backed Shiite militia, won one seat. The Kurdistan Justice Group, a Sunni Islamist party, won one seat. Jordan: TheIslamic Action Front, long affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, won five seats in the 130-member House of Representatives in the 2020 election. The Islamic Center Party, which advocated for an Islamic democracy, won five seats. No Islamist parties were represented in the 65-member Senate appointed by the king. Kuwait: The Islamic Constitutional Movement, an affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood, won three seats in the 65-member National Assembly in the 2023 election. Lebanon: Hezbollah's political wing, the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc, won 13 seats of the 126 seats in parliament in the 2022 election. It held two cabinet ministries. Libya: The Muslim Brotherhood won seats in parliamentary elections after the ouster of Moammar Qaddafi in 2012. But amid political and geographic divisions, it converted into an NGO after many its largest branches disbanded.Morocco: The Justice and Development Party, a Sunni Islamist Party, lost nearly 90 percent of its seats—down from 125 to 13 in the House of Representatives—in the 2021 parliamentary election. Oman: There were no Islamist parties in Oman, an absolute monarchy. Palestinian Authority: Hamas, a Sunni Islamist party backed by Iran,won the parliamentary election in 2006 with 76 of 132 seats. In 2007, it ousted Fatah, a rival secular party, from Gaza and ruled the territory largely uncontested. President Mahmoud Abbas, leader of the secular and nationalist Fatah Party, governed in the West Bank. In 2018, the Palestinian Authority dissolved the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council. Qatar: There were no Islamist parties in the 45-member Consultative Assembly. Saudi Arabia: Political parties were outlawed in Saudi Arabia, a country where Sharia is the source of all laws. The 150 members of the seat Consultative Assembly were appointed by the king. Syria: There were no Islamist parties in the 250-member People's Assembly. The government has long banned Islamist parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood. In rebel-held Idlib province, Hayat Tahrir al Sham, a former affiliate of al Qaeda, ruled the Salvation Government in northwest Syria.Tunisia:Ennahda and Al Karama, two Sunni parties, boycotted the 2022 parliamentary elections over frustration with the president's increasingly autocratic rule. For the first time since the 2011 Jasmine revolution, no Islamist parties had seats in the 161-member Assembly of the Representatives of the People. In 2023, Ennahda founder Rachid Ghannouchi was tried for "plotting against state security" and sentenced to a year in prison. Turkey: In 2023, the Justice and Development Party, a movement rooted in Islamism and led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, won 267 seats in the 600-member Grand National Assembly. It allied with the Nationalist Movement Party, which advocated Turkish Islamism and won 50 seats, and the Free Cause Party, a Kurdish Islamist party. which won 4 seats. The Felicity Party and the New Welfare Party, both Islamist parties, joined the opposition in parliament. United Arab Emirates: Political parties were illegal, so there were no Islamist parties in its 40-member Federal National Council. Yemen: The Houthis, a rebel movement of Zaydi Shiites and backed by Iran, seized Sanaa, the capital, in September 2014. In November 2016, they formed a government that ruled roughly a third of Yemen's territory, in which at least 70 percent of the population lived. Jordanna Yochai, an MA candidate at Columbia University's School of International & Public Affairs, contributed research.
1. IntroductionOver the last decade, increased attention has been paid to terrorism, particularly to the new wave of terrorist groups, fundamentalist movements, and extremist organisations such as Al‐Qaeda. September 11 marked the beginning of a turbulent phase in which states face a new kind of threat made up of a complex network of insidious revolutionary and nationalist forces. Such transformations have given rise to an unprecedented number of publications. However, both political violence and terrorism remain sources of endless disputes and controversies because of their political implications. At the same time, in the scientific community, terrorism studies lack conceptual and methodological uniformity. In his article, Domenico Tosini synthesises and discusses some major findings from this research. Courses using such a review will be confronted with the four major topics that any analysis of terrorism, to be comprehensive, should take into account: the definition of terrorism; its history and classification; its explanations; and an assessment of the consequences of counterterrorism policies.2. Literature recommendations Bjørgo, Tore (ed.) 2005. Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward. London, UK: Routledge.In this book, based on the analysis of numerous case studies (e.g. Palestinian armed groups, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, right‐wing extremists, state terrorism and state‐sponsored terrorism), experts in political violence examine the preconditions for the emergence of different types of terrorist organisations and the main factors that sustain terrorist campaigns. Cole, David 2003. Enemy Aliens: Double Standard and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism. New York, NY: The New Press.Thanks to its analysis and evaluation of the consequences of counter‐terrorism measures, David Cole's Enemy Aliens is one of the most rigorous discussions of how states (like the United States since 2001) often combat terrorism by adopting emergency powers (such as the special detention at Guantanamo Bay), which, in turn, risk undermining civil liberties. della Porta, Donatella 1995. Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Based on empirical research that compares the origins and development of left‐wing terrorism in Italy and Germany between the 1960s and the 1990s, della Porta offers a middle‐range theory of political violence that combines an analysis of the political opportunities and ideological frames exploited by armed groups, a profile of their organisational structures, and an investigation of the typical patterns underlying their recruitment processes. Gambetta, Diego (ed.) 2006. Making Sense of Suicide Missions. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.In this book, a number of distinguished social scientists, while examining the use of suicide missions by political and religious groups (such as the Japanese Kamikaze, the Tamil Tigers, Palestinian organisations, and Al‐Qaeda), specify and discuss the most important methodological questions associated with definitions, data collection, and explanations concerning this form of political struggle. Hoffman, Bruce 2006. Inside Terrorism. New York, NY: Colombia University Press.The book introduces the most important issues of terrorism studies: the controversial problem of the definition of terrorism; a history of terrorism, from anti‐colonial struggles to international terrorism; an examination and explanation of the most recent waves of religious extremists and suicide terrorism; an analysis of the ways terrorist groups exploit old and new media such as the Internet; and, finally, an overview of the strategies, tactics, and organisational aspects of modern and contemporary terrorism. Horgan, John 2005. The Psychology of Terrorism. London, UK: Routledge.Horgan presents a critical analysis of our understanding of terrorist psychology; many shortcomings emerge, particularly the limitations of personality theories in attempting to explain militancy. Based on interviews with terrorists, the book considers the most relevant psychological and social factors underlying involvement and engagement in political violence, and the process of leaving terrorist organisations. Kalyvas, Stathis 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Scholars generally distinguish between terrorism and other forms of violence against civilians – tactics of guerrilla warfare or insurgency in civil wars, for example. However, this work makes a relevant contribution to terrorism studies. Kalyvas clarifies the rationality and micro‐processes of interactions during armed conflicts that account for indiscriminate and selective uses of violence against civilian populations by political actors. Kushner, Harvey W. 2003. Encyclopedia of Terrorism. London, UK: Sage.One of the most accurate and exhaustive dictionaries focusing on terrorism, with more than 300 entries concerning terrorist groups, key events, people, terms, and statistics, as well as biographical, historical, and geographical information. Free access is available at the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) (http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/eBooks.asp). Laqueur, Walter 2002. A History of Terrorism. London, UK: Transaction Publishers.Along with Laqueur's Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study (London: Transaction Publishers, 1998), this constitutes a pioneering history of armed organisations, from nineteenth century Europe, to the anarchists of the 1880s and 1890s, to the left‐wing clashes during the 20th century, and up to the most recent terrorist groups. Pape, Robert A. 2005. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York, NY: Random House.Over the last decade, suicide terrorism has become an alarming political threat and a crucial challenge for social scientists. In his work, which compares a number of organisations responsible for suicide attacks, Pape rejects the explanation of suicide terrorism based on religious fundamentalism. He argues for a correlation between the use of this tactic and specific kinds of groups engaged in separatist campaigns or in struggles for liberation from foreign occupiers. Ranstorp, Magnus (ed.) 2007. Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Directions. London, UK: Routledge.In this book, distinguished scholars of terrorism studies discuss state‐of‐the‐art field research. In exploring new trends in this area – the most important questions about the explanation of recent terrorist organisations such as Al‐Qaeda, and about counterterrorism – these essays shed light on the strengths and weaknesses of our current knowledge of political violence. Reich, Walter (ed.) 1998. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.This is another seminal work on terrorism, bringing together some of the most well known experts in political violence. The variety of approaches used in the explanations of terrorist organisations and in the analysis of counterterrorism paves the way for a real interdisciplinary setting, which is absolutely crucial once the multi‐faceted nature of terrorism is clear. Sageman, Marc 2004. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.Based on the analysis of biographical data for nearly 200 members of global Islamist extremism (of which Al‐Qaeda is a part), Sageman accounts for the origins and developments of this movement and specifies the crucial role played by social networks in the recruitment of individuals as Islamist militants. Wilkinson, Paul 2006. Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London, UK: Routledge.Wilkinson examines major trends in international terrorism and liberal democratic responses. On the one hand, the book introduces the specificity of terrorism and offers a classification and explanation of the most important types of armed groups. On the other, in approaching how states deal with terrorist threats, this work discusses forms of counterterrorism, by taking into account their impact on the rule of law and on the protection of civil liberties.3. Online materials Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Interna (AISI) (Agency for Internal Information and Security)(http://www.aisi.gov.it)The Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Interna (AISI) is the branch of Italian Intelligence tasked with collecting and analysing information about any criminal and terrorist threat to security. Among other activities, the AISI distributes its own periodical, Gnosis, online, where a chronology of international as well as domestic terrorist attacks since 2004 (currently updated through 2007) is available. Counterterrorism Blog (http://counterterrorismblog.org)The Counterterrorism Blog is a multi‐expert blog devoted to providing a one‐stop gateway to the counterterrorism community. It offers, among other things, overnight and breaking news, with real time commentary by experts; reports on terrorist organisations; discussions of long‐term trends in counterterrorism; and summaries of and discussions about US and international law. Center for Constitutional Rights
(CCR) (http://ccrjustice.org)Founded in 1966 by attorneys who represented civil rights organisations, the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) is a non‐profit legal and educational organisation dedicated to protecting the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also offers information about important issues related to counterterrorism (e.g., the prolonged battle in defence of civil liberties associated with the special detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba). Global Terrorism Database (GTD)(http://www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd)The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open‐source database on terrorist incidents around the world since 1970 (currently updated through 2004). It includes systematic data on international as well as domestic terrorist attacks. For each GTD incident, information is available on the date and location of the attack, the weapons used and nature of the target, the number of casualties, and (when possible) the identity of the perpetrator. Another important database, the Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) at the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) (http://www.mipt.org/TKB.asp), has recently ceased operations and elements of the system have been merged with the GTD. Information on terrorist groups is now available at the Terrorist Organization Profiles (http://www.start.umd.edu/data/tops). Human Security Report Project
(HSRP) (http://www.hsrgroup.org)The HSRP conducts research on global and regional trends in political violence, exploring their causes and consequences, and then making this research accessible to the policy and research communities, the media, educators, and the interested public. The HSRP's publications include the Human Security Report, the Human Security Brief series, and the Human Security Gateway. The recent Human Security Brief 2007, online, makes a relevant contribution in discussing the methodological issues associated with collecting data on terrorism and offers a comprehensive overview of terrorist incidents in the last decade. Middle East Media Research Institute
(MEMRI) (http://www.memri.org)The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) explores the Middle East through the region's media with respect to a variety of topics including terrorism. MEMRI provides translations of Arabic, Persian, and Turkish media, as well as analysis of political, ideological, intellectual, social, cultural, and religious tendencies in the Middle East. A new section, the MEMRI's Islamist Websites Monitor Project, was launched in 2006 as part of the Jihad & Terrorism Studies project. Its aim is to keep Western audiences informed about the phenomenon of jihadist sites on the Internet, which are used by terrorist groups and their sympathisers to spread their extremist messages, to raise funds, and to recruit activists. Uppsala Conflict Data Project
(UCDP) (http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP)The Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) collects data on armed conflicts around the world. A global conflict database is now available online. Data are useful for systematic studies of conflict origins, dynamics, and resolution. Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS)(http://wits.nctc.gov)The Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) is the National Counterterrorism Center's (NCTC) database of terrorist incidents. NCTC serves as the primary organisation in the United States government for integrating and analysing all intelligence pertaining to terrorism and, at the same time, as the central and shared knowledge bank on terrorism information. Based on WITS, the NCTC provides an annual report and statistical information about terrorist incidents. Additional Online Resources Scores of additional organisations and centres (too many to list) conduct and disseminate research on issues related to armed conflicts, terrorism, terrorist groups, security, and counterterrorism. What follows is a list of some other key organisations and centres, with links to their websites:Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)(http://www.aspi.org.au)Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS)(http://www.fhs.se/en/Research/Centers‐and‐Research‐Programmes/CATS)Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)(http://www.csis.org)Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV)(http://www.st‐andrews.ac.uk/~wwwir/research/cstpv)IntelCenter(http://intelcenter.com)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)(http://www.pvtr.org)International Crisis Group (ICG)(http://www.crisisgroup.org)International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)(http://www.iiss.org)International Policy Institute for Counter‐Terrorism (ICT)(http://www.ict.org.il)Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT)(http://www.mipt.org)Saban Center at the Brookings Institution(http://www.brookings.edu/saban.aspx)Senlis Council(http://www.senliscouncil.net)Southern Poverty Law Center(http://www.splcenter.org)Terrorism and Homeland Security at RAND Corporation(http://www.rand.org/research_areas/terrorism)Terrorism Research Center (TRC)(http://www.terrorism.org)Transnational Radical Islamism Project at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment(http://www.mil.no/felles/ffi/english/start/research/Analysis_Division/_TERRA)United States Institute of Peace(http://www.usip.org/index.html)4. Sample syllabus Course Title: A Sociological Analysis of Terrorism and Counterterrorism Course Description In this course, we will explore the most relevant issues around terrorism and counterterrorism policies. Although we will largely approach this topic from a sociological perspective, this study is quite interdisciplinary. Consequently, we will be reading works from other academic disciplines, including history, psychology, political science, and economics. There are four major areas that any analysis of terrorism, to be comprehensive, should take into account: the definition of terrorism; its history and classification; its explanations; and an assessment of consequences related to counterterrorism. After an introduction to terrorism research (part 1), we will discuss the controversies related to the definition of terrorism (part 2) and to data collection (part 3), both necessary for an understanding of tendencies concerning terrorist incidents. A historical overview (part 4) will give us some preliminary information about the variety of terrorist campaigns – information that prepares us for the next exercise (part 5): grouping terrorist organisations by different types. Looking in more depth at the evolution of terrorism in the last decade, we will examine the case of Al‐Qaeda (part 6), and how this and other organisations exploit old and new media, especially the Internet (part 7). The next chapter will be the explanation of terrorism, that is, the specification of the main psychological, political, cultural, and religious factors underlying the emergence of a terrorist organisation and the unfolding of a terrorist campaign. Suicide terrorism will be used as a case study. More specifically, we will approach terrorism by examining the motivations and rationality of terrorist organisations (part 8), of the communities that support them (part 9), and of those who join them (part 10). We end the course by focusing on both the legal (part 11) and strategic (part 12) implications of counterterrorism measures adopted since 2001. Course outline and reading assignments Part 1. Terrorism Research An overview of the most important approaches to the study of terrorism and of the strengths and weaknesses of available analyses. Bjørgo, Tore 2005. 'Introduction' (pp. 1–15) and 'Conclusions' (pp. 256–264) in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward, edited by Tore Bjørgo. London, UK: Routledge. Crenshaw, Martha 2000. 'The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century.'Political Psychology 21 (2): 405–420 (Doi: 10.1111/0162-895X.00195). Ranstorp, Magnus 2007. 'Introduction: Mapping Terrorism Research – Challenges and Priorities.' Pp. 1–28 in Mapping Terrorism Research, edited by Magnus Ranstorp. London, UK: Routledge. Silke, Andrew 2004. 'An Introduction to Terrorism Research.' Pp. 1–29 in Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures, edited by Andrew Silke. London, UK: Frank Cass. Sinai, Joshua 2007. 'New Trends in Terrorism Studies: Strengths and Weaknesses.' Pp. 31–50 in Mapping Terrorism Research, edited by Magnus Ranstorp. London, UK: Routledge. Turk, Austin T. 2004. 'Sociology of Terrorism.'Annual Review of Sociology 30: 271–286 (Doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110510). Wilkinson, Paul 2007. 'Research into Terrorism Studies: Achievements and Failures.' Pp. 316–328 in Mapping Terrorism Research, edited by Magnus Ranstorp. London, UK: Routledge. Part 2. What is Terrorism? A discussion of one of the most controversial issues, the definition of terrorism, focusing on its political and methodological implications. Aly, Waleed 2008. 'The Axiom of Evil.'The Guardian, 8 July, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/08/nelsonmandela.terrorism (last accessed: 8 July 2008). Hoffman, Bruce 2006. Chapter 1 (pp. 1–42). Inside Terrorism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. della Porta, Donatella 2004. 'Terror Against the State.' Pp. 208–16 in The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, edited by Kate Nash and Alan Scott. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing. Schmid, Alexander P. 2004. 'Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism.'Terrorism and Political Violence 16 (2): 197–221 (Doi: 10.1080/09546550490483134). Tilly, Charles 2004. 'Terror, Terrorism, Terrorist.'Sociological Theory 22 (1): 5–16 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9558.2004.00200.x). Tosini, Domenico 2007. 'Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat', Sociology Compass 1 (2), 664–681 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00035.x). Wilkinson, Paul 2006. Chapter 1 (pp. 1–19). Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London, UK: Routledge. Part 3. Collecting Data on Terrorism Incidents An introduction to the challenges and solutions to the collection of terrorism data, a preliminary and crucial aspect of any scientific analysis. Buchalter, Alice R. and Glenn E. Curtis 2003. Inventory and Assessment of Databases Relevant for Social Science Research on Terrorism. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division Library of Congress, http://lcweb.loc.gov/rr/frd (last accessed 10 June 2008). Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler 2006. Chapter 3 (pp. 52–83). The Political Economy of Terrorism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Lafree, Gary 2007. 'Introducing the Global Terrorism Database.'Terrorism and Political Violence 19 (2): 181–204 (Doi: 10.1080/09546550701246817). HSP 2008. Human Security Brief 2007. Dying to Lose: Explaining the Decline in Global Terrorism. Simon Fraser University, Canada: Human Security Report Project, http://www.humansecuritybrief.info/HSRP_Brief_2007.pdf (last accessed 15 June 2008). Part 4. Waves of Terror: The Evolution of Terrorism A look at terrorism from a historical perspective in an attempt to identify continuities and discontinuities in the use of political violence. Abrahms, Max 2006. 'Why Terrorism Does Not Work.'International Security 31 (2): 42–78 (Doi: 10.1162/isec.2006.31.2.42). Duyvesteyn, Isabelle 2004. 'How New Is the New Terrorism?'Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27 (5): 439–454 (Doi: 10.1080/10576100490483750). Hoffman, Bruce 2006. Chapters 2–4 (pp. 43–130). Inside Terrorism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Jenkins, Brian 1975. International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict. Research Paper n. 48, California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy. Kaplan, Jeffrey 2007. 'The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism?'Terrorism and Political Violence 19 (4): 545–570 (Doi: 10.1080/09546550701606564). Laqueur, Walter 2002. Chapters 1–2 (pp. 3–78). A History of Terrorism. London, UK: Transaction Publishers. Münkler, Herfried 2005. Chapter 5 (pp. 99–116). The New Wars. Cambridge, UK: Polity. Rapoport, David C. 2004. 'Modern Terror: The Four Waves.' Pp. 46–73 in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Great Strategy, edited by Audrey Cronin and J. Ludes. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Reed, Donald J. 2008. 'Beyond the War on Terror: Into the Fifth Generation of War and Conflict.'Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31 (8): 684–722 (Doi: 10.1080/10576100802206533). Part 5. Typologies of Terrorist Movements An overview of the complex task of classifying terrorist organisations on the basis of characteristics such as political objectives, ideological frames, and the cleavages between them and their enemies. Goodwin, Jeff 2006. 'A Theory of the Categorical Terrorism.'Social Forces 84 (4): 2027–2046. Gunaratna, Rohan and Graeme C. S. Steven 2004. Chapter 1 (pp. 1–98). Counterterrorism. Santa Barbara, CA: Abc Clio. Schmid, Alexander P. and Albert J. Jongman 1988. Chapter 2 (in collaboration with M. Stohl and P. A. Fleming, pp. 39–60). Political Terrorism. London, UK: Transaction Publishers. Tosini, Domenico 2007. 'Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat.'Sociology Compass 1 (2), 664–681 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00035.x). Wilkinson, Paul 2006. Chapter 2 (pp. 20–38). Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London, UK: Routledge. Part 6. Al‐Qaeda and its Affiliates: Ideologies, Strategies, Structures A sociological look at the ideological, strategic, and organisational aspects of Al‐Qaeda's terrorism from the 1980s to its most recent campaign in Iraq. Al‐Zayyat, Montasser 2004. The Road to Al‐Qaeda. London, UK: Pluto Press. Gunaratna, Rohan 2002. Chapters 1–2 (pp. 21–126). Inside Al‐Qaeda. New York, NY: Berkley Books. Pape, Robert A. 2005. Chapter 7 (pp. 102–125). Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York, NY: Random House. Sageman, Marc 2004. Chapters 1‐2 (pp. 1‐60). Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Hafez, Mohammed M. 2007. Chapters 1–5 (pp. 35–162). Suicide Bombers in Iraq. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Part 7. Terrorism and the Media An exploration of the ways that terrorist organisations exploit old and new media, especially the Internet, as communicative channels (for staging their attacks, threats, demands, and propaganda) and as instrumental tools (for fund raising, coordination, and recruitment). Hoffman, Bruce 2006. Chapters 6–7 (pp. 173–228). Inside Terrorism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. ICG 2006. In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency. International Crisis Group: Middle East Report No 50, 15 February, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3953&l=1 (last accessed 5 February 2008). Rogan, Hanna 2006. Jihadism Online: A Study of How Al‐Qaeda and Radical Islamist Groups Use Internet for Terrorist Purposes. Norwegian Defence Research Establishment: FFI/RAPPORT‐2006/00915, http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2006/00915.pdf (last accessed 5 June 2008). Sageman, Marc 2008. Chapter 6 (pp. 109–123). Leaderless Jihad. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Weimann, Gabriel 2006. Chapters 3–4 (pp. 49–145). Terror on the Internet. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Part 8. Terrorist Organisations and Their Logic An examination of the political objectives and ideologies of terrorist organisations and an overview of the rationality and strategies underlying their decision‐making in relation to the political opportunities and military events shaping their environment. Boyns, David and James David Ballard 2004. 'Developing a Sociological Theory for the Empirical Understanding of Terrorism.'American Sociologist 35 (2): 5–26 (Doi: 10.1007/BF02692394). Crenshaw, Martha 1998. 'The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Strategic Choice.' Pp. 7–24 in Origins of Terrorism, edited by Walter Reich. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Gambetta, Diego 2006. 'Can We Make Sense of Suicide Missions?' Pp. 259–299 in Making Sense of Suicide Missions, edited by Diego Gambetta. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Hafez, Mohammed and Quintan Wiktorowicz 2004. 'Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement.' Pp. 61–88 in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, edited Quintan Wiktorowicz. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press. Kalyvas, Stathis 2006. Chapters 6–7 (pp. 147–208). The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Kramer, Martin 1998. 'The Moral Logic of Hezbollah.' Pp. 131–157 in Origins of Terrorism, edited by Walter Reich. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Pape, Robert A. 2005. Chapters 3–5 (pp. 27–60). Dying to Win. New York, NY: Random House. Tosini, Domenico 2009. 'A Sociological Understanding of Suicide Attacks.'Theory, Culture & Society (Forthcoming). Part 9. Mechanisms of Social Support A discussion of the economic, cultural, and political conditions which make possible the support for, and collaboration with, terrorist organisations by members of certain communities. Cook, David and Olivia Allison 2007. Chapters 1–5 (pp. 1–85). Understanding and Addressing Suicide Attacks: The Faith and Politics of Martyrdom Operations. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International. Chernick, Marc 2007. 'FARC‐EP: From Liberal Guerrillas to Marxist Rebels to Post‐Cold War Insurgency.' Pp. 51–120 in Terror, Insurgency, and the State, edited by Marianne Heiberg et al. Philadelphia, PA: University Pennsylvania Press. Hashim, Ahmed S. 2006. Chapter 2 (pp. 59–124). Insurgency and Counter‐Insurgency in Iraq. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Kalyvas, Stathis 2006. Chapter 4 (pp. 87–110). The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Merari, Ariel 2005. 'Social, Organizational and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism.' Pp. 70–86 in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward, edited by Tore Bjørgo. London, UK: Routledge. Pape, Robert A. 2005. Chapters 6–8 (pp. 79–167). Dying to Win. New York, NY: Random House. Part 10. Social Networks and Recruitment An analysis of the motivations behind the process of joining terrorist organisations and of the role played by group dynamics and social networks. della Porta, Donatella 1995. Chapter 7 (pp. 165–186). Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Sageman, Marc 2004. Chapters 4–5 (pp. 99–173). Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University Pennsylvania Press. Horgan, John 2005. Chapter 3 (pp. 47–79). The Psychology of Terrorism. London, UK: Routledge. Khosrokhavar, Fahad 2005. Chapter 3 (pp. 149–224). Suicide Bombers. London, UK: Pluto Press. Pedahzur, Ami 2005. Chapters 6–7 (pp. 118–181). Suicide Terrorism. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Stern, Jessica 2003. Chapter 9 (pp. 237–280). Terror in the Name of God. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publisher. Wintrobe, Ronald 2006. Chapters 5–6 (pp. 108–157). Rational Extremism: The Political Economy of Radicalism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Part 11. Counterterrorism I: Legal Implications An overview of the emergency powers of antiterrorism legislations and 'special measures', and an analysis of their legal impact on the protection of human rights. Cole, David 2003. Chapters 1–5 (pp. 17–82). Enemy Aliens. New York, NY: The Free Press. Haubrich, Dirk 2003. 'September 11, Anti‐Terror Laws and Civil Liberties: Britain, France and Germany Compared.'Government and Opposition 38 (1): 3–29 (Doi: 10.1111/1477-7053.00002). Parker, Tom 2005. 'Counterterrorism Policies in the United Kingdom.' Pp. 119–148 in Protecting Liberty in an Age of Terror, edited by Philip B. Heymann and Juliette N. Kayyem. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Tosini, Domenico 2007. 'Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat', Sociology Compass 1 (2): 664–681 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00035.x). Part 12. Counterterrorism II: Strategic Limitations An examination of the most important counterterrorism policies adopted since 2001, with special reference to the occupation of Iraq, and an assessment of their advantages and risks for combating and preventing terrorism. Nesser, Peter 2006. 'Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe.'Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29 (4): 323–342 (Doi: 10.1080/10576100600641899). Pape, Robert A. 2005. Chapter 12 (pp. 237–250). Dying to Win. New York, NY: Random House. Silke, Andrew 2005. 'Fire of Iolaus: The Role of State Countermeasures in Causing Terrorism and What Needs to Be Done.' Pp. 241–255 in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward, edited by Tore Bjørgo. London, UK: Routledge. Smelser, Neil J. 2007. Chapter 6 (pp. 160–199). The Faces of Terrorism: Social and Psychological Dimensions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Tosini, Domenico 2007. 'Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat', Sociology Compass 1 (2): 664–681 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00035.x). Wilkinson, Paul 2006. Chapters 5–6 (pp. 61–102). Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London, UK: Routledge.5. Films and videos Al‐Qaeda Film on the First Anniversary of the London Bombings. 2006 (17 min)(http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/215/1186.htm)Excerpts from a message from 2005 London bomber Shehzad Tanweer and statements by Al‐Qaeda leaders Ayman Al‐Zawahiri and Adam Gadahn, posted on http://www.tajdeed.net.tc on 8 July 2006. A typical example of the communicative use of the Internet by Islamists in their attempt to frame terrorist attacks as legitimate acts of martyrdom, committed by courageous Muslims in defence of their brothers and sisters in occupied Muslim lands (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine). Al‐Qaeda Leader in Iraq Abu Musab Al‐Zarqawi's First Televised Interview. 2006 (17 min)(http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/344/1118.htm)A video posted by the Islamist web forum http://www.alsaha.com on 25 April 2006, in which the Al‐Qaeda commander in Iraq Abu Musab Al‐Zarqawi (killed by an airstrike on 7 June 2006) outlines all the typical condemnations (by Islamist extremists) of the Iraq occupation by the US‐led coalition, and calls for a jihad against its forces and allies. Propagandising the military capabilities of Al‐Qaeda, the video culminates in footage of Al‐Zarqawi with masked fighters, firing an automatic weapon, and 'new missiles' developed by 'the brothers'. Al‐Arabiya TV Special on the Culture of Martyrdom and Suicide Bombers. 2005 (7 min)(http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/215/807.htm)Excerpts from a show about the culture of martyrdom, aired on Al‐Arabiya TV on 22 July 2005. The documentary investigates some of the most relevant religious and political justifications and symbolic representations among Islamist extremists in favour of suicide attacks. In particular, it looks at the Palestinian organisations Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and at the Lebanese Hezbollah. The film includes an interview with Maha Ghandour, the wife of Salah Ghandour, who was responsible for a suicide attack carried out in 1995 on behalf of Hezbollah against an Israeli military convoy. Battle For Haditha. 2007 (93 min)(http://www.nickbroomfield.com/haditha.html)In this film, the director Nick Broomfield looks at the dramatic events surrounding an incident that occurred in Haditha, Iraq, when 24 Iraqis were allegedly massacred by US Marines, following the death of a Marine in a bombing perpetrated by Iraqi insurgents. The harsh reality of the war is viewed from three perspectives: that of the US troops, the insurgents who committed the attacks, and a civilian Iraqi family. Iranian Animated Film for Children Promotes Suicide Bombings. 2005 (10 min)(http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/215/906.htm)Including excerpts from an Iranian animated movie for children, aired on IRIB 3 TV on 28 October 2005, this film is an example of the mechanisms of de‐humanization of the enemy (the Israelis), based on a tale of the ferocious murder of innocent people by Israeli soldiers. This incident is followed by a bomb attack framed as an act of martyrdom by young militants in revenge of the previous assassination. Paradise Now. 2005 (91 min)In his film, the director Hany Abu‐Assad focuses on the final days of two Palestinian militants as they prepare to carry out a suicide attack in Tel Aviv. Once childhood friends Said (Kais Nashef) and Khaled (Ali Suliman) are offered such an attack, they feel a sense of purpose in serving their people's cause, whereas a young Palestinian woman, after learning of their plan, tries to dissuade them from carrying out their missions. Paradise Now has been viewed as a controversial attempt to examine the motivations of suicide bombers. The Reach of War: Sectarian War in Iraq. 2006 (7 min)(http://www.nytimes.com/packages/khtml/2006/12/28/world/20061228_SECTARIAN_FEATURE.html)The New York Times journalist Marc Santora reports on some of the most violent and bloody effects of the sectarian violence perpetrated in Iraq during the civil war between Sunnis and Shiites, which has followed the occupation by the US‐led coalition. The Road to Guantanamo. 2006 (92 min)(http://www.roadtoguantanamomovie.com)Directed by Michael Winterbottom, the film tells the story of four friends beginning a holiday in Pakistan. Through a series of interviews and news footage, the film shows how they end up in Afghanistan, where are then captured by American forces and kept in harsh conditions at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for over 2 years. The Role of Foreign Fighters in the Iraqi Jihad. 2006 (9 min)(http://www1.nefafoundation.org/multimedia‐original.html)In this video, NEFA Foundation expert Evan Kohlmann documents the phenomenon of foreign fighters in Iraq and their role within the Sunni insurgency. The video includes footage of senior figures from Abu Musab al‐Zarqawi's terrorist group (including Lebanese, Saudi, and Kuwaiti nationals) and scenes from Al‐Qaida training camps in Iraq. The Suicide Bomber. 2005 (12 min)(http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/july‐dec05/bombers_11‐14.html)In this debate aired on PBS on 14 November 2005, three experts (Mia Bloom, Mohammed M. Hafez, and Robert A. Pape) discuss what motivates suicide bombers and their terrorist organisations, with special reference to the 2005 hotel bombings in Amman, Jordan, where a female militant joining these attacks was found alive after her bomb failed to detonate. The Terrorist Propaganda (three videos): Indexing Al‐Qaeda Online. 2005 (6 min)(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/custom/2005/08/05/CU2005080501141.html?whichDay=1) Without the Video, It's Just an Attack. 2007 (5 min)(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/video/2007/09/28/VI2007092800608.html) Al‐Qaeda's Growing Online Offensive. 2008 (14 min)(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2008/06/23/AR2008062302135.html)Over the last decade, terrorist propaganda on the Internet has increased dramatically. In these videos, experts discuss how insurgent groups, in particular Islamist extremists in Iraq and Afghanistan, are using new media to spread their messages worldwide, to chronicle their operations (including the assembly and emplacement of roadside bombs targeting US forces), to recruit, and to raise money.6. Focus questions
What challenges do researchers interested in terrorism studies face and why? What are the most important theoretical and methodological weaknesses in current terrorism research? How can we define terrorism? What political controversies affect the definition of terrorism? When comparing different terrorism data sets, what kinds of diagnoses can we make on the tendencies of terrorist incidents in the last decade? How has terrorism changed in history? Based on the literature concerning Al‐Qaeda's ideology, strategies, and structures, what continuities and discontinuities can we identify with respect to previous forms of terrorism? When dealing with the explanation of terrorism, what are the most significant factors to be taken into account? How can we learn from the current literature on suicide terrorism in order to build a comprehensive model for its explanation? Given the legislative and military responses to September 11 and subsequent attacks (e.g. the 2005 London bombings), what have been the legal consequences affecting our societies and the strategic implications for combating and preventing terrorist violence?
7. SeminarsParticipants will be divided into small groups of about three persons. Each group will be asked to make a contribution to a sociological analysis (either written or presented) of a specific armed organisation, such as:Al‐Gama'a Al‐IslamiyyaAl‐QaedaAl‐Qaeda in IraqAl‐Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly Salafist Group for Call and Combat)Ansar Al‐SunnahAnsar Al‐IslamArmed Islamic Groups (GIA)Army of GodAum ShinrikyoChechen separatistsEgyptian Islamic JihadEuskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)HamasHezbollahIrgun Zvai LeumiIrish Republican Army (IRA)Islamic Movement of UzbekistanJemaah IslamiyahKashmiri separatistsKu Klux Klan (KKK)Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)Lashkar‐e‐JhangviLibyan Islamic Fighting GroupPalestinian Islamic JihadPalestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO)Red Army Faction (RAF)Red Brigades (BR)Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)Taliban.For each armed organisation, each group will examine the following aspects:
data on its attacks – including information that justifies the label of 'terrorist organisation'; a historical account of its origins and developments; an analysis of the strategy underlying its terrorist campaigns; a clarification of its social support and collaboration (if any); a profile of its militants and patterns of recruitment; a discussion of the counterterrorism policies adopted by states and their impact on the terrorist organisation.
Note * Correspondence address: Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology and Social Research, Piazza Venezia 41 – 38100 Trento, Italy, +39 0461 881324; +39 0461 881348 (fax); +39 347 2329219 (mobile); Email: domenico.tosini@soc.unitn.it http://portale.unitn.it/dpt/dsrs/docenti/tosini.htm
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh religiusitas dan pengetahuan produk terhadap keputusan pembelian produk halal dengan kepercayaan sebagai variabel intervening (studi kasus pada produk HNI-HPAI). Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah deskriptif kuantitatif, sedangkan teknik pengumpulan data menggunakan kuesioner online dan wawancara dengan beberapa responden. Populasinya adalah semua masyarakat muslim di Kota Pontianak yang pernah membeli produk HNI-HPAI. Pengambilan sampel menggunakan purposive sampling method dengan jumlah sampel sebanyak 110 responden yang berumur minimal 18 Tahun. Alat analisis yang digunakan yaitu SEM (Structural Equation Model) dengan Aplikasi Warp PLS 6.0.Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa religiusitas, pengetahuan produk dan kepercayaan berpengaruh signifikan terhadap keputusan pembelian. Variabel kepercayaan mampu memediasi hubungan antara religiusitas dan keputusan pembelian, serta mampu memediasi hubungan antara pengetahuan produk dan keputusan pembelian. Keterbatasan dalam penelitian ini yaitu sampel yang digunakan terbatas hanya dari konsumen muslim yang ada di Kota Pontianak. Disarankan untuk penelitian selanjutnya agar memilih sampel dari beberapa kota yang ada di Indonesia untuk mengetahui gambaran secara umum kecenderungan masyarakat Indonesia dalam memilih produk halal dan direkomendasikan untuk meneliti perilaku konsumen dari semua agama di Indonesia terhadap keputusan dalam memilih produk yang memiliki label halal. Kata Kunci : Religiusitas, Pengetahuan Produk, Kepercayaan, Keputusan Pembelian, Produk Halal DAFTAR PUSTAKA AbdRahman ,A., Asrarhaghighi,E. , & Ab Rahman, S.(2015). Consumers and Halal Cosmetic Products : Knowledge,Religiosity, Attitude and Intention. Journal Of Islamic Marketing, 6 (1), 148-163. Abdillah, W. & Jogiyanto.(2015). Partial Least Square (PLS) Alternatif Struktural Equation Modelling (SEM) Dalam Penelitian Bisnis. C.V Andi Offset. Ancok,D., & Suroso, F.N. (2008). Psikologi Islam : Solusi Islam Atas Problem- Problem Psikologi. Yogyakarta : Pustaka Pelajar. Astrila,G.(2014). Pengaruh Tingkat Pengetahuan Tentang Pesan Halal Terhadap Tingkat Kepercayaan Pada Produk Kosmetik (Studi Eksplanatif Mahasiswi UII Yogyakarta pada Kosmetik Wardah). Yogyakarta : Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik,Universitas Atma Jaya Yogyakarta. Aulia,A.N. (2018). Pengaruh Pengetahuan Produk Halal, Religiusitas, dan Halal Awareness Terhadap Keputusan Pembelian Produk Pangan Kemasan Berlabel Halal. Surakarta : Fakultas Ekonomi Dan Bisnis, Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta. Bungin, B.(2011), Metodologi Penelitian Kuantitatif (Komunikasi, Ekonomi Dam Kebijakan Publik Serta Ilmu – Ilmu Sosial Lainnya), Jakarta : Kencana Prenada Media Group. Darwin,Stevan., Kunto,Y.S. (2014). Analisis Pengaruh Kualitas Layanan Terhadap Loyalitas Pelanggan dengan Kepuasan dan Kepercayaan sebagai Variabel Intervening pada Asuransi jiwa Manulife Indo-Surabaya. Jurnal Manajemen Pemasaran Petra, 2 (1), 1-12 Dwiastuti,R.,et al ,. (2012).Ilmu Perilaku Konsumen. Malang : UB Press. Efendi, F., & Makhfudli. (2009).Keperawatan Kesehatan Komunitas Teori dan Praktik Dalam Keperawatan. Jakarta : Salemba Medika. Hadi, S.(2004). Metodologi Research, Yogyakarta: Andi Halik, A., Ujianto., Ratih, I.A.B. (2017) Costumer Trust As Intervening Variable of The Influence of Marketing Mix, Service Quality,and Religious Costumer Commitment in Sharia Bank Public.Journal International Bussiness Management, 11 (3),611 -623. Hosen,M.N.,et al,.(2008). Dasar-dasar Ekonomi Islam. Jakarta : PKES. Iskamto, D., & Yulihardi .(2017). Analisis Peranan Religiusitas Terhadap Kepercayaan Kepada Perbankan. Syariah. Jurnal Kajian Ekonomi Islam. 2(2), 205-214.Jalaluddin, R. (2010). Psikologi Agama Sebuah Pengantar. Bandung : Mizan Jati, T.A. (2017). Pengaruh Sikap Dan Pengetahuan Produk Terhadap Keputusan Pembelian Produk Ramah Lingkungan (Studi Kasus Pada Pelanggan Larissa Aesthetic Center Di Yogyakarta). Purworejo : Fakultas Keguruan Dan Ilmu Pendidikan, Universitas Muhammadiyah Purworejo. Kotler, Philip & Amstrong,G ., (2012). Prinsip-Prinsip Pemasaran. Jilid 2. Edisi Kedelapan. Jakarta : Erlangga. Kotler, P., & Keller, K.L. 2012. Marketing Management. New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc. Kusmayadi, Tatang. (2007). Pengaruh Relationship Quality Terhadap Loyalitas Nasabah Tabungan. Bandung : STIE STAN Indonesia Mandiri. Lestari, A.M. (2015).Pengaruh Religiusitas Produk Bank, Kepercayaan, Pengetahuan dan Pelayanan Terhadap Preferensi Menabung Pada Perbankan Syariah (Studi Kasus Pada Mahasiswa Fakultas Ekonomi dan Bisnis Universitas Brawijaya). Malang : JIM Universitas Brawijaya. Maski,Ghozali.(2010). Analisis Keputusan Nasabah Menabung : Pendekatan Komponen dan Model Logistik Studi Pada Bank Syariah di Malang.Journal of Indonesian Applied Economics,4 (1),43-57. Mukhtar, A., & Butt, M. M. (2012). Intention To Choose Halal Products: The Role Of Religiosity. Journal Of Islamic Marketing, 3(2),108–120. Nasrullah,Muhammad.(2015). Islamic Branding,Religiusitas Dan Keputusan Konsumen Terhadap Produk. Jurnal Hukum Islam, 13 (2), 79-87. Peter, J.P., Dan Olson, J.C. (2010). Consumer Behavior & Marketing Strategy.New York: Mcgraw Hill. Prasetijo,R., & Ihalauw,J.J.(2005). Perilaku Konsumen. Yogyakarta : Andi. Prasetyo,B., & Jannah, L.M. (2005). Metode Penelitian Kuantitatif (Teori & Aplikasi). Jakarta : Raja Grafindo Persada Rochmanto, B. A. (2014). Pengaruh Pengetahuan Produk Dan Norma Religius Terhadap Sikap Konsumen Dalam Niat Mengkonsumsi Produk Makanan Dan Minuman Halal (Studi Kasus Di Kota Semarang). Semarang : Fakultas Ekonomika Dan Bisnis Universitas Diponegoro. Rohmatun,K.I Dan Dewi,C.K. 2017. Pengaruh Pengetahuan Dan Religiusitas Terhadap Niat Beli Pada Kosmetik Halal Melalui Sikap. Jurnal Ecodemika,1 (1), 27-35 . Rondonuwu,A.N.T. (2014).Pengaruh Pengetahuan Produk Terhadap Kepercayaan Dan Minat Beli Calon Pengguna Smartfren Andromax di Sidoarjo. Surabaya : STIE Perbanas Surabaya. Sahlan, A. (2011). Religiusitas Perguruan Tinggi : Potret Tradisi Keagamaan di Perguruan Tinggi Islam. Malang: UIN Maliki Press. Sallam,Methaq Ahmed. (2016). An Investigation of Corporate Image Effect an WOM : The role of Costumer Satisfaction and Trust. International Journal of Business Administration. 7 (3).27-35 Shofwa,Y. (2016). Pengaruh Kualitas Produk Dan Religiusitas Terhadap Keputusan Nasabah Produk Simpanan Pada BSM Cabang Purwokerto.Islamic Economics Journal, 4(1), 189- 217. Siregar,S.(2010). Statistika Deskriptif Untuk Penelitian. Jakarta : Rajawali Pers. Sugiyono. (2012). Statistik Untuk Penelitian. Bandung: Alfabeta. Sumarwan, U.(2011). Perilaku Konsumen :Teori Dan Penerapannya Dalam Pemasaran. Jakarta : PT Ghalia Indonesia. Sunyoto,D. (2014). Perilaku Konsumen. Jakarta : PT Buku Seru. Supranto,J.( 2009). Statistik, Teori Dan Aplikasi Jilid 2. Jakarta : Erlangga Thouless,R.H. (2000). Pengantar Psikologi Agama. Jakarta : PT Raja Grafindo Persada. Utomo,T.P. (2014). Analisis Faktor-Faktor yang Mempengaruhi Keputusan Nasabah dalam Memilih Jasa Perbankan Syariah (Studi Bank Mandiri Syariah, Kantor Cabang Malang). Jurnal Ilmiah Mahasiswa FEB Universitas Brawijaya, 2(2). 3 Wulandari,I. S.(2018) .Analisis Pengaruh Religiusitas, Pengetahuan Dan Kualitas Pelayanan Terhadap Keputusan Menggunakan Jasa Bank Syariah Dengan Kepercayaan Sebagai Variabel Intervening (Studi Kasus Pada Bank Bri Syariah Kantor Cabang Semarang). Salatiga:Fakultas Ekonomi Dan Bisnis Islam,Institut Agama Islam Negeri Salatiga. Yousafzai, S. Y.,Pallister,J.G., dan Foxall,G.R. (2003). A Proposed Model of ETrust for Electronic Banking, Techovation,23. 847 -860. Diakses dari http://dsnmui.or.id/ pada 12 September 2018 Pukul 18.45 Diakses dari http://www.wikipedia.org/ pada 27 Desember 2018 Pukul 10.35
n/a ; Timeline of key events: March 2011: Anti-government protests broke out in Deraa governorate calling for political reforms, end of emergency laws and more freedoms. After government crackdown on protestors, demonstrations were nationwide demanding the ouster of Bashar Al-Assad and his government. July 2011: Dr. Nabil Elaraby, Secretary General of the League of Arab States (LAS), paid his first visit to Syria, after his assumption of duties, and demanded the regime to end violence, and release detainees. August 2011: LAS Ministerial Council requested its Secretary General to present President Assad with a 13-point Arab initiative (attached) to resolve the crisis. It included cessation of violence, release of political detainees, genuine political reforms, pluralistic presidential elections, national political dialogue with all opposition factions, and the formation of a transitional national unity government, which all needed to be implemented within a fixed time frame and a team to monitor the above. - The Free Syrian Army (FSA) was formed of army defectors, led by Col. Riad al-Asaad, and backed by Arab and western powers militarily. September 2011: In light of the 13-Point Arab Initiative, LAS Secretary General's and an Arab Ministerial group visited Damascus to meet President Assad, they were assured that a series of conciliatory measures were to be taken by the Syrian government that focused on national dialogue. October 2011: An Arab Ministerial Committee on Syria was set up, including Algeria, Egypt, Oman, Sudan and LAS Secretary General, mandated to liaise with Syrian government to halt violence and commence dialogue under the auspices of the Arab League with the Syrian opposition on the implementation of political reforms that would meet the aspirations of the people. - On October 26, the Ministerial Committee held discussions in Damascus with President Assad. - The establishment of the Syrian National Council (SNC) in Istanbul, the first opposition coalition of different groups, but failed to gain international recognition because of deep divisions. November 2011: Syrian government agreed to implement a new Arab Action Plan (attached) endorsed by LAS Ministerial Council to end all acts of violence, release detainees, withdraw Syrian military and armed forces from cities, and ensure freedom of movement for journalists and observers throughout the country. -LAS Ministerial Council suspended the membership of Syria (November 16), and imposed economic sanctions (November 27) and some member states withdrew their ambassadors from Damascus, as it failed to comply with the Action Plan. December 2011: Negotiations with Damascus were resumed and an agreement is finally reached on the implementation of the Action Plan. LAS Observer Mission was deployed in Syria to monitor the implementation of the plan (December 24). - The Mission later submitted a report (attached) covering the period from 24 December 2011 to 18 January 2012 in accordance with the mandate conferred by the protocol concluded between the Syrian government and LAS. The report was divisive among the members of the Arab League, as it blamed both the regime and the opposition for the violence. January 2012: LAS Ministerial Council adopted resolution 7444 (attached) which called on the Syrian President to immediately hand over power to his deputy in order to begin the process of a political transition, which would include negotiations with the opposition, the formation of a national unity government, and the holding of elections. The resolution also, requested the Chair of the Arab Ministerial Committee and the Secretary General to brief the United Nations Security Council on the developments and get it to endorse the plan. - On January 22, Saudi Arabia withdrew its monitors, followed by the other GCC members on January 24. - On January 28, the Secretary-General of LAS announced the suspension of the activities of the observer mission, given the serious deterioration of the security situation. - On January 31, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al-Thani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, Chair of the Arab Ministerial Committee and Dr. Nabil Elaraby, Secretary General of the League of Arab States briefed the Security Council (attached) on Arab efforts and called on the council to adopt a draft resolution submitted by Morocco, supporting Arab League resolution 7444 (which called on the Syrian President to hand over power to his deputy) February 2012: - On February 4, Russia and China vetoed a draft Security Council resolution (attached), tabled by Morocco (the Arab member of the Security Council) and others. - On February 12, the Arab League adopted its resolution 7446 (attached), practically "transferring the file" to the United Nations Security Council. - On February 16, the issue was taken to the General Assembly, which adopted its Resolution 66/253, calling-among other things- for the appointment of a Special Envoy. - On February 23, former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan was appointed as the Joint Special Envoy (JSE) of the United Nations and the League of Arab States on the Syrian crisis, to facilitate a peaceful Syrian-led and inclusive political solution. - On February 24, and upon the initiative of President Sarkozy of France, the first meeting of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People was held in Tunis, with the participation of more than 60 countries and representatives from the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the European Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Arab Maghreb Union and the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States to discuss the worsening situation in Syria. The group noted the Arab League's request to the United Nations Security Council to issue a resolution to form a joint Arab-UN peacekeeping force following a cessation of violence by the regime, and called on LAS to convene a meeting of all disparate opposition groups to agree on a clear statement of shared principles for a transition in Syria. The meeting recognized the SNC as a legitimate representative of Syrians seeking peaceful democratic change. Text of the Conclusions of the Meeting. March 2012: The SNC formed a military council to organize and unify all armed resistance. - The JSE, Kofi Anan, submitted a six-point peace plan to the UN Security Council (which the council adopted in April in its resolution 2042), that called for commitment to a Syrian-led political process, achieve an effective United Nations supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties, ensure provision of humanitarian assistance, intensify the release of arbitrarily detained persons, ensure freedom of movement for journalists and respect the freedom of demonstrating peacefully. It was later approved by the Syrian government, and the opposition remained skeptical. April 2012: United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) was established by United Nations Security Council resolution 2043 (attached) initially for a 90-day period, to monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties and to monitor and support the full implementation of the Joint Special Envoy's six-point plan on ending the conflict in Syria. June 2012: The Action Group for Syria, with the participation of the Secretary Generals of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and the European Union High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, chaired by the JSE, met in Geneva and adopted the Geneva Final Communique (attached) which called for the establishment of a transitional governing body, with full executive powers, as part of the agreed principles and guidelines for a Syrian-led political transition. July 2012: The Syrian Opposition meeting was held under the auspices of LAS in Cairo, and reached an agreement on a national compact and a detailed transition plan. The two documents complemented the guidelines and principles laid out by the Action Group in Geneva. August 2012: UNSMIS mandate came to an end owing to an intensification of armed violence and use of heavy weapons. - Prime Minister Riad Hijab defected, and US President Obama's first direct threat of force against Syria, if Assad's regime deploys or uses chemical or biological weapons, calling such action a "red line" for the US. - Joint Special Envoy, Kofi Annan announced his resignation because of the Security Council failure to reach binding resolutions; Lakhdar Brahimi succeeded Annan as the Joint Special Representative of the United Nations and the League of Arab states for Syria (JSR). September 2012: Egypt hosted the high level preparatory meeting of the regional Quartet on Syria on September 10, which included Turkey and Saudi Arabia key backers of the Syrian Revolution, and Iran the major supporter of al-Assad regime, in an initiative to bring together regional powers to voice their positions on how to end the Syrian conflict. - On September 17, the Quartet's ministerial meeting took place in Cairo; Saudi Arabia opted out while Iran proposed a peace plan which called on all parties to cease violence and stop all financial and military support to the opposition, and suggested the deployment of observers from the quartet's nations to Syria. The participants failed to reach an agreement. October 2012: a four-day ceasefire attempt was announced towards late October, in respect to Eid al-Adha Holiday, which was breached on the first day in Homs, Aleppo and Damascus. November 2012: National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC) was formed in Qatar, responding to repeated calls from their Western and Arab supporters to create a cohesive and representative leadership, it excluded Islamist militias. December 2012: US, Britain, France, Turkey and Gulf states formally recognized SOC as "legitimate representative" of the Syrian people. January 2013: the Emir of Kuwait hosted the first pledging conference on Syria, international donors pledged more than $1.5bn to help civilians affected by the conflict in Syria. March 2013: LAS Ministerial Council adopted resolution 7595 (attached) to recognize SOC as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Syrian people and called on the SOC to establish an executive body to take up Syria's seat. April 2013: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State, released a recorded audio message announcing Jabhat al-Nusra as an extension of al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria. The leader of al-Nusra, Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, refused the merger. Divisions among the jihadists emerged. - Hezbollah's involvement deepened when it led the ground assault on Al-Qusayr, a Sunni town in Homs province by the Lebanese border. August 2013: The Assad regime was accused of using chemical weapons in Eastern Ghouta to kill hundreds of civilians. The government denied using chemical weapons. President Obama sought congressional authorization for the use of force. September 2013: UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2118 (attached) requiring the Syrian regime to dismantle its chemical weapons arsenal by mid-2014, and avoid military strikes. December 2013: US and Britain suspended "non-lethal" support for rebels in northern Syria after reports Islamist rebels seized some bases of Western-backed Free Syrian Army. January 2014: the Geneva II Conference on Syria was held in Montreux on January 22, and attended by 37 states, 4 organizations and both Syrian parties. Iran was invited by SG Ban Ki- Moon on January 19, the Opposition declared its refusal to attend if Iran was not excluded, the US viewed Iran's invitation "as conditioned on Iran's explicit and public support for the full implementation of the Geneva Communique"; Iran refused any preconditions to the talks, and refused to endorse the Geneva Communique specially the transitional governing body. February 2014: two rounds of negotiations to discuss: 1- ending violence and 2-combating terrorism, 3-transitional governing body, national institutions, and 4- national reconciliation and national debate. The Syrian government refused to discuss a transitional government and insisted on discussing combating terrorism. The talks came to a halt. May 2014: JSR Brahimi announced his resignation because of the lack of progress and failure to agree on an agenda. - Iran proposed a political settlement of four points; a comprehensive cease-fire at national level, forming a national unity government consisting of the regime and the internal Syrian opposition, by transferring presidential powers to the government whereby the government will enjoy wide-ranging powers in years to come, and preparation for presidential and parliamentary elections. - Syrian rebels withdrew from the Old City of Homs, under an Iranian brokered deal and facilitated by the UN, after three years of Syrian government bombardment and siege. June 2014: President Assad held presidential elections, he was re-elected for another seven-year term allegedly winning 88.7% of the votes. July 2014: UN Secretary-General announced the appointment of Staffan de Mistura as his Special Envoy for Syria (SE)- NOT as a joint envoy with LAS. August 2014: US-led coalition began its airstrikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and expanded its strikes to Syria the following month, focusing on the city of Raqqa. September 2014: SE held his first round of consultations with concerned capitals, since taking up his office, it included his a visit to Damascus where he met with President Assad, senior officials and the tolerated internal Syrian opposition. October 2014: SE focused on establishing a series of local ceasefires, "freeze zones", starting with Aleppo, which aimed at the de-escalation of violence and allowance of the return of normalcy to it. February 2015: SE briefed the Security Council members on the 17th, announcing Syria's willingness to halt all aerial bombardment over Aleppo for a period of six weeks. It was not clear when would the freeze go into effect, reporting that a date would be announced from Damascus. June 2015: Egypt hosted the second Syrian Opposition meeting in Cairo, which excluded the National Coalition and announced a new road map to resolve the crisis which did not abolish Assad's government. July 2015: SE announced that his office would facilitate intra-Syrian working groups to generate a "Syrian-owned framework document" on the implementation of the Geneva Communiqué. Main themes of the groups were Safety and Protection for All, Political and Constitutional Issues, Military and Security Issues, and Public Institutions, Reconstruction and Development. September 2015: Russia conducted its first airstrikes against IS in Syria. The US and the Syrian Opposition claim it is targeting rebel-held areas instead. October 2015: First meeting of International Syria Support Group (ISSG) took place in Vienna, it included China, Egypt, the EU, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the United States. They agreed on a nine-point plan, but still had substantial divisions on the future of Assad. It was the first time Iran and Saudi Arabia were brought to the same table. November 2015: Second meeting of the ISSG was held in Vienna adding LAS to its members. They set a time frame to prepare for a parallel ceasefire and political process by January 2016 that would lead to credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance within six months, followed by the drafting of a constitution and elections within 18 months. Jordan was tasked to develop a list of groups and individuals identified as terrorists, and Saudi Arabia to hold a meeting to unify the Syrian opposition and prep for the talks with the government. December 2015: - Syrian political and armed opposition factions met in Riyadh, to agree on a common position to negotiate with Syrian government, and resulted in the formation of the High Negotiating Committee (HNC). The main Kurdish group was excluded, while Islamist hardliners such as Jaysh Al-Islam and Ahrar Al-Sham were present. - The Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) joined the follow-up meeting of the ISSG in New York, Saudi Arabia and Jordan briefed the group on their tasks. There was no agreement on the list of identified terrorists, especially with Russia's insistence on adding Ahrar Al-Sham to the list, which is considered pivotal to the unified Opposition bloc. - UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2254 (attached) which reaffirmed the road map set out by the ISSG and urged the Support Group to apply pressure on the Syrian parties to put an immediate end to the indiscriminate use of weapons against civilians, and allow unimpeded access to humanitarian aid convoys. January 2016: the SE sent out invitations to the Syrian participants, in accordance with the parameters outlined in Security Council resolution 2254, to start on the 25th with proximity talks and had expected to last for six months. The HNC requested assurances of goodwill from the government as precondition to beginning of talks, such as release of prisoners or lifting of sieges. February 2016: Talks were delayed and lasted two days before they were suspended for three weeks. - The ISSG met on the margins of the Munich Security Conference and decided that humanitarian access will commence same week of meeting to besieged areas, and an ISSG task force would elaborate within one week modalities for a nationwide cessation of hostilities. - The US and Russia announced the adoption of the terms for a cessation of hostilities in Syria, and proposed that the cessation of hostilities commence at 00:00 (Damascus time) on February 27, 2016. The cessation of hostilities does not apply to "Daesh", "Jabhat al-Nusra", or other terrorist organizations designated by the UN Security Council. - The Security Council endorsed the announcement in its resolution 2268 (attached). March 2016: SE announced March 9 set as target date of resumption of talks in Geneva. On March 14, SE resumed the intra-Syrian proximity talks in Geneva, which mainly discussed procedural matters to reach a shared list of principles and relied on Security Council resolution 2254 as its agenda. - SE briefed the Security Council on the cessation of hostilities which lowered overall levels of violence and more than 238,000 people had been reached with humanitarian aid. - On the same day, President Putin announced the withdrawal of most Russian forces from Syria, after it had largely fulfilled their objectives in Syria, and SE stated that it would have a positive impact on the negotiations. - On March 17, the PYD announced the establishment of a federal system in Kobane, Afrin and Cizire cantons in northern Syria, and its Constituent Assembly of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria-Rojava (DFNS) announced its final declaration. Both the Syrian government and other opposition affiliates denounced the plan, as well as the United States. - On March 24, the SE ended the first round by submitting a paper on the commonalities between the Syrian sides regarding the future of Syria and would help structure the next round that would address political transition. - Syrian government forces retook Palmyra from the Islamic State, with Russian air assistance. April 2016: The SE paid visits to Amman, Beirut, Damascus and Tehran ahead of the new round of talks. - The third round of proximity talks were set to start on April 13, which coincided with the parliamentary elections in the government-controlled areas in Syria. The SE met with the High Negotiations Committee delegation (Syrian Opposition) in Geneva and was expected to meet with the Syrian Government delegation within the following days. - During the 13-27 April round of negotiations, the SE developed a Mediator's Summary that identified eighteen points necessary to move forward on political transition arrangements. - on April 28, airstrikes in Aleppo on al-Quds hospital supported by both Doctors Without Borders and the International Committee of the Red Cross, which killed dozens of civilians and medical personnel. May 2016: The Security Council adopted unanimously resolution 2286 (attached) which called for the protection of civilians and medical facilities during armed conflict. - On May 4, the US-Russia brokered a 48-hour ceasefire in which helped reduce the violence, and was later extended for another 72 hours. - On May 9, France held a ministerial Friends of Syria meeting in "Paris Format", attended by the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, the European Union, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and Jordan, and issued a statement that called on the resumption of negotiations, unimpeded access of humanitarian assistance and the implementation of international law obligations to the protection of civilians. - Later on the same day, the United States and Russia issued a joint statement on Syria to reconfirm their commitment to intensify their efforts to implement a nationwide ceasefire and promote humanitarian assistance in accordance to security council resolution 2254. - On May 17, the fourth meeting of the ISSG took place in Vienna and reaffirmed its determination to strengthen the cessation of hostilities, to ensure full and sustained humanitarian access in Syria, and to ensure progress toward a peaceful political transition. Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands and Spain joined the group. June 2016: The SE announced that the time is not yet right for a resumption of the intra-Syrian talks because of the escalation of violence in Aleppo, Idlib, Latakia and other rural areas around Damascus, but the intention is to begin an official third round as soon as possible. - Riad Hijab, the Coordinator of the Opposition High Negotiations Committee, proposed a nationwide truce throughout the month of Ramadan. - On June 16, Jan Egeland Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria announced that 16 of the 18 besieged areas have been reached since the humanitarian taskforce started in late February. - On June 21, the SE briefed the United Nations General Assembly on the situation in Syria regarding the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian assistance access, as for the resumption of talks, it is yet to be decided and the OSE currently holds technical meetings with the parties on core issues. July 2016: - On July 6, the Syrian army declared a three-day nationwide "regime of calm" in respect to Eid al-Fitr holidays nonetheless pro-regime forces continued to engage in clashes and airstrikes across the country, particularly near the flashpoints of Damascus and Aleppo City. - On July 14, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow to discuss a proposal for bilateral military cooperation in the Syria; The proposal calls for the establishment of a 'Joint Implementation Group' (attached) based in Amman, Jordan to "support deliberate targeting" of Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra and "maximize independent but synchronized efforts" against ISIS in Syria, according to a draft memorandum leaked by the Washington Post. - On July 25, Stephen O'brien, the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, briefed the security council (attached) on the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Aleppo due to the escalation of violence over the Castello Road, the last access route in and out of eastern Aleppo, and the continuous attacks on medical facilities. O'brien called on the security council not to allow turning Aleppo into another besieged area where 250,000 to 275,000 people reside, and called to establish a weekly, 48-hour humanitarian pause to enable humanitarian aid deliveries across borders. - On July 28, the Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced, right after the Syrian government announced it has cut off the Castello Road and encircled the city of Aleppo, setting up three humanitarian corridors in Aleppo City to allow in food and medical aid, and help people flee the besieged city; the fourth corridor would be established in northern Aleppo near the Castello Road to allow the withdrawal of armed insurgents, and appealed to the Syrian government to provide guarantees to the amnesty provided to rebels to lay down their weapons. - On the same day, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, Jabhat al-Nusra's Leader announced split from al- Qaeda and mentioned that its new name would be Jabhet Fateh al-Sham, in order to get the group off the terrorist list and "to remove the excuse used by the international community – spearheaded by America and Russia – to bombard and displace Muslims in the Levant: that they are targeting al-Nusra Front, which is associated with al-Qaida". - On July 29, the SE commented on the Russian initiative in a press stakeout, that it should take into consideration a few improvements such as putting the 48-hour humanitarian pause into place on a sustainable basis irrespective of the humanitarian corridors; and suggested "to actually leave the delivery of aid through corridors to the UN and its partners"; and stressed that civilians should leave voluntarily, and given the option of leaving to areas of their own choice. August 2016: - On August 1, a Russian helicopter was downed near Saraqeb, in rebel-held Idlib province, on its way back to Russia's main air base in Hmyeim in the western province of Latakia, killing the five Russian military personnel on board. The downing of the helicopter marked the single deadliest event for Russia since its air campaign began in Syria on September 29, 2015. No group claimed the shooting down of the helicopter. - Since then, Russian warplanes conducted retaliatory airstrikes against several small opposition-held areas in the vicinity of Saraqeb. Syrian rebels accuse Russia of using incendiary munitions while conducting airstrikes against Idlib City on August 7, suggesting that Russia intended to achieve punitive and deterrent effects against opposition forces in the province. - In the early weeks of August, rebel forces launched a major assault, known as the "battle for Aleppo", on government-held southwestern towns of Aleppo City, to break the siege, and control supply lines in the south connected to eastern Aleppo. They claimed breaking the siege and capturing Ramouseh Artillery Academy, parts of the cement plant and Khan Touman-Ramouseh road. Intense fighting between warring parties continues to claim control over previously lost vicinities. - On August 9, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Turkish President Recep Tayip Erdogan in St. Petersburg, after the Turkish President officially apologized for the downing of a Russian military aircraft on June 27, 2016, and announced during a press conference that they discussed lifting of Russia's ban on imports of Turkish products, resumption of charter flights, the Turkish Stream project, Syrian settlement, and anti-terrorism efforts. - On August 10, Lieutenant-General Sergei Rudskoi, a senior Russian Defence Ministry official, announced a daily three-hour ceasefires in Aleppo, starting August 11, to allow humanitarian convoys enter the city safely, and would run from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. local time. - On August 16, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that Russian aircrafts took off from Iranian airbase Hamedan to carry out airstrikes on ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra-held facilities in the provinces of Aleppo, Idlib and Deir ez-Zour. - On August 18, the SE adjourned the HTF meeting as humanitarian convoys could not reach any of the besieged towns during the month, and called for at least a 48 hour humanitarian pause in Aleppo to deliver UN humanitarian assistance, through the Castello Road, to all parts of Aleppo City. - Also, on August 18, the Syrian government forces, unprecedentedly, launched strikes against Kurdish forces in Hasakeh in Northern Syria, after pro-government National Defense Forces (NDF) were engaged in clashes with the military wing of the Kurdish Workers Party, known as Asayish. The Syrian government claimed that "Asayish had escalated their acts of provocation attacking state establishments, stealing oil and cotton, disrupting examinations, carrying out abductions, and causing a state of chaos and instability, in addition to targeting positions of the Syrian Arab Army which required a suitable response by the Army as it targeted the sources of artillery fire and the gatherings of armed elements responsible for these criminal actions." - On August 19th, while the Kurdish fighters pushed back government forces and their allies, the Pentagon threatened to shoot down Syrian government aircrafts as they pose a threat to the US Special Forces deployed in the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) area. - On August 21, it was announced that a truce agreement had been reached between YPG and NDF, through Russian mediation, to start on August 21, 2016 at 17:00, which involved evacuating the wounded and transporting them to hospitals in Qamishli, and restore the situation to how it was prior to the clashes and hold talks on August 22 to resolve the remaining unresolved issues. - On August 22, most likely the ceasefires agreement failed as fighting escalated. - On August 24, Turkey and the International Coalition Air Forces launched "Operation Euphrates Shield" offenses to support the Free Syrian Army aligned with U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces SDF against IS militants in Jarablus, in northern Syria. - On August 26, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, addressing a joint press conference after their meeting in Geneva, announced that they failed to reach a breakthrough deal on military cooperation and a nationwide cessation of hostilities in Syria, saying they still have issues to resolve before an agreement could be announced. - On August 27, Kurdish militias targeted Diyarbakir airport in southeast Turkey, near the borders with Syria. Turkey retaliated by warplanes and artillery on targets held by Kurdish-backed forces the following day, despite US pentagon's criticism of the fighting. September 2016: - On September 4, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildrim announced that Turkish military forces and Ankara-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) had successfully purged the border region, from Azaz to Jarablus, from "terrorist organizations." - On September 9, the US and Russia reached a deal which called for a nationwide ceasefire in Syria, and unimpeded humanitarian access to all besieged areas starting on September 12th. If sustained for seven continuous days, the U.S. and Russia would establish a Joint Implementation Center (JIC) in order to share intelligence and coordinate airstrikes against both ISIS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra). - On September 21, the cessation of hostilities deal was implemented with regular violations, while the Syrian government continued to block humanitarian access to opposition-held districts of Eastern Aleppo City despite the agreement. - On September 17, the US-led coalition accidentally launched an air strike on Syrian government forces in Deir ez-Zour. - On September 19, a UN humanitarian convoy was shelled near Urum al-Kubra near Aleppo, killing 20 humanitarian aid workers and drivers, and destroying 18 out of 31 trucks. The US blamed Russia and the Syrian government for the attack; the latter declared unilaterally the end of the ceasefire agreement. - On September 20, the UN temporarily suspended its humanitarian aid to Syria after the attack, while international powers failed to reach a consensus to restore the ceasefire during an acrimonious UN Security Council Meeting on September 21st as well as two separate meetings of the International Syria Support Group on September 20 and September 22. - On September 22, the Syrian government announced a new military offensive in the rebel-held eastern Aleppo, and further escalation in a bombing campaign by Russian and Syrian airstrikes that had already intensified the day before. - On September 25, the Security Council Meeting discussed the recent escalation of violence in Aleppo after the Syrian government announced its intention to retake all of Aleppo City, and the SE called on the Security Council to "to press for a cessation of violence, and for the protection of civilians, and the civilian infrastructure; secondly to press for weekly 48-hour pauses in the fighting to ensure that the United Nations and its partners can reach eastern Aleppo, without preconditions from either the Government or the Opposition; and thirdly to press for medical evacuations of urgent cases." - On September 27, the Syrian government launched a large scale ground offensive in eastern Aleppo, and state media announced that it recaptured the central district of Al-Farafirah northwest of the Aleppo Citadel. - On September 29, the YPG set conditions to participate in operations to seize IS-held Raqqa City: the US provides arms to the YPG, recognizes its autonomy of the Federation of Northern Syria, and ensures that the Syrian Kurds are officially invited to participate in peace talks. October 2016: - On October 1, continuous airstrikes in eastern Aleppo damaged a major hospital codenamed M10, which was partially closed because of the raids. - On October 2, Stephen O'brien, the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, urged warring parties and their supporters to bring about a cessation of all hostilities, a medical evacuation system for eastern Aleppo, and regular unimpeded humanitarian access to eastern Aleppo, and he reiterated his plea to the Security Council for a 48-hours weekly humanitarian pause in fighting, at the very least. - In an official statement, the Syrian Army offered amnesty to fighters and their families to leave Aleppo under guarantee of safe passage to other rebel-held areas, after the Syrian regime forces recaptured strategic areas on the northern outskirts of the city. - On October 3, the EU announced an emergency humanitarian initiative for Aleppo, in cooperation with the United Nations and civil society organizations, in order to facilitate the urgent delivery of basic life-saving assistance to civilians in eastern Aleppo, and ensure medical evacuations with focus on women, children and the elderly. The EU has mobilized 25 million euros to support its humanitarian partners' response to cover medical, water and sanitation, and food assistance in Aleppo. The HNC issued a statement welcoming the European initiative to protect civilians in Aleppo. - The Security Council began negotiations over a draft resolution, circulated by France and Spain, which demanded all parties to the Syrian conflict "implement and ensure full implementation of cessation of hostilities, including an end to all aerial bombardments", and called on the US and Russia to "undertake joint efforts to stabilize the situation in Syria, with special measures for the Aleppo region", as well as the UN Secretary-General to propose options for a UN-supervised monitoring mechanism of the ceasefire and to "take further measures" in case of non-compliance of any party, without invoking chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault headed to Moscow and Washington to push for a vote on the draft resolution. - The United States suspended talks with Russia on trying to end the violence in Syria and accused Moscow of not complying with its commitments under the ceasefire agreement and would withdraw all personnel that were dispatched to prepare for military cooperation with Russia. - On October 4, Prince Zeid Ra'ad, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, warned over the use of incendiary weapons in Syria, and demanded bold initiatives such as limiting the use of the veto by the permanent members of the Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Russia rejected Zeid's call. - The Russian Defense Ministry declared its deployment of S-300 missile system to its Tartus naval base in Syria. - On October 6, the SE offered in a press conference to escort up to 1000 al-Nusra fighters to bring an end to the bombardment by Russian and Syrian forces to Idlib or anywhere else of their choice. While the Russian Defense Ministry announced it would shoot down US-led coalition jets if the US launches airstrikes against pro-government forces in Syria, after American officials had discussed using limited airstrikes to force government forces to halt its raids on Aleppo. - On October 7, Russia called for a Security Council emergency meeting to hear the SE's briefing (attached) on the situation in Aleppo, while the Russian Parliament ratified Moscow's deal with Syria on its "indefinite" deployment of forces. - On October 8, the Security Council held a meeting on Aleppo, and voted on the Russian-drafted resolution calling for the revival of the ceasefire deal, without mention of ending military fights in the city, and on the French-drafted resolution. The French draft received eleven votes in favor, China and Angola abstained, while Russia and Venezuela voted against. The Russian text only received four votes in favor of China, Egypt and Venezuela, Angola and Uruguay abstained, while the remaining nine council members voted against. - On October 9, France announced its intention to call the ICC for war crimes investigation in Syria, and shall contact the ICC Prosecutor on how to launch these investigations, putting into consideration that the only way is through the Security Council referral, which had been vetoed before by Russia in May 2014. - On October 13, the Deputy Special Envoy for Syria Ramzy Ezzeldin Ramzy confirmed the Syrian Government's approval of the October aid plan and for convoys to reach 25 of 29 besieged and hard-to-reach areas across Syria, but not to eastern Aleppo and three parts of the rural Damascus province. - On October 15, US Secretary of State John Kerry hosted a meeting on Syria in Lausanne, with the participation of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and seven foreign ministers from the region, from Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt, with the presence of the SE. The meeting failed to reach a joint statement on how to end the bombardment of Aleppo or on the aid delivery to the besieged towns. - On October 16, the UK's Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson held a meeting with his US, French and German counterparts and "like-minded" Gulf Arab states on the Syrian conflict in London. The UK and the US announced their consideration of imposing more sanctions against Russia and the Syrian Government to halt their ongoing raids on Aleppo. - On October 17, the European Council condemned the Syrian regime and Russia for their deliberate and indiscriminate bombardment of civilians and infrastructure in Eastern Aleppo, and called for a monitored cessation of hostilities, lift of sieges, and a nationwide sustainable humanitarian access. - On October 18, the Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced the cease of Russian and Syrian airstrikes on Aleppo to hold an 8-hour humanitarian pause on October 20th, in order to allow civilians and medical evacuations through six humanitarian corridors, and expected militants would withdraw with their weapons through two corridors, one via the Castello Road and the other near the souq al-Hai area in the south of the city. It was later announced that the eight-hour pause will be extended to eleven hours for four days. The armed opposition groups (AOGs) rejected the proposal in a joint statement claiming that "the initiative came at the same time as forced displacement operations are being carried out by the Assad regime in the Damascus suburbs of al-Mouadamiya, Qudsiya and al-Hama, and before that in Daraya." - On October 20, in conclusion of the EU summit, the EU failed to reach an agreement on imposing sanctions on Russia for the escalation of violence in Aleppo, and stated that "the EU is considering all available options should the current atrocities continue." The unilateral ceasefire took effect, and the Syrian Army declared that it would last for three days while artillery exchanges erupted around a crossing point near the rebel-controlled Bustan al-Qasr district shortly after the pause began. The Secretary-General and the SE briefed the General Assembly in an informal session on the situation in Syria, in response to an initiative led by Canada, after the Security Council failed to take action to end the aerial bombardment on Aleppo and revive peace efforts. - On October 21, the United Nations Human Rights Council held a special session on the deteriorating situation of human rights in Aleppo, upon the request of Britain (letter attached) that was submitted on behalf of a core group of 11 Western and Arab states. The Council adopted a resolution by a 24 in favor vote, seven against and 16 abstentions. It urged "the immediate implementation of the cessation of hostilities, and demanded that the regime and its allies put an immediate end to all aerial bombardments of and military flights over Aleppo city. The Council demanded that all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities and its supporters, promptly allowed rapid, safe, unhindered and sustained humanitarian access, including across conflict lines and borders." The Council further "requested the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic to conduct a comprehensive, independent special inquiry into the events in Aleppo, and identify all those responsible for alleged violations and abuses of international human rights law. It further requested the Commission of Inquiry to support efforts to ensure that perpetrators of alleged abuses and violations be held accountable, and to provide a full report of the findings of its special inquiry to the Human Rights Council no later than its thirty-fourth session." - On October 22, the humanitarian pause expired without any evacuations made and without further renewal despite the UN request. No medical evacuations had been made as no security guarantees had not been granted as requested by the UN. - On October 23, Turkey intensified its strikes targeting IS militants and Kurdish YPG forces in the town of al-Bab, in an attempt to sweep them away from its borders. The Turkish-backed FSA gained control over three areas of Tuways, al-Gharz and Tlatinah south of Akhtarin in northern Aleppo two days later. - On October 25, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated Moscow's willingness to restore the ceasefire in Aleppo and that the Western-backed opposition forces should be separated from terrorist groups in order to be able to move forward; after the UN had blamed all parties for the failure of evacuating injured people in Eastern Aleppo during the three-day ceasefires and called for "a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire so that life-saving humanitarian activities, including medical evacuations, can resume," meanwhile the Syrian Ambassador to Moscow ruled out any opportunity to restore the ceasefires. - On October 26, a school in the village of Haas, in rebel-held Idlib, was hit by a raid of airstrikes, causing the death of twenty-two children and six teachers. The UN Secretary-General called for an immediate investigation on this attack, as it could amount as war crimes if deliberate. Russia denied its responsibility and claimed that the damage was not consistent with an airstrike. - On October 27, Virginia Gamba, the head of the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism, presented the mechanism's findings to the Security Council. The report indicated that of the nine cases the JIM investigated, the Syrian regime used chlorine gas against civilians in three cases and the IS used mustard gas in one case. In the remaining five cases, the JIM investigated allegations that the government dropped chlorine bombs in rebel-held areas. While the JIM could not make a conclusive determination in three of these five cases, it was able to establish that government airstrikes had occurred and the presence of a toxic substance, but it was unable to fully determine the link between the two, or the actors responsible. Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin questioned the JIM's findings, and expressed reservations over the US-draft resolution to extend the mandate of the mechanism for another year, which would end on 31 October 2016. - The EU added ten top Syrian officials to its sanctions list who are held responsible for "violent repression against the civilian population in Syria." - On October 28, Syrian rebels relaunched Aleppo counter-attack aiming to break the siege imposed on Eastern Aleppo. The factions included the FSA and Jaish al-Fath targetting government-held Western Aleppo. - Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem met with his Russian and Iranian counterparts in Moscow to discuss counterterrorism, the cessation of hostilities and improvement of humanitarian operations, and the resumption of the intra-Syrian talks. The three ministers held a joint press conference following their meeting. - On October 30, SE condemned Syrian rebels for the indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas in Western Aleppo, raising the number of casualties in the last 48 hours. - On October 31, the Security Council extended the mandate of the UN-OPCW JIM until November 18, 2016. November 2016: - On November 1, in a teleconference with the leaders of the Russian Armed Forces, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu mentioned that Russia had halted air strikes on eastern Aleppo for 16 days, following western criticism over a Russian-Syrian government assault that killed civilians and destroyed infrastructure. - On November 2, DM Shoigu announced that it would enforce a 10-hour humanitarian pause in Aleppo on November 4, to allow civilians and fighters to exit the city through eight safe corridors. - On November 4, despite the announced unilateral ceasefire in Aleppo, there were no sign of civilians or fighters leaving the city, and opposition fighters vowed to continue fighting to break the siege. - On November 6, the SDF declared the launch of Operation "Wrath of the Euphrates" in the IS capital of Raqqa, which aimed at surrounding and isolating the city as an initial phase, in coordination with the US-led coalition airstrikes. The SDF had rejected any Turkish role to liberate the city. - On November 8, the Russian Defense Minister Shoigu announced that the first attack from the Admiral Kuznetsov, the aircraft carrier, and heavily armed escort ships were to bomb rebel positions in Aleppo. - On November 10, Jan Egeland, Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria, declared in a press stakeout following the weekly HTF meeting that Eastern Aleppo had run out of food rations, and that the UN had proposed an initiative of four elements which included delivery of food and medical supplies, medical evacuations and access for health workers. - On November 11, the OPCW Executive Council condemned all parties for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, after voting on a US-tabled text in a closed session. The text was supported by 28 members, including Germany, France, the United States and Britain; it was opposed by Russia, China, Sudan and Iran, and there were nine abstentions. - On November 15, Russia launched its "major operation" targeting the IS and Jabhat al-Nusra's positions in Idlib and Homs provinces. Heavy airstrikes and barrel bombs pounded Eastern Aleppo after the pause declared by Russia and the Syrian Government on October 18. It is considered the first mission operated from the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov. - The Third Committee of the UN General Assembly adopted a draft resolution tabled by Saudi Arabia on the human rights situation in Syria, by a vote of 116 in favor, to 15 against with 49 abstentions. It called upon the Syrian regime and the IS to cease using chemical weapons, and stop their attacks on civilians. - On November 17, the UN Security Council adopted the US-draft resolution to extend the mandate of the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism to 18 November 2017. - On November 20, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem held talks with the SE in Damascus, on the latest escalation of violence, the targeting of medical facilities and infrastructure, and the humanitarian initiative in Eastern Aleppo. The UN proposal of the withdrawal of al-Nusra fighters while maintaining the opposition's local administration of Eastern Aleppo; the proposal was rejected by the Syrian Government and called it a violation of "national sovereignty". - On November 23, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean Ayrault announced that France would hold a meeting on Syria early December 2016. - On November 24, Jan Egeland Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria briefed the press on the HTF meeting and the assistance deliveries of the month of November, not being able to reach besieged areas because of the absence of government approvals for convoys to enter and the escalation of violence. Egeland stated that the UN had received written approvals of the AOGs in eastern Aleppo and Russian support of the UN four-point plan, and still waiting for the government's approval. - On November 27, the rebels in Khan al-Shih town, in the outskirts of Damascus, handed in their weapons, as part of a local agreement with the Syrian government to withdraw to rebel-held Idlib province, so as government siege would be lifted. It was the only town not under government control on a major supply route from Damascus to Quneitra, in southern Syria. - On November 29, Egypt, New Zealand and Spain put in blue their draft resolution calling to put an end to all attacks on Aleppo, and allow unimpeded humanitarian access for the period of 7-days with consideration of further extension. The draft was later vetoed on 5 December by Russia and China, Venezuela voted against, and Angola abstained. It is Russia's sixth veto on a Syria draft resolution, and China's fifth veto. - After the Acting High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Kim Won-soo briefed Council members during Syria's chemical weapons consultations; the P3 announced they would circulate a draft resolution to impose sanctions on Syria for its use of chemical weapons against its own population. - On November 30, upon the request of France and the UK to hold an emergency meeting on Aleppo, SE Staffan de Mistura, USG Emergency Relief Coordinator Stephen O'brien and UNICEF Regional Director Geert Cappelaere briefed the Security Council on the situation in Aleppo, who agreed on the growing number of civilians fleeing eastern Aleppo and the dire need for safe humanitarian access. December 2016: - On December 1, ten AOGs announced the formation of 'Jaysh Halab' in Eastern Aleppo, in an attempt to unite their efforts to lift the siege and restore the districts where the pro-government militias took over in northeast and east Aleppo. It was led by Abu Abdul Rahman Nour, a senior commander in 'Jabhat al-Sham'. While Jan Egeland, Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria, and the SE briefed the press on the humanitarian situation in Aleppo after the HTF meeting; they mentioned that over 400,000 IDPs are in west Aleppo, and UN convoys reached reached all towns under the Four-Towns Agreement, including Madaya, al-Foua and Kafraya, and Zabadani, and that the December Plan was yet to be approved by the Syrian government. - On December 3, the Syrian armed forces and its supporting militias advanced into east Aleppo, taking over 60 percent of the city that was once under rebel control since mid-2012. More than 80,000 civilians fled the area since the beginning of the regime's offense on November 15. - On December 7, AOGs called for a five-day ceasefire in Aleppo, and medical and civilian evacuations without mentioning the withdrawal of their fighters as demanded by Moscow and Damascus. Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Germany to discuss the evacuation of opposition-held districts of Eastern Aleppo, and no agreement was reached. While leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the United States released a joint statement on the situation in Aleppo calling for an immediate ceasefire and the resumption of political negotiations. - On December 8, the SE briefed the Security Council in closed consultations after the Russian announcement that it paused its operations in eastern Aleppo to allow the evacuation of civilians. Jan Egeland had said, after the weekly HTF meeting, that the co-chairs are "poles apart" on a united humanitarian diplomacy. IS launched a major offensive on Palmyra, seizing a number of gas fields in the north and few mountains in the south. - On December 9, the General Assembly adopted the Canadian-drafted resolution A/RES/71/130, which calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the implementation of resolutions 2268 and 2254. The resolution passed by a vote of 122 to 13, with 36 abstentions. Russia, Iran and China opposed the resolution. - On December 10, Paris hosted a meeting of "like-minded" counterparts on Syria; it brought together US Secretary of State John Kerry, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson and Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, along with Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. They discussed the humanitarian situation, and called for a ceasefire and a post Aleppo plan, as Syrian government forces neared victory over rebels there. - On December 11, ISIS recaptured the city of Palmyra in Eastern Homs Province forces despite heavy air support provided by Russia. - On December 13, the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon briefed the Security Council on the situation in Aleppo, the growing number of IDPs and allegations of torture and executions. Meanwhile, AOGs agreed to evacuate their remaining positions in eastern Aleppo after the Syrian government recaptured the city and following an agreement between Russia and Turkey. The evacuation was initially scheduled to take place on 14 December, but was delayed after Iran called for simultaneous evacuations from the besieged Shi'a-majority towns of Fu'ah and Kafraya in Idlib Province. - On December 15, the LAS held an emergency meeting at the level of representatives, based on Qatar's request, and adopted resolution 8105 condemning the attacks on civilians in Eastern Aleppo. - On December 19, the Security Council unanimously adopted the French-drafted resolution 2328 which demanded that the UN and other relevant agencies to carry out adequate and neutral monitoring of evacuations from eastern Aleppo, ensure the deployment of staff members for this purpose, and emphasized that the evacuations of civilians must be voluntary and to final destinations of their choice. Also, the LAS Ministerial Council welcomed resolution 8106 reiterating the necessity to establish a full cease-fire in Aleppo in accordance with the Security Council resolution 2328, and condemned terrorism in all its forms and crimes committed against civilians by ISIS, Fateh al- Sham Front, and that actions of both the Syrian regime and other militant groups may amount to war crimes. - Following the adoption of resolution 2328, the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria announced "the intention of the United Nations to convene the intra-Syrian negotiations mandated by Security Council resolution 2254 in Geneva on 8 February 2017." - On December 20th, the foreign and defense ministers of Russia, Turkey and Iran held parallel trilateral meetings in Moscow, despite the assassination of the Russian Ambassador to Turkey Andrey Karlov on December 19, and adopted the "Moscow Declaration" by which they agreed to act as guarantor powers for a peace accord between the Syrian government and the opposition. - On December 21, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution establishing a mechanism to assist in the investigation of serious crimes committed in Syria since 2011. The resolution received 105 votes for, with 52 abstentions, and 15 votes against (Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Burundi, China, Cuba, DPRK, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Nicaragua, Russia, South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe). The UN Secretary-General submitted the report of the UN Headquarters Board of Inquiry that was established to investigate the humanitarian convoy incident in Urum al-Kubra on 19 September 2016., which stated that there is no enough evidence to conclude that the convoy was deliberately attacked. - On December 22, the Syrian army announced its full control over Aleppo, after the evacuations of the remaining rebel fighters. Evacuations had faced many delays because of Iran's demands to evacuate 1500 individuals from the opposition-besieged towns of Zabadani and Madaya. On the following day, the Russian military deployed a battalion to clear the city from improvised explosive devices. - On December 23, USG Stephen O'brien briefed the Security Council, upon the request of France, "on the modalities of the evacuation of civilians and delivery of humanitarian aid in East Aleppo." Meanwhile, Syrian government forces bombed the water pumping station during its raid on opposition-held Wadi Barada, disrupting water supply to Damascus. - On December 26, Kazakhstan accepted the Russian proposal to host peace negotiations between the Syrian government and opposition forces to find a solution to the Syrian crisis, in January 2017. - On December 27, the Russian and Turkish foreign ministers agreed to implement a nationwide ceasefire in Syria, separate moderate opposition groups from UN designated terrorist groups, and prepare for the Astana talks. - On December 28-30, the DFNS met in the city of Rmeilan to approve the draft constitution, known as the social contract, which was adopted on January 29, 2014 to form its administrative system and prepare for elections. Kurdish leaders voted to drop the word "Rojava" from the official name to include other ethnic and religious components in northern Syria. - On December 29, Russia and Turkey submitted the countrywide ceasefire plan to the warring parties, which had taken effect at midnight on 30 December 2016 Damascus time. - On December 31, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2336 in support of the Russian- Turkish agreement and the meeting to be held in Astana on 23 January 2017. January 2017: - On January 2, the Russian and Turkish air raids targeted IS militants in northern Syrian city of al-Bab; while 10 rebel factions threatened they would suspend talks regarding Astana until the ceasefire is fully implemented because of "major and frequent violations" in the rebel-held areas of Wadi Barada and Eastern Ghouta near Damascus. - On January 5, the SE welcomed the nationwide ceasefire, and the Security Council resolutions on Aleppo and Astana talks, in a press briefing after the weekly HTF meeting. Jan Egeland Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria, voiced disappointment over the government's denied aid access to 5 out 21 locations including places in Rural Damascus, Homs and Hama. - On January 6, the Russian military started to cut down on its presence in Syria, Military Chief Valery Gerasimov mentioned that the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov would be the first to withdraw from the Mediterranean. - On January 8, Syrian government airstrikes resumed on Wadi Barada after failing to reach an agreement with opposition groups to repair the damaged water springs. Later on January 14th, the retired army officer Ahmad al-Ghadban who negotiated the deal to restore the water was killed amid heavy clashes between rebels and pro-regime forces. Both sides accused each other. - On January 12, the US imposed sanctions on 18 senior Syrian officials who were connected to the development and use of chemical weapons including chlorine gas against civilians. It marked the first time the US sanctioned Syrian military officials. While Russia and Turkey signed an agreement to coordinate their airstrikes against terrorists in Syria. - On January 13, the Syrian state television accused Israel of targeting Mezzeh Airbase outside of Damascus. - On January 14, IS launched a major offensive against pro-regime forces (Hezboallah) in Deir al-Zor Province, cutting the communication between the military base and the city. - On January 16, the High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini will host an international conference on the future of Syria in Brussels, which "aims to identify with regional partners common ground on the post-conflict arrangements and examine the scope for reconsciliation and reconstruction of Syria." - On January 19, an agreement was reached in Wadi Barada, allowing regime maintenance teams to enter the area to fix the water pipes and grant rebels amnesty or safe passage to opposition-held Idlib. - On January 20, IS militants destroyed Palmyra's Tetrapylon with only four of sixteen columns still standing, and the facade of its Roman Theatre. The UNESCO condemned the act as a new war crime. - Russia and Syria concluded a bilateral agreement on expanding and modernizing of the Russian Naval Facility in Tartus. The agreement extends the current lease for the next forty-nine years with automatic extensions and permits the simultaneous deployment of up to eleven warships to the port. - On January 23-24, indirect talks between the Syrian government and opposition were held in Astana; the delegations refused to sign the joint declaration issued by Russia, Turkey and Iran, on setting up a "trilateral mechanism" to monitor and enforce the ceasefire. The new US administration was invited, despite Iran's objection, and was represented by its ambassador to Kazakhstan. The UN SE was present, and hoped Astana talks would support the intra-Syrian negotiations to be held in Geneva in February. - On January 24, the Russian delegation shared its draft of the Syrian Constitution with the Syrian delegations, and advocated the creation of a Constitutional Committee consisting of members of both delegations. - On January 23-24, Finland and UN agencies hosted the Helsinki Conference on Supporting Syrians and the Region, which launched the 2017-2018 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP). - On January 25, the US President Donald Trump called for establishing safe zones for refugees in Syria, after suspending visas for Syrians and other middle eastern states. President Trump later held telephone conversations with Saudi King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz and United Arab Emirates Armed Forces Deputy Supreme Commander Mohammed bin Zayed on January 29 to seek their support for his unidentified initiative. - On January 28-30, 1100 opposition fighters and 750 civilians evacuated Wadi Barada to Idlib Province, after reaching a reconciliation deal with pro-regime forces. The Syrian Forces reached Ain Fijeh spring to restore water to Damascus. - On January 30, the US delivered armored vehicles, medium and heavy weapons to SDF, in an attempt to isolate IS in al-Raqqa City. - On January 31, the SE briefed the Security Council in a closed session on the outcomes of the Astana talks and the upcoming intra-Syrian talks in Geneva, which was pushed to February 20. He mentioned if the Syrian opposition could not form an inclusive delegation by 8 February, he would select its representatives himself. The Council members welcomed the International Meeting on Syria in Astana, in a press statement. February 2017: - On February 6, high-level experts from Russia, Iran, Turkey, Jordan and the UN held their first technical meeting in Astana to discuss the implementation of the ceasefire mechanism, and cooperation on humanitarian issues; they agreed on the Concept Paper on the Joint Group. The Joint Group held its first meeting and managed to identify all areas controlled by IS and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham; the participants received two draft documents prepared by the Russians to be discussed in future Joint Group meetings, which are the Protocol to the Agreement on the mechanism to record violations of the cessation of hostilities in Syria announced on December 30, 2016 and the Procedure for imposing sanctions on violators, as well as the Regulation on Reconciled Areas. - On February 7, Amnesty International released its report (attached) on mass executions of as many as 13,000 detainees at Saydnaya Military Prison. Syrian authorities rejected the accusations. - On February 9, Russian airstrikes mistakenly kill three Turkish soldiers and injured eleven others near al-Bab city held by Turkish Armed Forces as part of Operation Euphrates Shield. Both sides agreed to strengthen their coordination. - On February 10-11, the HNC met in Riyadh and formed a delegation of 21 members, headed by Nasr al-Hariri; it included one representative each from the Cairo and Moscow groups. The HNC stated (Arabic statement attached) that the goal of the negotiations was a political transition under U.N. auspices in which Assad had no role in the future of the country. - On February 12, Turkish President Recep Erdogan stressed that the Operation Euphrates Shield aims to establish a five-thousand square kilometer 'safe zone' that includes Al-Bab, Manbij, and al-Raqqa City in Northern Syria. The safe zone would require the implementation of a no-fly zone, mentioning that he had discussed the issue with both the U.S. and Russia. - On February 13, the SE sent out invitations to the Syrian delegations for the intra-Syrian negotiations set to begin on February 23. - On February 15-16, the second round of talks took place in Astana a day later than scheduled; the opposition delegation was represented by only 9 armed groups from 14 groups which attended the first meeting; no direct meetings between the Syrian delegations were held and it ended without a final statement. The three guarantor states agreed to the Concept Paper on the Joint Group of the trilateral mechanism to observe the ceasefire, share information regarding the investigation of violations and promote confidence-building measures such as the release of detainees and abductees. - On February 17, a meeting between the "like-minded" states on Syria was held on the margins of the Bonn G20 Summit, and discussed Syria peace talks in Geneva. - On February 18, Turkey offered the US two proposals for an offensive against IS in al-Raqqa City that excludes the YPG. The preferred proposal calls for the insertion of opposition groups backed by Turkey into Tel Abyad in Northern al-Raqqa Province in order to advance against al- Raqqa City through a twelve-mile-wide corridor through terrain currently held by the SDF. The second proposal calls for opposition groups in Operation Euphrates Shield to advance more than one hundred miles from Northern Aleppo Province to Western al-Raqqa Province. - On February 21, the US CIA froze assistance to the FSA and its affiliated factions fighting in Northwestern Syria, after they came under an attack from Hay'at Tahrir al-sham HTS (successor of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) in January. The aid included salaries, training, ammunition and in some cases guided anti-tank missiles. - On February 23, a fourth round of the intra-Syrian talks commenced in Geneva with no expectations of a breakthrough; the SE reiterated that that resolution 2254 sets the framework of the negotiations, which calls for the establishment of credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance, and sets a timeline for drafting a new constitution and holding free and fair elections within 18 months. A day before in the ISSG Ceasefire Task Force meeting (CTF), Russia had called on the Syrian Government to halt aerial bombings during the discussions. - The Opposition groups backed by the Operation Euphrates Shield fully seized al-Bab in Northern Aleppo Province, after three months of clashes. - On February 24, the SE shared a paper on procedural issues, in bilateral meetings with the Syrian parties. The HNC held the Cairo and Moscow platforms responsible for the delay of direct talks, as they participated separately. - While Iraq conducted its first cross-border airstrikes against IS in Deir ez-Zour Province on the Syrian-Iraqi Border. The F-16 airstrikes were coordinated with the Syrian Government through a joint intelligence-sharing unit in Baghdad that includes Iraq, Syria, Russia, and Iran. Also, The U.S. provided intelligence in support of the operation. - On February 25, HTS claimed responsibility of a suicide attack on the State Security and Military Intelligence Offices in Homs City, killing at least forty pro-regime officers including Military Intelligence Branch Chief Brig. Gen. Hassan Dabul, so as to undermine the ongoing peace talks. The attacks prompted heavy airstrikes on al-Waer District, the Opposition's last strong-hold in the city. The HNC condemned the terrorist attack as per the Government's ultimatum. - On February 28, the UN Security Council voted on the French-British draft resolution which sought to ban the sale or supply of helicopters to the Syrian Government, and to blacklist 10 government and related entities involved in the production of chemical weapons. Nine countries voted in favor; Bolivia voted against the text, while Ethiopia, Egypt and Kazakhstan abstained. Russia casted its sixth veto backed by China. Britain and France had circulated the text in mid- December 2016, in response to the OPCW report findings proving government use of chlorine gas in three cases of the nine investigated cases. It was put on hold to asses US policy on Syria, the US later became a co-penholder after its unilateral sanctions on 18 Syrian senior officials on January 12. March 2017: - On March 1, the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Syria issued its report on the violations committed by warring parties in the last battle of eastern Aleppo, and considered the targeting of vital civilian infrastructure, withholding the distribution of humanitarian aid, and the use of civilians as human shields and forced evacuation agreements amount to war crimes. - On March 2, the Syrian forces backed by Russian airstrikes and Shi'a militias recaptured the city of Palmyra for the second time after heavy clashes. - On March 3, the fourth round of talks concluded with a political agenda for the upcoming round, which comprises of three baskets addressing the establishment of credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance, drafting a new constitution, and holding free and fair elections within 18 months. A fourth basket was added upon the request of the Syrian Government to address "strategies of counter terrorism, security, governance and also medium-term confidence building measures." - On March 6, Russia announced a ceasefire in Eastern Ghouta until March 20, despite the continuation of airstrikes and mutual shelling. - On March 7, the US-allied SDF agreed to handover six villages near Manbij, on the frontline with Turkey-backed rebels to Syrian government control, under a Russian-brokered deal, in an attempt to stop further Turkish incursion. - On March 8, the SE de Mistura briefed the Security Council on the course of the talks, which aims to address the aforementioned baskets in parallel, and concluded that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed unless the sides decide otherwise." The Syrian groups are invited to resume talks on March 23. - Meanwhile, Russian, US, Turkish high-level military officials met in Antalya to discuss additional coordination measures and "operational de-confliction of military operations" in northern Syria. - On March 13, a Russian-brokered agreement was reached to evacuate rebel fighters from Homs city, which would be carried out within six to eight weeks, between 10,000-15,000 people were expected to leave Homs in weekly batches. The neighborhood was besieged by regime forces since 2013. - On March 14, the EU unveiled its plan in Syria "in contributing to a lasting political solution under the existing UN-agreed framework and in helping to build resilience and stability in the country, as well as supporting post-agreement reconstruction once a credible political transition is underway." - On March 14-15, the third round of talks was held in Astana, even though the AOGs had called for the postponement of the meeting to assess the commitment to the declared ceasefire in Eastern Ghouta. Invitations were sent to the United Nations, the United States and Jordan. On March 14, preliminary consultations were held while a plenary meeting was due on March 15. The results of the intra-Syrian consultations were expected to be discussed. Talks failed to reach any significant agreement, and the three guarantor states issued a joint statement, and scheduled the next high-level meeting in Astana on May 3-4, 2017 and agreed to hold preliminary expert consultations on April 18-19, 2017 in Tehran. - On March 15, two suicide bombs targeted Damascus on the sixth war anniversary; one of them hit the main judicial building, and both killed 74 people and wounding a hundred other. It was later claimed by Fateh al-Sham Front. - On March 18, rebels began to evacuate al-Waer neighborhood in Homs City, to the opposition-held northern town of Jarablus on the borders with Turkey. - On March 20, the EU imposed sanctions against four Syrian high-ranked military officials related to the use of chemical weapons. The ban includes assets freeze and travel ban, and it is considered the first time the EU blacklists military officials. - On March 21, the US-led coalition dropped the SDF fighters on the southern side of the Euphrates to to cut the Aleppo - al-Raqqa Highway. the SDF launched an operation to seize the Tabqa Dam west of al-Raqqa City on March 22 with extensive support from the US. - On March 22, a US-led coalition strike on a center for displaced families in al-Mansoura town held by ISIL in northern Raqqa, killed 33 people. Earlier this month, the coalition declared that its raids in Syria and Iraq unintentionally killed at least 220 civilians. - On March 23-31, the fifth round of talks in Geneva was held despite of the escalation of fighting in Damascus and Hama; the SE shared non-papers with all Syrian sides with some political principles reached during the five rounds, and received their comments and amendments. - On March 24, Russia proposed a draft resolution on the use of chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq, that was reviewed in April 2016 and the UN Security Council did not support it. It was co-authored by China and Russia. Meanwhile, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution condemning the indiscriminate attacks against civilians, forced displacement of populations, and called to hold all those responsible to account. - On March 27, the second phase of evacuations from al-Waer neighborhood took place, moving 466 citizens and 129 fighters. Meanwhile, the UN SE briefed the LAS Ministerial Council on the recent developments of the Geneva intra-Syrian talks and the Astana process. - On March 28, Russia condemned the US-led coalition airstrikes on the Tabqa Dam, and accused it of trying to "completely destroy critical infrastructure in Syria and complicate post-war reconstruction as much as possible." It further claimed that the coalition destroyed four bridges over the Euphrates river. - On March 29, the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres addressed the annual Arab Summit, which was held in the Dead Sea, Jordan. He appealed to the Arab leaders to set aside differences and end the Syrian war. - An agreement was brokered by Iran and Qatar to swap Shi'ite citizens from the two pro-government towns of al-Foua and Kafraya, in the northwestern province of Idlib besieged by rebel fighters, with Sunni fighters and their families from the opposition-held towns of Zabadani and Madaya besieged by pro-government forces. The agreement was due to start on April 4 and would last 60 days; it included a ceasefire in the areas south of Damascus, aid deliveries, and the release of 1,500 prisoners held by the government. - On March 31, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson disclosed during his visit to Ankara that "longer-term status of President Assad will be decided by the Syrian people" and defeating ISIL is its priority, while U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley said the priority was no longer "getting Assad out"; it was later reiterated by the White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer's briefing. April 2017: - On April 3, the European Foreign Affairs Council chaired by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini took place in Luxembourg, and adopted the EU Strategy on Syria. It held the Syrian regime responsible for the violations against human rights, and reaffirmed that "there can be no lasting peace in Syria under the current regime." - On April 4-5, the EU and its co-sponsors hosted the Brussels Conference on Supporting the future of Syria and the region. The co-chairs declaration took note of UN appeals requesting $8 billion in 2017 to cover the required needs inside Syria and its neighboring countries, and announced pledges raised worth about $11 billion for humanitarian aid programs. - On April 4, an alleged chemical attack on Khan Shaykhun in the province of Idlib was carried out during a Syrian government air raid on the city, which claimed the lives of at least 72 civilians. Russia denied its responsibility and claimed that Syrian airstrikes targeted a rebel chemical weapons warehouse which leaked poisonous gas. While the implementation of the evacuation deal of 30,000 people from the four towns of Kafraya, al-Foua, Madaya and Zabadani was delayed because of reservations of their residents. All 16,000 residents of al-Foua and Kafraya are expected to leave under the deal. - On April 5, the UN Security Council was briefed on the attack by the Acting High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Kim Won-soo on the reported use of chemical weapons in Khan Shaykhun. The US, UK and France had informally circulated a draft resolution which demands that the Syrian government must provide the JIM and the FFM with flight plans and logs of April 4, the names of all helicopter squadron commanders and provide access to air bases where investigators believe chemical attacks may have been launched. Russia criticized the text, and produced its own draft; it did not condemn neither the attack nor the Syrian government, but rather expressed deep concern over the alleged "incident with chemical weapons" and called for a full-scale investigation. Later on April 6, the ten elected members (E10) of the Security Council met at ambassador level to express their frustration for not being included in the negotiating process and discussed an alternative text which would substitute language in the P3 draft on the Syrian government's obligation to provide information on its activities with agreed language from resolution 2118. Neither resolution were tabled for a vote. - On April 6, the US waged retaliatory airstrikes against al-Shayrat airbase outside of Homs, where the chemical attack was launched. 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles had hit the airfield in Syria. The missiles were aimed at Syrian fighter jets and other infrastructure. - On April 7, Bolivia called for a Security Council briefing after the US airstrikes, and Russia announced its suspension of "the Memorandum of Understanding on Prevention of Flight Safety Incidents in the course of operations in Syria signed with the US." - On April 11, the White House released a declassified report drawn up by the National Security Council which confirmed that the Assad regime used sarin gas on its own people, and accused Russia for shielding for its allies. - On April 12, the Security Council held a meeting to vote on the P3 revised draft resolution (4th draft), which incorporated the language from resolution 2118 proposed in the E10 draft; after the SE had provided the council with his monthly briefing on the assessment of the intra-Syrian talks held in Geneva. Ten members voted in favor of the text, China, Ethiopia and Kazakhstan abstained, while Bolivia joined Russia in voting against it. It is Russia's eighth veto against a Syria-related resolution. - On April 14, the evacuation of residents from the Shi'ite towns of al-Foua and Kafraya (besieged by opposition groups) began and their convoys headed towards the government-held Aleppo; meanwhile rebel fighters and their families left the town of Madaya (besieged by government forces) and headed towards Idlib. While the evacuation from Zabadani was delayed and expected to begin later the day. The four towns agreement began with the exchange of thirty prisoners and nine bodies on April 12. The evacuations resumed after a suicide attack that targeted a government loyalties convoy killing some hundred people including women, children and rebel fighters on April 15. - On April 19-20, over 2000 opposition fighters and civilians were evacuated from the besieged towns of Zabadani and Madaya in exchange for the evacuation of nearly 8000 pro-regime fighters and civilians from the besieged towns of al-Foua and Kafraya in Idlib Province. - On April 24, the US sanctioned 271 Syrians employed by the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center, related to the development of chemical weapons. The sanction froze the individuals' assets and prohibited US companies to conduct business with them. May 2017: - On May 3-4, military experts from the three guarantors held technical consultations ahead of the two-day fourth round of the Astana process, with the participation of the Director of the UN Mine Action Service Agnes Marcaillou. The SE de Mistura and Nawaf Uasfi Tel, Political Adviser to Jordan's Foreign Minister attended as observers, and the US was represented at a higher-level (for the first time) by US Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs Stuart Jones. - Despite the Syrian Opposition delegation suspended their participation in opposition to the ongoing bombardments across Syria, the three guarantors signed the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in Syria, setting up four "de-escalation zones" in Idlib, parts of Homs, Eastern Ghouta, and parts of Deraa and al-Quneitra provinces in southern Syria. The Syrian government welcomed the Russian initiative while the Opposition rejected Iran's involvement as a guarantor. - On May 5, Russia sought UN endorsement to the agreement reached in Astana, and circulated a draft resolution calling on member states to contribute to the implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation zones in Syria. The resolution failed to pass for a vote on May 8, as western member states had reservations on the draft. - On May 6, Riad Seif was elected as the sixth president of the SOC, beating Khaled Khoja with 58 votes from the 102 member coalition. He would replace the current head Anas al-Abdeh, who was elected in March 2016. Also, Abdulrahman Mustafa and Salwa Ktaw were elected as vice presidents. - On May 8, the evacuation process of the government-besieged Damascus suburb of Barzeh began, around 1,022 people, including 568 rebels, headed towards Idlib and northern town of Jarablus near the Turkish borders; the second convoy of 700 rebels moved on May 12. While Walid al-Muallem, the Syrian Foreign Minister, rejected any international forces under UN supervision to monitor the de-escalation zones deal. Meanwhile, the White House approved providing arms to Kurdish fighters as support to their operation to retake al-Raqqa City, despite Turkey's strong opposition. - On May 16, the FFM's report confirmed the use of sulfur mustard in the attack on Aleppo on Sept. 16, 2016, and was made public. The report was raised to the UN Security Council on May 5. The FFM, also, confirmed in its report, regarding its investigation of the April 4 attack on Khan Shaykhun, the use of sarin-gas or a sarin-like substance. The FFM is only mandated for indicating whether chemical weapons were used, while the JIM is mandated to determine responsibility for the attacks. - While the US Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned ten additional entities for providing support to the Syrian regime. - On May 16-19, the UN SE held the sixth round of the Intra-Syrian talks in Geneva, which ended without covering the four baskets of the agenda, only focusing on the constitutional issues. The SE shared a proposal with the parties to establish "a Technical Consultative Mechanism on Constitutional and Legal Issues;" the proposal would identify "options for the process of constitutional drafting, and for the conduct of a national conference/national dialogue, and identify for review specific options for ensuring a sound constitutional and legal basis for any framework agreed in Geneva embodying a package and including providing for credible, all-inclusive, non-sectarian governance," and that is through UN-facilitated expert-level meetings with both Syrian sides. - On May 18, while the EU Parliament adopted a resolution pertaining the EU Strategy on Syria, which the European Council for Foreign Affairs had passed on 3 April 2017; the US-led coalition's airstrikes destroyed a pro-Syrian regime convoy of the Iraqi Shi'ite militia of Kata'ib Imam Ali, that advanced along the Damascus-Baghdad Highway towards al-Tanf base (where the US, UK and Jordan train fighters of Jaysh Mughawir al-Thawra against IS in Eastern Syria). - On May 20-21, the evacuation of nearly 3000 people, some 700 fighters and their families, was completed from al-Waer district, the last opposition-held district in the province of Homs. According to Talal Barazi, Governor of Homs, more than 14,000 people had left al-Waer in several phases since the "reconciliation deal" began to be implemented in March. Among them were some 3,700 rebels, allowed to leave with their light weapons. Russia later deployed 50 to 150 Military Police into the district. - On May 22, the SE briefed the Security Council on the latest developments, and on the last round of the Intra-Syrian talks. He commended the Astana process for the reduction of violence in the agreed de-escalation areas, and urged its guarantors to finalize their agreement addressing the subjects of detainees, abductees and humanitarian demining. The SE asserted that the rounds' focus on legal and constitutional issues does not rule out "the principle of parallelism" in addressing the agenda, and that a new consultative process at a technical level was introduced to discuss relevant constitutional and legal matters. - On May 25, NATO leaders agreed in Brussels to become full members of the Global Coalition against ISIS; the organization would not engage in combat operations, but would provide air refueling to the Coalition's aircrafts, capacity building through the deployment of special forces to train local partners, and would establish an intelligence information cell to ensure information-sharing on foreign fighters. - On May 29, the final convoy of fighters and their families moved from the opposition-held besieged district of Barzeh in Damascus to Idlib Province; estimately more than 4000 fighters and civilians were evacuated from Barzeh and Eastern Ghouta under the Russian-brokered deal. - On May 30, the US delivered its first shipment of arms to the Kurdish-led SDF, which had advanced against IS in the eastern outskirts of al-Raqqa, seizing eight villages and taking control over the Ba'ath Dam. - On May 31, Russia's Grigorovich-Class Frigate Admiral Essen and Kilo-Class Submarine Krasnodar launched four cruise missiles targeting IS near Palmyra; it targetted arms depots of fighters relocating from al-Raqqa to Eastern Homs. Russia had notified the US, Turkey, and Israel of the strikes-On June 2, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini met with newly-elected President of the Syrian Opposition Council (SOC), Riad Seif, and Syrian Interim Government (SIG) Prime Minister, Jawad Abou Hatab, to discuss the political process and EU support for Syrian resilience. Both parties reiterated their commitment to the UN-led Geneva process. June 2017: -On June 4, pro-government forces gained control of Maskanah city, the last remaining ISIS stronghold in Aleppo governorate. The advances brought pro-government forces within 10 km of Raqqa's provincial border. -US-backed SDF captured a hydroelectric facility (Baath Dam) from ISIS militants, securing the final of three major dams along the Euphrates river. -On June 5, pro-government forces captured the areas of al-Alb, Bir Dahlon and Sharot Dahlon in Eastern Homs governorate, reportedly capturing over 6,000 sq km of ISIS-held territory. -On June 6, US-backed SDF announced the launch of the fifth phase of the campaign to capture Raqqa, ISIS' self-declared capital, with forces advancing from the north, east and west and the US-led Coalition supporting the offensive with air and artillery strikes. - The US-led Coalition conducted airstrikes against pro-government forces advancing near al- Tanf, a de-confliction zone in southeastern Syria. This marks the second strike in the area in less than a month, amid escalating tensions between the US and Iran-backed forces over control of Syria's southeastern frontier. - On June 8, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with the UNSE de Mistura in Moscow to discuss "the consolidation of the cessation of hostilities, the fight against terrorism, the continuation of the political settlement on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2254," according to the Russian Presidential Envoy for the Middle East and North Africa and Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov. The consultations were held prior to the fifth round of the Astana Process, which was set to take place in June, but was later postponed till the month of July. -On June 9, during a press briefing in Geneva at the conclusion of a meeting of the humanitarian task force set up by the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), the SE declared that the time was not right to resume the UN-led intra-Syrian talks. -On June 13, the WFP delivered food to more than 80,000 displaced people in seven hard-to-reach areas in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor governorates in northern Syria, where regular deliveries of humanitarian assistance had been suspended for over three years. -On June 14, Chairman of the CoI, Paulo Pinheiro, expressed concern for the "staggering loss of civilian life" caused by US-led Coalition airstrikes as part of the Raqqa campaign, stating that airstrikes had led to the displacement of 160,000 civilians. He also stressed that the Astana agreement had led to a reduction in violence in just one of the four zones outlined in the memorandum. -On June 15, during a briefing to Council members, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, noted that "some progress" had been made in the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of chemical weapons in Syria. However, she highlighted the continued lack of safe access to two above-ground stationary facilities scheduled for destruction under OPCW supervision. -Pro-government forces targeted the opposition-held neighborhoods of Jobar and Eastern Ghouta in the first major attack since the announcement of four "de-escalation zones" at the Astana talks in May. Syrian Armed Forces seized the Arak gas field in the region of Badiya, which had been captured by IS since 2015; the SAF declared that it recaptured 20 percent of the Badiya region. -On June 16, the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria declared that it had facilitated a meeting of technical experts from three opposition groups: the High Negotiating Committee, the Cairo Platform and the Moscow Platform as part of a technical consultation process announced at the end of the sixth round of intra-Syrian talks. The meetings focused on the timeline and process for drafting a new constitution. -On June 17, the SE announced that the seventh round of intra-Syrian talks would begin in Geneva on July 10, with further rounds tentatively planned for August and September. -The Syrian government declared a 48-hour ceasefire in the southern city of Daraa. The agreement, reportedly brokered by Russia, the US and Jordan, comes after an escalation in violence between pro-government forces and AOGs in Daraa. -On June 18, US-led coalition forces shot down a piloted Syrian government aircraft in southern Raqqa province. According to the Coalition statement, the aircraft was downed after it displayed hostile intent and advanced on coalition forces. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) released a statement following the incident claiming that the US shot down the Syrian jet while it was conducting an offensive against ISIS, and accusing the US of failing to use the "de-confliction channel". The MOD statement announced that Russia was cutting off participation in the de-confliction channel pending an investigation and that all kinds of airborne vehicles operating in combat mission zones west of the Euphrates River would be tracked by Russia as air targets. -Iran launched several ballistic missiles targeting ISIS positions in eastern Syria, reportedly carried out in retaliation for a terrorist attack in Tehran two weeks prior. This was Iran's first missile attack abroad in 15 years and its first in the Syrian conflict, representing an escalation of its role. -On June 19, the Syria Institute and PAX published the Sixth Quarterly Siege Watch Report, covering events from February to April 2017. -On June 20, an American fighter jet downed an "Iranian-made" armed drone in southern Syria after it "displayed hostile intent" when it approached coalition forces stationed at a base located in a de-escalation zone. It marked the second time in a month that the US had shot down an armed drone near Tanf camp. -On June 21, after opening a new front to the south of Raqqa, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) came within several kilometers of fully encircling the city after having already surrounded Raqqa to the north, east and west. - Turkey deployed reinforcements to the towns of Azaz and Marea in northern Syria, held by turkey-backed Syrian opposition forces, in preparation of anticipated battles with its rival Kurdish forces. - French President Emmanuel Macron, contradicting previous French policy, that France sees "no legitimate successor" to Assad and no longer considers his departure as a precondition to resolve the ongoing conflict. On July 5, the president met with Riad Hijab, Head of the HNC, to reiterate France's support to the Syrian Opposition. -On June 22, Turkish and Russian troops were deployed to Syria's northern Idlib province as part of a de-escalation agreement brokered by Russia, Turkey and Iran in May. - WFP announced that the first aid convoy had reached 15000 civilians in the city of Qamishli by land route, since it had been inaccessible in 2015, and humanitarian aid was sent through air drops instead. -On June 24, the Syrian government released 672 detainees in a move it said was aimed at bolstering the reconciliation process. -On June 27, the SE briefed the Council on the situation in Syria, expressing his readiness to facilitate direct talks between the Syrian government and opposition either at a formal or technical level. -On June 28, OPCW-JIM published its sixth report updating the SC on the status of its review of two cases identified by the FFM concerning incidents reported in Umm Hawsh in Aleppo Governorate in September 2016 and Khan Shaykhun in Idlib Governorate on April 4, 2017. -On June 29, OCHA head Stephen O'brien briefed the Council on the humanitarian situation in Syria, noting that despite a reduction in violence in some areas of the country, humanitarian convoys remained unable to reach civilians in besieged and hard-to-reach places due to bureaucratic restrictions. O'brien also detailed the Secretary-General's monthly report on the situation in Syria, released June 23, that highlighted the Astana memorandum signed by Iran, Russia and Turkey in May and the escalation of anti-ISIS operations in Syria. -The OPCW released a report on progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons program, verifying the destruction of 25 of the 27 chemical weapons production facilities previously declared by the Syrian government. However, the OPCW continues to express consideration that the initial declaration was incomplete. July 2017: -On July 1, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched a strike against pro-government positions near al-Baath in Quneitra governorate in response to two stray artillery shells fired from Syria that landed in the Golan Heights. This is the fifth Israeli strike on pro-government positions near the area of al-Baath within a week. -On July 3, the UNSC appointed Catherine Marchi-Uhel to head the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, the UN legal team tasked with collecting and preserving evidence of the most serious crimes committed in Syria since 2011 to be used by national courts or an international tribunal. The Mechanism was established by the General Assembly on December 21, 2016 despite fierce resistance from Russia, which had previously used its veto status to block criminal investigations into the conflict. -The Syrian Army announced the suspension of all combat operations in the southern governorates of Daraa, Suweida and Quneitra for four days ahead of upcoming peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan. It is the second unilateral ceasefire by the Syrian Army; it had announced a ceasefire in Daraa along the border with Israel on June 17. -On July 4-5, the fifth round of Astana talks co-sponsored by Russia, Iran and Turkey, convened in the Kazakh capital. The talks failed to finalize details on the boundaries and monitoring mechanisms of the four safe zones agreed to during the fourth round of Astana talks in May. In a joint statement, the guarantors welcomed the establishment of an expert-level joint working group tasked with finalizing the operational and technical parameters of the de-escalation zones, and scheduled the next Joint Working Group meeting in Tehran, on August 1-2. -On July 6, Edmond Mulet, head of the three-member leadership panel of the OPCW-JIM briefed Security Council members on the June 28 report of its investigations into the culpability for chemical attacks in Syria and urged the international community to allow the Mechanism to conduct its work in an independent and impartial manner. -On July 7, the United States, Russia and Jordan reached a ceasefire and "de-escalation" agreement for southwestern Syria to take effect July 9. The specificities of an enforcement mechanism and the precise boundaries of the ceasefire zone. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that the ceasefire would cover the areas of Daraa, al-Suweida and Quneitra governorates without providing exact boundaries. The ceasefire agreement in southwestern Syria is separate from the Astana memorandum, and was reached during the meeting between US President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Hamburg. The SG welcomed the ceasefire announcement, calling it a significant step towards reducing violence and humanitarian access in Syria; while Israel voiced its objections on the deal. -On July 10, the seventh round of UN-led intra-Syrian talks convened in Geneva. The UN-sponsored talks were scheduled to focus on four points: drafting a new constitution, combating terrorism, governance and elections. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed hope that the talks would help solidify de-escalation zones created through the Astana process. The SE stated that de-escalation zones can be beneficial but must only be interim measure to avoid the partition of Syria. The Geneva talks ended July 14 with no apparent progress. Representatives of the HNC accused the Syrian government of refusing to enter into serious negotiations. The SE noted that there had been "no breakthrough, no breakdown" during the talks and expressed hope that recent international momentum would push the parties face-to-face for substantive discussions. -On July 11, SOHR reported that it had "confirmed information" that ISIS leader Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi had been killed in the eastern province of Deir Ezzor. US-led Coalition Spokesperson Colonel Ryan Dillon could not confirm the report, nor could various media sources or Iraqi or Kurdish officials. -On July 12, following the opening of a land route connecting Aleppo to Hasakah governorate, WFP announced that it had successfully delivered food aid to two locations in the Raqqa governorate for the first time in three years. -On July 13, Brett McGurk, US Special Envoy for the Global Coalition fighting ISIS, revealed that Russia had expressed willingness to deploy military police to monitor compliance and prevent violations of the recently implemented ceasefire in southwestern Syria. -On July 14, Russia's parliament approved an agreement between Russian and Syrian officials that provides for the long-term deployment of Russian aircraft and personnel to Syria. Defense Minister Nikolay Pankov said the deal will help legalize Russia's military activities in Syria "within an international framework". -France proposed the creation of a contact group comprised of permanent members of the UN Security Council and regional actors to support UN efforts to formulate a political road map after the conflict ends. -On July 17, the EU added 16 scientists and military officials to the list of those targeted by sanctions against the Syrian regime due to their suspected involvement in a chemical attack against civilians in April. - The Syrian army, backed by Iranian-militias managed to seize oil fields of Wahab, al Fahd, Dbaysan, al-Qseer, Abu al Qatat and Abu Qatash and several other villages in the southwest of Raqqa province, while Russian strikes targeted the town of Sukhna, the gateway to Deir ez-zour. - The Turkish state-run Andalou Agency exposed ten US military locations in northern Syria, giving exact numbers of US and French special forces stationed there. The US-led Coalition against ISIS condemned Turkey for "leaking sensitive military information shared between two allies." -On July 19, it was made public that President Donald Trump ended a covert CIA program that provided arms and training to Syrian rebel groups. The program was a central feature of the Obama Administration's policy in Syria. -On July 20, 150 fighters from the Turkey-backed Euphrates Shield operation had crossed from Turkey through Bab alhawa to support Ahrar al-Sham in its fight against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), dominated by the Fateh al-Sham faction formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, in Idlib. -On July 21, the SG submitted to the Security Council the forty first report on the humanitarian situation in Syria for the period from 1 to 30 June 2017, highlighting the approximately 20,000 people displaced across northeast Syria in June due to the Raqqa offensive. According to the report, the Syrian government removed medical supplies sufficient for more than 84,000 treatments. -Hezbollah and the Syrian Army launched a joint offensive against militant groups in the town of Arsal and the western Qalamoun mountain range along the Lebanon-Syrian border, an area purported to hold over 3,000 militants, including al-Qaeda-linked insurgents and members of ISIS. -On July 24, 14 heads of mission in Geneva signed a letter addressed to Security Council President, Chinese Ambassador Liu Jieyi, raising "serious concerns" about the implementation of seven Security Council resolutions on humanitarian access and urging Liu to raise the issue at the upcoming Council meeting. The signatories include the United States, Saudi Arabia, Britain, France Turkey, Qatar, Japan, Australia, the European Union, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Canada and Italy. -General Sergei Rudskoi, chief of the Russian General Staff, announced the deployment of Russian military police to monitor compliance after a ceasefire, mediated by the Egyptian government, was declared in the Eastern Ghouta area of Damascus on July 22. Despite the reported ceasefire, part of the four proposed "de-escalation zones" outlined in the Astana memorandum, Syrian government forces continued to attack several towns in Eastern Ghouta. -On July 26, fighting on the Syrian-Lebanese border near the town of Arsal halted after a ceasefire agreement was reached between Hezbollah and HTS. The cessation of hostilities ended a six-day campaign to drive al-Qaeda-linked militants from the border region, which is also home to tens of thousands of refugees. The agreement included the evacuation of some 1000 HTS fighters, along with more than 6000 Syrians (in nearby refugee camps) from the Lebanese border town of Arsal to rebel-controlled Idlib province, as well as exchange of prisoners between Hezboallah, HTS and the Lebanese Armed Forces, which later took place on August 1. -On July 27, Ursula Mueller, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, briefed Council members on the humanitarian situation in Syria, noting that despite reduced violence, there had not been a noticeable increase in areas reached for aid delivery. -The Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates addressed two letters to the UNSG and the Security Council calling for immediate action in the militant-besieged towns of Kefraya and al-Foua. -The US-led coalition fighting ISIS told its local Syrian allies that they must exclusively fight ISIS, a directive that prompted Shohada al-Quartyan to depart a joint coalition base in Southern Syria to carry out independent operations against Syrian regime forces. -On July 28, the OPCW released its monthly report, noting that the security situation now allows safe access to confirm the condition of the final two above-ground facilities with planning underway to verify their destruction. -On July 30, for the first time in five years, UN aid was delivered to almost 7,2000 people in besieged al-Nashabiye located in Eastern Ghouta, a rebel-held area on the outskirts of Damascus. August 2017: -On August 2, the evacuation of at least 7,000 people, including al-Qaeda-linked fighters and refugees, from Lebanese border enclave of Arsal for rebel-controlled Idlib province commenced. The transfer agreement, the largest formal repatriation of refugees to Syria since 2011, was carried out without the involvement of aid groups generating concern about the welfare of the refugees. -On August 3, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced a ceasefire in northern Homs and southern Hama, in what is being billed as the third of four planned ceasefires agreed to under the Astana memorandum. Russia deployed police military to several checkpoints in northern Homs, later on August 4. Opposition groups called for a guarantor role for Turkey. According to SOHR, the ceasefire, which covered territory populated by more than 147,000 people, held for the first 10 hours before experiencing repeated violations by pro-government and rebel forces. -The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria of the Human Rights Council (CoI) called on the international community to recognize the crime of genocide being committed against the Yazidis in Iraq. -On August 8, experts from the guarantor states met in Tehran to discuss ways to strengthen the de-escalation zones and determine the agenda for the upcoming sixth round of Astana talks. -On August 8-11, twenty-four FSA-affiliated groups formed new group "Liwa Tahrir Deir ez- Zour" to liberate the province of Deir ez-Zour from IS; the new faction welcomed any cooperation with local and international parties, ruling out the SDF. -On August 9, OCHA expressed concern about the safety and protection of an estimated 10,000- 25,000 people trapped inside Raqqa without access to safe drinking water for 48 days. Due to the fighting on the ground, the UN has currently no access to Raqqa city. - Russian Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzya briefed the Security Council on the progress of establishing de-escalated zones in Syria, behind closed doors, and called on the UN to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in those areas. -On August 10, SDF US-backed forces encircled ISIS militants in central Raqqa, effectively cutting off ISIS' last remaining route to the Euphrates. -On August 12, the Syrian government captured al-Sukhna, the final ISIS stronghold in Homs governorate, as part of its multi-pronged campaign to take eastern Syria. The recent gains position the pro-government coalition 50 km (30 miles) away from Deir ez-Zour province, the last major ISIS foothold in Syria. -On August 14, approximately 300 FSA-affiliated Saraya Ahl al-Sham fighters and 3,000 refugees began evacuating the Lebanese border town of Arsal as part of a repatriation agreement brokered in early August between Lebanese and Syrian officials. Lebanon's Maj. Gen. Abbas Ibrahim, who is overseeing the transfer, said that civilians will head to the government held area of Assal al-Ward. The rebel fighters and their families are destined for the rebel-held town of al- Ruhaiba in the Eastern Qalamoun region where, according to Hezbollah's Al-Manar TV, they have been granted amnesty by the Syrian government. Their departure leaves the Islamic State as the last militant force straddling the border near Arsal. -Nearly 50,000 people remain stranded on the Jordanian border, in an area known as the berm, and are facing an increasing scarcity of food, healthcare and other basic services. The UN stressed that it will continue to support Jordanian authorities in the protection of affected Syrians. -On August 17, the UNSC adopted a presidential statement, read by Council President for August and Ambassador of Nigeria, Joy Ogwu, in support of a political transition process in Syria in accordance with the principles of the Geneva Communique. The adoption of the text signals, for the first time in two years, the consensus of the Council and its five permanent members on the need to establish a transitional government. -On August 17-20, Damascus hosted the 59th International Trade Fair, for the first time since 2011, and involved hundreds of delegations and private companies from at least forty-three states including Russia, Iran, China, and Egypt. -On August 20, President Assad announced in a speech before Syrian diplomats that Syria would not work with any Western nations until they ended their support for opposition and insurgent groups. -On August 21, UN experts launched an investigation into purported weapons deals between Syria and North Korea after two shipments to a Syrian government agency responsible for its chemical weapons program, the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), were intercepted. -Saudi-based High Negotiations Committee (HNC) met with delegations from the moderate Cairo and Moscow camps in Riyadh in an effort to establish a unified front for upcoming peace talks. Despite pressure from international allies calling for a more pragmatic approach, the HNC refused to accept a transition scenario in which Assad retained power. -On August 22, the next round of Astana talks was pushed back from late August to mid- September to allow the guarantor states to hold a technical meeting to set the meeting agenda. -On 23 August, a joint monitoring center was established in Amman for the southwestern de-escalation zone, which is located in the provinces of Daraa and Quneitra. The center is tasked with ensuring ceasefire compliance, ensuring humanitarian access and other forms of civilian assistance. -On August 24, the UN called for a humanitarian pause in US-led Coalition airstrikes on Raqqa to permit civilians to leave the city. This comes after the release of an Amnesty International report calling for greater protection efforts for the estimated 20,000 remaining civilians in Raqqa. -On August 25, the Russian army announced that it had dismantled the two remaining Syrian chemical weapons facilities targeted for destruction by OPCW. The OPCW has not confirmed the Russian report. -On August 28, hundreds of ISIS fighters and their families were evacuated from the Lebanese- Syrian border to militant-held eastern Syria following simultaneous Lebanese army and Hezbollah campaigns against ISIS positions. The transfer marks the first time ISIS agreed to a forced evacuation from territory it held in Syria. - The Secretary-General presented his monthly report on the situation in Syria, highlighting the recent efforts to reduce violence through de-escalation agreements and expressing hope that the Astana guarantors will reach an agreement on the finalization of operational and technical modalities for all de-escalation areas. -On August 30, Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura briefed the Security Council on the political path forward which includes a new round of Astana and Geneva talks. The SE highlighted the important role Syrian opposition allies stand to play in fostering cohesion and unity among the AOGs. - In his final address to the Council after two years as Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Stephen O'Brien appealed to members of the Council to take action to end the civil war in the name of common humanity, calling for a referral to the International Criminal Court. -On August 31, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, stressed that the protection and assistance of citizens must take priority before defeating the Islamic State, citing reports of heavy civilian casualties in Raqqa as evidence of the threat the remaining 20,000 civilians face. -US airstrikes stalled a convoy of 300 ISIS fighters and their families in a government-controlled part of the Syrian desert in an effort to prevent their advancement into ISIS-held territory near the Iraqi border. The convoy was traveling from the Syrian-Lebanese border to Syria's eastern province as part of an evacuation deal brokered between ISIS, Hezbollah and the Syrian Army. -Pro-government forces captured strategic al-Bishri mountain overlooking ISIS-controlled Deir Ezzor province, bringing government coalition forces within close range of ISIS positions. September 2017: On September 1, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian rejected a role for Assad in a political transition in Syria. -The Syrian Islamic Council called for Syria's AOGs to end their fragmentation and unite as one armed body under the Ministry of Defense in the Syrian Interim Government. Ahrar al-Sham, Failaq al-Sham, Liwa Ansar al-Sunnah and Jabha al-Shamiya supported the initiative. -SDF spokesperson, Jihan Ahmad, announced that the SDF had gained control over an estimated 65 percent of Raqqa city after capturing the Old City, the Great Mosque and al-Dariya neighborhood. SOHR reported that the SDF were still fighting to gain control over pockets of the Old City but added that the US-backed opposition forces held more than 90 percent of the surrounding area. -On September 2, Russian Aerospace Forces reported they had destroyed a convoy of 12 ISIS trucks carrying ammunition and weapons in Deir Ezzor province. -It was made public that the British Ministry of Defense had quietly halted its FSA training program and called back its training forces from Syria in late June 2017. -On September 3, pro-government coalition forces gained control of the remaining ISIS stronghold in Hama Governorate after capturing the town of Uqayribat and its surrounding areas. -On September 4, Syrian Interim Government Prime Minister Jawad Abu Hatab was appointed interim Defense Minister as part of a unification initiative launched by the Syrian Islamic Council in early September. Free Syrian Army factions formed a committee to select a Chief of Staff in consultation with the Prime Minister. -On September 5, the Secretary-General submitted the OPCW's forty seventh monthly report on the progress to eliminate chemical weapons in Syria to the Security Council. The report highlighted the preparations underway to confirm the status of the two remaining stationary above-ground facilities now that the security situation allows safe access and the upcoming high- level consultations with Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister, Dr. Faisal Mekdad, to clarify outstanding issues regarding the Syrian government's initial declaration. -Pro-government coalition forces reached the western perimeter of Deir Ezzor city, breaking a three-year ISIS siege of the government-held areas that had impacted 93,500 people. In support of the offensive, a Russian warship located in the Mediterranean Sea launched cruise missiles at ISIS positions near Deir Ezzor. -On September 6, SE Mistura said he expects a national ceasefire to follow shortly after ISIS has been pushed from its strongholds in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor. Although he stressed that the government "cannot announce victory", he called on opposition forces to accept defeat and focus on winning the peace through negotiations in October. -The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria released a report on the major human rights and humanitarian law violations committed between March and July 2017. The Commission accused the Syrian government of using sarin gas in the April 4 Khan Sheikhoun attack and found US forces culpable of not taking "all feasible precautions" to protect civilians in the March 16 attack on al-Jinah Mosque. -According to Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, experts from Russia, Iran and Turkey made progress towards an agreement "on the parameters, configuration and methods of ensuring security in the de-escalation zone in the Idlib province" in Syria. -On September 7, Israel conducted airstrikes on the Scientific Studies and Research Center, a facility believed to house a chemical weapons manufacturing center, and a military base storing surface-to-surface missiles near government-stronghold Masyaf in Hama province. The Syrian Foreign Ministry called on the Security Council to denounce the airstrikes. -US-led coalition forces fighting ISIS announced that airstrikes had killed two ISIS leaders near Mayadin in the Deir Ezzor province on September 4, 2017. -The Head of the High Negotiations Committee, Riyad Hijab, rejected the SE Mistura's call for the opposition to accept defeat, declaring the UN mediation process a failure and calling on Syrians to demonstrate in support of the continuation of the revolution. On September 8, a convoy of 42 trucks carrying humanitarian aid for 80,000 people reached Deir Ezzor for the first time by land in three years. -US-led coalition surveillance aircraft departed its position monitoring an 11-bus convoy of ISIS fighters and their families after attempting to prevent its advance into ISIS-held territory in Deir Ezzor since August 29. The surveillance aircraft departed the airspace at the request of Russian military officials who were conducting an operation with pro-government forces close to the convoy's position. -The Syrian National Coalition (NCSRF) condemned calls from "regional and external parties" for Western-backed opposition groups Ahmed Al-Abdu and Ussoud Al-Sharqiya to cease fighting government forces in southeastern Syria and withdraw to Jordan. Both groups refused the request. -On September 9, pro-government forces broke a years-long siege of Deir Ezzor airbase and captured the Damascus-Deir Ezzor highway from ISIS. -SDF launched Operation Jazeera Storm to liberate Deir Ezzor province from ISIS. -On September 10, SDF reached the industrial zone to the east of Deir Ezzor city putting the US-backed coalition within 15 km (10 miles) of pro-government forces positioned to the west of the Euphrates river. -On September 11, the Jordanian Foreign Minister, Ayman Safadi, and Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, declared the ceasefire brokered by Jordan, Russia and the United States in the southern Syrian provinces of Daraa, Quneitra and Suweida on July 9 a success and reiterated their commitment to the establishment a de-escalation zone in the area as a step towards achieving a comprehensive cessation of hostilities and a political solution to the crisis. On September 12, pro-government coalition forces continued their push into ISIS-held territory in Deir Ezzor city. Russia and Syria warplanes conduct heavy bombardment in support, killing an estimated 69 people over the course of 72 hours. -Hezbollah leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, declared the war in Syria over, referring to the remaining fighting as "scattered battles". -ISIS defectors have massed in Syria's Idlib province with many planning to cross into Turkey before continuing to other parts of the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. -Iran and Syria sign a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in Syria's electricity sector. The arrangement, part of a series of bilateral deals formalizing Iran's role in Syria's reconstruction process, provides for the establishment of a new power generation station in Latakia and the rehabilitation of gas units and power generating plants in Damascus, Aleppo, Deir Ezzo and Homs. -On September 13, the remaining buses of the convoy of ISIS fighters and their families stranded for over two weeks in the Syrian desert reportedly reached Mayadin, in militant-held Deir Ezzor province, following the withdrawal of US surveillance aircraft on September 8 in respect of de-confliction arrangements with Russia. -The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that pro-government coalition forces controlled 85 percent of Syrian territory. SOHR disputed the claim, saying government forces held 48 percent of Syria. -Experts from Russia, Iran and Turkey met ahead of the sixth round of talks in Astana, Kazakhstan to "lay the groundwork" for negotiations on the establishment of de-escalation zone in Idlib province. -On September 14, Col. Ryan Dillon, spokesperson for the US-led coalition fighting ISIS, said SDF forces will not enter Deir Ezzor city, and will instead focus operations on areas south of the city along the Euphrates river. He also said US-backed SDF was in control of 63 percent of Raqqa city. -On September 15, Ahmad Abu Khawla, commander of the SDF-affiliated Deir Ezzor Military Council, declared that it will not allow government forces to cross to the eastern banks of the Euphrates river. -Representatives from Russia, Iran and Turkey reached an agreement on the delineation and monitoring mechanism for the implementation of a de-escalation zone in Idlib province and agreed to position observers in "safe zones". Russia circulated a draft resolution among the permanent members of the Council to welcome the outcome of the Astana talks. -On September 16, the SDF and US Coalition officials accused pro-government forces of attacking one of their positions in the industrial zone east of Deir Ezzor city, injuring 6 SDF fighters. According to US Coalition sources, Russia conducted the airstrike after the United States had denied its request to target the area. Russian Defense Ministry spokesperson Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov rejected the allegations, saying warplanes carried out "pinpoint strikes only on Islamic State targets that have been observed and confirmed through several channels." -High-level consultations commenced between the Syrian government and the OPCW aimed at clarifying all outstanding issues regarding Syria's initial declaration of its chemical weapons facilities. -On September 17, a convoy of 80 Turkish military vehicles deployed to Turkey's southern border, close to the Bab Al-Hawa and Rihaniyah crossings with Syria's Idlib Governorate, ahead of the implementation of a de-escalation zone agreement brokered at the recent Astana talks. -On September 18, pro-government coalition forces crossed to the eastern bank of the Euphrates river to within five kilometers of SDF positions. In the first sign of direct contact between the SDF and the pro-government forces, US-led coalition spokesperson Col. Ryan Dillon said "open lines" of communication were being maintained to prevent clashes between the two forces as they converge on ISIS positions. -After capturing the Deir Ezzor Military Airporst from ISIS fighters, pro-government forces began operating combat and supply missions from the airport. -The World Food Programme (WFP) reached formerly besieged parts of Deir Ezzor city by land for the first time since May 2014. WFP has discontinued its high-altitude airdrop operations in favor of road deliveries which will allow for more affordable, sustainable humanitarian access. -In a meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, Members of the "Friends of Syria" Group agreed they will not support reconstruction in Syria until there is a political transition "away from Assad." -During its 36th session, the Human Rights Council held an interactive dialogue with the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria to discuss the continued targeting of civilians and the use of chemical weapons in the conflict, appealing to all parties to redouble their efforts to protect civilians and preserve civilian infrastructure. -On September 19, AOGs led by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), the Turkistan Islamic Party and Free Syrian Army affiliates launched an offensive against pro-government forces in northern Hama province in an effort to dismantle the de-escalation zone agreement on Idlib province brokered at the recent Astana talks. The offensive sparked intense Russian and Syrian bombardment of opposition-held territory in Hama and Idlib Governorates. Syrian government forces claimed the airstrikes targeted "terrorist supply lines" but SOHR alleged the strikes hit hospitals and towns, killing civilians. -The Syrian government asserted it will not accept Turkish forces on Syrian soil, effectively contradicting
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Niger's July 26 military coup, which ousted President Mohamed Bazoum, has created a volatile situation. While France and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) threaten military action against the Nigerien junta under the guise, respectively, of protecting French diplomatic and military facilities and restoring Niger's constitutional order, the crisis risks escalating into a regional conflict.Each of Niger's seven neighbors has a unique set of interests and perspectives on Niger's situation. Algeria, which shares a 620-mile border with Niger, is focused on promoting stability and a return to Niger's constitutional order while also preventing foreign powers from violating the country's sovereignty.Algiers is concerned about instability spilling into neighboring countries (including Algeria) and violent extremists exploiting the turmoil in Niger itself. Memories of Algeria's "Black Decade" (1991-99), in which a jihadist insurgency and a state-led crackdown led to much bloodshed, remain vivid in Algerian minds. No Algerian takes peace and stability at home for granted."National security officials in Algiers already have their hands full due to increasing tensions with Morocco to the west, continued instability in Libya to the east, and the worsening economic situation in Tunisia, also to the east," Gordon Gray, the former U.S. ambassador to Tunisia, told RS. "Uncertainty to the south, i.e., along the border with Niger, is yet another problematic development they will need to deal with."In 2012, three hardline jihadist terrorist groups — al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, and Ansar Dine — gained control of two-thirds of Mali, including territory bordering Algeria. Algerians worried about these armed extremists' ability to threaten Algeria's security. The 2013 In Amenas hostage crisis further informed Algeria's understandings of its vulnerability to transnational terror groups operating in neighboring countries. Today, Algerian officials have similar concerns about instability in Niger creating opportunities for the ISIS- and al-Qaida-linked terrorist groups operating in the country to wage attacks throughout the region.Algerian officials also worry about the devastating impact that the situation could have on Niger's 25 million people. ECOWAS-imposed sanctions on Niger in the wake of the July 26 coup do not include humanitarian exemptions, and Algeria's government worries that political turmoil and a worsening economic situation in Niger could prompt refugee flows into Algeria and other neighboring countries, further threatening regional stability.Algeria's concerns about Niger's crisis go beyond the threat of terrorism and worsening humanitarian disasters. Although in favor of restoring Niger's constitutional order, Algiers strongly opposes military intervention by foreign forces."Algeria opposes all kinds of external intervention in North Africa and the Sahel, whether it is military or political. Algiers stands firm by the principle of sovereignty and considers any foreign presence in its neighborhood as an infringement on the local countries' sovereignty, regardless of the nature of the foreign intervention or presence," Ricardo Fabbiani, North Africa project director for the International Crisis Group, told RS."For Algeria, a military intervention against Niger would be a catastrophe. The Algerians point out that the previous interventions in Libya and Mali have exacerbated pre-existing problems, rather than solving them," he added. "These operations have a significant political and security impact, with repercussions that can be felt for decades."In this sense, Algeria occupies a somewhat unique position — at odds with both France and ECOWAS threatening to wage a military campaign to reverse the coup on one side, and Burkina Faso and Mali vowing to militarily assist Niger's junta if ECOWAS attacks on the other.Seeing itself as a regional heavyweight, Algeria's sensibilities and principles guide the country's foreign policy. Having existed as a French colony before waging a war for independence (1954-62), Algerians view national sovereignty as sacrosanct. This history helps one understand the North African country's past opposition to foreign interventions in Libya, Iraq, Mali, and Syria.Viewing itself as a vanguard in anti-imperialist, pan-African, and Arab nationalist causes, Algeria will always oppose Western (especially French) military intervention in Africa, the Middle East, or anywhere in the Global South. Whereas many states evolve in their foreign policy strategies, Algeria's firm commitment to certain principles, concepts, and institutions has remained consistent over the decades, making Algiers' stance vis-a-vis Niger both predictable and characteristic.Within this context, Algeria is playing a leading role in advocating for a diplomatic solution to the Nigerien crisis that prevents any external military intervention. Last month, Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf visited three ECOWAS member-states — Nigeria, Benin, and Ghana — on orders from President Abdelmadjid Tebboune. After the visits, Attaf proposed a six-month transition plan to bring civilian rule and democracy back to Niger.He stressed Algeria's opposition to foreign military intervention and affirmed that external actors will be barred from transiting Algerian airspace as part of any intervention. The six-point plan's objective is to "formulate political arrangements with the acceptance of all parties in Niger without excluding any party" within the six-month-window, according to Algeria's top diplomat, who has also had contacts with junta members, as well as Nigerian civilian leaders. Overseeing this process should be a "civilian power led by a consensus figure."Before Attaf announced Algeria's plan, Niger's military leadership, backed by Burkina Faso and Mali, laid out its own very different plan. The junta called for a three-year transition period to restore constitutional order. ECOWAS has summarily rejected that plan, asserting that three years is much too long. Some members even called the junta's proposal a "provocation."Algeria is hoping that its proposal offers a middle ground that saves face on all sides but also leads to a restoration of democracy in Niger while preventing any military action against the landlocked and sanctioned country.Fortunately for Algeria, there is growing international support from foreign governments, such as Italy's, for its mediation efforts as the standoff over Niger intensifies. "If successful, this diplomatic effort could strengthen Algeria's role in the Sahel, which is one of Algeria's long-term goals in the area," said Fabiani.Washington has not yet taken a position on Algeria's plan and has generally followed a more cautious approach than Paris, a source of irritation between the two NATO allies. Despite an early unsuccessful mission by a top State Department official to engage the junta, the U.S. has thus far declined to label Bazoum's ouster a "coup," a legal determination that would require the U.S. to end military aid to Niamey, a key counterterrorism partner in the Sahel for years."The United States remains focused on diplomatic efforts toward a peaceful resolution to preserve Niger's hard-earned democracy," a State Department spokesperson told RS. "We all want a peaceful end to this crisis and the preservation of the constitutional order."Looking ahead, officials in Algiers understand that they must address the Nigerien crisis pragmatically while accepting the limitations of Algeria's influence in Niamey. Algerian policymakers are "working on a shortened timeline for the transition" and Algiers "thinks that the coup is difficult to reverse," which leaves them believing that "the quickest route out of this predicament is by accelerating the transition announced by the military junta and guaranteeing Bazoum's personal safety," explained Fabiani. "Yet, it is unclear what leverage Algeria has to make this happen and, most importantly, how willing to listen are the military authorities, given the regional polarization around this issue.""Today, Algiers doesn't want to antagonize the military junta in Niger, nor does it want to push for a military intervention," Dalia Ghanem, a Middle East and North Africa Senior Analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies, told RS. "Yet, Algiers learned that this noninterference stance is no longer efficient because it leaves the door open to foreign meddling like in Libya. The country's [leadership is] hence stuck between an old doctrine and the new regional realities. The country had no other [option] than [to] maximize security at its borders and this can't be done without hard choices being taken."In the public eye, Algeria will continue investing diplomatic energy into its six-month transition plan. Yet, as Gray told RS, "Behind the scenes, Algeria will be seeking ways to cooperate with the military junta to ensure the security of its southern border."
This research aims to find out the influence of transformational leadership and organizational commitment to turnover intentions in government agencies, especially on honorees of the Bengkayang district regent's office. This study is quantitative research and uses questionnaires as a research data collection tool, and is analyzed using SPSS 21.0. The population in this study amounted to 166 people with a sample of 118 people. The results showed transformational leadership have a negative influence but insignificant effect on turnover intention meanwhile organizational commitment didn't have negative effect and significant to the turnover intention. DAFTAR PUSTAKAAgnesya, R. A. (2018). Pengaruh Kepemimpinan, Komitmen Organisasional dan Budaya Organisasi Terhadap Turnover Intention Studi Kasus Pada Bank Muamalat Kc Surakarta Magelang (Skripsi yang tidak dipublikasikan). Institut Agama Islam Negeri Salatiga, Jawa Tengah.Ajie., & Wayan, N. (2018). Pengaruh Kepemimpinan Transformasional, Keadilan Organisasional Dan Kepuasan Kerja Terhadap Komitmen Organisasional. E-jurnal Manajemen Unud , 7(2), 730-758.Allen., & Mayer. (1997). Commitment In The Workplace (Theory, Research, and Application). London: Sage Publiscation.Alzubi, Y.Z.W. (2018). Turnover intentions in Jordanian Universities: The role of leadership behaviour, organizational commitment and organizational culture. International Journal of Advanced and Applied Sciences, 5(1), 177-192. Ana, S.W., Yulvi, Z., & Ruslin, A. (2014). Analisis Faktor-faktor yang Mempengaruhi Turnover Intention (Keinginan Berpindah) Karyawan Pada Perusahaan Jasa Kontruksi. Jurnal Rekayasa Sipil, 8(2), 1978-5658.Azwar, S. (2012). Reliabilitas dan Validias. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar.Badriyah, M. (2015). Manajemen Sumber Daya Manusia. Bandung: CV. Pustaka Setia.Buulolo, A., & Ratnasari, S.L. (2020). Pengaruh Dukungan Supervisor, Komitmen Organisasional, Dan Beban Kerja Terhadap Turnover Intention. DIMENSI, 9(2), 339-351Chang, E. (1999). Career Commitment as a complex Moderator of Organization al Commitment and Turnover Intention. Human Relations, 52(10). 1257-1278.Chang, C. (2008). Internal Marketing Practices and Employees Turnover Intentions In Leisure Hotels, . The Journal of Human Resource and Adult learning, 4 (2). 161-172.Dewi, N. A. (2019). Pengaruh Kepemimpinan Transformasional, Budaya Organisasi dan Komitmen Organisasi Terhadap Turnover Intention (Studi Empiris Pada Karyawan Pt. Arta Boga Cermelang Magelang (Skripsi yang tidak dipublikasikan). Universitas Muhamadiah Magelang, Jawa Tengah.Griffeth, R. W., Hom, P. W., & Gaertner, S. (2000). A Meta - Analysis of Antecedents and Correlates of Employee Turnover: Update, moderator tests, and research implications for the next millennium. Journal of Management. 26(3), 463-488.Ghozali, I. (2016). Aplikasi Analisis Multivariate dengan Program SPSS. Semarang: Badan Penerbit Universitas Diponegoro.Johannes., Edward., & Rofi'i. (2014). Pengaruh Kompensasi dan Iklim Organisasi terhadap Turnover Intention Dengan Kepuasan Kerja Sebagai Variabel Intervening. Jurnal Dinamika Manajemen , 2(2), 2338-123.Kadek, N., Dewi, N. C., & Subudi, M. (2015). Pengaruh Kepemimpinan Transformasional Terhadap Kepuasan Kerja Dan Turnover Intention pada Cv. Gita Persada Denpasar. E-jurnal Manajemen Unud, 4(12), 4219-4244.Kartajaya, H. (2017). Hadapi MEA Perlu WOW Marketing dan Leadership. Diakses dari https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20150518/12/434491/ hermawan kartajaya-hadapi-mea-perlu-wow-marketing-dan-leadership.Kuncoro, M. (2011). Metode Kuantitatif. Yogyakarta: UPP STIM YKPN.Lako, A. (2004). Kepemimpinan dan Kinerja Organisasi Isu Teori dan Solusi. Yogyakarta: Amara Books.Luthans, F. (2006). Organizational Behavior. New York: Mc Graw-Hill.Masta, N., & Riyanto, S. (2020). The Effect of Transformational Leadership, Perceived Organizational Support and Workload on Turnover Intention Sharia Banking Company in Jakarta. Saudi Journal of Business and Management Studies, 5(8), 473-381.Mathis, R.L ., & Jackson, J. (2001). Manajemen Sumber Daya Manusi. Jakarta: Selemba Empat.Melky, Y. (2015). Hubungan Kepuasan Kerja dan Komitmen Organisasi Terhadap Intensi Pindah Kerja (Turnover Intention) Karyawan Pt. Rejeki Abadi Sakti Samarinda . Psikoborneo, 3(1), 98-111.Mobley. (2011). Turnover Intention. Jakarta : Salemba Empat.Munandar, A. S. (2011). Psikologi Industri dan Organisasi. Jakarta: Universitas Indonesia Press.Noe, R. A., Hollenbeck, J. R., Gerhart, B., & Wright, P. M. (2010). Manajemen Sumber Daya Manusia: Mencapai Keunggulan Bersaing. Jakarta: Salemba Empat.Nourthouse, P. G. (2016). Leadership. California: SAGE Publications Inc.Park, T., & Pierce, B. (2020). Impacts Of Transformational Leadership On Turnover Intention Of Child Welfare Workers. Children and Youth Services Review, 108 (2020), 104-624.Rahman, A., Naqvi, R., & Ramay, M. I. (2008). Meansuring Turnover Intention: A Study of IT Professionals in Pakistan. Internasional Review of Business Research Papers, 4(3), 45-55.Ridlo, I. (2012). Turnover Karyawan Kajian Literature. Surabaya: Movement Publication.Rindu., Lukman, S., Hardisman., Hafizurrachman, M., & Bachtiar, A. (2020). The Relationship between Transformational Leadership, Organizational Commitment, Work Stress, and Turnover Intentions of Nurse at Private Hospital in Indonesia. Open Access Macedonian Journal of Medical Sciences, 8(E), 551-557.Robbins., & Judge. (2011). Organization Behaviour: An Evidence-Based Approach. Newyork: Mc. Graw Hill.Robbin., & Judge. (2015). Perilaku organisasi. Jakarta: Selemba Empat.Sitorus, M. A. (2017). Pengaruh Kepemimpinan Transformasional dan Komitmen Organisasi Terhadap Turnover Intention (Studi pada Hotel Ratu Mayang Garden Pekanbaru). JOM FISIP, 4(2).1-9.Sugiyono. (2017). Metode Penelitian Bisnis . Bandung: Alfabeta.Suparyadi. (2015). Manajemen Sumber Daya Manusia. Yogyakarta: Andi Publisher.Thamrin, A. (2012). Hubungan Antar Gaya Kepemimpinan Transformasional dan Budaya Organisasi Dengan Komitmen Kerja Karyawan PDAM Tirtanadi Provinsi Sumatera Utara. Jurnal Magister Psikologi UMA, 1(2), 48-61 .Umar, H. (2013). Metode Penelitian Untuk Skripsi dan Tesis. Jakarta: Rajawali.Witasari, L. (2009). Analisis Pengaruh Kepuasan Kerja Dan Komitmen Organisasional Terhadap Turnover Intention (Skripsi yang tidak dipublikasikan). Universitas Diponegoro Semarang, Jawa Tengah.
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The latest Houthi strike in the Red Sea has for the first time killed civilians — three workers on a Barbados-flagged cargo ship — underscoring the ineffectiveness of the Biden military response after five long months of militant attacks there. It also shows how elusive the goal is for ending the nearly decade-long war in Yemen.Just two weeks after assuming the presidency in January 2021, Joe Biden took three key steps in hopes of ending the war in Yemen. First, he removed the Houthis from the Foreign Terrorist Organization designation that was announced in the last days of Donald Trump's tenure. Second, he appointed Tim Lenderking as Special Envoy to Yemen. Finally, he announced that Washington would stop supporting Saudi offensive operations in Yemen, and declared that the war in Yemen had to end. Ending the war in Yemen has remained a major policy objective of his administration.By the time of these announcements, the Saudi regime, under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, or MBS, had begun extracting itself from the Yemeni quagmire, so the new U.S. position was not received with the hostility from Riyadh it might have expected; indeed, it was formally "'welcomed" in the hope that Washington's diplomatic involvement might assist this process. Since then, Lenderking has actively joined UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg in his efforts to bring about an end to the war in Yemen, although the impact of his involvement remains unclear. Major developments took place in April 2022 with the announcement by Grundberg of a truce between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition. (While that truce officially expired the following October, fighting since then has been small scale, and neither the Saudis nor the Emiratis have conducted air strikes against the Houthis.) A few days after Grundberg's announcement, the president of Yemen's internationally recognized government (IRG), Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who had clung to that post since 2012, was unceremoniously replaced by a Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) at a meeting in Riyadh hosted by MBS. Much like the resignation statement announced by Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in Riyadh in 2017, Hadi's renunciation was read in circumstances that suggested duress.The PLC consists of eight men -- Rashad al Alimi, the former Interior Minister who ascended to the presidency, and leaders of the various anti-Houthi military factions as vice presidents, some of them aligned with the Saudis and others with the Emiratis. When handing over his authority, Hadi gave them the mandate to negotiate "with (Ansar Allah) the Houthis for a permanent ceasefire throughout the republic and sit at the negotiating table to reach a final and comprehensive political solution that includes a transitional phase that will move Yemen from a state of war to a state of peace." Predictably, given the composition of the council, its members have since spent more energy disagreeing with each other than fighting the Houthis. Another major development later in 2022 was the start of direct and publicly acknowledged negotiations between the Saudis and the Houthis, resulting in the effective marginalization of both the UN-sponsored process and the PLC, but opening space for Omani mediation. During most of 2023, those talks progressed with two major markers: in April, an official trip to Sana'a, the Houthi-controlled capital, by a senior Saudi delegation, followed in September by a return visit to the Kingdom by senior Houthis. On both occasions there were widespread rumors that an agreement was on the verge of being reached. Indeed, PLC members were summoned to Riyadh on both occasions to be informed of the situation, rather than consulted. Similarly, the UN Special Envoy was, at best, informed of developments. The draft agreement involved a six-month cease-fire, to be followed by three months of intra-Yemeni discussions in preparation for a two-year transition phase. The Houthis' main concession was that the Saudis would sign as "mediators" rather than "participants" thus reducing the possibility of war crimes charges against Riyadh stemming from its highly destructive bombing campaign during earlier years in the conflict. In return, the Saudis agreed to pay the salaries of all government staff, including the Houthis' military and security personnel, for at least six months. The expected culmination would have been an event where the Houthis and the IRG, which had a great deal to lose by such an agreement, including generous Saudi subsidization, would sign as participants a document witnessed by the Saudis and likely the Omanis as mediators. It would have formalized Saudi Arabia's exit from the Yemen conflict while leaving to UN mediation the more difficult task of addressing the intra-Yemeni struggles.More recent developments in the Red Sea, however, have made it increasingly difficult to continue negotiations, let alone conclude the pending agreement. The Houthi seizure of the Galaxy Leader on November 19 was followed by a series of attacks on Israeli-connected shipping out of what Houthis said was solidarity with the Palestinian civilians in Gaza. The initial U.S. response was timid, largely because of the Biden administration's remaining hope that a public event formalizing the "end" of the Yemen war, would enable it to claim a major foreign policy success in an election year. While this hope explains Washington's restraint, it doesn't explain why the administration failed to consult with its major allies in Europe. As a result, when the U.S. established the ineffective Prosperity Guardian operation on December 18, it gained meager international support and a rapid disavowal by major European countries who announced their own operation in mid-February 2024.In the absence of a formal agreement, UN Special Envoy Grundberg, on December 23, announced a roadmap towards peace which includes "the parties' commitment to implement a nationwide ceasefire, pay all public sector salaries, resume oil exports, open roads in Taiz and other parts of Yemen, and further ease restrictions on Sana'a airport and the Hudaydah port…. and prepare for a Yemeni-owned political process under UN auspices." The IRG's welcoming of the announcement was, to say the least, muted. Regional states, particularly Saudi Arabia, were more positive, and both the UAE and the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council expressed support. Grundberg has tried to move his road map forward, but the escalations that have taken place in the Red Sea increasingly threaten those efforts. On January 11, the U.S. and UK initiated Operation Poseidon Archer against targets on the Yemeni mainland for the first time, intending to downgrade the Houthis' capability to launch missiles and drones. Initially presented as a "one-off," the strikes have become almost daily, and, by the end of February, had hit 230 sites throughout the country. The number of Houthi attacks, however, has not diminished. While few ships are hit, and those that have been have suffered only minor damage, the Rubymar, a British-owned ship struck on February 18 sank two weeks later, polluting the sea with fertilizer and a massive oil slick. There is no sign of an end to Houthi attacks: despite weeks of strikes, the U.S. officials remain unclear about their impact due to lack of information about Houthi stocks of projectiles. Meanwhile, the majority of Yemenis support Houthi actions in support of Palestine, even if they are unhappy with Houthi governance. The only explicit support for U.S. and UK strikes within Yemen comes from the IRG, a number of whose leaders have asked for the strikes to be complemented by materiel, training and other military support to fight and somehow defeat the Houthis. Widely seen as acting in defense of the Palestinians, however, the Houthis' popularity appears to have risen sharply both domestically and abroad, especially in Arab and predominantly Muslim countries. Should the U.S. and UK escalate their involvement in the Yemen conflict — a possibility made more likely by Wednesday's fatal Houthi strike— prospects for a worsening of the situation loom, increasingly reminiscent of Iraq or Afghanistan decades ago. While the Saudi involvement in the Yemen war appears to have ended, however informally, Yemenis are now facing the prospect of a new form of international intervention in their crisis, alongside the already worsening economic situation and humanitarian crisis which, between 2015 and until recently was considered the "world's worst" by the United Nations. Unfortunately, in the absence of any immediate likelihood of an end to Israel's catastrophic destruction of Gaza, prospects for peace in Yemen appear increasingly remote.
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Deaths from terrorism in Africa have skyrocketed more than 100,000 percent during the U.S. war on terror according to a new study by Africa Center for Strategic Studies, a Pentagon research institution. These findings contradict claims by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) that it is thwarting terrorist threats on the continent and promoting security and stability.Throughout all of Africa, the State Department counted a total of just nine terrorist attacks in 2002 and 2003, resulting in a combined 23 casualties. At that time, the U.S. was just beginning a decades-long effort to provide billions of dollars in security assistance, train many thousands of African military personnel, set up dozens of outposts, dispatch its own commandos on a wide range of missions, create proxy forces, launch drone strikes, and even engage in ground combat with militants in Africa. Most Americans, including members of Congress, are unaware of the extent of these operations — or how little they have done to protect African lives.Last year, fatalities from militant Islamist violence in Africa rose by 20 percent — from 19,412 in 2022 to 23,322 — reaching "a record level of lethal violence," according to the Africa Center. This represents almost a doubling in deaths since 2021 and a 101,300 percent jump since 2002-2003.For decades, U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in Africa have been centered on two main fronts: Somalia and the West African Sahel. Each saw significant spikes in terrorism last year.U.S. Special Operations forces were first dispatched to Somalia in 2002, followed by military aid, advisers, and private contractors. More than 20 years later, U.S. troops are still conducting counterterrorism operations there, primarily against the Islamist militant group al-Shabaab. To this end, Washington has provided billions of dollars in counterterrorism assistance, according to a 2023 report by the Costs of War Project at Brown University. Americans have also conducted more than 280 air strikes and commando raids there and created numerous proxy forces to conduct low-profile military operations.Somalia saw, according to the Africa Center, "a 22-percent increase in fatalities in 2023 — reaching a record high of 7,643 deaths." This represents a tripling of fatalities since 2020.The findings are even more damning for the Sahel. In 2002 and 2003, the State Department counted a total of just nine terrorist attacks in Africa. Today, the nations of the West African Sahel are plagued by terrorist groups that have grown, evolved, splintered, and reconstituted themselves. Under the black banners of jihadist militancy, men on motorcycles — wearing sunglasses and turbans and armed with AK-47s — rumble into villages to impose their harsh brand of Sharia law and terrorize, assault, and kill civilians. Relentless attacks by these jihadis have destabilized Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. "Fatalities in the Sahel represent a near threefold increase from the levels seen in 2020," according to the Africa Center report. "Fatalities in the Sahel amounted to 50 percent of all militant Islamist-linked fatalities reported on the continent in 2023."At least 15 officers who benefited from U.S. security assistance have been involved in 12 coups in West Africa and the greater Sahel during the war on terror. The list includes officers from Burkina Faso (2014, 2015, and twice in 2022); Chad (2021); Gambia (2014); Guinea (2021); Mali (2012, 2020, and 2021); Mauritania (2008); and Niger (2023). At least five leaders of the Nigerien junta, for example, received American assistance, according to a U.S. official. They, in turn, appointed five U.S.-trained members of the Nigerien security forces to serve as that country's governors.Such military coups have undermined American aims of providing stability and security to Africans, yet the United States has been hesitant to cut ties with these rogue regimes. Despite the Nigerien coup, for example, the United States continues to garrison troops at, and conduct missions from, its large drone base there. Juntas have also amped up atrocities. Take Colonel Assimi Goïta, who worked with U.S. Special Operations forces, participated in U.S. training exercises, and attended the Joint Special Operations University in Florida before overthrowing Mali's government in 2020. Goïta then took the job of vice president in a transitional government officially charged with returning the country to civilian rule, only to seize power again in 2021.That same year, Goita's junta reportedly authorized the deployment of Russia-linked Wagner mercenary forces to fight Islamist militants after close to two decades of failed Western-backed counterterrorism efforts. Wagner — a paramilitary group founded by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin, a former hot-dog vendor turned warlord — went on to be implicated in hundreds of human rights abuses alongside the longtime U.S.-backed Malian military, including a 2022 massacre that killed 500 civilians.U.S. law generally restricts countries from receiving military aid following military coups, but the U.S. has continued to provide assistance to Sahelian juntas. While Goïta's 2020 and 2021 coups triggered prohibitions on some forms of U.S. security assistance, American tax dollars have continued to fund his forces. According to the State Department, the U.S. provided more than $16 million in security aid to Mali in 2020 and almost $5 million in 2021. As of July 2023, the department's Bureau of Counterterrorism was waiting on congressional approval to transfer an additional $2 million to Mali. (The State Department did not reply to Responsible Statecraft's request for an update on the status of that funding.)Similarly, Burkina Faso's military killed scores of civilians in drone strikes last year, according to a recent report released by Human Rights Watch. The attacks, targeting Islamist militants in crowded marketplaces and at a funeral, left at least 60 civilians dead and dozens more injured. For more than a decade, the U.S. poured tens of millions of dollars into security aid to Burkina Faso. U.S. Africa Command or AFRICOM is, according to spokesperson Kelly Cahalan, "not currently providing assistance to Burkina Faso." But she did not respond to questions clarifying what, exactly, that means. Last year, in fact, AFRICOM commander Gen. Michael Langley admitted that the U.S. has continued to provide military training to Burkinabè forces. Those troops, for example, took part in Flintlock 2023, an annual training exercise sponsored by U.S. Special Operations Command Africa. Still, Burkina Faso suffered 67 percent of the militant Islamist-related fatalities in the Sahel (7,762) in 2023, according to the Africa Center.U.S. Africa Command touts that it "counters transnational threats and malign actors" and promotes "regional security, stability and prosperity" helping its African partners to ensure the "security and safety" of their people. The fact that civilian deaths from militant Islamist violence have reached record levels, according to the Africa Center, and spiked 101,300 percent during the war on terror demonstrates the opposite.AFRICOM directed queries on the findings of the Africa Center's new report to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Pentagon did not respond to the questions prior to publication.
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Lebanon's main Islamist party has undergone a profound transformation over the past four decades. Once associated with suicide bombings and hostage-taking, Hezbollah has steadily evolved from an underground movement in 1982 to the dominant political player in Lebanon in 2022. Yet even though Hezbollah is strong militarily and politically, it also faces greater challenges than ever before. They range from the party's massive expansion since 2006 to the domestic discontent over its refusal to abandon its weapons and the growing disenchantment within its Shiite base.Hezbollah's role in the region has been particularly controversial. The most powerful regional militia, Hezbollah used its vast arsenal to fight Israel for thirty-four days in 2006. The conflict was Israel's longest Middle East war and left no clear winner, although Hezbollah chief Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah emerged afterwards at the top of popularity polls across the region. But its armed intervention in Syria, beginning in 2012, on behalf of President Bashar al-Assad deeply tarnished its image among Sunnis across the region as a champion of anti-Israel resistance. After 2006, the party's expansion in manpower, military capabilities and funding also loosened internal control and made it more susceptible to corruption and penetration by Israel.Image CreditThe movement, created under Iran's auspices and aid after Israel's 1982 invasion, reflects the dynamic Shiite dimension of Islamist politics in the Arab world. Hezbollah was inspired by the teachings of Iranian revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. It subscribes to a doctrine known as the velayat-e faqih—or, in Arabic, the wali al-faqih—Khomeini's theory of Islamic governance, which bestows guardianship of government on a senior religious scholar. Iran remains Hezbollah's chief ideological, financial, and military supporter. Syria is also a close ally.Hezbollah's core ideological goals are resisting Israel, establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon, and offering obedience to Iran's supreme leader. But Hezbollah has developed a keen sense of realpolitik that helped shape its political agenda and allowed it to sidestep challenges to its armed status. It long ago accepted, for example, that an Islamic state is not appropriate for Lebanon, and it has considered alternative systems of government, while not relinquishing its ideological preference for an Islamic state.Hezbollah has deepened its involvement in Lebanese politics over the years, but it did so largely in response to potential threats to its armed status, what it calls its "resistance priority". Ideally, the party would prefer to avoid the pitfalls of Lebanon's political quagmire, believing that it complicates the more pressing goal of confronting Israel."We have never sought to be in government ministries," Nasrallah said after the collapse of then government of Prime Minister Saad Hariri in 2011. "All we have been saying to successive governments—and we still say it today—is the following: Brothers, we are a resistance movement.… We do not seek to run the government. Our hearts and minds are elsewhere. When people go to sleep, we conduct [military] training and prepare ourselves."Over four decades, Hezbollah's deepening political engagement also transformed the movement into the main representative of Lebanon's Shiites, the largest of the country's seventeen recognized sects. In turn, the movement now needs continued support of the community to ensure its own survival. Yet the interests of its constituents do not always correspond to the agenda of Iran's leaders, to whom Hezbollah is ideologically beholden. Balancing these rival obligations is a paradox that Hezbollah is finding ever more difficult to reconcile.The BeginningHezbollah emerged in the wake of Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, but its genesis lay in the Shiite religious seminaries of Najaf in southern Iraq. In the 1960s and 1970s, Lebanese clerical students were influenced by leading Shiite ideologues such as Mohammed Baqr al Sadr and Ruhollah Khomeini. Sadr, a founder of the Party of the Islamic Call, or Hizb al Dawa al Islamiyya, promoted Islamic values as a counterweight to secularism and the leftist ideologies then attracting Arab youth. Khomeini achieved prominence with his doctrine of velayat-e faqih.Lebanese students and teachers in Iraqi seminaries were forced to return home after President Saddam Hussein cracked down on the Shiite clerics in the late 1970s. Some then began to preach the ideas of Khomeini and Sadr to a domestic audience. By the end of the 1970s, three developments helped create fertile ground for the eventual emergence of Hezbollah. One factor was the creation of Amal, the first strong Shiite movement. Amal's founder was Musa Sadr, a charismatic Iranian-born cleric who tapped into rising anger among Shiites over their repression by other Lebanese sects, particularly Christians and Sunni Muslims. But in 1978, Sadr vanished during a trip to Libya. After his disappearance, Amal drifted in a more secular direction under new leadership, to the dismay of the movement's Islamists.Hezbollah's flagImage CreditThe second event was Israel's first invasion of Lebanon in 1978 in a bid to expel the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from south Lebanon. Israel installed a security cordon along the border inside Lebanon, which was controlled by an Israeli-backed militia. It was the first time many southern Lebanese lived under occupation.The third crucial event was the Iranian Revolution in 1979, when the first modern theocracy replaced the dynastic rule that had prevailed in Iran for more than 2,500 years. The revolution had an electrifying effect on Lebanese Shiites in general and on the clerical followers of Khomeini in particular. Iranian leaders and Lebanese clerics held lengthy discussions about importing the revolution to Lebanon and building an armed anti-Israel movement. Among the Lebanese clerics were Sheikh Sobhi Tufayli, who later became Hezbollah's first secretary-general, and Abbas Musawi, a preacher from the Bekaa Valley village of Nabi Sheet. The idea was delayed by an Iranian power struggle and the beginning of the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq in 1980.Then Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982to drive the PLO out of Lebanon. Iran immediately offered assistance, dispatching 5,000 Revolutionary Guards to Syria for deployment in Lebanon. But the main fighting soon ended, and most of the Iranians returned home. With Syrian approval, a smaller contingent of Iranians moved into the northern Bekaa Valley to begin mobilizing and recruiting Shiites into a new anti-Israel force that was the basis of what became Hezbollah.By 1983, the nascent Hezbollah's influence was seeping from the Bekaa Valley into Beirut's Shiite suburbs and from there further south toward the front line of the Israeli occupation. By 1985, Israel, exhausted by the intensifying resistance campaign, withdrew to a security belt along the Lebanon-Israel border. Hezbollah—along with Amal and secular local resistance groups, which played smaller roles—had more success in pressuring Israel in two years than had the PLO in a decade. Hezbollah won additional support by providing social welfare services to the Shiite community.In 1985, Hezbollah formally declared its existence in its "Open Letter," a manifesto outlining its identity and agenda. The goals included driving Israeli forces from south Lebanon as a precursor to the destruction of the Jewish state and the liberation of Jerusalem. Hezbollah confirmed that it abided by the orders of "a single wise and just command" represented by Ayatollah Khomeini, the "rightly guided imam."Hezbollah also rejected Lebanon's sectarian political system and instead advocated creation of an Islamic state. At the same time, the party was careful to emphasize that it did not wish to impose Islam as a religion on anyone and that other Lebanese should be free to pick their preferred system of governance.In formally declaring its existence and goals, Hezbollah emerged from the shadows and demonstrated that it was not a fleeting aberration of the civil war but a force determined to endure.First Phase: UndergroundHezbollah's evolution falls into six distinct phases. The first was from 1982 to 1990 and coincided with the chaotic 1975–90 civil war, during which the Lebanese state had little control. Lebanon was instead carved into competing fiefdoms dominated by militias and occupying armies. These were Hezbollah's wild days, when it could do as it pleased under Iran's guidance and Syria's guarded tolerance.The movement became synonymous with extremist attacks, including two on U.S. embassies in 1983 and 1984. Its deadliest attacks were the simultaneous truck bombings of the U.S. Marine barracks and the nearby French Paratroop headquarters, which killed 241 American servicemen and sixty-eight French soldiers. From 1984, more than 100 foreigners in Lebanon were kidnapped. Hezbollah denied responsibility, although some of its members were later linked with the attacks.After 1986, Hezbollah began to dominate the resistance against Israel's occupation in south Lebanon. But the party's growing influence in the south also brought it into conflict with the rival Amal movement. In 1988, the two factions fought the first in a series of bloody internecine battles that over the next two years resulted in thousands of dead and generated an animosity that continued to linger more than three decades later.Second Phase: Running for ParliamentThe second phase was from 1991 to 2000, following the end of Lebanon's civil war in 1990. The restoration of state control sparked a debate within Hezbollah over its future course of action. Hardliners, represented by Sheikh Tufayli, argued that Hezbollah should not compromise its ideological agenda regardless of the nation's changed circumstances. Others countered that Hezbollah had to adapt to the new situation to protect its "resistance priority"—the right to confront Israel's continued occupation of the south.The debate played out over whether Hezbollah should run in the 1992 parliamentary election, the first in twenty years. Joining parliament would strengthen Hezbollah's standing in Lebanon, but it would also flout its 1985 manifesto that rejected a sectarian political system. Pragmatists won after receiving the blessing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, to participate in the elections. Hezbollah won eight parliamentary seats.Hezbollah also went through a leadership change. A few months before the 1992 election, Hezbollah secretary-general Sayyed Abbas Musawi was assassinated in an Israeli helicopter ambush. He was replaced by his protégé, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, a 32-year-old cleric.Under Nasrallah, Hezbollah reorganized, adding new bodies to handle its military, political, and social work. It expanded its social welfare activities nationwide to sustain its popular support within the Shiite community. It also launched a television station, Al-Manar, as the flagship of its propaganda arm, and opened a media relations office. Hezbollah even began a dialogue with other factions and religious representatives, including Christians.Hezbollah's newfound pragmatism did not represent an ideological softening or a decision to exchange Islamic militancy for a share of Lebanon's political space. Hezbollah was instead adapting to postwar circumstances to safeguard the resistance. Shortly after the 1992 election, Nasrallah explained, "Our participation in the elections and entry into [parliament] do not alter the fact that we are a resistance party."Hezbollah's resistance efforts intensified after 1992. Other militias were disbanded under Syrian fiat, but Hezbollah was permitted to keep its armed status as resistance against the Israeli occupation. Its hit-and-run guerrilla tactics claimed ever-higher Israeli casualties during the decade. In 1993 and 1996, Israel responded with air and artillery blitzes against Lebanon in failed attempts to dent Hezbollah's campaign.The late 1990s were, in retrospect, Hezbollah's "golden years." Hezbollah's military exploits won it admirers across the Arab and Islamic worlds and earned the respect of all Lebanese, even those inclined to view the Shiite party with suspicion. Under growing pressure from Hezbollah, Israel finally ended its occupation in May 2000, the first time that the Jewish state had ceded occupied territory through force of Arab arms.Third Phase: ConfrontationThe third phase was from 2000 to 2005. With Israel's withdrawal, Hezbollah's reputation had never been higher. But its victory risked being Pyrrhic. A growing number of Lebanese began questioning why Hezbollah needed to keep its arms after Israel pulled out of Lebanon. Hezbollah countered by citing minor territorial disputes along the border and a number of Lebanese still detained in Israeli prisons. It claimed its weapons were a vital part of Lebanon's defense—in case the Israelis returned. Many Lebanese accused Hezbollah of serving an Iranian—rather than a Lebanese—agenda. But Hezbollah still enjoyed the political cover afforded by Syria, which continued to endorse the party's armed status. Beginning in September 2000, Hezbollah mounted a small-scale campaign against Israeli troops occupying Shebaa Farms, a mountainside area along Lebanon's south-east border. Shebaa Farms was claimed by Lebanon, but recognized as Syrian territory by the United Nations and occupied by Israel since 1967. The sporadic campaign of mortar and rocket attacks every two or three months helped sustain resistance against Israel.In February 2005, Rafik Hariri, a former prime minister of Lebanon, was assassinated in a truck bomb explosion. Many Lebanese blamed Damascus; more than a million people--one quarter of the population--turned out in protests against Syria. Syria pulled its troops out of Lebanon in April, two months after Hariri's murder, ending three decades of military occupation.The sudden loss of Syrian cover compelled Hezbollah to step deeper into Lebanese politics to defend its "resistance priority." It allied with Amal, its longtime predominantly Shiite rival, for the June 2005 parliamentary elections. After the election, Hezbollah joined the cabinet for the first time to defend its interests. In early 2006, Hezbollah signed a memorandum of understanding with the Free Patriotic Movement, then the main representative of the Christian community led by retired General Michel Aoun. Yet Hezbollah's political participation did not defuse the core military issue. Hezbollah rejected demands, by the United Nations as well as rival parties, to disarm. Lebanese politics grew increasingly rancorous over Hezbollah's arms. It became the single most divisive national issue.Fourth Phase: War and RebuildingThe fourth phase ran from 2006 to 2012. It featured Hezbollah's biggest military gamble. On July 12, 2006, its militia abducted two Israeli soldiers along the border to bargain for release of Lebanese detainees in Israel. The audacious kidnapping triggered a month-long war with Israel, which sought to disarm Hezbollah and demilitarize the borders. The war ended in a military stalemate—and at a high cost. More than 1,100 Lebanese died; damage was in the billions of dollars. Hezbollah nevertheless declared a "divine victory" simply for preventing an Israeli victory in its longest war since 1948.Facing intense political criticism for the deaths and destruction, Hezbollah walked out of the Lebanese government in November 2006. A month later, it mobilized a mass protest to force the government to resign. The government stood its ground, but Lebanon was gripped by political paralysis.Tensions between Hezbollah and the central government escalated. In 2008, the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora announced it intended to shut down Hezbollah's private telecommunications network. Hezbollah reacted by staging a brief takeover of west Beirut, triggering a week of clashes that killed more than 100 people and took the country to the edge of civil war. The crisis ended with the formation of a new government and the long-delayed election of a new president, Michel Suleiman.In 2009, Lebanon faced a new crisis when a U.N. investigation obtained evidence implicating Hezbollah in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri four years earlier. Hezbollah denied the allegations and claimed that the Dutch-based tribunal was serving the political interests of the United States and Israel. The government of Prime Minister Saad Hariri (the son of Rafik Hariri) refused to abandon its support for the tribunal. In January 2011, as the tribunal was preparing to issue its first set of indictments, Hezbollah and its political allies forced a vote of no confidence in the government. The new government was composed of Hezbollah and its allies; it was led by Prime Minister Najib Mikati, a billionaire businessman and political moderate.Fifth Phase: The Syria InterventionThe fifth phase began in response to turmoil in Syria. In March 2011, a popular uprising was launched against the regime of Bashar al Assad as the Arab Spring rippled across the Middle East. Hezbollah initially expected it to blow over quickly. But by the end of 2011, the uprising had morphed into a civil war. Within months, Hezbollah began covertly dispatching fighters to assist the Syrian army against nascent rebel groups.In May 2013, Nasrallah admitted that Hezbollah was fully engaged in Syria's civil war. He argued that the Syrian opposition was composed of radical Sunnis who would take the war to Lebanon after defeating Assad. He also warned that the Assad regime was the "backbone of resistance" against Israel and that its defeat would lead to the victory of Israel and the end of the Palestinian cause. Many Lebanese were dismayed at Hezbollah's military intervention in Syria. It breached the Baabda Declaration of 2012, when Lebanese leaders agreed to immunize Lebanon from the conflict tearing apart its larger neighbor. The intervention also eroded Arab and Muslim support. Once hailed for ending the Israeli occupation in 2000 and humiliating the Israeli army in 2006, Hezbollah was now vilified as a ruthless tool of Iranian power projection across the Middle East.Syria's civil war spilled into Lebanon, deepening political and sectarian tensions. In 2013 and 2014, Sunni militants carried out more than a dozen car bombings in Shiite areas of Lebanon. Almost 100 people were killed, 900 wounded. The emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other radical Sunni militias dampened criticism of Hezbollah. Shiites and other Lebanese minorities viewed the party as a protector against Sunni extremists. But Hezbollah casualties were higher than in any of its battles with Israel over the previous three decades. Discontent rumbled within its Shiite base. President Suleiman's six-year term ended in May 2014. In Lebanon, presidents are elected by parliament. Hezbollah endorsed its Christian ally, Michel Aoun, for the presidency and refused to attend successive sessions of parliament to vote until it could guarantee Aoun would win. The stalemate lasted two and a half years, during which the caretaker government lacked the power to pass legislation. The economy steadily declined. In October 2016, Hezbollah's opponents gave up. Aoun was elected in a deal in which Hariri returned as prime minister. Hezbollah became the paramount kingmaker in Lebanese politics, a paradox given its ideological rejection of Lebanon's confessional political system.Sixth Phase: The Collapse of LebanonFor three years, President Aoun and Prime Minister Hariri worked together in an uneasy partnership. It ended abruptly in October 2019 when the cash-starved government slapped a tax on the popular WhatsApp messaging portal, an action that symbolized a broader economic crisis over soaring prices, high unemployment, rampant corruption and poor public services. The largest protests in more than a decade erupted in Beirut and brought out members of all Lebanon's rival sects. Banks closed and prevented customers from accessing their U.S. dollar accounts. The value of the lira plummeted as the scope of Lebanon's financial disaster became apparent. The protests morphed into a nationwide anti-government movement amid anger at three decades of mismanagement by a political elite rarely held unaccountable. Hariri resigned and was replaced by Hassan Diab.In early 2020, the protests grew more violent, and security forces clamped down more rigorously. Hezbollah supporters stormed the protests--beating demonstrators with fists and sticks--on several occasions. Hezbollah, the self-described champion of the "oppressed" and "downtrodden," emerged as the Praetorian Guard for the corrupt and sclerotic status quo.The onset of the Covid-19 pandemic and subsequent lockdowns effectively killed off the protests even as a political opposition began to coalesce on the sidelines. In August 2020, a massive explosion at the Beirut port, caused by hundreds of tons of poorly stored ammonium nitrate, killed more than 200 people and badly damaged a swathe of east Beirut. Hezbollah challenged the official investigation its political allies were indicted. Its opposition fueled suspicions that the party may have had a connection to the ammonium nitrate.Hezbollah's deployment in Syria gradually decreased as the Assad regime regained a tenuous control over much of the country. But Hezbollah remained active in other regional theaters. Since 2014, it had dispatched cadres to Iraq to fight the Islamic State. In 2015, it sent fighters and trainers to Yemen to help the Houthi rebels against a Saudi-led military coalition.In May 2022, Lebanon held the first parliamentary election since the economic crisis. Hezbollah and its allies narrowly lost their parliamentary majority. Shiite turnout was low in what was interpreted as a protest against the two main Shiite parties--Hezbollah and Amal.In October 2022, Aoun's term comes to an end and the race will begin on a successor. Hezbollah has remained the paramount political force in the country. But a series of challenges between 2019 and 2022 dented its popularity as it struggled to balance domestic interests with its obligations to Iran.Key PositionsHezbollah has remained faithful to the core ideological pillars in its 1985 manifesto: the confrontation against Israel, the observance of the wilayet al-faqih leadership doctrine, and the preference to live in an Islamic state.But the party has adjusted its public discourse and operational behavior over the years to suit the unfolding political and social environment in Lebanon. Its survival strategy was evident in the 2009 "Political Document," a long-awaited update to the original "Open Letter." Much of the fiery rhetoric of the earlier manifesto was replaced with nuanced deliberations on a future Lebanese state and the most suitable form of democracy.Islam and DemocracyIn the 1985 "Open Letter," Hezbollah stated, "We do not wish to impose Islam on anybody, and we hate to see others impose on us their convictions and their systems. We do not want Islam to rule in Lebanon by force.… But we stress that we are convinced of Islam as a faith, system, thought, and rule, and we urge all to recognize it and resort to its law."Nearly four decades later, Hezbollah still prefers an Islamic state. As a jihadist Islamist organization, it would be anathema for Hezbollah to renounce the idea of living in a state run under Islamic Sharia law. But its leadership long ago accepted that Lebanon's multi-sectarian and pluralist environment are not suited to the establishment of an Islamic state. Instead, Hezbollah has debated acceptable alternatives.In its 2009 "Political Document," Hezbollah repeated its long-standing rejection of Lebanon's sectarian political system, which it considered "a strong constraint to the achievement of true democracy under which an elected majority may govern and an elected minority may oppose." Until political sectarianism is abolished, Hezbollah argued that "consensual democracy will remain the fundamental basis of governance in Lebanon."Hezbollah explained: "The consensual democracy constitutes an appropriate political formula to guarantee true partnership and contributes in opening the doors for everyone to enter the phase of building the reassuring state that makes all its citizens feel that it is founded for their sake."Women and Personal FreedomsHezbollah has had a more open attitude toward women's role in society than do many other Islamist organizations. Women play important roles within Hezbollah's social-welfare, media, and administrative departments. In the 2009 "Political Document," Hezbollah said that it sought a state "that works to consolidate the role of women at all levels in the framework of benefiting from their characteristics [and] influence while respecting their status."Hezbollah does not aggressively interfere in the lifestyles of its Shiite constituents. Certain taboos are observed. For example, Hezbollah bans the sale of alcohol and tries to stamp out drug use in areas under its control—but Hezbollah is generally uninterested in antagonizing its supporters by imposing a strict moral regimen.Other ReligionsHezbollah recognizes Lebanon's diverse religious landscape and has open channels of dialogue with all other sects. Hezbollah champions unity between the Shiite and Sunni sects on grounds that resistance against Israel takes precedence over doctrinal differences. Hezbollah counts Sunni Islamists among its allies, despite sporadic Shiite-Sunni tensions and the strains caused by its military intervention in Syria's civil war. Hezbollah opened a dialogue with the Maronite church for the first time in 1992, and a party representative regularly meets with religious leaders of various Christian denominations.The United States and the WestIn the 1985 "Open Letter," Hezbollah described the United States as the "first root of vice" and "the reason for all our catastrophes and the source of all malice." By 2022, that view had not changed. The 2009 "Political Document" railed against U.S. global hegemony, accusing it of being the "origin of every aspect of terrorism" and, under the administration of President George W. Bush, "a danger that threatens the whole world in every level and field."The 2009 "Political Document" also stated:"The unlimited U.S. support for Israel and its cover for the Israeli occupation of Arab lands in addition to the American domination of international institutions and dualism in issuing and implementing international resolutions, the policy of interfering in other states' affairs, militarizing the world and adopting the principle of circulating wars in international conflicts, evoking disorder and turbulence all over the world put the American administration in a position hostile to our nation and peoples and hold it essentially responsible of causing chaos in the international political system."In the 1980s, Hezbollah listed France, Israel, and the United States as its main enemies. In the past two decades, however, Hezbollah officials often meet with European representatives, and the party's attitude toward Europe is more reproachful than hostile. European policies, Hezbollah said, "fluctuate between incapability and inefficiency on one hand and unjustified subjugation to U.S. policies on the other."IsraelIn the 1985 "Open Letter," Hezbollah explicitly said that Israel "is a usurping enemy that must be fought until the usurped right [i.e., Palestine] is returned to its owners.… Our struggle with usurping Israel emanates from an ideological and historical awareness that this Zionist entity is aggressive in its origins and structure and is built on usurped land and at the expense of the rights of a Muslim people. Therefore, our confrontation of this entity must end with its obliteration from existence."In the 2009 "Political Document," Hezbollah cited its hostility toward Israel to justify keeping its arms and a military wing:"The role of the Resistance is a national necessity as long as Israeli threats and ambitions to seize our lands and waters continue, in the absence of the capable strong state and the strategic imbalance between the state and the enemy."Chief AlliesIran is Hezbollah's main financial, military, and logistical supplier, and Iran's supreme leader is the party's ultimate source of authority. Under the late President Hafez al Assad, Syria was Hezbollah's protector and supervisor. Since Assad's son Bashar al Assad took over in 2000, Syria became an even closer strategic ally. Syria was the vital geostrategic linchpin connecting Iran to Hezbollah. It provided strategic depth and a conduit for the transfer of arms, which explained the heavy effort by Iran and Hezbollah to preserve Assad's regime.The Palestinian Hamas movement and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have been allies of Hezbollah since the early 1990s. Both groups benefited from Iranian financial and material patronage. But Hamas, a Sunni movement, did not share the Shiite ideology of Iran and Hezbollah, making Hamas and Hezbollah sometimes uncomfortable bedfellows beyond a shared hostility toward Israel.Amal and the Free Patriotic Movement, both secular Lebanese political entities, have been allied with Hezbollah since 2005 and 2006, respectively. These relations, however, are tactical, political and interest-based rather than strategic and ideological. Hezbollah also maintains alliances with smaller pro-Syrian factions and individuals, Islamist groups, and Palestinian groups.The FutureAs of mid-2022, Hezbollah remained the most powerful political force in Lebanon through the implicit force majeure of its armed wing. It was also the most formidable non-state military actor in the Middle East—and arguably in the world. Yet Hezbollah also faced grave challenges from its dual roles as Iran's surrogate and, at the same time, chief representative of Lebanon's Shiites. Iran has helped transform Hezbollah into a robust and unique military force that serves as part of Iran's deterrence against efforts by Israel and the West to contain it. Hezbollah's military involvement in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen has made it the largest force enabler to help to project its influence across the Middle East.Hezbollah is also, however, answerable to the economic needs and political interests of its domestic constituency. By 2022, Hezbollah's standing had declined since the heady days after it emerged from the underground and ran for parliament in the 1990s. Its refusal to disarm was at the heart of Lebanon's festering political divide. Since 2005, Hezbollah has been sucked ever deeper into Lebanon's political swamp—forging complex alliances and deals with unreliable and capricious politicians—in order to defend its "culture of resistance."Sustaining the "culture of resistance" within the Shiite base has grown harder with the passage of time and direct military engagement with Israel. Israel ended its 22-year occupation in 2000; the last major conflict was the 2006 war. Since then, Hezbollah has had only a handful of limited skirmishes with Israel. Lebanon's demographics have also changed. Since 2000, a new generation of Shiites has grown up without the memory of the hardships and misery during Israel's occupation. Their interests have shifted to securing employment or – as the economic crisis accelerated – emigrating from Lebanon rather than joining any "resistance" against an increasingly nebulous enemy.Internally, Hezbollah has also struggled to grapple with the insidious corruption. Since 2006, Hezbollah has grown extensively--militarily, financially, and politically. Its sprawling bureaucracy has looser internal controls compared to its early days decades ago, opening the door to embezzlement and theft within the party. It has also become more vulnerable to penetration by Israeli intelligence agencies. By 2022, the leadership's inability to curb corrupt practices represented the single gravest danger to Hezbollah long-term.So Hezbollah is likely to remain a powerful political player in Lebanon for the foreseeable future. But it faces the challenge of balancing the ideological and logistical obligations to Iran against its political and social duties to Lebanon's Shiite community--a paradox that may only grow more difficult in the years ahead.Nicholas Blanford is a Beirut-based nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council's Middle East programs. He is the author of Killing Mr. Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and Its Impact on the Middle East (2006) and Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah's Thirty-Year Struggle against Israel (2011).
Importance: Cancer and other noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) are now widely recognized as a threat to global development. The latest United Nations high-level meeting on NCDs reaffirmed this observation and also highlighted the slow progress in meeting the 2011 Political Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases and the third Sustainable Development Goal. Lack of situational analyses, priority setting, and budgeting have been identified as major obstacles in achieving these goals. All of these have in common that they require information on the local cancer epidemiology. The Global Burden of Disease (GBD) study is uniquely poised to provide these crucial data. Objective: To describe cancer burden for 29 cancer groups in 195 countries from 1990 through 2017 to provide data needed for cancer control planning. Evidence Review: We used the GBD study estimation methods to describe cancer incidence, mortality, years lived with disability, years of life lost, and disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs). Results are presented at the national level as well as by Socio-demographic Index (SDI), a composite indicator of income, educational attainment, and total fertility rate. We also analyzed the influence of the epidemiological vs the demographic transition on cancer incidence. Findings: In 2017, there were 24.5 million incident cancer cases worldwide (16.8 million without nonmelanoma skin cancer [NMSC]) and 9.6 million cancer deaths. The majority of cancer DALYs came from years of life lost (97%), and only 3% came from years lived with disability. The odds of developing cancer were the lowest in the low SDI quintile (1 in 7) and the highest in the high SDI quintile (1 in 2) for both sexes. In 2017, the most common incident cancers in men were NMSC (4.3 million incident cases); tracheal, bronchus, and lung (TBL) cancer (1.5 million incident cases); and prostate cancer (1.3 million incident cases). The most common causes of cancer deaths and DALYs for men were TBL cancer (1.3 million deaths and 28.4 million DALYs), liver cancer (572000 deaths and 15.2 million DALYs), and stomach cancer (542000 deaths and 12.2 million DALYs). For women in 2017, the most common incident cancers were NMSC (3.3 million incident cases), breast cancer (1.9 million incident cases), and colorectal cancer (819000 incident cases). The leading causes of cancer deaths and DALYs for women were breast cancer (601000 deaths and 17.4 million DALYs), TBL cancer (596000 deaths and 12.6 million DALYs), and colorectal cancer (414000 deaths and 8.3 million DALYs). Conclusions and Relevance: The national epidemiological profiles of cancer burden in the GBD study show large heterogeneities, which are a reflection of different exposures to risk factors, economic settings, lifestyles, and access to care and screening. The GBD study can be used by policy makers and other stakeholders to develop and improve national and local cancer control in order to achieve the global targets and improve equity in cancer care.
Confession without Borders: 1st Wave Feminism against Woman's Right Disproportion in AtiqRahimi'sThe Patience Stone TitikHariPangestu English Literature Faculty of Languages and Arts State University of Surabaya Titik_hari@ymail.com Diana Budi Darma, SS. M.Pd. English Department Faculty of Languages and Arts State University of Surabaya Dianabd9@gmail.com Abstrak Penelitianinimemfokuskanpadaketidakseimbanganatashak-hakperempuan di Afghanistan denganmenggunakantindakantokohutamadalam novel inisebagaisumberdalamtesisini. Ktidakseimbanganhakmunculsebagaiakibatdaridominasisatusisikesisi lain. Masalahpertamadalamtesisiniberbicaratentangdominasilaki-laki. Yang keduamengungkapkanpengakuanperempuansebagaicerminandarifeminismegelombangpertama. Dalammenjawabpertanyaanpertama, penelitianinididukungolehteoripatriarki, sertadidukungolehbukuNawal El – Saadawi, dimanabukuiniberfokuspadadominasilaki-laki di wilayahArab. Permasalahankeduaakandijawabdenganmenggunakanteoridarifeminism, yang mengkhususkanpada feminismgelombangpertama. Analisisiniakanmenunjukkanbahwaketidakseimbanganperempuandisebabkanolehadanyawarisan agama danbudayasecaraturuntemurundalamkomunitasini. Setelahmenggambarkandoominasikaumpria, selanjutnyatesisiniakanmenggambarkanbagaimanaperempuan di wilayahinimenghadapiketidakseimbanganini. Tesisiniakanmengemukakan,sistemPatriarki yangdinilaisebagaipenyebabmunculnyaketidakseimbangantersebut,.Ketidakseimbanganinimemberikantekananbesartercermindalampengakuanistri, yang padaakhirnyamemberinyakekuatanuntukmelawanterhadapketidakseimbanganini. Kata kunci: Patriarki ,FeminismeGelombangPertama Abstract This study focuses on depicting Afghan women's rights disproportion by using main character's act inside this novel. Right disproportion appears as a result of the domination of one sides to the other. The first problem talks about the domination of men's. The second reveal the women's confession represent first wave feminism. In answering first question, this research is supported by patriarchy theory, and supported by Nawal-El-Saadawi's book which focus on men's domination in this region. The second statement of problem will be answered by using a theory from the first wave feminism. The analysis reveals the disproportion of women right caused by hereditary thought of their religion and cultural and also how women in this region face this disproportion. Patriarchal believes is use as a cause of the disproportion. Furthermore, this disproportion which cause a huge pressure analyzing by wife's confession finally give her a power to fight back against this disproportion. Keywords: Patriarchy, First Wave Feminism INTRODUCTION Offending to women in the society, especially to traditional system, it must dribble a fact of disproportion of women within it. This fact finally grounds the responder of it, especially to whom it may concern with cultural study to talk to. Besides that, this phenomenon also creates an unforgettable experience to author to write it down in utterance of beautiful work, especially novel that brings conflicts in detail. According to Rene Wellek and Austin Warren say that literary work is the representation of the author toward social life and society (Wellek & Warren, 1949: 90). According those quotation, literary can be affected by society because the author is part of the society. His idea can come from his or her society. The author combining his experience with some fiction than use this as the main source of literary works. In other word, between literary work and society or social life is tightly related each other. By using particular literary work, a researcher can identify a social condition in a particular area. Empirically, women are seen as the weakness subject. They are only put in in the second position in this life. Their duties only focus on domestic area such as bearing a child, cook for the household, and clean the house. Functionally, in war era women are only used for king and warrior sex satisfaction. They do not have any important role struggling for the war. Women's involvement in the war seen as a problem. They are seen as the weakness creature that will cause difficulties and also seen as a stupid creature who does not understand about war strategy. So, in this era, they were only used as the object for the warrior's sexual desire. Institutionally women are consider as the womb of baby child before it is born to the world. Unfortunately after their birth, the right of their naming is totally in their father hands. For example, in Chines system of family name, the structural of their kids name is come from their father family name. From those explanation, it can be conclude that women only seen from their function rather than their role. Women do not have their own in making important decision, to give their opinions, especially deliver about their feeling. They cannot live with their own will. Their man is the center of their live. They have to fulfill what their man need. This Traditional gender role cast men as rational, strong, protective, and decisive. They cast women as emotional (irrational), weak, nurturing, and submissive (Lois Tyson, 2006: 84). Men is the leader of their women, they have total control in decide how the women behave and act. However, in fact this traditional gender role still occur in this modern era, especially in Middle East country such as Afghanistan. This country known as an Islamic country which is uses Koran as their main laws, and guidance of their live. In Koran. Islam had been stated that "Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because God has made one of them to excel the other, and because they spend from their means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient and guard in the husband's absence what God orders them to guard. It is also said that men are little bit higher than women and they are oblised to protect and save the women. Patriarchy has become an inevitable issue of the growth of Afghanistan as a Muslim country. Especially during the Taliban leadership, which began in 1996 till 2001. Taliban as a part of Arabian world has different perception in apply Islamic laws. The Taliban's version ofIslamappears too many Muslims to be a new-bornfaithdeveloped, canonized, and interpreted by Taliban scholars with the reclusive supreme leader, Mohammed Omar at the helm giving his stamp of approval for implementation. Afghan women were forced to wear theburqaat all times in public which is quite different with burqa from Arabian women. Afghan women cover all of parts their body including their face except their eyes area. Taliban see face of a woman is a source of corruption for men who are not related to them.In a systematic segregation sometimes referred to asgender apartheid, women were not allowed to work, they were not allowed to be educated after the age of eight, and until then were permitted only to study theQur'an. Women were beaten for showing a bit of ankle or wearing noisy shoes. They could not speak in public or to men who were not relatives. They were beaten, even killed, for minor violations of these rules. But all of that oppression does not make women in Afghanistan hate Taliban men. Marrying Taliban warrior seen as one of the pride in their life. It cause the Taliban warrior seen as the hero in Afghanistan. They were struggling for their freedom from the western shackles, even in fact their coming give another suffering for women in Afghanistan. Marry them can increase the assessed value and the social status of a family. They will be considered as a family of heroes who fought for his country. So, it is pride for any Afghanistan women to married a Taliban warrior even they know what kind of consequence that they will face. Finally, it sharpen to a problem about the relation of them, Islam, Taliban, Patriarchy, and women in the world, especially to the facts reflected in Atiq Rahimi's The Patience Stone. Generally, religion have a patriarchal view of the relationship between the genders. The relation between Adam and Eve how many religion view woman. As Al-Hibri writes, God was declared male, and man was declared to be created in His likeness. Eve became the symbol of temptation and sin. The woman was consequently judged as a less likely candidate for salvation and an everlasting life in heaven than man. (Al-Hibri, 1981:176). Islam inherited the old image of Eve and of women that depict them as the close followers and instrument of Satan, the body of women being his abode (Saadawi, 2001:274). So, it is important to envelop them in veils and flowing robes (Saadawi, 2001:275). As the living carrier of the danger of sexuality and its infinite social destructive forces, women have to be controlled. Since Islam regards women as an active sexual power, it is important to restrict women's sexual power over men. The result is isolating women and men in different worlds. In talking about women's oppression, feminism thought as the appropriate philosophy in investigate this phenomenon. Feminism is an awareness of women's oppression and exploitation in society. This theory is struggling to achieve dignity, rights, and freedom for women to control their lives and bodies within home and outside. According to its movement, this philosophy were divided into three waves, first wave, second and third wave. First wave is concern about equality, second wave concern about the commitment of diversity, and third wave concern in diversity in specific normative. And according to the problem which is appear in the explanation above, the first wave movement of feminism, is appropriate movement that will be used to answer this question. Originally it focus on the promotion of equal contract and property rights for women and the opposition to chattel marriage and ownership of married women (and their children) by their husbands. This movement begin with Mary Wollstonecraft's Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792). Wollstonecraft's was the first to issue an outspoken rallying cry to middle-class women, especially mothers, as major influences on society (Gamble, 2001:15). Her emphasis was on the need to make women rational, till women are more rationally educated. Furthermore, this thesis will become a great analysis when it is known that the object of this thesis, AtiqRahimi's The Patience Stone, is the winner of prestigious Goncourt Prize in France, and is a deceptively simple book written in a spare, poetic style. It is rich read, part allegory, part of tale of retribution, part an exploration of honour, love sex, marriage, and war. It is without doubt an important and courageous book. This voice is in giving voice to those who, as the fable goes, suffer the most and cry out the least (Khaled Hosseini, The Patience Stone's Preface). The Patient Stone is a France novel which is translated in English version. Set almost entirely in one room - the bedroom of the husband and just about the only character who talks is the wife. The woman open up her feeling and thought to the men in her society, confronting the taboo of female oppression and sexuality. Her voice can describe the darkness in her live, her painful and her sorrow for being as a women. Her monologue definitely drive out the reader to think as the woman side, without eliminating the other character in this novel. Besides The Patience StoneAtiqRahimi also wrote some canon novel and won some prestigious appreciation. The first novel is Earth and Ashes, written in Persian and become an instant best seller in Europe and South America. A movie based on this book, directed by Rahimi, was awarded the Prix du Regard versl'Avenir at the 2004 Cannes Film Festival. The film was featured in 50 festivals, winning a total of 25 awards including the one at Cannes and a Golden Dhow award for best feature film at the Zanzibar International Film Festival. And the others work is A thousand Rooms of Dream and Fear. Working on disproportion of women right for study is always an interesting and courageous idea. Through the confession of "Wife" character in this novel, this study can reveal that there is a rebellion and courageous, and how this character survive from the disproportion in Taliban era. Wife already thought since she was young that man is leader for woman, so she must obey him. Rather than fight back against her husband, she choose to use her silence as a form of rebellion. By using this character, it is can be seen that there is a rebellion inside of hereditary understanding regarding woman and man positioned. With discussing this topic, there is a description about what happened in this country especially about the inequality and also how far the disproportion of the women right still exist in this country. RESEARCH METHOD As has been stated in the description above, literature is a reflection of a society portray and the combination of the author fiction. Literary work is meaningful. Hence, it delivers many meanings and interpretations that can be caught by the reader as an interpreter. In other word, to find the accounted result, it needs a method that is based on the problems to avoid the blurry result. This study take novel from Atiq Rahimi The Patience Stone as the main source, and using some quotation inside it as the data. The type of this research is qualitative research because it produces descriptive data. The problem in this study is concerning about man's domination and woman's inequality treatment that will be analyzed by using patriarchy and first wave feminism from several feminists. WOMAN IN ISLAM Islam already stated that man is a leader for woman so they obliged to educate, protect and maintain the woman. God had been created man little bit more than the woman. It can be seen by the existence of their muscle. This gift, make man as the stronger one so they are seen as the appropriate one to be a leader while woman is the follower. So, woman must follow and obey their husband. According to Saadawi's book, Islam inherited the old image of Eve and of women that depict them as the close followers and instrument of Satan, the body of women being his abode (Saadawi, 2001:274). So, it is important to envelop them in veils and flowing robes (Saadawi, 2001:275). In other word, this society position woman as the guilty one dealing with their body and sexuality. That is why, woman in Islam, especially in Patriarchy country must get married, so they need man to control their temptation. Islam makes marriage as the only institution where sex between men and women can be done in a way that is more moral (Saadawi, 2001:280). Sex is done outside this institution directly transformed into an act of sin and evil, even masturbation was not permitted. Based on Ibnu Abbas' (friend of Prophet Muhammad) statement "and married a slave is better than masturbation and fornication (zina)". Therefore an unmarried men divided into three sins, first married a slave, then masturbation the foremost is fornication (zina). In other words, marriage is an established system for sex where one part uses to avoid slander (fitnah) and the other side used it as the legalization for reproduction as much as they want, and off course get good agreement to acquire pleasure within the bounds of Islam (Saadawi, 2001:281). Based on the Al-Ghazali an Arabian philosopher statement in Nawal's book, besides for reproduction, the purpose marital is immunity against demons, break the sharp tip of the desire, distance from danger of lust, keep our eye from what who supposed not to be seen, protect male sexual organ, as well as follow the advice our prophet (Saadawi, 2001:276). But this institution is still different for men and women, especially dealing with their rights and obligations not only inside in their house hold but also in their society. In their household activities, wife only concern about their domestic business. Their main job only raising their children, cleaning their house and satisfying their husband in bed. They do not allowed to care about what happened outside their area. Marriage makes men's heart free from household and clean their house, so they can concern to their job, religion and science in other word, they can concern in developing themselves. Al-Ghazali states in Saadawi's book "In fact, your wife let you to work on the final day and she concern about your house and relieve your lust" (Saadawi, 2001:284). Therefore, a man is seen not able to devote themself in science development and religion unless they have a wife that can handle their household. ARABIC SOCIETY Arabic culture is male centered. Males dominate most cultural, political and social institutions. This has a direct impact on the cultural status of women in both Arabic and Islamic countries. While Islam emphasizes the equality of men and women, Arabic culture minimizes it. A Jewish Arab in Morocco or a Christian Arab in Syria adheres to the same system and thus would have the same views on the role and status of women. The socially-rooted conceptualizations of differences in women's and men's sexualities and their biological nature are so frequently evoked to the extent that they become part and parcel of the individual and collective consciousness. In this regard, the "natural role" of women is one of the most deeply rooted interventions at the conscious and unconscious levels. Consequently, women's fulfillment of their "natural role" associated with the reproductive process becomes compulsory and coercive. In the end, this leads to women's lives becoming regulated through the sharia, constitutions, laws, and predominant social norms, in ways that far exceed what applies to men. In Arab societies, women's status is mainly defined by their roles as mothers and wives. Their main job only concern about raising children, cleaning their house and also serve their husband (Saadawi, 2001:285). Different from the husband's position as head of the family, they are taking control over their families, so that the actual duty as a husband in this culture region is to control and supervise the family and finally it position woman in second position after their husband. Women could not make decisions based on their own beliefs, and had little control over their marriages. Society create that the noble obligation for a wife to completely obedient to their husband, they cannot be different, no asking a question or refused their orders, (Saadawi, 2001:286). In other words, there is no independent decision for women. Their freedom is limited or moreover it is deleted because the ideal women in this society is a woman who can follow her husband without complaining about anything. Essentially. So, it can be conclude women were slaves to men and made no decisions on anything, whether it be something that directly impacted them or not. LOVE AND SEX IN ARABIC SOCIETY The strong influence of the cultural background of the Arab and Islamic values which strongly stuck in Arabic life makes this nation see love and sex as something taboo and full of mystery. In this region, woman take crucial part in this ritual. As the legacy from cultural background and also religion values the Arabic seen women without exception as cause of fitnah (fornication). Arab woman adorned with temptation and fitnah. Where in this sense they become part of the spirit of Islam, which force women into sexual temptation in the community who bring libel. In this case is related to a conspiracy libel, resistance, which interfere with any order that has been built by the gods. So, they are very closely related to sex and sin (Saadawi, 2001:273). Men on the other hand, though had great sex appetite, not accused of sin unless driven by temptation and seduction of women. The power of the male sex being a part of the soul of the Arabs and its soul is connected with virility (Saadawi, 2001:294). Thus, man is ordered to marry in order to defeat the evil and the woman temptation. Despite the desire of sex are owned by both parties, but in fact women in this region bear all the restraints. Man sexuality is connected with virility different with women sexuality which their sex connected with sins and devil. So, it will be ashamed if men in this region have a problem in their sexuality that is impotent and the only one who can know this, is woman. But the solution taken upon of these problem were quite surprisingly. As quoted in Saadawi's book "Virgins were not permitted to know far about sex, while a widow who already have experience from her previous marriage definitely can recognize this weakness. That is why they give "Lower" for their label" (Saadawi, 2001:295). These restraints were taken up in order to protect men from women so they cannot drop them. Women must keep their virginity by their own self. A woman who lost her virginity before marriage will be confuse and fear of family rejection both from family or society, but men who come save her will be seen as a hero and respectful (Mernissi, 1999:86). In a marriage, blood of virginity is very important. In the first night after their marriage, commonly they will use white sheet in order to see virginity blood and this blood is an evidence of chastity and honor of family (Saadawi, 2001: 295). Contrary with men who cannot be identified their virginity from their physical and the limitation of the girls knowledge about sex, it makes them do not have any burden even they already ever had sex out of the marriage. So it can be said that Arabic society were more tolerate to men in their sexuality rather than women. Beside virginity blood, the other blood which is very crucial for Arabian society is menstruation "haid". In Islam haidseen as a dirt. In an authoritative Arab dictionary named Lisa Al'-Arab menstruation mean al- khubts (Viciousness combined with cruelty), al-makr (the desire to destroy been prepared with despicable). Menstruation for women is related with their sexuality. They are seen ready for their sexuality when they already in this period. So, when they arrive in this period, in Arabian culture means that their temptation was completed. And based on Surah above women in this period time were seen as the impurity women. PATRIARCHY IN TALIBAN When the Taliban took control of Afghanistan in 1996, the status of women declined rapidly until women were completely confined to home, or only allowed to leave home with a male escort while wearing a burqa. If a woman seen outside without being covered from head to toe, even if only a little skin was exposed, she would be beaten. These rules complicated things completely for women who no longer have a living male relative, or women who are too poor to be able to purchase a burqa.The other extreme rules confining women during Taliban are, the window in homes to be painted to prevent others from viewing women from the outside, women must not laugh, talk loudly, or make any noise at all when in public. All of these rules among others made women prisoners in their own homes, unable to go anywhere or do anything without being under the watch of man. Based on the explanation above, it can be conclude that there is a disproportion of rights in this sexes. The sense of patriarchy is definitely appear in regime. Taliban imposed straight rules for women or it is also can be said they tend to jail women., limited their access, hide them from worldwide and also do whatever they want to women. According to Millet, patriarchy's chief institution is family, where patriarchal ideology well maintained traditionally and modern. As the smallest unit, family contribute in strengthening this ideology (Millet, 1970:33). Encourage every family members to think and behave in accordance with the rules of the community who embraced the patriarchy. In this institution, commonly this ideology will be It will be taught into two categorize, that is how girl's role and boy's role. They will learn character, role and status between wife and husband and also father and mother. According to Millet, patriarchal ideology socialized into three categories. First, temperament involves the formation of human personality along stereotyped line of sex category ("masculine" and feminine), based on the needs and values of the dominant group and dictated by what its members cherish an themselves and find convenient in subordinates: aggression, intelligence, force, and efficacy in the male: passivity, ignorance, docility, "virtue" and ineffectuality in the female. This is complemented by a second factor, sex role, which decrees a consonant and highly elaborate code of conduct, gesture and attitude for each sex. In terms of activity, sex role assigns domestic service and attendance upon infants to the female, the rest of human achievement interest and ambition to the male (Millet 1970:26). Patriarchal ideology is very difficult to remove from this society because they still maintain it. Stereotypes attached to women as domestic workers made him weak because they did not get money from their work to take care of the household. Domestic work is taken for granted and it was her duty as a woman. She does not need to earn money from their work and the result she always dependent on her husband. Millet stated that patriarchal ideology cannot be torn down because women are economically dependent on men. Dependence that occurs throughout life. Conventionally men are the main source of income in the family while the woman is the housekeeper. Men worked outside for their economy and women living at home to do all the housework. Women are not allowed to make money, because men make it as property when they got married (Millet, 1970: 40). In a patriarchal system, men have full power to women so that they can do whatever it wants with his wife. Women economically dependent on her husband because they did not earn his money out of pain. According to De Beauvoir, regarded as a slave wife, while the husband is her master. This can lead to the occurrence of domestic violence (Beauvoir, 1989: xv). FIRST WAVE FEMINISM Feminist theory addresses two fundamental differences in the view of women and men. Expression of male-female differences in the biological aspects of the show as the essence of natural, innate. While expression masculine feminine is psychological and cultural aspects of difference (Megawangi, 2004: 184). Si mon de Beauvoir stated that in a patriarchal society, women are placed as the "Other", as second-class human beings, lower by nature (Selden, 1985: 137). Position as the "Other" affect all forms of social and cultural existence of women (Cavallaro, 2001: 202). Patriarchal society using a certain fact about the physiology of women and men as a basis to build a series of identity and masculine and feminine behaviors are enacted to empower men on one side and women on the other weakens. Patriarchal society convince themself that the construction of culture is "natural" and therefore "normality" depends on one's ability to demonstrate gender identity and behavior. This behavior is culturally associated with one's biological sex. Patriarchal society uses rigid gender roles to ensure women remain passive (loving, obedient, responsive to sympathy and approval, cheerful, kind, friendly) and men remain active (strong, aggressive, inquisitive, ambitious, full of plans, responsible, original, and competitive) Meanwhile, according to Millet, patriarchal ideology in academia, religious institutions, and family justify and affirm the subordination of women to men who lead for most women to internalize self to men (Millet, 1970:26). One way to understand the various dimensions of feminist theories and their theoretical approaches to understand patriarchy is to locate them within the broader philosophical and political perspectives that have been broadly classified as first, second and third feminism movement. This theory were categorize in three waves according to its concern about. First wave is concern about equality, second wave concern about the commitment of diversity, and third wave concern in diversity in specific normative. However, there are some ideological differences among the feminist groups, they are united in struggle against women inequality and hierarchical relationship between women and men. To be more focused on equality of women phenomenon, the first wave of this movement thought as the appropriate approach in analyzing this issue. The first wave of feminism took place in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, emerging out of an environment of urban industrialism and liberal, social politics. The goal of this wave was to open up opportunities for women, with a focus on suffrage.The feminist in this movement assumes that there is basically no difference between men and women. Therefore, women should have the same rights as men. Nevertheless, liberal feminists reject the overall equation between men and women. In some cases remain distinction (distinction) between men and women. However, the function of the female reproductive organs logical consequences in social life (Ratna Megawangi, 1999: 228). Mary Wollstonecraft is one of the pioneer for this movement. In her book Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792) she talked about her life and personal significance as an icon of the women's movement. Wollstonecraft's was the first to issue an outspoken rallying cry to middle-classwomen, especially mothers, as major influences on society (Gamble, 2001:15). Her emphasis was on the need to make women rational. Far from portraying women as superior to men, Wollstonecraft wanted to raise their overall moral and intellectual stature to make them into more rational citizens. For the most part, she did not envisage their leaving the domesticsphere, nor did she ask for anything as radical as the vote. Even she accepted that women in middle-class would marry and remain at home, but she want every girls get same education as a purpose for their freedom and dignity rather than the ability to fascinate potential husband (Gamble, 2001:16). Not only Wollstonecraft who does not agree with this disproportion. Rosemarie Putnam Tong in her books "Feminist-Though: A More Comprehensive Introduction" imply that there is a restriction of women's activity and it cause they lack of power and knowledge so that they cannot develop themselves. DOMINATION REPRESENTED IN NOVEL The Arabian world are very thick by the influence of their culture either before or after Islam. Where both are directly or indirectly gave a special position for men rather than women. If the granting of this position was originally intended to separate human's daily task, but in fact this positioning has grown to become a leader and the led. Develop as the domination of one side to the other sides. Through this novel, this domination will be exposed as a reflection of the real condition in the country inside this novel. In this region Patriarchy ideology has been used as root for society structural in this region. This ideology still maintained in this modern era, make this ideology quite difficult to be changed or removed (Millet, 1970:40). Since their a little, boys and girl were already given an example by their parents behave, and when their already in their puberty time, they were thought how man and woman behave, and unconsciously differentiate them in two different position. As an example in this passage, 'When I got engaged, I knew nothing of men. Nothing of married life. I knew only my Parents. And what an example! All my dad cared about were his quails, his fighting quails! I often saw him kissing those quail but never my mother, nor us, his children. There were seven of us. Seven girls starved of affection (Rahimi, 2010:57). In this passage can be criticize that family is chief institution for this ideology to get developed. Family has huge contribution in strengthening this ideology. According to this passage, her family was the only example for her to understand about how is marriage life. Her father only care about his quails and never the girls and also her mother, but she never saw her mother complain about it. Made this situation seems normal and that how it was supposed to. Wife should not disturb her husband, especially complaining about what they do. Because wife's job only concern about their household and fulfill husband's satisfaction (Millet, 1970:40). Concerning about husband satisfaction, letting him do what they want to do can also meant as an effort in satisfying her husband and women is this family was supposed to be quite and submissively. In this group, women are defined as something odd, deviate from a prototype of human's body, physically passive and contain of emotional, different with man's body who have active and ably mind result a conclusion that women considered as a carrier for men's seed, so the real creator is the men (Millet, 1970:54) As what the author had been explained above, men is leader for women because God create them a little bit more than women, so they should follow their command. (Back to the passage 'Look, I breathe just like you! (Rahimi, 2008:7), and also in the passage "You know that I live only for you, at your side, by your breath" (Rahimi, 2010:9). Through those passage, women should follow their husband in every way. They led them in every case, metaphor with "breath" which can be meant that women should follow them in every way, and bow down to their rule (HR. Tirmidzi verse. 1159). Women must following the rhythm of their husband breath, walk inside their shadow, and hide behind their shoulders. It is also mean that men are take control of women's life. Mean have a charge to change the rhythm to their breath or even stop it when they want it, it is all their right, and women should follow them. No asking and complaining as can be seen in this part 'I hope you are able to think, to hear, to see…to see, and hear me…' (Rahimi, 2010: 52). This part can be used as a reflection that women in this society do not have a voice to deliver their feeling, never have a chance to be thought, and seen as the important subject. Those description can be used as the early indication about how men dominate women's life in this region especially in their marital section. Human in this region separated into two different world, women's world and men's world. As the author already said, men have their special world as a heritage from their culture and also their religion. Men in this regime do not have any straight boundaries. Start from how their outfit and also how they behave. Different with women which have to concern about what they do, and how they do it. Man created a little bit more. It can be seen with their muscle, where muscle is related with physically power, and finally spread in many aspect. In other hand, women who are created without muscle are directly related to the weakness and finally prison them in domestic job. The differences of their body led different attitude towards both. Women in this society who does not penis considered less than man is seen as the embracing one. Penis who located in outside seen as sign of autonomy and power, while women's genital are putted inside and hide (Beauvoir, 1989:18). As an example in this novel 'I was a piece of meat, into which you could stuff your dirty dick. (Rahimi, 2010:112). According to this passage penetrate woman also can be meant show their authority and power while woman only used as a bowl to put this power. According those explanation, women in this ideology were putted in inferior position which mean that they only putted in second class. Their existence indirectly eliminated in this regime. In order to keep maintain this existence patriarchy ideology woman only have one conditional, that is companied by her mahram, or husband (Beauvoir, 1989; 225). Patriarchal society provide scary threat for women who is living without men beside her. As can be seen in the page 17 in this novel, 'And you leaving him in this state? What about his children? And me? You can't, you can't, you've no right to leave us like this, without a man!' (Rahimi, 2010:17). In this passage, wife feels afraid if her husband died and let her alone. It is because she will be left alone, not only by her husband but also because of the society and her family. Hence, they should get married. Women in this ideology does not allowed to choose their husband. As can be seen in this monologue before her marriage, her mother-in-law came to her house and asked her to married her son (Rahimi, 2010:53). According this passage, women in this region do not have any right to choose their husband. Her father or family never asked about her opinion or her criteria about her ideal man, and accepted without slightest hesitation. In contrary, men can choose which one they want to get married. Married in this region also can be criticized as a transaction. They used Maharas a tool in this transaction, (Saadawi, 2001: 283) a transaction between abolishing family anxiety because of their virgin daughter and find the legality of fulfillment of lust. But if be observed further marriage can be said as announcement for their leadership, and independence for a man, different with the women. As the consequence, a virgin who agree to get married must throw their freedom and get ready of any rules that had been made by her husband. When a man had married they have a freedom in sexual intercourse that just being a story when they were teenagers. They also allowed to set up a small country named family that ultimately gave them a power. And women, unconsciously walk into a trap which restrictive their freedom as seen in this part, 'Three years! For three years I wasn't allowed to see my friend, or my family…It wasn't allowed to see my friends, or my family…it was considered proper for a young married virgin to spend time with other married women. Such rubbish! (Rahimi, 2010: 54). This passage can reflect the exile from the association in women side, different with man which does not any significance differences, or limitation of their association. Seems like marriage is also a way for them develop themselves about science and knowledge, as an example is a war. Commonly when a women marry because of arranged marriage, usually their marriage are not based on love. For woman in this ideology love is not always about feelings, but also about the commitment throughout body and soul unconditionally (Beauvoir, 1989:526). In fact love is very important for a woman, they can sacrifice anything while she did not realize that this feeling can make her suffering. Love can be illustrated as an essence of sexual oppression for women, because men can used it as cultural power to dominate women (firestone, 1972:121). As an example, when wife decided to accept her mother-in-law proposed "Who were you, really? No one knew. To all of us, you were just a title: the Hero! And like every hero, far away. Engagement to a hero was a lovely thing, for a seventeen- years-old girl. (Rahimi, 2010:54). She directly falling in love with someone that she never known before. The reason was because of he was a hero, and it was a lovely thing married with a hero. But in fact, this love unconsciously made her sacrifice her freedom, and prepare to be a slave for her husband. He use her love to satisfy her lust, to bear their child and to clean and prepare for their meal. Love beat the rational thought of women, it was realize that the bride got married without her groom presence, 'At the ceremony, you were present in the form a photo, and that wretched khanjar, which they put next to me in place of you' (Rahimi, 2010:54). In this snippet of her monologue can be interpret the importance of man in women life. Even they have to marry with a strange men, whom only known from his photograph. This stage of live can be said as the place where patriarchy is definitely felt by women. Men have huge chance in developing their self because the already have wife who will concern about the domestic job (Ghazali,IhyaUlum ad-Din, 1964:699). As reflected in this passage 'Did you think about us for even a second, when you shouldered that fucking Kalashnikov? You son of a…'.the word suppressed again. (Rahimi, 2010:14). This passage can reflect that husband only concern about his struggle toward his enemy. Totally concern about his war, without understand his family. He throw domestic responsibility to his wife, and use her natural fate as his justification. Women should run in her roles as a wife who must serve their husband, bear a child, and satisfied her husband in their bed. This ideology see everything including about women with the male point of view (Beauvoir, 1989:xx). By using men likeness or dislike, patriarchy ideology make rule and prison them under men feet. As can be seen in this passage, It was not considered proper for a young married virgin to spend time with other married women, (Rahimi, 2010:54). Based on the passage above, woman could not see her friend or more is gossiping about many thing. Gossiping is not allowed in Taliban regime, because they see it as something useful. But if it see deeper, they are not allowed to see their friend especially among marriage woman because they afraid of being betrayed. Men never directly deliver this fears, they hide it hereditary. That is why they used this banning as law in their family. They use women's fear to control their behavior. And women who hereditary not rewarded by any right against her husband, do not have any effort except silent and following their command. Beside become the follower for the men, this region also put woman as place for bearing a child. This society make that women should birth a child, because it is their natural faith, and with that you will be the perfect women. So, it will be a huge problem if woman is infertile, they will be seen as imperfect or unideal woman because she cannot fulfill her nature destiny as a mother, she face divorce threat, and get low view from her society. As can be seen in aunt character. She got divorce because she cannot bear a child, and finally get exiled by her family. Society unilaterally blame her without care with her feeling and sadness because she cannot perfect as a woman. Different in man sides. If woman have their infertile problem, man will feel ashamed if he is impotence. But through this novel, it is not a big deal for men because the society seems like protect them for their weakness. In this novel there is a big secret that had been hidden since their marriage, the secret that only known by wife and her mother in–law. Start from her mother in-law unilateral decision that she was barren, 'Your mother had decided I was barren, and kept hassling me all the time' (Rahimi, 2010:65). From this part it can be used as an identification that in this region woman is the most important part in bearing a child, without care that woman also need man so they can bear a child. They blame all in woman shoulder, and try to find a solution as an interest of a descendant. And polygamy is the able solution for this case. Polygamy is allowed by the religion and of course make man have a big smile because of this policy. As reflected in the passage 'Your mother was dying to see you to take a second wife' (Rahmi, 2010:66). Based on this monologue, her mother in-law only concern about the real function of woman as a child bearing rather than a human. However unexpected situation came up and reveal that her husband is the infertile one. 'Because that child was not yours!' She falls silent, impatient to see her man finally crack. (Rahimi, 2010:131), 'Yes my sang-e sabur, those two girls are not yours! 'She sits up. 'And do you know why? Because you were the infertile one. Not me!' (Rahimi, 2010:132). The fact is, now they have two beautiful daughters and they are their real parent. Nobody know the secret except those women. Seems like everything was fine, and they can fulfill their natural fate. But if it is seen deeper, they create this scenario in order to keep save a husband. After her mother in-law knew that hers son is the weakness son, she did something that is contrary with her religion. She sent her to a Hakim, a kind of shaman until she is going to pregnant, as reflected in this passage 'She spent a lot of cash that day, I can tell you. And then I visited the Hakim several times, until I feel pregnant. As if by magic! But you know what, that Hakim was just my aunt's pimp. He mated me with a guy they had blindfolded '(Rahimi, 2010:132). The mother-in-law was willing to do anything for saving her son from bad view of social groups even she have to turn aside from her religion. In contrary with wife's aunt, because she is the infertile one, her family never look for a solution to save her, but they directly throw her from her family and forget about her. From those example can be criticize that society give a huge tolerant for men, gave more privilege to be understanding for their weakness. Hereditary it is done by the society. Give men some privilege either it is openly such as polygamy or closely by protecting their weakness. By sacrificing women's feeling. This condition finally raised women's anxiety for her husband satisfaction. According to this passage 'Although it often seemed to me that you weren't satisfied. And then I would guilty. I told myself that it was my fault, that I didn't know how to do it right. (Rahimi, 2010:105). According to this passage, wife feels guilty because of she believe that she cannot satisfied her husband. It was her fault because she believe that it was her duty as a field for her husband. Lacking of sexual knowledge make her blame herself (Saadawi, 2001:295). But after have several sexual intercourse she realize that it was her husband weakness, 'After a year, I discovered that actually, it was all coming from you, you gave nothing. Nothing' (Rahimi, 2010:105). Now he can find her husband weakness, but because of her position as woman which is does not have any voice, make her only keep inside her mouth. In sexual intercourse, although it was done by two subjects but in fact man is taking control for any movement or position in this intercourse. It because man is a leader for woman according to the religion. State by Al-Hasan an Islamic scholar in Saadawi's book state that man does not allowed to fulfill his woman command because he will throw into hell in the judgment day (Saadawi, 2001:286).In this monologue "If I'd asked all that to you…my God! I'd have got a broken nose! And yet it's not difficult…you just have to listen to your body. But you never listened to it (Rahimi, 2010:111). A woman can't make a favor though is aimed for their satisfaction. Women only follow the men, but in the end blame themselves if the husband feel unsatisfied in this intercourse. If in their personal intercourse, women must keep silent how about their daily live. Monologue above can used as the example that women in this region are completely silent. They feel afraid because they will get a punishment because of their favor. Men are allowed to beat their wife after they do advise and forsake them from bed. But in fact, for any reason that make her husband angry, he will directly beat them. As an example in this monologue, 'He beat up my mother, my sister and me, because we hadn't kept watch over his quail' (Rahimi, 2010:60). Her father beat them without clear reason. Because of he cannot find his quail make him angry and find an impingement. It is can be seen that his father forget about several steps before beating her wife, he only see "beat" word which is mean it was legally done by any chance. From those example above women in this region had already knew that marriage is not always beautiful like what they thought. But because of they live in patriarchy circle which put men as the central part make women in this region, completely need men. It would really frighten for a woman living without a man beside her, although it was just a name. In this novel wife only live with her husband name for three years, she must deal with her husband absence as a consequence having a hero husband. But it is fine for her, because she now has a man beside her, have somebody who is believed as her guardian, give her a distance as an accusation of temptation carrier. But when the husband back in a dying state and his wife, are required to maintain him, she still afraid of her society view, especially threat of widowed. In her monologue she stated 'She stands up. 'Even injured, you've been spared suffering' (Rahimi, 2010: 21). It can interpret even her husband lay down, suffering because of the shot, he never feel suffer because all of social cruelty come to her. She is afraid if her husband died brother in-law will come and harassing her. Afraid for become a widow and get exiled from her family. In other words it can be inferred that marriage is very important for a woman in compare man. Without marriage, which also mean that there is no man beside her, woman cannot retain their existence as part of their society. Excommunicated by the negative view about woman that hereditary this society inherited either from their religion and cultural background. Without marriage they will be seen as a devil with the temptation inside it. The devil who can bring trouble for their family and society. Always seen as the imperfect creature, which full of dirt and irrational emotion. CONFESSION WITHOUT BORDERS AGAINST DISPROPORTION Essentially, gender differences are not a problem as long as this difference create discriminative for one sides. There is a significance differences of the rights between women and men in this patriarchal world. Men are placed as the central, leader, and finally named as "The self"' while women who is seen physically weakness later differentiate as "the other" (Selden, 1985:137). As can be seen in this quotation, "There were seven of us. Seven girls starved of affection" (Rahimi, 2010:57). In this quotation, this girls feel starving of affection, although they have complete family. By using Selden's quotation above, seven of them feels less of affection because they do not get a figure of a father, in other hand their father only concern about his quail, and love it more than his family. This cold attitude can be seen as a disappointed feeling because they do not have a son, a son that can be a symbol of power, and heir his leadership. In other word, he see women as the unimportant one. As a formed of this disappointed, he use a quail. A quail is better than women, at least his quail can won and be a subject that he can proud of. In this regime, women in this region is not more meaningful rather than a display, 'She is still laughing. 'That story is so true. "You men! As soon have you have guns, you forget your women." (Rahimi, 2010:57), same like the theory about "women as the other". According this quotation, women are alienate with inanimate object or this inanimate is more prestigious than a women. When she speak about it she is laughing, this laugh can be seen as an expression that she has same level with that thing. But she cannot do anything against this attitude, except smile as her laugh at her sex bad destiny. Since in childhood she always alienate with inanimate, either with quail or a gun the positioning of women as "the other" has been tough since their childhood (Nunuk, 2004:76), so that they will adapt and unconsciously get usual with this called. According this situation it also can be imply that Family played a major role in this believed (Millet, 1970:26), parents become main teacher of this situation, especially mother who is seen as the real example for her daughter. In this region, where women performed as en-soi(Being-in-itself), while men performed as pour-soi(Being-for-itself) (Tong, 1998:181) will attempt to free from men's pressure. This is how was the normal human will struggle when they were in huge pressure. 'At that time, I was only ten …no…'She thinks about it. 'Yes, ten years old. I was scared. Scared that I too would become the stakes of a bet. So, do you know what I did with the quail?' She pauses a moment. It is unclear whether this is to make her story more exciting, or because she is afraid to reveal the next part (Rahimi, 2010:59).She was afraid, a quail is a danger for her. If it was lose, she will sent to live with a man like what happened with her sister. So, she will do anything to eliminate this danger. According this passage, there is a power inside this women's silence. She eliminate the quail to keep save, hope that by killed that bird she will not be used as bet. Using theory from Sartre, when there is a subject trying to free itself from the other, there is another subject who want to enslave it (Sartre, 1956:362). When her father trying to enslave her by using her as a bet, or beat her when he lose he find a way to free from him, that is by killed his bird. Started from this step, she finds a way to still save. And when she had enough to marry, she choose it as a solution for her to free from his father, but in fact after she got married, her husband enslave her. He put her as place to fulfill his sexual and also rearing a child. In other word it can be conclude that marriage is not a place to get a freedom, it is a form of slavery (Beauvoir, 1989:500). It is ultimately wrong if this society put women as the weak and fool creature only by using the weakness of their body. Because of they do not have a muscle and penis which always as a form of power because it penetrate women, does not mean that they are fool (Beauvoir, 1989:41). It is not enough use their body as the reason to put them as the inferior one. In those quotation we can see how women ability in order to protect themselves and the people she loves. She was lying, but it is work. She did keep her husband alive from the other shoot which directly kill him. She use her brain, her ability, her experience, and also the society norm to fight back. So it can be conclude that woman is not the other because of their lack of penis, but because of their lack of power,( Beauvoir, 1989:55), or it is also can be said that they were not allowed to get this power. In other word, if women put in same position with men, they would develop the same character (Wollstonecraft, 1975:23). But because of this society hereditary thought that women is lower than men, makes them deny their ability, which finally force them to keep silence, and killed their self-development. From this confession, she hide the fact, she did not want people to know about this, because she would be seen as a demon. So she kept silence, keep hide her power but indirectly she still use it to save her. But unconsciously she confess to her husband while he was lying powerless. Make her afraid if her husband hear it and finally beat her without understanding what will happened to her if this quail still alive. So it can conclude, because of this society treatment, who only blame women and hereditary this sex with the foulness of Eve (Saadawi, 2001: 278), they must hide it. Even use these weapons are not because they want to fight against their husband, but they use it in order to keep them save. Psychology and biological differences in the most contribute aspect in this disproportion. Men with their sperm give a life for the wife with their egg inside (Beauvoir, 1974:24), so it can be conclude that women is place while men is the real creature. CONCLUSION Live in patriarchy circle, make this women cannot do anything they want. As had been explain by the Beauvoir, women in this circle putted as passive, and submissive. Because of they are the weakness they need the superiority one to keep them as a part of this society. In other word, they need marriage to keep save inside this circle. In this region marriage can be seen as turning point that bestows prestige, recognition, and societal approval on both partners, particularly the bride. It also can be said as a social and economic contract between two families. But in other hand, marriage in this region is a new beginning of slavery that will happened to women. They have to sacrifice their freedom and concern about their household, but for men side marriage is a declaration for their leadership. And finally make them can be more focus in their self-development. Marriage is a form of slavery in all aspect related to women's body and sexuality including blood inside them. This research reveal the importance of virginity blood that is so important for women as its used as a proved that they can keep their dignity, and it is also make them as the ideal women that deserve to be married, contrary with menstruation blood which drop them in the lowest point as a women. It is happened because this society see menstruation blood as a dirt according by their holly book in verse 2:222. This research also reveal the differences treatment between a virgin and a widow. By using Saadawi's statement, based on the knowledge, this society limited virgin knowledge about sexuality, and widow is putted in bottom position as seen as the embracing one. This effort is taken as a way to protect men from their virility problem. So, it can be conclude that this society is more tolerant to men rather than to women. The Second statement of problem is the confession of women voiced by wife character in this novel. She reveal the real condition caused by the pressure that the society gave to her sex. Inside this confession, she deliver the disproportion that she gave in order to save her husband. As had been explained by Putnam Tong, this confession explicitly imply that she was created inside a men (en-soi), hide inside their body and shadow while men was created for their own self (pour-soi). This society believed that it was a natural faith that women must sacrifice themselves, and also follow what the leader had been said. But even it was already thought as their norm since their childhood, by using her confession this research reveal that they do not accept it totally. By using her husband dying body confess all her depress and her disappointed to her world. According her monologue, there are senses of hatred, insult, and harassment that happened to this woman, that make her angry and hate them. But because of the society will gave worse punishment to the women who against her husband who also seen as the rebellion, she only keep silence, but inside this silence she struggling by using her innocence, sexual and temptation . But this struggling is more to protect herself rather than fight back to her husband. Finally this confession make her realize what happened to her, how her society was being unfair to her. The accumulation of these unfair treatment make finally fight back and finally kill her husband by a Khanjar. REFERENCES Abrams, Meyer. H. 1971. The Mirror and The Lamp: Romantic Theory and The Critical Tradition. London: Oxford University Press. Rahimi, Atiq. 2010. The Patient Stone. London: Chatto&Windus.New Burke, Edmund. 1999. The social History of the Modern Middle East. Colorado:Westview Press. Millet, Kate. 1970. Sexual Politics, New York: Doubleday. Beauvoir, De. 1989. The Second Sex. New York: Vintage Books Shulamith, Firestone. 1972. The dialectic of sex, the case for feminist revolution. USA: William Morrow and company Inc. Gamble, Sarah. 2006. The Routlege Companion to Feminism and Post Feminism. New York. Routlege. Saadawi, El-Nawal. 2001. PerempuanDalamBudayaPatriarki. Yogyakarta: PustakaBelajar Mernissi, Fatima. 1999. PemberontakanWanita: PeranIntelektualKaumWanitaDalamSejarah Muslim. Yogyakarta: Mizan. Gorsky, Susan Robinov. 1992. Feminity to Feminism: Women and Literature in the Nineteenth Century, New York: Twayne Publisher. Tong, Putnam. 1998. Feminist Thought: A more Comprehensive Introduction. Colorado: Westview Press. Sumbulah, Umi. 2008. Spektrum Gender, KilasanInsklusi Gender di PerguruanTinggi. Malang: UIN. ARTICLE SOURCE MARRIAGE IN THE ARAB WORLD by Hoda Rashad, Magued Osman, and FarzanehRoudi-Fahimi INTERNET SOURCES www.mtholyoke.edu/-macne. www.Astyariah.com/godaan-dunia-dan-wanita.html.
Importance Cancer and other noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) are now widely recognized as a threat to global development. The latest United Nations high-level meeting on NCDs reaffirmed this observation and also highlighted the slow progress in meeting the 2011 Political Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases and the third Sustainable Development Goal. Lack of situational analyses, priority setting, and budgeting have been identified as major obstacles in achieving these goals. All of these have in common that they require information on the local cancer epidemiology. The Global Burden of Disease (GBD) study is uniquely poised to provide these crucial data. Objective To describe cancer burden for 29 cancer groups in 195 countries from 1990 through 2017 to provide data needed for cancer control planning. Evidence Review We used the GBD study estimation methods to describe cancer incidence, mortality, years lived with disability, years of life lost, and disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs). Results are presented at the national level as well as by Socio-demographic Index (SDI), a composite indicator of income, educational attainment, and total fertility rate. We also analyzed the influence of the epidemiological vs the demographic transition on cancer incidence. Findings In 2017, there were 24.5 million incident cancer cases worldwide (16.8 million without nonmelanoma skin cancer [NMSC]) and 9.6 million cancer deaths. The majority of cancer DALYs came from years of life lost (97%), and only 3% came from years lived with disability. The odds of developing cancer were the lowest in the low SDI quintile (1 in 7) and the highest in the high SDI quintile (1 in 2) for both sexes. In 2017, the most common incident cancers in men were NMSC (4.3 million incident cases); tracheal, bronchus, and lung (TBL) cancer (1.5 million incident cases); and prostate cancer (1.3 million incident cases). The most common causes of cancer deaths and DALYs for men were TBL cancer (1.3 million deaths and 28.4 million DALYs), liver cancer (572 000 deaths and 15.2 million DALYs), and stomach cancer (542 000 deaths and 12.2 million DALYs). For women in 2017, the most common incident cancers were NMSC (3.3 million incident cases), breast cancer (1.9 million incident cases), and colorectal cancer (819 000 incident cases). The leading causes of cancer deaths and DALYs for women were breast cancer (601 000 deaths and 17.4 million DALYs), TBL cancer (596 000 deaths and 12.6 million DALYs), and colorectal cancer (414 000 deaths and 8.3 million DALYs). Conclusions and Relevance The national epidemiological profiles of cancer burden in the GBD study show large heterogeneities, which are a reflection of different exposures to risk factors, economic settings, lifestyles, and access to care and screening. The GBD study can be used by policy makers and other stakeholders to develop and improve national and local cancer control in order to achieve the global targets and improve equity in cancer
BACKGROUND:Achieving universal health coverage (UHC) involves all people receiving the health services they need, of high quality, without experiencing financial hardship. Making progress towards UHC is a policy priority for both countries and global institutions, as highlighted by the agenda of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and WHO's Thirteenth General Programme of Work (GPW13). Measuring effective coverage at the health-system level is important for understanding whether health services are aligned with countries' health profiles and are of sufficient quality to produce health gains for populations of all ages. METHODS:Based on the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study (GBD) 2019, we assessed UHC effective coverage for 204 countries and territories from 1990 to 2019. Drawing from a measurement framework developed through WHO's GPW13 consultation, we mapped 23 effective coverage indicators to a matrix representing health service types (eg, promotion, prevention, and treatment) and five population-age groups spanning from reproductive and newborn to older adults (≥65 years). Effective coverage indicators were based on intervention coverage or outcome-based measures such as mortality-to-incidence ratios to approximate access to quality care; outcome-based measures were transformed to values on a scale of 0-100 based on the 2·5th and 97·5th percentile of location-year values. We constructed the UHC effective coverage index by weighting each effective coverage indicator relative to its associated potential health gains, as measured by disability-adjusted life-years for each location-year and population-age group. For three tests of validity (content, known-groups, and convergent), UHC effective coverage index performance was generally better than that of other UHC service coverage indices from WHO (ie, the current metric for SDG indicator 3.8.1 on UHC service coverage), the World Bank, and GBD 2017. We quantified frontiers of UHC effective coverage performance on the basis of pooled health spending per capita, representing UHC effective coverage index levels achieved in 2019 relative to country-level government health spending, prepaid private expenditures, and development assistance for health. To assess current trajectories towards the GPW13 UHC billion target-1 billion more people benefiting from UHC by 2023-we estimated additional population equivalents with UHC effective coverage from 2018 to 2023. FINDINGS:Globally, performance on the UHC effective coverage index improved from 45·8 (95% uncertainty interval 44·2-47·5) in 1990 to 60·3 (58·7-61·9) in 2019, yet country-level UHC effective coverage in 2019 still spanned from 95 or higher in Japan and Iceland to lower than 25 in Somalia and the Central African Republic. Since 2010, sub-Saharan Africa showed accelerated gains on the UHC effective coverage index (at an average increase of 2·6% [1·9-3·3] per year up to 2019); by contrast, most other GBD super-regions had slowed rates of progress in 2010-2019 relative to 1990-2010. Many countries showed lagging performance on effective coverage indicators for non-communicable diseases relative to those for communicable diseases and maternal and child health, despite non-communicable diseases accounting for a greater proportion of potential health gains in 2019, suggesting that many health systems are not keeping pace with the rising non-communicable disease burden and associated population health needs. In 2019, the UHC effective coverage index was associated with pooled health spending per capita (r=0·79), although countries across the development spectrum had much lower UHC effective coverage than is potentially achievable relative to their health spending. Under maximum efficiency of translating health spending into UHC effective coverage performance, countries would need to reach $1398 pooled health spending per capita (US$ adjusted for purchasing power parity) in order to achieve 80 on the UHC effective coverage index. From 2018 to 2023, an estimated 388·9 million (358·6-421·3) more population equivalents would have UHC effective coverage, falling well short of the GPW13 target of 1 billion more people benefiting from UHC during this time. Current projections point to an estimated 3·1 billion (3·0-3·2) population equivalents still lacking UHC effective coverage in 2023, with nearly a third (968·1 million [903·5-1040·3]) residing in south Asia. INTERPRETATION:The present study demonstrates the utility of measuring effective coverage and its role in supporting improved health outcomes for all people-the ultimate goal of UHC and its achievement. Global ambitions to accelerate progress on UHC service coverage are increasingly unlikely unless concerted action on non-communicable diseases occurs and countries can better translate health spending into improved performance. Focusing on effective coverage and accounting for the world's evolving health needs lays the groundwork for better understanding how close-or how far-all populations are in benefiting from UHC. FUNDING:Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.
Publisher's version (útgefin grein) ; Background Achieving universal health coverage (UHC) involves all people receiving the health services they need, of high quality, without experiencing financial hardship. Making progress towards UHC is a policy priority for both countries and global institutions, as highlighted by the agenda of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and WHO's Thirteenth General Programme of Work (GPW13). Measuring effective coverage at the health-system level is important for understanding whether health services are aligned with countries' health profiles and are of sufficient quality to produce health gains for populations of all ages. Methods Based on the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study (GBD) 2019, we assessed UHC effective coverage for 204 countries and territories from 1990 to 2019. Drawing from a measurement framework developed through WHO's GPW13 consultation, we mapped 23 effective coverage indicators to a matrix representing health service types (eg, promotion, prevention, and treatment) and five population-age groups spanning from reproductive and newborn to older adults (>= 65 years). Effective coverage indicators were based on intervention coverage or outcome-based measures such as mortality-to-incidence ratios to approximate access to quality care; outcome-based measures were transformed to values on a scale of 0-100 based on the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile of location-year values. We constructed the UHC effective coverage index by weighting each effective coverage indicator relative to its associated potential health gains, as measured by disability-adjusted life-years for each location-year and population-age group. For three tests of validity (content, known-groups, and convergent), UHC effective coverage index performance was generally better than that of other UHC service coverage indices from WHO (ie, the current metric for SDG indicator 3.8.1 on UHC service coverage), the World Bank, and GBD 2017. We quantified frontiers of UHC effective coverage performance on the basis of pooled health spending per capita, representing UHC effective coverage index levels achieved in 2019 relative to country-level government health spending, prepaid private expenditures, and development assistance for health. To assess current trajectories towards the GPW13 UHC billion target-1 billion more people benefiting from UHC by 2023-we estimated additional population equivalents with UHC effective coverage from 2018 to 2023. Findings Globally, performance on the UHC effective coverage index improved from 45.8 (95% uncertainty interval 44.2-47.5) in 1990 to 60.3 (58.7-61.9) in 2019, yet country-level UHC effective coverage in 2019 still spanned from 95 or higher in Japan and Iceland to lower than 25 in Somalia and the Central African Republic. Since 2010, sub-Saharan Africa showed accelerated gains on the UHC effective coverage index (at an average increase of 2.6% [1.9-3.3] per year up to 2019); by contrast, most other GBD super-regions had slowed rates of progress in 2010-2019 relative to 1990-2010. Many countries showed lagging performance on effective coverage indicators for non-communicable diseases relative to those for communicable diseases and maternal and child health, despite non-communicable diseases accounting for a greater proportion of potential health gains in 2019, suggesting that many health systems are not keeping pace with the rising non-communicable disease burden and associated population health needs. In 2019, the UHC effective coverage index was associated with pooled health spending per capita (r=0.79), although countries across the development spectrum had much lower UHC effective coverage than is potentially achievable relative to their health spending. Under maximum efficiency of translating health spending into UHC effective coverage performance, countries would need to reach $1398 pooled health spending per capita (US$ adjusted for purchasing power parity) in order to achieve 80 on the UHC effective coverage index. From 2018 to 2023, an estimated 388.9 million (358.6-421.3) more population equivalents would have UHC effective coverage, falling well short of the GPW13 target of 1 billion more people benefiting from UHC during this time. Current projections point to an estimated 3.1 billion (3.0-3.2) population equivalents still lacking UHC effective coverage in 2023, with nearly a third (968.1 million [903.5-1040.3]) residing in south Asia. Interpretation The present study demonstrates the utility of measuring effective coverage and its role in supporting improved health outcomes for all people-the ultimate goal of UHC and its achievement. Global ambitions to accelerate progress on UHC service coverage are increasingly unlikely unless concerted action on non-communicable diseases occurs and countries can better translate health spending into improved performance. Focusing on effective coverage and accounting for the world's evolving health needs lays the groundwork for better understanding how close-or how far-all populations are in benefiting from UHC. ; Lucas Guimaraes Abreu acknowledges support from Coordenacao de Aperfeicoamento de Pessoal de Nivel Superior -Brasil (Capes) -Finance Code 001, Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientifico e Tecnologico (CNPq) and Fundacao de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado de Minas Gerais (FAPEMIG). Olatunji O Adetokunboh acknowledges South African Department of Science & Innovation, and National Research Foundation. Anurag Agrawal acknowledges support from the Wellcome Trust DBT India Alliance Senior Fellowship IA/CPHS/14/1/501489. Rufus Olusola Akinyemi acknowledges Grant U01HG010273 from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) as part of the H3Africa Consortium. Rufus Olusola Akinyemi is further supported by the FLAIR fellowship funded by the UK Royal Society and the African Academy of Sciences. Syed Mohamed Aljunid acknowledges the Department of Health Policy and Management, Faculty of Public Health, Kuwait University and International Centre for Casemix and Clinical Coding, Faculty of Medicine, National University of Malaysia for the approval and support to participate in this research project. Marcel Ausloos, Claudiu Herteliu, and Adrian Pana acknowledge partial support by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research and Innovation, CNDSUEFISCDI, project number PN-III-P4-ID-PCCF-2016-0084. Till Winfried Barnighausen acknowledges support from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation through the Alexander von Humboldt Professor award, funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. Juan J Carrero was supported by the Swedish Research Council (2019-01059). Felix Carvalho acknowledges UID/MULTI/04378/2019 and UID/QUI/50006/2019 support with funding from FCT/MCTES through national funds. Vera Marisa Costa acknowledges support from grant (SFRH/BHD/110001/2015), received by Portuguese national funds through Fundacao para a Ciencia e a Tecnologia (FCT), IP, under the Norma TransitA3ria DL57/2016/CP1334/CT0006. Jan-Walter De Neve acknowledges support from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. Kebede Deribe acknowledges support by Wellcome Trust grant number 201900/Z/16/Z as part of his International Intermediate Fellowship. Claudiu Herteliu acknowledges partial support by a grant co-funded by European Fund for Regional Development through Operational Program for Competitiveness, Project ID P_40_382. Praveen Hoogar acknowledges the Centre for Bio Cultural Studies (CBiCS), Manipal Academy of Higher Education(MAHE), Manipal and Centre for Holistic Development and Research (CHDR), Kalghatgi. Bing-Fang Hwang acknowledges support from China Medical University (CMU108-MF-95), Taichung, Taiwan. Mihajlo Jakovljevic acknowledges the Serbian part of this GBD contribution was co-funded through the Grant OI175014 of the Ministry of Education Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia. Aruna M Kamath acknowledges funding from the National Institutes of Health T32 grant (T32GM086270). Srinivasa Vittal Katikireddi acknowledges funding from the Medical Research Council (MC_UU_12017/13 & MC_UU_12017/15), Scottish Government Chief Scientist Office (SPHSU13 & SPHSU15) and an NRS Senior Clinical Fellowship (SCAF/15/02). Yun Jin Kim acknowledges support from the Research Management Centre, Xiamen University Malaysia (XMUMRF/2018-C2/ITCM/0001). Kewal Krishan acknowledges support from the DST PURSE grant and UGC Center of Advanced Study (CAS II) awarded to the Department of Anthropology, Panjab University, Chandigarh, India. Manasi Kumar acknowledges support from K43 TW010716 Fogarty International Center/NIMH. Ben Lacey acknowledges support from the NIHR Oxford Biomedical Research Centre and the BHF Centre of Research Excellence, Oxford. Ivan Landires is a member of the Sistema Nacional de InvestigaciA3n (SNI), which is supported by the Secretaria Nacional de Ciencia Tecnologia e Innovacion (SENACYT), Panama. Jeffrey V Lazarus acknowledges support by a Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities Miguel Servet grant (Instituto de Salud Carlos III/ESF, European Union [CP18/00074]). Peter T N Memiah acknowledges CODESRIA; HISTP. Subas Neupane acknowledges partial support from the Competitive State Research Financing of the Expert Responsibility area of Tampere University Hospital. Shuhei Nomura acknowledges support from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology of Japan (18K10082). Alberto Ortiz acknowledges support by ISCIII PI19/00815, DTS18/00032, ISCIII-RETIC REDinREN RD016/0009 Fondos FEDER, FRIAT, Comunidad de Madrid B2017/BMD-3686 CIFRA2-CM. These funding sources had no role in the writing of the manuscript or the decision to submit it for publication. George C Patton acknowledges support from a National Health & Medical Research Council Fellowship. Marina Pinheiro acknowledges support from FCT for funding through program DL 57/2016 -Norma transitA3ria. Alberto Raggi, David Sattin, and Silvia Schiavolin acknowledge support by a grant from the Italian Ministry of Health (Ricerca Corrente, Fondazione Istituto Neurologico C Besta, Linea 4 -Outcome Research: dagli Indicatori alle Raccomandazioni Cliniche). Daniel Cury Ribeiro acknowledges support from the Sir Charles Hercus Health Research Fellowship -Health Research Council of New Zealand (18/111). Perminder S Sachdev acknowledges funding from the NHMRC Australia. Abdallah M Samy acknowledges support from a fellowship from the Egyptian Fulbright Mission Program. Milena M Santric-Milicevic acknowledges support from the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia (Contract No. 175087). Rodrigo Sarmiento-Suarez acknowledges institutional support from University of Applied and Environmental Sciences in Bogota, Colombia, and Carlos III Institute of Health in Madrid, Spain. Maria Ines Schmidt acknowledges grants from the Foundation for the Support of Research of the State of Rio Grande do Sul (IATS and PrInt) and the Brazilian Ministry of Health. Sheikh Mohammed Shariful Islam acknowledges a fellowship from the National Heart Foundation of Australia and Deakin University. Aziz Sheikh acknowledges support from Health Data Research UK. Kenji Shibuya acknowledges Japan Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. Joan B Soriano acknowledges support by Centro de Investigacion en Red de Enfermedades Respiratorias (CIBERES), Instituto de Salud Carlos III (ISCIII), Madrid, Spain. Rafael Tabares-Seisdedos acknowledges partial support from grant PI17/00719 from ISCIII-FEDER. Santosh Kumar Tadakamadla acknowledges support from the National Health and Medical Research Council Early Career Fellowship, Australia. Marcello Tonelli acknowledges the David Freeze Chair in Health Services Research at the University of Calgary, AB, Canada. ; "Peer Reviewed"
