Suchergebnisse

Programa de Doctorado en Ciencias Sociales ; Línea de Investigación: Cambio Social y Políticas Públicas ; Clave Programa: DSO ; Código Línea: 55 ; La participación de las mujeres en la historia social y laboral ha sido tradicionalmente obviada y silenciada. La mención específica a las mujeres en la literatura académica en materia de relaciones laborales ha sido vicaria, principalmente a través de sus esposos, padres o hermanos, en términos generales y salvo excepciones, como actores secundarios. Esta falta de agencia atribuida social e históricamente hacia las mujeres se mantiene aún hoy. En el movimiento del sindical en España son muy escasas las mujeres visibles en posiciones de poder. Este hecho genera consecuencias negativas para el bienestar de las mujeres y sus derechos laborales, al no estar suficientemente representadas en los espacios de negociación colectiva. Así, es previsible que la situación de precariedad de las mujeres en el mercado laboral no mejore si no se dan unas condiciones más igualitarias en cuanto a la presencia y la toma de decisiones a nivel sindical. El objetivo principal de esta tesis es la visibilización, puesta en valor y el análisis de la participación de las mujeres en el mundo sindical, así como la recuperación y reivindicación del papel desarrollado por las mujeres en el movimiento obrero desde el tardofranquismo hasta la actualidad. El ámbito territorial en el que se desarrolla la investigación es el Marco de Jerez. Su representatividad, desde el punto de vista histórico y geográfico, de las dinámicas sociales, económicas y políticas ocurridas en el contexto nacional, hacen que el análisis del sindicalismo en el Marco de Jerez haya sido objeto de estudio previo en cuanto al movimiento sindical, por su industria bodeguera y producción industrial, así como su densa red de estructuras sindicales autónomas desde el periodo de clandestinidad en los años sesenta (Foweraker, 1991). Las referencias teóricas que sustentan el análisis de esta investigación doctoral se basan fundamentalmente en cuatro enfoques conceptuales que, tomados en conjunto, contribuyen a explicar la desigualdad de las mujeres en la sociedad y las organizaciones en general, y en el sindicalismo en particular. Se toma como autora preeminente a Joan Acker y el concepto de regímenes de desigualdad (Acker 2006b; Healy, Tatli, Ipek et al., 2018). Otros conceptos también perfilan el análisis teórico: la intereseccionalidad como teoría e instrumento mismo de análisis iniciado por Creenshaw (Davis, 2008; Nash 2008; Hebson y Holgate, 2009), el concepto masculinidad hegemónica de Raewyn Connell (1995), y la perspectiva Gramsciana y las identidades subalternas como sujetos de cambio político (Green, 2002; Danielli, 2006). Se examinan en esta tesis, en especial, las formas de participación, los repertorios de protesta, así como las diferencias fundamentales percibidas en cuanto al activismo de hombres y mujeres, los obstáculos a los que se han enfrentado y siguen enfrentando las mujeres para la integración plena en las organizaciones sindicales. Este análisis se ha llevado a cabo a través de una metodología cualitativa, haciendo uso del método biográfico, de las narrativas de mujeres sindicalistas de diverso espectro ideológico y pertenecientes a diferentes organizaciones sindicales en distintos momentos históricos: el Tardofranquismo, la Transición y la época actual, tanto en sectores profesionales feminizados como masculinizados. Durante el periodo estudiado, las mujeres han tenido protagonismo y un papel activo, tanto desde la perspectiva de las esposas de sindicalistas amas de casa implicadas en la militancia de sus maridos durante el tardofranquismo y la transición, como de sindicalistas trabajadoras en el mercado laboral visible y remunerado actual. A pesar de tener la misma motivación para la acción social y la militancia sindical que los hombres, los impedimentos básicos a la participación de las mujeres en el sindicalismo, siguen estando relacionados con el modelo masculino hegemónico como patrón universal de acceso al poder y toma de decisiones, tanto en el ámbito laboral como el sindical, espejo multiplicador de las desigualdades del mercado de trabajo. Las organizaciones sindicales, a pesar de los avances en materia de género y los cambios políticos, jurídicos y sociales, siguen respondiendo a la división sexual del trabajo, donde los fenómenos de infravaloración, infrarrepresentación, y de segregación horizontal y vertical, siguen siendo la dinámica general. Estas dinámicas están asociadas a necesidad imperiosa de conciliación por parte de las mujeres (que no de los hombres) de la vida laboral, sindical y familiar, donde los modelos de masculinidad imperantes desincentivan en términos generales, la participación de las mujeres. ; Women participation in social and labor history has traditionally been neglected and silenced. Specific mentions in labor relations academic literature has usually been vicar, mainly present through their husbands, fathers or bothers. In general terms and except for some rare occasions, as secondary actors. This social and historical attribution of lack of agency in women has been maintained until today. There are very few visible women in power positions in Trade Unions in Spain today. This fact produces negative consequences for women welfare and their labor rights, due to the insufficient representation in collective bargaining ambits. Thus, it is predictable that precarious labor market situation for women will not improve, unless equality conditions related to the presence and decision making in Trade Unions ameliorate The primary objective of this thesis is to make visible, emphasize and analyze the participation of women in Trade Unions, as well as to recover and vindicate the role played by women in workers¿ movement. The time frame of this research is from the late Francoism until now, and the geographical frame corresponds to the Sherry Area, in the South of Spain, in the province of Cádiz. The representativeness of this territory in labor movement has already been studied, as it responds to the national dynamics in terms of social, economic and political processes. At the same time, there are wide nets of autonomous unionism structures in the wine industry and the different productive and services sectors, since the decade of the sixties (Foweraker, 1991). The foundations of the theoretical frame that sustain this doctoral research are four conceptual approaches which contribute to explain, from diverse and complementary perspectives, the inequality of women in society and organizations in general, and particularly in Trade Unions. Joan Acker is taken as preeminent author and her conception of inequality regimes (Acker 2006b; Healy, Tatli, Ipek et al., 2018). Other approaches also shape the theoretical analysis: intersectionality as a theory and instrument itself, initiated by Creenshaw (Davis, 2008; Nash 2008; Hebson and Holgate, 2009); Raewyn Connell¿s concept of hegemonic masculinity, and finally the Gramscian approach and subaltern identities as subjects of political change. (Green, 2002; Danielli, 2006). This thesis specially examines the forms of participation, the protest repertories and the fundamental perceived differences regarding women and men activism. It also pays attention to the obstacles women had and have to face to fully integrate in labor organizations. This analysis has been developed with a qualitative methodology, using the ethnographic method and the narratives of women belonging to diverse ideological spectrum in different historic periods: the late Francoism, the Transition period and the present time, both in masculinized and feminized sectors. During these periods, women have had an active role and were main actors in the struggles, considering two separate perspectives: as wives of men unionists, involved in the militancy during late Francoism, and as women unionist workers in the visible and wage labor market. In spite of their motivation for social action and union activism being equal to that of men, the essential obstacles for women participation are still linked with the hegemonic masculine model as universal pattern to access to power and decision-making spaces. The Trade Union ambit is a multiplying mirror of labor market inequalities. Trade Unions still respond to a sexual division of work, where the phenomena of undervaluation, underrepresentation and horizontal and vertical segregation are general dynamics, in spite of social, political and legal changes in gender issues. These dynamics are associated to the imperative need for women (and not men) of balancing work, family and union life, where masculinity prevailing models discourage women participation. ; Universidad Pablo de Olavide de Sevilla. Departamento de Sociología ; Postprint

The Government of Jordan, the World Bank Group (WBG), and the international community are working towards a paradigm shift in their collective response to the refugee crisis - a holistic approach which stresses the continuum between the humanitarian response and the country's development agenda. In parallel, Jordan's implicit social contract by which the state provided citizens with jobs and heavily subsidized public services is evolving. strategic engagement, the WBG will adopt a two-pronged approach aimed at simultaneously addressing Jordan's immediate needs in view of the fluid and worsening regional situation while keeping a medium and long-term development commitment built on reforming the economy to create the right environment for inclusive, job-creating growth. The first pillar of the Country Partnership Framework (CPF) aims to foster the conditions for stronger private-sector-led growth and better employment opportunities for all.The second pillar of the CPF aims to improve the quality and equity of service delivery, including through private sector solutions.The CPF will implement the new Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Strategy at the country level.The CPF aligns with the Government's vision Jordan 2025, the Executive Development Plan 2016-2018 (EDP), and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).The CPF's principles of engagement will be selectivity, flexibility, adaptability and partnership. The outlook for 2016 forecasts growth at three percent on account of a growing mining and quarrying sector, some energy investments, and base effect of the tourism and construction sectors, although some downside risks have begun to materialize in early 2016.

The subject of this study – The Youth in Croatia and the European Integration – is the relationship of youth toward the European integration process, including the Croatian accession to the European Union, as well as their sociopolitical readiness for integration into a united Europe. The analysis is based on a section of data gathered in early 2004, on the entire Croatian territory, and conducted within the scientific and research project Youth and the European Integration Process. The basic sample of youth, aged 15 to 29, consisted of 2000 examinees, and the control sample of persons older than 30 consisted of 1000 examinees. The obtained findings on youth have been systematically compared to results from the previous research project, The Value System of Youth and Social Changes in Croatia, conducted in early 1999, on an identically structured sample of 1700 young examinees. Data on Croatian youth has also been compared to the corresponding findings of several European researches. European integration is a dynamic and multidimensional process, and in this research, the accent was on the political and normative dimensions of integration. The genesis of the political development of European Union has indicated that, in spite of the oscillations in the process of integration, there is a recognizable progress toward the construction of a Europe of values, where all the included countries meet with equally high democratic demands. The existing research into the European integration process has undoubtedly shown that the relationship of citizens toward the EU varies as a function of time, and depends on the specific situation in certain countries or societies. Croatia is a transitional country that has stepped into the process of democratic consolidation, and after the year 2000, it had also stepped out of a certain kind of international isolation. Today, Croatia is a country trying to join the united Europe, which has managed to obtain the status of a candidate country for accession into the EU, albeit with an uncertain date for accession negotiations. Even though the main obstacle for the start of negotiations is supposedly the lack of satisfaction of the EU with the Croatian cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, the existing tendencies and events in the country indicate that Croatia is not adequately prepared to join the Union: not at the political, nor the social, and especially not at the economic plain. The indicated findings are also the starting points in the research of the relationship of Croatian youth toward the European integration process. A valid analysis of this relationship demands a previous insight into some aspects of the political readiness of youth for European integration of Croatia. With that in mind, special attention was dedicated to political values, attitudes and participation of youth, whose longitudinal monitoring enables a detection of changes that took place during the past five years. The data comparison showed that during the observed period of time, the young people' s otherwise relatively high acceptance of almost all the constitutional values, as well as the harmonious perception of politics and institutional trust have increased, while the lack of hard work, discipline and responsibility are now perceived as a social problem to a greater extent than before. The recent data also indicates that today' s youth perceive the existence of educational, gender and age inequalities in the Croatian society to a larger degree, as well as the worsening of political representation of all marginal groups. On the other hand, the understanding of conflicts and democratic rules (especially the role of the opposition) has weakened, the perception of crime in ownership conversion and privatization as a problem has decreased, there is also a weaker perception of the existence of social and religious inequalities, the social activism and political participation have decreased, and the attitude about inclusion into youth organizations of political parties and the establishment of independent youth parties as forms of activities that might contribute to a more active participation of youth in the society has decreased. From hence comes the conclusion that certain changes tend to lead to further social, most of all political, (self)passivization and marginalization of young people. The continuity of tendencies established in the previous research projects, confirm the finding that the young are not a monolithic group when it comes to acceptance of political values, expression of political attitudes and the level of political participation. The greatest differentiation is present regarding the not so present tolerance toward most observed social phenomena and groups, the perception of unemployment as the most important social problem and the cause of existing difficulties, the perception of existence of political inequalities and the stated interest in politics, as well as the perception of the role of the " diaspora" in the Croatian political life. When these results are observed integrally, it is obvious that the young are mostly differentiated by the level of obtained knowledge and their socio-professional status, then party identification, social origin and the phase of maturity. All the mentioned differentiations of youth can simply be summarized by outlining two large, relatively polarized groups: one consists of socially more competent youth, inclined to the ideological and political options of the left center, and the other consists of a socially inferior youth, inclined toward the right pole of the ideological-political spectrum. The socially more competent youth is more liberal, more critical toward the social reality and the political actors, they manifest a greater respect for democratic institutions and procedures, which is an indicator of the importance of favorable circumstances in the process of political socialization. The recent data enabled us to establish the existence of inter-generational differences, which are not enormous but are significant. The comparative analysis of the attitudes of both the young and the older examinees, demonstrated that the young state a higher degree of trust in the media than the older examinees, that they are more tolerant toward a number of social phenomena and groups, which cause dispute both in the Croatian and the European public opinion arena, as well as more sensitive regarding ethnic inequalities. The young perceive war as the main cause of current difficulties to a greater extent than the elders, they have considerably more trust in their own generation as a social force that could initiate positive trends, they express a greater readiness for inclusion in different civil society activities, and believe more that television and youth organizations could mobilize them into active participation in social affairs. At the same time, the young are slower than the older examinees to accept the value of a democratic order, however, they are also less prone to have a harmonious understanding of politics, they are less socially sensitive, they express less trust in the institutions of power, the socioeconomic goals and the preservation of tradition are less often among their political priorities, they less often think immorality and criminal activities in the privatization process are the cause of current problems, they perceive a smaller level of corruption in all areas of social life (aside from education), they believe less in the positive contribution of experts and entrepreneurs to overcoming the trends of crisis, they are less interested in politics and participate less in political parties, and they have a smaller level of faith in the mobilization role of education for democracy, volunteer work, political parties and non-governmental organizations, as well as the contribution of the family and education system in the stimulation of the young people' s social engagement. The established inter-generational differentiation can be explained through the life cycle theory, meaning the mentioned differences are mostly the effect of differing social statuses and the complete experiences of the young and the older examinees. That means that most young people have not assumed some of the permanent social roles, and that their immediate experiences are limited only to some social areas among which politics do not have a prominent place. The existing inter-generational differences are also the result of the fact that most older examinees draw on their experience gained in a different social and political regime, which to a certain measure forms their existing system of political values that is, in certain elements, especially those related to the social dimension, different than the youth' s system of political values. On the other hand, the congruence of the young and older examinees is contributed to by a common experience of an era, that is, life in a specific socio-historic period. The absence of deep inter-generational ambiguities also indicates that, in spite of the radical changes that have appeared through the decomposition of the old and the set-up of a new social and political order, the mechanism for transposing political values from the older generations to the young ones, functions to a considerable degree, along with the transfer of the shortcomings that exist in the structured political awareness of the older generation. Even though it was established that the youth in Croatia accept the traditional values to a smaller degree compared to the elders, the young are at the same time somewhat more conservative in certain areas than their European counterparts. Pointing to this finding is the greater orientation of the Croatian youth toward the family and a smaller extent of tolerance of certain phenomena and groups in the contemporary society. At that, the social participation of the Croatian young generation is at a lower level than the participation of their European peers. The attitude toward human rights is also one of the indicators of political preparedness of Croatian youth for integration into a democratic Europe, which promotes high standards in the protection of human rights and freedoms. The research results about the evaluation of individual human rights and freedoms, show that the youth accept the right to an education, the right to work and personal security, the right to privacy, the social protection of the elderly and those in other precarious situations, the equality before the law, the rights of women and the right to ownership the most. The analysis has shown that the preference of individual human rights and freedoms is not caused by the observed socio-demographic and socio-structural characteristics of the young, aside from education, which points to the significance of the education system as an agent of improvement of the state of human rights. Approximately a third of the young examinees were not satisfied with the respect for human rights in Croatia today nor were they satisfied five years ago, the percentage of the undecided has decreased in that period of time, and the number of those that think human rights in Croatia are mostly or completely respected has increased. The results of the analysis of social attributes of youth indicate that the ability of assessment and a higher degree of criticism toward the status of human rights in Croatia is related to life in economically more prosperous regions, a left ideological-political orientation as well as the female gender. The comparison of the evaluation of the contribution of institutions, organizations and significant individuals in the population of youth in 1999 and in 2004, established that the generation of youth today perceives a higher level of contribution of all observed participants (except for the opposition) to the protection of human rights and freedoms in Croatia. More precisely, most of the young assess that all the participants, completely or mostly, contribute to the realization of human rights in Croatia, which especially refers to the perception of the contribution of the highest institutions of power. The perception of the status of human rights in Croatia and the contribution of the observed actors to the realization of those rights, are considerably highly influenced by regional affiliation and party identification, followed by their social background, their gender and the religious self-identification of the young. The comparison of acceptance of the observed human rights and freedoms of the populations of young and older examinees in Croatia, indicates that the elders accept most individual human rights and freedoms more than the young, and that they also express less criticism toward today' s respect for those rights and freedoms in Croatia, while validating the contribution of all the observed actors to a higher degree. To summarize, the analysis has shown that the young accept human rights and freedoms very highly at the level of principle, but that there is a certain disagreement when it comes to concrete rights and practices in Croatia. Even though the degree of acceptance of the value of human rights and freedoms is high among the young, there are also deviations indicating an increased need for additional engagement of certain agents of socialization, especially the education system and the political actors. The national affiliation of youth is another indicator relevant to its relationship toward the European integration. The research has shown that the attitude most represented with the youth is one of moderate national identification, then the ones signifying an openness toward the world, while ethno-centric statements are at the back of the obtained hierarchy. The attitude that had demonstrated the highest representation of national identification is for the first time at the top of the rank in all our research projects, just as it is evident that nationally tinted attitudes, both moderate and extreme, are more represented now than in 1986 or in 1999. Such an increase of the national affiliation of the young can be interpreted by the fact that there is more emphasis on existential problems and that there is a higher uncertainty regarding the future, then the increase of differences between the rich and the poor, as well as a smaller degree of trust in the political leadership. The immediate confrontation with this type of social instability, results in a search for safer modes of relationships with other people, the society as a whole and some of its parts, where the nation represents one of the safe havens, much like family and church. However, it is necessary to emphasize that the attitudes of openness toward the world are quite stabile, and that they are often complementary instead of being opposite to attitudes of national identification. At the same time, this points to the complexity of the problem of national affiliation and the fact that it does not have to be exclusive, but can actually coexist with attitudes that enhance the process of European association. Regarding their national affiliation the young are, of course, not homogenous. The results of the analysis have shown that the nationally oriented youth is significantly more religious than the others, they prefer the conservative parties, live in Dalmatia, Central and Eastern Croatia, they originate more often from rural areas and families, where the father has a lower degree of education, they personally have a lower level of education and, within the youth sample, they belong to the youngest age cohort (age 15 to 19), and the groups of pupils and the unemployed. On the other hand, a significantly lower national affiliation is expressed by youth coming from the Istrian, Zagreb and Northern Croatia provenience, those indecisive about religion or atheists, youth of urban background and a higher family and personal education status. However, regarding cosmopolitism, the young demonstrate significantly more homogenous results. It is especially indicative that the more ethno-centric examinees and, to a smaller degree, those with a pronounced national identification, more often have a negative perception of the European Union, while the nationally more exclusive examinees refuse to even support the accession of Croatia into the European Union. The examination of the social (ethnic) distance toward certain nations has demonstrated that the young have put members of the former Yugoslav federation and Russians at the back of the scale, while, with an under-average evaluation, the center of the scale is occupied by members of certain Central and Eastern European nations (the Czech and the Hungarian). Inhabitants of the European Western and Southwestern territories, especially the Italians, which occupy the first position after form the Croats, and the Germans, demonstrate satisfactory results just by being evaluated by average grades. However, the degree of social closeness that the young citizens of Croatia feel toward other Croatian men and women, indicates a certain dose of self-criticism, because approximately one third of the young do not feel an especially high level of affinity toward, for the most part, their own nationals. The older examinees differ from the young in that they more pronouncedly represent attitudes at the center of the national affiliation scale, as well as indicate a higher ethnical distance on average. However, the fact is that, in spite of the existence of inter-generational differences when it comes to national affiliation where the older examinees dominate, there are also inter-generational differences that indicate a better position of the youngest examinees in our sample (aged 15 to 19). This phenomenon has already been described in literature by the so-called U-curve, which vividly illustrates a higher national affiliation of individuals at their earlier and later periods of life. Thus, the greater national affiliation, on the one hand, seems to appear as an expression of an adolescent transitional crisis, and on the other, as a consequence of a long-term perseverance of the perception and production of (most probably) negative experiences with a specific out-group. The relationship of the examinees toward the European integration and the European Union has been investigated via numerous indicators, where the emphasis was on the perception of the possible consequences of Croatian accession to the EU. However, other aspects of the relationship toward Europe and the EU have been the object of research, presenting a wider context for understanding the perception of consequences of joining the Union. The obtained results demonstrated that most of the young and of the older examinees in Croatia actually had a neutral image of the EU, even though those with a positive image exceed those that perceive the EU negatively. Actually, nine tenths of the examinees have in the beginning of 2004, supported the Croatian integration into the Union, but among those examinees, there is a highest number of euro-skeptics, that is, those that believe that too much is expected from the accession. At the same time, there were considerably less euro-enthusiasts (those that expect all-around benefits from the integration) and euro-realists (who believe that integration is inevitable for the survival of small countries). As for the difficulties standing in the way of the Croatian road to a united Europe, the examinees had equally addressed them to both Croatia and the European Union, however, the number of young emphasizing the accountability of the EU has increased from 1999 to 2004, and the number of those accenting Croatia' s responsibility has, in the same period of time, decreased. The finding that the young expect significantly more positive than negative consequences after the Croatian accession into the European Union, is especially important. However, in this regard, there has been a mild decrease in the expectation of the positive, and an increase of the negative consequences among the young during the last five years. The highest positive expectations have been registered at the individual and the socio-cultural planes, while the optimism regarding the socio-economic progress has decreased. Indeed, the lack of socio-economic preparedness of Croatia for the entrance into the developed European surrounding is expected to yield the most negative consequences. The research of the expected development of the EU in the coming ten years, has shown that only the possibility of easier travel, work, study and life in Europe is expected by most of the examinees, especially the young ones. The young are quite fearful of the costs Croatia might have from the integration and of the worsening position of the agricultural population. The negative conesquences expecting their own country are, however, less perceived by the youth in Croatia, than by their counterparts in Europe. Related to the fears from the construction of a united Europe and European Union, we have established that the youth in Croatia is most afraid of the abolition of the Croatian currency and the increase of crime, and its smallest fear has to do with the potential loss of social privileges. The fears of examinees in the enlarged Europe are somewhat different – the most expressed fear is that of labor transfer into other countries, the increase of crime and drug trade, the difficulties expecting the farmers and the price their country has to pay due to the development of the EU. Both the young and the old examinees in Croatia are less worried about the loss of national identity, language and their social privileges than the European examinees. All our examinees emphasize the multiple benefits of the EU enlargement, followed by the positive effects of that enlargement for Croatia, while the efforts of the Croatian government, regarding the accession to the Union, are valued quite poorly. The potential accession of Croatia into the European Union shall also signify a change in the decision-making process, meaning that some of those decisions will be reached at the national level, and some jointly with the EU. Our examinees have, in this regard, demonstrated a high level of readiness for integration, because more than half of them believes that four fifths of the observed areas should be the object of joint decision-making by the EU and Croatia. The only areas in which, in the opinion of the young examinees, Croatia should decide autonomously are the acceptance of refugees, the judiciary, culture, agriculture, fisheries and the police. The Europeans differ in their opinions on these issues from the Croats, and believe two thirds of the observed affairs should be decided on jointly by their country and the EU, while their country should be autonomous in deciding about education, basic rules about the media, health and social care and unemployment. Different social groups have, based on the perception of youth, been grouped into potential losers of the integration (farmers, the retired, workers, the unemployed), potential winners of the integration process (such as the inhabitants of the capital and certain regions, the young, as well as the Croatian population as a whole), and certain winners of the process of integration, which are also the best prepared for Croatian accession into the EU (experts, foreign language speakers, the political elite, managers, large companies). Actually, it was shown that the young consider the social groups which are in a relatively better position in the Croatian society today to be the greatest winners of EU integration, and those whose current status is unenviable, who are in the greatest need of a better future, were perceived as those that will potentially gain the least. The only encouraging fact is that the young are seeing themselves as the potential winners, meaning they believe the existing abilities and potentials of the young generation only need optimal circumstances in order to reach their peak. However, the data about the knowledge of foreign languages in Croatia are not very exhilarating, especially compared to the knowledge of foreign languages of the youth in the European Union countries. Within this research, we have also found that approximately three quarters of our examinees are proud of being Croatian citizens, while around half of the young, and somewhat less of the elders are proud to be European. The young are the ones to be more critical toward their national identity, and at the same time they lead in the positive validation of their European identity. However, the most interesting finding concerns the fact that all the Croatian examinees feel less national pride than the inhabitants of the European Union, while it is understandable that the examinees in the EU emphasize their pride of being European more. The answers of the examinees regarding the question about the contents of the concept " being a citizen of the European Union" indicate that neither the young, nor the older examinees posses a coherent understanding of the EU citizenship. Still, the right to work, live and study in any EU member, represents the key element for the understanding of EU citizenship, both with the young people in Croatia and with the youth in the Union. The young and the older Croatian examinees believe that active suffrage is the least important, regardless of whether the elections in question include the European Parliament, the national or the local representative bodies. Only one out of four Croatian examinees believes the Croatian membership in the EU might benefit them personally, while almost half of all the young and a third of the older examinees do not posses a defined opinion on this issue. It is clear that this feeling is closely related to the question of the personal meaning the European Union holds for the examinees, where neither the young nor the elders have a homogenous perception of the meaning of the EU. A single response appeared in an above-average number of cases – the EU is a way of creating a better future for the young – while the claim that the EU signifies a sort of " European government" , superimposed to the national states which are members of the Union, received a small level of support. Unlike that, the young from the Union countries emphasize the freedom of movement most often, while in time, the very concept of " European government" became more pronounced in the attitudes of the European youth. The young people in Croatia, as well as in the EU, express an equally small level of fear of the euro-bureaucracy, the loss of cultural diversity and the utopian idea of Europe. Considering the readiness of the young to live outside of Croatian borders, we have found that almost two fifths of them would like to live (and work and study) abroad for a while, while a quarter of the Croatian youth would like to leave the country forever. The older examinees, on the other hand, demonstrate a higher level of conservativeness toward the possible departure of their children into one of the countries of the Union, but they are, however, ready to accept their possible studying and training in the EU, while only one out of seven examinees would like his/her children to permanently live or spend their entire working life in one of the countries, which are members of the European Union. The analysis of the differentiation of the young in their relationship toward the European integration and the EU, has indicated that the used social characteristics have a limited influence. In other words, the young are relatively homogenous in their perception of a united Europe and the expectations from the Croatian accession to the European Union. However, certain differences do exist, and they are mostly caused by party identification, socio-professional status, regional affiliation and religious self-identification. This means that the most influential attributes, when it comes to attitudes toward the European integration process, are the ones consisting of ideological-political attitudes and the current social status along with the specifics of the wider environment. Thus, we have found that the sympathizers of parties that belong to the left center, then pupils and students, the inhabitants of the more developed regions and the non-religious examinees are more inclined toward the EU and the integration process, and at that, they emphasize the positive consequences and the potential gains from the Croatian accession into the Union, more than they express their concerns with the negative consequences. Hence, the concise conclusion would be that the greater social competence of the young is reflected in the establishment of a stable and more consistent pro-European orientation. Otherwise, the young differ from their older counterparts in their higher expectance of positive effects from the Croatian integration into the EU and, at the same time, in the lower perception of expected problems and undesirable consequences. Considering information sources and the level of information of the young in Croatia, the results show that the young follow the news in all the media outlets relatively often, but that they do lag behind the older examinees, and the examinees coming from the former EU candidate countries. This finding does not apply only to the use of the Internet as a source of information, where the young people are far superior to the older examinees. With that in mind, it is interesting that the young differ the most among each other, in the use of Internet and the reading of daily newspapers, where the socially more qualified young examinees (the more educated, coming from an urban environment and richer regions and averagely older ones) are the ones that use both media for obtaining information more often. As for the contents the examinees look for in the media, it is visible that the young are much more interested in events from the social and cultural life, and much less in issues related to politics. A comparison with the examinees from 13 countries that were EU candidates, demonstrated that they are far more interested in all the contents (aside from sports) than the Croatian examinees. Regarding the assessment of their own level of information about the EU, somewhat more than half of the young have stated that they are well informed about the European Union and events in it, compared to two thirds of the older examinees believing they are well informed. On the other hand, the results of both the young and the older examinees are surprisingly high, compared to the data on the level of information of the inhabitants in the 25 countries of the European Union, where three quarters of the examinees thought they were poorly informed about the issue. Closely related to the question of the level of information about the European Union itself, is the question about the general level of information about the Croatian accession to that association. The results demonstrate a somewhat different trend than the previous finding. In this case, less than half of the young consider themselves to be well informed about the process. It is interesting that the identically gathered data on this issue, from the former EU candidate countries, yielded a much lower evaluation by the examinees on their own level of information. Regarding issues and problems related to the EU that the examinees would like more information on, we have established that both the youth in Croatia and the examinees from the former EU candidate countries, find issues related to the Union' s policy on youth and education to be the most interesting, followed by the economy and social policy. Along with that, the issues regarding the enlargement of the EU, the cultural policy, the international relations, the regional policy and the EU budget are the ones the young find to be the least interesting. The manner in which the examinees gather information on the European Union mostly include the mass media outlets (the press, the television and the radio), and only then other forms of information gathering, such as discussions with their families and friends, surfing the Internet, specialized books and other published material, and the activities of non-governmental organizations. There are no significant differences in the use of the stated sources of information between the young and the older examinees, except in the case of the Internet. Considering the examinees from the 25 EU member countries, they use all of the observed sources as a way of getting information about the European Union, its policies and institutions, in a smaller amount. The examination of the objective knowledge of the examinees on specific issues related to the European Union has yielded devastating results. Thus, when asked about the phase Croatia was in, regarding the accession process into the EU, at the moment the research was being conducted, the correct answer was given by only a third of both the young and the older examinees. The second question asked, dealt with the familiarity of certain institutions of the European Union. The young and the older examinees do not differ very much from each other regarding their knowledge of this issue: the most familiar institution to both of them is the European Parliament, followed by the European Commission, then the EU Council of Ministers, then the European Central Bank, while all the other institutions were familiar to less than two fifths of the Croatian examinees. The examined citizens of the European Union are, understandably, more familiar with each of the observed institutions. The social attributes of the young, causing the greatest differences regarding their level of information, are mostly the ones connected to their level of socio-cultural qualifications (the socio-professional status and the level of education), followed by gender, and then provenience, regional affiliation and the age of the examinees. The highest level of information and knowledge belongs to men from the oldest age cohort of youth, those born and living in large cities, the inhabitants of the most developed regions, students and the employed examinees, as well as those with a higher education degree, the non-religious and examinees preferring liberal and left-wing parties. Along with all that, it is important to stress that a better level of knowledge and information about the European Union, its policies, institutions and enlargement process, correlates to positive attitudes about the different aspects of the European Union (the image of the EU, the following of issues related to it, the support for the Croatian accession to the Union, and so on), which, most probably, means that they are mutually determined. The inter-generational comparison has, on the other hand, indicated that the older examinees are more interested in most issues appearing in the media, especially politics, and that they assess their level of information to be better than do the young examinees. To put it shortly, the results of the research on the information level and knowledge of the Croatian citizens – both young and old – about the European Union, have indicated that they are not that interested in the European Union issues, as much as their level of presence in the media and the political agenda might imply, and the examinee' s knowledge about the relationship of Croatia and the EU is at an even lower level. Henceforth, it is necessary to conduct a strong and comprehensive public campaign directed precisely at the increase of the level of information and knowledge of the citizens about the European Union and what it represents, so that when the issue comes to the agenda, the Croatian inhabitants might make an educated decision about their country' s accession to that community of European states. The research results presented above may be summarized into a number of tendencies and statements of a wider nature. The political culture of the young testifies, in a number of aspects, to an approximation to the desirable democratic standards – especially regarding the acceptance of basic liberal-democratic values and the readiness for social engagement, at lease in principle – however, their social power and social capital are at a low level. At that, the young are aware of their own social and political marginalization, and recognize an entire plethora of measures that might help them gain a certain measure of power and become active citizens, as is desirable in a democratic society, but they do not use sufficiently the channels of social and political promotion, which are at their disposal. Today' s generation of youth expresses a lower level of social sensitivity and is more oriented toward individual efforts and family resources in the realization of life goals. At that, it seems that the young are not aware of the fact that an unequal access to existing social resources of the young generation today will have generated an unequal social status when they come of age. Hence, we can expect a widening and deepening of the process of social decomposition, that should be corrected through mechanisms that are supposed to ensure the highest possible equality of chances in the access to social resources (most of all, education). What we mean to say is that human capital is what Croatia, as a small and an insufficiently developed country, should deal with very thoughtfully. This, at the same time, signifies a maximum of investment into the development of human potentials, where the young generation certainly comes first. The inter-generational differences regarding the readiness of Croatia for accession into the European Union, and the relationship toward the European integration, are not of such a type and scale that there could be any mention of a generational gap, however, they are indicative. The most visible fact is that the young have demonstrated a more liberal, tolerant and flexible disposition, that they have a higher belief in the potentials of their own generation, and that they are consistent in their pro-European orientation, where they see their own generation as one of the certain winners of the Croatian accession into a united Europe. These trends suggest that the potentials of the young are a resource to be seriously reckoned with on the Croatian road into the EU. The process of the Croatian accession into the European Union is linked to different difficulties that affect the attitudes of citizens about the importance of Croatian entrance into the EU. Through this research, we have clearly detected that, unlike the Croatian political elite, both the young and the older citizens do not consider the Croatian integration into EU, to be the most important political goal. The political priorities of the citizens seem to be quite different, and their support to the project of European integration is weakening. It is, then, realistic to expect this trend to continue if the problematic events in the European Union persist, just as the difficulties in the relationship of Croatia and the EU, as well as the unfavorable economic and social trends in Croatia itself. This is why there are two equally important political tasks facing the ruling political elite: the initiation of the development of Croatia and an well-argumented explanation to the Croatian citizens why the country' s integration in the united Europe is purposeful.

Since the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s and through the Global Financial Crisis of the last decade, commendable progress has been made by the member states of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in improving economic and human development outcomes both within each country and across countries. Since 1997, the economies of the poorest countries in the ASEAN, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam, have generally grown faster than the richer economies, which has reduced gaps in per capita incomes. Overall, child mortality rates have been cut by two-thirds across the ASEAN. And significant reductions have occurred even in some of the poorer member countries such as Cambodia and Lao PDR. However, this report The ASEAN Equitable Development Monitor (henceforth referred to as The Monitor), also shows that much remains to be done to ensure that the poorest members of the ASEAN community, within countries and across countries, are not left behind as the countries of the ASEAN integrate further. In both policies and development outcomes, differences across the countries of the ASEAN remain large. In this context, the monitor is designed to facilitate further discussion on policies and programs that can promote inclusive growth within ASEAN member countries and across the ASEAN community. It presents a number of indicators that are intended to provide a summary of development outcomes across and within the ten ASEAN countries and over time. On this basis, the monitor is intended to help policymakers in ASEAN member states to identify areas of concerns and prioritize national and regional interventions. The monitor tracks indicators across two broad sets of development outcomes and policies: (i) economic development; and (ii) human development.

Inclusive growth (IG) analysis involves analyzing the available data in a country to determine the best course of action for accelerating growth and or improving the distribution of the opportunities and benefits from the growth process. In economies in which international migration is a significant trend, that determination may be especially challenging. The international migration phenomenon can contribute to (or detract from) growth and its distribution through myriad number of complex and sometimes divergent channels, and these effects can change substantially over time. The ability to analyze these impacts, however, is often significantly handicapped by a lack of appropriate data. Moreover, because the migration decision is inherently a private decision made by households in the best interest of their welfare, determining the policy conclusions based on the results of inclusive growth analysis is often unclear. Governments are rightfully wary of interfering with the migration process. This paper examines the issue of international migration in inclusive growth. The aim is to provide the practitioners of inclusive growth diagnostics a useful framework for assessing the nature of the international migration phenomenon, and to highlight the key tools utilized in evaluating its current and potential impact on shared growth.

Author's introductionAlthough criminologists have long dominated the field of school violence research, there has been a growing body of research by cultural sociologists in this area as well. In many ways, a cultural approach to understanding school violence has taken school violence beyond the realm of just criminal and physical acts of violence. These scholars have begun to examine verbal, emotional, sexual, and racial expressions violence, as well as violence that is perpetuated by institutions, what Bourdieu has called symbolic violence. Courses that take this perspective explore how cultural concepts, or what Swidler calls a 'cultural toolkit', can be used as a lens for analyzing the experiences and practices of school violence. This can include, for example, an examination of how the dominant American ideology of meritocracy and competition can foster fights between middle school students, or how a feminine identity might push girls to be relationally aggressive towards each other rather than physically aggressive. In this regard, cultural sociology broadens our understanding of what constitutes school violence to uncover a wide spectrum of behaviors, attitudes and beliefs that may indeed lead to more overt expressions of violence. In doing so, a cultural approach can also help educators rethink discipline policies that have been created to resolve this social problem.Author recommendsSwidler, Ann 1986. 'Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.'American Sociological Review51: 273–86.Swidler's concept of a cultural toolkit provides a strong foundation for any cultural sociology course. Swidler defines a cultural toolkit as the symbols, stories, rituals, beliefs, ideologies and practices of daily life through which people use to shape their behavior. This paper presents a broad understanding of culture, which Swidler argues is not a unified system, but rather a set of complex and changing concepts from which we select different pieces from in order to construct different strategies of actions. When considering cultural approaches to school violence, it is useful to consider this broad definition of culture.Henry, Stuart 2000. 'What is School Violence? An Integrated Definition.'Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science567: 16–30.Henry provides a definition of school violence that transcends physical violence and interpersonal violence between students to include psychological, emotional, ethical and moral violence that occurs not only between students, but also includes harm committed by teachers and organizations against students. This latter form of harm can include tracking, school security, sexual harassment, or essentially anything that hinders the creativity, learning and academic success of a student. Henry argues that school violence must include symbolic violence, which he defines as the use of authority, power, and coercion to dominate an individual or group of people.Ferguson, Ann Arnett 2000. Bad Boys: Public Schools in the Making of Black Masculinity. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Ferguson builds on Bourdieu's concept of symbolic violence and Foucault's theory of disciplinary power to examine an intervention program for 'at‐risk' students, which was comprised of mainly 5th and 6th grade African‐American males. Her ethnography provides a great example of the benefit of using a cultural approach to studying violence, discipline and punishment in schools. For example, Ferguson argues that fighting among boys should be seen as a symbolic expression of masculinity and a space for boys to do emotional work, as well as a site for the production of power and a form of resistance to authority. Her work also explores how teachers and administrators can enact a form of symbolic violence onto students. She observed how the cultural behaviors of African‐American boys, for example, their use of Black English, was often translated by the teachers as 'problem behavior' and resulted in their label of 'Troublemaker'. Such labels often condemned the boys to the bottom rung of the social order and negatively impacted their academic success.Spina, Stephanie Urso, ed. 2000. Smoke and Mirrors: The Hidden Context of Violence in Schools and Society. New York, NY: Rowan and Littlefield.This edited collection examines school violence as a complicated and multi‐faceted phenomenon, exploring how political, economic, ideological and discursive practices contribute to school violence. This interdisciplinary book includes chapters from Donna Gaines, Henry Giroux, Peter McLaren, Stanley Aronowitz, and Paulo Freire and Donald Macedo. The authors expand the definition of violence by arguing that youth violence, adult violence and societal violence are all intricately connected, and therefore prevention of school violence would requires educators to move beyond reform that only takes place in the school system. Instead, violence prevention needs to implore a broader strategy for change that includes schools, families, communities, and beyond.Brown, Lyn Mikel 2003. Girlfighting: Betrayal and Rejection among Girls. New York, NY: New York University Press.Mikel Brown conducted qualitative interviews with more than 400 girls from first grade through high school who were from different economic, racial and geographic backgrounds. She begins the book by analyzing the cultural messages that girls receive in the media; messages and images that she argues provide girls with a context for fighting among their peers. She draws on Paulo Freire's notion of horizontal violence to look at how girls' meanness to other girls is a result of their struggle to make sense of gender‐saturated images of beauty and heterosexuality that often reinforce their subordinate status in the world. Girlfighting then becomes an avenue to power for young girls in a culture that is rife with sexism. Unlike many other recent books on relational aggression among girls, Mikel Brown interrogates the complicated intersections of race, ethnicity, and class as it relates to girlfighting.Casella, Ronnie 2001. 'Being Down': Challenging Violence in Urban Schools. New York, NY: Teachers College Press.Casella's ethnography of Brandon High School, a small city school in a diverse neighborhood in upstate New York, takes a cultural‐ecological approach to school violence, capturing systemic, interpersonal and hidden forms of violence. He provides a thoughtful critique of intervention strategies that have been created to deal with school violence, such as peer mediation programs, the use of police officers in the hallways, and D.A.R.E. programs, because these programs only address individual acts of violence and do not account for the realities of urban environments, prejudice, economic injustice and poverty that underlie and contribute to school violence.Merten, Don E. 1994. 'The Cultural Context of Aggression: The Transition to Junior High School.'Anthropology and Education Quarterly25(1): 29–43.Don Merten has published several articles that provide a useful framework for examining aggressive behavior from a cultural standpoint. The data from this article come from a larger ethnographic project of predominantly middle class students in a suburban area who recently transitioned from elementary to junior high school. Merten argues that middle class culture promotes and celebrates individualism, success and hierarchy, which in turn creates a culture that promotes aggressive behavior among students, because students learn that meanness can be an easy avenue for gaining power and status in the hierarchy of cliques in schools.Morris, Edward 2005. '"Tuck in that Shirt!" Race, Class, Gender and Discipline in an Urban School.'Sociological Perspectives48(1): 25–48.Morris draws on Bourdieu's classic reproduction theory to look at the relationship between cultural capital and bodily discipline as it relates specifically to clothing styles and manners. This article is based on an ethnographic study of an urban middle school in Texas that recently enlisted a 'Standard Mode of Dress' uniform policy. The regulation of dress became a constant source of conflict between the students and staff at the school, but had the most punitive effect on poor and racially ethnic minority students, whose cultural styles tended to be negatively stereotyped by the teachers. These students were more likely to punished for violating the policy, even though all social class and racial groups, to some degree, violated the policy. This harsher punishment engendered resistance and alienation among the minority students, which Morris argues had the potential of pushing these students away from school, further reproducing the very inequalities that the school was trying to change.Online materials http://nces.ed.gov/programs/crimeindicators/crimeindicators2008/ The National Center for Education Statistics puts out an annual report on indicators of School Crime and Safety. The indicators in this report are based on information drawn from a variety of data sources, including national surveys of students, teachers, and principals. The report covers not just overt forms of school violence, such as bringing a weapon to school, fighting, and teacher injuries, but also covers bullying, victimization, student perceptions of school safety, and availability and use of drugs and alcohol. http://www.cdc.gov/HealthyYouth/yrbs/index.htm The Youth Risk Behavioral Surveillance System is a school‐based survey conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The survey is conducted every 2 years and provides a representative sample of 9th through 12th graders in public and private schools in the United States. The YRBSS asks a wide variety of questions, but most relevant to school violence include self‐reported responses about behaviors that might lead to unintentional injuries and violence, such as carrying a weapon to school, being threatened by a weapon or being in a fight on school grounds. These data serve a useful comparison between student self‐reporting of violent behavior and school reporting of incidents of school violence. http://www.sshs.samhsa.gov/default.aspx The Safe Schools/Healthy Students website is a federal initiative by the U.S. Departments of Education, Justice, and Health and Human Services. It provides many useful resources, including links federal reports on school safety, a list of related websites, and video podcast discussions of school violence that can be used in the classroom. http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2001/uslgbt/toc.htm 'Hatred in the Hallways: Violence and Discrimination against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Students in U.S. Schools' is a report conducted by the Human Rights Watch. Data consists of interviews with 140 students, ages 12–21, and 130 parents, teachers, administrators and counselors across seven states, in every region of the U.S. The findings discuss a broad spectrum of violent behavior, including verbal harassment, homophobia, and physical violence. It can be useful for classroom discussion because each finding section of the report includes a 'case study' of one of the participants with direct quotes from their interview. http://www.aauw.org/research/hostile.cfm 'Hostile Hallways: Bullying, Teasing and Sexual Harassment in School' is a national report conducted by American Association of University Women on 8th to 11th grade students. The study found that 8 in 10 students experienced some form of harassment during their time in school. Both the executive summary and entire report are available to download on the website.Sample syllabusCourse outline and selected reading assignmentsSection 1: Introduction to cultural sociologyDefining CultureSwidler, Ann 1986. 'Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.'American Sociological Review 51: 273–86.Jepperson, Ronald and Ann Swidler 1994. 'What Properties of Culture Should We Measure?'Poetics 22: 359–71.Cultural Capital and Symbolic ViolenceBourdieu, Pierre and Jean‐Claude Passeron 1977. Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture. London: Sage.Lareau, Annette, and Elliott B. Weininger 2003. 'Cultural Capital in Educational Research: A Critical Assessment.'Theory and Society 32: 567–606.Reproduction TheoryMacLeod, Jay 1987. Ain't No Makin' It: Aspirations and Attainment in a Low Income Neighborhood. Oxford: Westview Press. Read Chapter 2, 'Social Reproduction in Theoretical Perspective.' Pp. 11–24 and Chapter 8, 'Reproduction Theory Reconsidered,' pp. 135–54.Cultural PedagogyGiroux, Henry 2000. 'Representations of Violence, Popular Culture and Demonization of Youth.' Pp. 93–105 in Smoke and Mirrors: The Hidden Context of Violence in Schools and Society. Edited by Stephanie Urso Spina. New York, NY: Rowan and Littlefield.Section 2: Broadening the definition of school violenceHenry, Stuart 2000. 'What is School Violence? An Integrated Definition.' Annals of the American Academy of Political and social Science 567: 16–30.Watkinson, Ailsa 1997. 'Administrative Complicity and Systemic Violence in Education.' Pp. 3–24 in Systemic Violence in Education: Promise Broken. Edited by Juanita Ross Epp and Ailsa M. Watkinson. Albany, NY: State University of NY Press.Urso Spina, Stephanie 2000. 'Violence in Schools: Expanding the Dialogue.' Pp. 1–40 in Smoke and Mirrors: The Hidden Context of Violence in Schools and Society. New York, NY: Rowan and LittlefieldCasella, Ronnie 2001. 'What is Violent about School Violence? The Nature of Violence in a City School.' Pp. 15–46 in Preventing Violence in Schools: A Challenge to American Democracy. Edited by Joan Burstyn. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.Elliott, Delbert S., Beatrix Hamburg, and Kirk R. Williams 1998. 'Violence in American Schools: An Overview.' Pp. 3–30 in Violence in American Schools. Edited by Delbert S. Elliott, Beatrix A. Hamburg, and Kirk R. Williams. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Newman, Katherine 2004. Rampage: The Social Roots of School Shootings. NY: Basic Books. Read Part I, Chapters 1–3, pp. 3–76.Section 3: Ideology and aggressionMerten, Don 1994. 'The Cultural Context of Aggression: The Transition to Junior High School.'Anthropology and Education Quarterly, v. 25 (1): 29–43.Willis, Paul 1977. Learning to Labour: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs. Farnborough, England: Saxon House.Newman, Katherine 2004. Rampage: The Social Roots of School Shootings. NY: Basic Books. Read Part II, Chapters 4–7, pp. 77–178.MacLeod, Jay 1987. Ain't No Makin' It: Aspirations and Attainment in a Low Income Neighborhood. Oxford: Westview Press. Read Chapter 6, 'School: Preparing for Competition,' pp. 83–111.Devine, John 1997. Maximum Security: The Culture of Violence in Inner‐City Schools. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Read Chapter 1, 'Schools or 'Schools'? Competing Discourses on Violence,' pp. 19–46.Section 4: Cultural scripts – masculinityKimmel, Michael S. and Matthew Mahler 2003. 'Adolescent Masculinity, Homophobia, and Violence.'The American Behavioral Scientist 46(10): 1439–58.Ferguson, Ann Arnett 2000. Bad Boys: Public Schools in the Making of Black Masculinity. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Read Chapter 4, 'Naughty by Nature,' pp. 77–99 and Chapter 6, 'Getting into Trouble,' pp. 163–96.Bender, Geoff 2001. 'Resisting Dominance? The Study of a Marginalized Masculinity and its Construction within High School Walls.' Pp. 61–78 in Preventing Violence in Schools: A Challenge to American Democracy. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.Klein, Jessi and Lynn S. Chancer 2000. 'Masculinity Matters: The Omission of Gender from High‐Profile School Violence Cases.' Pp. 129–62 in Smoke and Mirrors: The Hidden Context of Violence in Schools and Society. New York, NY: Rowan and Littlefield.Section 5: Cultural scripts – femininityEder, Donna 1985. 'The Cycle of Popularity: Interpersonal Relations among Female Adolescents.'Sociology of Education 58(3): 154–65.Merten, Don 1997. 'The Meaning of Meanness: Popularity, Competition, and Conflict Among Junior High School Girls.'Sociology of Education 70(3): 175–91.Merten, Don 2005. 'Transitions and 'Trouble': Rites of Passage for Suburban Girls.'Anthropology and Education Quarterly 36(2): 132–48.Artz, Sibylle 2004. 'Violence in the Schoolyard: School Girls' Use of Violence.' Pp. 167–90 in Girls' Violence: Myths and Realities, edited by Christine Alder and Anne Worrall. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.Morris, Edward W. 2007. ''Ladies' or 'Loudies'? Perceptions and Experiences of Black Girls in Classrooms.'Youth & Society 38: 490–515.Mikel Brown, Lyn 2003. Girlfighting: Betrayal and Rejection among Girls. NY: New York University Press.Section 6: Culture resources and school violence – languageLanguage and Symbolic ViolenceFerguson, Ann Arnett 2000. Bad Boys: Public Schools in the Making of Black Masculinity. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Read Chapter 7, 'Unreasonable Circumstances,' pp. 197–226.Youth Talk about ViolenceDiket, Read M. and Linda G. Mucha 2002. 'Talking about Violent Images.'Art Education March: 11–7.Morrill, Calvin, Christine Yalds, Madelaine Adelman, Michael Musheno, and Cindy Bejarano 2000. 'Telling Tales in School: Youth Culture and Conflict Narratives.'Law & Society Review 34(3): 521–65.Burman, Michele 2004. 'Turbulent Talk: Girls Making Sense of Violence.' Pp. 81–103 in Girls' Violence: Myths and Realities. Edited by Christine Alder and Anne Worrall. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.Obidah, Jennifer 2000. 'On Living (and Dying) with Violence: Entering Young Voices in the Discourse.' Pp. 49–66 in Smoke and Mirrors: The Hidden Context of Violence in Schools and Society. New York, NY: Rowan and Littlefield.Section 7: Culture resources and school violence – clothingClothing and School Safety DebatesHolloman, Lillian and Velma LaPoint, Sylvan I. Alleyne, Ruth J. Palmer, and Kathy Sanders‐Phillips 1996. 'Dress‐Related Behavioral Problems and Violence in Public School Settings: Prevention, Intervention, and Policy—A Holistic Approach.'The Journal of Negro Education 65(3): 267–281.Stanley, M. Sue 1996. 'School Uniforms and Safety.'Education and Urban Society 28(4): 424–35.Gereluk, Dianne 2008. 'Limiting Free Speech in the United States.' Pp. 41–64 in Symbolic Clothing in Schools: What Should Be Worn and Why. New York, NY: Continuum.Brunsma, David L., ed. 2006. Uniforms in Public Schools: A Decade of Research and Debate. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Education.Clothing, School Policies and Symbolic ViolenceHorvat, Erin McNamara 1999. '"Hey, Those Shoes are Out of Uniform": African American Girls in an Elite High School and the Importance of Habitus.'Anthropology and Education Quarterly 30(3): 317–42.Morris, Edward 2005. '"Tuck in that Shirt!" Race, Class, Gender and Discipline in an Urban School.'Sociological Perspectives 48(1): 25–48.Ferguson, Ann Arnett 2000. Bad Boys: Public Schools in the Making of Black Masculinity. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Read Chapter 3, 'School Rules,' pp. 49–73.FilmsTough guise: violence, media, and the crisis in masculinity (2002)This Media Education Foundation film explores the relationship between popular culture and the construction of violent masculinity. Of particular relevance to this class, the film examines how the construction of masculinity relates to school shootings. The film is directed by Sut Jhally and narrated by Jackson Katz. This film could be used in the section Cultural Scripts – Masculinity.Wrestling with manhood: boys, bullying and battering (2004)This Media Education Foundation film, written and directed by Sut Jhally, examines the relationship between professional wrestling and the construction of masculinity. The film looks at how wrestling contributes to homophobia, violence against women and bullying in school. This film could be used in the section Cultural Scripts – Masculinity.School violence: answers from the inside (2000)This film originally aired on PBS''In the Mix,' a television series created by and for teens. The film examines stereotyping and conflict in schools through the eyes and voices of teenagers attending a diverse suburban high school. This film could be used in the section Cultural Resources – Language.The killer at Thurston high (2000)This PBS Frontline film focuses on Kip Kinkel, who in 1998, at the age of 15, shot his mother and father, and then opened fire at his school in Springfield, Oregon, killing two and injuring 25. He is currently serving 111 years in prison. The film provides an understanding of the tragedy through multiple viewpoints, including interviews with Kip's sister, teachers and psychiatrists. This film could be used in the section Broadening the Definition of School Violence.Mean girls (2004)Written by Tina Fey and based on Rosalind Wiseman's book, Queen Bees and Wannabes: Helping Your Daughter Survive Cliques, Gossip, Boyfriends, and Other Realities of Adolescence, this fictional account of 'mean girls' is a film that most college students will be familiar with. Clips from the film can be used in the section Cultural Scripts—Femininity to begin a discussion about relational aggression between girls in schools. It can also be used to examine the role that racism and classism play in our public perception of violent behavior, particularly since 'mean girls' in this film tend to be constructed as white and upper class, whereas in contrast, 'violent girls' in film have historically been constructed as poor, young women of color.Project ideas1. Social Policy and Intervention. This assignment is intended to get students critically thinking about how educators approach school violence. Have students pick either a national intervention program, such as D.A.R.E., or a local school policy created to deal with school violence. Begin by analyzing how school violence is defined and what type of intervention/prevention is being proposed. Require students to use a cultural approach to understand and critique the policy. In writing the paper, students should consider the following questions. How would a cultural sociologist define violence? What types of violence are missing from this policy? How would this policy be different if it took into account a cultural approach? The book, 'Being Down': Challenging Violence in Urban Schools (2001) by Ronnie Casella provides a good background resource for completing this assignment.2. Observation Project: Clothing and School Safety. Students will begin by gaining permission to observe at a local middle school or high school. Begin by analyzing the school policy towards clothing. Some schools might have an official uniform policy, whereas others might have policies regarding certain types of clothing (i.e. gang clothing, clothing with profanity, etc.) Next, spend several days observing students in non‐classroom settings, like the hallways, cafeteria, bus or playground. Take detailed fieldnotes. Pay particular attention to the clothing that students wear, any discussion made about clothing by either students or teachers, the relationship between clothing and identity, how clothes are used as a site of resistance, and how clothes might cause conflict between students, or between students and teachers. (You may also want to informally interview students about their perception of the school's policy on clothing, how they negotiate rules about clothing, and how they see clothing policies as contributing to conflict and violence, as well as school safety.) As a class, develop a coding scheme for the fieldnotes. Each student will then individually write an analysis paper on the relationship between clothing, conflict, discipline policies, and school violence.3. Mean Girls: Examining Relational Aggression in Schools. There has been much public attention in recent years to 'mean girls.' As a class, view the film Mean Girls during the course section, Cultural Scripts – Femininity. As a class, develop an interview guide with about six open‐ended questions (i.e. What were your experiences with 'mean girls' in high school? How did you or a close friend deal with being the victim of relational aggression? To what extent did you ever participate in being a 'mean girl'? How did teachers at your school respond to relational aggression between girls?) Next, have students interview six female students using the class interview guide. Students can work individually or in groups to write a paper that compares and contrasts the social construction of mean girls in the film with the actual perceptions of mean girls from their research participants. The analysis should be grounded in the social science research that students are reading on relational aggression.

The Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region is making progress in opening the doors of development to all. But it still has a long way to go. At the current pace, it would take, on average, a generation for the region to achieve universal access to the basic services that make for human opportunity. Intra-county regional disparities are large, and barely converging.This book assesses the status and evolution of human opportunity in LAC. It builds on the 2008 publication, "Measuring Inequality of Opportunity," in several directions. First, it uses newly-available data to expand the set of oppo

The Kyrgyz Republic has made some progress in improving its poverty and social indicators but the gains have been fragile and significant disparities remain within the country. The slowdown in economic growth in 2009 and the resulting uptick in poverty underscored the susceptibility of the economy to external shocks. In this report, author's tackle the issue of inequality in the Kyrgyz Republic by framing it along the notion of equity as opposed to equality. The reason for doing so is that it is easier to galvanize social consensus and policy action when the overarching principle guiding policy is fairness in the allocation and access to opportunities as opposed to equality of outcomes. A girl born in a remote village in the oblast of Naryn to a single, uneducated mother with four other siblings ought to have the same shot at becoming a doctor or an engineer as a boy with one sibling, born in an educated, two-parent household in Bishkek. Basic opportunities are defined as subset of goods and services for children, such as access to education, safe water on site, or reliable electricity that are critical in determining opportunities for economic advancement in life. These are either already affordable by society at large or could be in the near future, given the available technology. Opportunities among children are measured in this report by the Human Opportunity Index (HOI), which is the coverage rate of a particular basic service adjusted by how equitably the service is distributed among groups differentiated by circumstances. In discounting inequitable access, the HOI reflects how personal circumstances- for which the children cannot be held accountable-affect their basic opportunities. The key finding of this report is that the goal of equal opportunity remains distant in the Kyrgyz Republic: a child's circumstances such as her parents' socioeconomic status, region of residence, whether it is urban and rural etc. have a substantial bearing on the extent to which certain services are available to her. Similarly, opportunities pertaining to a healthy start in life adequate access to household infrastructure and amenities that ensure a stable, safe and stimulating childhood also have strong regional dimensions with entire regions being underserved. Finally, what this report has done is taken a snapshot of the distribution of opportunities in the Kyrgyz Republic for a particular year.

The results of the research described above were obtained on a representative sample of Croatian youth from 15-24 years of age in the second half of 2002. The research was carried on in the context of a regional research project on youth under the auspices of the PRONI institute from Sweden. The main objective of the project was to provide empirical data on life, needs, attitudes and aspirations of young people as a means of assisting the process of youth policy review. The process was initiated by the Council of Europe with a view to strengthen youth participation in democratic changes of the countries in the region. This report is the most recent one in a long and well-established tradition of studying youth issues in Croatia. Therefore, it often includes comments and references to earlier research findings for the purpose of determining the changes in youth trends, as well as for the purpose of validity testing of our data. On the other side, the data presented in this report may, together with earlier studies, be used as a reference point in the process of reviewing the National Programme of Action for Youth, as well as in developing a comprehensive, efficient and youth-centred national youth policy. The core of the findings is probably that the criteria for determining the upper age-level of youth period should be reviewed and extended to include those who are 30 years of age. The fact that more and more young people remain longer in education, that they decide to marry and have children later in their life, that they consider changing their job and probably, if possible, enroll in re-training programmes for that purpose, as well as that they desire to reach full independence by relying on their own abilities and endeavour, speaks in favour of the need to redesign our traditional approaches to youth upper age-limits. Other findings that help us understand some important dimensions and trends of contemporary life of Croatian youth are summarised below. The most basic socio-demographic data demonstrate that very few young people from our research who are 24 and below are married and few think of having children before the age of 25. About half of them live in a two-child nuclear family in a house/apartment of their own that, averagely, comprises more than two rooms. Very few have an opportunity to live in an apartment of their own, although four fifths express desire to live separately. The aspiration towards such independence is mainly motivated by socio-economic and maturity factors: it is a prominent feature of young people who are university students, whose fathers have more education, and who are over 20. Since the chances of having their own apartment in a reasonable period of time are rather minimal, not only due to the difficulties in finding a job but due to extremely high prices in the housing sector, such prolonged co-habitation and dependency on parents and/or relatives is a frequent cause of young people' s frustrations and is probably related to, together with other factors such as poverty and limited capacity of pre-school child-care institutions, a constant decrease in the average number of children per family. On average, young people are satisfied with their present life and expect no change in the future. Despite a high unemployment rate especially among them, approximately three quarters assess their own present and future life, the life of their closest friends and their peers in Western Europe as good or excellent. Their optimism is somewhat even higher than it was found in the end of 1990s. When asked to imagine their life in 10 years ahead majority see it as a success, either in general terms or in specific terms of their professional advancement or family happiness. Dissatisfaction with present life grows with age and with opportunities to enter the world of work and become fully independent, since the young between 20-24 years of age, both employed and unemployed are more inclined to perceive their present life as unsatisfactory. Interestingly enough, the age does not have influence on the assessment of future, which means, in the context of this research, that young people in general, irrespective of age, equally believe that future brings better opportunities. In reference to their professional and educational aspirations, almost two thirds of the young want to continue education, while one fourth of them think of finding a job. The differences are mainly determined by residential, social, and age factors. Thus, a primary aspiration of pupils and university students, as well as of those who live in Zagreb or in families of higher socio-economic status, is to continue their education. Contrary to them, rural young people, those who live in low-income families, as well as those who are over 20 are more inclined to seek for a job or to continuing the job they currently hold. Over two fifths of young people plan to leave their present place of residence so as to be able to meet their professional and educational aspirations. Almost half of this group prefer to move somewhere inside the country, most often to a bigger city which is perceived as the place that offers better opportunities for career and social positioning, while other half think of going abroad. The percentage of the young planning to leave the country for good rose from 11% in 1986 and 18% in 1999 to 19% in 2002. Their migratory plans are connected to their residential status, i.e. to the conditions in the place or region where the young actually live. Young people from Zagreb are less willing to go somewhere else; rural youth and youth from Eastern Croatia wish to migrate to another place inside Croatia more than any other group, while all groups (except youth from Middle and Northern Croatia who want that somewhat more than others) equally (do not) want to settle abroad. Data on a desired place for living are quite similar to those on migratory plans. The number of youth preferring to remain in their present place of residence and the number of those having no migratory plans are almost identical. When compared to earlier studies, we see an increase in the number of young people preferring to live in large cities. In addition, almost one quarter express their preference for living abroad, majority of which opt for a Western European country. The fact that almost one fifth of all has plans and almost one fourth prefer to live abroad indicate the existence of two closely related but, nevertheless, separate dimensions of youth migratory thinking. While the preference for other counties may mean only an inclination, having plans on migrating abroad most certainly includes active search for such a possibility. In light of our findings it means that at least one fifth of Croatian youth not only dream of leaving the country but actually make plans how to make it a reality. Employed youth is far from being satisfied with their jobs. Every second confirms his or her disappointment. Approximately one fifth of both them and those that are still in the process of education desire jobs in the service or business sector; little less in number think of entering more creative and/or dynamic professions or professions related to education, health care and social services. This means that their professional aspirations are somehow higher that those of their parents, majority of whom have secondary school completed and are mainly employed as industrial, service and shop workers or clerks. Nevertheless, if their choices are compared to the structure of the employed force in Croatia and if we add to it a rapidly changing labour market in all transitional countries, their professional preferences seem rather realistic. This is probably why almost half of the young hold that their chances for getting a preferred job are high or very high. The data also confirm that their estimations are related to age and socio-professional status since pessimism increases with age (except for the university students) and is tightly linked to unemployment status. In any case, optimism prevails among the young and it, as well, may be linked to their strong motivation to succeed in life by relying on their own abilities despite unfavourable social and economic context in which they live. It is also possible, at least partly, that self-assurance of young people comes from positive educational experience. Over half of the young state they feel happy and satisfied when thinking of their schools or universities. However, it is not clear whether their satisfaction should be understood in terms of acquiring subject-matter knowledge and skills or in terms of developing certain personal qualities through participating in school life. Earlier studies on youth have proven that the young have complex relations towards education which are the outcomes of both institutional tasks and personal expectations. Moreover, our results document that feelings about school are correlated with sex and socio-professional status.Girls and university students, in general, are more satisfied with their education, while the unemployed are among the least satisfied. It is also possible that positive feelings about education also relate to school grades. Earlier studies have shown that female pupils receive somewhat better average scores than their male schoolmates, which may explain why girls have more positive feelings about school than boys. • On the other hand, it is clear that school is by no means a source of information about the events in the country and the world for young people since a great majority of them actually receive news through ordinary media (TV, radio, newspapers and magazines). Moreover, Internet has become an important source of information about the country and the world for approximately one fifth and over one fourth of them, respectively. This shift has to do with the fact that over two thirds of the young from our study are computer users and that more than half of them already have computer at home. It is, therefore, obvious that new information and communication technologies are becoming part and parcel of young people' s daily life what needs to be taken into account when policies and programmes of action for promoting their wellbeing are designed, especially in reference to underprivileged youth. Namely, our research confirms that the use of computer correlates with residence (urban environment), family background (parents with higher education and higher socio-economic status), age, and education factors (younger population and students). Nevertheless, young people are not enslaved by new information communication technologies. Most of them spend their free time associating with friends, engaging in sport activities, going to disco-clubs, watching TV or performing outdoor activities, while far less enjoy music, reading books or art exhibitions. In addition, many young people have no daily obligations, except in relation to school and spend their free time idling or sleeping. This means that the majority of youth either do nothing or engage almost solely in the so called passive and/or receptive activities for self-entertainment. Despite that fact, almost three fourths of them claim they are more or less satisfied with how they spend their free time what brings us to the conclusion that the main problem is not the quality of their free time activities but their lack of awareness that the quality itself is being at stake. However, it should be pointed out that their opinions are related to age and socio-professional status. Young people who belong to an upper age-cohort and who are unemployed exhibit far more dissatisfaction with their free time than the youngest. Overpronounced dissatisfaction among the unemployed seems to be an indicator of an overall discontent with one' s own life. For the unemployed, free time becomes a burden not only because they cannot perceive it in terms of an offduty activity but because they can not afford it financially. In reference to the use of psychoactive substances, it seems that tobacco smoking and alcohol consumption are the most widespread types of risk behaviour among the youth. Approximately one third of them smoke cigarettes or drink alcohol daily or weekly ; three fifths are non-smokers and one fifth never drink alcohol. Smoking increases with age and employment. Alcohol, on the other hand, is solely related to gender in a way that young women drink less than their male peers. Such trend may be the sign of a subtle male initiation rite de passage that has outlived its traditional context. Since the data on smoking are more favourable than those from earlier research it may be presumed that an anti-smoking media campaign, which has been going on rather aggressively throughout the country, has brought positive effect, whereas non-existence of similar anti-alcohol campaign may be the sign of a relatively high level of a social tolerance for alcohol consumption. As far as drug are concerned, Croatian youth is more inclined to the so-called 'soft' drugs. Over one third of the young have tried or used twice or more only marijuana ; hashish and ecstasy is mentioned by less than one tenth of them, whereas other 'hard' drugs have been only tried or are consumed by 1-3% of them. The consumption of marijuana is associated with a recognizable youth group, what confirms earlier studies. A group of highest risk is made of young people between 20 and 24, male, university students, the residents of Zagreb, Istria, Croatian Littoral and Dalmatia, and whose fathers have higher education level. A great majority of young people tend to see themselves in rather positive terms: they are self-assured, think they have a good number of personal qualities; believe in their capabilities when compared to other people and have no doubts that most people they know like them. This may be related to feeling of security they experience in the context of their immediate environment since a great majority of the young claim that they can almost always get warmth, care and support from their parents and support from their friends. On the other hand, only every second of them feel the same about their teachers. It seems that most Croatian families are characterised by an exercise of indirect and flexible control over their children in the course of their growing up. In over half of the cases parents or relatives hardly ever determine rules for their children' s behaviour although they do control the choice of their friends, as well as their evening outdoor activities. Moreover, young people claim that their parents are especially keen of their school progress since they almost regularly keep records on their children school situation. • When asked about the most serious problems of their generation, the majority of young people in Croatia mention socially unacceptable behaviour, such as drug abuse, alcohol consumption and violence, unemployment, low standard of living, the lack of life chances and mass migration of young experts abroad. Since unemployment was repeatedly displayed as the major problem of young generation in earlier studies, their present preoccupation with socially unacceptable behaviour may be related either to the sample structure (majority of them are students) or to a general social climate which is, due to predominance of media campaigns mainly geared against smoking and drug abuse (but not against alcohol consumption, except for safe driving), inducing an over-sensitisation to behavioural issues causing, on the other side, the lack of awareness of existentially important issues of young people that are of an utmost importance for their independence and self-satisfaction. Young people are inclined to attribute responsibility for solving these problems primarily to themselves, their parents and public authorities, i.e. firstly to those actors that function at the private level (personal and parents' responsibility), than to public sector (government, education system) and, finally, to the civil society (nongovernmental organizations, youth associations and religious institutions). This means that youth principally count on their personal strength and family support, as well as that they have explicit expectations of state institutions, whereas they think of receiving the assistance from the civil sector only exceptionally. Notwithstanding, since half of the young studied have failed to mention personal responsibility, it clearly demonstrates that both strong sense of self-responsibility and its avoidance stand side by side as two features of Croatian youth. Among the measures that Croatian youth see as the most efficient for solving their problems two are underlined: equal education and career opportunities, on the one hand, and strict punishment of drug dealers and restrictions on alcohol selling, on the other hand. Since the majority of youth consider socially unacceptable behaviour, including drug-addiction, to be the gravest problem of their generation, it is understandable that they see the way out in strict punishing of drug dealers, (rather than consumers), what is still inadequately determined by Croatian law. Other most frequently mentioned measure has to do with the youth quest for developing society of equal chances which is in line with their perception of unemployment as the second most frequently mentioned youth problem in Croatia. Although lesser in number, the young refer to their under-representation and require their participation in decision-making to be ensured at all levels. They also require better adapting of secondary and higher education to the needs of contemporary life, as well as better quality of education, in general; some speak in favour of establishing a ministry for youth affairs, developing national strategy for promoting youth well-being, setting up of funds for youth initiatives, better legal regulations of the places of youth entertainment, i.e., the issues majority of which have already been integrated into the recently adopted National Programme of Action for Youth that is seen as an initial step in developing a national youth policy. The values that the majority of young people hold personally important or very important are healthy environment, peace in the world, gender equality, and rights and freedoms of the individual. Second group of the most personally preferable values encompasses solidarity among people, social justice, economic security, respect for differences, rule of law, inalienability of property, civil society, free market, freedom of the media, protection of minorities, religion and democratic system. The bottom of the scale is occupied by social power, national sentiment, European integration, and high economic standard. The review of their preferences demonstrates a relatively respectable level of democratic potential of young people in Croatia. They are more oriented towards comfortable life based on key principles of democracy and civil society, which is in correspondence with earlier research that have documented the shift to a more individualistic value system, including youth' s preference for independence and their focus on self-realisation and material security. However, their relative devaluation of the importance of European integration may be, on the one hand, the sign of either their dissatisfaction with, or their criticism of the way new European order has been established, partly due to the fact that Croatia has been somehow unjustly left behind. On the other hand it may be the consequence of their perceiving the integration merely in terms of a political objective of which very little they experience in everyday life. This is not to say that they devaluate the importance of European integration for Croatia as such. It would be more accurate to say that Croatian young people are becoming more and more pragmatic in their social positioning of which many think not only in the context of Croatia but in the context of Europe and the world. Having in mind a long tradition of Croatian youth emigration to Europe and the fact that almost 20% of contemporary youth plan to leave the country for good (mostly for a European country), their relation toward European integration may mean that they see it only as an added value to an already established youth migratory pattern in Croatia. of young people about the determinants of upward social mobility in Croatia reflect their accurate perception of social anomalies that, if left unquestioned, threaten to deepen social inequalities and diminish democratic potential of the society. Namely, a great majority of the young see as important or highly important for social promotion in Croatia a combination of the following variables: adaptive behaviour, personal endeavour, knowledge and skills, and connections and acquaintances. University degree, money and wealth, and the obedience and submissiveness to the 'boss', are identified less but, nevertheless, reflect a combination of appropriate and inappropriate means of social promotion. Somehow more troublesome is the finding that one third to one half of the young consider belonging to certain nation or political party, as well as bribing and corruption as important determinants of one' s success in Croatia. These data present an index of youth's perception of Croatian society as the society of unequal chances since it, by allowing nondemocratic practice to play an important role in social promotion, actually discriminates against those who in this matter believe in, and rely on their own abilities and efforts. When compared to earlier studies, it is highly troublesome that almost the same factors of social promotion are estimated as important by both socialist and ' transitional' young people in Croatia. Overall examination of the above results may be seen as an indicator of a process of relative homogenisation of young people in today' s Croatia – certainly, within the issues here examined and at the present level of analysis. There is no doubt that young people here described have many characteristic in common, especially in reference to their marital status, family pattern, housing conditions, parent' s educational background, attitudes towards present and future life, professional and educational aspirations, desired accommodation, sources of information, satisfaction with free time, positive feelings about themselves, feeling of security in relation to their parents and friends, as well as in reference to their abuse of psychoactive substances. They also share their desire for autonomy and independence, and for the recognition by the society at large, as well as their dreams of a more just society in which life opportunities would match individual abilities and endeavour. When they differ, it is mostly due to their varied socio-professional status and age. Residential status, father' s educational background, gender, and regional background are less important. The tendencies that have been documented suggest that youth are divided primarily by their actual social status and stage of attained maturity, and only secondarily by socialization factors, such as social origin in a narrow and broad sense of the term, and a gender socialization patterns. However, further analysis of data should disclose youth dominating trends with more accuracy.

Doing business in India 2009 is the first country specific subnational report of the doing business series that measures business regulations and their enforcement across India. Doing business in India 2009 covers 10 out of the 12 previously measured cities, and documents their progress. It adds 7 new locations, expanding the study to 17 locations. Comparisons with the rest of the world are based on the indicators in doing business 2009. The indicators in doing business in India 2009 are also comparable with the data in other subnational and regional doing business reports. The indicators are used to analyze economic outcomes and identify what reforms have worked, where, and why. Other areas that significantly affect business, such as a country's proximity to markets, the quality of infrastructure services (other than services related to the trading across borders indicator), the security of property from theft and looting, the transparency of government procurement, macroeconomic conditions, or the underlying strength of institutions, are not directly studied by doing business.

Priorities for future sustainable development within Europe and Central Asia are formulated in visions by governments and societal actors. Integrated scenario and modelling studies enable the assessment of impacts on nature, nature's contributions to people, and a good quality of life resulting from these priorities, and help to co-design and codeliver appropriate pathways to sustainable futures (established but incomplete) (5.1.2, 5.4.2, 5.4.3, 5.5.2). Priorities for future sustainable development are captured in regional visions, which describe a future desired by society or parts of society in Europe and Central Asia. Matching these priorities to the Sustainable Development Goals and Aichi Biodiversity Targets revealed that regional priorities include sustainable economic growth in tandem with sustainable industrialization (Goal 8, Goal 9), sustainable agriculture, forestry, aquaculture and management of natural resources (Goal 15, Target 7), all promoted by sustainable consumption and production patterns (Goal 12, Target 4). Climate action and sustainable energy (Goal 13, Goal 7) are also priorities. Reduced inequalities (Goal 10), gender equality (Goal 5) and peace, justice and strong institutions (Goal 16), as well as representation of a diverse range of values, are less emphasized (established but incomplete) (5.1.2, 5.4.2, 5.4.3). Integrated assessments of future interactions between the priorities for sustainable development and nature and its contributions to people, which support proactive decisionmaking that anticipates change, mitigates undesirable trade-offs and fosters societal transformation in pursuit of a good quality of life, are rare due to the complexity of human and environment interdependencies (well established) (5.1.1, 5.3.1, 5.5.3, 5.5.4). Nevertheless, ignoring these complexities is likely to cause undesired trade-offs and to prevent the realization of synergies (5.3.1). Cross-sectoral and cross-scale integration of adaptation, mitigation and transformative actions and policies by multiple actors is key to the co-design and co-delivery of appropriate pathways to realize visions of future sustainable development (established but incomplete) (5.4.2, 5.4.3, 5.5.2, 5.5.3, 5.5.5, 5.5.6). The choices made by decision-makers and societal actors are expected to lead to large differences in future impacts on nature, nature's contributions to people, and good quality of life within Europe and Central Asia (established but incomplete) (5.2.3, 5.3.3, 5.3.4). More positive impacts are projected under futures that assume proactive decision-making on environmental issues and promote a more holistic approach to managing human and environmental systems which supports multifunctionality and multiple contributions from nature to people (established but incomplete) (5.2.3, 5.3.3, 5.3.4). Projecting historical trends into the future under a businessas- usual scenario results in stable trends in nature (e.g. reflected in biodiversity vulnerability indices), negative trends in nature's regulating contributions (e.g. regulation of climate or hazards and extreme events) and mixed trends in nature's material contributions (e.g. food production) (established but incomplete) (5.3.3, 5.6.1). Different assumptions about future trends in drivers lead to widely varying projected impacts on nature, nature's contributions to people and a good quality of life. Under economic optimism scenarios, where global developments are steered by economic growth and environmental problems are only dealt with when solutions are of economic interest, an increase in the provision of most of nature's material contributions to people (e.g. food and timber) is projected associated with a general decline in nature and its regulating contributions to people (e.g. air and water quality regulation) (established but incomplete) (5.3.3, 5.6.1). Under regional competition scenarios there is a growing gap between rich and poor, increasing problems with crime, violence and terrorism, and strong trade barriers. Consequently, its impacts are highly mixed with generally large declines in nature (e.g. habitat maintenance and creation) and the most negative impacts of all scenarios on nature's non-material contributions to people (e.g. learning and inspiration) and good quality of life indicators (e.g. health and well-being) (established but incomplete) (5.3.3, 5.6.1). Inequality scenarios, which assume increasing economic, political and social inequalities, where power becomes concentrated in a relatively small political and business elite who invest in green technology, result in negative impacts on nature's regulating contributions to people (established CHAPTER 5. CURRENT AND FUTURE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN NATURE AND SOCIETY 575 but incomplete), but mixed or unclear impacts on other indicators (inconclusive) (5.3.3, 5.6.1). Under global sustainable development scenarios, which are characterized by an increasingly proactive attitude of global policymakers towards environmental issues and a high level of regulation, positive impacts are projected for nature and its regulating contributions to people. Predominantly positive trends are also projected for nature's material contributions to people and good quality of life indicators, with some regional variation (established but incomplete) (5.3.3, 5.6.1). Under regional sustainability scenarios, which show increased concern for environmental and social sustainability and a shift toward local and regional decision-making, similar impacts are projected as for global sustainable development. Regional sustainability, however, leads to slightly fewer benefits for nature's regulating and material contributions to people (with decreases in food provision) than global sustainable development and more positive impacts on nature's non-material contributions to people and good quality of life, particularly traditional knowledge and supporting identities reflecting the local focus of the regional sustainability scenario (established but incomplete) (5.3.3, 5.6.1). Trade-offs between nature and different contributions from nature to people are projected under all plausible futures for Europe and Central Asia (established but incomplete) (5.3.3, 5.3.4). How these trade-offs are resolved depends on political and societal value judgements within each plausible future. In general, those futures where environmental issues are mainstreamed across sectors are more successful in mitigating undesirable cross-sector trade-offs, resulting in positive impacts across a broad range of indicators concerning nature, nature's contributions to people and good quality of life indicators (established but incomplete) (5.3.3, 5.6.1). Trade-offs between nature's material and regulating contributions to people are commonly projected in the economic optimism and regional competition scenarios, which tend to promote a limited number of nature's material contributions to people. For example, increases in food provision (generally associated with the expansion of agricultural land or the intensification of livestock production and fish captures) are often associated with decreases in the provision of nature's regulating contributions to people (e.g. prevention of soil erosion, regulation of water quality and quantity) and nature values. Similar trade-offs were projected between increases in timber provision and decreases in nature's regulating (e.g. carbon sequestration) and non-material (e.g. aesthetic value) contributions to people. Such trade-offs lead to strong positive effects in nature's contributions to people with market values and negative effects in nature's contributions to people without market values (established but incomplete) (5.3.3, 5.6.1). Trade-offs were also apparent under the sustainability scenario archetypes, particularly in relation to the use of land and water (e.g. effects of agricultural extensification – the opposite of agricultural intensification - or increases in bioenergy croplands on other land uses and biodiversity) (established but incomplete) (5.6.1). However, such scenarios proactively deal with such trade-offs through, for example, political choices aiming to maximize synergizes through mainstreaming and multifunctionality (global sustainable development) or through societal choices to live less resource-intensive lifestyles and, hence, reduce demand for nature's material contributions to people (regional sustainability). Impacts of plausible futures differ across the regions of Europe and Central Asia. Hence, regional and national decision-makers face different trade-offs between nature and its various contributions to people. Cooperation between countries opens up possibilities to mitigate undesirable crossscale impacts and to capitalize on opportunities (established but incomplete) (5.3.3). In Central Asia, significant water shortages are projected in the long-term. This affects farmers' choices between intensive crop production and more sustainable production with resulting impacts on nature's regulating contributions to people, such as water quality (established but incomplete) (5.3.3). Similar impacts on water stress are projected under future scenarios for Central Europe, including decreases in multiple contributions from nature to people from wetlands (established but incomplete) (5.3.3). Transboundary and integrated water management strategies that protect minimum water levels for the environment are projected to mitigate these negative impacts. In Eastern Europe, particularly Russia, trade-offs between wood extraction and carbon sequestration are projected. Sustainable forest management and reforestation of areas set aside from agricultural activities are suggested as having the potential to mitigate such trade-offs. Similarly, in mountain systems in Central and Western Europe and in marine systems in all subregions adaptive management strategies are projected to address the vulnerability of the majority of nature's contributions to people (established but incomplete) (5.3.3). In the European Union (EU), significant differences between northern and southern countries are projected. Most scenarios indicate increases in agricultural production for food, feed and bioenergy for northern European Union countries, while decreases in agricultural and timber production, as well as increases in water stress, are projected for southern European Union countries. The latter is projected to have considerable negative impacts on nature's non-material contributions to people, such as national heritage and tourism-related services dependent on local food production. Scenarios which included international coordination of adaptive measures across THE REGIONAL ASSESSMENT REPORT ON BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM SERVICES FOR EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA 576 geographical areas were projected to have better capacity to cope with, or mitigate, undesirable cross-scale impacts (established but incomplete) (5.3.3). Future impacts of drivers of change on nature and its contributions to people in Europe and Central Asia are likely to be underestimated because scenario studies are dominated by a few individual drivers (e.g. climate change) and often omit other important drivers (e.g. pollution) that may adversely affect their impacts (well established) (5.2.2, 5.3.2). Scenario studies predominantly focus on single direct drivers and fail to capture interactions between drivers (well established) (5.2.2, 5.3.2). Climate change is the most represented single direct driver in scenarios of biodiversity and ecosystem change. By contrast other direct drivers, such as pollution and invasive alien species, which are known to have an adverse impact on nature and its contributions to people, are poorly represented in scenario studies (well established) (5.2.2). Single-driver scenarios fail to capture various dynamics such as feedbacks and synergies between and amongst indirect and direct drivers operating at different scales. Policy approaches that consider single drivers or single sectors are unlikely to successfully address environmental problems as they do not consider trade-offs between different drivers, impacts and responses. Integrated, multi-driver scenario studies offer a more realistic assessment of impacts to inform robust decision-making about future sustainable development pathways that avoid unintended consequences (established but incomplete) (5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.4, 5.3.1, 5.3.3, 5.3.4, 5.4.4, 5.4.5, 5.5.5). Priorities for future sustainable development expressed by governments and other societal actors for Europe and Central Asia are more widely achieved under plausible futures that consider a diverse range of values (established but incomplete) (5.3.4, 5.5.4, 5.5.5, 5.6.1). Recognizing the different time frame of the scenarios of plausible futures (often 2050 or later) to those stated in the Sustainable Development Goals and Aichi Biodiversity Targets (2030 or 2020), continuing current trends under a business-as-usual scenario is estimated to lead to failure in achieving most of the Sustainable Development Goals (13 out of 17), but mixed effects on achieving the Aichi Biodiversity Targets (8 achieved). Economic optimism is estimated to have a mixed level of success in achieving the goals (8 achieved), but would fail to achieve the majority of the targets (16 out of 20), while regional competition fails to reach the majority of all goals and targets (15 and 19, respectively). The focus of these scenarios on instrumental values and individualistic perspectives, with little acknowledgement of relational or intrinsic values, means they are unlikely to offer effective sustainable solutions to environmental and social challenges (established but incomplete) (5.3.4, 5.6.1). In contrast, the sustainability scenarios (regional sustainability and global sustainable development) are estimated to achieve the majority of the Sustainable Development Goals and Aichi Biodiversity Targets. Such scenarios attempt to support nature and its multiple nature's contributions to people and aspects of a good quality of life. Thus, they represent a greater diversity of values, but often at the acceptance of lower, or more extensive, production of nature's material contributions to people (established but incomplete) (5.3.4, 5.6.1). Multiple alternative pathways exist to achieve the priorities for future sustainable development set by governments and societal actors within Europe and Central Asia and in particular for mitigating tradeoffs between nature and nature's contributions to people (established but incomplete) (5.5.2). The most promising pathways include long-term societal transformation through continuous education, knowledge sharing and participatory decisionmaking. Such pathways emphasize nature's regulating contributions to people and the importance of relational values in facilitating a holistic and systematic consideration of nature and nature´s contribution to people across sectors and scales (established but incomplete) (5.5.3, 5.5.4). Four types of pathways have been developed to address trade-offs between food, water, energy, climate and biodiversity at different scales (5.5.2). Green economy pathways focus on sustainable intensification and diversification of production activities coupled with the protection and restoration of nature. Low carbon transformation pathways focus on biofuel production, reforestation and forest management. Both types of pathways include actions related to technological innovation, land sparing or land sharing. Green economy and low carbon transformation pathways do not fully mitigate trade-offs between nature's material contributions to people, nature conservation, and nature's regulating and non-material contributions to people (established but incomplete) (5.5.2, 5.5.4). Ecotopian solutions pathways focus on radical social innovation to achieve local food and energy self-sufficiency and the production of multiple contributions from nature to people. They include actions on multifunctionality within individual land uses with connecting green infrastructure, urban design and food production (established but incomplete) (5.5.2, 5.5.4). Transition movements pathways emphasize a change towards relational values, promoting resource-sparing lifestyles, continuous education, new urban spatial structures and innovative forms of agriculture where different knowledge systems are combined with technological innovation. Transformation is achieved through local empowerment, participatory decision-making processes, community actions and voluntary agreements. As opposed to other pathways, transition movements CHAPTER 5. CURRENT AND FUTURE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN NATURE AND SOCIETY 577 pathways address all of the Sustainable Development Goals identified as being important in the Europe and Central Asia visions (5.1.2, 5.5.4), except Goal 7 (sustainable energy). The narrative offers the broadest set of actions targeting elements of nature, multiple contributions from nature to people (material, regulating and non-material) and multiple dimensions of a good quality of life (established but incomplete) (5.5.2, 5.5.4, 5.6.1). Different sets of actions and combinations of policy instruments are suggested by the different pathways. Joint instruments suggested across pathways give priority to participation, education and awareness raising, and often cross-scale integration and mainstreaming of environmental objectives across sectors (established but incomplete) (5.5.2, 5.5.3, 5.5.4, 5.5.6). The green economy and low carbon transformation pathways build towards sustainability without challenging the economic growth paradigm. They are implemented through combinations of top-down legal and regulatory instruments mixed with economic and financial instruments designed at regional (European Union) or national levels (Eastern Europe and Central Asia). Such pathways are often formulated at a sectoral level, and integration across sectoral pathways is critical. However, because green economy and low carbon transformation pathways do not fully mitigate trade-offs, they may not be sufficient alone to achieve sustainability (established but incomplete) (5.5.2, 5.5.4, 5.6.1). The trade-offs are better addressed by diverse local bottom-up transition movements or ecotopian solutions pathways (5.5.2). Such pathways reconsider fundamental values and lifestyles through sets of actions focusing on less resource-intensive lifestyles, education, knowledge sharing, good social relations and equity (e.g. food and dietary patterns, transport, energy and consumption patterns). Transition movements pathways also develop bottom-up transformative capabilities by combining rights-based instruments and customary norms (including indigenous and local knowledge) and social and information instruments (established but incomplete) (5.5.3, 5.5.4). The sets of actions proposed in the pathways are not mutually exclusive and can be combined. For example, actions from green economy and low carbon transformation pathways may pave the way towards more transformative transition movements pathways. Moreover, future transitions to sustainability may be fostered through cross-scale integration and mainstreaming of environmental issues into sectoral policies and decisions, along with nurturing diverse social, institutional and technological experiments (established but incomplete) (5.5.5). Participatory scenario, vision and pathway development is a powerful approach for knowledge co-production and has great potential for the explicit inclusion of indigenous and local knowledge (established but incomplete) (5.4.3, 5.5.1, 5.5.2, 5.5.6, 5.6.2). Many scenario, vision and pathways exercises include local stakeholders and their valuable knowledge and practices. However, the use of different knowledge systems, such as indigenous and local knowledge, was rarely explicitly mentioned in studies (5.6.2). Explicit examples that included indigenous and local knowledge (see Boxes 5.2, 5.6 and 5.10), show a clear added value from combining different forms of knowledge with technological innovations, and cultural diversity, norms and customary rights when pursuing goals of sustainable development (5.2.2, 5.5.2, 5.5.3, 5.5.6). Knowledge gaps and resulting uncertainties in exploring future interactions between nature and society are substantial because integrated assessments of future impacts on nature, nature's contributions to people and a good quality of life that take account of the complex interdependencies in human and environmental systems are rare (well established) (5.6.2). Very few studies were available for Central Asia and to a lesser extent for Eastern Europe (well established) (5.6.2). Less information was also available for marine systems than for terrestrial and freshwater systems (well established) (5.6.2). Few integrated scenario and modelling studies include indicators of nature's nonmaterial contributions to people and good quality of life (5.3.2, 5.5.1, 5.6.2) and therefore existing assessments of synergies and trade-offs are limited in the interactions and feedbacks they represent (well established) (5.3.2). No studies were found that assessed future flows of nature's contributions to people across countries, which would have been important to assess the impacts of the scenarios and pathways for Europe and Central Asia on other parts of the world (well established) (5.6.2). There is also a significant gap in the current literature in recognizing the diversity of values, with the focus being mainly on instrumental values (well established) (5.6.2). Finally, scenario and modelling studies include many uncertainties in their projections of the future resulting from input data, scenario assumptions, model structure and propagation of uncertainties across the integrated components of the systems, which should be borne in mind when interpreting their results (well established).

This report highlights key trends, challenges, and opportunities for advancing financial inclusion and presents major high-level policy recommendations for consideration by the Group of 20 (G-20) policy makers to benefit a wider range of developing countries, including many non-G-20 countries. The report serves a broad audience, ranging from policy makers, development finance institutions, and the private sector to experts seeking a synopsis of the key subtopics relevant for financial inclusion and areas of work for advancing progress. The report is organized into four sections. The first recommends broad goals and agenda items to accelerate progress in financial inclusion. The second defines the financial inclusion concept and its importance for economic growth and poverty reduction. The third section provides a snapshot of each of the pillars presented as part of the recommendations, and the fourth section summarizes the way forward. The report also contains an annex that takes a closer look at the microfinance industry as a case in point for reviewing the successes, innovations, and lessons learned, which are critical for the broader discussion on financial inclusion.

In this dissertation, we are mainly interested in the interactions between poverty and one of its greatest dimensions1, namely health. More specifically, we will focus on their inequalities: does poverty inequality have more effect on poverty than health level? Does health inequality matter to poverty? Poverty and health are two related concepts that both express human deprivation. Health is said to be one of the most important dimensions of poverty and vice-versa. That is, poverty implies poor health because of a low investment in health, a bad environment and sanitation and other living conditions due to poverty, a poor nutrition (thus a greater risk of illness), a limited access to, and use of, health care, a lower health education and investment in health, etc2. Conversely, poor health leads inevitably to poverty due to high opportunity costs occasioned by ill-health such as unemployment or limited employability (thus a loss of income and revenues), a lower productivity (due to loss of strength, skills and ability), a loss of motivation and energy (which lengthen the duration of job search), high health care expenditures (or catastrophic expenditures), etc3. But what are the degree of correlation and the direction of the causality between these two phenomena? Which causes which? This is a classic problem of simultaneity that has become a great challenge for economists. Worst, each of these phenomena (health and poverty) has many dimensions4. How to reconcile two multidimensional and simultaneous events? 1 Aside the income-related material deprivation. 2 Tenants of the ?Absolute Income? hypothesis for instance show that absolute income level of individual has positive impact on their health status (Preston, 1975; Deaton, 2003). Conversely, lack of income (and the poverty state it implies) leads unambiguously to poor health. For other authors, it is not the absolute level per se, but the relative level (i.e. comparably to others in the society) that impacts most health outcomes. This is the ?Relative Income? hypothesis (see van Doorslaer and Wagstaff, 2000, for a summary). 3 See Sen (1999) and more recently Marmot (2001) for more information. 4 Poverty could be seen as monetary poverty, human poverty, social poverty, etc. Identically, one talks of mental health, physical health, ?positive? and ?negative? health, etc. So a one-on-one causality could not possibly exits between the two, or will be hard to establish. We?ve chosen the first way of causality: that is, poverty (and inequality) causes poor health. As justification, we consider a life-cycle theory approach (Becker, 1962). An individual is born with a given stock of health. This stock is supposed to be adequate enough. During his life, this stock is submitted to depreciation due to health shocks and aging (Becker?s theory, 1962). We could think that the poorer you are, the more difficult is your capacity to invest in your health5. Empirically, many surveys (too numerous to be enumerated here) show that poor people6 do have worse health status (that is, high mortality and morbidity rates, poor access to health services, etc.). It has been established that poor children are less healthy worldwide, independently of the region or country considered. It is generally agreed that the best way to improve the health of the poor is through pro-poor growth policies and redistribution. Empirically, one of the major achievements of these last two decades in developing countries is the improvement in health status of populations (notably the drop in mortality rates and higher life expectations) following periods of (sustained) economic growth. However, is this relation always true? In some countries as we will see later in this thesis, while observing an improvement in the population?s welfare, the converse is observed in its health status, or vice versa. If health and poverty are so closely related, they should theoretically move in the same direction. But the fact that in some countries we observe opposite trends suggests that some dimensions of health and poverty are not or may not be indeed so closely related, as postulated, and that they may depend of other factors. 1. The Purpose of the Study. 5 Another justification is that many authors have studied the problem the other way. Schultz and Tansel (1992, 1997) for instance showed that ill-health causes a loss of revenues in rural Cote d?Ivoire. Audibert, Mathonnat et al. (2003) also showed that malaria caused a loss of earnings of rural cotton producers in Cote d?Ivoire. 6 Usually defined from some income or expenditure-related metric or some assets-based metric. The ultimate goal of our dissertation in its essence is to measure inequality in health7 in developing countries using mainly Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS, henceforth)8. It deals with interactions between poverty and one of its greatest dimensions, putting aside the income-related material deprivation, namely health. It therefore measures inequality in health status and access to health and discusses which policies should be implemented to correct these inequalities. That is, it aims to see how much rich people are better off and benefit from health interventions, as compared to the poor, and how to reduce such an inequality. The present dissertation contains four papers that are related to these questions. Our main hypothesis (that will be tested) is that poverty impacts health through inequality effects9. Graphically, we can lay these simple relationships as: The dashed line in the figure above suggests that income inequality could impact health directly. But we consider that this direct effect is rather small or negligible, as compared to the indirect effect through inequality in health. Therefore, inequality in health is central to our discussion. To measure inequalities in health, we face three challenges: 7 And corollary health sanitation (access to safe water, toilet and electricity). Though electricity is more a measure of economic development that health measure per se, we add it here as a control for sanitation and nutrition: for example women could read more carefully the drugs? notices, or warm more quickly foods; more generally, electricity often improves the mental and material wellbeing of households. It also conditions health facility?s performance. 8 And potentially other surveys. In this case, we mention explicitly the survey(s). 9 The other important factor that could impact health is the performance of the health system. This is discussed in the Chapter 3. Health Assets Inequality Health Inequality Poverty (Assets Index) - measuring welfare (income metric) and subsequently inequality in welfare, - measuring health, - and measuring inequality in health. The measurements can be conducted using two approaches (Sahn, 2003): - Directly by ranking the households or individuals vis-à-vis their performance in the health indicator; we thus have a direct measure of inequality in health. This is suitable when the health indicator is continuous (such as weight, height or body mass index). According to Prof. David E. Sahn, that approach ?which has been referred to as the univariate approach to measuring pure health inequality, involves making comparisons of cardinal or scalar indicators of health inequality and distributions of health, regardless of whether health is correlated with welfare measured along other dimensions?. - Indirectly by finding a scaling measure such as consumption or income or another indicator (assets index for instance)10 that would help ranking the households or individuals (from the poorest to the richest), and see what are their performance in the health variable of interest. We are therefore measuring an indirect health inequality. The indirect method is mostly suitable when the health indicator is dichotomous (for example whether the individual has got diarrhoea last 2 weeks, or ?have the child been vaccinated?, or ?place of delivery?) or is a rate (such as child mortality). Again, quoting Prof. Sahn, ?making comparisons of health across populations with different social and economic characteristics is often referred to in the literature as following the so-called `gradient? or `socioeconomic? approach to health inequality. Much of the motivation for this work on the gradient approach to health inequality arises out of fundamental concerns over social and economic justice. The roots of the gradient will often arise from various types of discrimination, prejudice, and other legal, social, and economic norms that may contribute to stratification and fragmentation, and subsequently inequality in access to material resources and various correlated welfare outcomes?. While the first method would appear quickly limited for dummy or limited categorical health variables because of the small variability in the population, the second approach could also be 10 Or more generally any other socioeconomic gradient such as education, gender or location. impossible when no information is available to scale the units of observation in terms of welfare. We?ll be mostly focusing on the second approach, as did many health economists, and also due to the nature of the DHS datasets in hand and the indicators that we are investigating. 2. Strategy, Methods and Structure. Measuring wealth-related inequality in health implies in the first stage defining and characterizing the poor. Who are indeed the poor? Traditionally, monetary measures (income or consumption) have been used to distinguish households or people into ?rich? and ?poor? classes. Indeed, it is agreed that the ?incomemetric? approach is one of the best ways to measure welfare11. However, it sometimes, if not often, happens that we lack this essential information in household survey datasets. Especially in our case, the DHS datasets do not have income nor consumption information. Then, how to characterize the poor in this situation? For a long time, economists have eluded the question. But soon, it became evident that an alternative measure is needed to strengthen the ?poverty debate?. In the first part of our dissertation, we start by providing a theoretical framework to find a proxy for wellbeing, in the case where consumption or income-related data are missing, namely by discussing the use of assets as such a proxy. The first part of this thesis is relatively long, as compared to the second. However, this is justified, due to its purpose. The goal of the first part of the dissertation is to participate to the research agenda on poverty. It attempts to measure it in a ?non traditional?12 way. 11 There is a consensus in the economic literature that income is more suitable to measure wealth or welfare in developed countries while consumption is more adequate for developing ones due to various reasons such as irregularity of incomes for informal sector, seasonality, prices, recall periods, trustworthy, etc. (see Deaton 1998 for detail). 12 i.e. a non monetary way. The main rationale for this first part therefore is thus to find a new, non monetary measure to characterize in best, life conditions, welfare and then the poor. This measure is referred to as the ?assets index?. Indeed, as the majority of developing countries are engaged more and more in fighting poverty, inequality and deprivation, more and more information on the state of poverty13 is needed. If in almost all these countries, many household surveys have been implemented to collect information on socioeconomic indicators, the major indicator that is needed to analyze poverty (namely income or consumption data) is unfortunately not often collected due to various reasons (time, cost, periodicity, etc.). Even, if they were collected, the quality of the data is often poor. Therefore, economists tend to rely more on other indicators to compensate for the absence of monetary measures. One of the indicators often used are the assets owned by households. The question arose then how to use these assets to characterize the poor in this context? How to weight each of them? In a first attempt, many economists built a simple linear index by assigning arbitrary weights to the assets14. In a seminal paper, Filmer and Pritchett (2001) propose to construct the so-called ?assets index? which could be used as a proxy for consumption or income. It is commonly agreed that their methodology follows a ?scientific? approach, thus is more credible. In their case, they use a Principal Component Analysis (PCA, henceforth) to build their assets index. Since, many other economists have followed in their footsteps which we label in our dissertation, the ?material? poverty approach (as opposed to the monetary one) since it is based on materials (goods and assets) owned by the households or individuals. Because of the importance of the subject (poverty) and because the method is pretty new and original, this first part of our thesis is as said quite long as compared to the second one and has two papers which focus mainly on poverty and inequality issues and their connections with economic growth. In this part, we start by presenting a methodology of measuring non monetary (material) poverty, when a consumption or income data is not available. We show how one can obtain robust results using assets or wealth variables. Once the method is clearly 13 And more generally welfare. 14 For example a television is given a weight of 100, a radio 50, and so on. But this is clearly not a `scientific? way to proceed, as there is no rational ground in giving such weights. tested and validated, it is then confronted to real data. We show that the index shares basically the same properties with monetary metrics and roughly scales households in the same way as does the consumption or income variables. We discuss the advantages and also the limitations of using the assets index. The important thing to bear in mind is that, once it is obtained, it could be used to rank the observational units by wealth or welfare level. - The first chapter defines in a first section poverty and how it is usually measured (by the income metric approach). We discuss the limitations of the use of income/expenditure and what could be alternative measures. We then propose in section 2 the assets metric as a proxy for poverty measurement and test the material poverty approach on international datasets collected by the DHS program. We explore the material poverty and inequality nexus in the world and how Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)15 compares with other regions. We show, using that index and DHS data, that poverty, at least from an assets point of view, was also decreasing in SSA as well as in other regions of the world. This result contrasts with other findings such as Ravallion and Chen (2001) or Sala-i-Martin (2002) that show that, while other regions of the world are experiencing a decline in their (monetary) poverty rates, SSA is lagging behind, with rates starting to rise over the last decade. Therefore, two different measures of welfare could yield opposite results and messages in terms of policies to implement to combat poverty. Moreover, the method we use not only allows observing changes over time for each country, but also provides a natural ranking among countries (from the poorest to the richest). In this chapter, aside the measure of welfare and poverty, we also discuss in a final section the impact of demographic transition on economic growth and therefore on poverty. Indeed, demographic transition is a new phenomenon that is occurring in developing countries, especially African ones. Its negligence could lead to underestimating poverty measures (both material and monetary) by underestimating real economic growth rates. We show that changes in the composition and the size of households put an extra-pressure on the development process. While traditional authors have not considered the impact of these 15 SSA countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Côte d?Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The ?rest of the world? is represented by Armenia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Vietnam and Yemen. changes, we show that taking this into account implies higher economic growth rates than those actually observed or forecasted. - Once the assets index approach is established and tested on international data, the question arose how it performs as compared to the monetary metric. Indeed, if monetary measures remain the reference, then our assets index should share some common properties with them. The second chapter assesses the trends in material poverty in Ghana from the assets perspective using the Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaires Surveys (CWIQ). It then compared these trends with the monetary poverty over roughly the same period. We show that the assets index could be used and yields the same consistent results as using other welfare variable (such as income, consumption or expenditure). Therefore, using two consecutive CWIQ surveys, we find that material poverty in Ghana has decreased roughly by the same magnitude as monetary one, as found in other studies by other authors such as Coulombe and McKay (2007) using Ghanaian GLSS16 consumption data. Thus, this chapter could thus be viewed as providing the proof that the material and the monetary approaches could be equivalent. The second part of our dissertation seeks how to define and measure health and inequality in health. While the definition of health is not obvious, we propose to measure it with child mortality rates. Our main rationale in doing so is that low child mortality generates, ceteris paribus, higher life expectancy17, thus is an adequate measure of a population?s health. This may not be true in areas devastated by wars, famines, and HIV and other pandemics where child mortality could be high (in this case, the best measure should be life expectancy by age groups). Also, the reader should bear in mind that in fact, child mortality could be itself is a good indicator for measuring the (success of the) economic development level of a society as a whole (Sen, 1995), mainly because in developing countries, child mortality is highly correlated to factors linked to the level of development such as access to safe water, sanitation, vaccination coverage, access to health care, etc. - In the third chapter, we focus on measuring overall population?s health. For this, we estimate child mortality in SSA and compare it to the rest of the world. We explore the 16 Ghana Living Standard Surveys. 17 By construction, life expectancy at birth is highly correlated and sensitive to child mortality (it is based on child mortality rates for various cohorts). Lower child mortality rates lead to higher life expectancy and vice versa. determinants of child mortality using mainly a Weibull model and DHS data with socioeconomic variables18 as one of our major covariates. The use of the assets index information is to see how these quintiles behave in a multivariate regression framework of child mortality (i.e. how they affect child mortality). We find, among others, that mother?s education and access to health care and sanitation are one of the strongest predictors for child survival. Controlling for education and other factors, family?s wealth and the area of residency do not really matter for child survival in SSA, contrasting with results found elsewhere. - The fourth and last chapter answers the ultimate goal of this dissertation, that is, the scope of health inequalities in the developing world, particularly in SSA. It uses the factor analysis (FA) method of Chapter 1 to rank household according to their economic gradient status19 and then studies inequalities in various health indicators in relation with these groups. The intention is to analyze inequality rates between rich and poor for various health variables. In this chapter, we concentrate solely on inequality issues in health and health-related infrastructures and services. Mainly, we analyze inequality in access to sanitation infrastructures (water and electricity20) and various health status and access to health indicators (such as child death, child anthropometry, medically assisted delivery and vaccination coverage) using a Gini and Marginal Gini Income Elasticity approach (GIE and MGIE, henceforth) on one hand, and the Concentration Index (CI) approach on the other. Results show that, while almost all countries have made great efforts in improving coverage in, and access to, these indicators, almost all the gains have been captured by the better-offs of the society, especially in SSA. We extend the analysis to compare GIE estimates to those of CI and find consistent results yielding quite similar messages. 18 Quintiles groups derived from an assets index. 19 By grouping usually households in 5 quintiles from poorer to richer ones. 20 On the rationale of using electricity, see footnote 7 above. 3. Results and Policy Implications. As said above, the major goal in conducting this thesis research is to analyze inequality in health status, health care and health-related services using DHS data. To reach our objective, we follow two intermediate steps: - For assets poverty, results show that assets poverty and inequality are decreasing in every region of the world, including Sub-Saharan Africa. This tends to support our hypothesis that, contrary to common beliefs, African households use assets and building ownerships as saving tools and buffer to economic shocks. The first paper also shows however that the demographic transition actually occurring in developing countries could impede on economic growth and trigger a bullet on policies aiming at combating poverty. - Our third paper shows that child mortality is decreasing in all parts the world. However, the 1990s and early 2000s have been a lost decade for the African continent where many countries have witnessed an increase in rates that is mostly attributable among other factors to the economic and financial turmoils of the 1990s and early 2000s and the HIV epidemic. Our hypothesis is that these phenomena have destabilized the organization of the health care system, cut its funding and hampered its performance. High levels of health inequality can also be part of the puzzle. Coming back to the particular case of HIV/AIDS, the reader should observe that it affects more and more the less poor so that it can also lead to a decline in assets inequality (richer people are dying) along with an increase in child mortality and thus explain in great part our paradox. This setback (the rise in mortality over recent periods despite poverty reduction) will make impossible for these countries to reach the millennium development goals, at least for child mortality. The conclusion to this is that African population?s health has been stagnant over the period 1990-2005. Regression analysis reveals no strong correlation between our measure of welfare (assets index) and child mortality. More important are mothers? education and access to health care and sanitation services. - Finally, our inequality estimates show that they are quite high for all indicators considered. For ill-health indicators (child malnutrition and death), rates are excessively concentrated in poor and rural groups. Concerning access to health care services, rich and urban groups tend to be more favoured than poor and urban ones. But the high level of inequality tends to be reducing at the margin over time, as the poor have increasing access. Finally for access to sanitation services, results show that while the majority of countries have made substantial efforts to increase coverage on the first two periods, the rich and urban classes have benefited more and inequality (which is at high levels) tends to rise at the margin over time, especially for the poor. More preoccupying is the fact that rates are falling between 1995-2000 and 2000-2005, probably because of the privatization of these services and the new costs they impose on households. Overall, inequality in all variables considered is more pronounced in SSA than the rest of the world (expect for death and malnutrition). The sub-continent is still disadvantaged in terms of access to services or ill-health. Where to go from here? In the African sub-continent, we have the following picture: a decreasing (material) poverty and inequality but coupled with a stagnant child mortality situation, a stagnant or increasing malnutrition. This is mostly due to high levels of, and an increasing inequality at the margin in access to sanitation and electricity services coupled with a decreasing access to these services. Thus, despite the fact that we observe a decreasing inequality at the margin in access to health care (even though the average level of inequality is still high) the missing link in health-related services coupled with an overall high inequality in these two types of services hugely impact child health and survival. Therefore, as access to health care services and health-related sanitation services is essential to child survival, our findings call for vigorous policies to promote access of the poor groups and rural areas to these services. African Governments should continue to favour access of the poor to health care and reverse the inequality trends in access to water, sanitation and electricity. This is vital for the health of the population and for the development of Africa. Funding can come from various sources: the Government Budget, International Assistance but also from households themselves (since the first part of our thesis has demonstrated that they are getting richer (and various surveys show that they are willing to pay for quality health care), an adequate fees policy could benefit to the health care system). Measures should be put in place to strengthen the performance of the health system and to mitigate the negative effects of macroeconomic imbalances, economic crises and HIV/AIDS. Only on these conditions the Sub-Continent could hope to eradicate poverty and promote health for all. 4. Contribution of this Thesis. This thesis seeks to analyze empirically the inequality in health and access to health in SSA and how this region compared to the rest of the world. To do so, it develops a new method to characterize poor households and to analyze assets-based poverty, when the monetary measure is unavailable. Such a method is indeed necessary as almost all developing countries have collected many surveys that lack the consumption or income information. Once a poverty measure and a correct measure of health have been found, and their core determinants clearly established, we then proceed to the health inequality analysis, along with its determinants, using two methodologies: the traditional CI and the more recent GIE approaches. These approaches have been the mostly used to explore the inequality in health and access to health these last years. Though already studied in the literature, and sometimes applied on DHS or some groups of DHS datasets, our dissertation differs in its purpose and scope and its large scale. No paper to our knowledge used the totally to-date freely available DHS datasets to study poverty and inequality topics and provide basic statistics. Our main contribution is to shed a new light on the welfare-inequality-health nexus in Africa, how it evolves over time and how it compares to other regions around the world, using all available information. It also put numbers on various important socioeconomic indicators such as poverty, inequality, child health and mortality, access to health-related infrastructures, etc., for developing countries, especially African ones. As we sometimes lack these important information, this thesis proves finally to be a very useful exercise. ; Cette thèse part d'un postulat simple : « l'amélioration du niveau de vie s'accompagne de l'amélioration de l'état de santé générale d'une population » et teste sa validité dans le contexte de l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara (ASS). Si cette hypothèse se vérifie en général dans le contexte de l'ASS en ce qui concerne le niveau (plus le pays est riche, plus sa population est en bonne santé), il l'est moins en ce qui concerne les dynamiques, du moins à court et moyen terme. Notamment, les pays qui connaissent une amélioration tendancielle de bien-être matériel ne connaissent pas forcément une amélioration de la santé de leurs populations. Ceci constitue un paradoxe qui viendrait invalider notre postulat. En écartant tout effet de retard ou de rattrapage qui pourrait l'expliquer car nous travaillons sur une période de 15 ans réparties en 3 sous-périodes (1990-1995, 1995-2000 et 2000-2005), nous expliquons ce paradoxe, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, par deux canaux principaux qui peuvent interagir : - la performance du système de santé et - l'inégalité en santé. Si le premier est plus évident mais aussi plus difficile à prouver empiriquement du fait du manque de données sur des séries longues, ou du fait que ces données sont trop agrégées et éparses, le second canal est testable avec des bases de données adéquates qui, elles, sont disponibles au niveau microéconomique (ménages). Les bases de données que nous avons privilégiées sont les Enquêtes Démographiques et de Santé (EDS) du fait de leur comparabilité dans l'espace et le temps (mêmes noms de variables standardisées, même méthodologie d'enquête, mêmes modules, etc.). Ces atouts sont d'autant plus importants que les comparaisons de pauvreté et de bien-être basées sur les enquêtes de revenus ou de consommation butent sur de sérieux problèmes à savoir la comparabilité de ces enquêtes (méthodologies différentes, périodes de rappel différents, prix souvent non collectés de la même manière, etc.). Pour montrer ces effets de l'inégalité de santé sur les niveaux et les tendances de la santé des populations et la pauvreté et le bien-être, nous avons axé notre recherche autour de 3 axes principaux : 1- Comment mesurer le niveau de richesse et donc le bien-être des ménages en l'absence d'information sur la consommation et le revenu ? Les chapitres 1 et 2 de notre thèse se penchent sur cette question. Nous avons privilégié, à l'instar de plus en plus d'économistes, l'utilisation des biens des ménages et les méthodes de l'analyse factorielle et d'analyse en composantes principales pour construire un indice de richesse. Cet indice de richesse est pris comme un substitut du revenu ou de la consommation et sert donc de proxy pour la mesure du bien-être. Bien qu'il comporte quelques lacunes (notamment le fait qu'il ne concerne que les biens matériels et durables du ménage alors que la consommation ou le revenu sont des concepts plus globaux de bien-être, il ne prend pas en compte les préférences des ménages, il ne comporte aucune notion de valeur car le prix n'est pas pris en compte, de telle façon qu'une petite télévision en noir blanc vieille de vingt ans est mise au même niveau qu'un grand écran plasma flambant neuf, etc.), il n'en demeure pas moins que d'un côté, avec les EDS, il n'y a pas moyen de faire autrement en l'état actuel des choses, mais aussi et surtout parce que ces données permettent d'éviter les problèmes évoqués plus haut, notamment celui de la comparabilité des données pour faire de la comparaison spatiale et inter-temporelle des données en matière de pauvreté. Dans le premier chapitre, en nous basant sur cet indice et une ligne de pauvreté définie a priori à 60% pour la première observation dans notre échantillon (Benin, 1996), et en utilisant les données EDS et une analyse en composantes principales (ACP), nous avons pu mesurer la tendance de la pauvreté dite « matérielle » (en opposition à la pauvreté monétaire, basée sur la métrique monétaire). Cette méthode qui est privilégiée par des auteurs comme Sahn et Stifel est d'autant plus intéressante qu'elle donne non seulement les tendances de la pauvreté dans chaque pays, mais elle permet aussi une classification naturelle de ces pays par ordre de grandeur de pauvreté. Cependant, dans la mesure où les biens des ménages et la dépenses de consommation sont disponibles, l'analyste devrait estimer les deux types de pauvreté (matérielle via l'indice de richesse et monétaire via le revenu ou la consommation) car les études montrent souvent que les biens matériels et la consommation ou le revenu ne sont pas très bien corrélés, et donc le choix de l'indicateur de bien-être est crucial en termes de politiques économique et de santé. En effet, si l'indicateur sous-estime le vrai niveau de pauvreté ou d'inégalité (ou les surestime), les dépenses publiques qui en résultent peuvent être plus ou moins surévaluées, de même que les réponses apportées se révéler inadéquates. Donc dans la mesure du possible, il conviendrait de se pencher sur la question du choix de l'indicateur. Les résultats de notre méthodologie montrent que l'ASS reste la région la plus pauvre du monde en termes de possession d'actifs. La région orientale de l'ASS est la plus pauvre au monde (75%) suivie de l'Asie du Sud (64%), le Sud de l'ASS (61%), l'Afrique Centrale (57%), l'Afrique de l'Ouest (55%), l'Asie de l'Ouest (40%), l'Asie du Sud-Est (19%), l'Amérique Latine (18%), les Caraïbes (17%), l'Afrique du Nord (6%), l'Asie Centrale (2%) et l'Europe de l'Est (1%). Notre analyse nous montre que la pauvreté baisse dans l'ensemble des pays Africains au Sud du Sahara (sauf la Zambie), à l'instar des autres pays du monde dans l'échantillon. En effet, en considérant les trends, nous voyons que la moyenne de l'ASS passe de 63% de pauvreté matérielle entre 1990-1995 à 62% en 1995-2000 et 58% entre 2000 et 2005. La baisse est modeste et lente mais non négligeable et surtout, elle est en accélération sur les 2 dernières périodes. Mais elle demeure toutefois beaucoup plus marquée dans le reste du monde. Concomitamment à la baisse de la pauvreté, nous observons aussi une baisse de l'inégalité. Nous terminons ce chapitre par une réflexion sur l'effet de la transition démographique sur la croissance économique et la pauvreté en ASS et dans les autres pays en développement. En effet, la chute de la fertilité et de la mortalité couplées à un exode rural font que le nombre de famille se démultiplie du fait de la transition vers des tailles plus réduites. Ceci impose plus de contraintes (et donc peut avoir un impact négatif) sur la croissance économique et risque de sous-estimer le niveau réel de pauvreté. Il convient, une fois que la pauvreté matérielle et ses tendances ont été bien calculées avec les biens durables (et la transition économique prise si possible en compte), de tester la validité de cette méthode en la confrontant avec les résultats issus de l'analyse monétaire de la pauvreté. Les EDS ne comportant pas données d'information sur la consommation, nous nous sommes tournés vers une autre source de données. Dans le chapitre 2, nous avons testé la robustesse de notre méthode dans le cas particulier du Ghana, en utilisant les enquêtes du Questionnaire Unifié sur les Indicateurs de Base de Bienêtre (QUIBB), et en confrontant les résultats issus de la méthode ACP avec ceux issus de la méthode traditionnelle monétaire et trouvons grosso modo les mêmes résultats (10% de baisse avec la méthode monétaire traditionnelle et 7% avec notre méthode sur la période 1997- 2003). Ceci valide donc le fait que la méthode que nous proposons (à savoir, mesurer le bienêtre et la pauvreté par les biens durables des ménages) est tout aussi valide que la méthode plus traditionnelle utilisant des métriques monétaires. Une analyse fine dans le cas du Ghana montre que la baisse de la pauvreté est due à une croissance économique particulièrement pro-pauvre mais aussi à des dynamiques intra et intersectorielles (réallocation des gens des secteurs moins productifs vers ceux plus productifs) et aussi une forte migration des campagnes vers les villes. Nos simulations montrent que les migrants ruraux ont aussi bénéficié de cette croissance dans les villes où ils trouvent plus d'opportunités. 2- Une fois établie que la pauvreté est en recul en ASS, nous avons voulu mesurer la tendance de la santé de sa population (approximée par les taux de mortalité infantile et infanto-juvénile). Nous discutons dans le chapitre 3 de trois méthodes pour estimer et comparer les taux de mortalité des enfants : - la méthode des cohortes fictives (sur laquelle l'équipe de l'EDS se base pour estimer les taux « officiels » de mortalité), - la méthode non paramétrique (Kaplan et Meier) que privilégient un certain nombre d'économistes et - la méthode paramétrique (Weibull) de plus en plus utilisée pour sa souplesse et sa robustesse. Les deux premières méthodes ont tendance à sous-estimer le vrai niveau de mortalité et de ce fait nous avons privilégié le Weibull. De plus, avec cette dernière, nous pouvons évaluer l'effet de chaque variable spécifique (comme l'éducation ou l'accès à l'eau) sur le niveau de mortalité. Une étude des déterminants de cette mortalité montre qu'outre l'effet attendu de l'éducation des mères, l'accès aux infrastructures de santé (soins médicaux et surtout prénataux durant et lors de l'accouchement) et sanitaires (accès aux toilettes et dans une moindre mesure à l'eau potable) en sont les principaux facteurs. L'effet de richesse joue peu en ASS (mais pas dans le reste du monde), une fois que nous contrôlons pour le lieu de résidence (urbain) et le niveau d'éducation. Ce résultat nous surprend quelque peu, même s'il a été trouvé dans d'autres études. Ensuite, nous avons calculé la mortalité prédite des enfants. De toutes les régions du monde, l'ASS a le niveau de mortalité le plus élevé (par exemple en moyenne 107 décès pour la mortalité infantile contre 51 pour le reste du monde, soit plus du double). Ce résultat était toutefois attendu. Par contre nous avons été quelque peu surpris en ce qui concerne les tendances. Le constat est que sur les 15 ans, la mortalité des enfants a très peu ou pas du tout baissé dans le sous-continent africain (et est même en augmentation dans certains pays, alors qu'ils enregistrent une baisse de la pauvreté matérielle sur la même période). En moyenne, considérant les enfants de moins d'un an, les taux sont passés de 95%o à 89.5%o pour remonter à 91.5%o pour les 3 périodes 1990-1195, 1995-2000 et 2000-2005. Ainsi sur 15 ans, la mortalité infantile n'a baissé que de 3 points et demie en moyenne et surtout, elle remonte sur la période 1995-2005. Un examen des taux de malnutrition des enfants confirme ces tendances. On pourrait dire que ces résultats sont plutôt encourageants et normaux si on fait une analyse d'ensemble du sous-continent. En effet pour l'ensemble de l'ASS, cette légère baisse semble en conformité avec la baisse de 5 points des taux de pauvreté matérielle (63% en 1990-1995 à 58% en 2000-2005). Mais l'ordre de grandeur est faible en termes de magnitude, et surtout si compare au reste du monde où on observe une baisse de la mortalité beaucoup plus conséquente. Mais c'est l'arbre qui cache la forêt. Une analyse plus fine par pays montre en effet une situation plus contrastée. Notre postulat de départ nous dit que sur une période suffisamment longue, une amélioration de bien-être s'accompagne d'une amélioration de la santé. Or on constate que certains pays qui connaissent une baisse de la pauvreté matérielle connaissent également une recrudescence de la mortalité des enfants. Pour une même année, ce résultat peut être normal, traduisant un simple décalage pour que l'amélioration de bien-être se traduise par un meilleur état de santé de la population. Mais à moyen terme (période de 5 ans), nous observons la même absence d'effet. Nous sommes donc face à un paradoxe qu'il nous faut comprendre et tenter d'expliquer. Une des pistes pour comprendre ces résultats est d'analyser la performance des systèmes de santé en Afrique. Les facteurs qui expliquent notamment cette performance sont : des facteurs « classiques » comme la performance économique des périodes passées, les montants et l'allocation des dépenses de santé, l'organisation des systèmes de santé, la baisse de la fourniture de services de soins de santé (vaccination, assistance à la naissance, soins prénataux, soins curatifs, .), la malnutrition, le SIDA, les guerres, la fuite des cerveaux notamment du personnel médical, etc., à côté de facteurs plus « subtils » ou ténus car moins saisissables comme les crises financières des années 1990s qui ont plombé certaines des économies de la sous-région, la qualité des soins, la corruption et les dessous-de-table, l'instabilité de la croissance économique (même si elle est positive), etc. La seconde voie que nous examinons pour expliquer le manque de résultat en santé dans certains pays concerne l'inégalité en santé et ceci fait l'objet de notre dernier chapitre. 3- Expliquer l'absence de lien entre santé et pauvreté dans certains pays de l'ASS : l'effet de l'inégalité en santé. Dans le chapitre 4, nous émettons l'hypothèse que le fort niveau d'inégalité dans l'accès aux services de santé et d'assainissement couplé à la faible performance du système de santé (avec en toile de fond l'impact du Sida) peuvent servir à expliquer en partie notre paradoxe. Nous considérons deux types de services : - soins de santé (vaccination, assistance médicale à la naissance et traitement médical de la diarrhée) et - hygiène et assainissement (accès à l'eau potable et à l'électricité, accès aux toilettes propres). Le choix de ces services est motivé par le fait que le modèle Weibull dans le chapitre 3 nous montre que toutes choses égales par ailleurs, ils sont cruciaux pour la survie des enfants, en particulier en Afrique. Les niveaux d'accès montrent une baisse tendancielle des taux pour les services de santé (surtout pour la vaccination) et une légère augmentation de l'accès à l'électricité et dans une moindre mesure à l'eau potable. L'accès aux toilettes propres demeure un luxe réservé à une petite fraction de la population. Pour les calculs d'inégalité, nous considérons deux indicateurs: - l'indice de concentration (pour mesurer le niveau moyen d'inégalité) - et l'élasticité-revenu du Gini (inégalité « à la marge » quand le revenu d'un individu ou d'un groupe augmente d'un point de pourcentage). Globalement, les pays d'ASS ont un niveau d'inégalité beaucoup plus élevé comme on s'y attendait par rapport au reste du monde. Pour les tendances, nous remarquons que l'inégalité marginale s'accroît pour les services d'assainissement (eau, toilette et électricité), mais qu'elle diminue pour les soins de santé. En ce qui concerne l'inégalité moyenne, elle indique une disproportion dans l'accès des classes riches par rapport à celles pauvres. Même si les groupes pauvres « rattrapent » ceux riches dans la provision de certains services, cela se fait de façon trop lente. De fait, le haut niveau d'inégalité couplé à une recrudescence de cette inégalité à la marge pour certains services tendent à annihiler les effets positifs de la croissance économique et de la réduction de la pauvreté et maintiendraient la mortalité, la malnutrition et la morbidité des enfants en Afrique à des niveaux relativement élevés et plus particulièrement concentrées dans les groupes les plus pauvres. Tout ceci appelle à des politiques économiques, sociales et sanitaires pour renverser fortement les tendances de la mortalité des enfants. En particulier, nos résultats suggèrent qu'il faudrait que les pays Africains puissent entre autres : - accroître les services de soins de santé, notamment les soins préventifs comme les services essentiels à la santé de l'enfant dès sa naissance (vaccination, services prénataux et assistance à la naissance), les soins curatifs et les campagnes de sensibilisation. - renverser la tendance baissière dans la provision des services sanitaires (eau, électricité, environnement et assainissement, prise en charge des déchets, etc.). - améliorer la nutrition et l'environnement immédiat de ces enfants et les comportements des ménages (espacement des naissances, éducation des mères en matière de santé, etc.). - plus généralement comme le montrent d'autres études, il faudrait aussi améliorer la performance globale de leur système de santé en empêchant la fuite des cerveaux, en allouant un budget suffisant à la santé, en organisant mieux les différents organes, de même que les ciblages des politiques de santé, en empêchant la corruption, en améliorant la qualité (accueil, propreté des centres de soins, etc.), en équipant les centres en médicaments, vaccins, moyens de transport et de communication, etc. Intégrer si possible les systèmes plus traditionnels de soins (comme les matrones et les guérisseurs) et le secteur privé, de même qu'une meilleure organisation du système pharmaceutique. Ces politiques constituent un tout et doivent être mise en oeuvre rapidement, ou renforcées le cas échéant. A cette seule condition les pays Africains pourraient espérer rattraper leur retard dans les Objectifs du Millénaire.

Desde hace mucho tiempo, los Estados Unidos y Canadá tienen experiencia con la migración a gran escala, y siguen acogiendo a grandes flujos de inmigrantes legales. Las mujeres representan un porcentaje creciente de estos flujos internacionales. En ambos países, la mayoría de los inmigrantes legales son elegibles para la plena ciudadanía, y pueden acceder rápida o automáticamente a derechos políticos y mercados de trabajo, aunque los derechos estratificados son una realidad para los inmigrantes temporales e irregulares, también en el ámbito de la protección social. En el plano formal, las mujeres y los hombres disfrutan de estos derechos en igualdad de condiciones, pero la desigualdad de género persiste tanto en la política gubernamental como en los mercados de trabajo. Asimismo, el marco político y de política establecido recientemente en ambos países está influido por principios ideológicos neoliberales, lo que contribuye a la introducción de cambios en la política de migración, los mercados de trabajo y las prestaciones sociales que aumentan la vulnerabilidad de las mujeres migrantes ante las desigualdades estructurales. En la primera parte del documento se comparan los regímenes de migración establecidos en ambos países. El número de mujeres inmigrantes está incrementándose tanto en Estados Unidos como en Canadá, aunque la mayoría de ellas sigue dependiendo de los hombres. Los cambios en la política de migración que apoyan cada vez más la admisión de migrantes altamente cualificados han tenido lugar a mayor escala en Canadá; en la actualidad, el número de migrantes en ambos países que pertenecen a categorías "económicas" muy cualificadas supera el número de migrantes que ha llegado a estos países en el marco de categorías humanitarias de reunificación familiar y de asilo a los refugiados. Los requisitos en materia de admisión que ponen de relieve el capital humano perjudican a las mujeres procedentes de países en los que los recursos están principalmente en manos de los hombres. En los Estados Unidos, los migrantes correspondientes a la categoría humanitaria siguen prevaleciendo, aunque la competencia profesional es un medio "encubierto" para que un migrante temporal alcance la categoría de permanente. En el ámbito de las admisiones de refugiados, los cambios introducidos en las normas que rigen la selección de refugiados han fomentado la sensibilidad ante la situación de las mujeres en Canadá, pero el número de personas afectadas sigue siendo poco elevado. En ambos países, el número de migrantes correspondientes a categorías de entrada temporales ha aumentado en el último decenio. Las mujeres están presentes en categorías de entrada temporales que abarcan migrantes tanto muy cualificados como poco cualificados, cuyas perspectivas difieren considerablemente dependiendo de la ubicación del mercado de trabajo. Las iniciativas de política emprendidas en los últimos tiempos en ambos países proponen conceder la categoría temporal a los migrantes irregulares; tales propuestas podrían acercar los regímenes de migración norteamericanos a los modelos europeos del "trabajador invitado", aun cuando estos modelos hayan demostrado ser insostenibles en Europa. A continuación se examinan los entornos de trabajo. En los Estados Unidos y Canadá, la liberalización de los mercados de trabajo ha reforzado las jerarquías profesionales marcadas por la desigualdad de género, en las que las mujeres inmigrantes están con frecuencia en una situación de desventaja. Aunque las mujeres inmigrantes están presentes entre los trabajadores muy cualificados, inclusive en los países en desarrollo, también están desproporcionadamente presentes en las categorías más bajas de los servicios estratificados, en el sector manufacturero, y el comercio al por menor. Pueden observarse claramente patrones similares en lo que respecta al desempleo, el subempleo, las condiciones de trabajo y los ingresos. Derechos sociales reducidos que enfatizan la prestación de cuidados en la esfera privada brindan numerosas pero precarias oportunidades de empleo, a la vez que incrementan la carga de las mujeres en su propio ámbito familiar. El hecho de que los órganos competentes en la concesión de licencias no reconozcan los títulos adquiridos en el extranjero constituye un gran problema en Canadá, y contribuye a las descualificación y el subdesempleo de las mujeres inmigrantes. En ambos países, la acción afirmativa y la legislación relativa a la igualdad en el empleo que tienen por objeto combatir y rectificar la discriminación en el mercado de trabajo por motivos de raza y sexo se han visto perjudicadas por el compromiso político decreciente, la aplicación limitada de la legislación y un alcance restringido. Los derechos sociales se examinan en la última sección del documento. En el ámbito de los servicios de sentamiento, la devolución y descentralización de los servicios han trasladado la responsabilidad de los gobiernos federales a los gobiernos estatales y provinciales, que en muchos casos se asocian con empresas y organizaciones no gubernamentales. A pesar de los cambios que reconocen la creciente necesidad de las mujeres de recibir educación lingüística en Canadá, los fondos destinados a tales fines no han variado desde mediados del decenio de 1990. Una cuestión que afecta particularmente a las mujeres inmigrantes en lo que respecta a la disminución de los derechos de los inmigrantes es la elegibilidad para recibir una pensión de jubilación. A pesar de que se les otorgan pensiones reducidas, universalmente adjudicadas, a las personas mayores en ambos países; los migrantes que trabajan en el hogar, en los sectores informales, o las personas que llegan al país de acogida en una etapa posterior de su vida, muchas veces no son elegibles para los regímenes de pensión gubernamentales relacionados con el trabajo. La estratificación de las prestaciones sociales es más destacada en los Estados Unidos, en gran parte a consecuencia de dos características del régimen estatal de protección social establecido en este país. La primera es la considerable privatización del sistema de atención de salud, por lo que muchas veces los pobres no están asegurados y dependen únicamente de las prestaciones del programa Medicaid concedidas a personas supeditadas a un tope en los ingresos, o tienen que pagar en efectivo una onerosa atención médica. La segunda característica son los cambios en el ámbito de la asistencia social que niegan el acceso a las prestaciones sociales a las mujeres solteras que no trabajan; que limitan el acceso durante toda la vida a dichas prestaciones a un período de cinco años, y que niegan completamente el acceso a tales prestaciones a los residentes permanentes legales que no han alcanzado la categoría de ciudadanos legales. En ambos países, la degradación de la protección social asociada con el énfasis neoliberal en la austeridad fiscal del gobierno y en una dependencia de la prestación de los servicios en el mercado tiene consecuencias desproporcionadamente negativas en los pobres, en particular en los inmigrantes pobres con un déficit educativo o lingüístico. Combinados con la liberalización de los mercados de trabajo, estos cambios pueden menoscabar el compromiso con los principios de la redistribución económica en América del Norte, y amenazar el bienestar de las mujeres que emigran a estos países. ; Abstract. The United States and Canada have long histories of large-scale migration, and they continue to welcome large flows of legal immigrants. Women make up an increasing proportion of these international flows. In both countries, the majority of legal immigrants are eligible for full citizenship rights and entitlements, with rapid or automatic access to both political rights and labour markets, although stratified entitlements are present for temporary and irregular migrants, and in the realm of social provision. Formally, women partake of these rights equally with men, but gender inequality persists both in government policy and in labour markets. In both countries, moreover, recent political and policy environments are influenced by neoliberal ideological principles, contributing to changes in migration policy, labour markets and social provisions that make female migrants increasingly vulnerable to structural inequalities. In the first part of the paper, migration regimes in the two countries are compared. Women are entering both countries in increasing numbers, though still primarily as dependants of men. Changes to migration policy that increasingly favour admissions of highly educated migrants have been enacted more extensively in Canada; entry in high-skill "economic" categories now exceeds entry through the humanitarian categories of family reunification and refugee asylum. Admission requirements that emphasize human capital penalize women who come from countries in which resources are highly concentrated in male hands. In the United States, humanitarian category entries still predominate, although high-skill temporary entry increasingly functions as a "back door" route to permanent status. In the realm of refugee admissions, changes in rules that govern refugee selection have increased gender sensitivity in Canada, but the numbers affected remain low. In both countries, numbers of migrants within temporary categories of entry have increased over the last decade. Women are present in temporary categories that encompass both high and low skill streams, with very different prospects depending on labour market location. Recent policy initiatives in both countries propose the granting of temporary status to irregular migrants; such proposals have the potential to move North American migration regimes closer to European "guest worker" models, even as these models have proved untenable in Europe. Next, gendered work environments are examined. In the United States and Canada, deregulation of labour markets has reinforced gendered occupational hierarchies in which immigrant women often hold disadvantaged places. While immigrant women, including those from the developing world, are present among highly skilled workers, they are also disproportionately visible at the bottom rungs of stratified service, retail and manufacturing sectors. Similar patterns are evident with respect to unemployment, underemployment, working conditions and earnings. Diminished social entitlements that emphasize private provision of care provide abundant, but also precarious, employment opportunities, while increasing women's burdens within their own families. Lack of recognition of credentials acquired abroad by licensing bodies is a serious issue in Canada, contributing to deskilling and underemployment among immigrant women. In both countries, affirmative action and employment equity legislation that seeks to oppose and redress labour market discrimination based on race and sex has been hobbled by waning political commitment, limited enforcement, and restricted reach. Social entitlements are examined in the final section of the paper. In the realm of settlement services, devolution and decentralization of services have relocated responsibility from federal governments to state and provincial governments, which frequently partner with businesses and non-governmental organizations. Despite changes that recognize women's greater need for language instruction in Canada, funding has remained static since the mid-1990s. One area of diminished entitlements for immigrants that particularly affects immigrant women is eligibility for pensions. Although small, universally awarded pensions are given to the elderly in both countries, migrants who work at home, in informal sectors, or who enter the country late in life are frequently ineligible for government pension plans that are work-related. It is in the United States that stratification of social benefits is most marked, largely as a result of two features of US welfare state provision. The first is the largely private health care system, in which the poor are often uninsured and must rely on means-tested Medicaid benefits, or pay cash for expensive medical care. The second is changes to social assistance that deny welfare access to single, non-working mothers, limit lifelong access to welfare to five years, and deny welfare completely to legal permanent residents who have not become legal citizens. In both countries, the erosion of social provision associated with neoliberal emphases on government fiscal austerity and a reliance on market provision of services is disproportionately felt by the poor, and especially poor immigrants with educational or language deficits. Combined with deregulation of labour markets, such changes both undermine commitment to principles of economic redistribution in North America, and threaten the well-being of women who migrate to these countries. ; Résumé. Les Etats-Unis et le Canada ont une longue expérience des migrations à grande échelle et continuent d'accueillir des flux importants d'immigrants réguliers. Les femmes tiennent une place croissante dans ces flux internationaux. Dans les deux pays, la majorité des immigrants réguliers remplissent les conditions requises pour jouir pleinement des droits liés à la nationalité et entrer dans le système de protection sociale. Ils ont un accès rapide ou automatique à la fois aux droits politiques et au marché du travail, bien qu'il existe une stratification des droits pour les immigrés temporaires et clandestins. Officiellement, les femmes jouissent de ces droits au même titre que les hommes, mais l'inégalité entre les sexes persiste, tant dans la politique gouvernementale que sur les marchés du travail. De plus, l'environnement politique et les politiques récentes ont été influencées dans les deux pays par les principes de l'idéologie néolibérale, qui contribuent, par les changements apportés à la politique de l'immigration, aux marchés du travail et aux dispositions sociales, à rendre les femmes immigrées de plus en plus vulnérables aux inégalités structurelles. La première partie du document compare l'immigration dans les deux pays. Les femmes sont de plus en plus nombreuses parmi les immigrants, bien qu'encore principalement en qualité de personnes à charge. Le Canada, plus que les Etats-Unis, a modifié peu à peu sa politique de l'immigration pour favoriser l'entrée de migrants hautement spécialisés; les immigrants "économiques" hautement qualifiés sont maintenant plus nombreux que les demandeurs d'asile et les migrants accueillis pour raison humanitaire au titre de la réunion des familles. Des conditions d'admission qui privilégient le capital humain pénalisent les femmes originaires de pays caractérisés par une forte concentration des ressources aux mains des hommes. Aux Etats-Unis, les entrées relevant de la catégorie humanitaire prédominent encore, bien que l'immigration temporaire soit pour beaucoup de travailleurs hautement qualifiés "l'entrée de service" qui leur permet de s'établir définitivement. Pour ce qui est des réfugiés, les changements apportés aux règles qui régissent leur sélection ont rendu le Canada plus sensible au sort des femmes, mais le nombre des réfugiées accueillies reste bas. Dans les deux pays, le nombre des immigrés qui arrivent en qualité de migrants temporaires a augmenté depuis dix ans. Il y a des femmes dans cette catégorie de migrants temporaires, dans laquelle entrent à la fois des professionnelles hautement qualifiées et des travailleuses peu qualifiées, et leurs perspectives sont très différentes selon leur situation sur le marché du travail. Dans les deux pays, des initiatives politiques récentes proposent d'accorder un permis temporaire aux migrants clandestins; de telles propositions pourraient rapprocher les régimes d'immigration nord-américains des modèles européens, même si ceux-ci se sont révélés intenables en Europe. Les auteurs étudient ensuite l'environnement de travail pour chaque sexe. Aux Etats-Unis et au Canada, la déréglementation des marchés du travail a renforcé la hiérarchie des métiers, dans laquelle les femmes immigrées sont souvent défavorisées. S'il existe des femmes immigrées, notamment de pays en développement, parmi les travailleurs hautement qualifiés, elles sont surtout visibles, et en nombre disproportionné, aux échelons les plus bas des services, du commerce de détail et des industries manufacturières. Le même schéma est patent pour ce qui est du chômage, du sous-emploi, des conditions de travail et des gains. Un système où les droits sociaux sont réduits et dans lequel l'accent est mis sur l'origine privée des soins offre de nombreux emplois précaires tout en alourdissant la charge des femmes dans leur famille. Au Canada, la non-reconnaissance de diplômes et qualifications acquis à l'étranger est un problème grave, qui contribue à la déqualification et au sous-emploi chez les femmes immigrées. Dans les deux pays, une volonté politique affaiblie a réduit l'application et la portée des mesures d'action positive et des lois relatives à l'équité dans l'emploi, adoptées pour combattre et compenser la discrimination fondée sur la race et le sexe sur le marché du travail. La dernière section du document est consacrée aux droits sociaux. S'agissant de l'aide à l'établissement, la décentralisation des services a entraîné un transfert des responsabilités du gouvernement fédéral à celui de l'Etat ou de la province, qui souvent s'allie avec des entreprises et des organisations non gouvernementales. Bien que l'on ait compris au Canada que les femmes avaient plus besoin de cours de langue que les hommes, le financement n'a pas augmenté depuis le milieu de la décennie 90. Si les droits sont parfois réduits pour les immigrants, il est un domaine dans lequel les femmes immigrées sont particulièrement touchées: celui des retraites. Bien que dans les deux pays, de modestes pensions soient versées à toutes les personnes âgées, les immigrés qui travaillent à domicile, dans l'économie informelle ou qui arrivent dans le pays à un âge avancé ne réunissent souvent pas les conditions requises pour bénéficier du régime de retraite public, qui dépend des années de travail. C'est aux Etats-Unis que la stratification des avantages sociaux est la plus marquée, en grande partie à cause de deux caractéristiques du système de prévoyance de ce pays. D'une part, le système des soins de santé est en grande partie privé, ce qui fait que les pauvres sont souvent sans assurance et dépendent des prestations de Medicaid, soumises à des conditions de ressources ou ils doivent payer comptant des soins médicaux coûteux. D'autre part, des modifications ont été apportées à l'assistance sociale, qui ont pour effet d'en refuser l'accès aux mères célibataires qui ne travaillent pas, de limiter à cinq ans la durée totale pendant laquelle on peut en bénéficier pendant sa vie et de la refuser totalement aux résidents établis régulièrement mais n'ayant pas acquis la nationalité du pays. Dans les deux pays, l'érosion de la prévoyance sociale, alliée à l'importance que prend l'austérité budgétaire dans un contexte néolibéral et à la confiance faite au marché pour fournir les services voulus, a des effets disproportionnés sur les pauvres, et plus particulièrement sur les immigrés pauvres peu instruits et handicapés par la méconnaissance de la langue. Avec la déréglementation des marchés du travail, ces changements à la fois ébranlent l'attachement aux príncipes de la redistribution économique en Amérique du Nord et menacent le bien-être des femmes qui y immigrent.

Public Policy and Ageing in Northern Ireland: Identifying Levers for Change Judith Cross, Policy Officer with the Centre for Ageing Research Development in Ireland (CARDI)��������Introduction Identifying a broad range of key public policy initiatives as they relate to age can facilitate discussion and create new knowledge within and across government to maximise the opportunities afforded by an ageing population. This article looks at how examining the current public policy frameworks in Northern Ireland can present opportunities for those working in this field for the benefit of older people. Good policy formulation needs to be evidence-based, flexible, innovative and look beyond institutional boundaries. Bringing together architects and occupational therapists, for example, has the potential to create better and more effective ways relevant to health, housing, social services and government departments. Traditional assumptions of social policy towards older people have tended to be medically focused with an emphasis on care and dependency. This in turn has consequences for the design and delivery of services for older people. It is important that these assumptions are challenged as changes in thinking and attitudes can lead to a redefinition of ageing, resulting in policies and practices that benefit older people now and in the future. Older people, their voices and experiences, need to be central to these developments. The Centre for Ageing Research and Development in Ireland The Centre for Ageing Research and Development in Ireland (CARDI) (1) is a not for profit organisation developed by leaders from the ageing field across Ireland (North and South) including age sector focused researchers and academics, statutory and voluntary, and is co-chaired by Professor Robert Stout and Professor Davis Coakley. CARDI has been established to provide a mechanism for greater collaboration among age researchers, for wider dissemination of ageing research information and to advance a research agenda relevant to the needs of older people in Ireland, North and South. Operating at a strategic level and in an advisory capacity, CARDI�۪s work focuses on promoting research co-operation across sectors and disciplines and concentrates on influencing the strategic direction of research into older people and ageing in Ireland. It has been strategically positioned around the following four areas: Identifying and establishing ageing research priorities relevant to policy and practice in Ireland, North and South;Promoting greater collaboration and co-operation on ageing research in order to build an ageing research community in Ireland, North and South;Stimulating research in priority areas that can inform policy and practice relating to ageing and older people in Ireland, North and South;Communicating strategic research issues on ageing to raise the profile of ageing research in Ireland, North and South, and its role in informing policy and practice. Context of Ageing in Ireland Ireland �۪s population is ageing. One million people aged 60 and over now live on the island of Ireland. By 2031, it is expected that Northern Ireland�۪s percentage of older people will increase to 28% and the Republic of Ireland�۪s to 23%. The largest increase will be in the older old; the number aged 80+ is expected to triple by the same date. However while life expectancy has increased, it is not clear that life without disability and ill health has increased to the same extent. A growing number of older people may face the combined effects of a decline in physical and mental function, isolation and poverty. Policymakers, service providers and older people alike recognise the need to create a high quality of life for our ageing population. This challenge can be meet by addressing the problems relating to healthy ageing, reducing inequalities in later life and creating services that are shaped by, and appropriate for, older people. Devolution and Structures of Government in Northern Ireland The Agreement (2) reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations in Belfast 1998 established the Northern Ireland Assembly which has full legislative authority for all transferred matters. The majority of social and economic public policy such as; agriculture, arts, education, health, environment and planning is determined by the Northern Ireland Assembly at Stormont. There are 11 Government Departments covering the main areas of responsibility with 108 elected Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLA�۪s). The powers of the Northern Ireland Assembly do not cover ��� reserved�۪ matters or ��� excepted�۪ matters . These are the responsibility of Westminster and include issues such as, tax, social security, policing, justice, defence, immigration and foreign affairs. Northern Ireland has 18 elected Members of Parliament (MP�۪s) to the House of Commons. Public Policy Context in Northern Ireland The economic, social and political consequence of an ageing population is a challenge for policy makers across government. Considering the complex and diverse causal factors that contribute to ageing in Northern Ireland, there are a number of areas of government policy at regional, national and international levels that are likely to impact in this area. International The Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing (3) and the Research Agenda on Ageing for the 21st Century (4) provide important mechanisms for furthering research into ageing. The United Kingdom has signed up to these. The Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing commits member states to a systematic review of the Plan of Action through Regional Implementation Strategies. The United Kingdom�۪s Regional Implementation Strategy covers Northern Ireland. National At National level, pension and social security are high on the agenda. The Pensions Act (5) became law in 2007 and links pensions increases with earnings as opposed to prices from 2012. Additional credits for people raising children and caring for older people to boost their pensions were introduced. Some protections are included for those who lost occupational pensions as a result of underfunded schemes being wound up before April 2005. In relation to State Pensions and benefits, this Act will bring changes to state pensions in future. The Act now places the Pension Credit element which is up-rated in line with or above earnings, on a permanent, statutory footing. Regional At regional level there are a number of age related public policy initiatives that have the potential to impact positively on the lives of older people in Northern Ireland. Some are specific to ageing such as the Ageing in an Inclusive Society (6) and others by their nature are cross-cutting such as Lifetime Opportunities: Governments Anti-Poverty Strategy for Northern Ireland (7). The main public policy framework in Northern Ireland is the Programme for Government: Building a Better Future, 2008-2011(PfG) (8) . The PfG, is the overarching high level policy framework for Northern Ireland and provides useful principles for ageing research and public policy in Northern Ireland. The PfG vision is to build a peaceful, fair and prosperous society in Northern Ireland, with respect for the rule of law. A number of Public Service Agreements (PSA) aligned to the PfG confirm key actions that will be taken to support the priorities that the Government aim to achieve over the next three years. For example objective 2 of PSA 7: Making Peoples�۪ Lives Better: Drive a programme across Government to reduce poverty and address inequality and disadvantage, refers to taking forward strategic action to promote social inclusion for older people; and to deliver a strong independent voice for older people. The Office of the First Minister and deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) have recently appointed an Interim Older People�۪s Advocate, Dame Joan Harbison to provide a focus for older peoples issues across Government. Ageing in an Inclusive Society is the cross-departmental strategy for older people in Northern Ireland and was launched in March 2005. It sets out the approach to be taken across Government to promote and support the inclusion of older people. The vision coupled with six strategic objectives form the basis of the action plans accompanying the strategy. The vision is: ���To ensure that age related policies and practices create an enabling environment, which offers everyone the opportunity to make informed choices so that they may pursue healthy, active and positive ageing.�۝ (Ageing in an Inclusive Society, Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, 2005) Action planning and maintaining momentum across government in relation to this strategy has proved to be slower than anticipated. It is proposed to refresh this Strategy in line with Opportunity Age ��� meeting the challenges of ageing in the 21st Century (9). There are a number of policy levers elsewhere which can also be used to promote the positive aspects of an ageing society. The Investing for Health (10) and A Healthier Future:A 20 Year Vision for Health and Well-being in Northern Ireland (11), seek to ensure that the overall vision for health and wellbeing is achievable and provides a useful framework for ageing policy and research in the health area. These health initiatives have the potential to positively impact on the quality of life of older people and provide a useful framework for improving current policy and practice. In addition to public policy initiatives, the anti-discrimination frameworks in terms of employment in Northern Ireland cover age as well as a range of other grounds. Goods facilitates and services are currently excluded from the Employment Equality (age) Regulations (NI) 2006 (12). Supplementing the anti-discrimination measures, Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (13), unique to Northern Ireland, places a statutory obligation on public authorities in fulfilling their functions to promote equality of opportunity across nine grounds, one of which is age(14). This positive duty has the potential to make a real difference to the lives of older people in Northern Ireland. Those affected by policy decisions must be consulted and their interests taken into account. This provides an opportunity for older people and their representatives to participate in public policy-making, right from the start of the process. Policy and Research Interface ���Ageing research is vital as decisions in relation to policy and practice and resource allocation will be made on the best available information�۝. (CARDI�۪s Strategic Plan 2008-2011) As outlined earlier, CARDI has been established to bridge the gap to ensure that research reaches those involved in making policy decisions. CARDI is stimulating the ageing research agenda in Ireland through a specific research fund that has a policy and practice focus. My work is presently focusing on helping to build a greater awareness of the key policy levers and providing opportunities for those within research and policy to develop closer links. The development of this shared understanding by establishing these links between researchers and policy makers is seen as the best predictor for research utilization. It is important to acknowledge and recognise that researchers and policy makers operate in different institutional, political and cultural contexts. Research however needs to ���resonate�۪ with the contextual factors in which policy makers operate. Conclusions Those working within the public policy field recognise all too often that the development of government policies and initiatives in respect of age does not guarantee that they will result in changes in actual provision of services, despite Government recommendations and commitments. The identification of public policy initiatives as they relate to age has the potential to highlight persistent and entrenched difficulties that social policy has previously failed to address. Furthermore, the identification of these difficulties can maximise the opportunities for progressing these across government. A focus on developing effective and meaningful targets to ensure measurable outcomes in public policy for older people can assist in this. Access to sound, credible and up-to-date evidence will be vital in this respect. As well as a commitment to working across departmental boundaries to effect change. Further details: If you would like to discuss this paper or for further information about CARDI please contact: Judith Cross, Policy Officer, Centre for Ageing Research and Development in Ireland CARDI). t: +44 (0) 28 9069 0066; m: +353 (0) 867 904 171; e: judith@cardi.ie ; or visit our website at: www.cardi.ie References 1) Centre for Ageing Research and Development in Ireland (2008) Strategic Plan 2008-2011. Belfast. CARDI 2) The Agreement: Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations. Belfast 1998 3) Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing. http://www.un.org/ageing/ 4) UN Programme on Ageing (2007) Research Agenda on Ageing for the 21st Century: 2007 Update. New York. New York. UN Programme on Ageing and the International Association of Gerontology and Geriatrics. 5) The Pensions Act 2007 Chapter 22 6) Office of the First Minister and deputy First Minister (2005). Ageing in an Inclusive Society. Belfast. OFMDFM Central Anti-Poverty Unit. 7) Office of the First Minister and deputy First Minister (2005). Lifetime Opportunities: Government�۪s Anti-Poverty and Social Inclusion Strategy for Northern Ireland. Belfast. OFMDFM Central Anti-Poverty Unit. 8) Northern Ireland Executive (2008) Building a Better Future: Programme for Government 2008-2011. Belfast. OFMDFM Economic Policy Unit. 9) Department for Work and Pensions, (2005) Opportunity Age: Meeting the Challenges of Ageing in the 21 st Century. London. DWP. 10) Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety (DHSS&PS) (2002) Investing for Health. Belfast. DHSS&PS. 11) Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety (DHSS&PS) (2005) A Healthier Future:A 20 Year Vision for Health and Well-being in Northern Ireland Belfast. DHSS&PS. �� 12) The Employment Equality (Age) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2006 SR2006 No.261 13) The Northern Ireland Act 1998, Part VII, S75 14) The nine grounds covered under S75 of the Northern Ireland Act are: gender, religion, race, sexual orientation, those with dependents, disability, political opinion, marital status and age.