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Is China rising in the Arab Gulf region as it is in other parts of world? Does China rise politically and militarily as well as economically in the region? Does its rise represent a golden opportunity for Arab Gulf states? Does China challenge the United States in the Arab Gulf region? What are the strategic responses of the Arab Gulf states toward China's rise? There is an ongoing debate among scholars of international relations (IR) and Asian studies regarding China's rise, its forms and types, its impacts on hegemonic power, international order, states' internal and external politics, and states' strategic responses toward this rise. Realists argue that any rising power will ultimately challenge the dominant power, seek to change the international order to its favor, attract or coerce by utilizing its increasing economic and military powers the other states to do what it needs and demands. In their view China is not an exception. This dissertation contributes to these discourses by examining if China is rising in the Arab Gulf region, what type is this rise, what it means to the Arab Gulf monarchies, and what are their strategic responses toward it. This dissertation finds the following: first, although China's recent increase in prominence and power is profoundly affecting some parts of the world, China is rising only economically in the Arab Gulf region. This rise is an 'infant energy-oriented economic rise.' Importing and exporting oil represent the bulk of Sino-Arab Gulf economic ties. In spite of ongoing and planned investments between China and the Arab Gulf states, these investments are mostly in the energy sector and relate mainly to building oil refineries and storage facilities in China in order to increase oil trade between the two sides. Also, although the Arab Gulf states and China are members in many economic forums and dialogues, these forums are merely 'talk shows' without any influence in strengthening ties between the two sides. Moreover, Arab Gulf states do not play a significant role in China's One Belt One Road initiative (OBOR). It can be stated that the mutual economic interests in energy sector are the wheels that have driven China's infant economic rise and paved the way for it.Secondly, China's rise today represents a limited opportunity for Arab Gulf states. China's increased economic power is not translated into superior security and military power. Also, although China and the Arab Gulf states are increasing their economic/energy ties, their security and military ties are insignificant compared to Arab Gulf states' ties with their traditional ally, the United States. Therefore, China lacks the ability to provide the Arab Gulf states with the security they need. Four factors set limits on China–Arab Gulf security and military ties: first China's support and strong political, economic, and military ties with rival states, namely, Iran and Syria. Second, China's influence over the Arab Gulf states' traditional allies specifically, Pakistan. Third, the Arab Gulf states' alliances with the United States. Although the US-Arab Gulf ties have witnessed major political tensions after the events of September 11 and the Arab Spring, the United States will continue to be, for the next few decades, the region's protector. Fourth, China's fear of being entangled in the region's security issues and their impacts on China's internal stability, mainly the fear of Sunni radical Islam and its links to and impact on Muslims in China.Thirdly, the Arab Gulf states studied here—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman—are pursuing a "dual hedging" strategy against China and the United States. The strategy has two dimensions. First, they are hedging against the danger that China poses to them by its stance on the region's security issues. The Arab Gulf states find that China's approach in their region is threatening their stability and survival. Therefore, while maintaining and increasing their economic and commercial ties with China, they are also strengthening military ties with the United States as well as taking steps on their own to build their militaries. This first dimension of the strategy enables them to cope with indirect threats that China poses to them because of its position regarding the Arab Gulf region's security matters and support of Iran and Syria. Second, the Arab Gulf states are hedging against the possibility that the United States might someday abandon them. They are utilizing growing economic and commercial ties with China to signal to the U.S. that the Arab Gulf region is no more dominated by the United States. And there is a new power in their region that is willing to strengthen its ties with them without irritating them by interfering in their internal political issues, a new rising power that is perceived by the U.S. as threat to its power and hegemony. Finally, a new rising power that made the U.S. change its foreign and security policies toward the Arab Gulf and 'pivot to Asia.' The Arab Gulf states realize that maneuvering between the two powers, the U.S. as the security power, and China as the economic power, is their only strategic choice to fulfil their security and economic needs simultaneously, therefore, securing themselves externally and internally.Fourth, it is Iran, not Saudi Arabia, which is viewed by China as its primary strategic ally, economic, and security partner in the region. China and Iran cooperate extensively and comprehensively in economic, political, and security aspects. Both are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which is a vital organization in Central Asia, that paves the way for them to upgrade and solidify their security, political, and economic cooperation.This dissertation applies qualitative methods of research, including online archival research, physical archival research and interviews. Personal interviews with political officials, retired diplomats, scholars, writers, and journalists were conducted in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

Lusíada. Direito. - ISSN 2182-4118. - S. 2, n. 19 (2018). - p. 57-67 ; In the global arena where we live, we, citizens of the world, with different nationalities, backgrounds, creeds and cultures, share the same space nevertheless maintaining our identity and cultural heritage. A new concept of citizenship is laid on multiculturalist societies, without, in many cases, engagements of cultural fusion with the host country and, those particular values, creeds and cultural manifestations, that we inherit and cherish, are being maintained abroad. Tolerance and respect for others are the main principles to accomplish and protect, in this cultural patchwork. Distinguishing the individuality and autonomy of each human being and, therefore, his cultural background, his religion, his creeds, in his new home, the country he chose as his own, aiming, in each case, and for all, the intrinsic values universally recognized to man based on the human dignity. Although today we can recognize hostile indicators to globalization, such as some actual protectionist policies mainly dealing with terrorism or the migrant crisis, however, the fact is that itinerant movements around the world have made countries a true cultural mosaic and, in many cases, for that, challenges are modelled, especially legal ones dealing with controversial relations. In this context, the year of 2018 ended with a decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), whose critical analysis we propose to engage. The matter is related on the applicability of the Sharia law – the Islamic religious law –, and the Mufti jurisdiction, opposing the applicability of the national law of the State in which the case was judged, in casu, the Greek Law. The Hellenic Court admitted the applicability of the Sharia law and accordingly, the material solution of this Islamic rule in opposition to the Greek Civil Code. The case brought to the ECtHR has also the peculiarity of being, first, a question of international private law considering a multiple localization of the lex rei sitae and, for that fact, the merit of the same case is still being judged, at the present moment, in another country (Turkey). Considering historical reasons and international obligations, the Hellenic Republic allows Greek citizens, of the religious Muslim minority and residents in Western Thrace, to use, in their disputes, the Sharia law and the Mufti jurisdiction. There is, in these cases a real parallel legal system and the Sharia Law can prevail, even if in conflicted solutions. The Court, sitting as a Grand Chamber delivered, on 19 December 2018, the judgment on the case of Molla Sali v. Greece (Application no. 20452/14). Nevertheless, curiously, the Strasburg Court, in this most expected judgment, at the end decided, "not to decide". However, the controversy has been launched and the case raises interesting questions mainly whether, or not, the applicability of national legislation can be excluded and accepted the solution of the Sharia law and the Mufti jurisdiction in the European Space. ; Na aldeia global em que vivemos, nós, cidadãos do mundo, com diferentes cidadanias, credos e acervos culturais, partilhamos o mesmo espaço físico, mas mantendo a nossa identidade e herança culturais. Um novo conceito de cidadania emergiu, assente no multiculturalismo, muitas vezes, sem que haja homogeneização cultural com o país que nos acolhe e, por isso, valores, credos e manifestações culturais próprias do estrangeiro são acarinhadas e mantidas. A tolerância e respeito pelos outros são princípios a cumprir e proteger, nesta manta de retalhos cultural. Distinguindo a individualidade e autonomia de cada ser humano e, por isso, a sua herança cultural, a sua religião, os seus credos, na sua nova casa, aquela que escolheu como sua, mas, em todo o caso, e para qualquer uma das posições em que nos encontremos, dentro dos valores intrínsecos universalmente reconhecidos assentes na dignidade humana. Ainda que hoje se possam identificar manifestações adversas a movimentos de globalização, como em políticas protecionistas muitas relacionadas com o terrorismo ou a gestão da crise migratória, é reconhecido que a itinerância de pessoas à volta do mundo tornou os países verdadeiros mosaicos culturais e, em muitos casos, por isso, desafios são lançados mormente ao nível legal na gestão de relações de conflito. Neste contexto, o ano de 2018 terminou com uma decisão do Tribunal Europeu dos Direitos do Homem (TEDH), cuja análise critica nos propomos fazer. O busílis da questão está relacionado com a aplicabilidade da lei da Sharia – a lei religiosa Islâmica – e a jurisdição Mufti, em detrimento da aplicabilidade da lei do Estado onde o caso foi julgado, in casu, na Grécia. A decisão helénica trazida perante o TEDH está relacionada com a aplicabilidade da lei da Sharia, no Espaço Europeu, que o Estado admitiu e, para além disso, com solução material conflituante com a que resulta do Código Civil Grego. O processo trazido perante o TEDH tem a particularidade de se tratar, primeiro, de um caso de direito internacional privado, uma vez que o conflito é plurilocalizado dando-se cumprimento ao princípio da lex rei sitae e, por isso, o mérito da questão está também (e ainda) a ser julgado noutro país (Turquia). Por razões históricas e consequentes obrigações internacionais o sistema legal grego moldou-se e permite que cidadãos nacionais, da minoria religiosa muçulmana e residentes em Trácia possam, nas suas relações controvertidas, ver aplicadas as soluções da lei Islâmica, sob a jurisdição Mufti. Há, nestes casos, um verdadeiro sistema legal paralelo em que, em caso de conflito, a lei da Sharia pode prevalecer. O Tribunal decidiu a 19 de dezembro de 2018 o caso Molla Sali vs. Grécia (Processo n.º 20452/14). Não obstante, curiosamente, o Tribunal de Estrasburgo, nesta muito aguardada decisão, acabou por "não decidir". Mas, a controvérsia está lançada e o caso suscita interessantes questões sobretudo relacionadas com a aplicabilidade da lei da Sharia, e da jurisdição Mufti, com eventuais soluções díspares com a lei nacional do Estado.

This research is aimed to discover the interrelation between marital satisfaction, religiouscommitment and marital commitment globally and based on its types, personal, moral, andstructural. The sampling of the research is 315 persons, with age 20 until 58 years old. The resultof the research shows there is a significant correlation between marital satisfaction and maritalcommitment, religious commitment and marital commitment, marital satisfaction together withreligious commitment and marital commitment. It is also discovers that marital commitmentinfluences personal commitment and moral commitment, while religious commitment influencespersonal commitment, moral commitment, and structural commitment.Keywords: marital satisfaction, religious commitment, marital commitment Abstrak Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui hubungan antara kepuasan pernikahan, komitmen beragama, dan komitmen pernikahan secara global dan menurut tipenya, komitmen personal, moral, dan struktural. Partisipan penelitian ini adalah berjumlah 315 orang, berusia 20 hingga 58 tahun. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukan bahwa terdapat hubungan signifikan antara kepuasan pernikahan dan komitmen pernikahan, komitmen beragama dan komitmen pernikahan, kepuasan pernikahan bersama dengan komitmen beragama dan komitmen pernikahan. Juga diketahui bahwa kepuasan pernikahan memiliki pengaruh terhadap komitmen personal dan komitmen moral. Sementara komitmen beragama memiliki pengaruh terhadap komitmen personal, komitmen moral, dan komitmen struktural. Kata kunci: kepuasan pernikahan, komitmen beragama, komitmen pernikahan References Abbott, D., Berry, M. and Meredith, W. (1990). Religious Belief and Practice: A Potential Assetin Helping Families. Family Relations, 39(4), p.443.Adams, J. M. & Jones, W. H. (1999). Interpersonal commitment in historichal perspectives. InHandbook of Interpersonal Commitment and Relationship Stability. New York: SpringerScience+Business Media.Agnew, H. (2009). 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Terrorism has been one of the most documented and studied phenomena of the 21 st century. After the end of the Cold War, the dichotomized views of the West and a deranged infinitesimal number of Muslims seemed to present a case for a clash of civilizations. Islamic terrorist groups were baying for the downfall of unlslamic Arab governments to make way for a transnational Islamic state administered by Sharia. The US and her "lackeys" were perceived to be supporting Arab states in putting political Islam down and in the 1990s became the priority target of lslamic terrorists. The long-arm of jihadism first shocked Australia when Jemmaah Islamiyah, once Southeast Asia's largest and most sophisticated terrorist organization, killed 202 people in Bali in 2002. Subsequent years bred subsequent terror as JI bombings repeatedly rocked the Indonesian archipelago. Little did many realize, much less those who purported to be experts in the field, that this jihadi fervor had long existed on Indonesia's islands and that there were deeply entrenched historical grievances these groups held that went far beyond the factor of external "Arab" ideological influence. The impact of the Darul Islam rebellion in the early years of the Indonesian republic has been the most salient source of a domestically developed jihadi narrative of the 20th century. This narrative has mythologised the deeds of mujahidin (holy warriors) while, at the same time, perpetuated aparanoia of Christian evangelism and an embittered feeling for the secular-orientation of the Indonesian state. This narrative has constituted a central source' of inspiration for succeeding generations of mujahidin wannabes. The founders of Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar, were two such wannabes. Jemmah Islamiyah did not become operational until after the death of Suhgkar in 1999. Under the feeble leadership of Bashir the organization experienced a schism of sorts after the first Bali bombings. Hit hard by arrests and a loss of popular support, the ideological foundations of JI have fractured into three streams that express distinctly different ideas of jihad. The first, headed most prominently by Abu Rusdan, believes indiscriminate bombings are invidious, that the community is not yet ready to wage jihad and that dakwah (proselytisation) needs to be carried out until it is. This long-term view of jihad still aspires to an Islamic state administered by Sharia and still encourages terrorist training and hateful sermons. The second, a Ia the deceased 2005 Bali bombings mastermind, Noordin Mohammed Top, takes a much more immediate and internationalist approach to jihad. It advocates repeated bombings performed by a disparate collection of cells that work towards the same goal and targets: Westerners and Western interests. The third, epitomized by the Dulmatin-Aman Abdurrahman training camp uncovered in Aceh last year, seeks to create a qaidah amanah (safe base) in which to implement Sharia, build a strong and committed community and proto-Islamic government. This base becomes the first building block of an Islamic state and is from where military attacks are then carried out on the godless kufir (infidel) armies. These streams are by no means exclusive, their membership is fluid, as is their organizational affiliations. For example, one niche, individual or 'freelance' jihad is of growing portent. It requires no organizational or societal sanction. Lastly, the most virulent and present latter two streams are quick to regenerate after police crackdowns and hard to detect. At the beginning of the 'War on Terror', governments stumbled through the dark, unsure of what or who the threat was, and they demanded analyses to light their way. Top on the list was radicalization: how and why does one come to the decision to engage in unconscionable acts of terrorism? Psychological profiling was largely unhelpful and there was no socio-economic evidence that could draw the silhouette of the depraved masses as the profile of the modern Islamic extremist. As the threat to Western nations became better understood, the field of Indonesian terrorism continued to suffer a dearth of scholarly inquest. Today, this dearth is as persistent as ever and new ideas about the radicalization process are sorely in arrears. The research conducted for this paper fleshes a new insight into the field. As the very empirical International Crisis Group reports make plain, terror networks in Indonesia revolve. around familial bonds (brought about by marriage and a family history of involvement in Islamism in particular), networks of pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) and the fraternity of Islamic ikhwiyah (brotherhood). These characteristics make Indonesian radicalization an exceptional case to the rest of the world. It also differentiates the step-by-step process of radicalisation in Indonesia, which becomes more complex to untangle and see in a linear fashion. Lastly, socialisation produces individuals in Indonesia that are more susceptible to the preachings of charismatic senior religious figures and the in-group dynamics that bind members together in terrorist networks. Coupled with the above characteristics, these factors result in an exacerbated likelihood that an individual will be radicalised. The onus to act has fallen ever more heavily on Susilo Bambang Yudhiyono's shoulders. Years of publicly steely rhetoric has now fallen short and his policy position, hesitant over its potential to incense backlash of perceived thoghut (unlslamic) oppression, has been galvanized to a serious head-on confrontation. This has been in the face of public outcry over a string of recent bombings and Islamic vigilante violence. It would be overly dramatic to say Indonesia is poised over some precipice. Increasing the prosperity of the average Indonesian by dradicating corruption, improving public infrastructure and attracting investment are far more important issues. However, Indonesia is at a place where long-term policies to excise Islamic terrorism can be realized before the momentum is lost and the country falls back into the same pattern of attack-crackdown-regenerate that has allowed jihadism to survive.

Im Kontext des religiösen Konflikts in Südkorea entstand die Idee zu dieser Untersuchung. Meine Vision ist, einen Beitrag zu leisten, wie man diesen Konflikt mit religionspädagogischen Erkenntnissen minimieren kann. Ferner geht es um die Frage, wie die Religionspädagogik angesichts der religiösen Pluralität funktionieren kann. In dieser Arbeit wurde davon ausgegangen, dass die aktuelle Problematik des religiösen Konflikts in der Rolle der Religionspädagogik im Kontext der religiösen Pluralität adaptiert werden kann. Im Rahmen der christlichen Schulreligionspädagogik habe ich untersucht, mit welchem Ziel, mit welchem Inhalt und mit welchen Methoden der Religionsunterricht an den Schulen erteilt werden soll. Die südkoreanische religiöse Situation kann durch die Koexistenz der vererbten traditionellen Religionen (z.B. Konfuzianismus, Buddhismus sowie Cheondogyo) und der überlieferten Religionen (z.B. evangelisches Christentum, Katholizismus und Islam) als pluralistisch charakterisiert werden. Hinzu kommen erhebliche Anteile Konfessionsloser und Atheisten. Religiöse Vielfalt ist Teil heutiger Lebenswirklichkeit in Südkorea. Sie erscheint meines Erachtens mit einem doppelten Gesicht. In der Außenperspektive sieht sie harmonisch aus, so als ob sich die verschiedenen Religionen respektvoll und friedlich zueinander verhalten. Aus der inneren Sicht jedoch lassen sich vielschichtige Spannungen zwischen den Religionen erkennen. Dies hängt damit zusammen, wie die Religionen sich zueinander verhalten. In der Geschichte Koreas haben die Religionen in sozialen Aufgaben (z.B. Unabhängigkeitsbewegung gegen Japan, Demokratisierungsbewegung gegen Diktatur, Umweltschutz, sowie die Wiedervereinigung Koreas) zusammengearbeitet und sich gegenseitig positiv beeinflusst. Im Gegensatz dazu sind die religiösen Konflikte sowohl in der politisch geprägten als auch in der privaten Gesellschaft seit Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts entstanden. Diese Konflikte haben sich zwar nicht intensiviert, aber sie wurden im Lauf der Zeit vielfältig und haben sich verschärft. In dieser Studie untersuchte ich den wesentlichen Grund für den religiösen Konflikt zwischen Buddhismus und evangelischem Christentum unter religionssozialwissenschaftlichen und theologischen Aspekten. Die Gründe der religiösen Konflikte wurden aus unterschiedlichen Blickwinkeln betrachtet. Aus der Perspektive des evangelischen Christentums liegt der Hauptgrund dafür in der fundamentalistischen Theologie bzw. in einer extrem konservativen Tendenz der Kirchen. Im evangelischen Christentum wird aus meiner Sicht die religiöse Pluralität eher als ein Hindernis der Missionierung denn als eine Bereicherung wahrgenommen. Wie Kyoung-Jae Kim erläutert, befindet sich das evangelische Christentum auf dem Weg der dogmatischen Verhärtung. Dieser Überblick über die religiöse Situation Südkoreas zeigt deutlich, dass die religiöse Toleranz, Aufgeschlossenheit und Anerkennung gegenüber anderen Religionen für das Zusammenleben unabdingbar ist. Darüber hinaus habe ich die pädagogische Notwendigkeit des Religionsunterrichts in der Schulbildung festgestellt. Wie Folkert Doedens und Jürgen Lott konstatierten, ist Religion eine konstitutive Komponente umfassender allgemeiner Bildung und das Fach Religion ein unaufgebbarer Bestandteil des Fächerkanons in den öffentlichen Schulen. Aus diesem Verständnis ergeben sich zwei wichtige Aufgaben: zum einen ist die aktuelle Situation des Schulreligionsunterrichts in Südkorea kritisch zu analysieren, zum anderen sind die neuen religionspädagogischen Impulse außerhalb Südkoreas vergleichend heranzuziehen. In der ersten Aufgabe geht es um die Frage, wie und mit welcher strukturellen Form der Religionsunterricht sich angesichts der religiösen Pluralität bis heute entwickelt hat. Hinter der zweiten Aufgabe steckt das Problem: die Schulen stehen in Südkorea vor der Herausforderung, eine mögliche Reform und die zukünftige Gestalt des Religionsunterrichts bzw. alternative Konzepte des Religionsunterrichts zu prüfen und zu realisieren. Diese Studie hat beide Richtungen bearbeitet. Hinsichtlich der ersten Aufgabe wurde im zweiten Teil dieser Arbeit aufgezeigt, wie die staatlichen Lehrpläne des Religionsunterrichts und deren Inhalte von dem ersten bis zum siebten Lehrplan verändert wurden. Tatsächlich wurde und wird der Religionsunterricht konfessionell nur in den Missionsschulen erteilt. Die Diskussionen verliefen in den zurückliegenden Jahren zwischen einem konfessionellen und einem religionskundlichen Konzept. Hier werden die Konfessionaltiät und die Neutralität des Religionsunterichts als wesentliche Komponenten angesehen. Diese beiden Punkte beziehen sich auf die Asymmetrie der Zielsetzung für den Religionsunterricht zwischen den Missionsschulen und dem Bildungsministerium. Es lohnt sich in diesem Kontext für Südkorea, einen neuen Weg zu finden. Es ist klar, dass es im Schulreligionsunterricht in Südkorea nicht mehr so sehr darum gehen kann, eine bestimmte religiöse Botschaft zu vermitteln, sondern vielmehr darum, die Suchprozesse der Schülerinnen und Schüler im Kontext der religiösen Pluralität hilfreich zu begleiten. Dies bedeutet, dass die religiöse Pluralität im Religionsunterricht ernst genommen wird und sie im Sinne einer Aufgabe und Herausforderung des Religionsunterrichts fokussiert wird. Darüber hinaus erfordert die religiöse Pluralität ein Einübungsfeld, in dem die Schüler die religiöse Vielfalt selber mit Toleranz voreinander erleben. Denn die Erziehung zur Toleranz beginnt schon mit dem Schulbeginn. In der Zukunft soll für die Schülerinnen und Schüler unterschiedlicher religiös-kultureller Prägung ein integrierender Schulreligionsunterricht genau so obligatorisch sein wie für andere Schulfächer. Für einen religiösen, pluralitätsfähigen Religionsunterricht spielt das Kennenlernen und das Verstehen von anderen Mitschülern eine große Rolle. Die grundlegenden Informationen über andere Religionen, die tolerante Offenheit und die Dialogfähigkeit werden als wesentlich angesehen. Sie wurden durch den Vergleich mit den bundesrepublikanischen drei Ansätzen, LER, KRU, Hamburger Modell aus dem religionspädagogischen Aspekt ausführlich erläutert. Als alternatives Konzept wird das interreligiöse Lernen beschrieben. Die kontextuellen Hintergründe für die Notwendigkeit des interreligiösen Lernens sind wie folgt: (1) die Schüler sollen von den anderen Schülern durch eine intensive Verständigung miteinander lernen. Denn die Schule ist zu verstehen als ein Bildungsort für Kinder und Jugendliche unterschiedlicher sozialer, kultureller, weltanschaulicher und religiöser Herkunft. (2) die veränderte gesellschaftliche Situation bzw. der Zuwachs der Migration machen das interreligiöse Lernen unerlässlich. (3) als gesellschaftliche Aufgabe sollte der Religionsunterricht zu einem möglichst konfliktfreien Zusammenleben beitragen. In diesem Sinne ist Religionspädagogik eine Praxistheorie. Um die neuen religionspädagogischen Impulse aufzuzeigen, wird Deutschland als Beispiel herangezogen. Zwar ist die religiöse Situation in Deutschland etwas anders als in Südkorea. Aber die religiöse Pluralität und Modernisierung sind identische Komponenten. Wie oben erläutert wurde, geht es in der koreanischen religiösen Situation um die friedliche Koexistenz zwischen herkömmlichen Religionen - und damit einer kulturellen Tradition von ca. 2000 Jahren - und der christlichen Religion. Im Gegenzug geht es in der religiösen Situation in Deutschland darum, wie man in einem traditionell christlichen Land mit einer wachsenden Anzahl von nicht christlichen Mitbürgern und insbesondere von Muslimen umgehen soll. Auffällig ist, dass die religiöse Kluft zwischen West- und Ostdeutschland als ein zukünftiges mögliches Vorbild für ein wiedervereinigtes Land Korea gelten kann. In beiden Ländern ist und bleibt Religion eine wichtige Dimension menschlichen Lebens und gesellschaftlichen Zusammenlebens. Daneben wird klar, dass das Christentum in Deutschland sich mehr als in Südkorea auf dem Säkuralisierungsprozess befindet. In der Zeitung Welt wurde konstatiert: "In 20 Jahren werden weniger als 50 Prozent der in Deutschland lebenden Menschen einer der beiden großen Kirchen angehören. Derzeit sind es rund 60 Prozent, nämlich 23 Millionen Protestanten und 24 Millionen Katholiken, deren Gesamtzahl alljährlich um rund 500.000 sinkt, und zwar hauptsächlich durch Todesfälle." Maria Jepsen hat dieses so formuliert: "Je stärker sich die Religion - dann auch die Religiösität oder als Spiritualität bezeichnet - individualisiert und pluralisiert, desto weniger kann ein didaktischer Zugang zu Kindern und Jugendlichen von der geprägten Sprache kirchlicher und dogmatischer Tradition ausgehen." Damit hängt eng zusammen, dass die Bedeutung der religiösen Erziehung sowohl in der Famile als auch in den Religionsgemeinschaften abnimmt. Dementsprechend wächst die Bedeutung des Religionsunterrichts an den Schulen. Dies ist ein gemeinsames Phänomen in beiden Ländern. Von daher kann und soll der Schulreligionsunterricht insbesondere für Kinder und Jugendliche bedeutsam sein. Trotz dieses kontextuellen Unterschiedes haben sich die religionspädagogischen Bemühungen angesichts der multikulturellen und multireligiösen Lebenszusammenhänge nach einer entsprechenden einleuchtenden Didaktik in beiden Ländern entwickelt. In Südkorea koexistieren das konfessionelle und das religionskundliche Konzept. Dem gegenüber gibt es in Deutschland dazu die didaktischen Bemühungen für das ökumenische, interkulturelle und interreligöse Lernen. In der Tat wurden sie in Deutschland ausführlicher diskutiert. In den meisten Bundesländern findet Religionsunterricht in seiner grundgesetzlich abgesicherten Form als konfessionell ausgerichteter christlicher Religionsunterrricht statt. Es gibt noch andere Ansätze, wie der Religionsunterricht anders erteilt werden kann. In dieser Arbeit wurden die drei repräsentativen Ansätze in Deutschland dargestellt, LER, KRU, das Hamburger Modell. Das Charakteristikum von LER ist der Anspruch der Neutralität. Konfessionalität erweist sich dagegen als Kernpunkt des konfessionell-kooperativen Ansatzes in Baden-Württemberg. Demgegenüber ist die dialogische Schülerorientierung ein wesentliches Element im Hamburger Modell. Durch den Vergleich ist ersichtlich, dass eine konzeptionelle Gemeinsamkeit zwischen dem koreanischen Lehrplan des Religionsunterrichts und LER besteht. Die beiden Modellversuche sind charakterisiert durch die Neutraltiät des Religionsunterrichts und weisen keine Verbindung mit den Religionsgemeinschaften auf. Tatsächlich wurde über ökumenische und interreligiöse Ansätze für den Schulreligionsunterricht in Südkorea noch nicht ernsthaft diskutiert. Trotz der großen Unterschiede zwischen beiden Ländern hinsichtlich des Religionsunterrichts und seines juristischen Hintergrundes des Schulwesens, der religiös-gesellschaftlichen Situation sowie der Schülerschaft wurde der Grundgegensatz - die Konfessionaltiät und die Neutralität - auch in Deutschland diskutiert. Darüber hinaus wurden die Themen "Identität und Verständigung" und "Dialog und Toleranz" in die Diskussion eingebracht. Diese Diskussionen um das interreligiöse Lernen - "Identitätsbildung durch Beheimatung oder durch Begegnung" und "wie man das Andere verstehen kann bzw. wie man das Andere in seiner Andersheit anerkennen kann" - sind auch für die koreanischen Missionsschulen notwendig. Von den dargestellten Ansätzen werden drei religionspädagogische Merkmale unter Berücksichtigung des Verhältnisses zwischen Buddhismus und evangelischem Christentum präsentiert: (1) Lebensweltlich- und schülerorientierter Religionsunterricht, (2) Dialog und Perspektivenwechsel, (3) Lehrkraftwechsel, Team Teaching in Übereinstimmung mit dem Lehrplan. In LER wird der erste und der zweite Aspekt unterstrichen. Daneben wird der dritte Aspekt in KRU besonders hervorgehoben. Im Hamburger Modell wird der zweite Aspekt einschließlich mit den beiden anderen akzentuiert. Die drei Aspekte müssen im konkreten Kontext in Südkorea durch die Auseinandersetzung mit Lehrerschaft, Theoretikern und Schülern übertragen werden. Heute wird religiöse Bildung in der Schule immer wichtiger - für die eigene Verwurzelung und Identität der Kinder und Jugendlichen, für religiöse Urteilsfähigkeit, für Sinnfindung und Orientierung in der Welt sowie für Verständigungsfähigkeit und Toleranz. Daher soll die christliche Religionspädagogik bzw. das religiöse Lernen in der Situation der religiösen Konflikte bzw. angesichts der religiösen Pluralität grundsätzlich zu einem besseren Verständnis des eigenen Glaubens beitragen und zu mehr Respekt gegenüber Menschen anderen Glaubens. Ich betone die Notwendigkeit, in der Schule ein Wissen über die Religionen mit ihren vielfältigen Erscheinungs- und Ideenwelten als kulturell maßgebliche sowie identitäs-und gemeinschaftsstiftende Bestimmungsfaktoren in unserer Gesellschaft zu vermitteln. Aufgrund dieser Einsichten erscheint es mir notwendig, das Ziel des Religionsunterrichts und die Rolle der Schulreligionspädagogik als Friedenserziehung angesichts der religiösen Konflikte in Südkorea neu wahrzunehmen.

On 4 January 2011, a twenty-six-year-old Tunisian street-vendor named Muhamed Bouazizi, driven to desperation after a spate of abuse at the hands of government officials, doused himself in petrol and set himself alight. While by all accounts Bouazizi's self-immolation should have passed unnoticed, his act of defiance sparked a revolution that led to the overthrow of Tunisia's autocratic leader Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and influenced similar regional movements. Bouazizi was declared a martyr, not for Islam, although he was a Muslim, but, to quote his mother, "all of the Tunisian people."1 He was constructed as a secular figure, whose sacrifice transcended the parochial boundaries of class, religion and nationality through his single act self-destructive defiance. The framing of Bouazizi's death as martyrdom was counter to the conventional popular understanding of martyrdom in the west, which, following the 9/11 attacks on America, has been narrowly conflated with suicide bombing. The attacks led to a plethora of works written by academics clamoring to explain the phenomenon of the 'suicide martyr' to an increasingly insecure public fearful of religious extremists bent on sacrificing themselves as a martyr. In the course of critiquing all of Middle Eastern society in one broad swathe, prominent Orientalist scholar Bernard Lewis ruminated that "if the peoples of the Middle East continue on their present path, the suicide bomber may become a metaphor for the whole region, and there will be no escape from a downward spiral of hate and spite, rage and self-pity, poverty and oppression."2 Conversely, the emergence of the supposed religious phenomenon of the martyr is, in Lewis' view, indicative of the regions' historical failure to join in the project of modernization. Taking Bouazizi's martyrdom as an inspiration, my broader intent with this paper is to counter the view that martyrdom is solely a religious phenomenon, and to show how the martyr has been constructed in particular historical situations as a secular politicized figure. There is more to martyrdom than suicide bombing, and by understanding the complexity and variety of these representations, I hope to contribute to the scholarship that recognizes the maturity and depth of contemporary Middle Eastern political and social culture. Before I do so I would like to briefly outline what it is I mean when I use the words 'secular' and 'martyrdom', two terms whose definitions in popular and academic discourse are amorphous at best. While in contemporary usage secularity has come to mean almost anything not of or relating to religion, this sharp distinction has little analytical utility in the study of how cultural and religious concepts become codified in nationalist discourses. Anthropologist Talal Asad has written extensively on the conceptual linkages between supposed secular and religious ontologies, particularly in regard to the fluidity of contemporary cultural transmission and the way the modern state constructs and promotes its own legitimacy. In Formations of the Secular Assad quotes Charles Taylor, who defined secularity as the "attempt to find the lowest denominator among the doctrines of conflicting religious sects."3 Benedict Anderson placed religious communities as the conceptual antecedents to the modern nation state in his lauded Imagined Communities, arguing that individuals of differing cultures and languages would nonetheless understand each other through the shared ideographs of their religious traditions.4 Secularity then, if we are to take Anderson and Asad's arguments, is not simply a concept's state of 'not being of' or 'not relating to' religion but may also be a concept whose constituent parts can be shared and commonly understood across religions, cultures and temporal spaces. Martyrdom is one of Anderson's shared ideographs in that while different communities and cultures conceptualize martyrdom in widely divergent ways, there is a basic narrative structure that each can share in. While the term 'martyr' in English, and its Arabic analogue 'shahid', are both rooted etymologically to the secular act of 'witnessing' in a legal context,5 it was adopted as a loanword in the Christian, Jewish and Islamic traditions to refer to one who had died for their faith. It was within these faiths that martyrdom acquired a specific narrative and descriptive format. "In it's purest form," writes Samuel Z. Klausner, "martyrdom is a voluntary, conscious, and altruistic readiness to suffer and offer one's life for a cause."6 A martyr is generally presented as a hero fighting for a cause, who, although foreeseing harm done to them by their opponents, carries on despite the risk. Who can, and cannot be a martyr varies, as civilians, fallen soldiers, politicians, and public leaders have all, at one point or another, been memorialized by Middle Eastern communities as martyrs. When the son of Syrian leader Hafez al-Assad was killed in a car accident in 1990, for example, government run news agencies referred to him as a martyr to the state.7 Mohammad Bouazizi, as mentioned before, was hailed as a martyr to the Tunisian revolution. The framing of these two incredibly dissimilar figures as martyrs attests to the malleability of martyrdom, and was made possible, in part, by the reconceptualization of martyrdom as a secular concept that took place in the Middle East throughout the 20th century. In the broader study of the links and divergences between the secular and the religious in the Middle East, we must, in the words of Talal Asad, "discover what people do with and to ideas and practices before we can understand what is involved in the secularization of theological concepts in different times and places."8 By examining how martyrdom was conceptualized and formed in the modern Middle East, we can get a broader view of the ways in which the cultures of the region mediate and augment their cultural practices and respond to the ever-shifting challenges they face. ; Arts, Faculty of ; History, Department of ; Unreviewed ; Undergraduate

Rouham,Yamout:American University of Beirut Rita,Giacaman:Community and Public Health ; With the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, about 700 000 Palestinians were dispossessed and dispersed, mostly to neighbouring countries. Roughly 100 000 Palestinians fled to Lebanon and now 400 000 are living there, most in refugee camps. Although tolerated by the Lebanese Government and population, with their basic needs supported by the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Palestinian refugees are subjected to regulations that hinder their opportunities to seek employment and ownership of property, thereby restricting their integration into society and compromising their wellbeing. In a study of the quality of life and wellbeing of Palestinians living in the occupied Palestinian territory, a team from Birzeit University, Ramallah, West Bank, investigated classic and war-related indicators of insecurity in the Gaza Strip 6 months after the Israeli war during the winter of 2008—09, using locally developed scales for the measurement of insecurity and individual distress. We assessed the relevance and validity of the two scales as measures of wellbeing for Palestinian refugees living in camps in Lebanon. Methods Researchers from Lebanon undertook six focus group discussions to investigate notions of relevance to the quality of life and wellbeing of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and modified the questionnaire used in the Gaza Strip, without changing its psychometric properties and without modifying the questions in the scales to be studied. In this pilot study, households were selected from four Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon to represent the different areas—north, south, Beirut, and Dbayeh (only functional refugee camp hosting Christian Palestinians, whereas the refugees in the others are Sunni Muslim). Every other household was selected in Beddawi and one in every three households in Burj el-Barajneh and Ein el-Helweh, and all households were approached in Dbayeh. In the camps of Beddawi, Burj el-Barajneh, and Ein el-Helweh, the fieldworkers stopped gathering data when the sample size of 100 individuals was attained, whereas in Dbayeh this number could not be achieved. One adult respondent from every household was randomly selected according to Kish tables, with alternating of men and women—ie, the person answering the door was asked to list the male or female adult members of the household. Indicators of insecurity and individual distress were analysed after application of the cutoffs used in the Gaza Strip study. χ2 and logistic regression analyses were done to identify the association between the dependent variable—reports of high insecurity—with demographic, socioeconomic, and health factors, and with objective and subjective factors related to the political and legal conditions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. This study was approved by the Institute of Community and Public Health Ethical Review Committee, West Bank. Data gatherers obtained verbal informed consent from the household members selected before their participation in the study. Findings 356 (94%) of 378 adults who were approached by the fieldworkers responded—101 in Beddawi, 100 in Burj el-Barajneh, 100 in Ein el-Helweh, and 55 in Dbayeh. All the indictors of insecurity and distress were the same as in the study undertaken in the Gaza Strip, with Chronbach's α showing good internal consistency for the insecurity scale (0·84) and for the individual distress scale (0·86). 134 (38%) respondents reported moderate to high amounts of individual distress and 121 (34%) reported high intensity of insecurity. A first logistic model, including demographic and socioeconomic variables, showed that insecurity was associated with living at Burj el-Barajneh refugee camp (49 [49%] of 100 vs 72 [28%] of 256 living in the other three camps surveyed), displacement of the family from another refugee camp (28 [55%] of 51 vs 92 [30%] of 303 whose families had not been displaced), and the respondents thinking that the camp was overcrowded (86 [43%] of 202 vs 35 [24%] of 148 who did not have a problem with the camp crowding). The results of a second model of all the variables that were significant in the bivariate analysis and adjusted for age, sex, and employment, showed that the odds of individuals reporting high insecurity were significantly higher in Palestinians living in the refugee camp at Burj el-Barajneh than in those living at Dbayeh (49 [49%] of 100 vs eight [15%] of 55, respectively; odds ratio 5·95, 95% CI 2·05—17·29); in individuals whose families had been displaced from another refugee camp than in those who had not been displaced (28 [55%] of 51 vs 92 [30%] of 303, respectively; 5·62, 2·67—11·85); in Palestinians who felt deprived than in those who did not (50 [43%] of 115 vs 69 [29%] of 237, respectively; 2·18, 1·22—3·89); and in individuals who felt estranged from their homeland than in those who did not (95 [41%] of 234 vs 23 [21%] of 109, respectively; 2·41, 1·28—4·53) Interpretation The security and distress measures developed in the Gaza Strip showed good internal consistency when applied to Palestinians living in refugee camps in Lebanon. Furthermore, high intensities of insecurity and distress were noted in Palestinians living in refugee camps in Lebanon, raising questions about the legal, political, and social conditions imposed on these individuals as determinants of their insecurity, life quality, and wellbeing. The results encourage testing and validation of the security and distress scales in Palestinian refugees in other Arab countries, and in other migrants, refugees, and people living in zones affected by war and conflict. Funding Medical Aid for Palestinians. Contributors RY is the principal investigator and drafted the Abstract. SF did the data analysis. NMEAR and RG participated in the concept and design of the study and reviewed the data analysis and the drafts. DH reviewed the consecutive drafts of the Abstract. All authors have read and approved the final Abstract for publication. Conflicts of interest We declare that we have no conflicts of interest.

Dwarfing the direct losses due to ruminant abortions and flock mortality, the main economic impact of RVF is systemic and ensues from the trade restrictions aimed at its containment. Indeed, past outbreaks of RVF in East Africa and Middle East came as disturbing events in a commercial context of high specialization in trade of small ruminants and interdependence between East-African exporters and the Middle-Eastern importing countries. The two successive bans imposed by Middle-Eastern countries on livestock products coming from the Horn of Africa in 1998-1999 and 2000-2002 highlighted this interdependence. Both bans caused an abrupt stop in exportations from IGAD countries. Nevertheless, the impact of the outbreaks motivating these bans differed due to their unique timing with regard to the Muslim celebrations that trigger the main flow of livestock from the Horn of Africa to Mecca. Hence, in 2000, the worst impact was observed on pastoralist households because the ban was imposed in September, prior to the Haj festival, when the main seasonal export flow had not been realized yet. Regarding the 1997 outbreak, the ban was implemented only in February 1998, after the main trade flow had occurred. The impacts of the bans on Somalia were particularly severe, due to the high specialization of the concerned region in an export-oriented livestock sector, benefitting from a niche market organized around the above-mentioned religious festivals and Arab consumers preferences. The country was all the more affected, as they own two main ports involved in this trade, i.e. Berbera (Somaliland) and Bossaso (Puntland). Prior to the bans, the size of the export market from Somalia to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates was estimated around US$600 million, with Saudi Arabia representing 66% of the total. The bans led the Somali livestock market to collapse. Losses for the livestock industry were estimated at US$109 million and US$326 million, for the first and second ban respectively. The government also directly incurred an important loss around US$45 million from foregone export taxes and docking fees. In the same time, livestock exporters lost a net cumulative profit of US$330 million, whereas producers estimated their annual losses at over US$8 million. Hence, the successive RVF-related trade bans impacted the employment rate, the public treasury, the exchange rate of national currency and thus, the price of imported goods, inducing a general inflationary pressure and important socio-economic upheavals. More generally, the livestock market in the whole East Africa was affected, due to the fall in prices caused by the loss of outlets for livestock. Using market equilibrium models taking these shocks into account, the impact of the trade bans on the Somali region of Ethiopia were estimated at a 36% fall of the GDP. Other impacts originated in the closure of markets inside East Africa, being part of national control strategies. In Kenya, e.g., the closure of the Garissa Market, which is a major outlet for Somali and Ethiopian livestock, resulted in a more than 25% decrease in the price of cattle, inducing a total loss of US$10 million for the value chain. The emergency destocking response of distressed households also participated to the fall in prices and worsening of terms of trade. Together with flock mortality and abortion, destocking moreover affects the herds' dynamics on the long run and the commercial potential of households. These mechanisms show greater impact on smallholders, due to threshold effects in livestock capitalisation and the loss in risk management ability in such variable environmental conditions. In the Middle East too, the bans showed drastic economic impacts. In Yemen, e.g., the bans caused a loss of US$15 million from foregone custom taxes and US$27 million profit losses for traders. The two bans, combined with the prolonged ban maintained till 2009 by Saudi Arabia on Somalia, contributed to a restructuration of trade within and between the two regions. Indeed, trade actors soon reorganized their activity, as highlighted through official figures, notwithstanding the importance of informal trade. Hence, Yemen and the United Arab Emirates appeared as major alternative entry points on Arab Peninsula for Somali livestock. The latter could also transit through Djibouti or Sudan to reach Saudi Arabia. Benefitting from the prolonged bans on Somalia, the port of Djibouti emerged as a major player in the region between 2006 and 2009, thanks to massive investment in port infrastructures and agreements with Saudi importers. Therefore the private sector played a considerable role in adapting to new risks. The Djibouti port diverted much of the livestock trade previously handled at the Berbera and Bossaso ports. On this occasion, as it has been the case in Somalia after ban lifting in 2009, the Middle East has been a source of investment for the Horn of Africa for biosecurity infrastructure. Finally, the second ban led to the emergence of Australia as a major livestock supplier for Saudi Arabia from 2000 till now, and to a certain a point Australia has been a country of major Saudi investments which is seen as another way of adapting for some major value chain agents. In the two last decades, the intraregional livestock trade grew rapidly in East Africa, spurred by the urban demand. Most of this trade is informal, thus lacking official figures. It nevertheless shows a great importance regarding poverty alleviation aspects, the small to medium actors being the main operators of this trade. In recent years, a considerable growth in recorded intraregional trade is noticed, mainly due to a growth of recorded exports from Ethiopia to neighboring countries, as a result of a policy aiming at the facilitation of registration procedures through the CAC/AP-system. As a conclusion, livestock export to Middle East and the growing intraregional East-African livestock trade are both threatened by RVF-linked bans due to loss of outlets and price volatility. Thus, stability of the livestock sector being crucial to human and economic development in the region, a high priority must be given to RVF prevention and control, as supported by figures of impact of past outbreaks. ; Peer reviewed

International audience ; The institutional frame into which N. K. Roerich and his collaborators wished to fit their actions has attracted little attention from historians, even though if one wants to understand how Roerich planned to fulfill his ideals, one cannot neglect the complex web created during his life in America, Europe, and Asia. This article aims to shed light on one of Roerich's numerous organizations, the "Association française du Roerich Museum de New York," created in Paris in June 1929. Relying on unpublished correspondence, this essay examines the network created by Roerich in his effort to persuade governments in Europe and elsewhere to ratify the so-called Roerich Pact. The Association's Russian section, consisting of a political branch and Siberian, Ossetian, Kalmyk, and Caucasian Muslim branches, attempted to win support from the French military, political, and scientific worlds, as well as from the Catholic Church. The three managers of the Association faced several obstacles which eventually doomed their work to failure. First, despite the stated mission of the Association to promote Franco-American cultural relations, it could not obtain official support from the United States because of the private status of the Roerich Museum, whose subsidiary it was. Second the methods of operation and, particularly, self-promotion imposed on the Association by the Roerich Museum proved entirely unsuited to the European context or to European tastes. Finally, the financial crisis and the revival of international tensions in the mid-1930s rendered the ideals promoted by the Roerich Pact obsolete in Europe. Meanwhile, discussions about Roerich's nationality, as well as about his political persuasion, implicitly cast doubt on the supposed neutrality of his Pact. Rumours spread in Paris by one of his ex-adepts raised suspicions that he was a Bolshevik, a Buddhist, or a Freemason. Moreover, his self-portraits in the guise of a wise Asian and the mysterious Banner of Peace symbol sparked incomprehension in the Vatican as well as in the Belgian and French Catholic worlds--just as the famed French Sinologist Paul Pelliot directed hostile skepticism at the claims made by Roerich and his son George to have discovered evidence of Christ's apocryphal sojourn in Ladakh. In order not to prejudice European governments against the Association, the Roerichs voluntarily curtailed the diffusion of Agni Yoga, with its advocacy of religious syncretism, in France. Two of the Association's managers appear not to have known anything about Roerich's spiritual teachings, or about his changing stance toward the Soviet Union. While adding to our understanding of the Russian emigration in France, this study of the Association between its creation in 1929 and the 1935 resignation of the two abovementioned managers, also shows the forced and artificial nature of its mission. Given the utopian project that underlay it, could things have been otherwise? ; Le cadre institutionnel dans lequel Roerich et ses collaborateurs ont souhaité inscrire leurs actions n'a guère suscité l'attention des historiens. Pourtant qui veut cerner la façon dont Roerich entendit réaliser ses idéaux ne peut négliger la nébuleuse d'organisations créées de son vivant en Amérique, en Europe et en Asie. Le présent article entend présenter l'une de ces organisations, celle créée en juin 1929 à Paris sous le nom d'" Association française du Roerich Museum de New York ". S'appuyant sur des correspondances inédites, cette présentation examine le mode de constitution d'un réseau de sociabilité dont le propos fut de contribuer à faire ratifier le Pacte Roerich par plusieurs États européens et extra-européens. Si l'Association disposa d'une section russe (composée d'une branche exclusivement politique et de branches sibérienne, ossète, kalmouke et musulmane du Caucase), elle visa essentiellement à s'intégrer à la société française et à se concilier les mondes militaire, politique et scientifique français, de même que l'Église catholique. Les trois collaborateurs de Roerich qui œuvrèrent au sein de l'Association furent confrontés à une série d'obstacles qui, à terme, marqua l'échec de leur action. D'une part, l'Association ne put espérer un soutien officiel des États-Unis en raison du caractère privé du Roerich Museum dont elle était la filiale (ce fait amène d'ailleurs à s'interroger sur ses prétentions à promouvoir les relations culturelles franco-américaines). D'autre part, les méthodes de travail imposées par le Roerich Museum s'avérèrent inadaptées à l'Europe. Enfin, avec la crise financière et la résurgence des tensions internationales, les idéaux pacifistes défendus par le Pacte Roerich devinrent, dès le milieu des années 1930, obsolètes en Europe. Dans le même temps, les interrogations sur la nationalité du peintre et sur son engagement politique remirent implicitement en cause la soi-disant neutralité de ce pacte. Des rumeurs répandues dans Paris par une ancienne adepte de Roerich l'accusèrent d'être bolchévique, mais aussi bouddhiste et franc-maçon. Il est un fait que ses portraits en sage asiatique tout comme l'intrigante symbolique de la Bannière de la Paix suscitèrent l'incompréhension. Les réactions du Vatican et des milieux catholiques français et belges en fournissent des exemples. À la même époque, les prétendues découvertes faites par Roerich et son fils Georges sur le séjour du Christ au Ladakh lui valurent l'hostilité d'un sinologue comme Paul Pelliot. Afin de ne pas nuire à l'action menée par l'Association auprès des gouvernements européens, la diffusion en France de l'Agni Yoga - qui prône un syncrétisme religieux - fut volontairement restreinte par Roerich et certains de ses collaborateurs. Deux des dirigeants de l'Association, Marie de Vaux Phalipau et Michel de Taube, semblent d'ailleurs n'avoir jamais rien su de cet enseignement spirituel, pas plus qu'ils ne semblent avoir été au courant du revirement de Roerich à l'égard de l'Union soviétique. Tout en apportant un éclairage original à l'histoire de l'émigration russe en France, l'étude de cette Association pour la période 1929 à 1935 (année de la démission des deux dirigeants évoqués plus haut) révèle le dynamisme exagéré et le caractère finalement artificiel de son action. Étant donné le projet utopique non-avoué qui la sous-tendit, pouvait-il vraiment en être autrement ?

341 p. ; Libro Electrónico ; This book is offered for consideration and critical reflection primarily by political science scholars throughout the world from beginning students to professors emeriti. Neither age nor erudition seems to make much difference in the prevailing assumption that killing is an inescapable part of the human condition that must be accepted in political theory and practice. It is hoped that readers will join in questioning this assumption and will contribute further stepping stones of thought and action toward a nonkilling global future. ; Este libro se ofrece a la consideración y la reflexión crítica sobre todo por los estudiosos de ciencias políticas en todo el mundo desde el principio a los estudiantes a los profesores eméritos. Ni la edad ni la erudición parece hacer mucha diferencia en la suposición dominante de que matar es una parte ineludible de la condición humana que debe ser aceptado en la teoría y la práctica política. Se espera que los lectores se unan a cuestionar este supuesto y que contribuirá aún más peldaños de pensamiento y acción hacia un futuro no alcanzar global. ; The long history of nonviolent cross-border interventions in situations of conflict constitutes a rich source of practical experience, of lessons learned. However, these lessons have never been drawn together and subjected to sustained scrutiny.In line with a new and comprehensive typology developed for this book, various examples of nonviolent cross-border direct interventions, which have been undertaken by activists rather than by humanitarian agencies, are described here and the lessons provided by these interventions are detailed. ; Contents Contents 7 Affirmation of the Global Nonkilling Spirit 13 For a Nonkilling World Report of the First Global Nonkilling Leadership Forum 15 Blessings of Acharya Shri Mahapragyaji 19 Opening Remarks 21 THE GLOBAL NONKILLING SPIRIT Hawaiian Spirituality of Nonkilling 27 Ha aheo Guanson Nonkilling in Buddhism 29 A.T. Ariyaratne The Global Nonkilling Spirit: Sources of Nonkilling Inspiration 31 Mairead Maguire Nonkilling in Hindu Tradition 33 Balwant "Bill" Bhaneja Humanism, Nonkilling, and Leadership 35 George Simson Roots of the Spirit of Nonkilling in Jainism 39 S. L. Gandhi Ants, Birds, Infants, and Humans: Notes on Islam and Nonkilling Politics 43 Chaiwat Satha-Anand Nonkilling in the Jewish Tradition 47 Alice Tucker Tao (Compassion) and Nonkilling 51 Rhee Dongshick Is a Nonkilling Haitian Voodoo Religions Possible 53 Max Paul THE CHALLENGE OF NONKILLING GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION Nonkilling Leadership and the Global Condition 61 Mairead Maguire Nonkilling Leadership for No-Poverty Development 67 A. T. Ariyaratne A Nonkilling World is Possible 71 Glenn D. Paige SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NONKILLING THESIS The Global Significance of the Nonkilling Thesis: The Ethics Link 79 Abdel-Salam Majali "Harmony is Most Valued": To Build a Harmony World 85 Zhao Baoxu Nonkilling as a Common Value and Global Program for Action 89 William V. Smirnov Achieving the Nonkilling Society in Nigeria: The Role of the Teacher 93 A. M. Wokocha On the Global Significance of the Nonkilling Thesis 97 Jose V. Abueva TRANSLATIONS AND CULTURAL EXPERIENCES Obstacles Faced in Translation from English to Arabic 105 Faisal O. Al-Rfouh Ohimsa Visva Rajniti 109 Rashida Khanam A Great Honor to do Something for a Nonkilling World 113 Tang Dahua Komentaryo tungkol sa pagsasalin ng Nonkilling Global Political Science 115 Galileo S. Zafra Joies et peines de la traduction en fraçais de Nonkilling Global Political Science 119 Max Paul Globalizing Understanding of Nonkilling Capabilities 121 Joám Evans Pim and Bárbara Kristensen Nonkilling Global Political Science in Hindi 129 N. Radhakrishnan Note on the Japanese Translation 133 H. Henry "Hank" Fukui Korean Translator's Note on Nonkilling Experiences 135 Yoon-Jae Chung Nonkilling Global Political Science Malayalam Edition 137 N. Radhakrishnan On the Mongolian Translation 141 Batchuluun Baldandorj Translating Nonkilling Global Political Science into Russian 143 Galina Startseva Nonkilling Global Political Science Sinhala Translator's Experience 145 Sunil Wijesiriwardena Nonkilling Global Political Science traduction en kiswahili 151 Mabwe Lucien Nonkilling Global Political Science Tamil Edition 155 N. Radhakrishnan A Brief Report on Translation into Urdu 157 Syed Sikander Mehdi PUBLICATION OF ENGLISH EDITIONS From Oxford to Xlibris: Story of an America "Samizdat" 161 Glenn D. Paige Nonkilling Global Political Science's Indian Edition 163 N. Radhakrishnan On Publishing the Philippine Edition of Nonkilling Global Political Science 167 Jose V. Abueva The Nigerian Edition of Nonkilling Global Political Science 169 Fidelis Allen COMMUNITY AWAKENING EXPERIENCES Towards a Nonkilling Filipino Society 175 Jose V. Abueva Founding of the Centre for Global Nonviolence Nigeria 181 Fidelis Allen The CCNGD: Philosophy, Structure, Progress and Outlook 185 Max Paul La societé non meurtrière est elle possible en Afrique des Grands Lacs? 191 Mabwe Lucien LESSONS FROM NONKILLING LEADERSHIP EXPERIENCES Transforming Leadership 205 James MacGregor Burns Tolstoy and the Doukhobors 207 Koozma J. Tarasoff Nonkilling Leadership Lessons from Gandhi 215 N. Radhakrishnan Building Nonkilling Muslim Societies: Relevance of Abdul Ghaffar Khan 221 Syed Sikander Mehdi Lessons from the Life of Martin Luther King, Jr. 225 Bernard LaFayette, Jr. Nonviolent Buddhist Leadership of A.T. Ariyaratne 229 Arjuna Krishnaratne Lessons from the Nonviolent Political Leadership of Gov. Guillermo Gaviria 233 Luis Botero "She Belongs to the Ages" - Petra Kelly (1947-1992) 239 Nancie Caraway Leadership Legacy of Petra Kelly 243 Eva Quistorp Ron Mallone and the Fellowship Party 251 Glenn D. Paige Leadership Lessons from the Sarvodaya Party of India 255 T. K. N. Unnithan The Role of Nonviolence Advisor to the Governor of Antioquia 263 Luis Botero Advising Leaders on Nonkilling Politics 265 Chaiwat Satha-Anand INTRODUCTION TO TRAINING METHODS Educating Leaders for Global Understanding 271 Abdel-Salam Majali The TRANSCEND approach to simple conflicts 273 Johan Galtung Kingian Nonviolence Leadership Training 285 Bernard LaFayette, Jr. and Charles L. Alphin, Sr. Brief Overview of the Shantisena (Gandhi's Peace Brigade) 289 N. Radhakrishnan The Shanti Sena of Gandhigram Rural University 299 Dennis August Almeida Charter for a World Without Violence 319 Contributors 329

Pertev Tevfik Bey?in sahibi olduğu, Şehabettin Süleyman Bey?in başyazarlığını yaptığı Muahede gazetesi, 18 Ekim 1910 tarihinde İstanbul?da, "Demokrasi Mesleğinin Hâdim ve Müdâfii" künyesiyle yayın hayatına başlar. Günlük, siyasî, iktisadî ve edebî bir gazetededir. Yayım hayatı, II. Meşrutiyetin çalkantılı ortamında kısa sürer ve sadece 24 sayı çıkar. Demokrasinin ve özgürlüklerin memlekette yerleşmesi ve kanunların buna göre işlemesi için çalışan gazete, İttihat ve Terakki iktidarının politikalarını bu açıdan eleştirir. Ayrıca hükümetin meslek dışı atamaları da uygun bulunmaz. Sıkıyönetimin olduğu, hükümet aleyhine yazılar yazan gazetelerin kapatıldığı bir dönemde, hükümetin siyasî ve idarî hatalarını yazmaktan çekinmez. Hükümetin, meşrutiyetin ruhuna uygun demokrat bir şekilde hareket etmesini ister. Bu tarz bir yönetimin sergilenmesi ile meşrutiyetin tam manasıyla memlekette yerleşebileceğini ifade eder. Demokrasinin gelişmesinde basına önemli görevler düştüğünü belirten gazete, basını demokrasinin temel unsuru olarak görür. Basına getirilen sansürü eleştirerek, sansürün demokrasinin gelişmesinin önünü tıkadığını vurgular. Demokrasiye sıklıkla atıf yapan gazete, meşrutiyet, adalet, hürriyet, Kanun-ı Esasi ve demokrasi kavramlarının halk tarafından daha iyi anlaşılması için gazete sütunlarında bu kavramlara yer verir. Gazete, devletin, sosyal, iktisadî, idarî ve siyasî açıdan gelişmesini amaçlayan yayın politikası takip eder. Basının görevinin kamuoyunu her türlü gelişmelerden haberdar etmenin yanı sıra, ülkenin sorunlarını gündeme getirerek, hükümetin dikkatini bu sorunlara çekmek olduğunu belirten gazete, Anadolu insanının karşılaştığı sorunları ve güçlükleri ele alarak, bunların ortadan kaldırılması için hükümete telkinlerde bulunur. Matbuat Kanunu?na rağmen idarî zaafları, yolsuzlukları, usulsüzlükleri ve hataları cesurca ve korkusuzca ele alır. Ayrıca Osmanlıcılık siyasetini savunan gazete bu siyaset gereği, Türk ve Müslümanlarla birlikte Osmanlı Hristiyanlarının da sosyal, kültürel, idarî ve eğitim sorunlarını gazete sütunlarına taşır. Bununla gazete birlik ve bütünlükten yana bir yayın takip ettiğini ortaya koyar. Gazetede siyasî konular diğerlerine göre daha çok yer alır. Osmanlı Devleti?ndeki ve Avrupa?daki her türlü gelişmeden bahsedilir. Özellikle Avrupa?nın Osmanlı Devleti?ne karşı yürüttüğü politikalar gazete sütunlarına taşınarak kamuoyu bilgilendirilir. Gazetenin ilgi alanı Osmanlı Devleti?yle sınırlı değildir. Osmanlı Devleti?nin dâhilî ve haricî siyasetinin yanı sıra Avrupa?nın ve İran?ın siyasî ve sosyal vaziyeti ile dünyadaki her türlü siyasî, sosyal ve ekonomik gelişme gazete sayfasında yer alır. Özellikle Rusya?nın Balkanlarda ve Osmanlı Devleti?nin komşuları üzerinde sinsi politikalar takip ederek, bu bölgelerde meydana getirdiği karışıklıklar ele alınır. Çalışmada, II. Meşrutiyet Döneminin önemli siyasî kişiliği olan Pertev Tevfik ile sahibi olduğu Muahede gazetesi incelenmiş ve II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi fikir hayatına katkıları ele alınmıştır. ; The Muahede, which was owned by Pertev Tevfik Bey and edited by Şehabettin Süleyman Bey, began its publication life as newspaper in İstanbul on October 18, 1910 with the tag line "Demokrasi Mesleğinin Hâdim ve Müdâfii" (The Servant and Defender of Democracy). It was a daily newspaper with political, economic and literary content. Its publication life did not last long in the convulsive atmosphere of the Second Constitutional Era and only 24 issues were printed. The newspaper, which adopted the mission of promoting the ideas of democracy and liberties among the public, criticized the policies of İttihat ve Terakki (The Union and Progress Party) government especially with respect to these aspects. The publication did not hesitate to write about the political and administrative mistakes of the government even in a period when martial law was in effect and those newspapers writing against the government were closed down. It asked the government to adopt democratic means in accordance with the spirit of constitutionalism. The newspaper expressed the view that the regime of constitutionalism can be completely established in the country only with the implementation of a democratic government. While emphasizing the importance of the role the press must play in the development of democracy, the publication foregrounded the press as the essential element of a democracy. By criticizing the censorship practices, it asserted the idea that censorship was a barrier for the development of democracy. By frequently referring to the ideas of democracy, the articles in the publication often included terms like constitutionalism, justice, freedom, Kanun-ı Esasi (Main Constitution) and democracy, so that these terms could be better understood by the general public. The newspaper pursued a policy which aimed to promote the development of the state socially, economically, administratively and politically. The newspaper, which stated that the mission of the press was to place the problems of the society on the agenda, thereby directing the attention of the government to these problems, as well as informing the public about all kinds of developments, wrote about the problems and difficulties encountered by the people of Anatolia and tried to influence the government towards the solution of these problems. Despite the Press Law (Matbuat Kanunu), it bravely wrote about administrative weaknesses, corruption, abuse and mistakes. Moreover, as a supporter of the policy of Ottomanism, the paper also wrote about the social, cultural, administrative and educational problems of the Christian minorities, as well as those of the Turks and Muslims. However, the newspaper also emphasized its policy of supporting the unity and integrity of the state. Political issues dominated the contents of the newspaper. All kinds of developments in the Ottoman State and Europe were mentioned. Especially the European policies against the Ottoman State were included to inform the general public about these. The scope of interest of the publication was not limited to matters about the Ottoman State. In addition to articles about the domestic and foreign policy of the Ottoman State, developments in the political and social spheres of Europe and Iran, and news about the political, social and economic situation from around the world were included in the newspaper. Particularly, the sly policies pursued by Russia in the Balkans and against the neighbors of the Ottoman State, and the consequent disorder in these regions were discussed. In this paper, Pertev Tevfik Bey, who was an important political figure during the Second Constitutional Era, and the Muahede, which was owned by him, are studied in terms of their contributions to the intellectual scene of the Second Constitutional Era.

[SPA] La Iglesia Catedral de Santa María de Murcia, como edificio que siempre ha estado plenamente vivo, ha sido objeto desde su origen, como modificación de la mezquita musulmana, y a lo largo de su historia, de una considerable cantidad, tanto de transformaciones de su configuración inicial para adaptarse a las necesidades de cada momento, como de actuaciones de reparación y mantenimiento. Pero de todas ellas, solo consideraremos de «restauración», aquellas realizadas en la Catedral desde el momento en que se convierte en un Bien Patrimonial con valores histórico-artísticos expresamente reconocidos, categoría que adquiere a partir del 28 de marzo de 1928, cuando se declara Monumento Nacional la capilla de San Lucas o de los Vélez. Será, pues, esta fecha la que marque el punto de inicio del periodo que abarca la investigación en que se fundamenta este trabajo, que concluirá con las actuaciones realizadas en la primera década del siglo XXI. A través del análisis sistemático de las intervenciones desarrolladas en nuestro Conjunto Catedralicio durante estos casi cien años, contextualizadas en su ámbito histórico, político, administrativo y social y estudiadas desde el punto de vista de los criterios de intervención aplicados en ellas, como proyección de una determinada teoría de protección del Patrimonio Histórico y Cultural, será posible alcanzar los objetivos de la tesis: por una parte, realizar una pequeña aportación al conocimiento de la Catedral de Murcia, con la recopilación de la numerosa documentación existente derivada de dichas actuaciones. Por otra parte, determinar las consecuencias que dichas intervenciones tuvieron en la continua transformación que la edificación ha mantenido y mantiene a través del tiempo, no sólo desde el aspecto constructivo, arquitectónico o artístico, sino como Bien Cultural dotado de una serie de valores que debemos transmitir a las generaciones futuras. Con este fin quedan recogidos diferentes aspectos analizados en el trabajo: la configuración arquitectónica del conjunto, su evolución constructiva, las circunstancias legislativas y administrativas que afectaron a su conservación, la significación del monumento tanto para los responsables de su protección, como para la sociedad murciana, la relación que mantuvieron aquellos en aras de su tutela, a veces de fructífera colaboración, a veces en franca confrontación, y la repercusión que sus acciones tuvieron en la Catedral. Se reflejan igualmente los proyectos desarrollados por los diferentes arquitectos que trabajaron en el monumento desde el ámbito institucional, y sus criterios de intervención, así como aquellos trabajos efectuados por la propiedad, muchas veces sin las debidas garantías, comprobando la evolución del carácter y los criterios aplicados en todas estas actuaciones, ligada al devenir histórico, político, económico y social del ámbito en el que se desarrollaron. Se concluye el trabajo cuestionando cual debería ser el planteamiento de la tutela futura de la Catedral, teniendo en cuenta los aspectos la condicionan: la necesidad de profundizar en el conocimiento del monumento y la concienciación de todos aquellos agentes responsables de su preservación. ; [ENG] The Cathedral Church of Saint Mary in Murcia is a building which has always been completely active. Throughout its history and since its construction as a modification of the Muslim mosque, its original configuration has undergone a considerable number of transformations through reparations and modifications in order to adapt it to the needs of the times. However, of all these changes, we shall only consider as restoration the building amendments carried out on the cathedral since it became an official place of historical interest with specifically recognized historical and cultural values, a category which was obtained on 28th March 1928 when Saint Luke s Chapel, also known as the Vélez Chapel, was declared a National Heritage Site. This event marks the starting point for the period under investigation which forms the basis of this study concluding with the building modifications carried out in the first decade of the 21st century. Through the systematic analysis of the modifications carried out on the cathedral site over this period of nearly one hundred years it will be possible to achieve the objectives of the thesis. These changes will be placed in their historical, political, administrative and social contexts, and studied from the point of view of the restoration criteria applied to them, as a projection of a specific theory of historical and cultural heritage protection. Firstly, we can provide a small contribution to the knowledge of the Cathedral of Murcia by compiling a collection of the extensive documentation that exists as a result of these developments. Secondly, we can determine the consequences that these modifications have had, and are having, on the continued transformation of the building over time, not only for constructive, architectonic or artistic purposes, but also by considering the monument as a cultural treasure endowed with a series of values that we should transmit to future generations. In order to achieve this, the different aspects analysed in the study have been gathered together: the architectonic configuration of the historical site; the evolution of its construction; the legislative and administrative circumstances that affected its conservation; the significance of the monument for those responsible for its protection and for Murcian society; the relationships among those involved in its preservation, sometimes a fruitful collaboration, other times a frank confrontation; and what repercussions their actions have had on the cathedral. A reflection will also be made on the projects developed by the architects from institutional spheres who worked on the monument, and their restoration criteria, as well as those modifications carried out by the ownership, often without the necessary guarantees, considering the evolution of its character and the criteria applied in these restoration processes, grounded in the historical, political, economic and social setting in which they were developed. To conclude the study, we question how to conduct the future maintenance and conservation of the cathedral, taking into account the two main aspects affecting this matter: the need to improve our knowledge of the building and our awareness of all the players involved in its preservation. ; Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena ; Programa de doctorado en Arquitectura y Tecnología de la Edificación

Part five of an interview with Musa Ali of Fitchburg, Massachusetts. Topics include: Food in Saudi Arabia. His feelings about "the good old days." His feelings about life in the U.S. ; 1 SPEAKER1: So he told the judge how… eh, I told my wife 1A, the judge he say, "By gosh, even myself I bought 1A from my pocket to make it hundred. Sonny, go home." See my point the bigger, you make something just a little small before they gone around and turn come back to you, you find biggest story. SPEAKER2: Right. SPEAKER1: See? Then when you mix with bad people, you keep your mouth shut and if anyone say, if the person is bad even, say he's good. Then that person, he can't repeat and think about you. He says, "How is girl?" "Girl is the best." He can't say, "Mo says girl is bad girl." Because I said she's good. I don't care what you are. See? That's the best thing: never talk about any person in his back. See? This is my life and I'm gonna die the same thing, to all do it, to change. This my life and this my way. And my family the same. I will sometime go to Boston with my brother, 188 Mass. Ave., Boston, Leominster – same idea, same thing like me. SPEAKER2: Yeah, right. SPEAKER1: We don't believe talk about anybody. We love everybody. And nobody is small for us, nobody too big for us. SPEAKER2: You… you have more freedom, though, don't you think in this country to say what you feel? SPEAKER1: You say down there the same thing in Arabia. SPEAKER2: You do? SPEAKER1: Yes. SPEAKER2: Yeah. SPEAKER1: You say anything what you want. SPEAKER2: Some of the things you told me, though, like you can't even talk to a… say you couldn't talk to another woman, things like that. SPEAKER1: Yes, the girls, I mean, because the girls you have to respect. SPEAKER2: That's totally out of respect, don't you…?2 SPEAKER1: See, because in order to self, male and female, like a gas and match, you can't put match and gas together. Isn't it? It's natural. It's in nature. Look to our father Adam. When God bring Adam, you know that story from the dirt, right? SPEAKER2: Yeah. SPEAKER1: When you bring him, where you bring him? In Arabia, Jeddah. Adam. He started from mountain to mountain, right? When God make him sleep, He make Eve coming from his ribs. That's what we believe, isn't it? SPEAKER2: Yes. SPEAKER1: When he look he find female next to him. He don't wanna move no more. SPEAKER2: Yeah. SPEAKER1: Isn't it? SPEAKER2: True. SPEAKER1: All right. It is the first person in the world, he like female, okay? All right, how about we are? We see TV, sex, love story, a lot of acting, we human being. We have feeling just like anyone. See? And I think you have idea. I live in hot country and hot blooded. If something, you look at it [speaking in Italian] to prove to yourself, because a lot of thing you don't believe it till you see yourself. I'm going to talk a little deeper with you but you're old enough to know. The girls in this country, when she have like a lady, monthly, you know, she will be 10, 14, 15 years old, right? SPEAKER2: Mm-hmm. SPEAKER1: In India, you know how much? SPEAKER2: Eight? SPEAKER1: Eight or nine. SPEAKER2: Yeah. SPEAKER1: Why? Because hot country. All right, when she have her period, she could have a baby, right?3 SPEAKER2: Mm-hmm. SPEAKER1: Here is… sometime like it, I don't know what's English. Like impossible. Girls, 10 years old have a baby? It's impossible here. SPEAKER2: Right. SPEAKER1: But when you're going to India, it's not impossible. All right, number two: here if the snake bites you, you die. SPEAKER2: Right. SPEAKER1: In India, no, because they have poison. When the baby born, give her with the milk with the poison, see? In Arabia hot blooded. We can put the Arabian girl with the boy together. Like if you are engaged, you have to go with your mother or your brother or your sister with you when you go with your boyfriend. After you engaged you can, see, afraid, because nature automatic. When you go together, maybe one of them get weak. See? But when you keep both far away from each other, they can. They want but they can't. See? SPEAKER2: So you think that's a better custom… SPEAKER1: That's right. SPEAKER2: Than what we have here. SPEAKER1: Because like I say when they get married, they have to be the same and you can't go your life and not worth nothing. SPEAKER2: Yeah. SPEAKER1: Alas, you're gonna spoil her mother, father name. SPEAKER2: Yeah. SPEAKER1: Number three, the person who was with her can get killed, too. You're going to bring from his mother… from his mother, father. Come on, mister. You're the boss, you both get killed. And local man can't say nothing. SPEAKER2: No? SPEAKER1: No, siree. Local man can't say nothing. SPEAKER2: I find that so hard to believe.4 SPEAKER1: That's right. SPEAKER2: They will let that happen. SPEAKER1: Maybe you read even what the Arabs that years and years always Arabian girls cover her face. Why? Because when a person can see the face, you get a feeling. SPEAKER2: Yeah, true. I guess, yeah, that's right. SPEAKER1: See? SPEAKER2: Yeah. SPEAKER1: Here, you can wear like here. SPEAKER2: Mini-skirts, yeah. Yeah, you got feeling. SPEAKER1: You can't say nothing. SPEAKER2: Right. SPEAKER1: See? SPEAKER2: Do you think that your children, because they came to this country, had a better chance here than they would've back home or…? SPEAKER1: When they grow up… when they grow old, they wanna go back. SPEAKER2: They all wanna go back? SPEAKER1: Yeah, they're born here but will take a vacation once in a while. See? And they love it down there, because even the farm, every house you have a farm from the village. You have figs, grapes, apple, orange… SPEAKER2: Do you think the people have a lot to do with it because the people make you feel welcome that you naturally just love to go back there? SPEAKER1: Yes, anywhere. Even everything what you eat, you taste it, honey. SPEAKER2: You don't like… American food is so bland. Yeah. SPEAKER1: You eat the apple; you don't know what you eat. Eat orange; you don't know what you eat. No taste. But you go down there, when you take the orange from the tree, you take the lemon from the tree, you take the apple from the tree, difference smell, different taste.5 SPEAKER2: Yeah, everything is fresh. SPEAKER1: Fresh, honey, from the farm. See? Down there, like I say, it's hard to believe it but when you see it with your eyes… I have one man, going hometown, his name Joseph Solomon, Sulaiman. He married a girl from Texas. She have two brother, one lawyer, one doctor, her name Aida. See? She live not far from my property. She have one baby boy by him. He's bashful; he can't work. See? Shortcut, he told her he like her. He told her, "Honey, I'm going to see my cousin. Try to borrow a few dollars." She say, "Okay," but she have feeling he gonna leave her, run away. [Speaking in Italian] He went to Arabian club, we call coffee house. He told stories, "I wanna go and I have no money." Have one fellow took his hat and try to collect money for him, buy his ticket. Actually, when she had feeling she said but my husband ran away, she went to New York, she went after him. She took her baby and she asked the policeman, "Please, take me to the Arabian coffee house." Policeman knew where the coffee house they went straight ahead. When she walked in, the man took the hat and he picked up the money to collect for her husband ticket. When she walked in, she started crying; he grabbed and he started kissing and he cried, too. The boy, they cried, each other because they love each other – but no money. He ran away because he can't support her. When he say that to people, they don't know the story, he lied to them. He say, "I can't make money, I can't make my living, please let me go home." When they see the story, anyone who paid $10, he start to pay 50; anyone who paid 50, he pay 200. They paid two tickets to them and the baby ticket and over $2,000 in the pocket. SPEAKER2: Wow. SPEAKER1: That's why the Arab is good with that, like I say they help each other. He went back home. I met that girl, the Aida. She say, "Mo, honest to God, I love this country." I say, "Why?" She say, 6 "A lot of thing different." On that day she swear to me, three months, because his father he met, while he fool that girl. I don't how he married her, nobody know, he won't tell nobody. He say, "I fall in love with her, I married her." Shortcut, his father give him one house, old-fashioned house, you know, not like rooms, like here, you know, not what you call apartment, one floor belong to you, no. You know, one house, old-fashioned house. SPEAKER2: Yeah. SPEAKER1: He give to them. That girl she told me, "Mo, honest to God, in three weeks, three months, I don't eat nothing except bread and olive oil like soup," you bring olive oil and she cut piece of bread with olive oil and eat it. Three months. And now, she live in farm, cow farm and chicken farm. We didn't have chicken farm in old country house. We have eight house, you have two chicken; each house we have two chicken. SPEAKER2: Yeah. SPEAKER1: The reason, not we chicken lover because we didn't have any stalls like here so market, you can just take car, drive to market, pick up the eggs. We didn't have that. All right, whole town, small town, like I say, Westminster, we have only one store. And if you all live in old mill, you can walk down there. But you have two chicken. I'm your guest, I walk into your home; you have to give me something to eat. We didn't have any meat, cold cut like what you have in this country – everything fresh. When you buy meat, we didn't have any freeze meat either. One man, the meat man, he kill two lamb, three lamb a day and whole town coming to buy two pound, three pound, four pound, two pound, three pound, four pound. SPEAKER2: Just for that day. SPEAKER1: For that day. And you cook it. Next day you didn't have any. SPEAKER2: Right.7 SPEAKER1: We didn't have any salami, bologna, freezing ham, canned ham, we didn't have that. All right, what you have, eggs. SPEAKER2: Yup. SPEAKER1: The two chicken, they lay eggs. You pick up two eggs, drop them, drop in olive oil. You know, fried eggs. Down there they have no lard like here. SPEAKER2: No butter, I think? SPEAKER1: It got to be olive oil. SPEAKER2: Yes. SPEAKER1: You put olive oil, drop the eggs and give you loaf of bread, just to lunch, you eat. Then you are sport; you're not cheat, you give your guest something to eat. See? Every house you have two chicken. Every house. This woman she have over 2,000 chickens and start sell eggs to the stores. SPEAKER2: Yeah. SPEAKER1: And she made good living. She have five boys and two girls after that, and they come here for vacation and she… but she doesn't live here, no. SPEAKER2: She likes it better there. SPEAKER1: And she go in taxis. See? I wish someday you're going to our country. Honest to God. SPEAKER2: I think it sounds so beautiful. The way the people are, it's just… everybody says that American people aren't as friendly and as warm as any other foreigners. Foreigners are always… they're just far more friendly; they're far more human when they treat you. SPEAKER1: That's right. Here, honey, like I say… SPEAKER2: Down south, there you get hospitality. SPEAKER1: Yes. SPEAKER2: They say down in American south, you do. SPEAKER1: Yes. 8 SPEAKER2: But the rest of the country is… New England is known for its coldness. SPEAKER1: That's right. I don't know why. I'll tell you there's something, in tape two. One day when [Moe] was doing walked by the chief police, Mr. Joseph sent me to lawyer Dulan. I went to his home because I don't know where he live. When you don't know a place, you have to take taxi. I took the taxi, "You take me to this house." He say, "This is his house." I ring the bell, he say, "Come in." I walk in. I find him eating on the table at five o'clock at night. You know, all the family, him, his wife and his son. He's a lawyer now and call it Dulan Dulan Lawyer, I didn't know that. SPEAKER2: Yeah. SPEAKER1: Sit down in the table, eating. And I walked in. I said, "Good afternoon." He said, "Good afternoon." "Mo?" I said, "Yes?" He said, "You wanna have a cup of coffee? You're welcome if you do want it. If you don't want it, there's living room, they have magazine and read." He didn't wait for me, I say, yes or no. SPEAKER2: Yeah. SPEAKER1: He said, "You wanna have a cup of coffee with us. Okay, if you don't want it, there's living room, have… they have magazine, make yourself at home." Okay. I stand in the living room over an hour and a half. I never feel cheap in my life till that day. All right, can you go to Arabian house, it's time to eat and they tell you, "If you want it, okay; if you don't want it, go to living room?" Absolutely not. Sit down in my table. If you don't want to eat have a cup of tea, have a cup of coffee, have a glass of milk." SPEAKER2: But at least… SPEAKER1: Not, "If you want a cup of coffee, if you don't want it, this is the living room." Give me a chance to say yes or no. I never received that in my life. I never feel cheap in my life till that day. And 9 since that time, I never go to American house till he take me with the hand. SPEAKER2: That's true. SPEAKER1: See? Down there, it's different, here different in a lot of way. See? When you go even to American house, honest to God, you feel like a stranger, you get lost. See, I wish every American people go to our country. Maybe they change their custom. SPEAKER2: We could use a little improvement, I think. Are there any plans that you made when you came to this country? Is there anything that you regret that you haven't achieved yet? Is there anything that you planned to do when you came here that you haven't done yet? SPEAKER1: No. SPEAKER2: Everything you wanted to do you've done? SPEAKER1: I've done everything what I want. SPEAKER2: And probably more even, right? SPEAKER1: Yes, because I didn't… SPEAKER2: You didn't expect to do all… SPEAKER1: I didn't expect all things. See? SPEAKER2: So you're pretty satisfied with your life then? SPEAKER1: Yes. SPEAKER2: Yeah, that's good. Do you feel there's any one important advantage you have as a citizen of this country? SPEAKER1: Yes. SPEAKER2: What? SPEAKER1: I got anything I want. I mixed with a lot of people in this country. We had visited Roosevelt. I told you we had dinner with him in White House, and I was in White House in the table and I was between Roosevelt, George Simon the staff and Admiral Max. SPEAKER2: I bet not everybody can do that. SPEAKER1: Not every person.10 SPEAKER2: No. SPEAKER1: See? And Swiss land. I'll show you the picture. Let's stop it. SPEAKER2: A lot of time people say that they long for like the good old days. Do you hear that expression a lot? SPEAKER1: Yes. SPEAKER2: And when you think back to what the good old days were like for you, do you think they were really that good? SPEAKER1: Yes. SPEAKER2: You do? SPEAKER1: Yes, yes. SPEAKER2: You think…? SPEAKER1: When you're young, you're not worried about nothing, see, you don't care, you want just… just like fun. When you get old, you're past 40, see, you wanna do something, people talk behind you something good, not bad. That's why good days when that passed you're young, you don't worry about nothing. Like the kid in a school in this country they say he's not worried about his dinner because if he just cry everybody will, "Don't cry, sonny. Don't cry, sonny." SPEAKER2: Cater to him, yeah. SPEAKER1: See? But when you're past 25, 30 in this country you cry? Go ahead, cry more. Quiet world. Nobody force you. And old country, too, number one make me think that, here after you're past 80 you have to be border room for your mother, father. SPEAKER2: In this country? SPEAKER1: In this country; in our country, no. Sometime you're married like… SPEAKER2: You live to eat. SPEAKER1: My nephew, now his son married, right? They have a baby now. His father still support them. SPEAKER2: Really?11 SPEAKER1: That's right. SPEAKER2: And sometimes in your country, they probably will live with the parents, too. SPEAKER1: Oh, yes. Yes. SPEAKER2: Sometimes that happens in America but it doesn't happen that often. SPEAKER1: But it's very hard. SPEAKER2: I don't have to pay board, things like that, you know. SPEAKER1: Well, because you go to the college. SPEAKER2: Yeah. SPEAKER1: Well, honey, when you go to the college your mother, father they supposed to be support you because you have no income. But if you were not go to college… SPEAKER2: If you're working, yeah. SPEAKER1: You have to work. You have to pay your mother, father board or… SPEAKER2: Get out on your own. SPEAKER1: You're gonna rent apartment, you start support yourself. See? In our country, no, the girls never work. You never let her work either. SPEAKER2: Just at home. Does she do most of the work at home? SPEAKER1: No, her mother help her. SPEAKER2: Yeah. SPEAKER1: But most of the time, just sit down with her mother. If you want mother she go out, you go with her and her mother see you want something, help each other. Cooking, crochet, you know, knit. I don't know what's called in English. SPEAKER2: Knit or crochet. SPEAKER1: All silk. I'm talking about dress from Jerusalem. I'm going to sell them with sample to see if I could sell it.12 SPEAKER2: I'm sure you will. Something like that would go very well, I guess. SPEAKER1: You want to see sample? SPEAKER2: You have a sample? SPEAKER1: Yes. SPEAKER2: Yeah, sure. So you think that all in all your life has been good here? SPEAKER1: Yes, thank God. SPEAKER2: Yeah, you possibly you will go back to the old country? SPEAKER1: Yes. SPEAKER2: But you're satisfied with things in… SPEAKER1: Yes. At least, over there, your life is safe, your life. SPEAKER2: You still feel danger here? SPEAKER1: Danger here, honey. SPEAKER2: More so than when you first came. SPEAKER1: Maybe you read about it yesterday. This morning one policeman got shot in Boston, in his stomach, 2:30 in the morning and his brother, I think brother-in law… SPEAKER2: The two… his two brothers-in law get killed. SPEAKER1: Gets killed years ago – same thing, with stealing thieves. See? This country was a beautiful law, constitution, before; now, the law getting loose and weak and weak. Someday… maybe you understand that even if you are over five years in jail they give you parole. Yeah, more than. Why they give you parole? There's no law. It's weak. Why he's not in jail then? And now maybe you read about it or you know my worry is that in jail they try to make union. They get… they wanna be retirement. If you're not bad, why are you gonna retirement? Where are you gonna get retirement? You kill me, you kill my mother, you kill my brother, you kill my wife and you give retirement, too, beside? See? There's no law in this country anymore.13 SPEAKER2: Everything is at such a state of shame. SPEAKER1: It's weak, honey. SPEAKER2: Everything is being challenged. SPEAKER1: Yeah, it's weak. See? It's hard to call it modern but it's not modern. When the law split from teeth by teeth, eyes by eyes, that's a law. Now even look at the Catholic, maybe you know that more than me. We don't talk about religion because too deep for us. The Pope, number one, you can't divorce; now you divorce. Number two, you can't eat meat on Friday; now you can eat meat on Friday. See? What the law? What you get… how you came to arrive here? [Unintelligible - 00:20:46] Jesus came in nineteen hundred seventy-four, 2,000 years, why you change it now? The [Bible] weak, naturally weak; don't make them all weak. It's not truth? SPEAKER2: True, yes. SPEAKER1: See? Now, they allow them now man and woman live together, no married, no nothing. You never see that before. SPEAKER2: No. SPEAKER1: You never hear that before. See? There's no law in this country anymore. The law is weak. We have a law in this country. We have but nobody force it. SPEAKER2: No. SPEAKER1: You can buy the law by you money. If you have good lawyers they take away, I don't care if you killed two people. There's not law? See? Who you know not how much you know, see? This is really bad. You call big city, every single day somebody get killed. See? I know when I went sometime in Station 4 or 9 or 12, or had got onboard because I don't know, maybe… one fellow's name John, surname I forget it, he's a policeman at Abraham Lincoln School. Do you know of Abraham Lincoln School? SPEAKER2: I've heard of it, I don't know…14 SPEAKER1: One fellow drive in the car, come from work, he killed a dog. He killed a dog. Not dead but he crippled him, break his leg, break his arm, I don't know what you call that. He stopped, he opened the door, he want to pick up the dog, put him in the car, take him to the hospital. One black man come in, when the man, he put his head down, you know, you know how he is… SPEAKER2: Yeah. SPEAKER1: He tried to pick up the dog, he hit him… he killed the man. All right. The dog is not yours, the man he don't kill you, he don't bother you, he don't talk to you. Okay? Why you kill him? This man, by the law, should be get killed. They don't do nothing for him. SPEAKER2: In other words we have a lot of weaknesses and a lot more things we got to improve. SPEAKER1: That's right. I hope like the… our Mohammad, our prophet, he say, "If something you can't fight it," like he say, I'll try to make him Muslim. I'll try. I'll talk to you. I know but I say anything nice to you to be turned to be Muslim but I can't. You say no, no, no, but I love you. I want you be Muslim because if I don't love you, I don't care what you be. It's right? But if I love you, I'd like to see everything is good to you. All right, I can't make you. Your weak things to me, what can you say? I have to stand in God and say, "Please, God, help me. Help my dear friend to be Muslim." That weak spots for me just to pray, isn't it? Now, our weakness, let me we pray to God to change our government, to put force the law. Somebody murder, murder him. Because we have to sacrifice, we have to sacrifice. It's something to teach the people because we went too far overhead. This is really bad, honey. See? But we can't say nothing, like I say, only the weakened spot, nothing only pray to God and pray as weak. Like Hitler say, "No justice in this world except with the power. If you're strong,15 everybody with you; if you're weak, everybody walk on you." Absolutely is the truth. We can't deny it. See? That's the only thing, honey. SPEAKER2: I appreciate you for giving me the time and helping me with this. SPEAKER1: It's my pleasure. SPEAKER2: It means a lot to me, and you've been very helpful. SPEAKER1: It's my pleasure. SPEAKER2: So I just want to thank you./AT/jf/jc/ee

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Introduction: Rediscovering Religion -- Part I: The Big Picture -- 1. Studying What People Do -- 2. Lived Religion and Its Context -- Part II: Zooming In -- 3. The Spiritual Dimensions of Lived Religion -- 4. Embodied Religious Practice -- 5. The Materiality of Lived Religion -- 6. Lived Religious Emotions -- 7. Lived Religious Aesthetics -- 8. Morality in Religious Practice -- 9. Narratives in Religious Practice -- Concluding and Beginning: Methods for Studying Lived Religion -- Acknowledgments -- References -- Index -- About the Author