Suchergebnisse

Aus polnischer Sicht

In November 2012 it was ten years since the Justice and Development Party became the party of government in Turkey. During that time, it has raised its profile abroad and sought to project its influence. In particular, it has tried to increase its impact on the European Union and the Middle East-the primary regions to which Turkey lies adjacent. This approach has been parcelled up in the name of turning Turkey from a state of marginal importance into a 'centre' country. The relationship to the EU got off to a good start; Turkey adopted liberal EU norms wholesale, before relations soured over Cyprus and membership in general. By 2006, ties were moribund. Links with the Middle East also started well. Turkey avoided the worst effects of the 2003 Iraq war; and its stature was at its zenith in the early months of the 'Arab Spring', when it raised the slogan 'let the people decide'. But this was hubris. By the summer of 2011, it had become clear that Turkey had miscalculated both with regard to the timing of regime change in Syria and its own leverage, whether on the ground or with NATO. Rather than a new, transregional power house, Turkey looked tentative, frequently inert and increasingly dependent on NATO. Turkey remains a country subject to the highly contrasting twin gravities of the EU and the Middle East in spite of its leadership aspirations and its will to accomplish more. (International Affairs (Oxford) / SWP)

Though they have historically been close, Moscow and Tehran have had to redefine their relationship following the demise of the USSR. This relationship entails, among other things, different approaches to political developments in the Middle East, ambiguous cooperation on nuclear and conventional weapons and a shared perspective on the Syrian crisis. Both capitals should nevertheless take care to make sure that their positions on the latter do not alienate major players in the region. (Politique étrangère (Paris) / SWP)

One of the first acts of the new administration of President John F. Kennedy in 1961 was to promote an 'Alliance for Progress' throughout Latin America. JFK's stated goal was 'to transform the American continent' by improving the often desperate living conditions of its peoples; advancing industrialization; diversifying and increasing exports (especially away from heavy dependence on single items such as coffee); encouraging interstate trade and communications; and-above all-strengthening democracy: a term to inspire but one rarely, if ever, defined. The primary means for achieving these ends would be the extension of loans by the United States and others, thereby building up capital for industrial production while increasing food and raw material supplies to maximize foreign exchange-all with the aim of reversing the 'dependency' of 'underdeveloped' Latin America upon the more 'advanced' economies of the north Atlantic area. Kennedy's expressed fear was that Latin America, its impoverished peoples ripe for revolution, would follow the path of Cuba under the new regime of Fidel Castro. In the first part of a two-part analysis the historical and political origins of the Alliance are traced to both US and Latin American sources, including schemes within the Organization of American States and 'Operation Pan America'; in the second part the economic failures and the strategic successes of the Alliance during the presidencies of Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon will be evaluated as another, if varied, stage in the evolving 'hegemonic presumption' of the US towards its southern neighbours. (International Affairs (Oxford) / SWP)