On August 25, 2009, the 13th Government of the Palestinian Authority (PA) presented a program entitled "Palestine: ending the occupation, establishing the state" (hereafter referred to as the program) outlining several national goals, including the achievement of 'economic independence and national prosperity'. The program accords high priority to the development of the public institutions of the PA in order to achieve the stated national goals. It acknowledges that maintaining an efficient and effective public sector that provides citizens with high quality services and value for money is a constant challenge. No amount of well-functioning institutions, will, however, lead to economic growth in the absence of access to markets, whether within the West Bank and Gaza, in Israel, or in the rest of the world. In this regard, the recent developments in easing of movement and access restrictions by the Government of Israel (GoI) represent a welcome first step. The GoI has taken steps to ease movement restrictions in the West Bank and to allow greater access to West Bank markets for Arab citizens of Israel. In the first half of 2009, the political stalemate in Gaza continued and the economy stagnated. The West Bank economy is showing signs of new growth, so that it is possible that for the first time in years, West Bank and Gaza (WB&G) may have positive per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in 2009.
The proposed tobacco settlement agreement, as negotiated by some state attorneys general and the tobacco industry that was made public on June 20, 1997 (Appendix F), raises a complex array of public health, public policy, legal and economic issues. It was intended to be a blueprint for national tobacco control legislation that would end the most important litigation current and potential against the tobacco industry. As with most complex legislation, the deal, after it was announced, underwent a great deal of scrutiny and criticism. Many public health and policy groups analyzed the deal in whole or in part in order to provide guidance for those who wished to distill the essential elements and implications of the deal. While many have pronounced the original deal 'dead' as a result of this criticism, it remains the fundamental framework around which most proposals for federal legislation on tobacco has been based. As a result, a careful analysis of the terms and implications of the original June 20 deal remains a worthwhile effort. This report seeks to provide policy makers and advocates with a context and analysis of the most important aspects of the deal through a series of briefing papers, which can be read independently or collectively. Each paper addresses one aspect of the deal. The papers are organized according to general topics: political issues related to the deal, financial and tax aspects of the deal, regulatory implications of the deal, and civil liability controls in the deal. For those who desire a more technical approach to the issues, we have included five technical appendices to provide additional support regarding the economic analysis of the deal, the economic analysis of the lookback provision, the political analysis of the deal, and the public health analysis of the deal, the legal analysis of the deal. To the extent that the deal is reflected in any legislative proposals that emerge, this analysis will be relevant to that legislation. In the months leading up to the publication of the deal, many commentators discussed the relative merits of entering into a negotiated resolution of the tobacco litigation. The advocates of the deal pointed to the ability to obtain specific relief, the advantages of having a national tobacco policy, and the elimination of the risks to continuing the litigation. Critics of the deal-making process were concerned that making a deal would: guarantee tobacco industry profitability; require Congressional action, which in turn would provide weak proposals because of the influence the tobacco lobby in national politics; preempt stronger state and local regulatory efforts to control tobacco; and preclude broad based public health efforts to control tobacco in the future. Many commentators have described the deal as one in which the tobacco industry accepts strong restrictions in exchange for some limitation of liability. Our analysis reaches just the opposite conclusion: A close reading of the deal reveals that the benefits to the tobacco industry are concrete and substantial whereas the public health benefits are less clear. The Funding Provisions of the Deal Are Inadequate The money in the deal is large in absolute terms but small when compared to the damage done by tobacco products. Even if one takes the more limited view of the deal that its purpose is only to reimburse the states for future Medicaid expenses plus fund the specified public health programs, the payments are not high enough to cover these limited costs. If the deal is designed to reimburse society for all damage done by tobacco, it provides less than 10 cents on the dollar. The financial portions of the deal are structured in such a manner that they will guarantee industry profits. The Taxpayers will Absorb a Substantial Fraction of the Nominal Costs to the Industry All payments by the tobacco industry, including those made 'in lieu of' punitive damages, are tax deductible, which results in a decrease in the impact of the deal on the industry and a cost shifting to American taxpayers. Taxpayers will absorb 30-40% of the cost of the deal, which will need to be recovered through increased taxes or spending cuts. The tax subsidy provided to the tobacco industry by the deal, amounting to about $4 billion a year, dwarfs both the current tobacco price support program and the funds that the deal makes available for public health programs. The Industry Will be Protected from Litigation The civil liability protections will strongly protect the tobacco industry. The deal eliminates large-scale suits that are most threatening to the industry and only allows individual cases, which the industry has been successful in defeating. In addition, the deal changes the rules of evidence and civil procedure in ways that will make it more difficult for people with cancer, heart disease, and other smoking-induced problems to win their individual cases. The deal provides the industry financial security by capping exposure. These limitations on litigation will effectively preclude injured smokers from receiving just compensation and perhaps limit future criminal and civil enforcement actions against the tobacco companies. Moreover, the caps eliminate the incentives the civil justice system to improve corporate behavior, by reducing the threat that the tobacco companies will be held fully accountable for their actions. Under the terms of the deal, the industry will avoid about $150-$200 billion in liability at a cost of $6-$7 billion. Eliminating Litigation Will Eliminate a Valuable Public Health Tool The current litigation against the tobacco industry has a discernible benefit to the public health community which will be eliminated should the litigation cease. For example, the litigation provides a ready means to educate the public about the dangers of smoking and misbehavior of the tobacco industry. Without the prosecution of the current lawsuits, a valuable health education opportunity will be lost. In addition, the litigation which the deal seeks to resolve is based upon the enforcement of laws which serve public health interests, such as consumer protection and anti-trust laws. The deal restricts use of these laws in against the tobacco industry. Losing both a timely health education opportunity and the right to fully utilize consumer protection and related laws against the tobacco industry limits the public health tools to combat death and disease related to tobacco. The public health community has an interest in preserving the right to litigation to obtain social justice. The deal compromises the rights of individuals and institutions to sue the tobacco industry without fair compensation. Similarly, the public health community has an interest in fairly allocating the damages related to a particular harm. Societal resources which are currently being expended to remedy the harms related to tobacco could be re-allocated to serve other public health interests. The litigation provides a valuable tool to force the tobacco companies to pay for the damages related to tobacco, leaving societal resources to address other public health problems. The absence of litigation will remove one tool the public health community can use to force the tobacco companies to internalize the costs of the damage tobacco does. The Deal Requires Congress to Preempt Laws in Every State The essential principle behind the deal was the willingness of the Attorneys General, private lawyers, and health officials who negotiated the deal to support substantial limitations on liability of the tobacco industry for its past and future behavior. The deal not only 'legislatively settles' the Medicaid lawsuits brought by the Attorneys General, but also effectively ends most other forms of litigation against the tobacco industry. Since most of this litigation is being brought under state (as opposed to federal) consumer protection, fraud, anti-trust, and other laws, granting the tobacco industry the immunity it seeks will require Congress to preempt these laws in every state and the District of Columbia. In addition to preempting these laws, the deal preempts existing state authority to require ingredient disclosure and may increase the strength of tobacco industry claims that local and state restrictions on tobacco industry marketing practices are illegal. Regulatory Controls are Unnecessary and Insufficient The details of the regulatory provisions in the deal favor the tobacco industry. Rather than recognizing that there are many agencies with jurisdiction over tobacco, the deal concentrates almost exclusively on the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The deal also ignores the fact that most progress in tobacco use has been made at the local and state level. The FDA currently has jurisdiction over tobacco products and is executing its regulatory authority pursuant to its jurisdiction. The few provisions in the deal which are not currently a part of FDA regulations could become so even without the deal, or like the current advertising restrictions, be regulated by another agency. Furthermore, the expectations regarding the benefits attendant with many of the regulatory changes should be small. Even with the advertising restrictions in place, the tobacco industry will still find successful ways to market their products, and tobacco imagery will be ubiquitous. Similarly, the proposed regulations regarding tobacco warnings and restrictions on youth access add little new authority. The deal would essentially codify the law as it currently exists, except that it would also place limitations on future FDA authority. Although the codification of FDA authority may be desirable, the deal would add intensive rollback FDA authority by requiring the FDA to meet additional regulatory hurdles before it can regulate tobacco constituents and restricting how and when it can regulate nicotine. These hurdles will preclude much of the potential for true regulatory reform. Similarly, the secondhand tobacco smoke provisions in the deal represent a rollback of the current ability of the Department of Labor to regulate broadly. The secondhand smoke provisions within the deal accept industry claims that smokefree workplace laws would harm the hospitality industry, which is not true. The Lookback Provision Is Inadequate There are provisions in the deal designed to penalize the industry for not meeting specific targeted reductions in youth smoking. The lookback provision is a good example of how the technical details of the deal have important impacts that are not evident. The lookback provision ties goals in reducing teen smoking to the percentage of teens who are daily smokers. While 75% of smokers have their first cigarette by age 14, 75% do not become daily smokers until they reach age 18 (the cutoff for calculating the lookback penalty). Epidemiological evidence indicates that nicotine is as addictive as cocaine heroin and opiates. Symptoms of addiction begin before the onset of daily smoking. Limiting the measure of youth smoking to daily smokers will allow the tobacco industry to comply with the lookback provision by simply marketing in a way that leads children to begin smoking two years older than they do now; it will continue to recruit new adult smokers by addicting them as youths. By increasing the age of initiation by two years, the transition of most smokers to daily smoking in new smokers will occur after their eighteenth birthday. In addition, the penalty is too small to provide an effective economic incentive for the industry to reduce youth smoking; if the industry were to simply continue its current recruiting of teens, the after-tax cost of the lookback provision would be about a nickel a pack. Furthermore, the penalties are pooled among the industry, which decreases the pressure any one company will have to reform its behavior. The Deal Preserves the Oligopoly Structure of the Industry Throughout the deal there are a number of provisions which increase barriers to market entry and preserve the current profit structure. These provisions will encourage anti-competitive behavior and eliminate any incentive to innovate toward safer products. Furthermore, by closing the market, new companies will find it more difficult to compete. This situation will further guarantee excess profits for the existing companies. The Deal does not Provide for Full Disclosure of Tobacco Industry Wrongdoing One of the most important aspects of the current litigation is the ongoing disclosure of industry wrongdoing. The document disclosure provisions of the deal are weak and would permit the industry to continue to withhold privileged documents, which many believe are the most damaging to the industry. The deal may not be necessary to secure disclosure of these documents, because the Congress has subpoenaed and disclosed some tobacco industry documents, and more are emerging through litigation. Between further Congressional action and the litigation there is likely to be a continuous release of documents without a need for the deal. There are No Barriers Other than a Lack of Political Will to Adopting the Beneficial Provisions of the Deal Tobacco control advocates have successfully enacted legislation that meets many of the goals of the deal at the state and local level without compromise with the tobacco industry. The federal government could do the same. For example, the public health measures of the deal could be enacted and the funds for these programs appropriated out of the general fund or through an increase in the tobacco excise tax. Congress can give the FDA and Department of Labor more direct authority over tobacco products, and it could ensure full funding for their programs. Plaintiffs can enter (and Mississippi, Florida, Texas, San Francisco, and a plaintiffs' class of non-smoking flight attendants have entered) into individual legal settlements with the tobacco industry. The Deal is Silent on International Issues The deal ignores the implications that U.S. tobacco control policy has on international tobacco control efforts. The precedents established by the deal are particularly important because litigation against the tobacco industry is beginning in other countries. The limitations on liability in the deal may compromise the ability of other countries to recover the cost of tobacco-induced illness. The Deal is Based on Several Premises that are no Longer True The original premise behind the deal was that if the Attorneys General, public health advocates, and the tobacco industry could come to an agreement that all found acceptable, such legislation would be enacted into law rapidly. Some public health advocates argued that such a compromise was necessary and appropriate because the power of the tobacco industry in Congress was such that industry acceptance was necessary in order to get legislation enacted. Legislation was seen as necessary because the tobacco industry had never lost nor settled any health-oriented lawsuits against it. Because of this, rather than risking everything in Court, the Attorneys General and other decided that it was better to gain a partial victory in Congress. Since then, the terms of the deal have been declared unacceptable by all elements of the public health community, so the original premise of going to Congress with a partnership between public health and tobacco forces no longer holds. The tobacco industry has maintained that the deal should be enacted as negotiated and has dramatically increased its campaign contributions and lobbying activities in order to see the deal enacted. Tobacco executives have testified in Congress that a grant of immunity for the industry is a condition of industry support for federal tobacco legislation. Public health groups are divided about the wisdom of trading some form of immunity for the tobacco industry in exchange for public policy changes that some believe will reduce tobacco control. Even the forces in the health community who are willing to entertain such a trade, however, have rejected the deal as originally negotiated. As a result, they are now in the position of going into Congress opposed to the tobacco industry, the very situation that the deal was supposed to avoid. Finally, the belief that the tobacco industry would never settle or lose heath-related lawsuits has changed. The industry settled the Mississippi, Florida, and Texas Medicaid suits on favorable public health terms, as well as a case brought by San Francisco over the Joe Camel advertising character and a class action suit on secondhand smoke brought by flight attendants. The industry has also lost several cases brought by individuals. It will be difficult for the industry to return to a no-settlement strategy, particularly in light of documents and other information that have come out of the litigation process and Congressional hearings to date.
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Eyal Weizman on the Architectural-Image Complex, Forensic Archeology and Policing across the Desertification Line
Incidents in global politics are usually apprehended as the patterned interaction of macro-actors such as states. Eyal Weizman takes a different tack—an architect by training, Weizman tackles incidents through detailed readings of heterogeneous materials—digital images, debris, reforestation, blast patterns in ruins—to piece together concrete positions of engagement in specific legal, political, or activist controversies in global politics. In this Talk, Weizman—among others—elaborates on methods across scales and material territories, discusses the interactions of environment and politics, and traces his trajectory in forensic architecture.
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
What is—or should be—according to you, the biggest challenge, central focus or principal debate in critical social sciences?
We live in an age in which there is both a great storm of information and a progressive form of activism seeking to generate transparency in relation to government institutions, corporations or secret services. These forms of exposure exponentially increase the number of primary sources on corporations and state and provide also rare media from war zones, but this by itself does not add more clarity. It could increase confusion and increasingly be used disseminate false information and propaganda. The challenge is to start another process to carefully piece together and compose this information.
I'm concerned with research about armed conflict. Contemporary conflict tends to take place in urban environments saturated with media of varicose sorts, whenever violence is brought into a city, it provokes an enormous production of images, clips, sounds, text, etc.
As conflict in Iraq, Syria, Missouri and the Ukraine demonstrate, one of the most important potential sources for conflict investigations is produced by the very people living in the war zones and made available in social networks almost instantly. The citizens recording events in conflict zones are conscious of producing testimonies and evidence, and importantly so, they do so on their own terms. The emergence of citizen journalists/witness has already restructured the fields of journalism with most footage composing Al Jazeera broadcasts, for example, being produced by non-professional media. The addition of a huge multiplicity of primary sources, live testimonies and filmed records of events, challenge research methods and evidentiary practices. There is much locational and spatial information that can be harvested from within these blurry, shaky and unedited images/clips and architectural methodologies are essential in reconstructing incidents in space. Architecture is a good framework to understand the world, alongside others.
Whereas debates around the 'politics of the image' in the field of photography and visual cultures tended to concentrate on the decoding of single images and photojournalistic trophy shots we now need to study the creation of extensive 'image-complexes' and inhabit this field reconstruct events from images taken at different perspective and at different times. The relation between images is architectural, best composed and represented within 3D models. Architectural analysis is useful in locating other bits of evidence—recorded testimonies, films and photos—from multiple perspectives in relation to one other bits of evidence and cross referring these in space.
But 'image complexes' are about interrogating the field of visibility it is also about absence, failures of representation, blockages or destruction of images.
How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about global politics?
I'm an architect, and my intellectual upbringing is in architectural theory and spatial theory. I tend to hold on to this particular approach when I'm entering a geopolitical context or areas that would otherwise be the domain of journalists and human rights people, traditional jurists, etc. Architecture taught me to pay attention to details, to materiality, to media, and to make very close observations about the way built structures might embody political relations.
When I study political situations, I study them as an architect: I look at the way politics turns into a material—spatial practice—the materialization, and at the spatialization, of political forces. Architectural form—as I explained many times—is slowed-down force. My thinking is structured around a relation between force and form. And form, for an architect, is an entry point from which to read politics. So when I look at matter and material reality—like a building, a destroyed building, a piece of infrastructure, a road or bridge, a settlement or suburb or city—I look at it as a product of a political force field. But it is never static. A city always grows, expands or contracts recording the multiple political relations that shaped it.
Buildings continuously record their environment. So one can read political force on buildings. In taking this approach, I am influenced by building surveyors, and insurance people going into a building to look at a scratch in a wall to piece together what might have happened, and what might still happen. So I feel like a kind of property surveyor on the scale of a city at times of war. But in practicing this forensic architecture I also work like an archaeologist: archaeology is about looking at material remains and trying to piece together the cultural, political, military, or social spheres. But I'm an archaeologist of very recent past or of the present. While some of my investigations will always retain a haptic dimension based on material examination, much of it is an analysis of material captured and registered by various medias. Verify, locate, compose and cross-reference a spatial reality from images of architecture.
What would a student need to become a specialist in your field or understand the world in a global way?
The institutes I run do not recruit only architects. We need to open up the disciplinary bounds of education. We work with filmmakers and architects and with artists.
It embodies a desire to understand architecture as a field of inquiry, with which you can interrogate reality as it is effectively registering material transformation. I see architecture as a way of augmenting our way of seeing things in the world, but it's not for me a kind of sacred field that should not be touched or changed.
But I'm also using architecture across the entire spectrum of its relation to politics, from the very dystopian—with forensic architecture, a kind of architectural pathology—to the utopian. I have a studio in Palestine with Palestinian partners of mine, and internationals. Alessandro Petty and Sandi Hilal are in this group, which is called Decolonizing Architure. It's this group that is engaged in very utopian projects for the West Bank and Palestine and the return of refugees and so on. So I use architecture across the entire spectrum, from the very dystopian to the very utopian. Architecture is simply a way of engaging the world and its politics. Space is the way of establishing relations between things. And actually space is not static, it is both a means of establishing relations between people and objects and things. Just as material itself is always an event, always under transformation. So that is something I have taken from architecture and try to bring into politics, but not only in analyzing crimes, but in producing the reality yet to come.
So what we need from people is the desire to understand aesthetics as a field of inquiry, not simply as a pleasurable play of beauty and pleasing kind of effect, but as a kind of very sensorial field, sensorium, in which you can interrogate reality as it is effectively registering material transformation. So I would look simply for that kind of sensorial intensity and high critical approach and understanding and speculating of how it is we know what we think we know. Of course, you cannot see, or you do not know what you see, you do not have the language to interpret or question what it is you 'see' without abstract constructs. This means I don't necessarily look for theoretical capacities in people: I see theory as a way of augmenting our way of seeing things in the world, of registering them, of decoding them, but it's not for me a kind of sacred field to which I submit in any way.
So what is it you work on now?
I'm mostly trying to establish forensic architecture as a critical field of practice and as an agency that produce and disseminate evidence about war crimes in urban context. Recent forensic investigations in Guatemala and in the Israeli Negev involved the intersection of violence and environmental transformations, even climate change. For trials and truth commissions, we analyze the extent to which environmental transformation intersect with conflict.
The imaging of this previously invisible types of violence—'environmental violence' such as land degradation, the destruction of fields and forests (in the tropics), pollution and water diversion, and also long term processes of desertification—we use as new type of evidence of processes dispersed across time and space. There are other conflicts that unfold in relation to climatic and environmental transformations and in particular in relation to environmental scarcity.
Conflict has reciprocal interaction with environment transformation: environmental change could aggravate conflict, while conflict tends to generate further environmental damage. This has been apparent in Darfur, Sudan where the conflict was aggravated by increased competition over arable due to local land erosion and desertification. War and insurgency have occurred along Sahel—Arabic for 'shoreline'—on the southern threshold of the Sahara Desert, which is only ebbing as million of hectares of former arable land turn to desert. In past decades, conflicts have broken out in most countries from East to West Africa, along this shoreline: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal. In 2011 in the city of Daraa, farmers' protests, borne out of an extended cycle of droughts, marked the beginning of the Syrian civil war. Similar processes took place in the eastern outskirts of Damascus, Homs, al-Raqqah and along the threshold of the great Syrian and Northern Iraqi Deserts. These transformations impact upon cities, themselves a set of entangled natural/man-made environments. The conflict and hardships along desertification bands compel dispossessed farmers to embark upon increasingly perilous paths of migrations, leading to fast urbanization at the growing outskirts of the cities and slams.
I'm trying to understand these processes across desert thresholds. There has been a very long colonial debate about what is the line beyond which the desert begins. Most commonly it was defined as 200 mm rain per annum. Cartographers were trying to draw it, as it represented, to a certain extent, the limit of imperial control. From this line on, most policing was done through bombing of tribal areas from the air. Since the beginning, the emergence of the use of air power in policing in the post World War I period—aerial control, aerial government—took form in places that were perceived, at the time, as lying beyond the thresholds or edges of the law. The British policing of Iraq, the French in Syria, and Algeria, the Italians in Libya are examples where control would hover in air.
Up to now I was writing about borders that were physical and manmade: walls in the West Bank or Gaza and the siege around it—most notably in Hollow Land (2007, read the introduction here). Now I started to write about borders that are made by the interaction of people and the environment—like the desert line—which is not less violent and brutal. The colonial history of Palestine has been an attempt to push the line of the desert south, trying to make it green or bloom—this is in Ben Gurion's terms—but the origins of this statement are earlier and making the desert green and pushing the line of the desert was also Mussolini's stated aim. On the other hand, climate change is now pushing that line north.
Following not geopolitical but meteorological borders, helps me cut across a big epistemological problem that confines the writing in international relations or geopolitics within the borders organize your writing. Braudel is an inspiration but, for him, the environment of the Mediterranean is basically cyclically fixed. The problem with geographical determinism is that it takes nature as a given, cyclical, milieu which then affects politics—but I think we are now in a period where politics affects nature in the same way in which nature affects politics. The climate is changing in the same speed as human history.
What does your background in architecture add to understanding the global political controversies you engage in?
We are a forensic agency that provides services to prosecution teams around the world. With our amazing members we ran 20-odd cases around the world from the Amazon to Atacama, for the UN, for Amnesty, for Palestinian NGOs, in Gaza of course, West Bank, issues of killings, individual killings in the West Bank that we do now, and much more drastic destructions.
Forensic Architecture is unique in using architectural research methodologies to analyze violations of human rights and international humanitarian law as they bear upon the built environment—on buildings, cities and territories, and this is why we get many commissions. We produced architectural evidence for numerous investigations and presented them in a number of cases in national and international courts and tribunals. We were commissioned by the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights to study single destroyed buildings, as well as patterns of destruction, resulting from drone warfare in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and Gaza. This study was presented at the UN General Assembly in New York. We developed techniques to locate the remains of buildings and villages overgrown by thick rain forests and presented this material as evidence in the genocide trial of former president Efraín Ríos Montt in the National Court of Guatemala and the Inter-American Court. We quantified and analyzed levels of architectural destruction in Gaza after the 2014 conflict for Amnesty International. We provided architectural models and animations to support a petition against the wall in Battir submitted to the Israeli High Court, helping to win the case.
Recently, we use and deal with the reconstruction of human testimony. Witnesses to war give account of the worst moment of their lives; times when their dear ones have died or hurt. Their memory is disturbed, and tends to be blurred. We have developed a way of very carefully interviewing and discussing with witnesses. Together with them, we build digital models of their own homes. So we can see a very slow process of reconstruction of the relation between memory space and architecture. And events start coming back, through the process of building.
In order to develop this, we needed to explore the historical use of memory and architecture, such as Frances Yates' The Art of Memory (read it here), as well as different accounts on the use of trauma, and bring them into the digital age, bring an understanding of the relation of testimony and evidence into contemporary thinking. Single incidents tend to be argued away as aberrations of 'standard operating procedures'. To bring charges against government and military leaderships, it is necessary to demonstrate 'gross and systematic' violations. This means finding consistent and repeated patterns of violations. Architectural analysis, undertaken on the level of the city is able to demonstrate repetition and transformations in patterns of violation/destruction in space and time—within the battle zone along the duration of the conflict. Architectural analysis is useful not only in dealing with architectural evidence—i.e with destroyed buildings—but also helpful in locating other bits of evidence—testimony films or photos—in relation to one other bits of evidence, and cross referring these in space.
Urban violence unfolds at different intensities, speeds and spatial scales: it is made of patterns of multiple instantaneous events as well as slower incremental processes of 'environmental violence' that affects the transformation of larger territories. We aims to analyze and present the relation between forms of violence that occur at different space and time scales. From eruptive kinetic violence of the instantaneous/human incident through patterns of destruction mapped across and along the duration of urban conflict, to what Rob Nixon calls the 'slow violence' of environmental transformation (read the introduction of the eponymous book here, pdf).
Last question. How does your approach to research relate to, or differ from, approaches to international politics?
To study conflict as a reality that unfolds across multiple scales, we use the microphysical approach—dealing with details, fragments and ruins—as an entry-point from which we will unpack the larger dynamics of a conflict. We reconstruct singular incidents, locate them in space and time to look for and identify patterns, then study these patterns in relation to long terms and wide-scale environmental transformations. This approach seeks to make connections between, what Marc Bloch of the Annales School called 'micro- and macro-history, between close-ups and extreme long shots' in his thesis on historical method. This topological approach is distinct from a traditional scalar one: the macro (political/strategic/territorial) situation will not be seen a root cause for a myriad set of local human right violations (incidents/tactics). In the complex reality of conflict, singularities are equally the result of 'framing conditions' and also contributing factors to phase transitions that might affect, or 'de-frame' as Latour has put it, changes occurring in wider areas. Instead of nesting smaller scales within larger ones, our analysis will seek to fluidly shift from macro to micro, from political conditions to individual cases, from buildings to environments and this along multiple threads, connection and feedback loops.
While in relation to the single incident it might still be possible to establish a direct, liner connection between the two limit figures of the perpetrator and the victim along the model of (international) criminal law, evidence for environmental violence is more scattered and diffused. Instead, it requires the examination of what we call 'field causalities'—causal ecologies that are non-linear, diffused, simultaneous, and that involve multiple agencies and feedback loops, challenging the immediacy of 'evidence'.
Establishing field causalities requires the examination of force fields and causal ecologies, that are non-linear, diffused, simultaneous and involve multiple agencies and feedback loops. Whereas linear causality entails a focus on sequences of causal events on the model of criminal law that seeks to trace a direct line between the two limit figures of victim and perpetrator field causality involves the spatial arrangement of simultaneous sites, actions and causes. It is inherently relational and thus a spatial concept. By treating space as the medium of relation between separate elements of evidence brought together, we aim to expand the analytical scope of forensic architecture. It is inherently relational and thus a spatial concept. By treating space as the medium of relation between separate elements of evidence brought together, field causalities expands the analytical scope of forensic architecture.
Let me illustrate this a bit. Forms of violence are crucially convertible one to another. Drying fields along the Sahel or the Great Syrian Desert, for example, reach a point in which they can no longer support their farmers, contributing to impoverishment, migration to cities, slumnization and waves of protest that might contribute to the eruption of armed conflict. These layers call for a form of architectural analysis able to shift and synthesize information at different scales—from single incidents as they are registered in the immediate spatial setting, through patterns of violations across the entire urban terrain to 'environmental violence' articulated in the transformation of large territories.
Eyal Weizman is an architect, Professor of Visual Cultures and director of the Centre for Research Architecture at Goldsmiths, University of London. Since 2011 he also directs the European Research Council funded project, Forensic Architecture - on the place of architecture in international humanitarian law. Since 2007 he is a founding member of the architectural collective DAAR in Beit Sahour/Palestine. Weizman has been a professor of architecture at the Academy of Fine Arts in Vienna and has also taught at the Bartlett (UCL) in London at the Stadel School in Frankfurt and is a Professeur invité at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS) in Paris. He lectured, curated and organised conferences in many institutions worldwide. His books include Mengele's Skull (with Thomas Keenan at Sterenberg Press 2012), ForensicArchitecture (dOCUMENTA13 notebook, 2012), The Least of all Possible Evils (Nottetempo 2009, Verso 2011), Hollow Land (Verso, 2007), A Civilian Occupation (Verso, 2003), the series Territories 1,2 and 3, Yellow Rhythms and many articles in journals, magazines and edited books.
Related links
Facultyprofile at Goldsmith Forensic Architecture homepage Read Weizman's introduction to Forensis (2014) here (pdf) Read Weizman's Forensic Architecture: Notes from Fields and Forums (dOCUMENTA 2012) here (pdf) Read Weizman's Lethal Theory (2009) here (pdf) Read the introduction to Weizman's Hollow Land (2007) here (pdf)
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
0 0 1 3506 19988 School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg 166 46 23448 14.0
The Situation In The Middle East This Record Contains The Text Of Speeches Delivered In English And Of The Translation Of Speeches Delivered In Other Languages. ; United Nations S/PV.8164 Security Council Seventy-third year 8164th meeting Tuesday, 23 January 2018, 3 p.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Umarov. . (Kazakhstan) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz China. . Mr. Shen Bo Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Ms. Guadey France. . Mr. Delattre Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Peru. . Mr. Tenya Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Allen United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-01889 (E) *1801889* S/PV.8164 The situation in the Middle East 23/01/2018 2/11 18-01889 The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East The President: The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I should like at the outset to apologize to the members of the Security Council and the Secretariat for the fact that I ruined their siesta today. We have requested the convening of an open meeting of the Security Council because the issue that we intend to raise is far too important for the discussion to be held in closed consultations. We have nothing to hide. When we discussed Syria in consultations yesterday, many touched on the importance of establishing a new structure to investigate instances of chemical-weapons use in Syria to supplement the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM), which fully discredited itself. We have never forgotten this issue, and we have consistently recalled in meetings our readiness to continue consultations on this matter, as noted by Minister Lavrov to the Secretary-General last week. Yesterday, however, we were unable to rise to that call. Today, upon instruction from our capital, it is my honour to report the following. Russia has consistently stressed the importance of taking the most serious approach to the problem of the manufacture and use of chemical weapons. We are troubled by manifestations of chemical-weapons terrorism in the Middle East, which are not limited to Syrian territory. Unfortunately, the JIM, which no longer exists, caused the collapse of the investigation, which from a scientific and technical perspective was an utter failure and became an instrument for political manipulation. Members of the international community and the Security Council were well aware of the Russian specialists' scrupulous analysis of the conclusions of the JIM. In an attempt to interpret certain elements of the Russian approach, during consultations on 9 January the United States delegation circulated the relevant document. However, at no point in the document was there even an attempt to approach the matter from a professional standpoint. The so-called refutations of our position do not stand up to any criticism. I invite Council members to familiarize themselves with the material supporting our position in the response that we circulated yesterday as an official Security Council document. Today, incidentally, senior representatives of the United States Department of State made further unfounded accusations alleging that Russia is hindering international verification of the facts of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We have already responded to that, and anyone who wants to can read Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov's comments on the issue. No one has called more than we have for a further investigation — a professional one rather than a simulacrum — into the incidents involving the use of chemical weapons in Syria, and at the moment we are still trying to get the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to send its specialists to Syria to see for themselves the stockpiles of chemical weapons left by militants in liberated areas that the Syrian Government has discovered. By the way, during yesterday's consultations, following the reports of various recent incidents involving the use of toxic substances in Syria, which have yet to be verified, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom — without a second's pause or any evidence, let alone an investigation — hastened to declare them the work of what they refer to as the Syrian "regime". Now they are trying to drag Russia into it too. Secretary of State Tillerson brought this up in Paris today at the meeting of the so-called international partnership of States against impunity for the use of chemical weapons, basing his argument on an incident that allegedly occurred yesterday in eastern Ghouta. However, his statement was devoted almost exclusively to Russia. By the way, does nobody find it strange that this alleged incident, whose genuineness has yet to be confirmed — as does the identity of its perpetrators, if it is genuine — coincided very conveniently with the meeting in Paris and the forthcoming Syrian national dialogue conference in Sochi? An amazing coincidence. Some States are persisting in their attempts to push through an anti-Damascus verdict at the OPCW at all costs, and thereby undermining that respected organization's authority. Others are seeking to scrape together a narrow alliance of anti-impunity-ites through non-legitimate formats. In November of last year, Russia, working with others of like mind, put together draft resolution 23/01/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8164 18-01889 3/11 S/2017/968, which would have ensured that the JIM's activities conformed to the the high international standards of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which guarantee a genuinely impartial and professional investigation. The initiative was blocked by a number of delegations at the time. We want to rise above those differences and propose creating a new international investigative body that could establish the facts that the Security Council needs in order to identify those who used toxic substances as weapons, based on irreproachable, irrefutable information from transparent, credible sources. It must be professional and non-politicized. We have prepared a draft of such a resolution and ask that the Secretariat circulate it. We hope that Council members will study our initiative with their capitals as soon as possible. We are ready for substantive consultations. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): Russia has convened us with almost no notice, and then put forth a proposal that it hopes will distract from the new French initiative to hold accountable those who use chemical weapons. Today, Russia is again doing what it does best with regard to chemical weapons. It is running from the facts. It has the audacity to lecture the Security Council about how to stop the use of chemical weapons. I know that I have said this before, but it is worth repeating. In the past year, Russia exercised the right to veto three times to kill the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) in Syria. All by itself, Russia killed the Mechanism, which we had specifically tasked with identifying those responsible for using chemical weapons in Syria. Russia should look in the mirror before bringing us into the Security Council to talk about chemical weapons. Earlier this week, we received yet another report that the Al-Assad regime had used chlorine gas on its own people. Dozens of civilians had to be treated for suffocation. Syrian children were literally gasping for breath as chlorine gas surrounded them. Of course, it is no coincidence that this week's chlorine-gas attack reportedly happened in the exact place that the Al-Assad regime is trying to take over militarily. We know that it resorts to such brutal tactics when it wants to retake territory, without any regard for innocent civilians, and we know that Russia has looked the other way for years while its Syrian friends use those despicable weapons of war. Russia is complicit in the Al-Assad regime's atrocities. Will the representative of the Russian Federation say anything at all today about the suffering caused by Al-Assad's barbaric tactics? Will it hold Al-Assad to account? Of course not. It never does. It is therefore fitting that Russia brought us here on the same day that a new initiative on accountability for chemical weapons has been introduced in Paris. Today, France launched an international partnership against impunity for chemical weapons. We strongly support that effort and commend France for its leadership. More than 25 like-minded countries have come together to share and preserve information on who has used chemical weapons and to make sure that the perpetrators will be held accountable. Make no mistake — the United States, together with the Council, will continue to pursue those who have used chemical weapons to ensure that they are held accountable for their atrocities. Russia says that it has concerns about this French initiative to share evidence of the use of chemical weapons. That is no surprise. Russia opposed the Joint Investigative Mechanism because it collected facts about who used chemical weapons in Syria. Now Russia is questioning the French effort to collect facts on who used chemical weapons. What can we conclude? To put it simply, when Russia does not like the facts, it tries to distract the conversation. That is because the facts come back over and over again to the truth that Russia wants to hide, which is that the Al-Assad regime continues to use chemical weapons against its own people. Today, Russia once again threw around many different accusations. Again, that is not surprising. Russia often puts out misleading and unfounded claims to confuse the conversation about chemical weapons. In fact, this happens so often that we recently wrote to the Security Council with a detailed assessment of Russia's misleading claims. The letter is public and available for anyone to see. We encourage everyone to take a look at it for themselves. Here is the bottom line. The Security Council gave the Joint Investigative Mechanism a mandate to tell us who used chemical weapons in Syria. When investigators found the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham to be responsible, Russia was fine. When the investigators found that the Al-Assad regime had used them, Russia tried to find any excuse to poke holes in the investigation and threw up smoke to question the findings. But hat is not how independent investigations work. You do not get to question the findings when they do not go your way. We are therefore not going to accept any Russian proposal that undermines our S/PV.8164 The situation in the Middle East 23/01/2018 4/11 18-01889 ability to get to the truth or that politicizes what must be an independent and impartial investigation. If the Russians want to work in good faith towards that goal, we are ready to re-establish the JIM, with its original, independent and impartial mandate, right now. But anything less is unacceptable. To be crystal clear: the United States supports accountability for anyone who uses chemical weapons. We agree with Russia that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham must be held accountable for its use of such weapons, as the Joint Investigative Mechanism has found. But the difference between the United States and Russia is that we believe that no one should be let off the hook. Chemical weapons must never be used. Russia can continue to talk for as long as it wants about chemical weapons. It can bring it up in the Security Council Chamber as often as it wants. We welcome the debate. The United States and the international community will not be fooled. We remain steadfast in pursuing accountability for those who use chemical weapons. We stand strong in doing all we can to preserve the norm against their use. We remain forever committed to preserving the truth about what the Al-Assad regime has done in Syria and, sadly, what it will likely continue to do. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): We meet today after receiving news about another chemical attack in Syria — this time in Douma — which resulted in more than 20 victims, including women and children. Furthermore, the attack was penetrated in a de-escalation zone. We are closely following all available information. We expect that the international investigative mechanism in place — in particular the Fact-finding Mission — will shed light on the attack. As we commemorate the one hundredth anniversary this year of the end of the First World War, during which chemical weapons produced on an industrial scale were used for the first time in history, repeated chemical-weapon attacks in Syria are an affront to the human conscience and a violation of the most fundamental norms of international law. The facts prove that the scourge continues to exist. Last year in Syria, on 4 April, more than 80 people, including women and children, were killed by a powerful nerve agent. Four years prior, 2,000 Syrian civilians were gassed in Ghouta with sarin gas. The use of chemical weapons was confirmed by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) clearly determined that the Syrian regime and Da'esh were responsible for those attacks. France itself independently confirmed that the Syrian regime was responsible for the attack perpetrated on 4 April. Since 2013, investigations have revealed more than 100 allegations of the use of chemical weapons, primarily in Syria but also in Iraq and Malaysia. Chlorine gas, sarin, mustard gas and VX — all deadly nerve agents — have returned to the forefront of the international arena a century after the horrors of the First World War. Gruesome images of the victims of such weapons of terror, which we thought we had long ago left behind, have also resurfaced. We cannot allow the use of such loathsome weapons to become commonplace. They destabilize entire regions and threaten everyone's security. They increase the risk of chemical terrorism, which we all fear. They also weaken the regime against chemical weapons as well as the entire non-proliferation regime. They undermine international law and call into question the outcome of international forums that have been held for decades. That is why we must take action. We owe it to history; it is a responsibility we must shoulder together. Those of us who claim to be committed to the non-proliferation regime and helped to build it should bear that in mind. Let us be clear: those who hamper our efforts to combat impunity endorse de facto impunity for the perpetrators of such chemical attacks. They prevent us from deterring and bringing to justice those who participated in chemical-weapon programmes and those Governments and entities that give the orders to carry out attacks. We therefore cannot turn a blind eye and allow them to continue — and all the more so, and I repeat this, given that the chemical-weapon non-proliferation regime is the most developed and successful of all international non-proliferation regimes. Allowing it to be weakened without taking action would be tantamount to accepting the erosion of the entire non-proliferation regime on weapons of mass destruction, which we built together, step by step, over decades and which now serves as the backbone of the international security architecture and one of multilateralism's main accomplishments. France has therefore proposed the establishment of a new international partnership to combat impunity for the use of chemical weapons by anyone — State and non-State actors alike. That partnership was launched yesterday in Paris at a conference convened by the 23/01/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8164 18-01889 5/11 French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jean-Yves Le Drian, at which representatives of 24 States were in attendance to reiterate their willingness to work together to counter the threat. I should like to mention just a few of the partnership's ambitious commitments. They include the transfer and sharing of information, when possible, about the perpetrators of attacks; a commitment to impose national or international sanctions against entities and individuals concerned; assistance for building State capacity with regard to designations and sanctions; and the publication of a single, consolidated list of the names of individuals involved in attacks. Criminals who claim responsibility for developing and using such barbaric weapons must know that they will not go unpunished. Once again, this is about the future of the entire collective security system. One should not be able to violate the most basic norms without eventually facing the consequences. Owing to obstruction on the part of certain countries, we were unable to renew the JIM's mandate at the end of last year. Yesterday's consultations on Syria confirmed that an overwhelming majority of the members of the Security Council do not agree with the current impasse. In that regard, we take note of the proposal made today by Russia. We will consider it in the light of the principles I have just outlined. The new partnership launched in Paris does not aim to replace international instruments and the investigative mechanism established by the United Nations and the OPCW. Instead, it seeks to complement and bolster that structure by making a new operational instrument available to the multilateral system and the international community. It will assist investigations and help the international justice system in its work. It is neither an anti-Syrian instrument nor an exclusive club of countries. All countries can join this pragmatic and open partnership by adhering to its statement of principles. Through the partnership, they will show their commitment to law, international stability, justice and security in order to end impunity for the perpetrators of chemical attacks and their accomplices. We must therefore work through the partnership to consolidate the regime prohibiting chemical weapons. The cornerstone of the partnership was laid in Paris and embodies our faith in effective and demanding multilateralism. In an effort to take immediate action, I can confirm that France has imposed asset-freezes on networks involved in the proliferation of chemical weapons in Syria. In conclusion, I recall that there will be no justice or sustainable peace in Syria without putting an end to impunity. How can we continue to defend the regime and reiterate its willingness to speak in good faith and seek a political solution when that very same regime employs barbaric weapons against its own people? There has never been a larger gap between words and deeds. At the United Nations in both Vienna and Geneva, I said that we must work together to reach a political solution in Syria. Implementing an inclusive political solution as outlined in resolution 2254 (2015), which serves as our guidepost now more than ever, will depend upon a neutral environment in Syria guaranteed by the regime's clear commitment to credible constitutional change and democratic elections. It is the only way to permanently end the suffering of Syrians. We continue to believe that we can, and must, bring the Security Council together to proceed in that direction. Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): When I heard today that Russia had called for an urgent meeting on the use of chemical weapons in Syria, I was glad that we could return to an issue on which the Council has a duty to ensure that those responsible are held to account. That duty is even more pressing today, because yet another heinous attack on civilians was reported yesterday to the Council by the Secretariat. In that attack, in Douma, in eastern Ghouta, at least 21 civilians were treated for symptoms consistent with exposure to chlorine. That followed another reported attack in eastern Ghouta on 13 January, affecting six people. In 2016, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) found in three cases that the Syrian regime had used chlorine gas to attack civilians. Last year, it found that the regime had used sarin in Khan Shaykhun. Now, as the regime is escalating its attacks on eastern Ghouta in an attempt to force the besieged opposition to surrender, we remain deeply concerned about continuing reports of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. In all of this, we should not forget that it was the regime's 2013 attack on eastern Ghouta, using sarin, that led to the Council's adoption of resolution 2118 (2013), which had the clear, unanimously endorsed aim of disarming Syria's chemical-weapon programme. Throughout that process, Russia has claimed to be acting as a leading Power, a guarantor. But when the Al-Assad regime deliberately ignored its obligation to stop using chemical weapons and continued to do so with careless regard for human life, Russia chose to S/PV.8164 The situation in the Middle East 23/01/2018 6/11 18-01889 abuse its power of veto to protect that regime. Russia says that it supported the renewal of the JIM mandate and that it was the rest of us who killed it, because we could not agree with Russia's terms. Yet Russia's proposed draft resolution would have removed the JIM's ability to investigate the Al-Assad regime, which has been found responsible for multiple attacks. Russia has made it clear several times that it will not support a new investigative mechanism as long as it has the power to hold to account a State Member of the United Nations, and it seems, from a rapid reading of the latest text, that this proposal is another attempt to shift attention to non-State actors. The Russians have even claimed that Syria is a signatory in good standing to the Chemical Weapons Convention. It is not. It has not completed its declaration. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has repeatedly warned of inconsistencies, gaps and omissions. Russia has great influence over the Al-Assad regime. For the sake of the Syrian people and for preventing the future use of chemical weapons, we call on Russia to persuade its Syrian friends to get rid of their chemical weapons and comply fully with the Chemical Weapons Convention. By ending the JIM, Russia also stopped its investigations of chemical attacks by Da'esh. The investigators had found that those terrorists had carried out at least two such attacks. We condemn Da'esh unreservedly for its use of these vile weapons, which is yet another reason why we must defeat those terrorists once and for all. The United Kingdom was proud to join the international partnership against impunity for the use of chemical weapons led by our French colleagues today in Paris. The use of chemical weapons is barbaric, illegal under international law and must stop. We must ensure that we can re-establish a mechanism to ensure accountability. We all know where the obstacle to that lies. In response, we will only redouble our efforts to pursue accountability for these crimes. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): The Kingdom of the Netherlands is deeply shocked by the ongoing attacks using chemical weapons in Syria. The Secretariat briefed the Council yesterday on yet another alleged chemical-weapon attack, the second this month. Two surface-to-surface projectiles targeted eastern Ghouta, releasing what is suspected to be chlorine. The attack resulted in injuring 21 people through exposure to chlorine, of whom eight were men, six women and seven children. Furthermore, there are shocking estimates of 130 chemical attacks between 2012 and 2017, with more than 60 pending allegations of chemical-weapon use in Syria still to be investigated by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and its Fact-finding Mission. The Netherlands condemns in the strongest terms the use of chemical weapons by any State or non-State actor. I would now like to make three points. First, accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria is neither optional nor negotiable. Secondly, it is unacceptable that four years after Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention, its declaration is still unable to be verified as accurate and complete. Thirdly, the Netherlands will use its membership of the Security Council to bring accountability to the fore. We regret the dismantling of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM). We were convinced of the professionalism and independence of the JIM's work, and its results still stand. The Council should shoulder its responsibility in that regard. In particular, the countries on the Council with influence on Syria should use it with the Syrian regime to convince it to refrain from further chemical-weapon attacks, acknowledge its past use of such weapons and complete its chemical-weapon declaration. As long as the Council remains deadlocked, our focus on accountability will not stop here. We will look for complementary measures so that impunity will not prevail. We therefore thank France for taking the initiative to establish an international partnership against impunity for the use of chemical weapons. The Netherlands participated in the meeting of the partnership that took place in Paris today. The Paris initiative aims to collect evidence of the use of chemical weapons anywhere in the world. It will enable States to take action to uphold the international norms against the use of chemical weapons. It represents a political commitment to increasing pressure on those responsible for the use of chemical weapons, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands is fully committed to that goal. Furthermore, the International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011; the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic; and national prosecution in third countries, as well as sanctions, remain instrumental for achieving accountability for the crimes committed 23/01/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8164 18-01889 7/11 against the Syrian people. We must use all the tools available to us to achieve accountability. In conclusion, the Netherlands remains convinced that a referral of the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court in The Hague is by far the best option for achieving accountability for the extremely serious crimes that have taken place in Syria. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): Yesterday the Council members were briefed by Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman on yet another alleged chemical-weapon attack in Syria. Allegations of the use of such weapons continue to be reported. There are some 60 cases of the reported use of chemical weapons in Syria that are currently being examined by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and that its Fact-finding Missions continue to investigate and report, including a case of a sarin attack in Lataminah in March of last year. I would like to reiterate once again that Sweden condemns the use of chemical weapons in the strongest terms. It is a serious violation of international law and its use in armed conflict amounts to a war crime. Bringing the perpetrators of such crimes to justice remains a high priority. There must be no impunity for those responsible. That is why we participated in the meeting of the international partnership against impunity for the use of chemical weapons held today in Paris. As a member of the Council and the OPCW Executive Council, Sweden attaches great importance to all international efforts to combat the use and proliferation of chemical weapons by State and non-State actors alike, anywhere in the world. We trust that the French initiative will complement and support our collective work in multilateral forums, as well as the existing multilateral mechanisms to achieve unity around those important goals. That also includes the Human Rights Council's Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic and the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for the Syrian Arab Republic, which play an important role in collecting information. It was highly regrettable that the Council was not able to agree on an extension of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. It is a critical to establish a similar new impartial and independent attributive mechanism now. The Council needs to come back together and speak with one voice. We need to be forward-looking and overcome our differences with a view to protecting the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime and ensuring accountability. That should be possible if everyone engages seriously, constructively and genuinely in good faith. We stand ready to engage in such efforts in order for the Council to fully shoulder its responsibilities. Ms. Wronecka (Poland): We are deeply concerned about the reported use of chemical weapons in eastern Ghouta, which is in clear violation of international law and deserves condemnation in the strongest possible terms. This alleged use of chemical weapons, as with other incidents, including in Talmenes, demonstrates the need to hold perpetrators accountable. There is no space for impunity in this regard. We support taking all the necessary measures to fill the gap left by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, so as to ensure that no one goes unpunished for using chemical weapons, which cause unacceptable harm and suffering. Those responsible for chemical attacks must realize that they will be held accountable because their acts are an affront to all humankind and the basic rules of civilization. We support the tireless work done by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. We are convinced that it is the responsibility of the Security Council to establish and maintain a suitable institution to investigate alleged cases of the use of chemical weapons. Let me take this opportunity to thank France for today's hosting of a high-level meeting to launch a new initiative to protect the core values underpinning the credibility of the non-proliferation regime on chemical weapons established by the Chemical Weapons Convention. Poland joined that new partnership with the sole purpose of using all the tools at our disposal to end impunity for those responsible for chemical attacks and to promote and complement existing standards and mechanisms against the use of chemical weapons. We look forward to working on this issue in the Council in the months to come. Mr. Tenya (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): The Security Council has the highly sensitive responsibility of contributing to the prevention of the use of chemical weapons, which entails identifying and prosecuting those responsible for atrocities such as the one perpetrated yesterday in Syria. S/PV.8164 The situation in the Middle East 23/01/2018 8/11 18-01889 Peru participated in the meeting convened by France today to establish a partnership to combat impunity for the use of chemical weapons, at which a declaration of principles was adopted. The document sets out a series of measures aimed at ensuring that individuals and entities responsible for the use of chemical weapons are brought to justice. During that meeting, Peru's Ambassador to France referred in particular to paragraph 3 of the terms of reference, which had been circulated in advance, wherein it is expressly stated that the purpose of the initiative is not in any way meant to replace, reproduce or supersede international inquiry and investigation mechanisms that serve the same purpose. Our Ambassador also expressed his satisfaction with those words, insofar as Peru, as a member of the Security Council and a member of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, encourages the necessary action to be taken by those competent bodies. Peru condemns in the strongest possible terms the lack of accountability in the continuing incidents involving chemical weapons in Syria, for we believe it undermines international regimes on the matter and weakens peace efforts in the region. Mr. Shen Bo (China) (spoke in Chinese): China expresses its grave concern about the use of chemical weapons in Syria and extends its deepest sympathy to the Syrian people for their suffering. China's position on chemical weapons has been clear and consistent. We firmly oppose the use of chemical weapons by any country, group or individual for any purpose and under any circumstances. The use of chemical weapons is unacceptable, whenever or wherever they are used. China supports a comprehensive, objective and fair investigation into such incidents in order to arrive at a conclusion that can stand the test of time and to shed light on the facts in order to bring the perpetrators to justice. China welcomes the draft resolution circulated by the delegation of the Russian Federation that would establish a new investigative mechanism on Syrian chemical weapons. China appreciates the efforts made by Russia in the Security Council to continue to advance the work on the Syrian chemical weapons issue. China will seriously study the draft resolution and actively participate in consultations on it. It is imperative to establish a new investigative mechanism to find out the truth and to deter further use of chemical weapons in Syria. We hope that Council members will participate in the consultations in a constructive manner and strive to reach consensus on the establishment of a new mechanism. The Syrian chemical weapons issue is closely linked to a political settlement to the Syrian question, and it requires a comprehensive, balanced and integrated approach. China supports the role of the Security Council and of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons as the main channel for achieving an appropriate resolution to the Syrian chemical weapons issue. We hope that all the relevant parties will adopt a constructive attitude and seek appropriate solutions during consultations. We must maintain the unity of the Council and coordinate with the relevant parties in an effort to actively promote the political process in Syria. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): Bolivia reiterates its strong, categorical condemnation of the use of chemical weapons and chemical substances as weapons as unjustifiable and criminal acts — wherever, whenever and by whomever they are committed. We believe that there can be no justification for the use of such weapons, regardless of the circumstances and of who uses them, as it constitutes a serious crime under international law and a threat to international peace and security. We emphatically condemn the reported use of chemical weapons in the city of Douma, in eastern Ghouta. That incident must be investigated in order to identify the perpetrators, bring them to justice and ensure that their actions do not go unpunished. Accordingly, we reiterate our support for the work carried out by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic. However, as we have stated on other occasions, we emphasize the urgent need for an investigative mechanism with a clear mandate that can carry out its assigned tasks of investigating methodically, transparently, technically, faithfully, with assistance and in a fundamentally depoliticized way. We must have a mechanism that can develop an independent, impartial, complete and conclusive investigation to hold accountalbe those responsible for such horrific crimes. We believe that, if what we want is an independent and transparent mechanism, we have the challenge of not exploiting the Security Council by bringing geopolitical interests on the ground into the Chamber. We have 23/01/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8164 18-01889 9/11 the challenge of demonstrating to the international community the unity of the Council. To that end, we must not turn the Chamber into a sounding board for warring confrontation and, even less so, transfer the immediate interests of the battlefield to this setting. In that regard, we welcome the proposal put forward by the Russian Federation today. We will study the text, and we hope that consultations will be convened as soon as possible and that they will result in the Council and the international community having on an independent investigation mechanism. It is essential that we overcome the lack of trust that exists in the Council. Furthermore, we must always bear in mind that no initiative, however well intended, should supplant our responsibilities, as established by the Charter of the United Nations. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): The ongoing use of chemical weapons in Syria represents one of the deplorable elements of this crisis, which has been continuing for seven years. It is all the more deplorable when we see that there is an absence of justice and accountability and that there is impunity for every criminal who has contributed to and participated in such crimes against civilians. Following the attack when chemical weapons were used in Ghouta, where most of the victims were civilians, we witnessed the unity of the Council in ensuring that such a crime would not be repeated and that perpetrators would be held accountable through the adoption of resolution 2118 (2013). However, unfortunately, we note that there are still reports of chemical attacks in Syria, most recently by Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, yesterday regarding a chemical attack on the city of Duma on 13 January. We would therefore like to express our disappointment that the Security Council has been unable to reach consensus on renewing the mandate of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, which, we believe, carried out its work in a professional, impartial and independent way. As a result, the failure to renew the mandate meant the complete absence of a tool for accountability in Syria. For that reason, the perpetrators of such crimes will go unpunished and there is no guarantee of holding them, or any perpetrator of such crimes in future, accountable. The State of Kuwait has a firm, principled position strongly condemning any use of chemical weapons at any time, anywhere and by anyone, since the use of chemical weapons is a grave violation of international law. We underscore the need to hold perpetrators — individuals, entities, non-State groups or Governments — accountable. As members of the Security Council, we are responsible for maintaining international peace and security. We must therefore seek alternatives and mechanisms, agreeable to all members of the Security Council, to ensure the independence, impartiality and professionalism of any new future mechanism to ensure that criminals are held accountable. We note that there is a draft resolution before us on establishing a new mechanism. We recall the clear and decisive language in resolution 2118 (2013), which stipulates the need to hold accountable those responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. In that regard, the State of Kuwait welcomes the French initiative to convene the Paris meeting on an international partnership against impunity for use of chemical weapons. Along with a number of countries, the State of Kuwait participated in that event to underscore the importance of strengthening the values of justice and accountability and to implement the principle of ending impunity. We support the international mechanisms established by the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council to gather evidence regarding any crimes related to human rights violations in Syria. In conclusion, we emphasize that it is important for the Security Council to stand united when dealing with issues that threaten international peace and security, such as the incidents mentioned in reports on the Syrian crisis, through the unanimous adoption of such resolutions as resolution 2118 (2013), on chemical weapons; resolution 2165 (2014), on the humanitarian situation; and resolution 2254 (2015), on the political track of the Syrian crisis. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): My delegation thanks the Russian Federation for having called for this emergency meeting of the Security Council with a view to once again discussing the issue of the use of chemical weapons in general, and in Syria in particular, where, it seems, that atrocious weapon is being used. My country, which is opposed to the use of chemical weapons, ratified the Convention on the Prohibition S/PV.8164 The situation in the Middle East 23/01/2018 10/11 18-01889 of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in order to show the world our determination to work with other international stakeholders for the complete elimination of such weapons. To that end, on this very day, 23 January, we signed in Paris the declaration of principles, issued by the meeting held at the initiative of France on the topic of combating impunity through the international partnership against impunity for the use of chemical weapons. Côte d'Ivoire extends its full support to that initiative and vehemently condemns any use of chemical weapons, regardless of the reasons or perpetrators. In firm support of the values of equity and justice, Côte d'Ivoire wishes to draw the attention of the Security Council to the need to set up a new consensus mechanism aimed at combating the use of chemical weapons. In that regard, we welcome the Russian initiative to propose the establishment, by means of a resolution, of a new mechanism. We assume that such a mechanism, like the previous one, would be tasked with identifying perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons, in general. In the specific case of Syria, the perpetrators of such acts must be identified and be held accountable for their actions. Inaction by the Council on this important issue would be a bad sign and send a message of encouragement to those who indulge in the use of chemical weapons with impunity. To conclude, my delegation calls on the Council to act in a consensus-based and coordinated manner in order to establish a new mechanism, for our action must prompt us not only to protect and to help victims, who are martyrs in the endless war in Syria, but also to work to uphold international peace and security. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): The use of chemical weapons, the issue we are considering is critically important to the Republic of Equatorial Guinea. We categorically repudiate and condemn their use by any country, State or non-State actor. We also condemn in the strongest terms the recent chemical-weapon attacks in Syria. With regard to the issue of who is responsible for the use of such weapons, there is no consensus among the members of the Security Council on that. We realize that the Security Council must address the issue of the use of chemical weapons in a spirit of understanding and unanimity, with a view to combating impunity, thereby sending an unambiguous message to anyone who has used such weapons or is thinking of doing so that they will be held responsible for their actions. We repeat that we categorically condemn the production, stockpiling and use of chemical and other weapons of mass destruction. If we are to take steps against those who have used such weapons, we must clearly identify the responsible parties in a way that leaves no room for doubt. That is why, given the lack of consensus among the members of the Council and the need to identify those responsible for the use of such weapons, we are of the view that the proposal that the Russian Federation has just made is worth considering as a new opportunity for conducting a fully transparent investigation whose results all Council members would have to accept, thereby fostering the unanimity and consensus within the Council that would enable it to take the necessary steps against the perpetrators of the heinous act of using chemical weapons. The President: I shall now make a statement in my national capacity as the representative of Kazakhstan. We are deeply worried about the fact that chemical weapons continue to be used in Syria. It is regrettable that this inhuman and illegal type of weapon is being used with the specific purpose of intimidating ordinary people, since it mostly affects unprotected civilians. Another discouraging fact is the lack of unity and the deepening confrontation among the parties on the chemical dossier, which complicates our ability to address this threat in an appropriate way. It is therefore urgent to start thinking about developing a new investigative tool that can effectively counter all such chemical crimes. Any delay or inaction on the part of the Council could lead to an increase in the commission of such acts in the absence of clear plans and mechanisms to end impunity. We welcome the Russian Federation's proposal to establish a new mechanism, giving us a new opportunity to look into the matter. Since we will have to start over with the creation of an investigative mechanism, we must try to get it right from the very beginning, on a basis of consensus. The mechanism should be impartial, depoliticized, professional, representative, and with a clear mandate that will preclude any doubts and ensure the credibility of its work. That does not mean that we think the previous mechanism was unfit for its purpose, but it is obvious that accountability requires a Security Council that is united in its decision-making. 23/01/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8164 18-01889 11/11 Kazakhstan is ready to contribute and to assist in finding the best way to move forward together. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. The representative of the Russian Federation has asked to make a further statement. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I am taking the floor to further clarify our position. It is a pity that my friend Mrs. Haley has left the Chamber. She mentioned that we convened this meeting today on short notice, for which I apologize. As I recall, however, we have frequently been convened by Mrs. Haley's call, and we are ready to do it again. Please let her know that I am doing it because I am always very pleased to see her here. Once again, everything that we heard from the United States in its statement today was about Russia. The fact that it is rejecting our proposed draft resolution from the get-go says a great deal. It once again betrays a truth that we are sadly familiar with. The United States has no need of any independent professional mechanism. It is not only betraying a truth, it is betraying itself in the eyes of the international community. Let me say straight out what I spoke about before in a rhetorical question. It was no accident that the allegations — which will remain allegations until they are confirmed — about the use of chemical weapons in eastern Ghouta emerged on the eve of some important political events for Syria, the meeting in Vienna and the Syrian national dialogue conference in Sochi. Furthermore, I will say it again, why does the United States need an investigative mechanism when both yesterday and today, before any kind of investigation, it asserted, without apparently a shadow of doubt, that it was the Syrian Government that did it? It has taken the role of both judge and prosecutor. Does the United States at least understand that it is betraying itself by this? If it genuinely wants to establish a professional, independent attributive mechanism, it should at least read the draft resolution before rejecting it. Did we not discuss a new mechanism with Council members of the Council at the conclusion of the multiple acts in the political spectacle surrounding the closure of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism? We did not time our draft resolution to coincide with any events or partnerships. However, I want to reiterate something that I spoke about at a Council meeting presided over by President Nazarbayev on 18 January, which is that no commissions, partnerships or so-called independent mechanisms in this area can be legitimate unless they are approved by the Security Council. That must be our premise. I would like to echo what the Permanent Representative of Sweden — and he was not the only one — said in his statement, which is that we must overcome our differences, engage in dialogue and try to restore the Council's lost unity. That is the aim of our proposal. The meeting rose at 4.10 p.m.
This paper aims to examine how effective Cuba's national security services were in working with drug traffickers to obtain their national goals, how exactly the Cuban government was involved and when these drug operations began, as well as the level of culpability on the part of the Castro brothers and legal veracity of the drug trials. Given the extreme lack of academic study into Cuban intelligence and their potential involvement in the drug trade, this research (utilizing interviews with persons who have direct involvement and insight, analyzing declassified files and memorandums) is highly instrumental in determining how effective Cuba has been in making effective foreign policy in addition to offering insights into how Cuba's military and intelligence agencies have performed covert action operations. ; Winner of the 2021 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the College of Graduate and Continuing Studies Graduate category. ; CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY "Trafficking for a Cause": Cuban Drug Trafficking Operations as a Foreign Policy Alan Chase Cunningham Norwich University Advisor: Gamze Menali 01 June 2021 CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham ABSTRACT A capable intelligence service and military force is immensely integral to the national security policy of any nation, regardless of their political ideology or international activity. Cuba's national security apparatuses have proven themselves time and again to be exceptional at accomplishing the Republic's foreign policy goals. From the nation's early beginnings, in the 1960s and 70s, elements of the Cuban government were involved in the drug trade, either on an official or unofficial basis, utilizing drug trafficking as a form of aiding likeminded non-state actors, acquiring small arms and other weaponry, gaining U.S. currency, and making war against the United States. In the 1980s, following increased international outcry, multiple members of Cuba's military and intelligence forces were arrested, tried, and either executed or sentenced to prison for their roles in the drug trade. Many international observers, alongside defectors from Cuba's military and intelligence services and foreign governments, claimed that these trials were for show designed to protect the Castros. This paper aims to examine how effective Cuba's national security services were in working with drug traffickers to obtain their national goals, how exactly the Cuban government was involved and when these drug operations began, as well as the level of culpability on the part of the Castro brothers and legal veracity of the drug trials. Given the extreme lack of academic study into Cuban intelligence and their potential involvement in the drug trade, this research (utilizing interviews with persons who have direct involvement and insight, analyzing declassified files and memorandums) is highly instrumental in determining how effective Cuba has been in making effective foreign policy in addition to offering insights into how Cuba's military and intelligence agencies have performed covert action operations. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham ACKNOWLEDGMENT I would first like to thank my thesis advisor, Professor Gamze Menali, at Norwich University. She provided exceptional advice and support that was highly integral to the completion of this thesis and my degree. Her comments were always well-received and significantly bolstered my paper's overall effect and allowed my research to take on a professional quality. A better advisor could not have been provided nor found. I additionally must thank those persons who sacrificed their time and allowed themselves to be interviewed for my final project. Bobby Chacon of the FBI, Fulton Armstrong of the Intelligence Community, Harry Sommers of the DEA, Mike Powers of the DEA, Pierre Charette of the DEA, Richard Gregorie of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida, Mike Waniewski of the DEA, Harry Fullett of the DEA, and Seth Taylor of the U.S. Customs Service. This work is intended to honor them and their years of service and dedication to the U.S. government. I would also like to thank two professors whom were of immense importance in my academic career; Professor Jonathan Brown and Assistant Professor Joshua Frens-String of the University of Texas. Both sparked my interest in Latin American affairs and guided me on how to conduct historical research. They were inspirations and role models for me as a historian. Finally, I would like to offer special thanks to both my mother and father who supported me in more ways than one through my entire educational career. My family, importantly Kaytlynn Lopez, were a source for comfort, relaxation, and support throughout this endeavor. I could not have done this without any of them. I hope this work looks well upon all of those who helped and inspired me and allows a new generation of researchers and scholars to better understand this period in Cuban history. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham Table of Contents Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………….01 A Basic History of Cuba's Military and Intelligence Services……………………………….03 Early Beginnings: Cuba and Drugs in the 1960s…………………………………………….07 A Change in Policy: Cuba and Drugs in the 1970s………………………………………….16 The Cocaine Boom: Cuba and Drugs in 1980s……………………………………………….21 The Question of Culpability on the Part of the Castros…………………………………….52 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………61 CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham1 Introduction Cuba's intelligence and military services are among the best in the world. They have been described in laudatory terms by intelligence professionals, national security theorists, and academics alike. Brian Latell, a former National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Latin America and career Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst, agrees and recounts how veteran counterintelligence officers from all areas of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) would, "stand in awe of how Cuba, a small island nation, could have built up such exceptional clandestine capabilities and run so many successful operations against American targets".1 The CIA's former Chief of Counterintelligence, James M. Olson, agrees, writing, "no foreign intelligence service rankled me more than [Cuba's]…It was ruthless, it was devious, and worst of all, it was very, very good".2 Analysts from the research and analysis think tank CNA agree with Latell, writing, "[Cuba's] intelligence services are widely regarded as among the best in the world – a significant accomplishment given the country's meager financial and technological resources".3 The longtime lead historian of Cuban affairs, Jorge I. Dominguez, wrote in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, "Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)…have been among the world's most successful military".4 Longtime attorney and the Chief of Narcotics for the U.S. 1 Brian Latell, Castro's Secrets: The CIA and Cuba's Intelligence Machine (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 01, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/733231302. 2 James M. Olson, To Catch A Spy: The Art of Counterintelligence (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2019), p. 31, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/1055568332. 3 Sean Durns, "Castro's dead, but his spies live on," The Hill, Capitol Hill Publishing, published 05 December 2016, https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/308811-castros-dead-but-his-spies-live-on. 4 Jorge I. Dominguez, "Cuban Military and Politics," Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford University Press, published 29 May 2020, https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1810. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham2 Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida (USAO-SDFL) during the early 1980s, Richard Gregorie, has said that Cuba's intelligence services "is better than the CIA in Miami".5 It is apparent that, across multiple fields and specialties, Cuba is a well-regarded foreign power with a highly effective intelligence apparatus and robust military force. Not only that, but Cuba has been able to maintain effective relationships with like-minded state and non-state actors. Throughout the Cold War, Cuba maintained effective relationships with Latin American states by encouraging leftist revolutions amongst foreign populaces and aligning with foreign political parties6, becoming a benefactor to various regimes, political parties, and revolutionary groups in places like Venezuela, Angola, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. These relationships were maintained in a variety of ways from the providing of covert financial and military aid to the physical commitment of Cuban troops to ground warfare. It is well documented that, one of these relationships included the providing of security to drug traffickers and the usage of Cuba as a weigh station for drug traffickers. Through this almost three decade long covert operation, Cuba was heavily entrenched in building up beneficial relationships with non-state actors like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and legitimate nation states like Manuel Noriega's Panama, finding a steady source of income, and being able to make war against their age old adversary, the United States of America. By efficiently coordinating these operations and working to traffic illicit substances abroad, Cuba was able to improve their standing in Latin America and assist in the making of revolution abroad, essentially using the trafficking of drugs and other narcotics as a form of positive foreign policy. 5 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. 6 "Castro and the Cold War," American Experience, Public Broadcasting Service, published 2005, republished November 2015, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/comandante-cold-war/. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham3 Despite the fact that this incident offers a great deal of information as to how Cuba has conducted themselves in a foreign policy sense and has made war against the United States, it has been only minimally studied. In researching this area, one can find only a few academic papers and books written from the late 1990s which covers this issue in depth, with other books on Cuban history or drug trafficking in Latin America failing to cover this area or devoting only a paragraph or two to the entire ordeal. By examining this issue in depth, one can be able to determine just how intricate and involved Cuba's foreign policy endeavors were in addition to better understanding Cuba and the Castro's commitment to the exportation of revolution. This research chronologically catalogs how Cuba engaged in the drug trade, where they expanded and how they altered plans to most effectively suit their own needs. This research also intends to determine the level of knowledge Fidel and Raul Castro, Cuba's most well-known and high ranking officials, had of the operation and show how Cuba's drug trafficking efforts either succeeded or failed in bringing about the results desired by the island nation. A Basic History of Cuba's Military and Intelligence Services To fully and best understand Cuba's involvement in the drug trade, one must first come to understand the nation's intelligence and military infrastructure. The history of the FAR began when Fidel Castro and the military arm of his 26th of July Movement (M26) returned to the nation in December of 1956.7 Though soundly crushed by Fulgencio Batista's forces, Castro's rebellion was able to persevere by launching successful guerilla raids upon important military targets and acquiring a devoted following of students and lower to middle-class Cuban citizens, eventually becoming militarily superior to Batista's forces and claiming the country in January of 1959.8 The rebel army, under the command of Fidel Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, 7 Marc Becker, Twentieth-Century Latin American Revolutions (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), p. 111. 8 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham4 purged the military corps of Batista's regime, executing, exiling, or simply discharging various officers before officially creating the FAR in October of 1959.9 The FAR was initially under the control of the Ministry of Defense, yet this was renamed to the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR) and was headed by Raul Castro, Fidel's brother and later Vice President.10 Between 1959 and 1961, Castro populated the FAR with officers and enlisted personnel who would remain loyal to the new government, implemented educational programs which served to expose the military to Communist and Marxist teachings, and established militias which bridged the gap between Cuba's military and societal structures.11 Cuba's intelligence service, the Dirección General de Inteligencia (until 1989, the service went by the acronym DGI, before being changed to DI; the acronym DGI will be used when referring to this service), was created sometime in 1961, the actual date being unclear, as placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior (MININT).12 What is clear with the DGI, however, is their connections to the Soviet Union and the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezposnosti (KGB). Immediately following the Bay of Pigs crisis, the KGB assisted Cuba in infiltrating Cuban exile groups in Florida and New York to determine if the Kennedy administration would try and oust Castro from power again.13 In March of 1962, the KGB set up an "operations base in Havana to export revolution across Latin America,"14 while later beginning an information 9 Damián J. Fernández, "Historical Background: Achievements, Failures, and Prospects," in The Cuban Military Under Castro, ed. Jaime Suchlicki (Miami, FL: University of Miami Graduate School of International Studies, 1989), p. 05. 10 Ibid. 11 Fernández, "Historical Background: Achievements, Failures, and Prospects," in The Cuban Military Under Castro ed. Jaime Suchlicki, p. 07-08. 12 "Cuba, Intelligence and Security," in Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security, ed. K. Lee Lerner & Brenda Wilmoth Lerner (Farmington Hills, MI: The Gale Group, 2004), p. 292, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/55960387. 13 Oleg Kalugin, Spymaster: My Thirty-Two Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West (United States of America: Basic Books, 2009), p. 51-53. 14 Christopher Andrew & Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (United States of America: Basic Books, 2001), p. 184, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/727648881. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham5 sharing operation with the Cubans and even putting in place a KGB liaison officer within the DGI.15 Since the beginning of Cuba's foray into the world of counterintelligence and foreign intelligence collection, the KGB has been heavily invested and taken a special interest in Cuban intelligence operations. Early Beginnings: Cuba and Drugs in the 1960s Stratfor, a private geopolitical intelligence firm based in Austin, Texas, wrote in 2008 that, "While seeking refuge from Batista forces in the hills outside Havana, the future dictator was sheltered by marijuana farmers. Castro promised the growers protection for their hospitality".16 While trying to corroborate this claim about Castro's promise is difficult, it is well-documented that the Sierra Maestra mountain range, where Castro and his 26th of July Movement carried out guerilla attacks against the Batista regime, "had been traditional outlaw country long before Castro – rife with smuggling, marijuana growing…".17 Cuban governmental involvement in the drug trade seemingly sometime shortly after the DGI was founded in 1961. A declassified Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD – the precursor to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)) document details how, in 1961, a meeting was held between Che Guevara (then the President of Cuba's National Bank and head of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA)18), Ramiro Valdes (Che's deputy during the revolution and now head of the "[state's] security and intelligence apparatus"19), a Captain from Valdes' outfit, and Salvador Allende, then a Senator from Chile.20 The meeting first revolved 15 Ronald Young, "Cuba," in Encyclopedia of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), p. 186, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/436850527. 16 "Organized Crime in Cuba," Stratfor, Rane Corporation, published 16 May 2008, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/organized-crime-cuba. 17 Gil Carl Alroy, "The Peasantry in the Cuban Revolution," The Review of Politics Vol. 29, No. 01 (1967), p. 97, https://www-jstor-org.library.norwich.edu/stable/1405815?seq=4#metadata_info_tab_contents. 18 Jon Lee Anderson, Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (New York, NY: Grove Press, 2010), p. 424. 19 Anderson, Che Guevara, p. 368. 20 Rachel Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1990), p. 24. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham6 around Chilean politics, "but soon Comandante Valdes turned the talk to setting up a cocaine-trafficking network in order to raise money to help finance Allende…Valdes…suggested that Roberto Alvarez, chief of Cuban espionage, head the new organization".21 While attempts were made to gain access to this document via a FOIA request to the DEA, the DEA was unable to provide the document by the time of publication. This is not the only document which alleges Cuban governmental involvement in the drug trade during the early 1960s. Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN - the precursor to the BNDD and therefore the DEA) Henry Giordano specified in multiple letters and internal memoranda that the FBN and BNDD had located, "a "pattern of Cuban nationals," who were "suspected Castro sympathizers . . . dominating the traffic" and "operating in Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile to distribute large quantities of cocaine throughout the United States",".22 This mirrors what Giordano's predecessor, Harry J. Anslinger, seemed to believe in early 1961, that "the island nation [was] trying to subvert the United States with drugs".23 The BNDD too apparently, "investigated a purported Cuban government operation to sponsor marijuana and heroin crops in Cuba's Oriente province, using a secret department within the country's National Institute of Agrarian Reform".24 While both these incidences mention drug trafficking/production on the part of INRA and within Chile, seemingly backing up what the defector alleged to the BNDD, Giordano and Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury David Acheson both changed their opinions in the mid-1960s. The two officials believed that while individual Cubans were involved in the drug trade, this was not government 21 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism, p. 24-25. 22 William L. Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine: How U.S. Foreign Policy Has Created a Thriving Drug Industry in Central and South America (Chicago, IL: Chicago Review Press, 2010), p. 92, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/592756109. 23 William O. Walker III, Drugs in the Western Hemisphere: An Odyssey of Cultures in Conflict (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1996), 171, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/33132446. 24 Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine, p. 91. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham7 sanctioned and was of such a tiny scale that it would be "too small to have much of an effect on the supply of dollars to that country".25 Naturally, for a government official to change their personal opinion (especially those with the highest access to sensitive documents), they must have been exposed to some form of information which detailed to them that their previously held notion of Cuban involvement was faulty. This being said, evidence collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), individual FBN agents, and allegations by Soviet defectors, seem to corroborate the investigations by federal agencies, pointing to drug trafficking endeavors sanctioned by the Cuban government. According to a letter penned by J. Edgar Hoover, the longtime director of the FBI, "several Colombian airplanes taken to Cuba in 1967 were hijacked on behalf of the Cuban government for the purpose of obtaining the cargo—smuggled heroin".26 The Federal Bureau of Narcotics also agreed with the FBI's assessment and even estimated the total worth of the heroin was in the twenty million dollar range.27 Also in 1967, "a Cuban trained Venezuelan intelligence officer established…Cuban link of drugs for guerrilla weapons in the hemisphere," detailing this information before the Organization of American States (OAS), "providing a major connection between Havana, the guerilla movements, and narcotics".28 Acting Federal Narcotics Commissioner and long-time FBN agent Charles Siragusa also claimed in March of 1962 that six Cuban drug traffickers arrested in Miami and New York were transporting cocaine from Cuba to the U.S. for the purposes of "raising money [and] 25 Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine, p. 92. 26 Marcy, The Politics of Cocaine, p. 93. 27 Ibid. 28 Ralph E. Fernandez, "Historical Assessment of Terrorist Activity and Narcotic Trafficking by the Republic of Cuba," The Law Offices of Ralph E. Fernandez and Associates, P.A., Ralph E. Fernandez, P.A., published 22 January 2003, p. 02. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham8 demoralizing Americans and discrediting Cuban exiles in Miami".29 An FBN agent involved in the investigation and raid also confirmed this.30 A 2003 historical assessment focusing on the Cuban government's involvement in the drug trade and terrorism published by the law offices of Ralph E. Fernandez in Tampa, Florida indicated that Juvenito Pablo Guerra, the Miami group's ringleader, was an intelligence officer.31 Among the evidence that this cell was linked to the Cuban government and that Guerra was an intelligence officer includes "a supply of Communist literature and pictures of Cuban premier Fidel Castro in Guerra's apartment".32 While this piece of information is highly circumstantial in trying to link Castro to the drug ring, it does indicate that this cell was most likely not a grouping of exiled Cubans, ones who fled following Castro's claiming power in 1959, but rather were supporters of the Castro regime. Upon being sentenced in June of 1962 to "fifteen years in prison [for] narcotics conspiracy and assault with intent to kill a Federal officer…an undercover narcotics agent testified that Guerra was closely associated with Premier Castro and has been a member of a ring that had smuggled cocaine into this country from Cuba to obtain arms for Dr. Castro during the revolution".33 Also in the early 1960's, a FBN agent named Salvatore Vizzini was involved in the arrest of, "two Cuban agents…in Miami with large amounts of cocaine in their possession".34 29 "Cuba Plot Is Cited in Narcotics Raids," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 31 March 1962, https://www.nytimes.com/1962/03/31/archives/cuba-plot-is-cited-in-narcotics-raids.html?searchResultPosition=78. 30 "Big Cocaine Seizure Held Cuban in Origin," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 30 March 1962, https://www.nytimes.com/1962/03/30/archives/big-cocaine-seizure-held-cuban-in-origin.html?searchResultPosition=106. 31 Fernandez, "Historical Assessment of Terrorist Activity and Narcotic Trafficking by the Republic of Cuba," The Law Offices of Ralph E. Fernandez and Associates, P.A, p. 02. 32 "Big Cocaine Seizure Held Cuban in Origin," The New York Times. 33 "U.S. Jails 2 in Narcotics Case; One Reported Close to Castro," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 02 June 1962, https://www.nytimes.com/1962/06/02/archives/us-jails-2-in-narcotics-case-one-reported-close-to-castro.html?searchResultPosition=12. 34 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism, p. 25. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningham9 Recounting the arrest in a 1978 letter to Morley Safer of CBS' 60 Minutes, Vizzini detailed that the subsequent investigation proved conclusively that the arrestees (Ramon Diaz and Jose Barrel) were both working for the Cuban government and were either selling the cocaine for profit or were involved in trading the coke for weapons.35 Throughout Vizzini's law enforcement career, this would not be the only time he would encounter evidence of Cuban governmental involvement in the drug trade. Writing in his 1972 memoirs, Vizzini recounted one undercover operation in which he was sent to San Juan, Puerto Rico and received a teletype by HQ. The teletype contained "a lot of unconfirmed rumor" which included headquarters' suspicion, "that Castro and his boys were secretly involved in the smuggling [of narcotics]," while also including the names of two Cuban expats, Luis Valdez and Caesar Vega.36 Eventually being able to infiltrate the Puerto Rican underworld and meet with Valdez and Vega, Vizzini bought $750.00 USD for an ounce of cocaine. While the eventual arrests of those involved failed to capture both Valdez and Vega, the San Juan Police Department's Narcotics Squad seemed to believe the two had already fled back to Cuba.37 While the FBN seemingly was never able to confirm their suspicions about Valdez and Vega's relationships to the Castro government, it is worth pointing out that, in early Summer 1959, a Cuban Major similarly named Cesar Vega was in charge of a Castro sanctioned operation to overthrow the Panamanian government.38 Vizzini it seems held that, "there was reason to believe the operation was being carried on with the knowledge of Fidel Castro, that his supporters were running it, and that the profits were getting back to shore up the dictator's shaky 35 Sal Vizzini, letter to Morley Safer, 27 February 1978. 36 Sal Vizzini, Vizzini: The Secret Lives of America's Most Successful Undercover Agent (New York, NY: Pinnacle Books, 1972), p. 284. 37 Vizzini, Vizzini, p. 309. 38 Robert L. Scheina, Latin America's Wars: The Age of the Professional Soldier Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2003), p. 56. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m0 government".39 In an extension of remarks placed in the Congressional Record in May of 1965, the CIA's view of these allegations and claims comes through. DeWitt S. Copp, a CIA analyst, detailed additional evidence concerning Castro and the Cuban government's culpability in the drug trade in a paper titled, "Castro's Subversion in the United States". Copp writes, "In December 1964, three Castro agents were arrested at Miami Airport – one of them a Cuban, Marlo Carabeo Nerey…On January 15, 1965, Oscar H. Reguera and Elidoro Martinéz were taken into custody in a New York motel with $3 million worth of cocaine in their luggage. Martinéz is believed to be a Cuban agent," while also making the claim that Cuba was engaging in narcotics trafficking in order "to finance an insurrection in Puerto Rico".40 The CIA, while any comment on the arrests of Juvenito Guerra's cell or the other arrests listed was unable to be found, certainly seemed to investigating that Cuba was, on some level, involved in the trafficking of narcotics to better support their own desires and machinations. This would also not be the last time that a group of drug traffickers would be alleged to be aligned with Cuba in the 1960s as well. In September of 1967, it was reported that, following an investigation conducted by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and Queens District Attorney's Office, six persons were arrested for their involvement in a drug ring which brought in, "$2.88 million [of cocaine]…from Cuba to Montego Bay, Jamaica and then to New Orleans for the flight to New York".41 According to law enforcement officers, Cuban governmental officials knew about this drug trafficking ring yet, "did not interfere in the 39 Vizzini, Vizzini, p. 282. 40 Representative Craig Hosmer, Extension of Remarks, on 25 May 1965, "Castro's Subversion in the United States – Part I," 89th Cong., Congressional Record, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP75-00149R000400100003-7.pdf. 41 "6 Are Seized Here With Cocaine Worth Nearly $3-Million," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 10 September 1967, https://www.nytimes.com/1967/09/10/archives/6-are-seized-here-with-cocaine-worth-nearly-3million-cuban-did-not.html?searchResultPosition=156. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m1 narcotics ring's activities and, in return, ring members supplied the Cuban government with information about anti-Castro elements in the United States," with members posing, "as fundraisers for anti-Castro elements," and then transmitting the contributor's information back to Cuba.42 Attempts to access the NYPD's files or interview detectives with relevant knowledge of the case were unsuccessful. In the late 1960s as well, it appears that some measure of involvement by the Cuban military in the drug trade was occurring within South Florida. Around 1969, two agents from the FBN/BNDD's Miami Field Office (FO) went undercover as local drug dealers to meet with a Cuban contact at a dock behind the Playboy Club in Miami at 7701 Biscayne Boulevard. According to former DEA Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge (ASAC) Pierre Charette, "the two agents did meet with a Cuban general and had discussed using Cuba as an entry point [for drugs]".43 Charette, who was not himself involved in the meeting but was close with one of the agents who was present, also confirmed that the Cuban general was an "active-duty [officer] with Castro's forces" and that the conversation was audio recorded by one of the agents.44 What one can see here is Cuba utilizing drug trafficking, not as a way of gaining an upper hand against the United States or to gain a better financial standing, but rather as a form of information gathering and intelligence collection on potential political and national security threats. By aligning themselves with a non-state actor able to work abroad in foreign land without arising suspicion from counterintelligence organizations, the Cuban government was able to better defend from foreign threats by Batista supporters and anti-Castro groups. In the form of gaining the upper hand on adversaries and gathering intelligence, this is an ingenious 42 Ibid. 43 Pierre "Pete" Charette (retired Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge with DEA) in discussion with the author, 16 March 2021. 44 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m2 tactic. In the late-1960s, a defector alleged that "Raúl Castro and/or his associates within the Cuban Defense Ministry actively discussed the issue of drug trafficking as an ideological weapon to be used against the United States [and that] Czech intelligence operatives trained Cuban agents to produce and distribute drugs and narcotics into the United States".45 This claim was made by Major General Jan Sejna, a military officer in the Czechoslovak People's Army and, "chief of the political wing of the Czech Defense Ministry and…member of the Communist Party's General Staff and the National Assembly, the country's legislative body".46 Sejna defected in 1968 following the "Prague Spring" under allegations of embezzlement by reformist Communists led by Alexander Dubček, a political opponent of Sejna's "patron, Antonin Novotny".47 Following Sejna's defection, both the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) kept Sejna on their payroll as a counterintelligence analyst and consultant.48 Throughout the 1960s, it is apparent that Cuba was, at the least, a way station for drug traffickers to resupply before heading on into the United States (as the island nation had served since the mid-1500s)49 or, at the most, was officially sanctioning the trafficking of narcotics into the U.S. for profit. Given the fact that Cuba was a newly created country and was in dire need of economic stability, it makes sense that Castro's regime would engage in some form of drug 45 Emilio T. González, "The Cuban Connection: Drug Trafficking and the Castro Regime," CSA Occasional Paper Series Vol. 02. No. 06 (1997), p. 01-02, https://scholarship.miami.edu/discovery/delivery?vid=01UOML_INST:ResearchRepository&repId=12355424610002976#13355471490002976. 46 Louie Estrada, "Gen. Jan Sejna, Czech Defector, Dies," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 27 August 1997, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1997/08/27/gen-jan-sejna-czech-defector-dies/0aa7916b-1005-4595-9a2e-5dc51012dbf5/. 47 David Stout, "Jan Sejna, 70, Ex-Czech General and Defector," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 30 August 1997, https://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/30/world/jan-sejna-70-ex-czech-general-and-defector.html. 48 "Gen. Jan Sejna, Czech defector, dead at 70," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 26 August 1997, https://apnews.com/article/395f04eda00526846fb4d3cfff44f726. 49 T.J. English, The Corporation: An Epic Story of the Cuban American Underworld (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 2018), p. 04, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/990850150. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m3 production and trafficking to provide a certain level of income. Additionally, it also would allow the new nation to craft strong foreign ties to non-state actors and individual governmental officials abroad who could prove valuable in other, more legitimate matters. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April of 1961, in which the United States and the Cuban governments became more antagonistic towards one another, one can see (based upon U.S. documents and defector testimony) that Cuba began taking further actions of trafficking narcotics into the U.S. as a method of covert action, "those activities carried out by national governments or other organizations…to secretly influence and manipulate events abroad".50 Sejna's allegations, if true, corroborate a great deal of what the FBN/BNDD and FBI found during the course of their criminal investigations, that the Cuban government was involved in the creating of narcotics and the trafficking of drugs throughout the Latin America region. Given the abundance of evidence surrounding Cuba and the drug trade in the 1960s, it would be logical to believe that some elements of the Cuban government (either individual ministers, agency heads, etc.) or Fidel and Raul Castro themselves, were involved in the trafficking or shipping of narcotics to the United States from Cuba. While the amount of evidence conclusively linking the Castros to the drug trade in the 1960s is minimal (with perhaps the most concrete evidence being the undercover agent's testimony during the Guerra trial), given the fact that Castro exerted a tight grasp upon the daily functions of the government and was heavily involved in minute details of military operations, foreign policy endeavors, and domestic matters, it is hard to envision that Castro was not aware of these operations or was completely oblivious to them. These operations to traffic drugs, throughout the 1960s, do not appear to be a large scale 50 Loch K. Johnson & James J. Wirtz, "Part IV: Covert Action," in Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies: An Anthology, ed. Loch K. Johnson & James J. Wirtz (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 237. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m4 policy stance. It did not appear to be organized nor a prominent feature of the Cuban government's foreign policy or income. The usage of drug trafficking by governmental entities and the allowing of drug traffickers to ply their trade within the island nation indicates this was done in an effort to garner additional currency, gather intelligence on threatening groups, or temporarily assist foreign allies. These operations do not seem to be large scale or integral to the overall conduct of the Cuban government, but are instead minor and almost done in a tentative way, perhaps out of fear of reprisal from the U.S. or the Soviet Union had their activities been uncovered. A Change in Policy: Cuba and Drugs in the 1970s Throughout the 1970s, the solidifying of the relationship between the Cuban state and non-state actors became more apparent. It was at this time that the Cuban government began making more long-lasting and profitable strides into the global drug trade while also greatly increasing their alignment with non-state actors and strengthening their foreign policy goals. At this time in Cuban history, Cuba was involved in a variety of foreign policy endeavors and military conflicts. Having failed in the 1960s to become self-sufficient economically, the island, "turned to the Soviet Union for support…[increasing] its subsidies for the Cuban economy through running trade deficits with the island and paying above-market prices for its sugar", further cementing the Soviets' presence in the nation-state.51 Given the fact that Cuba was in need of hard currency and did not desire to be too reliant upon the Soviets, Cuba can be seen as somewhat increasing their drug trafficking and security operations significantly in the mid to late-1970s. Evidence of Cuban involvement in the 1970's drug trade came through in the early-mid 51 Becker, Twentieth-Century Latin American Revolutions, p. 127. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m5 1980s and onward, with multiple defectors and arrested drug traffickers from Cuban military/intelligence organizations and Latin American cartels respectively offering this information to the U.S. government. Cuban defectors and drug cartel associates arrested in the 1980s indicated "in late 1975, some of Colombia's best-known and biggest cocaine kingpins met secretly in Bogotá…with the Cuban ambassador Fernando Ravelo-Renendo…Havana not only was prepared to ignore drug-laden mother ships operating in its waters but also to provide fueling and repair services to its ports…Havana also offered to escort the narcotics boats upon leaving Cuban ports, as well as provide Cuban flags to disguise their origin all the way to feeder vessels stationed off the Florida Keys," in return for roughly "$800,000 per vessel".52 In her book Narco-Terrorism, Rachel Ehrenfeld, then a research scholar at New York University School of Law, claims that Ravelo-Renendo was a Cuban intelligence operative from the Departamento América53, a "parallel intelligence apparatus"54 headed by Manuel Piñeiro Losada. It does seem that Ravelo-Renendo was a Cuban intelligence operative of sorts as, upon his death in July of 2017, a former Cuban Army officer wrote a detailed obituary documenting Ravelo-Renendo's services to Cuba, mentioning his entry into Cuba's intelligence service and his tenure during the 1970s as Cuba's Ambassador to Colombia.55 According to Dirk Krujit, professor emeritus of development studies at Utrecht University, the Departamento América was a unit which, "conducted Cuba's secret foreign 52 Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism, p. 29-30. 53 Ibid. 54 Nora Gámez Torres, "He now hunts Cuban human-rights abusers in the U.S. Was he one himself?" Miami Herald, The McClatchy Company, published and updated 12 July 2018, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article214754450.html. 55 Alfredo García, "Cuban internationalist veteran Fernando Ravelo dies," Colarebo, Colarebo, published 04 July 2017, https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=https://colarebo.wordpress.com/2017/07/04/fallece-veterano-internacionalista-cubano-fernando-ravelo/&prev=search&pto=aue. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m6 relations under the direct supervision of, and access to, Fidel Castro"56 with these secret foreign relations techniques coming in the form of "[supplying] arms, money, intelligence, guidance, and a rear base to a variety of leftist guerilla movements in Latin America that wanted to duplicate the Cuban model".57 Manuel Piñeiro Losada too was a close friend of both Fidel and Raul Castro, having solidified his position as a loyal intelligence officer during the revolution.58 An interview with retired Resident Agent-in-Charge (RAC) of the DEA's Tampa office, Mike Powers, also was able to shed some light on how important Cuba was in the Colombian drug trade. He relayed an incident detailed to him by a smuggler arrested sometime in the 1980s who later became an informant. According to the smuggler, in the early 1970s, "he was flying a load of marijuana from Colombia to Florida…As he was almost across [Cuban airspace], a Cuban MiG came up, flew next to him and signaled to follow him and land. At that point, he [the smuggler] held up a bale of marijuana and the pilot laughed and signaled [him to] go ahead [through Cuban airspace]".59 While this incident does not indicate official government sanctioning of the drug trade nor some larger effort by the Cuban government to enter into the drug trade, this piece of information is indicative of how important Cuban airspace was in the drug trade and also how individual Cuban military officers or officials may have begun engaging in the drug trade to attain either larger foreign policy goals or as an extra source of income. This information is all quite interesting as this is the first time there is some form of evidence, albeit tangentially, in which Cuban officials and members of drug cartels met to 56 Dirk Krujit, Cuba and Revolutionary Latin America: An Oral History (London, UK: Zed Books, 2017), p. 05, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/964892858. 57 Larry Rohter, "Manuel Pineiro, Spymaster For Cuba, Is Dead at 63," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 13 March 1998, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/13/world/manuel-pineiro-spymaster-for-castro-is-dead-at-63.html. 58 Dirk Krujit, "Cuba and the Latin American Left: 1959-Present," Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina Vol. 28, No. 02 (2017), p. 32, http://eial.tau.ac.il/index.php/eial/article/view/1519/1623. 59 Mike Powers (retired Resident Agent-in-Charge with DEA) in discussion with the author, 20 December 2020. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m7 discuss a potential relationship revolving around the drug trade. However, this information must be treated with care in that these come from the mouths of defectors who must be listened to warily and have their claims treated with suspicion given the facts they, on occasion, will say anything in order to be given a lesser sentence or protection. Attempts to try and access CIA or other IC members' files were largely unsuccessful. However, declassified files were able to shed some light on the area. According to a declassified November 1983 document from the CIA, the Agency documented a series of claims revolving around Cuba and the drug trade, including one which mentioned how "Cuban officials, including Fidel Castro, has considered a scheme in 1979 to deal with narcotics smugglers in order to obtain hard currency for Cuba and contribute to the deterioration of US society".60 The CIA did mention as well that "not all of [these reports] have been corroborated", though were comfortable enough with the totality of the reports that they did endorse the belief that Cuba was involved, in some measure, with drug traffickers.61 The American non-profit, Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba (FHRC), produced a historical work in 2019 documenting Cuba's involvement in Venezuela, including a section on Cuba's alleged involvement in the international drug trade. They allege that Cuba's official entry into the narcotics trade began in 1978, "with the creation of a department for [MININT] operations inside the Cuban corporation CIMEX [Corporación de Industrias Mixtas de Exportación], for money laundering and marijuana trafficking".62 The FHRC cites Norberto 60 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Drug Trafficking: The Role of Insurgents, Terrorists, and Sovereign States (Langley, November 1983), p. 05-06, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00283R000300010008-6.pdf. 61 Ibid. 62 Juan Antonio Blanco, Rolando Cartaya, Luis Domínguez, & Casto Ocando, "Cubazuela: Chronicle of a Cuban Intervention," Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba, Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba, published April 2019, p. 87, https://www.fhrcuba.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/CUBAZUELA-CUBAN-INTERVENTION-English.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m8 Fuentes, an original member of the Cuban Revolution and Castro historian, as the source for the claims. While Fuentes' exact statements were unable to be accessed, it is known that a defector from Cuba's Ministry of the Interior, Major Jose Rodriguez Antonio Menier, too claimed that CIMEX was "linked to the drug trade" while even going a step further and stating that Castro had knowledge of general drug trafficking and CIMEX operations, using the profits to "support and opulent lifestyle [and fund] off-budget projects".63 Maria C. Werlau, an independent scholar and Cuban human rights activist, speaking to other anonymous defectors from the DGI, confirmed that CIMEX had a department entirely under the control of MININT in addition to making the allegation that, "100% of their revenue went into Fidel Castro's accounts".64 In testimony before Congressional subcommittees during the late-1980s, two convicted drug traffickers provided similar statements on Cuban involvement in the drug trade. One of them, Luis Garcia, testified that, in either "late-1979 or early-1980, Cuban officials offered him use of airstrips for refueling drug flights" and though he did not accept, "he was aware of other smugglers who did".65 Another trafficker named George Morales claimed that during a 1979 meeting in Cuba, he was sold planes which were seized by the Cuban government (presumably, Morales either stripped these planes for parts or would use them in his own drug trafficking endeavors) before eventually getting the Cubans to agree "to allow his pilots overflight rights through Cuban airspace".66 Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, 63 Don Podesta, "Ex-Cuban Officer Says Castro Profited from Drug Trafficking," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 26 August 1989, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/08/26/ex-cuban-officer-says-castro-profited-from-drug-trafficking/5f7a23ba-b4ad-4bc6-b8ec-fbea4470bac5/. 64 Maria C. Werlau, "Fidel Castro, Inc. A Global Conglomerate," Cuba in Transition Vol. 15 (2005), p. 379, https://ascecuba.org//c/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/v15-werlau.pdf. 65 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: A Report, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., December 1988, p. 64. 66 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha1m9 Narcotics, and International Operations, did however call Morales' statements "obviously incomplete", indicating that Morales' assertions required additional substantiation either through federal investigations, informants, or defectors.67 Attempts to find further evidence of Cuban involvement in the Western Hemispheric drug trade during the 1970s was minimal. It does appear that a top-secret, interagency, criminal investigation, initially codenamed "Operation Delta", was being conducted by the FBI, DEA, NYPD, and Chicago Police Department with the stated goal of "[digging] into the burgeoning Cuba-to-Florida narcotics trade and the distribution of drugs out of Miami".68 The details of this operation, however, are incredibly marginal, with attempts to access the records of this operation failing, despite multiple FOIA requests to the relevant agencies. It is possible that Cuba was not as active in the drug trade during this time due to the other foreign policy endeavors the nation-state was undertaking at that time (extensive military operations in Angola, South Africa, and Ethiopia). Due to the immense pressures going on with the nation, it is highly possible and logical even that Cuba toned down any drug trafficking activities that may have been going on. However, with the Soviet Union's death becoming more imminent and Cuba's foreign policy becoming more Latin American focused in the 1980s, Cuba seems to have significantly increased their ability at trafficking and providing security for drugs shipments as the crack epidemic swept into the U.S. during that time. The Cocaine Boom: Cuban and Drugs in the 1980s The 1980s saw a boom of drug trafficking and use throughout the Western Hemisphere. During the late 1970s, cocaine "[surged] in popularity…[being] associated with celebrities, high 67 Joan Mower, "Witness Claims Contra Drug Smuggling, Payoffs To Cuban, Bahamian Officials With," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 15 July 1987, https://apnews.com/article/5f5dd485a6d6825e88496281a2b1711c. 68 "Drugs gangs here, terrorist linked," Chicago Sun-Times, Sun-Times Media Group, published 16 April 1979, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/drugs/faln-drugs.htm. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m0 rollers and glamorous parties" with this continuing into the 1980s before peaking in 1985 and being declared a nationwide epidemic.69 Throughout this time period, cocaine (and the even more popular derivative crack cocaine) was trafficked into the United States predominantly by organized criminal elements utilizing "a distribution system that imported cocaine from South America into the U.S. market using sea and air routes via the Caribbean and the South Florida coast" in addition to trafficking drugs through Mexico.70 While these trafficking routes are now largely managed and controlled by Mexican cartels like the Gulf Cartel or the Los Zetas, in the 1980s, the Colombians were the largest drug traffickers in the Western Hemisphere. The Medellín and Cali Cartels were the two largest players in the drug trade, with the Medellín Cartel being the dominant organized criminal element until 1993 with the death of Pablo Escobar.71 While both the Medellín and Cali Cartels are now extinct, they were incredibly powerful at the time, with the Medellín Cartel raking "up to $60 million daily in drug profits"72 and the Cali Cartel, by 1992, being "responsible for seventy percent of the cocaine sold in the United States, as well as for the extraordinary growth of the cocaine market in Europe".73 Because of the massive influence these organizations had and their wide area of operations throughout Central and North America, these cartels, mainly the Medellín, also joined forces with legitimate state enterprises such as Manuel Noriega's Panama to drastically increase their 69 Jason Ferris, Barbara Wood, & Stephanie Cook, "Weekly Dose: cocaine, the glamour drug of '70s, is making a comeback," The Conversation, The Conversation, published 08 March 2018, updated 12 March 2018, https://theconversation.com/weekly-dose-cocaine-the-glamour-drug-of-the-70s-is-making-a-comeback-88639. 70 Deonna S. Turner, "Crack epidemic," Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., published 08 July 2016, updated 04 September 2017, https://www.britannica.com/topic/crack-epidemic. 71 U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Strategic Intelligence Section, The Cocaine Threat to the United States (Springfield, VA, 19 July 1995), p. 04, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/154678NCJRS.pdf. 72 Sara Miller Llana, "Medellín, once epicenter of Colombia's drug war, fights to keep peace," The Christian Science Monitor, Christian Science Publishing Society, published 25 October 2010, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2010/1025/Medellin-once-epicenter-of-Colombia-s-drug-war-fights-to-keep-the-peace. 73 Juan E. Méndez, Political Murder and Reform in Colombia: The Violence Continues (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, April 1992), p. 82. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m1 drug trafficking abilities.74 During the 1980s, many organized elements utilized the Caribbean to traffic narcotics either into Europe or into North America. It is without question that Cuba was one of these locations in which both air and sea craft landed to refuel and resupply before continuing on their way with payloads of narcotics.75 The first instance of Cuban involvement in the drug trade came in 1982 and 1983, with the apprehension and subsequent investigation of three persons with firsthand knowledge of these operations. These persons were Mario Estebes Gonzalez, an associate of Cuban intelligence, Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombian weapons and drug smuggler, and Johnny Crump, a Colombian lawyer and drug smuggler. Mario Estebes' story was first reported on in the New York Times in April of 1983. According to Selwyn Raab, Estebes "was arrested by the Coast Guard on Nov. 29, 1981, while he was transporting 2,500 pounds of marijuana in a speedboat off the Florida coast. He was indicted on a charge of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and faced a maximum prison term of 15 years".76 Facing many years in prison, Estebes decided to turn state's evidence and inform, in returning for immunity from some criminal charges, delivering rather explosive testimony. Estebes' testified that his mission priorities included, "disrupting Cuban exile groups and performing economic espionage, but that his principal mission was the distribution of cocaine, marijuana, and methaqualone[sic] tablets in New York, northern New Jersey, and 74 Mimi Yagoub, "How Panama's Criminal Landscape Has Changed Since the Days of Narco-Dictator Noriega," InSight Crime, InSight Crime, published 30 May 2017, https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/how-panama-criminal-landscape-changed-since-narco-dictator-noriega/#. 75 Robert Filippone, "The Medellin Cartel: Why We Can't Win the Drug War," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. 17, Iss. 04 (1994), p. 332, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576109408435960. 76 Selwyn Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 04 April 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/04/04/nyregion/a-defector-tells-of-drug-dealing-by-cuba-agents.html. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m2 Florida" and returned multiple millions of dollars back to Cuba.77 He also testified that "heroin and other narcotics were shipped to the New York area inside vans with concealed compartments to hide the drugs" in addition to claiming "he saw Vice Admiral [Aldo] Santmaria give orders permitting the unloading of narcotics at Paredon Grande [a small island off the Northern Coast of Cuba] brought in by a reputed international narcotics trafficker, Jaime Guillot Lara".78 In May of that same year, Estebes spoke before the United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control in a joint hearing, testifying that the Cuban government, "used the 1980 Mariel boatlift to send as many as 7,000 spies to the United States, some of whom were ordered to help drug smugglers ''flood'' this country with illegal narcotics [and that] some agents were in this country for propaganda purposes and others were to create ''chaos'' in the event of war".79 Estebes expanded upon his earlier allegations and stated, "one scheme [involved] 23,000 pounds of marijuana and 10 million methaqualone tablets [being] shipped from Cuba to Florida," the profits of which were to be split between Cuban officials and the smugglers themselves.80 Jaime Guillot Lara is perhaps the most important of the three. Guillot Lara was a well-known drug/arms smuggler in Colombia who also happened to be "a close personal friend of the leader of the M-19 guerilla group, Jaime Bateman".81 As far as his smuggling habits, Guillot Lara, according to the DEA who had been keeping tabs on him as far back at 1975, "he was delivering over 400,000 pounds of marijuana, more than 20 million illicit methaqualone pills and 77 Alex Larzelere, Castro's Ploy-America's Dilemma: The 1980 Cuban Boatlift (Fort. Lesley J. McNair: National Defense University, 1988), p. 229-230, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Apr/23/2002287258/-1/-1/0/LARZELERE_MARIEL_BOATLIFT.PDF. 78 Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times. 79 "Cuban Ties Boatlift To Drug Trade," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 01 May 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/01/us/cuban-ties-boatlift-to-drug-trade.html. 80 Ibid. 81 LT. Timothy J. Doorey, "The Cuban Interventionary Forces: The Growing Strategic and Regional Threat to the United States and NATO" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 1986), p. 115, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a180123.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m3 thousands of pounds of cocaine to U.S. markets each year" while also acquiring an impressive fleet of ships for trafficking purposes.82 Guillot Lara first became introduced to the Cuban ambassador to Colombia, Ravelo-Renendo, through their mutual friend, Johnny Crump, during a meeting (conducted at Gonzalo Bassols' apartment, the number two at the Cuban Embassy in Colombia) which resulted in a profitable relationship between Guillot Lara and the Cubans. While Crump would also corroborate this meeting between the following members, Guillot Lara's girlfriend, who was there when the meetings took place, corroborated many aspects, while also testifying that Bassols "told Mr. Guillot-Lara that the drug scheme had been cleared by a high Cuban official" which Bassols then identified was Fidel Castro.83 Either during or immediately after this introduction, according to Congressional testimony from Francis M. Mullen, Jr., the Administrator of the DEA in the early 1980s, Guillot Lara "began to receive official Cuban protection for the movement of his drug-ladened[sic] vessels to the United States…[in addition to transporting and delivering] arms which were ultimately destined for the Colombian terrorist group, M-19" on Cuban behalf.84 Not only did Guillot Lara traffic weapons to Cuban aligned rebels and allow the Cubans in on his drug trafficking endeavors, it appears he "also transferred funds to the guerillas through an employee of a Panamanian bank" acting as something of a go-between.85 From 1980 to 1981, Guillot Lara 82 Nathan M. Adams, "Havana's Drug-Smuggling Connection, Reader's Digest, Reader's Digest Association, Inc., published July 1982, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/drugs.htm. 83 Extensions of Remarks, Cuba's Active Role in Drug Trafficking to the United States, 98th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 130, pt. 24B: 10400, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1984-pt8/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1984-pt8-2-3.pdf. 84 Leslie Maitland Werner, "U.S. Officials Link Castro and Drugs," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 10 November 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/10/us/us-officials-link-castro-and-drugs.html. 85 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication. Cuban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency in the Western Hemisphere, edited by Colleen Sussman, (Washington, D.C., 12 March 1982), p. 02, https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5QafYFT9344IVwbKAk5KG_OJydGlr3Q7oZPpK8WHGSx3JeWsUS431ZZwaW55TaMUk3UvHW4jiCHRb9Utgv1_TsoAFZD6FOi8njL3jjxp8gSVFo2zCTKSLLP0KOTaXLPl9ZdycsUgqn7e8ud91hnk09ZPGbYZ0QYrbwbNypMoakmWoqtvZNPGG0e9cQ33AwwDL7jITmBXQF CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m4 and the Cubans entered into a cozy relationship, though one that quickly became fraught with complications. In March of 1981, Colombian authorities found a "cache of M-19 weapons" and, with captured M-19 fighters implicating Cuban involvement, the Colombian government "[broke] off diplomatic relations with Havana and [expelled Ambassador Ravelo] and his staff".86 From midsummer to November of 1981, two Guillot Lara operated boats and one aircraft (the aircraft and one of the boats carried weapons for M-19) were apprehended by both the Colombian Coast Guard and United States Coast Guard; the capture of three M-19 rebels by the Colombian military also resulted in smuggling operations being significantly damaged.87 Guillot Lara fled Colombia, facing criminal charges, before being arrested by Mexican authorities.88 Awaiting extradition by the Mexicans to either the United States or Colombia, Guillot Lara revealed to both Mexican and U.S. investigators that he had "been involved in trafficking operations to Colombia for the M-19 on behalf of the government of Cuba. The latter provided the funds for the purchase of the arms".89 Following his revelations, however, Guillot Lara was released from Mexican custody and disappeared; according to the Colombian daily newspaper El Tiempo, Guillot Lara died in early April 1991 in Cuba of a myocardial infarction having "been detained on the island for twelve years".90 xujwOix6ni7j0-eT0RVti430wKPH9bicd8LdzulTZPXR8JDPGMTsyF2guKz20_HFjQkKlW8r6xpBfdR4TEC5SqWHYuetwHCl4rS7YWkCl0. 86 Adams, "Havana's Drug-Smuggling Connection, Reader's Digest. 87 John Dorschner & Jim McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine, The Miami Herald, KnightRidder, published 20 November 1983, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/crump.htm. 88 Edna Buchanan, "Miami drug smuggler ran drugs for Castro to guerillas, agents say," Miami Herald, Knight Ridder, published 24 January 1982, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00552R000303490005-9.pdf. 89 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 90 "Guillot Died of a Infarction," El Tiempo, Casa Editorial El Tiempo S.A., published 13 April 1991, https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-61284. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m5 Johnny Crump is where the public first became aware of a Cuban connection to the drug trade, though the last defector to be arrested by U.S. authorities. Crump, according to investigative reporter Ernest Volkman, was a Colombian lawyer of American descent who "went into the narcotics racket, running a large-scale cocaine and marijuana-smuggling operation" following the failing of his family's ranch in the late-1970s.91 Being politically well-connected, he was asked to serve as a guide for the newly appointed Cuban Ambassador to Colombia, the aforementioned Fernando Ravelo-Renendo, in 1975, the two quickly becoming friends.92 The two became so close that Crump even asked Ravelo to be his newborn daughter's godfather.93 At one point in 1979, in both federal testimony and statements made to Miami Herald journalists John Dorschner & Jim McGee, Crump detailed a meeting he had between Ravelo in which the ambassador detailed, "was dealing with some Chileans who needed help…seeking American weapons, not traceable back to Cuba, to use in the fight to overthrow Augusto Pinochet," to which Crump agreed and offered assistance.94 Following this, Crump tried to arrange a deal in which a plane would transport marijuana into the country, however, few pilots were willing to enter Cuba's Camaguey airport where Ravelo had arranged for refueling.95 In a previously mentioned meeting between Ravelo, Crump, 91 Ernest Volkman, "The Odd Couple: Castro and Vesco: The Cocaine Alliance," The Gadsden Times, Edward Marsh, published 29 April 1984, https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1891&dat=19840428&id=jKkfAAAAIBAJ&sjid=etYEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5242,6122535. 92 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 93 NBC Nightly News, "The Cuban Connection," featuring Roger Mudd, Brian Moss, Johnny Crump, and George H.W. Bush, aired 29 September 1982, transcript, NBC Network, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88-01070R000100380010-3.pdf. 94 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 95 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991, transcript, Public Broadcasting System, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/archive/cubaandcocaine.html. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m6 and Guillot Lara, the four agreed to transport the drugs via boat to Cuba with protection from Cuban Navy and Coast Guard forces.96 In a 1991 interview with PBS Frontline, Crump detailed the finalization of the first watercraft drug shipment to Cuba, discussing how he disembarked from "the plane to a Cuban government car that was waiting for us in the airport. I mean, there's no way that you can go to any country with no passport, with nothing like that, landing from another country in an international airport and have a car waiting for you right there in the field. It has to be with the OK of that government, that country… Everything was paid by the Cuban government. The hotel, you had to sign, like, you are a guest from the Cuban government because they don't let me pay for the hotel"; while Crump left the country before he personally could see any drugs entering the country, he was reassured by Ravelo that the drugs indeed touched down on Cuban soil.97 From that point onward, Crump became very involved in trafficking narcotics and arms with the Cubans, doing so via air and seacraft and aiding the Cubans larger foreign policy goals in aiding left-wing insurgent groups through Central and South America. In January of 1982, however, Crump was arrested in a joint Customs-DEA operation "at the Omni Hotel in Miami…on drug trafficking charges".98 At the time, Crump was acquiring arms and other weaponry "to be sent to an unspecified group in Bolivia" via his friend Jaime Guillot Lara.99 Much like Estebes, Crump was facing heavy prison time and began cooperating with federal 96 Dorschner & McGee, "Did the Castro Regime Run Drugs to Florida?," Tropic Magazine. 97 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991, accessed through vault, Public Broadcasting System, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/cuba-and-cocaine/. 98 Buchanan, "Miami drug smuggler ran drugs for Castro to guerillas, agents say," Miami Herald. 99 U.S. Department of State. Cuban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency in the Western Hemisphere, edited by Colleen Sussman, p. 02. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m7 authorities, providing them "with details of his meetings and alleged drug dealings with Cuban government officials in Bogota and Havana".100 Much of Estebes, Guillot Lara, and Crump's claims are astounding, however, it must be kept in mind that these persons are convicted drug traffickers and defectors from Colombian drug cartels or are in some way associated with Cuba's military respectively. Despite this, many prosecutors and U.S. government agencies found some, if not a sizeable portion of their claims, credible. In Estebes' case, Richard Gregorie commented at the time on Estebes' validity as a witness describing how his comments were "very credible" and had been "independently corroborated".101 In an interview with Gregorie, the former attorney stressed he "found him credible because of that [outside and additional] corroboration".102 The Senate Chair of one committee also stated that Estebes' credibility was "checked out…with the Justice Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration".103 As far as Guillot Lara's credibility goes, the CIA's opinion of him seems to be rather high. According to a CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate from 1983, "[t]he Guillot Lara case…is proof that Cuba has used Colombian drug smuggling networks move arms to Colombian insurgents. In this case, Cuban officials and Colombian drug traffickers were clearly associated in facilitating narcotics shipments to the United States. Guillot paid the Cubans in hard currency and used his vessels and smuggling networks to move arms to Colombia for the insurgents. On the other hand, Cuba rather routinely searches some drug-smuggling ships found 100 NBC Nightly News, "The Cuban Connection," featuring Roger Mudd, Brian Moss, Johnny Crump, and George H.W. Bush, aired 29 September 1982, transcript. 101 Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times. 102 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. 103 Raab, "A Defector Tells of Drug Dealing by Cuban Agents," The New York Times. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m8 in Cuban waters, confiscates drugs found and often imprisons the crew".104 Through this excerpt, the CIA seems to endorse the view that the overall claims about drug traffickers smuggling weaponry and drugs in collusion with Cuban figures and through Cuban waters is true and based in fact. While the CIA did seem to treat the accounts and his entire involvement with legitimacy, the agency was careful to note they were unsure of "the extent to which Cuba has continued to facilitate drug trafficking, either for money or arms".105 While the following document is not exactly an intelligence estimate or official analysis, an August 1982 conference report conducted by the CIA and the National Intelligence Council (NIC) stated, "Given the involvement of senior Cuban officials and at least two Cuban embassies, we believe this activity was approved at the highest levels of the Cuban Government. It almost certainly was not a case of corruption by mid- or low-level Cuban officials…Given the level of Guillot's Cuban contacts and the political implications of the arrangements, the operation was almost certainly approved at the highest levels of the Havana government" though the document was clear in stating that the U.S. government was uncertain as to who was behind the operation.106 These three witnesses were able to corroborate a great deal of information that the U.S. federal government, mainly the DEA and U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), had been investigating since the late 1970s. With this testimony from defectors and arrested drug traffickers who were seemingly vetted and verified, the U.S. government finally was able to bring forth official charges against certain members of the Cuban government and military. 104 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Implications for the United States of the Colombian Drug Trade Vol. II (Langley, 28 June 1983), p. 02, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00302R000600990002-9.pdf. 105 Ibid. 106 U.S. Intelligence Community, National Intelligence Council and Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Cuban Involvement in Narcotics and Terrorism (Langley, August 1982), p. iii, 3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83B00851R000100160008-1.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha2m9 On 05 November, 1982, an indictment brought by the USAO-SDFL in Miami, Florida charged that certain drug traffickers and members of the Cuban government did "knowingly, willfully and unlawfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree, together with each other, and with diverse other persons who are both known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to commit certain offenses against the United States" in the importation and possession of methaqualone tablets and marijuana and "used and caused to be used facilities in interstate and foreign commerce, including the telephone, and traveled and caused others to travel in interstate and foreign commerce between the Southern District of Florida, Colombia, Cuba and elsewhere, with the intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on and facilitate the promotion, management, establishment and carrying on of an unlawful activity, said unlawful activity being a business enterprise involving controlled substances".107 The persons charged in this indictment brought forth by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida included Jaime Guillot Lara, Fernando Ravelo-Renendo, Gonzalo Bassols-Suarez, Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado, Rene Rodriguez-Cruz, and David Lorenzo Perez, Jr. alongside multiple other, predominantly, Miami-based drug traffickers.108 Neither Crump or Estebes were charged as both had testified for the prosecution and received either partial or full immunity in addition to new identities and federal protection. The Cuban Interests Section in Washington, Cuba's foreign policy arm operating as an independent section of the Czechoslovakian Embassy, commented that the charges against Ravelo, Bassols, Santamaria, and Rodriguez-Cruz were "all lies"109; a January 1982 letter from 107 United States v. Jaime Guillot Lara et al., No. 82-643-Cr-JE (S.D. Fla., 05 November 1982), http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/drugs/indictment-82.htm. 108 Ibid. 109 George Volsky, "U.S. Drug Charges Cite 4 Cuban Aides," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 06 November 1982, https://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/06/us/us-drug-charges-cite-4-cuban-aides.html. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m0 Cuba's Ministry of Foreign Relations (MINREX) denied Cuba ever utilized drug traffickers to transport arms to rebels in Latin America, never gave arms to guerillas in Colombia, and denied that Guillot Lara had ever set foot in Cuba or received any monies from the Republic of Cuba.110 The denial by Cuba of having never gave arms to Colombian guerillas was roundly criticized, most notably in a 1990 interview with former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Thomas Boyatt.111 Among those charged were high level Cuban officials, some of whom have already been discussed including the Cuban Ambassador to Colombia Ravelo-Renendo and his "minister-counsel" at the Cuban Embassy in Colombia Bassols-Suarez.112 In addition to these figures, the indictment also charged Vice Admiral (VADM) of the Cuban Navy Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado and Rene Rodriguez-Cruz a "member of the Cuban Community Party Central Committee and president of the Cuban Institute of Friendship With The Peoples [ICAP]" with the same charges.113 It is worth noting that the ICAP was described by the CIA in a 1984 brief as being an organization which, in addition to bringing in foreign youths interested in Communism, Socialism, or Cuba also "provided Cuban intelligence services with a registry of aliens who might prove useful for intelligence collection efforts and operations in their homelands".114 110 "Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Drugs," Minister of Foreign Affairs Isidoro Malmierca Peoli (28 January 1982), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin America Report, Cuba, JPRS L/10334, 18 February 1982, p. 03-04, heading: Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Drugs, Republic of Cuba, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Latin America Report, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82-00850R000500030043-6.pdf. 111 Ambassador Thomas D. Boyatt (Ret.), interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 08 March 1990, p. 48, https://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Boyatt,%20Thomas%20D.toc.pdf?_ga=2.264396167.981542772.1592939617-1066174783.1588020094&_gac=1.137161348.1589401103.EAIaIQobChMIgqnAwtSx6QIVSx-tBh2tGgsJEAAYASAAEgKALvD_BwE. 112 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, Directory of Officials of the Republic of Cuba (Langley, October 1979), p. 224, https://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/AA/00/07/66/14/00003/AA00076614_00003.pdf. 113 Mary Thornton, "Four Cuban Officials Indicted in Drug Smuggling," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 06 November 1982, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/11/06/four-cuban-officials-indicted-in-drug-smuggling/d70ed042-0adc-42d2-971b-23475f7adc83/. 114 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Cuba: Castro's Propaganda Apparatus and Foreign Policy (Langley, November 1984), p. 13, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000972183.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m1 David Lorenzo Perez, Jr. is an interesting figure within this legal case as he, in December of 1982, pled guilty to the first count of the criminal indictment.115 In his plea, Lorenzo Perez indicated culpability on Guillot Lara's part to "purchase, receive, store, and possess with intent to distribute approximately eight and one-half million methaqualone tablets" while indicating "that Jaime Guillot-Lara would provide ships to transport methaqualone tablets from Columbia[sic] with the knowledge of the Cuban governmental officials".116 Lorenzo Perez admitted he assisted Guillot Lara in all of these actions while also admitting he "traveled by private vessel from the Southern District of Florida to Paredon Grande, Cuba [and] met with Cuban government officials" including Santamaria and Rodriguez-Cruz.117 In Congressional testimony, Lorenzo Perez also testified that that "Cuban government was also to receive one-third of the profit of the marihuana[sic] sale" yet this did not go through as it appears Guillot Lara kept the profits [just under half a million USD] to himself.118 This case was the most significant development in the long standing allegations against Cuba on the area of narcotics trafficking. However, it is incredibly important to note that there was no evidence linking the Castros to the drug trade. The lead attorney who personally handled the case for the DOJ, Richard Gregorie, stated "Was Fidel Castro involved? At this point, no…[I] can't honestly say I saw that open Cuban involvement [and] did not come up with anyone who spoke directly to Fidel in those early cases".119 115 United States v. David Lorenzo Perez, Jr., et al., No. 82-643-Cr-JE (S.D. Fla., 09 December 1982), p. 01, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/perez-jr.htm. 116 United States v. David Lorenzo Perez, Jr., et al., No. 82-643-Cr-JE, p. 02, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/perez-jr-1.htm. 117 Ibid. 118 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 30 April 1983, p. 33. 119 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m2 Also around this time, many officials from the DOJ and U.S. Department of State (DOS) changed their previously emphasized opinions on the extent of Cuban involvement in the drug trade. In an October 1983 hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, DEA Administrator Mullen stated, "I moved very cautiously at first wanting to have evidence before publicly stating I was convinced that the Cuban Government was involved in drug trafficking. I am now convinced, as I have stated in prior sessions, that there is Cuban Government involvement in drug trafficking", bringing forth the above indictments and other "[classified and confidential] information" to support his reasoning.120 The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, James H. Michel, stated before Congress also in May of 1983 "the evidence clearly indicates more than a case of corruption by local or mid-level security officials in Cuba…Narcotics trafficking has apparently been sanctioned by Cuba as a means to finance subversion in Latin America".121 These comments were found by the Washington Post to, "fit in with a Reagan administration campaign to rally public and congressional support for its Central American policies, including more aid for El Salvador's army".122 Michel was not the only State Department official to make this claim either. The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence S. Eagleburger stated in May of 1983 that he "would find it very difficult to believe that the Cuban Government itself is not 120 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Impact of the South Florida Task Force on Drug Interdiction In The Gulf Coast Area, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 28 October 1983, p. 16, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/97516NCJRS.pdf. 121 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, Cuban Involvement in Narcotics Trafficking, edited by Colleen Sussman, (Washington, D.C., 30 April 1983), p. 02, https://www.google.com/books/edition/Cuban_Involvement_in_Narcotics_Trafficki/NItKAQAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0. 122 Edward Cody, "Castro Ties To Drugs Suggested," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 01 May 1983, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/05/01/castro-ties-to-drugs-suggested/242170fe-a930-4bc4-b30c-18016f794497/. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m3 involved… [The evidence is] really quite clear that there is major Cuban involvement in the drug traffic in this country", while also accusing the Castro government of playing a role in this.123 However, this appears to be more Eagleburger's own personal opinion as a more senior State Department official stated later that no agency had been able to prove "personal involvement by Fidel Castro".124 A spokesman for the Cuban Interests Section responded to the comments by Mullen and Michel by stating, "[This is] propaganda against the Cubans…We [the Cuban government] are refusing this accusation. We have consistent fighting against drug traffic. There are many American people who are put in Cuban jails for drug trafficking".125 At this stage, in relation to the Guillot Lara/Crump case, these definitive comments that Castro or the Cuban government officially was involved seemed to an extreme jump and other officials protested against this characterization. Stanley Marcus, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida and the attorney whose office brought forth the indictments against the four Cuban officials, stated before Congress "I think it is a fair and accurate statement to say some of the major organs and institutions of the Cuban state and some high-ranking officials of those organs and institutions of the state are involved in drug-running to the United States".126 William H. Webster, then Director of the FBI, also spoke about this in a television interview, stating the majority of the evidence currently being used by some officials to make judgements "[came] from one set of 123 Kenneth B. Noble, "Official Ties Cuba to U.S. Drug Traffic," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 02 May 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/02/world/official-ties-cuba-to-us-drug-traffic.html. 124 Ibid. 125 Werner, "U.S. Officials Link Castro and Drugs," The New York Times. 126 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism and Security, The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 30 April 1983, p. 15. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m4 sources and should be viewed with care".127 At this juncture, there was a great deal of conflicting views upon the established evidence, some most likely based upon political and individual biases based upon preconceived notions on both the nature of Communism and Latin America in general. While the evidence linking Castro or the Cuban government as a whole is very minimal (mostly relegated to evidence that would be considered hearsay in a U.S. court of law), it is undeniable that sections of the Cuban government, including areas of Cuba's diplomatic and intelligence services, were utilizing drug traffickers to achieve larger foreign policy goals within the Latin American region. As the 1980s progressed, additional evidence of Cuban involvement in the drug trade became even more apparent with defectors from Noriega's Panama, Cuba's DGI, and the arrests of multiple drug traffickers all speaking to U.S. officials. During this time as well, many criminal investigators of the U.S. federal government found or came across evidence of drug trafficking on Cuba's part along with the U.S. IC coming to a more solid conclusion on the matter. Prior to these November 1982 indictments, an FBI investigation into Cuban involvement in the drug trade was underway. In October of 1982, a U.S. Customs plane near Corpus Christi, Texas intercepted a Cessna aircraft that was having a mechanical malfunction and tracked it to Cleburne, Texas. The pilot, an American, "was arrested with 877 pounds of marijuana onboard" with "Chemical analysis [showing the marijuana] almost certainly was grown in Cuba".128 Following the pilot's conviction in April of 1983, federal investigators detailed "the ring operated for two years in violation of government embargoes on trade with Cuba by shipping computers and other equipment. Some of the return flights carried high-grade Cuban 127 Ibid. 128 "Did Cuba get computers in return for marijuana?" The Miami Herald, KnightRidder, published 02 April 1983, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuba/computers.htm. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m5 marijuana".129 The evidence necessary to make the claim that this ring was operating with the explicit approval of Cuban government officials or the Castros themselves is very lacking, however, what this does indicate is that there were individual smugglers beyond large metropolitan centers who were found to have ties to Cuba and that Cuba seemingly was involved in producing drugs in some quantity. In December of 1984, the CIA released an interagency intelligence memorandum stating outright, "Cuba is currently supporting drug trafficking…We judge that Fidel Castro is fully cognizant of and condones the drug-related activity that is taking place with the support of Cuban officials…The key Cuban participants are officers of the Interior Ministry or America Department of the Cuban Communist Party's Central Committee…Their participation strongly indicates a sanctioned government policy, rather than an arrangement for personal gain".130 While a good portion of this document is redacted, this is the first time in which an intelligence agency, or the CIA at least, has openly accused the upper echelon of the Cuban government and Castro himself of playing some role or in some way supporting the activities occurring. During this period, many criminal investigations uncovered more information on Cuban involvement in the drug trade, with additional evidence of Castro involvement becoming more apparent. In addition to this, many Congressional hearings and panels were convened with the goal of exploring the Latin American drug trade, during which many witnesses were called. Among these witnesses was Diego Viafara Salinas, an M-19 physician who infiltrated an armed civilian group with ties to members of the Medellín Cartel.131 Salinas held the belief he would be 129 Ibid. 130 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Cuban Government Involvement in Drug Trafficking (Langley, December 1984), p. 03, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87T00217R000700140002-5.pdf. 131 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Structure of International Drug Trafficking Organizations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 12-13 September 1989, p. 70, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/146771NCJRS.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m6 killed due to his past association with M19 and began providing evidence to the Colombian government, which eventually resulted in the deaths of many prominent Medellín Cartel leaders.132 In testimony before the U.S. Congress, Salinas recalled that, "[on November 22, 1988] two pilots flying a Commander 1000 aircraft were planning to stop and refuel in Cuba. They were leaving from an estate [in the Department of Cordoba] …When the seats of the plane were removed to load the cocaine, I saw the navigation charts, which indicated they were flying over the southern coast of Cuba. These pilots commented that they had to be sure to carry some amount of U.S. dollars with them to leave in Cuba as prearranged payment for the stopover".133 While the pilots Salinas spoke with never identified who gave them clearance to fly over Cuba with drugs, Salinas did testify "that it [the drug trafficking operation] was all the way up to Fidel Castro" with this information apparently coming from Fidel's spokesman.134 It is worth noting that this piece of testimony would effectively qualify as hearsay in a U.S. court of law. Many informants also came forward with information that would prove to be incriminatory to many persons with ties to the drug trade, including certain high-ranking Cuban leaders. On such source, a confidential informant for the DEA, who, after being arrested in 1985 on conspiracy charges, provided information on much of the Medellín's drug trafficking activities to the U.S. government.135 In a request for payment from the DEA's Asuncion Country Office, the agency noted the source's decades of service to the United States, describing him as having led "successful 132 U.S. Congress, Senate, Structure of International Drug Trafficking Organizations, p. 73. 133 U.S. Congress, Senate, Structure of International Drug Trafficking Organizations, p. 71-72. 134 Ibid. 135 U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Asuncion Country Office, REQUEST for PAYMENT under 28 U.S.C. 524 (C)(1)(B) for CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE (CS #####) (Asuncion, post-2009), p. 01. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m7 negotiations for landing rights and refueling operations in [among other countries] Cuba…[the source] purchased a birthday surprise (an airplane bought in the U.S.) for Fidel CASTRO's[sic] birthday, which he personally handed over to Castro's brother Raúl (then Cuba's Minister of Defense) during lunch".136 This information is quite damning to the Castro regime and, if true, would prove that, at the least, Raúl Castro did have knowledge of Cuban involvement in the drug trade and condoned those operations. While it cannot be emphasized enough that this confidential source pled "nolo contendere to the conspiracy charges in 1986", it does speak volumes that the DEA found him an essential and trustworthy source to continue using well into the 21st century.137 At this same time, another development implicated an American fugitive with close ties to the Castro regime in the drug trade. In April of 1985, appearing "before the Senate subcommittee on children, family, and drugs" (which was investigating Nicaraguan governmental involvement in the drug trade) were two convicted smugglers who provided further information on Cuban involvement in the drug trade.138 One of them was smuggler James A. Herring, Jr. who, while insisting he never transported drugs for the Cubans or Nicaraguans, detailed his smuggling activities with the Cubans in an interview with PBS Frontline, saying, "When I would go into Varadero with boatloads of equipment, we would be received by marked vessels that the Cuban navy, so to speak, utilized, their military gunboats. They would escort us into the gunboat dockage there at Varadero. From there they would offload. We would stay as long as we felt necessary to refuel us, wined and dined us. And when we were ready to return to 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid. 138 "Witnesses Testify on Vesco Link to Drug trafficking in Nicaragua, Cuba," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 19 April 1985, https://apnews.com/article/09e42836a8f58d76da155fa155da7847. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m8 the Keys, they would take and escort us out".139 In addition to this, Herring also claimed that the DGI, "would even offer drugs in lieu of the cash. [They] had the availability of enormous amounts of drugs that they had warehoused through seizures that they had made in their country on drug operations that weren't paying protection for their air space or their waterways. So they had a readily available amount of drugs in the form of cocaine, Qualudes[sic] and marijuana".140 Herring also testified that "he worked with Cuban Government officials and [Robert Vesco] to help the Nicaraguan government build a cocaine-processing laboratory near Managua".141 Vesco had been a successful businessman in the United States, creating a hundred-million-dollar manufacturing empire by 1970 before being twice indicted on federal charges for "defrauding thousands of investors [of $224 million USD]" and "for making illegal contributions totaling $250,000" to Richard Nixon's re-election campaign in 1972 and 1976 respectively.142 Following this, Vesco fled to numerous Latin American countries (including Nicaragua) before settling in Cuba around 1984.143 In a March 1996 profile for Vanity Fair, Vesco's immediate family indicates a friendly relationship to Fidel and Raul Castro in addition to a partnership to traffic narcotics with Col. Antonio De La Guardia, a high-ranking figure in the DGI and an important part of Cuba's overall foray into the drug trade.144 Eventually, however, Vesco attracted the eye of U.S. federal law enforcement for his 139 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991. 140 Ibid. 141 Joel Brinkley, "Panel Hears Details Linking Managua and Drugs," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 20 April 1985, https://www.nytimes.com/1985/04/20/world/panel- hears-details-linking-managua-and-drugs.html. 142 Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, "Robert L. Vesco," Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., published 20 July 1998, updated 30 November 2020, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Robert-L-Vesco. 143 Ibid. 144 Ann Louise Bardach, "Vesco's Last Gamble," Vanity Fair, Condé Nast, published March 1996, https://archive.vanityfair.com/article/1996/3/vescos-last-gamble. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha3m9 alleged participation in drug trafficking and, though some convicted drug traffickers and Cuban intelligence defectors implicated him in criminal acts, the "FBI and [DEA] denied he had any role" in certain elements of the drug trade, disproving these traffickers and defectors' claims.145 Ultimately, Vesco was arrested and sentenced to prison in Cuba in 1996 "for economic crimes against the government of Fidel Castro".146 Since at least April of 1987, the DEA's Miami Office was actively pursuing an investigation against Cuban government and military officials. Harry Sommers, a newly minted DEA agent to the Miami FO and later Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) of the Atlanta FO, was the lead investigator on the case and detailed his investigation in an April 1990 academic work for Florida International University. According to Sommers, in April of 1987, "two pilots [an American and Cuban national] flew approximately 480 pounds of cocaine from Colombia to [Varadero Military Base, Cuba]…where the cocaine was transferred to Cuban military officers".147 According to Sommers, the pilots were both questioned by U.S. officials and, in this interview, both pilots claimed they had stopped in Cuba to make "emergency repairs" and "presented documentation from the Cuban government confirming their story".148 The drugs were then placed upon a boat named the "Flerida" and, while attempting to enter Florida waters that April, was intercepted by the DEA. In the ensuing interviews with the boat's operators (all Cubans who were "residing in 145 Jim McGee, Pierre Thomas, Guy Gugliotta, & Jerry Knight "Vesco Held In Cuba," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 09 June 1995, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/06/09/vesco-held-in-cuba/874c16d3-81a5-4700-84ce- 6a4e8300fdab/. 146 Douglas Farah, "Vesco Gets 13-Year Sentence in Cuba," The Washington Post, The Washington Post Company, published 27 August 1996, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/08/27/vesco-gets-13-year-sentence-in-cuba/77271414- 9219-4efe-b68c-5d30b0f9b11b/. 147 Harry Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," (graduate paper, Florida International University, 23 April 1990), p. 07. 148 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 08. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m0 Miami"), the DEA found the boat was "[initially] met at sea by a Cuban Coast Guard vessel and escorted to the military base in Varadero [where the] crew members were housed and fed until the cocaine was loaded onto the vessel" upon which the boat was escorted out of Cuban waters by a Coast Guard ship.149 Additional evidence showing U.S.-based drug traffickers of Cuban descent docking and landing at Varadero and interacting heavily with Cuban military officers was uncovered through further investigations in May and November of 1987.150 This investigation led to the federal indictments of various figures in late 1988, including Reinaldo and Rueben Ruiz, a Cuban father and son drug trafficking team operating out of the South Florida.151 Reinaldo Ruiz, facing a sentence of life imprisonment, agreed to make a deal with the government in return for a lighter sentence.152 In a television interview with PBS Frontline before his death, Ruiz detailed his involvement in the drug trade and his associations with the Cuban government. According to Ruiz, he would transport a boat from Florida to Varadero where "everything had been arranged in advance [by Colonel Pardo, Chief of Command of Naval Operations in Varadero]" while his son, Rueben, would fly the cocaine from Colombia to Varadero which, upon landing, would be transferred to Ruiz's boat by members of the Cuban military and MININT.153 In this interview, Ruiz also stated "Every time that I went over there, I was completely sure that I was a 100 percent backing[sic], all the way to the top, otherwise I never, ever touch a thing out there". 154 149 Ibid. 150 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 08-10. 151 Buddy Nivens, "Jury Links Cuba To Drug Smuggling," South Florida Sun Sentinel, Tribune Publishing, published 27 February 1988, https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-1988-02-27-8801120759-story.html. 152 Richard Cole, "Prosecutors: Trafficker Implicated More Top Cuban Officials," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 21 August 1989, https://apnews.com/article/348da22ca41fd9a7e77c7ab9226c504e. 153 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991. 154 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m1 Despite Ruiz's comment, he never once indicated to federal investigators he met Fidel or Raul Castro; the closest Ruiz got to implicating either senior leader was a secret recording made by a DEA informant in which Ruiz claimed "The [payoff] money went in Fidel's drawer".155 Again, Ruiz never identified this person as being Fidel Castro and, if he did, the information would have come from someone who had heard this information from someone else, effectively being inadmissible evidence. What is quite serious about Ruiz's allegations and testimony however are his connections to Cuban intelligence. According to Harry Sommers and confirmed by other federal investigations, Ruiz was a "cousin of Miguel Ruiz-Poo…a Cuban captain in the Ministry of the Interior" who was working in Panama when he met Reinaldo Ruiz.156 While they initially began transporting U.S. goods and products to circumvent the embargo, Reinaldo Ruiz eventually floated the idea of trafficking cocaine through Cuba which resulted in Ruiz-Poo informing his superior Major Amado Padrón Trujillo and Colonel Antonio "Tony" de la Guardia, both members of the Moneda Convertible (MC) Department, a division meant to "circumvent the United States embargo and earn Cuba hard currency".157 This is where Ruiz's involvement in shipping boats and aircraft filled with cocaine and other narcotics to Cuba and then on to Florida began. According to esteemed journalist Andres Oppenheimer, shortly after de la Guardia and Ruiz initially met, Ruiz asked de la Guardia if Fidel Castro was aware of their arrangement to traffic narcotics to which de la Guardia replied in the affirmative. Oppenheimer writes however 155 "Secret Drug Case Tape Talks of 'Fidel' Payoffs" Associated Press, Associated Press, published 09 March 1988, https://apnews.com/article/0800e600293914df73901e1fe452316b. 156 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 11. 157 González, "The Cuban Connection: Drug Trafficking and the Castro Regime," CSA Occasional Paper Series Vol. 02. No. 06 (1997), p. 10. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m2 "It is unclear whether Tony de la Guardia had personally discussed his cocaine-trafficking plans with Castro. The Commandante, with his instinctive revulsion for money matters, seldom got involved in dirty business deals. That was Interior Minister Abrantes's job…De La Guardia's statement to Reinaldo Ruiz may have reflected the colonel's assumption that Abrantes never would have okayed something as hot as a drug operation without Fidel's blessing".158 Also around this time was the federal indictment against Manuel Noriega, the dictator of Panama who had become an increasing annoyance to the U.S. government. Despite having initially been friendly to the U.S., providing information to the CIA and DEA159, his involvement in substantial drug trafficking and racketeering efforts (in addition to the significant corruption and general abuses of his regime) had made him a liability.160 Among the witnesses who provided information against Noriega was Jose Blandón Castillo, a former key member of Noriega's intelligence service and a "consul general in New York".161 Blandón provided first-hand knowledge of incidences, confirming some of what was already suspected by American officials and investigators on Noriega's activities, but also claimed Fidel Castro mediated a dispute between Noriega and the Medellín Cartel in the Darién Province of Panama. According to Blandón, he "met with Castro in Havana on June 21 or 22, 1984 [and] Castro recommended that Noriega return the $5 million in protection money and return the plant, personnel, and equipment to the Cartel" and on either June 27th or 28th, "Noriega and Castro met 158 Andres Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour: The Secret Story Behind the Coming Downfall of Communist Cuba (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 29. 159 Robert L. Jackson, "Noriega Gave DEA Limited Aid for 5 Years, Officials Say," Los Angeles Times, Times Mirror Company, published 16 December 1991, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-12-16-mn-517-story.html. 160 Philip Shenon, "Noriega Indicted by U.S. For Links to Illegal Drugs," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 06 February 1988, https://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/06/world/noriega-indicted-by-us-for-links-to-illegal-drugs.html. 161 Stephen Engelberg with Elaine Sciolino, "A U.S. Frame-Up of Nicaragua Charged," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 04 February 1988, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90M00005R001100160023-3.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m3 directly" and Noriega agreed to go forward with Castro's suggestions, resulting in the release of numerous prisoners.162 While this information was used in indictments against senior Cuban officials and Manuel Noriega, some have found reason to doubt Blandón's claims. John Dinges, a noted investigative journalist and current Professor Emeritus of International Journalism at Columbia University, documented Blandón's claims in his 1991 book Our Man in Panama, stating, "There was no independent corroboration for the story…No other witnesses, including [Floyd Carlton Caceres, Noriega's personal pilot], had any knowledge of the Cuban meeting. If investigators had checked flight records and even press clips in Panama, they might have discovered that Blandón had gotten some basic facts of the Darién incident wrong: the dates for the trip to Cuba were wrong, and the prisoners supposedly released at Castro's urging had been freed more than one month before Blandón and Noriega went to Cuba".163 Richard Gregorie, who met with Blandón, disagrees with Dinges' assertions, saying, "Blandón provided the US government with valid evidence that was corroborated, but Blandón volunteered his cooperation and no one knew his true motivation. He was caught, prior to trial, recording his interviews by agents… The photos and information he provided were valid, but whether this was a lure by some foreign intelligence service or an attempt to sell his story for personal gain made him untrustworthy as a witness".164 Castro was interviewed around this time by Maria Shriver of NBC News and wholeheartedly rejected "José Blandón's charge" while also "[inviting] the Congressional committee [which heard Blandón's claims] to visit Cuba to receive evidence that Blandón was 162 U.S. Congress, Senate, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: A Report, p. 66. 163 John Dinges, Our Man in Panama: The Shrewd Rise and Brutal Fall of Manuel Noriega (New York, NY: Random House, 1991), p. 292, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/232993288. 164 Richard "Dick" Gregorie (former Chief of Narcotics for the USAO-SDFL) in discussion with the author, 08 April 2021. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m4 lying to Congress".165 In this interview, he also "[denied] that the Medellín drug cartel has ever trafficked drugs through Cuba to the United States".166 Despite Castro's invitation to the committee, subcommittee chairman Senator John Kerry approached the Cuban Interests Section in D.C. and requested to visit Cuba on the conditions that "staff [be] permitted to advance the trip and…the Cubans agreed to discuss the drug trafficking problem in general" along with being able to meet Robert Vesco; the trip never materialized as "The Cubans never replied to any of these requests and never made any further arrangements for the visit".167 The concentrated U.S. criminal investigations, Congressional hearings, and federal indictments, the intense media speculation and reporting, along with seeming pressure from the Soviet Union168 forced the Cuban government's hand. On 12 June, 1989, multiple high-ranking members of Cuba's military and intelligence services were arrested. These members included General Arnaldo T. Ochoa Sanchez,169 Brigadier General Patricio de la Guardia, Colonel Antonio "Tony" de la Guardia (twin brother to Patricio), Colonel Antonio Rodriguez Estupinan, Captain Jorge Martinez Valdes, Lieutenant Colonel Alexis Lago Archoa, and Major Amado Padrón Trujillo.170 Also charged were Captain Leonel Estevez-Soto, Captain Antonio Sanchez-Lima, First Lieutenant Jose Luis Pineda-Bermudez, Captain Miguel Ruiz-Poo, Captain Rosa Maria Abierno-Gobin, and Captain Eduardo Diaz-Izquierdo.171 165 Jane Franklin, Cuba and the United States: A Chronological History (New York, NY: Ocean Press, 1992), p. 239, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/944186211. 166 Ibid. 167 U.S. Congress, Senate, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: A Report, p. 66-67. 168 U.S. Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, International Narcotics Situation Report (Langley, VA: May 1989), p. 13, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91M01043R002200150004-9.pdf. 169 Robert Pear, "Cuba Arrests Top General on Corruption Charges," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 16 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/16/world/cuba-arrests-top-general-on-corruption-charges.html?searchResultPosition=8. 170 Robert Pear, "Cuba Seizes 6 More Officers Amid Signs of Big Shakeup," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 17 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/17/world/cuba-seizes-6-more-officers-amid-signs-of-big-shakeup.html. 171 Sommers "Untitled Graduate Studies Paper," p. 14. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m5 The majority of these persons were members of Cuba's Ministry of the Interior and intelligence services, though Estupinan and Martinez were both former aides-de-camp to General Ochoa.172 Save for Archoa and Trujillo, who were not charged with any crime, the other persons were charged with a variety of public corruption crimes, including money laundering, drug trafficking, and treason. As well, though all were arrested rather simultaneously, there were two separate cases going on which involved the drug trade in Cuba. The first involved, "[Antonio "Tony"] de la Guardia, Major Padrón, and six other officers who worked at [the MC Department] … The Cuban government charged that de la Guardia's group arranged for six tons of cocaine to be sent from Colombia through Cuba to the United States in the two years after April 1987, and that they were paid $3.4 million for doing so".173 The second case involved primary Ochoa and his aide-de-camp Martinez (in addition to "several others") in which the Cuban government charged that "[Ochoa] enriched himself in black-market trading, using army resources, when he was stationed in Angola in 1988, and to have neglected his military duties…[stole] $161,000 from Nicaragua's Sandinista army through a failed weapons deal…[and] was said to have conceived of a scheme to send major cocaine shipments to the United States, and for that purpose to have sent Martínez secretly to Medellín, Colombia, in 1988 to meet with Pablo Escobar Gaviria, a magnate of the drug cartel".174 The charges against Ochoa did not allege he was involved in de la Guardia's operations nor ever took part in a drug deal, alleging only he engaged in treason and efforts to gain private funds for either independent military operations or for personal use. 172 Ibid. 173 Julia Preston, "The Trial that Shook Cuba," The New York Review of Books, NYREV, Inc., published 07 December 1989, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1989/12/07/the-trial-that-shook-cuba/. 174 Ibid. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m6 The trial (which aired on public television throughout Cuba) began on 25 June, 1989, thirteen days after Ochoa had initially been arrested, with the first hearing beginning on the 26th of June.175 Throughout the course of the trial, numerous witnesses were called who testified in regards to the charges, in some cases admitting culpability and accepting responsibility for individual actions which were illegal while also implicating others such as Ochoa and the de la Guardia brothers in the illegal activities they had been charged with. Both Patricio and Tony de la Guardia and Arnaldo Ochoa admitted their involvements in drug trafficking and treasonous activities, respectively, before the trial had commenced.176 At the trial's conclusion, the prosecutor for the government recommended to the Honor Tribunal, a board of 47 high-ranking Cuban military officers (one of whom was Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado, who had been charged with drug trafficking by the U.S. in 1982)177, that "Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, Antonio de la Guardia Font, Jorge Martinez Valdez, Amado Bruno Padron Trujillo, Antonio Sanchez Lima, Alexis Lago Arocha, and Eduardo Diaz Izquierdo [receive] the death penalty…[for] the most serious crimes in this indictment, which are drug trafficking and treason against the fatherland".178 The prosecutor also recommended "30 years imprisonment for defendants Patricio de la Guardia Font and Rosa Maria Abierno Gobin, 25 years imprisonment for defendants Gabriel Prendes Gomez, Leonel Estevez Soto, Miguel Ruiz 175 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 03, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a347578.pdf. 176 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 07, 154, 164. 177 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 44. 178 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 187. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m7 Poo, and Luis M. Pineda Bermudez, and 15 years imprisonment for defendant Antonio Rodriguez Estupinan".179 The Honor Tribunal agreed unanimously on 11 July 1989, with the stripping of ranks coming later on 12 July 1989.180 On 13 July 1989, Ochoa, Tony de la Guardia, Valdez, and Trujillo were all executed by way of firing squad.181 During and following the trial, Cuba's Ministry of the Interior and the Cuban government as a whole was revamped; Diocles Torralba Gonzalez, Cuba's Minister of Transportation "was dismissed [on 14 June 1989] for "improper conduct" – suggesting he may have been engaged in corruption"182 while Cuba's Minister of the Interior, Brigadier General Jose Abrantes Fernandez, "was dismissed [on] June 26" and then arrested on 31 July 1989 alongside "Brig. Gen. Roberto Gonzalez Caso, a former head of immigration; Oscar Carreno Gomez, former customs chief; Lt. Col. Rolando Castaneda Izquiero, and Hector Carbonell Mendez, director of a state-owned company that dealt in foreign currency".183 Five more Brigadier Generals of the Cuban military, presumably aligned with the Ministry of the Interior, were also "demoted to colonel and retired".184 Both Abrantes and Torralba would later receive twenty year prison sentences, with Abrantes dying in 1991 of a heart attack.185 Replacing Abrantes in the MININT was "trusted four-star general Abelardo Colomé Ibarra" who quickly revamped much of MININT's capabilities.186 179 Ibid. 180 "Cuban Government Proceedings Against Arnaldo Ochoa-Sanchez and Other Officials," Government of Cuba (June-July 1989), Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, JPRS-LAM-89-003, 25 July 1989, p. 208-209. 181 Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour, p. 01-03. 182 Jim Anderson, "U.S.: High-level shakeup may be under way in Cuba," United Press International, United Press International, published 14 June 1989, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/06/14/US-High-level-shakeup-may-be-under-way-in-Cuba/4954613800000/. 183 Isaac A. Levi, "Five Senior Cuban Officers Arrested in Drug Scandal," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 31 July 1989, https://apnews.com/article/0782d185225919535cf3aa518ed550a9. 184 Ibid. 185 Richard Gott, Cuba: A New History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 285. 186 Krujit, Cuba and Revolutionary Latin America, p. 183. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m8 During and after the trial, the charges and convictions were heavily criticized. Some cast doubt on the trial's veracity in regards to having a military officer who had allegations of drug trafficking leveled against him187, while others (Cuban human rights activities, American journalists, and international human rights advocacy and monitoring groups) took offense to the lack of questions asked by the defendants' military appointed prosecutors (in addition to the rather loaded way in which some questions were asked).188 Jaqueline Tillman, a member of the National Security Council, was quoted as saying, "The evidence of Cuban involvement in narcotics trafficking was becoming so abundant that the regime moved to protect Fidel Castro by dissociating him from those activities" while Frank Calzon, a member of the human rights group Freedom House stated that either of the Castros, either Fidel or Raul, "had to approve of this activity, or at least [look] the other way".189 Even civilians of the island nation, according to former diplomat Wayne Smith, were "questioning the official explanation and arguing that there has to be a lot more to this than what is contained in the official announcement".190 Following the trials and into the 1990s, however, Cuba seemingly became more committed to halting drug traffic in Cuba. Fulton Armstrong, a former NIO for Latin America and two-time Director for Inter-American Affairs for the NSC, has stated that "Since Ochoa, collaboration has been good" mentioning that, since 1997, a formal relationship between the United States and Cuba exists, with both the U.S. and Cuba "[identifying] this as a matter of 187 Richard Cole, "Admiral's Role Calls Cuba Drug Crackdown Into Question," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 29 June 1989, https://apnews.com/article/9ef279d0c5de07e958d53e9c1a7bea5b. 188 Preston, "The Trial that Shook Cuba," The New York Review of Books. 189 Robert Pear, "Cuba Discloses A Drug Network Of Top Officials," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 24 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/24/world/cuba-discloses-a-drug-network-of-top-officials.html. 190 Larry Rohter, "Castro Is Anxious About His Military," The New York Times, The New York Times Company, published 25 June 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/25/weekinreview/the-world-castro-is-anxious-about-his-military.html?searchResultPosition=10. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha4m9 national interest".191 Pierre Charette, the ASAC for the DEA's Caribbean division during the late-1980s, identified that into the early-1990s, cooperation with the Cuban government has been "fantastic [with] drug trafficking through go-fast boats dropping significantly" and that this productive relationship remains in place today.192 In 1991, the U.S. Customs Service detailed to Frontline that "[drug, arms, and other illicit] trafficking had declined since the trial, but…not stopped".193 The DEA's Administrator194 and Chief of International Operations195, in 1996 and 1999 respectively, both testified before Congress that, despite large profile cases in the media, the Cuban government itself nor senior officials were not involved in drug trafficking. Also in 1996, the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs "recognized cuban[sic] counter-drugs efforts, stating that the cuban[sic] government was giving anti-narcotics policies higher public profile in the face of growing narcotics transshipments and consumption".196 General Barry McCaffrey, who served as Commander of U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and was President Clinton's Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ODNCP) from 1994 to 2001, recalled in 2015 "Cuba's a police state, and I don't believe the Cuban government wants to be a hub for drug smugglers. They saw it as a 191 Fulton Armstrong (retired National Intelligence Officer for Latin America with NSC) in discussion with the author, 13 January 2021. 192 Pierre "Pete" Charette (retired Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge with DEA) in discussion with the author, 16 March 2021. 193 PBS Frontline, season 09, episode 10, "Cuba and Cocaine," directed and written by Stephanie Tepper & William Cran, aired 05 February 1991. 194 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Statement by: Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, 104th Cong., 06 June 1996, https://fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/h960606c.htm. 195 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Statement by: William E. Ledwith, Chief of International Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration, 106th Cong., 17 November 1999, https://fas.org/irp/congress/1999_hr/ct111799.htm. 196 Isabella Bellezza-Smull, "Will Cuba Update its Drug Policy for the Twenty First Century?," Igarapé Institute, Igarapé Institute, published 29 December 2017, https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/08-11-2017-NE-29-Cuba-Drog-Policy.pdf. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m0 threat to their children, the workforce, their economy, their government" while noting that though cooperation was imperfect, there was constant communication with the Cubans throughout his time in terms of combating drug trafficking.197 The Question of Culpability on the Part of the Castros The involvement on the part of Fidel and Raul Castro in the drug trade is something that has long been debated and speculated. Since the 1960s, individual criminal investigations, U.S. federal government memorandums, Cuban intelligence defectors, convicted criminals, and congressional hearings have included testimony that has tried to implicate Fidel, Raul, or both Castros in the drug trade. With the 1989 trials, these speculations have increased and, in some cases, due to the handling of the trials, been given more credence. At least two U.S. Congressional hearings have been conducted since 1989, both of which focused on continuing drug traffic in Cuba.198 199 Into the 1990s, more evidence of possible involvement by the Castro regime was revealed. First were the allegations of Carlos Ledher, an experienced drug trafficker and pilot and co-founder of the Medellín Cartel.200 Ledher, upon his arrest and extradition in 1987, was "convicted…on charges of conspiracy and running a criminal enterprise as well as other charges related to the importation and sale of cocaine" in May of 1988.201 Due to this, Ledher began 197 Joshua Partlow & Nick Miroff, "In fight against drugs, Cuba and U.S. on same team," The Washington Post, Nash Holdings, LLC., published 05 January 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-fight-against-drugs-cuba-and-us-on-same-team/2015/01/05/6416305a-90fc-11e4-a66f-0ca5037a597d_story.html. 198 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Cuba's Link to Drug Trafficking, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 November 1999, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=2027. 199 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Reform, Drug Trafficking in the Caribbean: Do Traffickers Use Cuba and Puerto Rico As Major Transit Locations For State-Bound Narcotics?, 106th Cong., 2nd Sess., 3-4 January 2000, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg69521/pdf/CHRG-106hhrg69521.pdf. 200 Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2001), p. 45, https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/45086854. 201 Patricia Bauer, "Carlos Ledher," Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., published 18 June 2018, updated 03 September 2020, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Carlos-Lehder. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m1 cooperating with the U.S. government for a lesser sentence. In federal testimony during the Noriega trial, Ledher claimed "that Castro mediated a bitter 1984 dispute between Noriega and Colombia's Medellin cartel that saved Panama's strongman from probable assassination…and bribed Cuban government officials to ship tons of cocaine into the United States".202 Lieutenant Colonel Luis del Cid, a close aide to Manuel Noriega, alleged during Noriega's trial that he "accompanied Noriega on a flight to Cuba and met Castro following the raid [in which Panamanian troops raided a cocaine lab in Darién province Colombia]" though specified he did not attend the meeting in question.203 While both Ledher and del Cid's testimonies seem to corroborate what Blandón had previously testified in regards to Castro's connections to Noriega and the Medellín Cartel, it must be noted that both del Cid and Ledher testified in exchange for reductions in their sentences (which numbered into the hundreds of years for each of them) and also could easily have become aware of Blandón's testimony in any of the three years prior to their providing evidence to the U.S. government. Two former officials who defected from Cuba two years before the trials, Oscar Valdes from the Ministry of Trade and Manuel de Beunza from the Ministry of the Interior, offered their insights on the trial, claiming the trials were for "show" and were more politically motivated as Castro desired to remove opponents whom he saw as a threat to his power.204 This allegation that the drug trials were a show trial meant to snub out political opponents of Castro's hold on Cuba has become a very prominent. 202 Robert L. Jackson, "Cartel Leader Reveals Secrets of Drug World," The Los Angeles Times, Time Mirror Company, published 21 November 1991, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-11-21-mn-404-story.html. 203 Richard Cole, "Former Aide Tells of Drug Cash, Castro, and Prostitutes," Associated Press, Associated Press, published 24 September 1991, https://apnews.com/article/0b7fcac1c0842630af2d1cc758ab1acd. 204 Jim Anderson, "Defectors: Cuba trials about politics, not drugs," United Press International, United Press International, published 27 July 1989, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/07/27/Defectors-Cuba-trial-about-politics-not-drugs/2648617515200/?spt=su. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m2 Other defectors, including those from the DGI who defected, also voiced their views on the trial. Jorge Masetti, a DGI officer and Tony de la Guardia's son-in-law who defected from Cuba in 1990, claimed in an interview, "If this operation really existed, it could only have existed if Fidel and Raúl Castro knew about it. They made these accusations, which were supposed to make the case against Ochoa. Arnaldo Ochoa was never proven to have smuggled drugs. The direct evidence does not exist, but they accused Ochoa, and why? Because Fidel wanted to send a message to all the officials with high authority".205 Juan Reinaldo Sánchez, a seemingly credible defector206 from Cuba's MININT who was the personal bodyguard to Castro for seventeen years, wrote in his book The Double Life of Fidel Castro that Castro had knowledge of subordinates' involvement in the drug trade and sanctioned it. Sánchez recalls overhearing a conversation in 1988 between Minister of the Interior Jose Abrantes and Castro in "centered on a Cuban [drug trafficker] living in the United States" who wanted to travel to Cuba to visit his parents; Castro approved the trip along with allowing the trafficker to, as a cover, say he was a Cuban intelligence operative while also requesting that Tony de la Guardia handle "the logistics of the trip".207 This conversation, while innocuous, seems to indicate that Castro did maintain a friendly relationship with some drug traffickers, yet reveals no legitimate information of Castro's involvement in the drug trade. Into the 1990s, working off the indictments against the Ruiz Family in 1988 and the 1992 Noriega trial, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida began investigating senior level members of the Cuban government. In 1993, the USAO-SDFL "drafted a [proposed 205 The Cuba Libre Story, season 1, episode 7, "Secrets and Sacrifices," directed by Emmanuel Amara, Kai Christiansen, & Florian Dedio, aired 11 December 2015, https://www.netflix.com/title/80109535. 206 Edward A. Lynch, "All Socialists Are Equal, but Some Are More Equal Than Others," Military Review (November-December 2019), p. 124, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/ND-19/ND-19-Book-B.pdf. 207 Juan Reinaldo Sánchez with Axel Gyldén, The Double Life of Fidel Castro: My 17 Years as Personal Bodyguard to El Líder Máximo (New York, NY: St. Martin's Griffin, 2015), p. 230. CUBAN DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A FOREIGN POLICY Cunningha5m3 indictment that] would have charged Raul Castro and 14 other top Cuban officials [including Manuel Piñeiro, head of the Departamento América] with conspiracy and racketeering for allegedly providing safe passage for Medellin cartel cocaine loads, including permission to fly over Cuba and use its waters".208 Among others allegedly involved in this large enterprise was Abelardo Colomé Ibarra, the Minister of the Interior who replaced Jose
Regulatory reform has emerged as an important policy area in developing countries. For reforms to be beneficial, regulatory regimes need to be transparent, coherent, and comprehensive. They must establish appropriate institutional frameworks and liberalized business regulations; enforce competition policy and law; and open external and internal markets to trade and investment. This report examines the institutional set-up for and use of regulatory policy instruments in Kenya. It is one of five reports prepared on countries in East and Southern Africa (the others are on Zambia, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania). The report is based on a review of public documents prepared by the government, donors, and the private sector, and on a limited number of interviews with key institutions and individuals.
Regulatory reform has emerged as an important policy area in developing countries. For reforms to be beneficial, regulatory regimes need to be transparent, coherent, and comprehensive. They must establish appropriate institutional frameworks and liberalized business regulations; enforce competition policy and law; and open external and internal markets to trade and investment. This report analyses the institutional set-up and use of regulatory policy instruments in Uganda. It is one of five reports prepared on countries in East and Southern Africa (the others are on Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Zambia), and represents an attempt to apply assessment tools and the framework developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in its work on regulatory capacity and performance to developing countries.
This report seeks to inform the development of a framework for addressing governance reform in fragile and conflict affected environments through are view of international experiences. The report analyzes the experience both of countries that sustained a transition to peace and those that fell back into conflict. Pertinent lessons will be drawn selectively from a range of fragile and conflict affected countries, including Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mozambique, Liberia, Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, Rwanda, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, and Angola. No specific typologies have been adopted or formed in order to assess these lessons, because typologies can be limiting and experiences can be better assessed based on the specificity of each country's context. The first section of the report sets out broadly accepted definitions of key terms such as governance, state building, and fragility. The second section reviews experiences with diverse governance dimensions and explores the objectives, opportunities, and constraints associated with each.
The Situation In The Middle East Letter Dated 1 February 2018 From The Secretary-General Addressed To The President Of The Security Council (S/2018/84) ; United Nations S/PV.8174 Security Council Seventy-third year 8174th meeting Monday, 5 February 2018, 10 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Alotaibi. . (Kuwait) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Allen United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda The situation in the Middle East Letter dated 1 February 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/84) This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-03099 (E) *1803099* S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 2/17 18-03099 The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m. Expression of thanks to the outgoing President The President (spoke in Arabic): As this is the first public meeting of the Security Council for the month of February, I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute, on behalf of the Council, to His Excellency Ambassador Kairat Umarov, Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan, for his service as President of the Council for the month of January. I am sure I speak for all members of the Council in expressing deep appreciation to Ambassador Umarov and his team for the great diplomatic skill with which they conducted the Council's business last month. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East Letter dated 1 February 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/84) The President (spoke in Arabic): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2018/84, which contains the text of a letter dated 1 February 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. I now give the floor to Ms. Nakamitsu. Ms. Nakamitsu: I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council once again on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical-weapons programme. I remain in regular contact with the Director- General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to discuss matters related to this issue; I spoke to him last week. In addition, I met with the Chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations this past Friday. At the time of my previous briefing, planning was under way with regard to the destruction of the remaining two stationary above-ground facilities of the 27 declared by the Syrian Arab Republic. I am informed that the OPCW, working with the United Nations Office for Project Services, is currently at the stage of finalizing a contract with a private company to carry out the destruction, which I understand could be completed within two months. There have been some developments on the issues related to Syria's initial declaration and subsequent amendments. The translation and analysis of documents that were provided to the OPCW by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in November have been completed. The OPCW has indicated that this information provided clarifications on some issues. However, the OPCW is continuing to follow up with the Government of Syria on the remaining gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies. The Director- General will submit a report in that regard to the next session of the OPCW Executive Council, which will take place in March. Further to its routine inspections in Syria, samples taken by the OPCW team during its second inspection at the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre are currently being analysed by two OPCW-designated laboratories. The Executive Council will be informed of the results of the inspection via a separate note from the Director-General to the next session of the Executive Council. The OPCW Fact-finding Mission continues to look into all allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the majority of which involve the use of toxic chemicals, such a chlorine, in areas not under the control of the Government. The Fact-finding Mission expects to submit a report on the allegations very soon. In addition, another Fact-finding Mission team has been looking into allegations of the use of chemical weapons brought to the attention of the OPCW by the Government of Syria. At the time of our previous briefing, a Fact-finding Mission team was in Damascus, at the invitation of the Government, to look into several of those allegations. I am informed that a report in that regard is also pending. 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 3/17 There is still work to do before resolution 2118 (2013) can be considered to have been fully implemented, and for the international community to have shared confidence that the chemical-weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic has been fully eliminated. Moreover, allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria have continued, including just this past weekend in the town of Saraqeb. That makes abundantly clear our continuing and collective responsibility to ensure that those responsible are held to account. New reports by the Fact-finding Mission are pending. Should they conclude that there has been the use, or likely use, of chemical weapons in any of those alleged incidents, our obligation to enact a meaningful response will be further intensified. It is my hope, and the hope of the Secretary-General, that such a response will favour unity, not impunity. As always, the Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide whatever support and assistance it can. The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank Ms. Nakamitsu for her briefing. I shall now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): The news out of Syria this morning is following a troubling pattern. There are reports of yet another chemical-weapon attack on Sunday. Victims of what appears to be chlorine gas are pouring into hospitals. Few things have horrified my country and the world as much as the Al-Assad regime's use of chemical weapons against its people. The Security Council has been outspoken on ending Syria's use of chemical weapons, and yet they continue. Under the Chemical Weapons Convention and resolution 2118 (2013), the Al-Assad regime's obligations are clear: it must immediately stop using all chemical weapons. It must address the gaps and inconsistencies in its Chemical Weapons Convention declaration. And it must destroy all of its remaining chemical weapons under the supervision of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). These are worthy goals. These are urgent goals. Yet we spent much of last year in the Council watching one country protect the Al-Assad regime's use of chemical weapons by refusing to hold them responsible. What do the American people see? What do people of all countries see? They see a Council that cannot agree to take action, even after the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, created by the Council, found that the Al-Assad regime used chemical weapons. Now we have reports that the Al-Assad regime has used chlorine gas against its people multiple times in recent weeks, including just yesterday. There is obvious evidence from dozens of victims, and therefore we proposed a draft press statement by the Security Council condemning these attacks. So far, Russia has delayed the adoption of the draft statement — a simple condemnation of Syrian children being suffocated by chlorine gas. I hope Russia takes the appropriate step to adopt the draft text, thus showing that the Council is unified in condemning chemical-weapon attacks. Accountability is a fundamental principle, but it is just the first step. Our goal must be to end the use of these evil, unjustifiable weapons. When actions have consequences — when perpetrators are identified and punished — we come closer to reaching our goal. But if we cannot even take the first step of establishing accountability for the use of chemical weapons, we have to seriously ask ourselves why we are here. The requirements for establishing accountability for the use of chemical weapons have not changed since the Council voted unanimously to create the Joint Investigative Mechanism, in 2015. They have not changed since Russia acted alone to kill the Mechanism last year. Such a mechanism must be independent and impartial. It must be free of politics. It must be controlled by experts, not politicians or diplomats. And it must be definitive. The latest Russian draft resolution does not meet any of those criteria. Russia's draft resolution completely ignores the findings of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, which was an investigation that Russia supported until the investigators found the Al-Assad regime to be responsible. That should already be enough to make us sceptical. However, there are other deep problems. For their new investigation, Russia wants to be able to cherry-pick the investigators. It wants to insert unnecessary and arbitrary investigative standards. And it wants the Security Council to be able to review all the findings of this investigation and decide what makes it into the final report. That is not an impartial mechanism; it is a way to whitewash the findings of the last investigation that Russia desperately wants to bury. No one should believe that the draft resolution is a good basis for discussion, when it is designed to undermine our core principles on chemical weapons. We cannot S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 4/17 18-03099 hope to end the use of chemical weapons if those who use them escape the consequences of their actions. Therefore, while we regret the need for its creation, we applaud the efforts of France to launch the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons. That is yet another way to hold accountable the Al-Assad regime and any group that uses chemical weapons. The United States has also announced that we will contribute to the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011. The United States strongly supports the Mechanism as a valuable tool to hold the Al-Assad regime accountable for its atrocities, including its repeated and ongoing use of chemical weapons. It is a true tragedy that Russia has sent us back to square one in the effort to end the use of chemical weapons in Syria. But we will not cease in our efforts to know the truth of the Al-Assad regime — and ensure that the truth is known and acted on by the international community. That is why we hosted all 15 members of the Council at the United States Holocaust Museum last week. The exhibit was called "Syria: Please Don't Forget Us". All of us saw undeniable evidence of the Al-Assad regime's atrocities and human rights violations. We cannot, and should not, forget the Syrian people. The United States will not forget them. While the Council has not yet been able to act to provide real accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the United States will not give up on the responsibility to do so. That is the sincere wish of the American people, and I know that it is shared by many on the Council. We are not motivated by score-settling, payback or power politics. We are motivated by the urgent need to end the unique and horrible suffering that chemical weapons have inflicted on innocent men, women and children in Syria. The Syrian people are counting on us. Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): I would like to thank High Representative Nakamitsu for her briefing. We are holding this meeting in the open Chamber today after reports of a series of chemical attacks in eastern Ghouta within the past month, as the Al-Assad regime continues its merciless bombing and killing of civilians. Over the weekend, there were further allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Idlib, as well as air strikes by pro-regime forces that reportedly hit three hospitals, leaving doctors scrambling to remove premature babies from their incubators in order to move them. I cannot say that they were moving them to safety, because the reality is that for the citizens of Idlib and eastern Ghouta, nowhere is safe. We are appalled by this violence and the reports of deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure, and we call on all parties to the conflict to uphold international humanitarian law and protect civilians. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is already investigating reports of the use of chemical weapons in recent weeks, but establishing who is responsible for that use will be much more difficult, because Russia has vetoed the continuation of the independent, expert OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) three times, in order to protect the Al-Assad regime. We would welcome any serious attempt to re-establish a properly independent investigative and attribution mechanism for continuing the JIM's meticulous work. Sadly, we do not yet see that in the Russian proposal. Any successor investigation must be empowered to investigate all use of chemical weapons, whoever the perpetrator may be. Yet the Russian proposal focuses only on non-State actors. We have repeatedly condemned Da'esh for its use of chemical weapons, which the JIM clearly reported. But given Al-Assad's track record of chemical-weapon use and its failure to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention, it is imperative to ensure that any new mechanism also investigates the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. A second objection is the proposal that experts would merely gather evidence, leaving the Council to decide what it meant. No other United Nations expert panel that I know of is specifically prohibited from reaching conclusions and reporting to the Council on its findings on what has happened. We are not specialists on chemical weapons around this table. We rely on independent, United Nations-selected expert panels. The entire purpose of the JIM was that an independent panel would reach conclusions on the basis of the evidence, taking the issue out of the hands of us, the Member States and Council members, because we have been unable to agree. Russia's proposal looks as if it is designed to avoid the political embarrassment of having to use its veto power to defend the indefensible when independent bodies report on what has truly happened. The underlying intent seems to be to ensure that there are no clear conclusions in future reports. 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 5/17 Thirdly, we object to the proposal's demands that the standard of proof should be beyond reasonable doubt. That standard has not been used in any other comparable past or current United Nations investigation. It is used in relation to criminal prosecutions in courts of law, which have significantly greater investigative powers and independence than those envisaged in Russia's text. Finally, the proposal insists on site visits, despite the explicit provision in the Chemical Weapons Convention for other ways to gather relevant evidence, recognizing the difficulty of safe and timely visits. There is no scientific basis for this proposal. It is simply an attempt to hamstring future investigations and discredit the JIM. Of course, Russia made much of the lack of a site visit to Khan Shaykhun, despite the fact that the Al-Assad regime handed over to the United Nations samples from the site that contained chemical signatures unique to regime sarin, obviating the need for such a visit. It is for those reasons that the current text is unacceptable. The JIM set a high standard of impartiality and expertise. We expect that standard from any future mechanism. The Syrian regime, of course, claims not to have used chemical weapons. Yet over the years two separate reports from the JIM, under separate leadership panels, drawing on a broad range of respected independent international experts, concluded that the regime had used chlorine at least three times — in Talmenes in April 2014 and in Sarmin and Qmenas in March 2015 — and had used sarin to attack Khan Shaykhun in April 2017. We should also remember the infamous attack in eastern Ghouta in August 2013, when a separate United Nations investigation found that sarin was used to kill hundreds and injure thousands. That attack brought near-universal international condemnation, and following our concerted international pressure, Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention. Syria promised, as it was legally obliged to do, to destroy and abandon its chemical-weapon programme. Yet it has been unable to satisfy inspectors that it has done so. We have to ask ourselves why that is. In 2013 Russia promised to act as a guarantor for the Al-Assad regime's compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. Yet month after month we all sit here and hear that Al-Assad has not done so. Why does Russia not compel the Syrian regime to comply with its obligations and make it impossible for it to use chemical weapons? Tragically, for the people of Syria, the regime continues to use chemical weapons with impunity. If it is confirmed that Al-Assad has again used chemical weapons on his own people, it would not only be another entry in the catalogue of his war crimes, it would also be another attack on us all, Members of the United Nations who have worked for decades — in the words of the Chemical Weapons Convention, for the sake of all mankind — to completely exclude the possibility of the use of chemical weapons. Throughout history, our peoples have said "never again" — among others, starting with the First World War battlefields, in Ethiopia, in Manchuria and in Saddam Hussein's attacks on Iran and on Iraqi Kurds. Let us, the members of the Council, stand up for the peoples of the United Nations, determined that such abhorrent chemical weapons should never be used. Let us stand up for the people of Syria and give them a real investigation into those responsible for the use of chemical weapons — an investigation that pursues justice for the horrific crimes committed against them. Let us signal our determination to pursue accountability by all means available, even if one member of the Security Council is currently preventing us from taking action here. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): I would first like to congratulate Kuwait through you, Mr. President, on the start of its presidency of the Security Council. You can rely on France's support in the month to come. I would also like to thank Izumi Nakamitsu for her usual very informative briefing. This is the second time we have met in less than two weeks after reports of four new cases of the use of chlorine against Syria's civilian population, some of them in Idlib province, which is a de-escalation zone. We are examining the information that is available and waiting for the conclusions of the investigative mechanism, but the reality is that resorting to toxic substances as weapons has never ended in Syria. I would like to remind the Council that the Syrian regime has already been identified as the perpetrator in four such cases, one of which involved the use of sarin, in violation of international humanitarian law and the obligations that Syria assumed when it acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention. The challenges go beyond the Syrian issue. A century after the end of the First World War, in which mustard gas was used on a massive scale against civilians, what we are seeing is shocking. These weapons, which we had thought were a thing of the past, are once again being used methodically and systematically by the Syrian regime against its own people. Furthermore, there is a real threat of such S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 6/17 18-03099 weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. The threat is all the greater given the fact that the dismantling of the Syrian chemical-weapon programme remains at a deadlock. The cooperation of the Syrian regime with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has for months taken place in a piecemeal manner, and suspicions remain about the status of Syrian stockpiles. I would recall that OPCW expert teams have repeatedly found at Syrian sites indicators of undeclared substances, without any convincing explanation being provided by the country. Given that chemical weapons continue to be used, it seems that Syria has lied and maintained clandestine capacities. The situation is aggravating regional instability, undermining the non-proliferation regime and weakening the international security architecture, as well as jeopardizing the security of each of our States. It represents a violation of the law and flouts the most fundamental principles of humanity. The international community cannot downplay the situation and allow the perpetrators of these heinous crimes to remain unpunished. It is the responsibility of the Security Council to prevent this; it is our shared responsibility. The criminals who chose to design and use these barbaric weapons must be punished. At stake is the future of our collective security system; no one can be allowed to undermine its foundations without facing consequences. The hindrances and obstructions facing the international community's initiatives within existing bodies contribute to promoting impunity, and this we cannot accept. For that reason, France launched in Paris an open, pragmatic partnership that brings together States that reject impunity for individuals involved in chemical-weapon attacks or in the development of chemical-weapon programmes. It brings together all the States concerned about the threat of erosion of the non-proliferation regime and of strategic stability. It was designed to support all international bodies and investigative mechanisms in their efforts. This universal partnership applies to all instances of the use of such weapons throughout the world by all perpetrators, be they State or non-State actors. The partnership is open, and States that embrace these principles are invited to join. Like everyone else here, we hope that a mechanism for the identification of those responsible will be recreated as soon as possible. However, any sincere and credible effort to that end must align with the basic standards of independence, impartiality and professionalism that underpinned the Joint Investigative Mechanism, as the very reason for the establishment of such a regime is to determine the truth. Within the Council, France will be very vigilant with respect to the principles listed and will not accept a lesser mechanism. Impunity in Syria is not an option. The perpetrators of all of the crimes committed in Syria will be held accountable, sooner or later. The International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria, which we support, is a part of that process. That is the only way to ensure lasting peace in Syria, and this can come about only in the framework of an inclusive political solution in Geneva, in line with resolution 2254 (2015), which more than ever before represents our shared compass. The repeated use of chemical weapons in Syria has been proved. We cannot turn a blind eye to this, for no one can now say that they did not know. Denial or hypocrisy, or a combination of of the two, cannot be presented as a strategy. The persistent use of chemical weapons in Syria represents a violation of the universal conscience as well as the most fundamental principles of international law. It also poses a potentially lethal threat to the sustainability of the international non-proliferation regime, which is the most comprehensive and successful of all of the international non-proliferation regimes. To allow it to be undermined without any response would be to accept the erosion of the entire international regime for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that we have built together, stone by stone, over the course of decades and which constitutes the very backbone of the international security architecture as well as one of the paramount gains of multilateralism. On behalf of France, I call on all members of the Security Council to shift their attitudes and adjust their focus. The heavy responsibility that we all bear requires that we join together and take action. Mr. Llorenty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): My delegation wishes to congratulate you once again, Sir, as well as the Permanent Mission of Kuwait, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. We are also grateful for the briefing provided by the Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu. We also 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 7/17 wish to acknowledge the letter sent by the Secretary- General (S/2018/84) concerning the periodic report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Bolivia believes that there can be no justification for the use of chemical weapons, regardless of circumstances and by whomsoever committed, as such use is a serious violation of international law and poses a grave threat to international peace and security. We therefore categorically condemn the use of chemical weapons or substances as weapons, as we deem this an unjustifiable and criminal act, wherever, whenever and by whomsoever committed. In that context, we express our grave concern about the ongoing reports of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, especially in eastern Ghouta. If that is confirmed, the Council should remain united in order to ensure that the perpetrators are held accountable and brought to justice, so that there is no impunity for their actions. We commend the coordination between the OPCW and the United Nations Office for Project Services in all of the arrangements aimed at making possible the destruction of the two remaining facilities as well as the preparedness of the Syrian Government to achieve this end. We call on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate with the OPCW on this initiative, as well as during the second inspection of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre. We encourage the Fact-finding Mission to continue its investigation so that, in accordance with its mandate, it can investigate, in the most objective, methodical and technical manner, reports of the use of chemicals weapons on Syrian territory. In that regard, we highlight the latest visit to the city of Damascus during January, and we will await the results thereof. We call on all parties involved to cooperate fully as well as to provide viable and reliable information, so that an effective investigation of all of the ongoing cases can be conducted as soon as possible. Concerned about the reports of the use of chemical weapons, we deem it essential to establish as soon as possible an independent, impartial and representative mechanism to carry out a full, reliable and conclusive investigation of the cases referred by the Fact-finding Mission that will make it possible to identify those responsible for such acts. Nevertheless, if we want to create a new, transparent accountability mechanism, we have the major challenge and the responsibility of not instrumentalizing the Security Council for political ends. In that vein, we view the Russian proposal as a new and positive opportunity to reach this goal. We therefore call on the members of the Council to commit themselves to a process of purposeful negotiation, and we echo the words of the Secretary-General in his letter transmitting the current report, calling on the Security Council to demonstrate unity on this issue, which is so vital for the international community. Finally, we reiterate that the only option for resolving the conflict in Syria and prevent more people from becoming victims is through an inclusive political transition led by and benefiting the Syrian people that respects their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): Since this is the first public meeting of the Security Council for the month of February, I would like to congratulate the delegation of Kuwait on the commencement of its presidency and wish it great success in implementing its ambitious programme of work. I am grateful to High Representative Nakamitsu for her informative briefing. Our position on this issue remains unchanged. We strongly condemn any use of chemical weapons and advocate that such threats must be eliminated in the future. We firmly believe that there must be accountability for perpetrators of such crimes. Today I would like to concentrate on three major points. First, we support the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), as reflected in its fifty-second report (S/2018/84, annex). The speedy destruction, probably in two months, of the remaining chemical-weapon production facilities and resolving all outstanding issues relating to the declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic are of the utmost importance. That would help to dispel all existing doubts on many principal issues and to comprehend the real situation in the country. It is commendable that, during the inspection of Barzah and Jamrayah, all samples were sealed, packaged and shipped to OPCW's laboratory and were received there in the presence of the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic, observing all established rules. We look forward to the follow-up to the OPCW's work, and we will also await the results S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 8/17 18-03099 of a thorough analysis of the documents submitted by Syria by the Declaration Assessment Team. Secondly, the continuing reports on the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria are extremely alarming. But the most alarming fact is that the Council has not yet restored its investigative potential to properly respond to such cases. I recall the words of the Secretary-General, who pointed to the serious gap that had arisen at the end of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, which leaves one with the feeling that impunity will continue without any strict monitoring. Thirdly, and lastly, considering the current developments, it is also most critical that a new mechanism be established as soon as possible. We here in the Council are not experts on chemical weapons — neither to judge or blame anyone — but must act on the basis of credible evidence provided to us by an independent, impartial and representative investigative body we can all trust. In that regard, we support the ongoing consultations on creating a new investigative instrument, in order to prevent any further use of chemical weapons and to bring perpetrators to justice. We are ready to participate actively and contribute to the earliest revival and ultimate realization of our investigative potential. Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We join others in congratulating your delegation, Sir, on having assumed the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. We support you in discharging your tasks, which we are sure you will do in full. We welcome the holding of this meeting and thank Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu for her valuable briefing on this topic. Peru condemns the use of chemical weapons by any actor, in any place and under any circumstance. Their use against the civilian population in Syria is a war crime and a flagrant violation of international law, international humanitarian law and the non-proliferation regimes. In that regard, Peru believes it is essential for the international community, and in particular the Security Council, to remain resolute and united in its support for the non-proliferation regime and in ensuring that those responsible for these atrocious crimes — which are also threats to international peace and security — be held accountable. We must continue to demand that the Syrian Government fulfil its commitment to cooperate with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the elimination of all of its chemical weapons. We take note of some recent progress, such as the imminent destruction of the last two declared chemical-weapon production facilities, as verified preliminarily by the OPCW last November, and the allocation of new financial resources to that end. Nevertheless, we are concerned that key points of the Syrian Government's declaration have yet to be verified, more than four years after its accession to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. We hope that the 19 recently translated documents that were provided to the OPCW will help rectify errors and omissions and clear up discrepancies. We reaffirm our commitment and support to the OPCW, whose Executive Council Peru is honoured to be a member of. In the face of new reports of chemical-weapon attacks in eastern Ghouta and Idlib, Peru expresses its solidarity with the victims and reiterates the urgent need to identify and bring to justice the perpetrators of such atrocities. Like a majority of Council members, we believe that accountability is essential to safeguarding the international non-proliferation regimes. Preventing this threat requires a credible deterrent. With that goal in mind, we believe it is urgent to establish an attributive mechanism with the highest standards of professionalism, objectivity, transparency and, primarily, independence in order to fill the gap left by the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. My delegation will continue to work constructively to create a new mechanism that addresses the legitimate concerns of all Council members and of the international community. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): I also want to congratulate you, Mr. President, on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. I also thank Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu for her briefing today. In recent weeks there have been new, alarming reports of alleged chemical-weapon attacks in Syria. The most recent allegation was this weekend in Idlib. These reported attacks must be immediately investigated by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-finding Mission, to which we offer our full and unreserved support. We reiterate our strongest condemnation of the use of chemical weapons. It is a serious violation 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 9/17 of international law and it constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Their use in armed conflict amounts to a war crime. Perpetrators of such crimes must be held accountable. We cannot accept impunity. That is why Sweden joined the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, initiated by France. As a member of the Security Council and of the OPCW Executive Council, we support all international efforts to combat the use and proliferation of chemical weapons by State and non-State actors alike anywhere in the world. We count on this initiative to complement and support our collective work in multilateral forums, as well as the existing multilateral mechanisms to achieve unity around those important goals. That also includes the Human Rights Council's Commission of Inquiry and the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, both of which have important mandates in collecting information. I again thank High Representative Nakamitsu for her briefing today. She reminded us that work remains on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013). The outstanding issues relating to Syria's initial declaration must be resolved without further delay. We again call upon the Syrian authorities to fully cooperate with the OPCW in that regard. As the Secretary-General has stated, the continuing allegations highlight yet again our shared obligation to identify and hold to account those responsible for the use chemical weapons on Syria. We need to heed his call, come together and act. That is why Sweden has engaged in the negotiations on establishing a new independent and impartial attributive mechanism. The Council has a responsibility to protect the international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and for ensuring accountability. Negotiations need to be in good faith, but with the objective of establishing a truly independent, impartial and effective mechanism for accountability. Ms. Wronecka (Poland) (spoke in Arabic): I would like to take this opportunity to wish the delegation of Kuwait every success in implementing the programme of work for this month. (spoke in English) Let me thank High Representative Izumi Nakamitsu for her informative briefing. We appreciate the ongoing work of the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Fact-finding Mission. We welcome the cooperation between the secretariat and the United Nations Office for Project Services, which facilitated the destruction of the two remaining chemical-weapon production facilities. We look forward to the results of the analysis by the Declaration Assessment Team of a set of documents and declarations submitted by Syria. Chemical weapons continue to pose a threat to the people of Syria. Repeated allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria, including the recent ones, serve to underline the fact that there is still a challenge to international peace and security, as well as to the credibility of the Chemical Weapons Convention regime. In that context, there is a genuine need for a clear message that impunity for perpetrators is not an option. We have clearly stated in various forums that the use of chemical weapons by anyone — State and non-State actors alike — anywhere and under any circumstances must be rigorously condemned and those responsible for such acts must be held accountable. We agree that the Security Council needs to take steps in order to establish a credible, professional and independent investigative mechanism. We have therefore engaged in the discussions to find the best solution for the future mechanism. I would like to focus on three points. First, Poland has supported the work of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) and continues to support the establishment of an independent and credible investigative mechanism aimed at holding accountable the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. However, a future mechanism will not operate in a void. The instrument must build on the Joint Investigative Mechanism. Not only should it build on the significant achievements of the JIM, but its mandate must not deviate from resolution 2235 (2015). Secondly, the mandate of the mechanism should be balanced. There is a need to identify not only the individuals, entities and groups but also the Governments responsible for any use of chemicals as weapons. Thirdly, one of the most important elements of the mandate must be to ensure that the mechanism is independent in its proceedings and conclusions and S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 10/17 18-03099 free from the pressure of political verification of its conclusions by the Council. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): Allow me once again to congratulate you, Mr. President, and the State of Kuwait on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. I wish you every success and assure you of our full support. Allow me also to express my congratulations and appreciation to Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and her team for the presentation of the comprehensive and detailed briefing on the current political and humanitarian situation with regard to chemical weapons in Syria. The political — and in particular the humanitarian — crisis in Syria is reaching alarming proportions. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea expresses its solidarity with the families of the countless victims, as well as with the thousands of displaced people trapped by the hostilities and the more than 13 million people who currently need humanitarian assistance as a result of the continuing conflict. I would like to take this opportunity to condemn the loss of numerous civilian lives in this conflict, and I call on all parties to comply with international law on the protection of civilians and to distinguish between military and civilian objectives and refrain from firing rocket launchers into populated areas, as is being reported in eastern Ghouta. Equatorial Guinea can only express its satisfaction at the destruction of almost all the chemical-weapon production facilities declared by the Syrian Arab Republic thanks to the technical assistance of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). However, while we welcome the cooperation between the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the OPCW, it is necessary to be vigilant and to continue to condemn in the strongest terms any possible use, development, acquisition or manufacture of chemical weapons in the country or transfers of such weapons to other States or non-State actors. In that regard, we vigorously condemn the recent use of toxic chemical weapons by whomsoever. The perpetrators of such horrendous acts must be brought to justice and sentenced appropriately. For seven years already, Syria has been a war scenario that crystallizes internal, regional and, even, international divisions. The primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security bestowed upon the Security Council by the Charter of the United Nations should lead the 15 member countries of this principal organ of the United Nations to overcome their differences regarding the situation in Syria and to renounce their political and strategic interests in favour of the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people to achieve well-being and prosperity. In that regard, it is appropriate that, as Russia has already proposed, another mechanism be established to replace the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism so that it can carry out the necessary investigations on the use of chemical weapons in Syria and thereby arrive at a result that garners consensus among the members of the Council in order to again unify our criteria for an objective examination of the situation. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): At the outset, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, at the beginning of your presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. I wish you every success. We also thank Ms. Nakamitsu for her briefing. We trust that, with the assistance of the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the two remaining above-ground Syrian chemical-weapon facilities will be promptly destroyed. The Syrian side has repeatedly demonstrated its interest in that. The pending issues related to the initial declarations should be dealt with as part of the dialogue between the OPCW and the Syrian Government. We welcome such cooperation, by which Syria, as a conscientious party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, provides the necessary assistance, complies with its obligations and facilitates access to the relevant documents. Many people have raised false issues that should now be closed and put aside. Syria's chemical-weapon capacity was destroyed under the oversight of the OPCW. However, it seems that there are some who wish to contrive to fan the flames on the issue. The Syrians have provided exhaustive explanations. However, issues are being raised and questions are being asked in a endless cycle. The Syrian side consistently reports to the international community, including the Security Council, about the detection of toxic chemical substances in areas liberated from the terrorists. There 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 11/17 are reports from Syria about possible provocations that may be used by representatives of foreign intelligence services. All such reports must be investigated immediately by the experts of the OPCW. However, we note that, in general, tremendous efforts are necessary for The Hague to duly respond to the important message. There are numerous pretexts being put forward not to travel there and decisions are being delayed. In the light of last year's story of Khan Shaykhun and the Shayrat air base, such conduct suggests deliberate sabotage. However, the statements today have left us with the impression that it is not Syria that some delegations are interested in. The United States and the United Kingdom have used today's meeting to slander Russia, and it is quite clear why that is happening. Someone cannot tolerate the success of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi and the prospects it offers for injecting new momentum into the political process in Syria. That requires launching a major campaign of slander against Russia in order to try, not for the first time, to cast doubt on Russia's role in the Syrian political settlement. As always, the statements of these representatives contain a grain of truth mixed with mountains of lies. Russia has never contested the use of sarin in Khan Shaykhun. But who it was used by is still a mystery, because the absurd conclusions of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) have not convinced us. In the past few days there has been general uproar about alleged incidents involving the use of chlorine in some Damascus suburbs. There has already been talk of the use of sarin. Where? When? By whom? The outlines of this propaganda campaign are not new. The terrorists, through the social associations that are closely linked to them, foremost among them the notorious White Helmets, spread rumours via social networks. These are instantly picked up by the Western press, and then we get representatives speechifying in the Security Council, making unproved accusations about the so-called Syrian regime and spreading slander about Russia. I have said it before and I will say it again: has anyone thought to ask the basic question as to why the Syrian Government needs to use chemical weapons? What do we suppose that could do for it? The first thing we should do, and various speakers today, particularly the representative of Sweden, have discussed this, is to send an OPCW fact-finding mission to those areas to investigate. Where is the presumption of innocence? The speakers are blaming the so-called regime for everything in advance, before any investigation. What do they want an independent investigative mechanism for? Surely at least they know that an investigation has to precede any conclusions. But apparently they do not need one. In my opinion, it should be completely clear to everyone that that the capitals that these representatives represent in the Council have absolutely no interest in any investigation. They do not need facts or precise evidence. They need to see a political order carried out. On 23 January, Russia announced the launch in the Security Council of expert efforts to draft a resolution establishing a new investigative entity for incidents involving the use of chemical weapons to replace the defunct OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, which was killed by the United States and its allies when they blocked the draft resolution (S/2017/968) that we proposed, together with China and Bolivia, designed to ensure that the Mechanism could be genuinely independent and professional. Not only do they not recall that episode, they have made strenuous attempts to convince the Security Council and the world community of the opposite. It has become clear that some of our partners are not prepared to consider this possibility. They want a second JIM that would continue to rubber-stamp the scientifically and technically ridiculous anti-Damascus conclusions on the basis of disinformation generously supplied by militant groups. They have long had a persistent allergy to the pressing need to pay close attention to the activities of terrorist groups, both in Syria and beyond its borders, in the context of manipulating toxic substances. In the realization that we will not allow the now entirely discredited JIM to be revived, Syria's opponents are now attempting to take alternative routes, cobbling together narrow groups of like-minded people. However, they are forgetting that in doing that they are undermining the authority of international bodies, particularly the United Nations and the OPCW, and destroying the international architecture on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Any initiatives in the context of the use of chemical weapons that circumvent the OPCW would be illegitimate. We certainly hope that the leadership of the United Nations Secretariat and the OPCW Technical Secretariat will make a firm show of will and distance themselves from such dubious projects. S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 12/17 18-03099 We are ready to accept a press statement on the Syrian chemical issue, but not the one proposed by its sponsors, because in its current form its purpose is quite clearly to blame the Government of Syria for what is so far the unproved use of chemical weapons. Somehow the draft statement does not say anything about the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, but the reference to Article 7 of the Charter of the United Nations leaves no doubt as to its essence. We cannot accept any still unconfirmed references to the use of chemical weapons without a credible investigation, nor can we accept any threats to a sovereign State for unproved actions. For some reason, eastern Ghouta has been dragged into the statement. I would like to remind the Council that last week we were prepared to accept an agreed-on draft presidential statement on the humanitarian situation in Syria. But our partners preferred to reject it. We are ready to accept a press statement, but not as it is proposed by our colleagues. We have proposed amendments to it that we are ready to circulate and agree on in that form. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): I would like to congratulate Kuwait through you, Mr. President, on its accession to the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February, to wish it every success and assure it of Côte d'Ivoire's cooperation. I would also like to thank Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for her excellent briefing. My delegation commends the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons through its Fact-finding Mission with regard to the dismantling of Syria's chemical-weapon stocks. We encourage the Syrian Government to comply with decisions regarding the destruction of its chemical arsenal. My delegation is seriously concerned about the reports in the past week once again alleging the possible use of chemical weapons in the conflict in Syria, particularly in eastern Ghouta, where 21 cases of suffocation have been reported. They represent a significant reversal in our efforts to combat impunity with regard to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. The suffering inflicted on the Syrian people is intolerable and must be ended. In that regard, my country calls for continued efforts to implement resolution 2118 (2013), which provides for the complete dismantling of the Syrian chemical-weapons arsenal. These new allegations of the use of chemical weapons once again call into question the Council's responsibility, particularly in terms of putting an end to these acts as soon as possible and of clearly identifying the perpetrators of such criminal acts. In its latest statement on the issue of chemical weapons in Syria (see S/PV.8164), my delegation warned against the Council's failure to act, which could be interpreted by those involved in the use of such weapons in Syria as a weakness of this organ and licence to act with impunity. Clearly, those who commit these despicable acts will continue to do so as long as the Council remains divided about the need to set up a consensus-based framework capable of identifying perpetrators and bringing them to justice. My delegation therefore encourages all ongoing initiatives that support the establishment of an accountability mechanism acceptable to all. In conclusion, Côte d'Ivoire reiterates its strong condemnation of the use of chemical weapons in Syria and calls upon the relevant United Nations mechanisms to shed light on the new allegations of the use of such weapons. My delegation eagerly awaits the conclusions of the report that will be submitted after the second round of inspections conducted at the Scientific Studies and Research Centre in Syria. Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): China congratulates Kuwait on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for the current month. We also commend Kazakhstan for its accomplishments during its presidency last month. I wish to thank the High Representative Nakamitsu for her briefing. China welcomes the progress achieved in the verification and destruction of the two remaining chemical-weapon facilities within Syria's borders. We support the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in continuing its coordination and cooperation with the Syrian Government so as to properly settle all the questions revolving around the initial declarations of chemical weapons by Syria through the OPCW platform. China expresses its deepest sympathy to the Syrian people for their suffering as the result of chemical weapons. No use of chemical weapons will be tolerated. Lately, there have been some media reports of suspected use of chlorine and other poisonous chemicals as weapons within Syria's borders, over which China wishes to register its deepest concern. It is hoped that 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 13/17 the parties will carry out verification of the related incidents as soon as possible. When it comes to the question of chemical weapons, China's position is as clear cut as it is consistent. We stand firmly against the use of chemical weapons by any country, organization or individual for whatever purpose and under any circumstances. China supports conducting comprehensive, objective and impartial investigations into any alleged use of chemical weapons within Syrian borders so as to come up with results that withstand the test of time, square with the facts and help bring the perpetrators to justice. Establishing a new chemical-weapon investigative mechanism is critical to getting to the bottom of the chemical-weapon incidents as well as warding off any future recurrences in Syria. All Council parties should work together to that end. China supports the efforts on the part of Russia to promote the establishment of a new investigative mechanism into the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We hope that the members of the Council will continue to engage in constructive consultations so as to achieve consensus at an early date. The chemical-weapon issue in Syria is closely related to a political settlement to the Syrian situation. Major achievements have been made at the Syrian National Dialogue Congress, held recently in Sochi, which played a positive role in advancing the Syrian political process, while lending impetus to relaunching the Geneva talks. It is China's hope that relevant parties will support the Security Council and the OPCW in continuing to act as the main channel for tackling the Syrian chemical-weapon issue, adopt a constructive attitude, seek proper solutions through consultation, maintain the unity of the Council and work with the United Nations and with the relevant parties in advancing the political process in Syria. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): As this is the first time that I take the floor under the Kuwaiti presidency of the Security Council, I would like to congratulate and honour Kuwait's assumption of the presidency by trying to offer my thanks in Arabic: (spoke in Arabic) Thank you, Mr. President. (spoke in English) I would also like to thank Ms. Nakamitsu for her comprehensive and clear briefing. I will address three issues today: first, reports of the renewed use of chemical weapons in Syria; secondly, the need for accountability; and, thirdly, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) report at hand (S/2018/84, annex). With respect to the renewed use of chemical weapons in the past weeks, the Kingdom of the Netherlands is shocked at the recent reports of chemical attacks in Syria, including this weekend and last night. We are outraged. In Douma, in eastern Ghouta, and last night in Saraqeb, in Idlib, innocent civilians, including children, have become victims once again of horrible chemical-weapon attacks. Such attacks deserve the strongest condemnation of the Security Council as violations of international law. Furthermore, recent OPCW laboratory tests show that samples of the chemical attack on Ghouta in August 2013 correspond to the chemical-weapons arsenal declared by the Syrian regime in 2014 and the Khan Shaykun attack in 2017. This confirms once again that the Al-Assad regime uses chemical weapons against its own population. We pay tribute to the work of the White Helmets, who have saved more a 100,000 civilians from the rubble of the Syrian war. The use of chemical weapons should never go unpunished. Impunity erodes the important prohibition against the use of chemical weapons. It is inconceivable that impunity now reigns, which brings me to my second point, namely, the need for accountability. As others have said, we had a well-functioning and professional mechanism to ensure accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM). The JIM repeatedly determined the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime and by Da'esh. It had a strong mandate to investigate and identify perpetrators independently from the politics of the Security Council. And it did so accordingly, but the renewal of its mandate fell victim to the repeated use of the veto. However, that does not mean that we now need to settle for less. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is prepared to work together on any proposal that strengthens accountability and the international rule of law. But let me emphasize that a weak accountability mechanism is not an option. For us, the fundamental characteristics of any accountability mechanism are the principles of impartiality, independence, comprehensiveness and effectiveness. S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 14/17 18-03099 In order to uphold those principles, a mechanism should at least meet the following requirements. First, it should operate independently from the Security Council, including when it comes to the attribution of guilt. It should be impartial. The separation of powers is necessary to prevent undue politicization. Secondly, the mechanism should be effective; it should independently decide how it will conduct its investigations, including when it comes to analysing facts and assessing the quality of evidence. Lastly, it should be comprehensive and investigate and identify perpetrators among all parties to the armed conflict — both State and non-State actors. The draft resolution that is currently being discussed has not yet met those important principles. That brings me to my third point, namely, the fifty-second OPCW report (S/2018/84, annex), which the High Representative presented very clearly in her briefing. The report points out that, unfortunately, too little progress has been made by the Syrian authorities in addressing the outstanding questions that the OPCW posed about the declaration of the Syrian authorities. It is essential that the Syrian authorities cooperate seriously with the OPCW. The Kingdom of the Netherlands supports the continuation of the work of OPCW Fact-finding Mission. We call on all States to ensure that the Fact-finding Mission can continue its work independently. In conclusion, we stand ready to adopt the draft press statement, as circulated before. We are convinced that the Security Council cannot allow the continued use of chemical weapons to go unpunished. Impunity is a curse; accountability is a must. The Council has to act. As long as the Council is blocked from achieving accountability by the use of the veto, we will also continue our efforts outside the Council. We therefore strongly support other accountability initiatives for Syria, such as the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for the Syrian Arab Republic and the Human Rights Council's Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. We also support the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, which was just highlighted by our French colleague. However, let me repeat what I have said in the Chamber before, the Council should refer the situation in Syria, especially the mass atrocities committed in the conflict, to the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We are very pleased to see you, Mr. President, assuming responsibility for the presidency. I wish to thank High Representative Izumi Nakamitsu for her briefing, which, as always, we found to be balanced, and therefore useful. We are in need of that kind of approach. Frankly speaking, we need that very desperately. During times such as this, when we seem to be so deeply divided, the role of United Nations officials like her becomes all the more critical. We thank her. We remain deeply concerned by the continued reports on the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We strongly condemn the use of chemical weapons by any actor, State and non-State alike, in Syria or anywhere else. As we have stated repeatedly, the use of chemical weapons is totally unjustifiable under any circumstances. It constitutes a threat to international peace and security and undermines the international non-proliferation architecture. We cannot agree more with what the Secretary-General stated in the concluding paragraph of his letter of 1 February: "The fact of these continuing allegations again highlights the shared obligation to identify and hold to account those responsible for the use of chemical weapons." That is why the unity of the Council is absolutely important. Without it, the Council's ability to respond to grave threats to international peace and security, such as the use of chemicals as weapons, will be seriously hampered. In that regard, what High Representative Nakamitsu said a while ago is most relevant: "unity, not impunity". Let me say that we regret that the Council was not able to renew the mandate of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. If we are not able to address this institutional gap by drawing lessons from last year and forge the necessary unity and compromise, we will be sending the wrong message and encouraging impunity. The fact that chemical-weapon attacks have continued as recently as yesterday worries us very much. That is why it is so critical that we seek an independent way of establishing accountability. We appreciate the initiative taken by the Russian Federation to propose a draft resolution on the establishment of a new mechanism, which has been the basis for discussion in recent days. This is a conversation that we welcome. As we continue to discuss this very important matter, our consultations should be constructive and forward-looking. Of course, 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 15/17 we are not naive; we have no illusions about how matters are becoming more and more complicated by the day. However, we still hope that the Council will restore its unity to reach common ground and create an independent, impartial and professional mechanism that will be able to identify those responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, based on robust evidence. We welcome that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has continued to assist the Syrian Government in destroying the remaining stationary above-ground facilities. As the High Representative stated, we hope the facilities will be totally eliminated in the coming month. We have just heard a very encouraging statement from the High Representative. We note that the OPCW has translated and finalized its analysis of the 19 documents submitted by the Syrian Government. While we look forward to the final report, we encourage continued cooperation and meaningful communication between the Syrian Government and the OPCW that leads to tangible results to address the outstanding issues. We also note that its Fact-finding Mission has continued its investigation related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We look forward to its reports. Let me conclude by again reiterating, at the risk of sounding naive, how the unity of the Council is vital to ensuring accountability and deterring and stopping the use of chemical weapons in Syria and elsewhere. We only hope that the challenge we face in this area is not a reflection of the growing lack of trust that characterizes international relations today, making joint action in most critical areas more complicated than it should be. The President (spoke in Arabic): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Kuwait. At the outset, I would like to thank the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, for the briefing she gave at the beginning of this meeting. We had hoped that the Security Council's unanimous adoption of resolution 2118 (2013), in September 2013 following the first incident involving the use of chemical weapons in Syria, would have resolved this matter, since the Council had demonstrated unity and determination in confronting that crime with a view to ensuring that it not be repeated and that its perpetrators be held accountable. Consequently, we regret the substantial regression in addressing the chemical-weapon issue in Syria, which is a result of the divisions among Council members after the Council was unable to extend the mandate of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism in Syria, which we feel carried out its tasks in a very professional, impartial and independent manner. We express our deep concern about the allegations of the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria, most recently during the attack in Douma, in eastern Ghouta, last week and during the attack that took place in Saraqeb, in Idlib, yesterday. This is the third such attack during the past few weeks, which means that the perpetrators of those crimes will go unpunished and that there is no guarantee that they, or anyone else, who commits such crimes in the future will be held accountable, after we lost the Joint Investigative Mechanism. The position of the State of Kuwait is a principled and steadfast one that strongly condemns any use of chemical weapons, wherever, whenever and by whomsoever, as this is considered a grave violation of international law. We reiterate the need to hold accountable those responsible for such use, be they individuals, entities, non-State groups or Governments. In that context, we condemn the use of heavy and destructive weapons as well as the targeting civilians and residential areas killing dozens of innocent victims. These weapons target health facilities and civilian locations in eastern Ghouta, Idlib and other areas. We therefore support the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria in its quest to gather evidence and investigate the crimes committed against civilians in order to hold the perpetrators accountable. The State of Kuwait will support any alternative or mechanism that enjoys the consensus of all members of the Security Council and ensures the independence, neutrality and professionalism of any new future mechanism. In that regard, we reaffirm that the primary responsibility of any mechanism must be to determine the identity of those using chemical weapons in Syria, provided that the Security Council would then play its role and hold the perpetrators accountable, in implementation of the principle of ending impunity and of resolution 2118 (2013), which undoubtedly stipulates the imperative need for, and importance of, holding accountable those responsible for the use of chemical S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018 16/17 18-03099 weapons in Syria. We also look forward to receiving the report that will soon be submitted by the Fact-finding Mission, as mentioned by Ms. Nakamitsu in her earlier briefing on the most recent incidents, as well as her reports on the use of chlorine gas in Saraqib. In conclusion, we reiterate our full readiness to take part in any efforts that are aimed at reaching consensus among Security Council members and at holding accountable the perpetrators of such internationally prohibited crimes. We assert that a political solution in Syria is the only way to arrive at a comprehensive settlement of the crisis, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, especially resolution 2254 (2015) and the 2012 Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). I now resume my functions as President of the Council. The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor to make a further statement. Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): I disagree with a lot of what my Russian colleague said, but I will not stretch my colleagues' patience. But I do feel compelled briefly to respond to several of the points that he made. The first point is to say that this is not political for us. Preventing the use of these abhorrent weapons should transcend political disagreements. We do not oppose Russia's important role in Syria at all. We noted the outcomes of Sochi, and we look forward to the proposal for a constitutional committee returning to the next round of Geneva talks, with the full participation of Russia and the Syrian authorities, as was laid out in resolution 2254 (2015). The second point I would simply make is that the notion that it was anyone other than Russia that ended the Joint Investigative Mechanism is absurd. The voting records of the Council are clear and are available to all. Russia vetoed three different proposals for the extension of the Mechanism, the last of which simply extended it for a short period and requested the Secretary-General to make recommendations, but even that was unacceptable. Finally, on a note of agreement, I just want, like my Dutch colleague, to praise the incredible work of the White Helmets, who risk their own lives on a daily basis to save thousands of Syrians civilians. The President (spoke in Arabic): I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Mounzer (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): My country condemns and rejects in the strongest possible terms any use of chemical weapons or of any other weapon of mass destruction, as this constitutes a crime against humanity and an unethical and unjustifiable act, under any circumstances. The real target of such weapons is the Syrian people, who remain the primary victims of the crimes committed by armed terrorist groups, which have not hesitated to use chemical weapons against them. I reaffirm before the Security Council that my country has sought, and continues to seek, to identify the real perpetrators responsible for the use of chemical weapons in my country, Syria. Based on those steadfast principles, my Government joined the Chemical Weapons Convention and has honoured all of its commitments thereunder. My country achieved an unprecedented and definitive feat in the history of the Organization by ending the Syrian chemical-weapons programme in record time. That was corroborated in the report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism to the Council in June 2014. My country is the party most desirous of uncovering the truth. We have always supported, and will continue to support, in principle any initiative by the Council whose aim is to establish the truth, identify those who are really trading in the blood of the Syrian people and using toxic chemical substances against Syrian civilians, including armed terrorist groups, as well as levelling false accusations against the Syrian Government. In that regard, on behalf of the Government of my country, I once again reiterate our condemnation of all American and Western allegations accusing us of committing chemical-weapon attacks in our country. I reaffirm that those accusations are groundless and cheap lies. International public opinion and the majority of United Nations Members now know that this is but standard procedure for the United States and its allies in the Council each and every time they learn that the armed terrorist groups that they finance, arm and support on the ground in Syria are at an impasse and losing ground to the advancing Syrian army and its allies. The latter are today waging a war, on behalf of the entire world, against terrorism, which, unfortunately, is being supported by certain Governments that have no interest 05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174 18-03099 17/17 in ensuring international peace and security and are solely seeking to advance their own political agendas. My Government reaffirms once again that the United States, the United Kingdom and France are fully responsible for the paralysis of international investigative mechanisms concerning the use of toxic chemical substances, as the Governments of those States are seeking to shield the armed terrorist groups that they support. We recall before all present here that it is Syria that originally called for an investigation into instances of the use of toxic gas by armed terrorist groups. False accusations against my Government of using toxic chemical substances are attempts to cover up its efforts to reveal to the world that certain armed terrorist groups and their sponsors have continued to perpetrate crimes against innocent civilians through the use, more than once, of toxic substances. The Syrian Government has provided the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) with evidence that proves that such groups possess banned toxic substances. We have repeatedly called for the carrying out of investigations to corroborate such evidence. However, our calls have been ignored. All of my colleagues here recall that the United States and its allies destroyed the JIM. Through their practices here in the Council, they put an end to the Mechanism. They brought pressure to bear on its Chair and its members by pressuring them to refuse to visit Khan Shaykhun. Rather than conduct a field visit to collect real evidence, they merely sought to level accusations and offered up evidence trumped up by Western countries to undermine Syria, to support terrorist groups and to cover up their responsibility for this incident. That occurred after the United States and its partners rejected the call by the Russian Federation to stop the politicization of the work of the JIM and to rectify its methodology by refraining from using false evidence and, instead, limiting itself to scientific and legally sound and reasonable proof. My country continues to honour all of its commitments — the ones we assumed when we joined the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. We shall persevere in our fight against terrorism — a war that we will wage despite any political or media blackmail or any exploitation of the blood of innocent civilians in Syria. The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic will today circulate a letter of the National Committee for the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, in response to the United States allegations vis-à-vis the work of the JIM and the Fact-finding Mission of the OPCW. The letter proves with scientific and legal evidence that the accusations against my country are false and that Syria has never used such chemicals, and will we ever use them, because we do not possess them. Let us recall that those who level such false accusations against Syria are the Governments of the same States with a dark history of using such internationally prohibited weapons against millions of innocent people — in Viet Nam, Cambodia, Algeria and the list goes on. Finally, on behalf of my Government, I would like to extend our gratitude to the Russian Federation and to friendly countries in the Council, countries that seek to establish truth based on their awareness about the pernicious aims behind the false accusations. They have demonstrated their commitment to the supremacy of the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, as well as their conviction that such abnormal practices undermine the credibility of international actions and institutions and jeopardize international peace and security. The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.
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President Biden has used the immigration authority known as "parole" to permit many immigrants to enter the country or remain in the country legally. But his actions have deep historical precedent. Under section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)), the Attorney General and later the Secretary of Homeland Security has had the authority to waive the normal restrictions on entry and allow certain noncitizens to enter the United States since 1952. Table 1 provides a list of 126 programmatic or categorical parole orders, meaning orders that were nationalized policies intended to permit the entry of certain defined types of noncitizens. This list is certainly not exhaustive. Until recently, programmatic or categorical uses of parole were often not publicized in any formal, consistent, or even public way. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) would simply create internal guidance that would only become public if stakeholders or the media publicized it.
For example, one instance in Table 1 is an INS official in 1990 listing six separate categories for parole in operation at the time that no other document refers to before or since. That is an exceptional case. In many cases, however, Congress acknowledged these uses of parole through subsequent or previous congressional actions, allowing for parolees to adjust to legal permanent residence or receive refugee benefits. In some cases, it just acknowledged that these procedures were in effect or expressed support for them. This list helps dispel some myths. Since the creation of the parole power in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952—which codified executive powers already in use—Congress has substantively amended the parole authority twice: in the Refugee Act of 1980 (P.L. 96–212, March 17, 1980), barring refugees from being paroled into the United States, and in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–208), which made two statutory changes. First, the standard for paroling someone changed from "emergent" or "public interest" reasons to "urgent humanitarian" or "significant public benefit" reasons. Second, each determination had to be made on a case‐by‐case basis. Few at the time thought these changes were substantive, and the categorical parole regulations then in effect were reenacted verbatim. Moreover, the case‐by‐case basis requirement was in effect for decades, including for large‐scale programmatic uses of parole, such as for Cubans and Vietnamese. Case‐by‐case determinations always meant an individual determination, even if someone's categorization created a presumption that they met the "emergent/humanitarian" or "public interest/significant public benefit" requirement. In many cases, these parole programs have received almost no attention in many years but contain precedents that the current administration should consider reimplementing. For example, parole used to be available in 1990 for children aging out of eligibility for green cards. In the 1950s, it was used for the employment‐based first preference category (skilled immigrants) when immigrant visas were unavailable under the cap. These two issues are particularly relevant now, with the employment‐based cap being exhausted even for Nobel laureates and their children. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive set of statistics for the number of people paroled since 1952. Figure 1 shows the data that the INS published from 1982 to 2003. Table 2 shows the programmatic grants under various programs from the 1950s through the year 2000.
Humanitarian and public interest parole categories (1952—present): This type of parole has evolved over time in the types of categories that fall under it. In 1964, the INS associate commissioner listed several categories of immigrants who would be granted parole: to "either attend to sickness or burial or some close family affair," "accompany servicemen, members of the Armed Forces where the wife or some child would have been technically inadmissible," reunite a mentally handicapped child who would otherwise be excludable with their family, or deal with medical emergencies. Since 1982, at least some of these reasons have been included in regulations. In 1980, the INS provided examples of parole, including children coming for medical treatment, people coming to donate a kidney, and a Chinese woman who was allowed to visit her 81‐year‐old adoptive mother, who had been expelled by the communists from China. In 1990, the INS described a "small sampling" of the kinds of humanitarian and public interest categories of parole available at the time: 1) Someone's immediate family member just died or is dying, and consular officers lack time to process a visa or deny the visa; 2) People coming for organ, blood, or tissue donation; 3) Extradited criminals, informants, witnesses; and 4) National security assets (e.g., Soviet dissidents and foreign U.S. spies). In September 2008, ICE, USCIS, and CBP signed a memorandum of agreement on the use of parole by the agencies. This document listed, among other programs described below, parole categories for 1) registered sources of the U.S. intelligence community, 2) transiters through the United States to legal proceedings in a third country, 3) trainees, 4) individuals necessary for prosecutions or investigations, 5) confidential informants, 6) extraditions, 7) civil court participants, and 8) international organization event participants. Parole from detention (1954—1980): On November 12, 1954, Ellis Island and several other INS detention centers were closed, and detainees were paroled into the United States. The number of detained immigrants fell from a monthly average of 225 to less than 40. Paroles were carried out under section 212(d)(5) of the INA. The INS promulgated a regulation on January 8, 1958, authorizing this practice of parole from ports of entry rather than detention. From 1954 until 1981, "most undocumented aliens detained at the border were paroled into the United States." Even after 1982, when the use of parole was narrowed, its use continued "when detention is impossible or impractical." The INS associate commissioner testified in 1964 that the closing of the detention facilities met the requirement of the parole statute because "it created a better image of the American Government and American public." Orphan parole (1956): The Refugee Relief Act of 1953 created 4,000 slots for orphans adopted by U.S. citizens, but when the slots were filled, the attorney general authorized the entry of additional orphans under his parole authority on October 30, 1956. A total of 925 orphans were paroled. Adjustment of status: On September 11, 1957, Congress enacted Public Law 85–316, which authorized the adjustment of status to legal permanent residence of any eligible orphaned paroled into the United States. Hungarian parole (1956): On November 13, 1956, President Eisenhower ordered that 5,000 Hungarians be paroled into the United States. On December 1, 1956, he revised the limit to 15,000 Hungarians before eliminating the limit on January 2, 1957. By June 30, 1957, 27,435 parolees had entered, and the total reached 31,915 by 1958. For context, only 109 immigrants were admitted from Hungary in 1956, and only 321,625 immigrants were admitted worldwide. The Justice Department said in 1957 that this was "the first time that the parole provision has been applied to relatively large numbers of people." Several U.S. charitable organizations helped prepare their parole applications and to find housing and jobs for them. Adjustment of status: On July 25, 1958, Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 85–559) that allowed Hungarians to adjust their status to legal permanent residence if they were "paroled into the United States" at any point after October 23, 1956 (including after the enactment of the act) if they had been in the United States for at least two years. Ultimately, 30,491 received legal permanent residence in this way. This set a precedent for handling adjustments of later parolees. Pre‐Examination Parole (1957—1959): Regulations of December 6, 1957 provided that someone who was subjected to pre‐examination in the United States prior to requesting an immigrant visa in Canada who was found inadmissible in Canada "shall be paroled" into the United States. This regulation was revoked in 1959. Crew Members Parole (1957—present): Regulations of December 6, 1957 provided for the parole of noncitizen crewmembers under certain circumstances and stated that shipwrecked or castaway crew members "shall be paroled." On December 8, 1961 and March 22, 1967, expanded the grounds for parole to asylum seekers from communist countries. On July 27, 1990, this parole was expanded to crewmen facing persecution in any country. On March 6, 1997, this provision was updated and reenacted, and it was revised and reenacted again on February 19, 1999. On April 4, 2004, the parole of lightering crews that were not eligible for D‑1 visas for technical reasons was authorized. The parole of crew members was recognized in Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–208, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(A)). Cuban parole (1959—1965): Starting about January 1, 1959, following the communist revolution, the Eisenhower administration used parole to allow a "small percentage" of Cubans who had left the island and entered illegally into the United States (INS 1960). By June 1961, there were 4,000 paroled Cubans in the United States (INS 1961). By December 31, 1961, there were 12,200 in parole status. In 1962, Cuban illegal entrants ceased to be referred for deportation hearings and were instead paroled into the United States (INS 1962). By June 1962, the number of Cubans on parole rose to 62,500 (INS 1962). Commercial travel between the U.S. and Cuba was suspended in 1962, and only a few thousand more Cubans made it off the island through the Red Cross (INS 1963). Altogether, about 107,116 Cubans were paroled into the United States from 1959 to 1965. Adjustment of status: The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (P.L. 89–732, November 2, 1966) made it possible for Cuban parolees, including future parolees, to adjust their status to legal permanent residence after two years in the United States if they entered after 1959. Guam parole (1959—1974): Starting in April 1959, the INS began to parole into the United States some Filipinos to work with the Defense Department and the Government of Guam on the island under the Parolee Defense program. At least 16 orders establishing and renewing Guam parole programs went out between 1960 and 1969, and an INS internal memo of January 27, 1960 established the initial rules for the program. Workers received INS Form I‑94 stamped, "Paroled into Guam under section 212(d)(5) I&N Act until the purpose of parole has been served not exceeding—–." Parolees could enter for up to a year and could be extended at least twice. On November 15, 1962, the INS created the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Parole Program to parole workers from the Philippines and the Trust Islands into Guam to help with emergency repairs to homes and defense installations following a storm (INS 1963). From FY 1963 to FY 1974, 26,501 workers received parole to enter Guam temporarily. The Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Parole Program ended in 1970, and the Parolee Defense program was eliminated in 1975 in favor of admitting workers under the H‑2 nonimmigrant work visa program. Refugee‐escapee parole (1960—1965): On July 14, 1960, Congress passed the Fair Share Law (Public Law 86–648), a joint resolution to "enable the United States to participate in the resettlement of certain refugees." The law directed the INS to parole into the United States any refugee who fled from a communist or Middle Eastern country in an amount not to exceed 25 percent of the total number of such refugees accepted by other countries in the world, and it allowed any of those paroled to receive legal permanent residence after two years. During fiscal year 1961, 2,942 refugees entered as parolees (INS 1961), the largest portion of which were from Yugoslavia. In 1962, the total reached 8,260 (INS 1962). By 1966, the total had reached 19,705 (INS 1966). Public Law 86–648 included a sunset date for this use of parole of July 1, 1962, but authorization to continue to parole was extended indefinitely by section 6 of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act Public Law 87–510 (July 1, 1962). Section 16 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 ended this parole program, and the law introduced a new capped category of immigrant visas for refugees. Adjustment of status: Public Law 86–648 of 1960 (the original statute establishing the refugee‐escapee parolees) allowed parolees to adjust their status to legal permanent residence after two years in the United States. Section 16 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 terminated this provision. First Preference parole (1961): In January 1962, the INS reported that "recent changes in regulations" allowed for the parole of two groups of first preference skilled workers who could not receive green cards or immigrant visas as a result of the annual caps: 1) those who were abroad if they will be coming to work in defense industries; and 2) anyone in the United States. It's not clear exactly what change in regulation made this possible, but in 1964, the INS associate commissioner testified that this was the policy for "many years." He testified, "The basis for this policy was this incompatible situation that seemed to exist in that, with one hand, the Service was in effect making a finding that the alien's services were urgently needed and, at the same time, in contradiction, we were seeking to expel him." Congress revised the caps in 1965, which may have ended this practice. Hong Kong Chinese parole (1962—1965): On May 23, 1962, Attorney General Robert Kennedy ordered the INS to parole into the United States Chinese who had fled to Hong Kong so long as they were "relatives of United States citizens and resident aliens" or "Chinese persons possessing special skills needed in the United States" (INS 1962). By the end of FY 1963, the total number reached 7,047 (INS 1963). Processing continued into 1964, during which the total reached 10,617 (INS 1964). The number reached 13,619 in 1965 (INS 1965). By 1966, the total reached 14,757 (INS 1965, Table 14B). A few stragglers were approved in 1966 but did not arrive until later, bringing the total to 15,111 (INS 1966). The program ended in June 1965. Adjustment of status: The INA was amended in 1960 to allow parolees to adjust their status to legal permanent residence for the first time—which many were eligible to do since parolees generally had to meet the standards for an immigrant visa except for a cap spot being available—but no law provided any special category for Hong Kong parolees. Nonetheless, when Congress created a new general refugee category in December 1965, the administration used it to enable most other Hong Kong Chinese refugees to adjust their status. On October 5, 1978, P.L. 95–412 authorized adjustment of status for "any refugee, not otherwise eligible for retroactive adjustment of status, who was or is paroled into the United States by the Attorney General pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act before September 30, 1980."
Russian Orthodox Old Believer parole (1963): The Russian Orthodox Old Believer church was being forced out of Turkey to the Soviet Union, where they would be persecuted. In response, the INS authorized the parole of 210 church members on May 10, 1963. Adjustment of Status: On October 5, 1978, P.L. 95–412 authorized adjustment of status for "any refugee, not otherwise eligible for retroactive adjustment of status, who was or is paroled into the United States by the Attorney General pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act before September 30, 1980."
Cuban airlift parole (1965—1973): Starting on December 1, 1965, based on a November 6, 1965 memorandum of understanding with the Cuban government, the Johnson administration operated daily "Freedom Flights" from Cuba to Miami. During its operation, 281,317 Cubans were paroled into the United States. At its peak year, 46,670 Cubans arrived via parole in 1971. This compares to 361,972 total immigrants that year. The airlifts were funded by congressional appropriations. In May 1972, the flights were suspended by the Cuban government before being terminated permanently on April 6, 1973. Adjustment of status: The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 made it possible for Cuban parolees entering after 1959, including future parolees, to adjust their status to legal permanent residence after two years in the United States. Czechoslovak parole (1970): Following the failed uprising against the Soviets in Czechoslovakia on September 4, 1968, Secretary of State David Rusk asked the president to authorize the attorney general to parole for Czechoslovaks fleeing the fallout of the failed anti‐communist uprising. When the refugee numbers permitted under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 ran out, every member of the House Judiciary Committee wrote in November 1969 to the administration to request that it parole Czechoslovakian refugees. On January 2, 1970, the attorney general authorized the use of parole. Nearly 5,000 were processed from February to November 1970, with 6,500 total. These parolees were given I‑94 documents that stated that the period of admission was "indefinite" and the purpose of the parole was "refugee." This type of indefinite parole document was still available throughout the 1980s for other parole types. Adjustment of Status: On October 5, 1978, Public Law 95–412 authorized adjustment of status for "any refugee, not otherwise eligible for retroactive adjustment of status, who was or is paroled into the United States by the Attorney General pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act before September 30, 1980."
Soviet Union minority religious groups (1971): Following a letter from Rep. Peter Rodino of the House Judiciary Committee, on October 1, 1971, Attorney General John Mitchell announced that the United States would parole Soviet religious minorities who secured exit permits from the Soviet Union. The first four arrived on January 7, 1972, and in FY 1973, 200 were processed this way (INS 1973). Adjustment of Status: On October 5, 1978, Public Law 95–412 authorized adjustment of status for "any refugee, not otherwise eligible for retroactive adjustment of status, who was or is paroled into the United States by the Attorney General pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act before September 30, 1980."
Advance Parole (1971): Advance parole appears to date to 1971 when the INS implemented a regulation in 1971 deeming an adjustment of status application abandoned if a person left the country while it was still pending unless "he had previously been granted permission by the Service for such absence." If someone had entered with a nonimmigrant visa and tried to adjust status, they would have had to prove "nonimmigrant intent" (i.e., intention to leave) upon reentry, which would be impossible with a pending adjustment of status application, and the only alternative to a visa is parole. Advance parole would not have helped prior to the effective date of the 1960 act, which authorized parolees to adjust their status (under a normal immigrant visa category) for the first time. The first advance parole regulation from 1982 stated that "parole [may be] authorized for an alien who will travel to the United States without a visa." Since then, advance parole has often been the top reason for granting parole. In several acts since then (1986, 1990, and 1996), Congress specifically mentioned how "advance parole" can be granted to people already paroled into the United States (8 U.S.C. 1151(c)(4)(A)). Ugandan Asian parole (1972): The Ugandan government ordered Ugandan Asians to leave the country in 1972, and Attorney General Mitchell responded by initially ordering the INS to parole 1,000 Ugandan Asians. It ended up paroling almost 1,200 into the United States in FY 1973 (INS 1973). Another roughly 1,300 came thereafter. Adjustment of Status: On October 5, 1978, P.L. 95–412 authorized adjustment of status for "any refugee, not otherwise eligible for retroactive adjustment of status, who was or is paroled into the United States by the Attorney General pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act before September 30, 1980."
Asylum parole (1972—1980): Following the United States acceding to the Protocol to the U.N. Convention on the Status of Refugees in 1968, the INS had no uniform process or status providing to asylum recipients because Congress had not created a specific status for them, but some were granted "individual parole." The April 10, 1979 regulations specifically provided for immigration judges to "grant asylum by parole under section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act." Adjustment of Status: The Refugee Act of 1980 (P.L. 96–212, March 17, 1980) provided the opportunity for those granted asylum to adjust their status to receive legal permanent residence.
Cuban third country parole (1973—1978): On October 26, 1973, the INS created a parole program for Cubans outside of Cuba who had family in the United States (INS 1975). A total of 11,577 were paroled in FY 1974, 6,940 in FY 1975, 2,341 in FY 1976, 413 in FY 1977, and 580 in FY 1978. Adjustment of status: The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 made it possible for Cuban parolees entering after 1959, including future parolees, to adjust their status to legal permanent residence after two years in the United States.
South American/Chilean parole (1975—1979): On June 12, 1975, the INS permitted 400 detained Chilean dissidents (and their families) to be paroled into the United States. A total of 1,600 people were ultimately paroled from 1975 to 1977. On October 27, 1976, the INS again authorized parole of 200 households, representing 800 people in FY 1977, and included some Uruguayans and Bolivians. On June 14, 1978, the parole of 500 households was authorized, and 2,000 people were admitted, including some Brazilians and Argentinians. More would have come if the government of Argentina had allowed more of them to leave. Adjustment of Status: On October 5, 1978, Public Law 95–412 authorized adjustment of status for "any refugee, not otherwise eligible for retroactive adjustment of status, who was or is paroled into the United States by the Attorney General pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act before September 30, 1980."
Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian parole (1975—1980): In late March 1975, a parole program was authorized for Vietnamese orphans, and the first 2,279 Vietnamese orphans were flown out on April 2, 1975 (INS 1975), and on April 18, 1975, the president authorized a large‐scale evacuation to Guam using parole. In FY 1975 alone, about 135,000 received parole. Congress funded (partially retroactively) the processing under the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act (Public Law 94–23, May 23, 1975). In August 1975, the program was expanded to Cambodians and Vietnamese with special connections to the United States, and on May 6, 1977, 11,000 more were authorized from Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos. The three countries were grouped together in expansive programs starting August 11, 1977, January 25, 1978, June 14, 1978, December 5, 1978, April 13, 1979, October 16, 1979, and December 15, 1979. From 1975 to the middle of 1980—when the Refugee Act was enacted and replaced the parole programs—more than 330,000 Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians were paroled into the United States. These refugees were all assessed on a case‐by‐case basis. Adjustment of status: In 1977, Congress passed Public Law 95–145 (October 1977) that authorized adjustment of status to anyone from Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia who was paroled as a refugee before March 31, 1979—that is, about two years in the future. On October 5, 1978, Public Law 95–412 extended the date to September 30, 1980 and allowed any refugee to adjust from any country. Soviet and Eastern European parole (1977—1980): On January 13, 1977, the attorney general created a Special Parole Program for 4,000 Soviet Jewish refugees (INS 1977). In December 1978, another program was initiated for 5,000 Soviet Jews and Romanians (INS 1978). On June 14, 1978, the INS launched another parole program for Eastern European refugees, with 3,260 processed in FY 1978 and 8,740 processed in FY 1979 (INS 1978). On April 12, 1979, 25,000 additional entries were authorized and occurred under parole in 1979. On October 16 and December 15, 1979, 3,000 additional entries were authorized per month until the enactment of the Refugee Act in March 1980. Adjustment of Status: On October 5, 1978, Public Law 95–412 authorized adjustment of status for "any refugee, not otherwise eligible for retroactive adjustment of status, who was or is paroled into the United States by the Attorney General pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act before September 30, 1980."
Lebanese parole (1978): On December 6, 1978, the attorney general announced the creation of a new parole program for 1,000 victims of civil strife in Lebanon, and by 1980, 349 had been used, and 107 were pending. Adjustment of Status: On October 5, 1978, Public Law 95–412 authorized adjustment of status for "any refugee, not otherwise eligible for retroactive adjustment of status, who was or is paroled into the United States by the Attorney General pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act before September 30, 1980."
Cuban prisoner parole (1978, 1985): On December 6, 1978, following an invitation by the Castro regime to take them, the attorney general announced the creation of a new parole program for 3,500 political prisoners who were then imprisoned or released since August 1978 plus their family. Ultimately, 12,000 Cubans were paroled in FY 1979. On December 14, 1984, Cuba and the United States signed an agreement under which the United States would take 3,000 Cuban political prisoners through parole and the refugee program. In fiscal year 1988, the State Department and INS approved 2,040 prisoners for entry to the United States, and 928 entered the United States. Adjustment of status: The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 made it possible for Cuban parolees entering after 1959, including future parolees, to adjust their status to legal permanent residence after two years in the United States.
Iranian parole (1979—1982): On April 16, 1979, following the Islamic revolution in Iran, the INS granted "extended voluntary departure" to Iranians in the United States and began paroling others into the country. Precise parole figures were not kept, but "a large number" ("thousands") were paroled. Part of this parole effort was a program under which—as the State Department put it—"not too many questions were asked" about B‑2 visa applicants from Iran, and those clearly not qualified were often paroled anyway. In 1983, Iranians were included under the Refugee Act cap for the first time, which—the administration said—replaced "the practice of the past several years of admitting them through the Attorney General's parole authority." Adjustment of Status: On October 5, 1978, authorized adjustment of status for "any refugee, not otherwise eligible for retroactive adjustment of status, who was or is paroled into the United States by the Attorney General pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act before September 30, 1980."
Cuban/Haitian entrant parole (1980): In April 1980, thousands of Cubans began arriving in Florida from Mariel, Cuba, by boat. Initially, these Cubans were granted parole for 60 days and allowed to seek asylum under the procedures of the newly‐passed Refugee Act of 1980 (P.L. 96–212, March 1980). As the crisis escalated, INS declared on June 20, 1980 that it would extend 6‑month parole documents to Cubans and Haitians who had already arrived. On October 21, 1980, these 6‑month paroles were then authorized to be extended again to those who arrived before October 10, 1980. More than 125,000 Cubans and 25,000 Haitians were paroled. Congress passed a statute that recognized the existence of the Cuban and Haitian "entrant status" parole in 1981. Congress specifically authorized benefits for both past and future Cuban and Haitian parolees in The Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980 (P.L. 96–422, October 10, 1980). On December 28, 1987, INS finalized a special regulation on the parole of Mariel boatlift Cubans detained since the boatlift ended, which resulted in about 7,000 additional paroles (or re‐paroles). Adjustment of Status: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1980 (P.L. 99–603, November 6, 1986) allowed any Cuban or Haitian who entered before 1982 and either received Cuban/Haitian entrant status or had a "record created" with the INS.
Parole from detention (1982—present): In 1981, the INS reversed its prior practice of not detaining people unless they were deemed a flight risk or a danger to the community. A court enjoined the policy, and the INS issued an interim regulation on July 9, 1982 that detailed the grounds under which it would issue parole from detention. On October 19, 1982, it finalized the regulation. This included the following categories of people eligible for parole from detention: people needing medical care, pregnant women, young children and teenagers whose processing will take longer than 30 days and who cannot be held with an accompanying adult; people with U.S. family eligible to petition for an immigrant visa for them; witnesses going to testify; people subject to prosecution; any other person whose "continued detention is not in the public interest." On March 6, 1997, INS reiterated its categories for those eligible for parole under the language of the new parole statute. On December 21, 2000, the INS revised its procedures for the parole of people ordered removed who could not be removed. Khmer border parole (1986): In May 1986, the attorney general created a parole program for Cambodians who fled the Khmer government to Thailand, had approved immigrant petitions filed by U.S. citizen family in the United States, and had no visa available to them because of the caps. A total of 53 approvals were made in 1986, and only 418 were made as of March 1988. In 1991, 1,123 received parole. This program ended in FY 1992. About 3,500 total paroles were issued. Adjustment of Status: The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1989 (P.L. 101–167, November 21, 1989) allowed any Cambodian paroled into the United States between 1988 and September 30, 1990 (about ten months in the future) to adjust to legal permanent residence after one year if they had been denied refugee status.
Parole for U.S. expats (1987): On December 12, 1987, the United States announced that it would parole former‑U.S. citizens who renounced their U.S. citizenship and then were ordered deported by their new state of nationality. Soviet/Moscow Refugee Parole (1988—present): In August 1988, the attorney general overturned the presumption that Soviet Jews qualified as refugees. On December 8, 1988, he created a "public interest" parole program for 2,000 Soviets per month who were denied refugee status. Parolees needed to have sponsors in the United States and were not eligible for refugee benefits. A total of 7,652 were paroled in FY 1989. Congress reinstated the presumption of refugee status for Jews and Evangelical Christians from the Soviet Union in 1989 (P.L. 101–167, November 21, 1989). Parole continued after this change in part because Jews had a plausible offer of alternative resettlement in Israel and continued after the Soviet Union dissolved under the label of the Moscow Refugee Parole Program. About 17,000 Soviets were paroled from 1992 to 1998 (INS 1996, 1998). On August 6, 2007, responsibility for the Moscow Refugee Parole Program was transferred to USCIS. In July 2011, it was canceled. Adjustment of Status: The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act of 1989 (P.L. 101–167, November 21, 1989) allowed any Soviet paroled into the United States between 1988 and September 30, 1990 (about ten months in the future) to adjust to legal permanent residence after one year if they had been denied refugee status. In 1992, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were added explicitly. This provision was then repeatedly reauthorized.
Orderly Departure Vietnam parole (1989—1999): In February 1989, the attorney general created a parole program to supplement the Orderly Departure refugee program from Vietnam, which was offered only to those denied refugee status. About 770 entered in 1989. Parole was also used for Vietnamese with immigrant visa petitions approved but who could not immigrate due to the caps. Some Laotians and Cambodians also were paroled. This program was created after the attorney general overturned the presumption that Vietnamese (and others) in refugee camps qualified as refugees under the Refugee Act of 1980. Parolees had to prepay their travel expenses. The program was closed at the end of fiscal year 1999 after about 32,000 paroles. Adjustment of Status: The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1990 (P.L. 101–167, November 21, 1989) allowed any Vietnamese paroled into the United States between 1988 and September 30, 1990 (about ten months in the future) to adjust to legal permanent residence after one year if they had been denied refugee status. On November 6, 2000, Congress enacted the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act of 2001 (Public Law 106–429), which authorized adjustment of status for citizens or natives of Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos paroled before October 1, 1997, even if they had not been denied refugee status.
Hungarian and Polish parole (1989): In the middle of 1989, Hungary and Poland's communist governments fell, meaning that refugees from those countries no longer feared persecution on political grounds. On November 21, 1989, the INS began denying them refugee status and paroled some 832 people who were already in the process, had been interviewed, and had family in the United States. Adjustment of Status: Section 646 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–208, September 30, 1996) granted legal permanent residence to these parolees.
Undated 1990s parole categories: In 1990, the INS described the following grounds for parole at the time without giving a date for when they started being used: Spouses of U.S. military members who cannot qualify for visas because of the caps; Aged‐out children of immigrant visa applicants who had waited for years for a visa; Children of immigrant visa recipients who failed to immigrate soon after visa receipt and for whom a visa number is not immediately available; Someone who was trying to legalize their status by getting an immigrant visa, but the State Department erred in scheduling an appointment because there were no visa numbers available for them and is attempting to return to their U.S. residence. Adopted children of U.S. citizens who do not qualify as orphans; and Unaccompanied children in refugee camps with family in the United States.
Chinese parole (1990): On April 11, 1990, the president ordered the attorney general to defer the removal of unauthorized Chinese until January 1, 1994. The INS determined that parole for detained Chinese should be considered in the public interest. Adjustment of Status: Congress enacted the Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992 (Public Law 102–404, October 9, 1992) that provided permanent residence to Chinese who were covered by the president's order and in the United States on April 11, 1990, if they were inspected and admitted or paroled.
Parole of asylum seekers (1990—present): Paroling asylum seekers is a subset of parole under the 1982 regulations, the final category of which (public interest) was amenable to several interpretations. On May 1, 1990, INS launched a "pilot parole program" for detained asylum seekers with a limit of 200. The pilot was expanded and made permanent everywhere on April 20, 1992. From 1993 to 1996, there were about 3,800 to 4,500 asylum paroles. On October 7, 1998, the INS made having established a "credible fear" of persecution a presumptive category of eligibility for parole. On November 6, 2007, DHS eliminated this presumption. On December 8, 2009, DHS reinstated the presumption to parole those establishing a credible fear of persecution. Despite a memorandum from the DHS secretary in 2017 that stated parole should be used "sparingly," the 2009 directive remained in force, though widely flouted during the Trump administration years. On March 29, 2022, DHS lowered the standard to parole someone who had not yet established credible fear. Haitian Guantanamo parole (1991): A 1991 coup led to refugee flows by sea from Haiti to the United States. The U.S. government intercepted the boats and relocated Haitians to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for processing. In September 1991, the INS announced a new parole program for Haitians at Guantanamo Bay who demonstrated a "credible fear" of persecution. The program continued until May 1992 when it was suspended. A small number of Haitians continued to be paroled thereafter, but they faced a strong presumption that they should be returned to Haiti. They received one‐year parole authorizations. About 13,000 Haitians received parole from 1992 to 1996 (INS 1996, 1998; INS Parole Report 1999). Adjustment of Status: The Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (P.L. 105–277, October 21, 1998) provided for the adjustment of status to legal permanent residence for any Haitian in the United States as of December 31, 1995 who applied for asylum or was paroled into the United States after a finding of credible fear.
ABC Settlement Parole (1991): On January 31, 1991, the INS settled a lawsuit that challenged its asylum adjudication policies for certain Salvadorans and Guatemalans. As part of the agreement, certain Salvadorans and Guatemalans were permitted to reapply for asylum. Among these were 20,000 who were paroled into the United States to reapply in fiscal years 1993 and 1994. Adjustment of Status: Section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (P.L. 105–100, November 2019) permitted these Guatemalans and Hondurans subject to the settlement agreement to apply for suspension of deportation (which provides legal permanent residence) under the lower pre‐1996 standards.
Adoptee parole (1994): On November 25, 1994, the INS created a new parole program for children adopted by U.S. citizens who did not fall into the "orphan" category required to receive an immigrant visa. Adjustment of Status: Congress passed Public Law 104–51 (November 15, 1995) to amend the definition of "child" to create green card eligibility for these children and other adoptees moving forward.
Cuban Migration Accord paroles (1994—present): On September 9, 1994, the United States and Cuba signed an agreement to pursue policies designed to reduce illegal immigration, including the United States maintaining a minimum level of 20,000 legal admissions of Cubans per year. The U.S. Coast Guard interdicted Cubans and moved them to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. On October 14, 1994, the White House announced that the INS would parole unaccompanied children, people over age 70, and chronically ill people at Guantanamo Bay. On December 2, 1994, it announced it would consider paroling family units if children would be adversely affected by staying in Guantanamo Bay on a case‐by‐case basis. On May 2, 1995, the United States agreed to accept all 18,500 Cubans currently detained at Guantanamo Bay detention facility through parole, but end the practice of taking Cubans there and simply return them to Cuba. In order to meet the 20,000 immigration quota, the United States created the Special Cuban Migration Program to grant parole to about 5,000 Cubans per year through a lottery (which was restricted to those who met at least two of the following criteria: 1) having any relatives living in the United States, 2) 3 years of work experience, and 3) a high school or college degree). In 1995, 1,898 were granted parole through the lottery out of 189,000 applicants. On March 15, 1996, the second parole lottery registration was opened. There were 433,000 applicants. On June 15, 1998, the final registration period was opened for the lottery, and 541,00 applied by July 15, 1998. Those qualifying under the 1998 registration continued to be paroled thereafter. Since 1998, the Cuban government has refused to allow another registration to occur in the country. Around 75,000 Cubans were paroled under these programs from 1994 to 2003 (the last year that statistics were available). Adjustment of Status: All Cubans paroled after 1959 are eligible to adjust to legal permanent residence after one year in the United States under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966.
Cuban Wet Foot, Dry Foot parole (1995—2017): On May 2, 1995, the U.S. government announced that it would not parole any Cubans intercepted at sea, even if in U.S. waters, but it would parole anyone on U.S. soil or arriving at a port of entry. The Customs and Border Protection field manual provided that Cuban asylum seekers "may be paroled directly from the port of entry" except for those who "pose a criminal or terrorist threat." Subsequently, the number of Cubans paroled at ports of entry (mainly along the southwest border) increased significantly. From 2004 to 2016, 226,000 Cubans were paroled at U.S. land borders. On January 12, 2017, DHS canceled the wet foot, dry foot parole process. Adjustment of Status: All Cubans paroled after 1959 are eligible to adjust to legal permanent residence after one year in the United States under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966.
Iraqi parole (1996): On September 17, 1996, the United States began airlifting some Iraqi Kurds to Guam, where they were granted parole. A total of 6,550 Iraqi Kurds who worked with the United States and 650 opposition activists were granted parole starting in September 1996. Adjustment of Status: The FY 1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act (Public Law 105–277, October 21, 1998) waived the cap on green cards for those adjusting after receiving asylum for Iraqis evacuated via parole but did not create a special green card category.
Cuban Medical Professional Parole (CMPP) Program (2006—2017): On August 11, 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) created a new parole program for Cuban doctors in third countries conscripted by the government of Cuba. In fiscal year 2007, 480 of 28,000 Cuban physicians applied for parole. As of December 2010, 1,574 physicians were paroled. On January 12, 2017, DHS canceled the program except for dependents of the physicians already in the program. Adjustment of Status: All Cubans paroled after 1959 are eligible to adjust to legal permanent residence after one year in the United States under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966.
Parole in Place for family of U.S. veterans (2007—present): On June 21, 2007, DHS announced that it would grant parole to a spouse of a U.S. active duty soldier, enabling the spouse to adjust to a green card. This policy continued for the next six years. On November 15, 2013, DHS issued a memorandum that provided clearer guidance on this program and expanded it to include veterans of the armed forces. On November 23, 2016, DHS expanded the program to cover family of deceased veterans and adult or married children of veterans. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2020 (P.L. 116–92) expressed congressional support for an ongoing parole program for relatives of U.S. military members. Adjustment of Status: Spouses of U.S. citizens have an uncapped opportunity to apply for a green card, but parole enables them to apply for a green card by allowing them to meet the requirement that they were "admitted or paroled" prior to applying.
Cuban Family Reunification Parole (2007—2017, 2021—present): On November 21, 2007, the DHS created a new parole program for any Cuban with an approved family‐based petition for legal permanent residence. In December 2017, USCIS shut down its field office in Cuba and suspended the program. In 2014, DHS started requiring a fee for the parole program. On May 16, 2022, DHS announced that it would resume processing Cuban Family Reunification Parole cases. Adjustment of Status: All Cubans paroled after 1959 are eligible to adjust to legal permanent residence after one year in the United States under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966.
Haitian Orphan Parole Program (2010): Following a 2010 Earthquake, on January 18, 2010, DHS announced that it would parole Haitian orphans in the process of being adopted by U.S. citizens. It accepted applications through April 2010. Adjustment of Status: Help Haitian Adoptees Immediately to Integrate Act of 2010 (Help HAITI Act, Public Law 111–293, December 2010) authorized DHS to adjust the status of adoptees to legal permanent residence even if the formal adoption process was not complete in Haiti as a result of the Earthquake.
Haitian Earthquake paroles (2010—2016): Following a 2010 Earthquake, on January 13, 2010, ICE suspended deportations to Haiti, and ICE began to generally parole detained Haitians. CBP at ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexico border likewise began to parole Haitians rather than detain them for transfer to ICE. On January 25, 2010, DHS authorized an automatic extension of advance parole documents through March 12, 2010 for Haitians who had traveled outside the United States prior to the Earthquake after receiving advance parole. From 2010 to 2016, about 16,000 Haitians were paroled after being deemed inadmissible at ports of entry. Central American Minors (CAM) parole (2014—2017, 2021—present): On November 14, 2014, DHS and the State Department announced a combination refugee and parole program for Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran children with U.S. family sponsors in legal status in the United States (and the minor children of the child and in‐country parent of the child if married to the sponsoring U.S. parent). On July 26, 2016, DHS expanded the program to include other relatives, including siblings and any in‐country biological parent of the child. On August 16, 2017, DHS announced it would be canceling the parole program. On March 10, 2021, DHS and the State Department announced it would be restarting the program for those who previously applied before the termination in 2017. On June 15, 2021, they announced the program would reopen to new applicants, including children whose parents were in the United States with pending asylum applications. The parole is indefinite. On April 11, 2023, it expanded the program to allow sponsorship by parents of children who have pending T visa applications. As of December 2016, there were 10,758 applicants for the CAM program. Of these applicants, 873 had received refugee status, and 2,086 had received parole. In 2017, another 2,700 were permitted to enter. Haitian Family Reunification Parole (2014—present): On December 18, 2014, DHS created a new parole program for any Haitian with an approved family‐based immigrant visa petition if they have a priority date within two years of being current. On August 2, 2019, DHS announced it would terminate the program but would extend the parole of current participants. On October 12, 2021, it reversed its decision and continued the program. Filipino World War II Veterans Parole (FWVP) program (2016—present): On May 9, 2016, DHS created a new parole program for Filipino World War II veterans who have approved family‐based immigrant visa petitions. On August 2, 2019, DHS announced its plans to terminate the program but would extend the parole of current participants. On December 28, 2020, it proposed a regulation to finalize this change. On October 12, 2021, it reversed its earlier decision and continued the program. International Entrepreneur Parole (2017): On January 17, 2017, DHS created a parole program for certain entrepreneurs. On July 11, 2017, DHS published a rule delaying the effective date of the program. In December 2017, the rule delaying the rule was vacated by a court and was forced to implement the rule. From 2017 to 2019, 30 people applied, and only one approval was granted. Parole + Alternatives to Detention program (2021): On July 31, 2021, Border Patrol created a policy of paroling detained immigrants at the border when ICE cannot accept custody of the person, there isn't a risk to national security or public safety, processing capacity exceeds 75%, and arrivals exceed discharges, the average processing time exceeds two days, and arrivals will likely exceed discharges the following day. On November 2, 2021, the Border Patrol chief formalized this policy with respect to family units. On July 18, 2022, Customs and Border Protection expanded this policy to cover both families and single adults. On March 8, 2023, the policy was blocked by a federal district court judge after about 700,000 paroles. Afghan evacuation parole (2021): After the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan on August 15, 2021, the U.S. military began to fly thousands of Afghans to U.S. military bases in the region. On August 23, 2021, DHS launched a new parole operation under Operation Allies Welcome (OAW). In the next few weeks, it paroled more than 75,898 Afghans into the United States. After the initial evacuation, DHS received 50,000 parole requests from Afghans, adjudicated about 9,500, and denied all but about 500. In September 2022, DHS stated that Afghans abroad would generally no longer be considered for parole at all. On June 8, 2023, DHS announced it would extend the parole of Afghan parolees in the United States. The Extending Government Funding and Delivering Emergency Assistance Act of 2021 (P.L. 117–43, May 2022) provided refugee benefits to Afghan parolees, explicitly appropriating money for those benefits, and directing the creation of a plan to process pending Afghan parole applications between July 31, 2021, and September 30, 2022 or paroled into the United States after September 30, 2022 if a spouse or child of an Afghan parolee or parent or legal guardian of an unaccompanied Afghan child. Uniting for Ukraine (2022): After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, DHS decided to parole Ukrainians arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border ports of entry, formally announcing the policy on March 11, 2022, and about 23,000 were paroled with 1‑year admissions. On April 27, 2022, DHS created a new parole program for Ukrainians with U.S. sponsors. As of May 2022, DHS had paroled about 125,000 Ukrainians under the Uniting for Ukraine sponsorship program with 2‑year admissions. The Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2022 (P.L. 117–128, May 2022) provided refugee benefits to Ukrainians paroled between February 24, 2022 and September 30, 2023 or paroled into the United States after September 30, 2022 if a spouse or child of a Ukrainian parolee or parent or legal guardian of an unaccompanied Ukrainian child. On March 13, 2022, DHS extended the parole of the 23,000 paroled at ports of entry. Adjustment of Status: A Ukrainian Adjustment Act (H.R.3911) was introduced in 2023.
Cuban, Haitian, Nicaraguan, and Venezuelan parole sponsorship processes (2022—2023): On October 19, 2022, DHS created a parole program for Venezuelans with U.S. sponsors modeled on Uniting for Ukraine with a cap of 24,000. On January 9, 2023, DHS replaced this cap with a combined 30,000 per month cap for Venezuela, Haiti, Cuba, and Nicaragua (each of which received its own parole sponsorship programs the same day). 1.5 million applicants had applied by May 2023, and about 131,000 had been admitted. Adjustment of Status: All Cubans paroled after 1959 are eligible to adjust to legal permanent residence after one year in the United States under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966. A Venezuelan Adjustment Act (H.R. 7854) was introduced in 2022.
Family Reunification Parole Processes (2023): On July 10, 2023, DHS created family reunification parole programs for Colombians, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans who have approved immigrant visa petitions. Parole applicants had to be invited by the U.S. government. This announcement followed up on the May 2023 announcement that the United States wanted to accept as many as 100,000 individuals from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras through the family reunification pathway. As of May 2023, there were 73,500 eligible for the program, but many more were waiting for their immigrant visas to be approved.
Article by Morris Arnold on the Arkansas Legal System during the Colonial Period. ; THE ARKANSAS COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM, 1686-1766 Morris S. Arnold* Except for the silence of its final letter, there is nowadays nothing very French about Arkansas. Yet before the American takeover in 1804 the great majority of the European inhabitants of the area presently occupied by the state were of French origin. There is s9me visible proof of this in the names, many now mangled beyond e:asy recognition, which eighteenth-century voyageurs and coureurs de bois gave to a good many Arkansas places and streams; 1 and there are, as well, a number of Arkansas townships which bear the names of their early French habitants .2 While these faint traces of a remote European past survive, absolutely nothing remains of the laws and customs which the ancient residents of Arkansas observed. This is no accident. It was a favorite object of Jefferson to introduce the common law of England into the vast Louisiana Territory as quickly as he could. In the lower territory he waited too late. New Orleans had had a large French population and a somewhat professionalized legal system for some time, and the civilian opposition, given time to congeal, proved to * Ben J. Altheimer Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock. B.S.E.E. 1965, LL.B. 1968, University of Arkansas; LL.M. 1969, S.J.D. 1971, Harvard Law School. This article is the first chapter of Professor Arnold's book, UNEQUAL LAWS UNTO A SAVAGE RACE: EUROPEAN LEGAL TRADITIONS IN ARKANSAS, 1686-1836, which will be published later this year. l. See generally Branner, Some Old French Place Names in the State of Arkansas, 19 ARK. HIST. Q. 191 (1960). The etymology of some of these names is difficult and interesting. Who would guess very quickly, for instance, that Smackover in Union County is Chemin Couvert (covered road) in disguise? Id. at 206. Tchemanihaut Creek (pronounced 'Shamanahaw") in Ashley County is a good deal easier: Chemin a haut (high road) must have been its original name. Its initial letter, one local historian has plausibly suggested, is probably attributable to "a misguided attempt to derive the name from the Indian language." Y. ETHERIDGE, HISTORY OF ASHLEY COUNTY, ARKANSAS 17, 18 (1959). Other names should on sight be instantly intelligible to a modern Parisian, though their current pronunciation might cause him consternation: Examples are the Terre Rouge (red earth) and Terre Noire (black earth) Creeks in Clark County, the L 'Angui!le (eel) River in northeast Arkansas, and La Grue (crane) township in Arkansas county. 2. Vaugine and Bogy Townships in Jefferson County, Darysaw (Desruisseaux) Township in Grant County, and Fourche La Fave (Lefevre) Township in Perry County are good examples. 391 392 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 have sufficient muscle to win a partial victory.3 As a result, as to substantive civil matters the state of Louisiana is today a thoroughly civilian jurisdiction. In the upper territory, however, by a piecemeal process beginning in 1804, the English common law was insinuated into the legal system, until, in 1816, it was at last adopted virtually wholesale by the General Assembly of the Missouri Territory.4 The purpose of this article is to explain why civilian legal institutions proved so weak in Upper Louisiana and especially in Arkansas. It turns out that the smallness and character of the European population in Arkansas was the main cause for the vulnerability of European legal norms there. The reception of the common law in Arkansas was simply one element in a more general exchange of cultures which occurred following the Louisiana Purchase. I At ten o'clock on the morning of March 12, 1682, Robert Cavalier, sieur de la Salle, having been commissioned four years earlier by Louis XIV of France to explore and take possession of the Mississippi and its tributaries, drew near the Quapaw Village of Kappa. The village was located on the right bank of the Mississippi River about twenty miles north of the mouth of the Arkansas. From the war chants emanating from the Indian town, La Salle judged that he was in for a hostile reception; so he hastily constructed a "fort" on an island opposite the village and awaited developments. Soon, however, the Quapaw chief sent the calumet of peace, and La Salle and his men went to Kappa where they were received with every possible demonstration of affection both public and private. Asked by the Quapaws for help against their enemies, La Salle promised that they could thenceforth look for protection to the greatest prince of the world, in whose behalf he had come to them and to all the other nations who lived along and around the river. In return, La Salle said, the Quapaws had to consent expressly to the erection in their village of a column on which His Majesty's arms were to be painted, symbolizing their recognition that he was the master of their lands. The Indians agreed and Henry de Tonti, La Salle's lieutenant 3. See generally G. DARGO, JEFFERSON'S LOUISIANA: POLITICS AND THE CLASH OF LEGAL TRADITIONS (1975). 4. 1 LAWS OF A PUBLIC AND GENERAL NATURE, OF THE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA, OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA, OF THE TERRITORY OF MISSOURI, AND OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI, UP TO THE YEAR 1824, ch. 154 (1842). 1983) COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 393 and commandant of one of the two brigades in the company, immediately caused the column to be fashioned. On it was painted a cross and the arms of France, and it bore these words: Louis the Great, King of France and of Navarre, rules. 13th of March, 1682. Tonti then conducted the column with all the French men-at-arms to the plaza of the village, and, La Salle taking up a position at the head of his brigade and Tonti at the head of his, the Reverend Father Zeno be Membre sang the hymn 0 crux, ave, spes unica. The company then went three times around the plaza, each time singing the psalm Exaudiat te Dominus and shouting vive le roy to the discharge of their muskets. They then planted the column while repeating the cries of vive le roy, and La Salle, standing near the column and holding the king's commission in his hand, spoke in a loud voice the following words in French: On behalf of the very high, very invincible, and victorious prince Louis the Great, by the grace of God, King of France and of Navarre, the fourteenth of this name, today, the 13th of March, 1682, with the consent of the nation of the Arkansas assembled at the village of Kappa and present at this place, in the name of the king and his allies, I, by virtue of the commission of His Majesty of which I am bearer and which I hold presently in my hand . , have taken possession in the name of His ffi.ajesty, his heirs, and the successors to his crown, of the country of Louisiana and of all the nations, mines, minerals, ports, harbors, seas, straits, and roadsteads, and of everything contained within the same . . . . After more musket-firing and the giving of presents the Indians celebrated their new alliance throughout the night, pressing their hands to the column and then rubbing their bodies in testimony to the joy which they felt in having made so advantageous a connection. Thus did France gain sovereignty over and ownership of Arkansas. The reason that we know all these details and more about La Salle's activities in Arkansas is that he had requested, and received, from Jacques de la Metairie, the notary who was in his company, a lengthy proces-verbal describing the events at Kappa and officially attesting their occurrence.5 This was Arkansas's first exposure to civilian legal processes. It would be almost 150 years before the influence of the civil law ceased to make itself felt there. 5. 2 P. MARGRY, DECOUVERTES ET ETABLISSEMENT DES FRAN<;:AIS DANS L'0UEST ET DANS LE SUD DE L'AMERIQUE SEPTENTRIONALE, 1614-1754 (1881). 394 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 II Arkansas Post was the first European establishment in the lower Mississippi valley. It was first located about twenty-seven miles by river from the mouth of the Arkansas on the edge of Little Prairie at what is now called the Menard Site. (See Figure 2). Settled in 1686 by six tenants of Henry de Tonti to whom La Salle in 1682 had granted the lower Arkansas as a seignory, 6 it was to serve as an Indian trading post and as an intermediate station between the Illinois country and the Gulf of Mexico.7 Tonti's plans for the place had been large indeed. In 1689 he promised the Jesuits to build a house and chapel at the Arkansas and to grant a resident priest a sizeable amount of land; while there, Tonti confidently asserted, the priest could "come and say mass in the French quarter near our fort."8 No priest in fact established himself during Tonti's ownership of the Arkansas and his French quarter and fort never materialized. When in an undated grant of land to Jacques Cardinal, one of his men at the Post, Tonti styled himself seigneur de ville de Tonti (lord of the town of Tonti),9 he was in the grips of an excessive enthusiasm. There is no evidence that the European population of the place ever exceeded six. In fact, when Joutel arrived there in 1687 there were only two Frenchmen remaining in residence; 10 and the single log house he descpbed is apparently the only structure ever erected at Tonti's Post. Joutel remarked of Tonti's two traders that "if I was joyous to find them, they participated in the joy since we left them the wherewithal to maintain themselves for some time." Indeed, he said, "they were almost as much in need of our help as we of theirs." He ridiculed the whole idea of a post at that location. "The said house," Joutel noted sarcastically, "was to serve as an 6. See Faye, The Arkansas Post ef Louisiana: French Domination, ;26 LA. HIST. Q. 633, 635-36 ( 1943). 7. Such was the view of Father Douay, a Jesuit who described Tonti's post in 1687. See M. THOMAS, THE ARKANSAS POST OF LOUISIANA, 1682-1783 (M.A. Thesis, University of California, 1948). 8. Tonti's grant to the Jesuits is quoted in 1 M. GIRAUD, A HISTORY OF FRENCH LOUISIANA 8 (J. Lambert trans., 1974). 9. The grant is translated in THE FRENCH FOUNDATIONS 396 (T. Pease & R. Werner eds., 1934). 10. Faye, supra note 6, at 735. 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM Henry de Tonti, lieutenant of La Salle. He founded Arkansas Post in 1686 and in the late seventeenth century styled himself seigneur de ville de Tonti. He was the first European to possess judicial authority in Arkansas. (Courtesy of the Museum of the History of Mobile). 395 396 UALR LAW JOURNAL · [Vol. 6:391 entrepot [way-station] for the French who travelled in these parts, but we were the only ones whom it so served." 11 Short of supplies and virtually inaccessible, the tiny outpost never prospered. The war with the Iroquois closed the route to Canada and made trade to and from Arkansas impossible much of the time until 1693.12 By 1696, Jean Couture, Tonti's lieutenant and commandant at the Post, had deserted to the English, 13 and in 1699 Jesuit missionaries to the Quapaws found no trace of a French settlement. 14 By then the French had evidently abandoned the Arkansas, though there may have remained behind a "few white savages thereabouts as wild as red savages." 15 However grandiose and ambitious had been the schemes of Tonti, they would soon come to seem tame. In 1717 the Mercure de France, a Paris newspaper, began advertising the riches of Louisiana to its readers: Gold and silver could be mined there "with almost no labor." The mountains situated on the Arkansas River would be explored, and there, one correspondent exuded, "we shall gather, believe me, specimens from silver mines, since others already have gathered such there without trouble." When Cadillac sensibly protested that "the mines of the Arkansas were a dream" he was promptly committed to the Bastille "on suspicion of having spoken with scant propriety against the Government of France."16 The man behind the propaganda campaign was John Law, a Scot, who owned a bank in Paris and who had in 1717 succeeded in securing for his Compagnie d'Occident a monopoly on Louisiana trade. Law's company recruited thousands of colonists to settle in Louisiana and the king granted it authority to grant land from the 11. Joutel Remarques sur /'Ouvrage de Tonti Re/at(( a la Louisiane ( 1703), Archives Service Hydrographique (Paris), vol. 115-9, no. 12 (Typescript in Little Rock Public Library). The translation in the text is mine. 12. Faye, supra note 6, at 638. 13. IBERVILLE'S GULF JouRNALS 144 at n.98 (R. McWilliams ed. 1950). 14. 18 COLLECTIONS OF THE WISCONSIN HISTORICAL SOCIETY 427, at n.37 (1908). 15. Faye, supra note 6, at 646. See also I M. GIRAUD, supra note 8, at 8: "When d'Iberville reached the Mississippi [i.e., in 1699] the post had been abandoned." Some writers are reluctant to say that the Arkansas was completely devoid of Europeans at this time. See, e.g., P. HOLDER, ARCHAEOLOGICAL FIELD RESEARCH ON THE PROBLEM OF THE LOCATIONS OF ARKANSAS POST ARKANSAS 4 (1957): "The French occupation of the general area along the lower courses of the Arkansas and White Rivers was virtually continuous from the 1680's onward." The truth is that the sources simply fail to mention any Europeans in Arkansas, except Jesuit missionaries, between 1699 and 1721. It is, however, hard to resist believing that a few hunters and trappers ventured from time to time into the area and established temporary camps there. Almost certainly no real settlement existed however. 16. Faye, supra note 6, at 653. 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 397 Royal domain. Proprietors of the company's land grants (concessionaires) were given considerable latitude in choosing the spots for their settlements, since the interior of Louisiana was not well known; and they therefore exercised much discretion in locating their colonists on arrival. 17 However, the company early on had recognized the Arkansas River as an important spot, since it was thought that it might well be the best route to the Spanish mines of Mexico. Thus the company specifically directed where the Arkansas concession should be located and ordered that it be the first occupied. 18 It granted this concession to Law himself. In August of 1721, a group of Law's French engages (perhaps as many as eighty) took possession of land on Little Prairie at or near the site of Tonti's abandoned trading post. 19 (See Figure 2). Although Law was by then bankrupt and had fled France, the news did not reach Louisiana until after Jacques Levens, Law's director in Louisiana, had caused the Arkansas colony to be established under the command of some of his subordinates.20 By December of that year Bertrand Dufresne, sieur du Demaine, replaced Levens as director for Arkansas, and in March of 1722 he took possession of the concession and began an inventory of its effects and papers.21 On his arrival he found only twenty cabins and three arpents (about 2.5 acres) of cleared ground. He reported a total of about fifty men and women resident,22 tristes debris, Father Charlevoix called them,23 of Mr. Law's concession. They had produced only an insignificant harvest. Lieutenant la Boulaye was nearby with a military detachment of seventeen men.24 (See Figure 1). Despite the existence of a company store at the Arkansas concession, both the colony and the military establishment were in considerable difficulty.25 Dufresne therefore immediately released twenty of the engages from service and gave them lots to cultivate in the hopes that a better harvest of corn and wheat would be realized in 1722. In February of the following year there were only forty-one colonists remaining, divided now into two small farming communi- 17. 4 M. GIRAUD, H!STOJRE DE LA LOUISIANE FRANc_;;AISE 198 (1974). 18. Id. 19. Id. 20. Id. at 199. 21. Id. at 271. 22. Id. at 272. 23. 6 P. CHARLEVOIX, JOURNAL D'UN VOYAGE FAIT PAR ORDRE DU Roi DANS L'AMERIQUE SEPTENTRIONNALE 164 (1744). 24. 4 M. GIRAUD, supra note 17, at 273. 25. The following paragraph is based on Id. at 273-74. 398 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 ties: Fourteen men and one woman at Law's concession under Dufresne, and sixteen men, some with families, two leagues down the river with the troops. Among this latter group there lived six black slaves. 26 Benard la Harpe, while exploring the river in 1721, had predicted, or at least hoped for, a turn in the fortunes of the struggling colony, but that hope proved false and in 1727 Father Paul du Poisson, the Jesuit missionary to the Arkansas, reported that only about thirty Frenchmen remained behind.27 The military post had been abandoned two years previous. 28 Village des Arcan~as ---N Poste francais commande par le S. la Boulaie 0 - - - -, ·: ·Concession de M. Law I I L. --- ' MISSISSIPPI Figure 1 Sketch of the location of Law's colony by Dumont de Montigny,Archives Nationales, Paris, 6 JJ-75, Piece 254. All this seemed worth recounting in some detail because for generations historians of Arkansas have believed that a colony of Germans once occupied their river. Law did recruit many Germans for settlement in Louisiana, and they were destined for the Arkansas, but as soon as the news of Law's bankruptcy reached the colony 26. Recensement General des Habitans Estab!ys,,.SoteJouy Arkansas et d~s Ouvrier~ ~e la Concession cy devant Apartenant a M. Law, 18 February, 1723. (Transcnpt at Lomsiana History Center, Louisiana State Museum, New Orleans). 27. Du Poisson to Father___, translated in Falconer, Arkansas and the Jesuits in 1727-A Translation, 4 PUBLICATIONS OF THE ARKANSAS HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 352, at 375 (1917). 28. Faye, supra note 6, at 670. 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 399 in June of 1721, the Compagnie des Indies took over the direction of his concession;29 and when the time arrived to transport the German immigrants to Arkansas, the company, in an economy move, decided instead to send them to Delaire's grant in Lower Louisiana.30 In short, none of Law's Germans ever reached Arkansas. This is a pity, as the prospect of discussing, or at least imagining, a group of German immigrants living under French law on the Arkansas River was an intriguing one--one of which the facts have now unfortu-nately deprived us. · III Before 1712, the colony of Louisiana, with a population of only a few hundred, had been entirely under military rule and regular civil regulation was altogether lacking. On September 19, 1712, the Crown granted a trade monopoly to Antoine Crozat but he was given no governmental authority: As Henry Dart noted, the charter was "only an operating contract with the duties of government retained in the Crown."31 However, the charter did adopt as law for the colony "nos Edits, Ordonnances Et Coutumes Et !es usages de la Prevoste Et Vitf/omte de Paris--our edicts, ordinances, and customs, and the usages of the Provostry and Viscounty of Paris."32 The Coutume, despite its name, was actually a small code of some 362 titles first reduced to writing in 1510,33 and treating both substantive and adjective law. It was itself terse, indeed epigrammatic; but the commentary on it by the time of its adoption in Louisiana was voluminous. 34 Annotated versions of the Coutume were therefore very popular in France and in time they found their way to Louisiana.35 Also in 1712, by a separate instrument, a new and important institution was created for the colony, the Superior Council of Louisiana. 36 Modelled on the governmental arrangements already in 29. 4 M. GIRAUD, supra note 17, at 216. 30. Id. at 248. 31. Dart, The Legal Institutions of Louisiana, 3 SOUTHERN LAW Q. 247 (1918). This article also appears in 2 LA. HIST. Q. 72 (1919). 32. The charter is printed in 4 PUBLICATIONS LA. HIST. Soc. 13, at 17 (1909). 33. For a precis of its provisions, title by title, see Schmidt, History ef the Jurisprudence of Louisiana, l LA. L. J., no. l, l (1841). 34. The most useful eighteenth-century commentary is C. FERRIERE, CoMMENTAIRE SUR LA CouTUME DE LA PREVOTE ET VICOMTE DE p ARIS. It is available in several editions. 35. Dart, The Law Library ef a Louisiana Lawyer in the 18th Century, 25 REPORTS OF THE LOUISIANA BAR ASSOCIATION 12, at 22 et seq. (1924). 36. See Dart, supra note 31, at 249 et seq. See also, for some discussion of the work of this body, Hardy, The Superior Council in Colonial Louisiana, in FRENCHMEN AND FRENCH 400 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 place in other French colonies, the Council had original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide disputes arising anywhere in Louisiana. It consisted of the Lieutenant General of New France; the Intendant of the same; the Governor of Louisiana; a first councilor of the king; two other councilors; the attorney general; and a clerk. Judgments in civil cases required the concurrence of at least three members and in criminal cases at least five. The Council was originally created to exist for three years, but on September 7, 1716, it became by virtue of a Royal Edict a permanent institution.37 In 1717 a fundamental change occurred in the government of Louisiana. In that year Crozat, having lost an enormous sum under his operating charter, surrendered it, and John Law's Compagnie d'Occident was given a monopoly over trade in the colony. In addition, unlike Crozat's company, the Compagnie d'Occident was granted extensive governmental authority: It had the power to appoint the Superior Council, to name governors and military commandants, and to appoint and remove all judges. The charter also provided that "Seront tous !es juges Etbalis en tous !es d. Lieux tenus de juger suivant !es Loix Et ordonnances du Royaume Et se Con-former a la Coutume de la prevoste Et Vicomte de Paris. . . ."; that is, that "all the judges established in all the said places shall be bound to judge according to the laws and ordinances of the realm, and [shall also be bound] to conform to the customs of the Prevostry and Viscounty of Paris."38 This portion of the charter obviously provided for the reception of general French legislation and the Custom of Paris. In addition, it has been shown that subsequent French legislation, as soon as it was registered in the colony, and the legislation of the Superior Council itself, formed part of the body of colonial Louisiana law.39 The subsequent French legislation was of three distinct sorts: (a) general legislation; (b) special colonial legislation; ( c) colonial legislation passed specifically for Louisiana. 40 Two years later we hear for the first time about inferior courts for outlying portions of the colony. On September 12, 1719, the king noted the need to appoint persons to act as judges "to facilitate w A YS IN THE MISSISSIPPI v ALLEY 87 (J. McDemott ed., 1969); Micelle, From Law Court to Local Government: Metamorphosis of the Superior Council of French Louisiana, 9 LA. HIST. 85 (1968). 37. The edict is printed in 4 PUBLICATIONS LA. HIST. Soc. 21-23 (19CS). 38. Id. at 48. 39. Baade, Marriage Contracts in French and Spanish Louisiana: A Study in "Notarial" Jurisprudence, 53 TUL. L. REV. 3, 9 (1978). 40. Id. 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 401 the administration of justice in places distant from the place where the Superior Council holds it sessions."41 The "heads or directors" of concessions along with "other of our subjects, capable and of probity" were to "exercise both civil and criminal justice." The edict went on to provide that, even in these inferior courts, "three judges shall sit in civil matters and in criminal matters five judges . " The plan, evidently, was to have a kind of provincial council at each settlement. The king further provided that an appeal from these local tribunals would lie in all cases to the Superior Council.42 All this was being done, of course, to make ready the way for Law's colonizing schemes. In 1720 or 1721 Louisiana was for the first time divided into districts (or counties). Arkansas was one of the nine districts originally created, and a local commandant and a judge was assigned to each "to put justice with greater ease in reach of the colonists."43 Presumably, and understandably, the plan to establish local councils outside New Orleans was abandoned at this time. The sources simply fail us on the question of whether more than one person was expected to sit on local courts, but it could not have proved workable in remote places like Arkansas to assemble a multi-member judicial body. In May of 1722 the Regent issued an order creating a provincial council for Illinois, the jurisdiction of which supposedly extended from "all places on and above and Arkansas River . . . to the boundaries of the Wabash River." The commandant of the Illinois, Lieutenant de Boisbriant, was to serve as "chief and judge" of this so-called council, which in fact had only one other member.44 It thus seems to have been the plan to abolish the Arkansas district and annex its territory to its nearest northern neighbor; and the Illinois provincial council was directed "to hold its sessions at the places where the principal factories of the company shall be estab- 41. The edict is printed in 4 PUBLICATIONS LA. HIST. Soc. 63 (1908). 42. The translation in the text is mine. The entire edict is translated and discussed in Dart, supra note 31, at 261 et seq. Further discussion of this edict can be found in Dart, The Colonial Legal Systems of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas, 27 REPORTS OF THE LOUISIANA BAR ASSOCIATION 43 at 52 (1926). 43. Id. at 267. The other districts were New Orleans, Biloxi, Mobile, Alibamous, Natchez, Yazoo, N atchitotches, and the Illinois. 44. Translated extracts from this order appear in 2 J. WHITE, A NEW COLLECTION OF LAWS, CHARTERS, AND LOCAL ORDINANCES OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND SPAIN, RELATING TO THE CONCESSION OF LAND IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COLONIES . 439-40 (1837). 402 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 lished."45 This language could have been construed to require the Illinois council to sit at the Arkansas. It is, however, very much to be doubted that such a session was ever held, and certainly it is not believeable that anyone would repair from Arkansas to Illinois to settle a grievance in 1722. It seems probable, then, that whatever judicial functions were exercised at the Arkansas were entrusted to its resident directors even after the supposed creation of the council of the Illinois. The only resident director that the Arkansas ever had was, as we saw, Bertrand Dufresne, sieur du Demaine, who arrived at the Post March 22, 1722, and he was evidently the judge from that point on. Prior to that, Jacques Levens had been director, but as he never took up residence in Arkansas we have to presume that if judicial functions were undertaken by anyone, it was by one or more of the three subordinates to whom Levens had entrusted the management of the struggling colony: Jean-Baptiste, Menard, Martin Merrick, and Labro.46 When Dufresne left the Arkansas around 1726 we can hardly guess the means resorted to for the settlement of disputes. Probably Father Paul du Poisson, the Jesuit missionary resident from 1727 to 1729, used his good offices to maintain order among the approximately thirty Frenchmen who had remained behind.47 It seems probable, therefore, that Arkansas's first sustained exposure to European legal proceedings and principles occurred in the period during which Law's Company held sway in Louisiana. Tonti's seventeenth-century feudal seignory no doubt carried with it the right to render justice. Though his charter from La Salle has not as yet come to light,48 other conveyances of La Salle's are extant; and in them he gave his grantees judicial power over small cases ("low justice" this is called) while specifically reserving important cases ("high justice") to himself. (Cases of the latter type he directed to be heard by the judge "who shall be established at Fort St. 45. Id. at 440. 46. 4 M. GIRAUD, supra note 17, at 272. Menard left the Arkansas in 1722 (jd., 275) and was in New Orleans in 1720. Index to the Records efthe Superior Council of Louisiana, 4 LA. HIST. Q. 349 (1921). 47. Dufresne appears in the Arkansas census of January !, 1726; but on October 21, 1726, he is described as a "settler in Arkansas, but now domiciled with Mr. Traguidy [in New Orleans]." Index to the Records of Superior Council of New Orleans, 3 LA. HIST. Q. 420 (1920). In 1727 there was no director at the Arkansas, as Father Du Poisson tells us that he took up evidence in "the India Company's house, which is also that of the commandants when there are any here . " See Falconer, supra note 27, at 371. 48. For a charter from Tonti to Jacques Cardinal, one of his men at the Arkansas, see THE FRENCH FOUNDATIONS, supra note 9, at 396. 'Fhla is tlae Olll)' grant gf Tgati's eKtastF 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 403 Louis.")49 We do not know whether Tonti's charter contained identical provisions but it certainly would have contained similar ones. But during the fifteen years or so that Tonti held the right to dispose of certain cases arising in his seignory, it hardly seems credible that he or his deputies ever held anything resembling a court, or even executed many instruments or documents.50 IV In 1731 the Compagnie d'Occident surrendered its charter to Louis XV, and for the rest of the period of French dominion Louisiana was a Crown Colony. Late that same year a military garrison was re-established in Arkansas; it consisted of twelve men commanded by First Ensign de Coulange and was located again on the edge of Little Prairie. 51 (See Figure 2). It was apparently during the reorganization of the colony in 1731 that civil and military authority at the outposts of Louisiana were combined in the commandant of the garrison-an arrangement that would survive into the Spanish period and even for a short time during the American regime. Part of a post commandant's civil authority was to act as notary and judge. The exact scope of his judicial jurisdiction during the French period is obscure, there being no document of which I am aware which describes it specifically. Parkman, writing of conditions in the Illinois in 1764, says that the "military commandant whose station was at Fort Chartres on the Mississippi, ruled the Colony with a sway as absolute as that of the Pasha of Egypt, and judged civil and criminal cases without right of appeal."52 Captain Phillip Pittman, an English engineer and Mississippi explorer who was writing at almost exactly the same time, gives a slightly different version. According to him, the Illinois commandant "was absolute 49. Concession in fee by La Salle to Pierre Prudhomme, in id. at 32. 50. When Tonti petitioned for confirmation of his charter, he was evidently refused. The petition is printed in E. MURPHEY, HENRY DE TONTI, FUR TRADER OF THE MISSISSIPPI 119 (1941). It is possible that La Salle did not have the power to make permanent grants and that may be the reason that Tonti needed confirmation. The Letters Patent of May 12, 1678, giving La Salle the right to explore "the western part of New France" in the king's behalf, gave him the power to build forts wherever he deemed them necessary; and he was "to hold them on the same tern1s and conditions as Fort Frontenac." See T. FALCONER, ON THE DISCOVERY OF THE MISSISSIPPI 19 (1844). La Salle said expressly in 1683 that this allowed him to "divide with the French and the Indians both the lands and the commerce of said country until it may please his majesty to command otherwise . " See THE FRENCH FoUNDATio~;upra note 9, at 43. The language is ambiguous, but on one permissible reading it indicates a specifically reserved power in the king to revoke grants made by La Salle. 51. Faye, supra note 6, at 673. 52. Quoted in Dart, supra note 31, at 249. 404 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 in authority, except in matters of life and death; capital offences were tried by the council at New Orleans."53 Of course, the Arkansas commandant's judicial jurisdiction was not necessarily as extensive as that possessed by the commandant of the Illinois. He may very well have been subordinate to the Illinois commandant during most of the French period. Some fitful light is thrown on the judicial authority of the Arkansas commandant by an interesting proceeding which took place at the Post in 1743.54 In October of that year, Anne Catherine Chenalenne, the widow of Jean Francois Lepine, petitioned Lieutenant Jean-Francois Tisserant de Montcharvaux, whom she styled "Commandant for the King at the Fort of Arkansas," asking him to cause an inventory and appraisal to be made of the community property in her possession. The object in view was to make a distribution to the petitioner's son-in-law and daughter who had the previous May lost all their goods when attacked by Chickasaws on the Mississippi not far below the mouth of the Arkansas. They had narrowly escaped with their lives.55 Widow Lepine had decided to make a distribution to "her poor children, at least to those who have run so much risk among the savages." She was preparing to marry Charles Lincto, a well-to-do resident of the Post, and she wished to dissolve the old community which by custom had continued after her husband's death in her and their children. The commandant informed Madame Lepine that on 26 October, 1743, he would inventory the "real and personal property derived from the marital community" and would bring with him two persons to look after the widow's interest and two to represent the children. The idea was that each party in interest should have independent appraisers present to insure the impartiality of the inventory and evaluation. De Montcharvaux in the presence of these and other witnesses caused the inventory to be made on the appointed day. The estate was fairly sizeable, being valued at 14,530 /ivres and 10 sols. It contained a great deal of personalty, including four slaves, a number of animals, 1600 pounds of tobacco, and notes and accounts receivable; the realty noted was "an old house" with three small outbuildings. Interestingly, no land was mentioned. There are two possible explanations for the absence of land in S3. P. PITTMAN, THE PRESENT STATE OF THE EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT ON THE M1ss1sSIPPI S3 (1770) (Reprinted with intro. by R. Rea 1973). S4. The relevant documents are translated in Core, Arkansas through the Looking Glass ef 1743 Documents, 22 GRAND PRAIRIE HISTORICAL SOCIETY BULLETIN 16 (1979). SS. This incident is reported and discussed in Faye, supra note 6, at 677-78. 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 405 the inventory. One is that land may not have been actually granted to Arkansas settlers but only given over temporarily to their use. The other possibility is that the land on which the house was built had belonged to Lepine before the marriage and had remained his separate property under his marriage contract or under the general provisions of the Coutume de Paris. The Coutume, which, as we have seen, was in force in French Louisiana, provided that all movables (personalty), belonging to a husband or wife, whenever acquired, became part of the community; but only certain immovables (realty) acquired after the marriage were so treated.56 This rule could be altered by contract, but in Louisiana, as in France, the Coutume was often specifically incorporated into marriage contracts by future spouses in defining the regime that would rule their property; 57 and if there was no contract provision creating a property regime, the Coutume of course automatically applied. The inventory is said to have been made "Pardevant nous Jean Francois Tisserant Ecuyer Sieur Demoncharvaus Commandant pour le Roy au Fort des Arkansas." The formulapardevant nous ("before us") is Parisian notarial boiler-plate and indicates that the commandant was acting in his surrogate notarial capacity. To an American common lawyer, the notary is not a member of the legal profession, not even a paralegal. But in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France he enjoyed a much more elevated status, as indeed he still does in that country. Originally an official of the medieval European ecclesiastical courts, the notary developed into a noncontentious secular legal professional in France. In England, partly because the canon and secular laws were not on speaking terms, "the notarial system never took deep root."58 For one thing, an important aspect of the notary's duties, his authority to "authenticate" documents, was of little use to the English. The whole notion of a state-sanctioned authenticator of private acts was entirely foreign to the common law: Whereas in France we see notaries "making" and "passing" contracts, the common law left that to the parties. The state was very much in the background in England, and was called upon only to enforce obligations that arose by force of nature. The other aspect of the French notary's duties, the drafting of instruments, conveyancing, and the giving of legal advice, was per- 56. See Baade, supra note 39, at 7, 8. 57. Id. at 25. 58. l F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 218 (2d ed., reissued with intro. by S. Milsom 1968). 406 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 formed by the regular legal profession in England. It is true that there was a scriveners' company organized in London in the sixteenth century which was granted a charter in the reign of James l.59 Members were empowered to draft legal documents, especially obligations (or bonds), and they gave a certain amount of low-level legal advice particularly in commercial and banking matters. 60 The few secular notaries who practiced in London at that time concerned themselves mainly with drafting documents relevant to international trade, and they were members of this company.61 But in the eighteenth century the company lost its effort to keep commonlaw attorneys from competing, and in 1804 parliament made conveyancing the monopoly of the regular legal profession.62 In contrast, the French notary's duties by the eighteenth century had come to include not only the familiar ones of administering oaths, taking acknowledgements, and giving "authenticity" to "acts" of private persons by attesting them officially, but they also ran generally to the drafting of documents, conveyancing, and the giving of practical legal advice.63 It is not surprising, therefore, that notaries would 59. See 12 w. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 70 (1938). See generally on the notary in England, Gutteridge, The Origin and Development ef the Profession of Notaries Public in England, in CAMBRIDGE LEGAL ESSAYS 12 (1926). 60. 12 w. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 59, at id. 61. 5 w. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 59, at 115 (3d ed. 1945). 62. 12 w. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 59, at 71-72; T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 227-28 (5th ed. 1956). 63. As draftman of wills, marriage contracts, and conveyances, Mons. le Notaire has survived in France as a much respected person, especially in the country villages. He is a general non-forensic legal practitioner, his part in the legal scheme "being confined to voluntary as distinct from contentious jurisdiction." Brown, The office of Notary in France, 2 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 60, at 64 (1953). Indeed, the French notary is close to the equivalent of the English solicitor, except for the latter's participation in litigation. Thus one modern-day commentator opined that "a solicitor would feel much at home in the etude of the French notary, though he would be surprised, and perhaps disappointed, by the cordiality of the morning post." Id. at 71. Today in Louisiana as well the notary enjoys considerable powers. See Burke & Fox, The Notaire in North America: A Short Study of the Adaptation of a Civil Law Institution, 50 TUL. L. REV. 318, at 328-32 (1975); Brosman, Louisiana-An Accidental Experiment in Fusrim, 24 TUL. L. REV. 95, 98-99 (1949). The Louisiana notary has the power "to make inventories, appraisements, and petitions; to receive wills, make protests, matrimonial contracts, conveyances, and generally, all contracts and instruments of writing; to hold family meetings and meetings of creditors; . to affix the seals upon the effects of deceased persons and to raise the same." LA. STAT. ANN.§ 35:2 (1964). When the Louisiana legislature defined the practice of law, and prohibited all but licensed attorneys from engaging in it, it therefore remembered to except acts performed by the notary which were "necessary or incidental to the exercise of the powers and functions of (his] office." LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:212(B) (1974). A walk through modern-day New Orleans will reveal a number of signs proclaiming the existence of "Law and Notarial Offices", a combination having an odd ring in the ears of an American common lawyer. The Louisiana notary is simply "a different and 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 407 make an appearance in eighteenth-century Louisiana. In New Orleans, of course, there was much work for them, but there were also provincial notaries operating in Biloxi, Mobile, Natchitoches, Pointe Coupee, and Kaskaskia.64 Since De Montcharvaux acted as notary for the Lepine inventory, it is reasonably clear that there was no provincial notary resident at the Arkansas at that time. This comes as no surprise since in 1746 there were at the Post only twelve habitant families, ten slaves, and twenty men in the garrison, 65 hardly a sufficient European population to require or attract a law-trained scrivener. When it was time to have their marriage contract made, the widow Chenalenne and her future spouse executed it in New Orleans. No doubt there was available there legal advice on which they might more comfortably rely.66 Besides, there was at that time no resident priest at the Post to perform the marriage. v On May 10, 1749, an event occurred that considerably reduced the European population of Arkansas and also made it difficult to attract settlers there for some time. On that day, the Post was attacked by a group of about 150 Chicaksaw and Abeka warriors. Their coming was undetected67 and thus they caught the small habitant population altogether unaware. They burned the settlement, killed six male settlers, and took eight women and children as slaves.68 The census taken later that year shows, not surprisingly, that the population had decreased since the previous census. Seven more important official person than is the notary public in other jurisdictions of the United States." Brosman, supra at 98. 64. See Baade, supra note 39, at 12. 65. Memoire sur /'Eta! de la Colonie de la Louisiane en 1746. Archives des Colonies, Archives Nationales, Paris [hereinafter cited as ANC], Cl3A, 30:242-281, at 249, (Typescript of original document available at Little Rock Public Library). As the average family size in Arkansas in the middle of the eighteenth century was about four, this would put the number of habitant whites at the Post at about forty-eight. 66. For an abstract of this marriage contract, see Records o.f the Superior Council o.f Louisiana, 13 LA. HlsT. Q. 129 (1944). 67. However, the habitants may have had a warning that something was afoot, for on May l, Francois Sarrazin had written from Arkansas that "two savages have killed a man and a woman and burnt a man in the frame." Records efthe Superior Court o.f Louisiana, 20 LA. HlsT. Q. 505 (1937). This incident may have been connected with the attack nine days later. 68. Vaudreuil to Rouille, September 22, 1749, calendared in THE VAUDREUIL PAPERS 59-60 (B. Barron ed., 1975). See also Faye, supra note 6, at 684 et seq. W. BAIRD, THE QUAPAW INDIANS: A HISTORY OF THE DOWNSTREAM PEOPLE 34 (1980), gives the number taken as slaves as thirteen. 408 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 men, eight women, eight boys, and eight girls remained, a total of only thirty-one white habitants at the Poste des Akansa .69 Nor did all this mark an end to serious trouble. When in June of 1751 First Ensign Louis-Xavier-Martin de Lino de Chalmette, the commandant of the Post, went uninvited to New Orleans to consult with the governor, his entire garrison of six men took the opportunity to desert. 70 Things were obviously at a critical juncture. When later in 17 51 Lieutenant Paul Augustin le Pelletier de la Houssaye took command at Arkansas he found there a post recently rebuilt by its habitants and _voyagij,tfrs and probably already relocated to a spot ten or twelve miles upriver at the edge of the Grand Prairie. (See Figure 2). It is clear that Governor Vaudreuil had determined to hold the Arkansas even if the cost proved high, for he assigned to De La Houssaye a large company of forty-five men.71 The lieutenant was also authorized to build a new fort; government funds being lacking, he undertook the construction at his own expense in return for a five-year Indian trade monopoly.72 This new beginning could, in the nature of things, have given only a slight lift to the prospects for sustained settlement in the Arkansas country. Late in 1752 Governor Vaudreuil was informed that the Osages had attempted an attack on Arkansas Post but had failed. 73 While this indicates a stability of sorts for the l?ost, thanks no doubt to the size of the new garrison, still the perceived danger must have been so high as to discourage all but the most intrepid from taking up residence at the Arkansas. Mentions of Arkansas in the legal records tend to emphasize the dangerousness of the place. For instance, a couple from Pointe Coupee, on the verge of leaving for a hunting trip to the White River country, thought it best to deed their property to a relative, with the stipulation that the deed was to be void if they returned.74 It is not surprising, therefore, that even as late as 1766, the last year of French dominion, only eight habitant families, consisting in all of forty white persons, were resident at Arkansas Post.75 69. Arkansas Post Census, 1749, Loudon Papers 200, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA. There were also fourteen slaves resident at the post and sixteen voyageurs who had returned after their winter's work. There were five hunters on the White River and four on the St. Francis. Thirty-five hunters had failed to return from the Arkansas River. 70. Faye, supra note 6, at 708. 71. Id. at 211. 72. Id. 73. THE VAUDREUIL PAPERS, supra note 68, at 136. 74. Index to the Records of the Superior Council of Louisiana, 24 LA. HlsT. Q. 75 (1941). 75. See Din, Arkansas Post in the American Revolution, 40 ARK. HIST. Q. 3, at 4 (1981). 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 409 All of these difficulties, and others, made for a place in which it might be regarded as too polite to expect the presence of much which corresponds to a legal system. In addition, political exigencies sometimes interfered to such an extent that the application of even-handed legal principle became inexpedient and thus entirely impracticable. For instance, the continued existence of the Arkansas settlement depended heavily on the loyalty of the Quapaws and their wishes were therefore relevant to any important decision made there. Their influence could extend even to the operation of the legal system as the following incident demonstrates. On 12 September, 1756, a meeting was held in the Government House in New Orleans to hear an extraordinary request from Guedetonguay, the Medal Chief of the Quapaws.76 His tribe had captured four deserters from the Arkansas garrison and had returned them; but the chief had come on behalf of his nation to ask Governor Kerlerac to pardon the soldiers. One of those captured, Jean Baptiste Bernard, in addition to having deserted, had killed his corporal Jean Nicolet within the precincts of the fort. The chief, obviously a great orator, said that he had come a long distance to plead for the soldiers' lives despite the heat and the demands of the harvest; and in his peroration he said that his head hung low, hi~ eyes were fixed to the ground, and his heart wept for these men. He knew, he explained, that if he had not come they would have been executed, and this was intolerable to him because he regarded them as his own children. He recited many friendly acts of the Qua paws to prove the fidelity of his people to the French. Among them was the release of six slaves (perhaps Chicaksaws captured by the Quapaws) "who would have been burned" otherwise, and the recent capture of five Choctaws and two trespassing Englishmen. He himself, he noted, had recently lost one son and had had another wounded in the war against the Chickasaws; and he . counted this "a mark of affection for the French." In recompense he asked for the pardon of the soldiers. The chief added that this was the only such pardon his nation had thus far requested, and he promised never to ask again. He did not doubt that Kerlerac, "the great chief of the French father of the red men," charged to govern them on behalf of "the great chief of all the French who lived in the 76. What follows is based on a memorandum entitled "Harangues faites dans /'assemb/ee tenue a /'hotel du gouvernment cejourdhui, 20 Juin 1756," found in ANC, Cl3A, 39:177-180 (Transcript at Little Rock Public Library). The translations are mine. 410 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 great town on the other side of the great lake," would listen and do the just thing. Guedetonguay left his best argument for last. He maintained vigorously that, under his law, any criminal who managed to reach the refuge of the Cabanne de Valeur where the Quapaws practiced their religious rites was regarded as having been absolved of his crime. It was their custom everywhere that the chief of the Cabanne de Valeur "would sooner lose his life than suffer the refugee to undergo punishment for his crime." Evidently the soldiers were claiming this right; and Ouyayonsas, the chief of the Cabanne de Valeur, was there to back them up. This last argument was an excellent one because it called upon the French to recognize an established Indian usage not dissimilar from the European custom of sanctuary. And the argument carried with it a threat of violent reaction if the custom were not allowed. Kerlerac answered the chief that he was not unmindful of the past services of the Quapaws, nor was he ungrateful for them. "But," he said, "I cannot change the words declared by the great chief of all the French against such crimes, and . . . it would be a great abuse for the future" to pardon the soldiers. So, he continued, "despite all the friendship that the French have for you and your nation, these men deserve death." The great chief stood for a long time with his head down and finally answered ominously that he could not be responsible for the revolutions which the chief of the privileged house might stir up-revolutions which he said ''would not fail to occur." The argument continued and the governor offered to grant the chief "anything else except these four pardons." But Guedetonguay stubbornly maintained that "the sole purpose of his journey was to obtain the pardon of the four men." In the end the Governor extracted from the Quapaw chiefs "publicly and formally their word . . . that they would in the future deliver up all deserting soldiers as malefactors or other guilty persons without any restriction or condition whatsoever, and that . pardons would be accorded at the sole discretion of the French." No immediate decision was reached by the Governor, but later that day some of his advisors, having reflected on what they had heard, reckoned "that a refusal of the obstinate demands of these chiefs . . . the faithful allies of the French would only involve the colony in troublesome upheavals on the part of the said nations who have otherwise up to the present served very faithfully." They con- 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 411 eluded that "saving a better idea by Monsieur le Gouverneur it would be dangerous, under all the present circumstances, not to satisfy the Indians with the pardons which they demanded." The governor took the advice but evidently did not write to Berryet, the French Minister of the Marine, for some time to tell him about it. From the comfort of Versailles it was easy for Berryet to pick at Kerlerac's decision.77 In responding to Kerlerac, Berryet first made the point that Bernard's case was different from that of the other captured soldiers since he was accused of homicide in addition to desertion. Then, too, the minister had a lot of questions. Could not the difference in Bernard's case have been urged on the Arkansas chiefs to get them to relent in his case? Where was the record of the legal proceedings which should have been conducted relative to the killing? If this was a wilfull murder the pardon had been conceded too easily. "It would be dangerous," the minister warned, ''to leave such a subject in the colony, not only because he would be an example of impunity but also because of new crimes that he might commit." (The arguments of general and specific deterrence are not very recent inventions.) Finally, the governor was sternly admonished "not to surrender easily to demands of this sort on the part of the savages . If on the one hand it is necessary, considering all the present circumstances, to humor the savages, it is also necessary to be careful of letting them set a tone that accords neither with the king's authority nor the good of the colony." Nevertheless, the minister talked to the king and he ratified the governor's decision. Writs of pardon were therefore issued under the king's name for each of the Arkansas soldiers. Because the homicide committed by Bernard was not a military crime and was cognizable therefore by the Superior Council of Louisiana, his pardon was directed to the Council. Interestingly, though Berryet admitted knowing nothing of the circumstances surrounding the killing, the pardon recited that a quarrel had arisen between Bernard and Nicolet, that they had beaten each other, that Bernard : "had had the misfortune to kill the said Nicolet," and that the death "had occurred without premeditated murder."78 Thus Louis XV pardoned Jean Baptiste Bernard for killing by mischance when there was no evidence adduced as to the facts resulting in Nicolet's 77. What follows is based in Berryet's letter to Kerlerac and Bobe Descloseaux dated July 14, 1769. ANC, B, 109:487-88 (Transcript at Little Rock Public Library). The translation is mine. 78. The pardon (brevet de grtJce) was enclosed in the letter and is ANC, B, 109:489 (Transcript at Little Rock Public Library). The translation is mine. 412 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 death. The decision was generated simply by a desire to accommodate an important ally. Faithful adherence to legal principle sometimes had to take a back seat to the more compelling demands of politics. VI Father Louis Carette, the Jesuit missionary who came to the Post of Arkansas in 1750, nevertheless attempted to bring some order to the legal affairs of the place. As he noted in a procuration (power of attorney) dated at Arkansas in 1753, he was "authorized by the king to make in every post where there is not a Notary Royal all contracts and acts . "79 There is no evidence that he had any formal legal training, but he was a Jesuit, and thus a learned man, one of a handful of such who would make their residence in eighteenth- century Arkansas. The 1753 procuration is itself of some interest, as it sheds light on how litigants whose cases were technically beyond the jurisdiction exercised by the Arkansas commandant (whatever that was) might have had their cases heard if they wanted to resort to regular methods of dispute settlement. As incredible as it seems, it is probable that the only court of general jurisdiction in the entire colony was the Superior Council of Louisiana. Now, in 1763 La Harpe said that it was a two-week boat trip from the Arkansas to New Orleans, and six to eight weeks back.80 Obviously, the procuration was an important device for people in remote posts like Arkansas, for it enabled them through their attorneys, in the language of the document under discussion, "to act . . . as though they were personally present."81 Convoys or individual vessels travelled down the Mississippi frequently enough to make this means of tending to legal affairs more tolerable than it might otherwise have been. In this case, the attorney chosen was Commandant de la Houssaye, and he was deputed to act in a probate matter at Pointe Coupee for Etienne de Vaugine de Nuysement and his wife Antoinette Pelagie Petit de Divilliers. An interesting feature of procurations which increased their utility and flexibility was that they were assignable. This feature came in handy in this instance since De La Houssaye, having 79. Index to the Records of the Superior Council of Louisiana, 22 LA. H!sT. Q. 255 (1939). 80. La Harpe to Chosseul, August 8, 1763, ANC, Ci3B, 1 (Typescript in Little Rock Public Library). 81. Records, supra note 79, at id. 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 413 been detained at the Arkansas due to illness, simply transferred the power of attorney to a member of the Superior Council "to act in my place as myself."82 Perhaps one of the reasons that Carette had acted as notary in this instance was that the only other person in the little community authorized so to act, the commandant, was a party to the instrument. But in the French period priests were given general notarial powers and could act even in the absence of circumstances disabling the commandant. For instance, Carette acted as notary, and thus probably draftsman, for a marriage contract in which the commandant was not interested. This was the marriage contract of Francois Sarrazin and Francoise Lepine, executed at Arkansas Post on January 6, 1752. Marriage contracts have no exact parallel in common-law practice, and it thus seems worthwhile, before discussing the particulars of the Sarrazin-Lepine contract, to devote some time to their explanation and description. In a recent seminal study, Professor Hans Baade has outlined the provisions which one typically finds in marriage contracts executed in accordance with eighteenth-century Parisian notarial practice.83 The first and invariable undertaking by the future spouses was a promise to celebrate their marriage in facie ecc! esiae. The parties would then choose the regime which would govern their property during the marriage. Next would come a declaration that the ante-nuptial debts of the parties were to remain their separate obligations; this was followed by a disclosure of the parties' assets, a requirement for the validity of the previous provision. The dowry brought to the marriage by the wife was next recited; and delineating preciput, the right of the spouse to specific property in the event of dissolution of the community, frequently followed. Finally came the donation clause, usually a reciprocal grant of all or part of the predeceasing spouse's estate. In Louisiana, this donation, in order to be valid, had to be registered with the Superior Council in New Orleans. An inspection of the Sarrazin-Lepine marriage contract reveals that it very clearly drew on these French notarial precedents, and it reflects, moreover, an awareness of the practical requirements of the Louisiana registration provisions. It contained a promise to celebrate the marriage in regular fashion, the creation of a community property regime, a clause stating the amount of the wife's dowry, a 82. Id. 83. What follows is taken from Baade, supra note 39, at 15-18. 414 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 mutual donation to the survivor of all property owned at death, and an undertaking to have the contract registered in New Orleans.84 While there was no clause dealing with ante-nuptial debts and no mention of preciput, it is quite obvious that the good Jesuit knew more than a little about French notarial practice, and may well have had at his disposal a form book on which he could draw. He was, for all practical purposes, for a time the "lawyer" of the post as well as its cure. Before we leave this interesting document there is an aspect of it which bears detailed attention. The property regime chosen by the parties included in the community "all property, movable and immovable"85-as common lawyers would say, all property, both personal and real. In this respect the contract departs from the Custom of Paris which included in the community all movables but only certain immovables (conquets) acquired after marriage. 86 Parties were allowed in Louisiana to contract almost any property arrangement they wanted, 87 and Sarrazin and Lepine had elected a somewhat unusual variety of community. Curiously, however, the contract reckoned that this regime was "in accordance with the custom received in the colony of Louisiana." A few months after the execution of this contract Commandant de la Houssaye wrote to the governor to say that Monsieur Etienne V augine, a French officer, was of a mind to marry Madame de Gouyon, the commandant's sister-in-law, and he sent along "the proposed conditions for the contract of marriage."88 This was a draft of the contract, as De La Houssaye asked the governor to pass "/'exemplair du contra!" along to the New Orleans notary Chantaloux if the governor decided to give his permission for the marriage. Chantaloux was "to make it as it should be."89 Three weeks later the governor wrote to say that the contract would be sent back soon and that Chantaloux had left it intact except for one reasonably minor alteration.90 In 1758 Father Carette, dismayed by the irreligious inclination of his flock, left the Arkansas and no replacement was sent. In 17 64, 84. Records of the Superior Council of Louisiana, 25 LA. HlsT. Q. 856-57 (1942). 85. Id. at 856. 86. Baade, supra note 39, at 15. 87. Id. 88. La Houssaye to Vaudreuil, Dec. l, 1752, LO 410, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA. 89. Id. 90. THE v AUDREUIL PAPERS, supra note 68, at 152. 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 415 Captain Pierre Marie Cabaret Detrepi, commandant at the Arkansas, after Madame Sarrazin had found herself widowed, passed a second marriage contract for her which was extremely unsophisticated and rudimentary.91 It contained only a promise to marry regularly and a mutual donation. Perhaps the good widow had by this time tired of long-winded formalities. Just as likely, the Post was feeling the absence of Carette's drafting skills. VII As tiny, remote, and inconsequential as the Arkansas settlement was, then, it is nevertheless clear that at least some of its people were part of the time adherents to French legal culture. Of course almost everyone who lived at the Post during the period of French domination was either a native of France or French Canadian; and by the end of the French period a substantial number of native Louisianans were there. It is most interesting to find the survival of civilian legal form in so remote an outpost of empire. Obviously, not all of Arkansas's residents lapsed into a kind of legal barbarism. There were, however, circumstances at work which would make it impossible for some time to establish a community which could be expected to value the observance of legal niceties very highly. As we have already seen, the Post could not have been very attractive to the more civilized settler owing to its dangerous location. Arkansas Post, moreover, over the years experienced an extreme physical instability since it was necessary to relocate it several times due partly to flooding. (See Figure 2). The Arkansas River was in the eighteenth century "a turbulent, silt-laden stream, subject to frequent floods which were disastrous along its lower course."92 This proved to be a considerable disincentive to settlement. Add to that the enormous expanse occupied by the alluvial plain of the Mississippi and the difficulty becomes plain enough. Almost any site within thirty miles of the mouth of the Arkansas carried with it a considerable risk of floods. Law's colony, on the Arkansas twenty-seven miles or so from its mouth, was said in 1721 to be "in a fertile sector but subject to floods."93 The success of the attack by the Chickasaws in 1749, when the Post was at the same 91. Records of the Superior Council of Louisiana, Feb. 11, 1764, Louisiana History Center, Louisiana State Museum, New Orleans. 92. P. HOI.DER, supra note 15, at 152. 93. 4 M. GIRAUD, supra note 17, at 273 (1974). 416 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 location, was made possible by the absence from the neighborhood of the Quapaws: Because of recent floods they had abandoned their old fields for a more promising place upstream.94 This place, called Ecores Rouges (Red Bluffs) by the French, was about thirty-six miles from the mouth of the Arkansas and was at the present location of the Arkansas Post Memorial.95 After the attack, the Post was moved to join the Indians at Ecores Rouges so as to provide for mutual protection.96 The new spot was free from floods but proved unsatisfactory from a strategic standpoint because of its distance from the Mississippi. The location delayed convoys and Governor Vaudreuil expressed the view that "a post on the Mississippi would be more practical."97 Therefore in 1756 the Post was moved back downriver to about ten miles above the mouth. But the inevitable soon occurred. In 1758 heavy flooding, graphically described in a letter of Etienne Maurafet Layssard the garde magasin (storekeeper) of the Post, caused heavy damage, almost undoing the work of builders and architects who had been at work for the better part of a year. The houses were saved by virtue of being raised on stakes against such a day as this; but the habitants' fields, everything but Layssard's garden for which he had providently provided a levee, were entirely inundated.98 It was in fact a small enough loss. From the beginning, and understandably, the attempt to make a stable agricultural community of the Arkansas had failed miserably. There is no doubt that the European population of Arkansas during the French period consisted almost entirely of hunters and Indian traders. In 1726 the reporter of the Louisiana census remarked of the Arkansas that "all the habitants were poor and lived only from the hunting of the Indians." 99 A 1746 report said of the twelve Arkansas habitant families 94. Faye, supra note 6, at 717-19. 95. See figure 2. 96. For details, see Appendix II to my forthcoming book, UNEQUAL LAWS UNTO A SAVAGE RACE; EUROPEAN LEGAL TRADlTIONS IN ARKANSAS, 1686-1836. 97. THE VAUDREUIL PAPERS, supra note 68, at 118. 98. Faye, supra note 6, at 718-19. A detailed description of the repairs made in the summer of 1758, evidently necessitated by these floods, is in ANC, CBA, 40:349-50 (Typescript in Little Rock Public Library). In addition to making repairs, the builders constructed a house 26 feet long and 19 wide just outside the fort for the Indians who came there on business. It was of poteaux en terre construction, was covered with shingles, and was enclosed with stakes. The report describing the renovation and construction work of 1758 is signed by Denis Nicol~s Foucault, chief engineer of the Province of Louisiana. 99. ANC, GI, 464 (Transcript at Little Rock Public Library). 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM • DeWitt ARKANSAS COUNTY • Dumas I I I 0 1. 1686-1699; 1721-1749 N 1 DESHA COUNTY T I I 4 I 8 mi Figure 2 Locations of Arkansas Post, 1686-1983 2. 1749-1756; 1779-1983 3. 1756-1779 JB Based on a map drawn by John Baldwin which appeared in Arnold, The Relocation of Arkansas Post to Ecores Rouges in 1779, 42 ARK. HIST. Q. 317 (1983). Used with permission of the Arkansas Historical Association. 417 418 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 that "their principal occupation is hunting, curing meat, and commerce in tallow and bear oil." As for cultivating the soil, the same source reported that the habitants grew "some tobacco for their own use and for that of the savages and voyageurs." 100 In 1765 Captain Phillip Pittman, an Englishman, said that there were eight families living outside the fort who had cleared the land about nine hundred yards in depth. But, according to him "on account of the sandiness of the soil, and the lowness of the situation, which makes it subject to be overflowed," their harvest was not enough even to supply them with their necessary provisions. Pittman noted that "when the Mississippi is at its utmost height the Lands are overflow' d upwards of five feet; for this reason all the buildings are rais'd six feet from the ground." Thus the residents of the Arkansas, he said, subsisted mainly by hunting and every season sent to New Orleans "great quantities of bear's oil, tallow, salted buffalo meat, and a few skins." 101 Both Layssard102 and Father Watrin103 hint that the discouragement produced by the frequent flooding contributed to Father Carette's decision to leave. However that may be, it must be clear that during the period of French dominion the Post did not provide fertile soil for either crops or religion. Would regular bourgeois legal procedures have generally been afforded a more cordial acceptance? Even absent direct evidence, this would in the abstract seem most unlikely. Unsafe, unstable, and uncomfortable, the Arkansas Post of Louisiana during the period of French dominion must surely also have been largely unmindful of bourgeois legal values. It is true, as we have seen, that some of the Post's residents tried to maintain a connection between their remote outpost and European legal culture. But the few legal records that chance has allowed to come down to us from the French period are remarkable not only for their small number but also for the social and economic characteristics they reveal of the people who figured in them. They were an elite, related by marriage and blood, struggling under the difficult circumstances of their situation to participate in regular le- 100. Memoire, supra note 65 (Transcript at Little Rock Public Library). 101. P. PITTMAN, supra note 53, at xliv, 40-41. 10+. See ANC, Cl3A, 40:357 (Transcript in Little Rock Public Library). Layssard there remarks that the inhabitants at Arkansas were too poor to build a levee, and that "the Father would rather leave than go to such an expense. He is very poor." 103. See J. DELANGLEZ, THE FRENCH JESUITS IN LOWER LOUISIANA 444, where Watrin is quoted as saying that, despite there being little hope for conversion of the Quapaws, Father Carette "nevertheless followed both the French and the savages in their various changes of place, occasioned by the overflowing of the Mississippi near which the post is situated." 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 419 gal processes. The probate proceeding of 1743 was instituted by one of the most well-to-do residents of Arkansas in the person of Anne Catherine Chenalenne, widow of Jean Francois Lepine. The community property inventoried included four slaves. 104 Her future husband Charles Lincto became the most substantial civilian resident of the Post. The 17 49 census, if one excludes from it for the moment the commandant and his household, reveals that Lincto's household accounted for eight of the twenty-nine white habitants and seven of the eleven slaves at the Arkansas. 105 Etienne de Vaugine de Nuysement who executed the procuration of 1753 was a member of one of the most distinguished French families of Louisiana; 106 and he granted the power to Commandant de la Houssaye who would soon become a Major of New Orleans and a Knight of the Royal and Military Order of St. Louis. 107 Vaugine and De la Houssaye married sisters. The marriage contract executed at the Arkansas in 1752 was entered into by the Post's garde magasin and Francoise Lepine, a daughter of Anne Catherine Chenalenne the petitioner in the probate proceeding of 1743; and the bride's dowry had resulted from the dissolution of the community which had been the aim of that proceeding. Finally, Francoise Lepine's second marriage contract, passed by Detrepi in 1764, was prelude to her marriage to Jean Baptiste Tisserant de Montcharvaux, officer and interpreter at the Post and son of the commandant who executed the 1743 inventory. We are dealing with a propertied and interconnected gentry here, a tiny portion of what was anyway a very small population. How the other, the major part of the Arkansas populace regulated their lives during the French period will, in the nature of things, be difficult to document. But there is some evidence on this point and it indicates that there was a good deal of lawlessness on the Arkansas. According to Athanase de Mezieres, the Lieutenant Governor at Natchitoches, the Arkansas River above the Post was inhabited largely by outlaws. "Most of those who live there," he claimed, "have either deserted from the troops and ships of the most Christian King and have committed robberies, rape, or homicide, 104. For a translation of this inventory, see Core, supra note 54, at 22. 105. Resancement General des Habitants, Voyageurs, Femmes. En.fans, Esclaves, Clzevaus, Beufs, Vaclzes, Coclzons du Foste des Akansas, 1749. Lo. 200, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA. 106. On the Arkansas Vaugines, see Core, T!ze Vaugine Arkansas Connection, 20 GRAND PRAIRIE HISTORICAL SOCIETY BULLETIN 6 (1978). 107. Faye, supra note 6, at 709. 420 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:391 that river being the asylum of the most wicked persons, without doubt, in all the Indies." 108 On another occasion, De Mezieres singled out as a particularly heinous offender an Arkansas denizen nicknamed Brindamur, a man "of gigantic frame and extraordinary strength." Brindamur, De Mezieres complained, "has made himself a petty king over those brigands and highwaymen, who, with contempt for law and subordination with equal insult to Christians, and the shame of the very heathen, up to now have maintained themselves on that river." 109 He had been resident on the Arkansas for a long time, as his name appears in the census of 1749. Interestingly, it is placed at the very head of a considerable list of "the voyageurs who have remained up the rivers despite the orders given them." 110 All persons hunting on the rivers were supposed to return every year as passports were not issued for longer periods. But there were large numbers of hunters who lived for twenty years or more in their camps without ever reporting to the Post. They constituted a large proportion, indeed sometimes a majority, of the European population in Arkansas during the French period. The 17 49 census, for instance, lists a habitant population of only thirty-one, including the commandant and his wife. But there were forty hunters on the Arkansas River whose passports had expired, and nine on the White and St. Francis Rivers. Sixteen hunters were said to be at the Post being outfitted to return to the hunt. Brindamur, the bandit King, was murdered by one of his men after the end of the French period, "though tardily" De Mezieres reckoned, and "by divine justice."111 In the Spanish period an effort was made to rid the river of these malefactors. VII Since no records of litigation initiated at the Arkansas during the French period have survived, if indeed any were ever kept, very little can be said directly on how lawsuits were conducted there. However, in 1747 Francois Jahan initiated a suit in the Superior Council in New Orleans against one Clermont, a resident of Arkansas Post, claiming damages for the conversion of a cask of rum at Arkansas. 112 The Superior Council, as we have shown, had jurisdic- 108. 1 ATHANASE DE MEZIERES AND THE LOUISIANA-TEXAS FRONTIER, 1768-1780 166 (H. Bolton ed., 1914). 109. Id. at 168-69. 110. Resancement, supra note 105. 111. t\. BOLTON, supra note 108, at 167. 112. Index lo the Records of the Superior Court of Louisiana, 17 LA. HIST. Q. 569 (1934). 1983] COLONIAL LEGAL SYSTEM 421 tion throughout Louisiana, and this case reveals how it was exercised against a defendant in the hinterlands. The summons was served on the Attorney General of Louisiana; thus, as Henry Dart pointed out, "it would seem . . . that a resident of the Post of Arkansas could be sued in New Orleans by serving the citation on the Procureur [Attorney] General."113 How the case would have, in the ordinary instance, proceeded from there is difficult to say. Probably the Arkansas commandant would have been asked to act as a master to gather facts and to report to the Superior Council. But it seems that the commandant had already ruled independently on the matter. Commandant de Monbharvaux's statement on this case, which is entered in the record a'few days after the suit was initiated, indicates that he had held a hearing on the matter at the Arkansas, had taken testimony as to the rum, and had "sentenced Clermont to pay for it."114 Apparently he had kept no record of the proceeding, as none was offered: The good lieutenant bore his own record. It is interesting to note, however, that this case was evidently not brought to enforce the commandant's judgment but was an independent action. How did the justice provided by the Post commandant during the French period measure up? In the absence of litigation records, this is the hardest kind of question to answer. We know, however, that whatever jurisdiction was exerciseable by the commandant, he acted alone, without official advisors and without, of course, a jury. To say that rule is autocratic is not to say
Letter From The Representatives Of France, Kuwait, The Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, The United Kingdom Of Great Britain And Northern Ireland And The United States Of America To The United Nations Addressed To The President Of The Security Council ; United Nations S/PV.8217 Security Council Seventy-third year 8217th meeting Tuesday, 27 March 2018, 11.10 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Blok . (Netherlands) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Dah Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Orrenius Skau United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/243) This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-08569 (E) *1808569* S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 2/21 18-08569 The meeting was called to order at 11.10 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/243) The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, to participate in this meeting. Mr. Lowcock is joining today's meeting via video-teleconference from Geneva. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/2018/243, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017). Recalling the latest note by the President of the Security Council on its working methods (S/2017/507), I want to encourage all participants, both members and non-members of the Council, to deliver their statements in five minutes or less. Note 507 also encourages briefers to be succinct and focus on key issues. Briefers are further encouraged to limit initial remarks to 15 minutes or less. I now give the floor to Mr. Lowcock. Mr. Lowcock: As all members of the Council know, the Syrian conflict has now entered its eighth year. When weapons speak, civilians pay the price — a relentless price with horrific violence, bloodshed and unspeakable suffering. The past few months have been some of the worst yet for many civilians in Syria. Today I want to start with the situation in eastern Ghouta. Since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) on 24 February, military operations in eastern Ghouta, in particular air strikes, have reportedly killed more than 1,700 people. Thousands more have been injured. Attacks on critical civilian infrastructure, such as medical facilities, continue to be reported. There have been at least 28 reported attacks on health facilities since mid-February and more than 70 verified incidents since the beginning of the year. The World Health Organization has reported that attacks on health facilities, health workers and health infrastructure were recorded during the first two months of the year at three times the rate that we saw during 2017. In recent weeks in Damascus city, at least 78 people were reportedly killed and another 230 injured by shells fired from eastern Ghouta. That includes reports of at least 35 people killed and scores wounded on 20 March, when Kashkul market in Jaramana, a suburb in the south-eastern part of the city, was struck by a rocket. Tens of thousands of civilians have been displaced from Douma, Harasta, Sagba and Kafr Batna in recent days and weeks. So far, reports indicate that some 80,000 civilians have been taken to places in Damascus city and rural Damascus. Nearly 20,000 combatants and civilians have been transported to locations in north-western Syria. Nearly 52,000 civilians from eastern Ghouta are currently being hosted in eight collective shelters in rural Damascus. That displaced population has endured months of limited access to food, medical care and other essential items. In the words of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, Ali Al-Za'tari, who met and spoke to some of them, those people are "tired, hungry, traumatized and afraid". Most of the collective shelters do not have the capacity or infrastructure to accommodate such large numbers of people. They are extremely overcrowded and severely lacking in basic water, sanitation and hygiene facilities. There are a number of serious protection concerns related to risks of gender-based violence, unaccompanied and separated children and restrictions on movement. The United Nations is not in charge of the management of those shelters. However, since 13 March, together with humanitarian partners, we have mobilized a rapid response to provide evacuees with basic support in close coordination with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and other local partners. So far, more than 130,000 non-food items have been distributed, 130 emergency 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 3/21 toilets have been installed, and water trucking services have been provided to most shelters. In addition, supplies to feed more than 50,000 people and a total of 38 mobile health teams and 18 mobile medical teams are currently providing support to those in need inside the shelters. Humanitarian organizations also need access to the people still trapped within eastern Ghouta, in particular in Douma, where fighting and siege continue. The United Nations and its partners are ready to proceed to Douma with food for up to 16,500 people, as well as health, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene supplies, but facilitation letters need to be signed by the Government of Syria. I reiterate the Secretary-General's call on all parties to fully respect international humanitarian law and human rights law in order to ensure immediate humanitarian access and guarantee the protection of civilians, including in relation to displacements and evacuations. The United Nations and its partners require unimpeded access to all those affected by the situation in eastern Ghouta. That means access to the areas where civilians remain, through which they transit and to which they exit, such as collective shelters, in order to ensure that effective protection mechanisms are in place so that we can deter any possible violations and provide remedial protection support. Eastern Ghouta is not the only place in which humanitarian needs continue to increase. In north-western Syria, in recent weeks, an estimated 183,500 people have been displaced by hostilities in Afrin district in Aleppo governorate. The majority — some 140,000 people — have fled to Tell Rifaat and the remainder have gone to Nubl, Al-Zahraa, Manbij, Hasakah and surrounding areas. That massive influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is putting a strain on host communities, which are already overwhelmed. Two days ago, on 25 March, an inter-agency convoy to Tell Rifaat delivered assistance for some 50,000 people. However, overall, humanitarian partners are still struggling to gain sustainable access to the area. Moreover, access to Aleppo city for IDPs from Afrin district is currently restricted. Of particular concern are medical evacuations that are urgently required for severely sick people to receive care in specialized hospitals in Aleppo city. Four deaths due to the lack of proper health care have already been reported. Between 50,000 and 70,000 people are estimated still to be in Afrin city. Humanitarian access to the city and its outer perimeters is possible through cross-border operations mandated by the Council. Today, the Government of Turkey told us that it is positively disposed towards such access, and we plan to run convoys in the very near future. We know that needs are very substantial. In Idlib governorate, the situation remains catastrophic, with almost 400,000 people displaced since mid-December. Local capacity to assist is overstretched. Thousands more people are now arriving there from eastern Ghouta, with no sites or shelters available for the vast majority of them. We have received reports of an increase in violence in Idlib in recent days. According to local sources, on 20 March air strikes hit an IDP shelter on the outskirts of Haas village in southern rural Idlib governorate, reportedly killing at least 10 displaced people and injuring another 15. On 21 March, air strikes on Kafr Battikh village, also in southern rural Idlib governorate, reportedly killed scores more. The next day, the central market in Harim town was hit by an air strike, reportedly killing 35 people, including many women and children. On 12 March, air strikes also resumed in southern Syria, with attacks being reported in and around Dar'a city. There have been no air strikes in those areas since an agreement was reached last year on the establishment of a de-escalation zone for parts of the south of the country. That therefore appears to be a major unwelcome development. Let me turn to Raqqa. On 19 March, we received approval from the Syrian authorities for an assessment mission to Raqqa city by the United Nations Mine Action Service, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the World Health Organization. As Council members know, we have been seeking agreement to that for some time. That was on 19 March. Three days later, on 22 March, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security deployed a team to conduct a security assessment. They report that while the city is considered calm and stable, considerable risk remains. Raqqa city is still highly contaminated with landmines, unexploded ordnances, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices. We hope that access to Raqqa city will be possible for humanitarian aid deliveries via Qamishli, Manbij, Aleppo, Hamah S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 4/21 18-08569 and Homs, depending on operational and logistical arrangements. The United Nations and our partners are now preparing a humanitarian assessment mission, which is likely to take place next week. Next I shall address Rukban, on the Syria-Jordan border. United Nations partners received permission from the Syrian authorities on 8 March to organize a humanitarian convoy from Damascus to reach people in need along the Syria-Jordan border. Last week, on 19 March, the United Nations itself received permission to join that humanitarian mission. Preparations are ongoing, and a first humanitarian convoy is expected to deploy soon. As the Council knows, we have been seeking approval for that for many months. As we sit here today, almost at the end of the month, we have reached some 137,000 people in need through inter-agency convoys — that is, cross-line convoys sent to hard-to-reach and besieged areas — to Tell Rifaat, Al-Dar al-Kabirah and Douma. That is limited, incremental progress, compared to the first part of the year, thanks to the extraordinary efforts of the team on the ground and some of those around this table. But we are essentially just given crumbs — an occasional convoy here and there, often, coincidentally, shortly before our monthly briefings to the Council. A total of 5.6 million Syrians in acute need cannot live on crumbs, and with a quarter of the year gone, our level of access is currently far worse than it was this time last year. We need the support of all Council members and members of the International Syria Support Group humanitarian task force to do their part to exert their individual and collective influence over the parties. A few days ago, the Government of Syria and others asked for more United Nations help with humanitarian aid in eastern Ghouta. In response, we have, first, proposed that a team of United Nations emergency response experts be deployed to strengthen efforts on the ground. Visa requests for the team have been submitted. Secondly, we have confirmed a new allocation of $20 million from the Syria Humanitarian Fund, which is managed by my Office, for eastern Ghouta and those displaced from Afrin to provide shelter materials, improve sanitation for displaced people, ensure that safe water is available, provide life-saving medicines and medical services and put in place measures to enhance protection in relocation sites. The United Nations and its partners, on average, reach 7.5 million people every month with life-saving humanitarian assistance across the whole of Syria. Clearly, without that assistance, the situation would be even more catastrophic than it is now and the loss of life even greater. The United Nations has no money of its own to do those things. We can do them only because we receive voluntary contributions from our donors. I want to take this opportunity to thank everyone who has supported our appeal over the last year, including our top donors: the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Norway, Canada, Japan, Denmark, Sweden, Qatar, Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Resolution 2401 (2018) was adopted just over a month ago. I ask all in the Council to make the resolution a reality. Whatever the difficulty, the United Nations and its partners remain determined to follow through, for the sake of the Syrian people. The President: I thank Mr. Lowcock for his briefing. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Recently, a Dutch photographer working with Save the Children published a photo album featuring 48 Syrian children, all seven years old. Those photos were school portraits, like we all had taken when we were young. The children were born in Syria, but they had to flee. They are as old as the Syrian war, so they have never seen their country at peace. Their memories of their homeland are fading. Sometimes they cannot remember their country at all, nor their family members left behind. But by giving those young children a public face, the photographer has tried to restore some of the dignity sacrificed to a war in which all humanity seems lost. I have here a photo of Nour. Those children were relatively lucky; they were able to escape. At the same time, inside Syria, during seven years of war, thousands of children have been killed. I myself am a father, and I am certainly not the only parent in this Chamber. Images of children affected by war should leave no one unmoved. Despite any differences between us, we should at least have one thing in common: the belief that protecting children should come first. Yet, such protection is lacking. The Syrian crisis is, above all, a protection crisis — a grave violation of the long-established norm to protect civilians and their belongings in the time of war. 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 5/21 Together, we — the international community — have expressed our determination to prevent conflict and save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. And where conflict cannot be prevented, we have agreed to regulate the conduct of warfare. One of the very first steps to that end was taken in Russia, almost 150 years ago. In Saint Petersburg, it was decided to forbid weapons that cause unnecessary suffering. Since those first steps, the body of international humanitarian law has grown considerably, including through the adoption of the Hague and Geneva Conventions. The imperative of those laws has always been to protect civilians in conflict, to spare them from disaster, save them from harm and respect their dignity. Sadly, what we see in Syria today is the exact opposite. Every day, many are showing total disregard for civilians. In eastern Ghouta, the Syrian regime and its allies, including Russia, have trapped hundreds of thousands of civilians and are relentlessly continuing their offensive. The United Nations has reported air strikes on densely populated areas, blatant attacks targeting hospitals and medical personnel, the use of starvation as a weapon of war and the use of chemical weapons. Many innocent children, women and men are suffering. They should be protected. Yet instead, families are seeing their homes destroyed, their loved ones killed and their dignity shattered. In Afrin, the effects of the Turkey-led offensive are clear for all to see: a worsening of the already precarious humanitarian situation, with more than 160,000 displaced people and a further obstacle to efforts to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS). I ask Turkey not to extend its military activities to other border regions in Syria or Iraq. Four weeks ago, the Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018). It is telling that in 2018, the Council should need to spell out that warring parties should immediately lift all sieges in Syria and grant unimpeded humanitarian access to those in acute need. Those are by no means exceptional demands. They are basic obligations under international humanitarian law, developed over decades to instil minimum standards of human decency in warfare. Not even the presence of terrorists is an excuse for disregarding those standards. It is humiliating that the Council is unable to enforce those minimum standards. If the Council is not willing or able to do it, who is? With all that in mind, we should not forget that the responsibility, and indeed the obligation, to execute the Council's decisions lies with individual Member States. So what should be done? First, we should reaffirm these norms and enforce the relevant resolutions. We call on all parties to the Syrian conflict — including the Syrian regime, Russia, Iran, Turkey and armed opposition groups — to respect and implement the Council's decisions. Secondly, we must strengthen resolution 2401 (2018), with United Nations monitoring of the implementation of the ceasefire and with full access for fact-finding missions to sites and collective shelters housing internally displaced persons. These missions are ready to go; we need their impartial information. Thirdly, with regard to accountability, if there is to be any credible, stable and lasting peace in Syria, the current culture of impunity must end. All those guilty of crimes must be brought to justice. The perpetrators of crimes, including ISIS and Al-Qaida, must know that they are being watched, followed and identified. They must know that files are being compiled with a view to prosecuting them for crimes that may include genocide. They must know that one day they will be held accountable. We urge all States to increase their support for the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, which aims to ensure that information about serious crimes is collected, analysed and preserved for future prosecutions. The Netherlands again calls on all Council members to support referring the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court. What will become of the children in the photographs I mentioned? Will they one day be able to return to Syria? Like all children, they long for a normal life, for stability, for safety. The Syrian regime believes in a military solution. But there is none. There are no winners in this war. But it is clear who is losing — the ordinary people of Syria. In these most extreme circumstances we commend the incredible courage and perseverance of the humanitarian aid workers. It is up to us to restore credibility to the Council. It is up to us to ensure a negotiated political process, in which all Syrians and other relevant actors are represented. And it is up to us to end the agony and restore dignity and humanity to the people of Syria. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 6/21 18-08569 I give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): We welcome you, Sir, in presiding over this important meeting. I am delivering this statement on behalf of Kuwait and Sweden. At the outset, I would like to thank the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mr. Mark Lowcock, for his briefing. Today I will address three main areas: first, the status of the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018); secondly, measures needed to improve the humanitarian situation; and thirdly, the responsibility of the parties to implement the resolution. First, on the status of the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), we are meeting today one month after its unanimous adoption by the Security Council, calling on all parties to cease hostilities without delay for 30 days following the adoption of the resolution. We deplore the fact that it has not yet been implemented. However, we must continue to do everything in our power to ensure the resolution's full implementation throughout Syria. The increased number of humanitarian convoys entering the besieged areas during the month of March shows that partial delivery was achieved by comparison to the complete deadlock in access in previous months. That indicates that progress can be made in implementing the resolution, and we must build on that progress. We affirm that the provisions of the resolution will remain valid beyond the first 30 days after its adoption. We look forward to continued reports from the Secretariat on the status of implementation through monthly briefings, as stipulated in the resolution. In that regard, we support the proposal for providing the Council with further regular updates. We appreciate the continued efforts of the United Nations to facilitate talks among all parties in eastern Ghouta with the goal of securing a ceasefire. We are particularly concerned about the continued military offensive by the Syrian authorities in eastern Ghouta, as well as air strikes on Dar'a and Idlib. The shelling of Damascus from eastern Ghouta is also a matter of concern. All of those acts of violence have claimed the lives of hundreds of innocent civilians. Secondly, on measures needed to improve the humanitarian situation, we must take the necessary measures to protect civilians fleeing eastern Ghouta and to improve the humanitarian situation in collective shelters. As we have said before, implementing the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018) is the only way to improve the humanitarian situation and to achieve tangible progress in that regard. Those provisions stipulate that there must be a cessation of hostilities and that access for humanitarian aid to reach the civilian population must be enabled. Regarding the humanitarian situation in eastern Ghouta, we have five points to convey to the relevant parties, which represent our special concerns about the protection of civilians. First, all evacuations must be voluntary. People must have the right to return and to choose safe places to go to. Secondly, any negotiations on the evacuation of civilians should include civilian representatives, such as local councils. Thirdly, humanitarian aid convoys should continue to enter eastern Ghouta for the benefit of those who decided to stay there. Those convoys should occur on a weekly basis, as stipulated in resolution 2401 (2018), according to the United Nations assessment of needs, including medical supplies, and with full access for United Nations staff. Fourthly, human rights violations, including detentions, disappearances and forced conscriptions, must end. Those are serious protection concerns for civilians staying in eastern Ghouta and for those leaving it. We therefore encourage the United Nations to register the names of those evacuated and their destinations and to reinforce its presence in the collective shelters for internally displaced persons, including through the use of monitors to protect them and prevent sexual violence. We call on the Syrian authorities to grant immediate permission for that. Fifthly, the deteriorating situation in the collective shelters for the internally displaced persons should be improved as quickly as possible as the number of new arrivals continues to rise. We are deeply concerned that the United Nations partners are bearing the brunt of a burden beyond their capacity. It will therefore be essential to make the maximum use of the United Nations, its staff and its resources in order to assist in managing the increasingly crowded collective shelters. We welcome the United Nations plans to increase staff on the ground to that end, and we encourage the United Nations to do the same for eastern Ghouta as soon as the security situation allows. We call on the Syrian authorities to grant visas for additional United Nations staff immediately. 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 7/21 Thirdly, on the responsibility of the parties to implement the resolution, we have a collective responsibility, as members of the Council and, specifically, as parties with influence, to work with the Syrian authorities and urge them to implement the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018) according to international humanitarian law. We expect the guarantors of the Astana agreement, Russia, Iran and Turkey, to achieve progress towards the fulfilment of the commitments undertaken in the statement they issued on 16 March in advance of their summit meeting, to be held in Istanbul on 4 April. Those commitments include, first, ensuring rapid, safe and unhindered access for humanitarian aid to areas affected by the conflict; secondly, increasing their efforts, as guarantors of the ceasefire agreement, to ensure observance of the respective agreements; and thirdly, pursuing their efforts to implement the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018). In conclusion, we affirm our full commitment to continuing to follow up closely on the status of the implementation of the resolution in the monthly reports to the Council. We will spare no effort to make progress in its implementation. This month marks the beginning of the eighth year of the conflict in Syria. Sadly, there is still a need for an end to the violence, sustained humanitarian and medical aid through weekly convoys across conflict lines, evacuation operations, the protection of civilians and hospitals, and the lifting of the siege. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I thank you, Foreign Minister Blok, for presiding over this meeting, and I thank Under-Secretary-General Lowcock for once again laying out the facts about what is happening in Syria. I also want to personally welcome Karen Pierce to the Council as the new Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom. I know all of us in the Chamber look forward to working with her. Today we have a very difficult subject to address: siege, starvation and surrender. That is the awful, unceasing rhythm of the Syrian war. As we meet today, the third step, surrender, is taking place in eastern Ghouta. After years of enduring siege and starvation, residents are surrendering eastern Ghouta. The terrible irony of this moment must be stated and acknowledged. In the 30 days since the Security Council demanded a ceasefire, the bombardment of the people of eastern Ghouta has only increased and now, at the end of the so-called ceasefire, eastern Ghouta has nearly fallen. History will not be kind when it judges the effectiveness of the Council in relieving the suffering of the Syrian people. Seventeen hundred Syrian civilians have been killed in the past month alone. Hospitals and ambulances are being deliberately targeted with bombs and artillery. Schools are being hit, like the one in eastern Ghouta that was bombed just last week, killing 15 children. Siege, starvation and surrender. I would like to ask my Security Council colleagues to consider whether we are wrong when we point to the Russian and Iranian forces working alongside Al-Assad as being responsible for the slaughter. Russia voted for the so-called ceasefire in Syria last month (see S/PV.8188). More than that, Russia took its time painstakingly negotiating resolution 2401 (2018), which demanded the ceasefire. If we watched closely during the negotiations, we could see our Russian friends constantly leaving the room to confer with their Syrian counterparts. The possibilities for what was going on are only two. Either Russia was informing its Syrian colleagues about the content of the negotiations, or Russia was taking directions from its Syrian colleagues about the content of the negotiations. Either way, Russia cynically negotiated a ceasefire that it instantly defied. Russia even had the audacity to claim that it is the only Council member implementing resolution 2401 (2018). How can that possibly be true when in the first four days after the so-called ceasefire, Russian military aircraft conducted at least 20 daily bombing missions on Damascus and eastern Ghouta, while the people of Syria remained under siege? The so-called ceasefire was intended to allow humanitarian access to sick and starving civilians. Russia even doubled down on its cynicism by proposing five-hour pauses in the fighting. It said that they were necessary to allow humanitarian convoys to get through, but Russian and Syrian bombs continue to prevent the delivery of humanitarian aid. Only after territory falls into the hands of the Al-Assad Government and its allies do they allow food and medicine to be delivered. Russia and Syria's rationalization is that they have to continue to bomb in eastern Ghouta in order to combat what they call terrorists. That is a transparent excuse for the Russians and Al-Assad to maintain their assault. Meanwhile, from the very beginning, the opposition groups in eastern Ghouta expressed their readiness to implement the ceasefire. They told the Council that they welcomed the resolution. Russia's response was to call those groups terrorists and keep pummelling S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 8/21 18-08569 civilians into submission, while the people of Syria continue to starve. Last week, after Syrian civilians had spent years barely surviving, an agreement was reached to allow them to leave eastern Ghouta. Who brokered it? Russia. So we see the cycle being completed. The people of eastern Ghouta are surrendering. That is the ugly reality on the ground in Syria today. Cynical accusations of bad faith from Russia will not stop us from speaking out, and their blatantly false narratives will not keep us from telling the world about Russia's central role in bombing the Syrian people into submission. Fifteen days ago, when it was apparent that the Russian, Syrian and Iranian regimes were utterly ignoring the ceasefire, the United States developed a plan for a tougher and more targeted ceasefire focused on Damascus city and eastern Ghouta. Despite overwhelming evidence that the ceasefire was being ignored, some of our colleagues urged us to give resolution 2401 (2018) a chance to work. Reluctantly, we agreed and put off introducing the resolution. Now, more than 80 per cent of eastern Ghouta is controlled by Al-Assad and his allies. Their deception, hypocrisy and brutality have overtaken the chance of a ceasefire in eastern Ghouta, and for that we should all be ashamed. If we were upholding our responsibility as a Security Council, we would adopt a resolution today recognizing the reality of what happened in eastern Ghouta. A responsible Security Council would condemn the Syrian authorities, along with Russia and Iran, for launching a military offensive to seize eastern Ghouta the same day that we called for a ceasefire. A responsible Security Council would condemn the Al-Assad regime for deliberately blocking convoys of humanitarian aid during its military campaign and removing medical items from convoys that attempted to reach eastern Ghouta. A responsible Security Council would recognize that the provision of humanitarian aid was never safe, unimpeded or sustained, and that there was no lifting of sieges. A responsible Security Council would express its outrage that at least 1,700 civilians were killed during a military campaign that it demanded to come to a halt — 1,700 civilians who should have been spared in the ceasefire we demanded, but who died on our watch. But we cannot. We cannot take those actions because Russia will stop at nothing to use its permanent seat on the Council to shield its ally Bashar Al-Assad from even the faintest criticism. And we cannot take those actions because instead of calling out the ways in which Al-Assad, Russia and Iran made a mockery of our calls for a ceasefire, too many members of the Council wanted to wait. That is a travesty. This should be a day of shame for every member of the Council and it should be a lesson about what happens when we focus on fleeting displays of unity instead of on what is right. For those who think otherwise, the people of eastern Ghouta deserve an explanation. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): At the outset, I would like to thank Mark Lowcock for his briefing and to commend him on his tireless efforts and those of his team in their response to the urgent and severe humanitarian situation in Syria. To address that urgency and severity, a month ago almost to the day the Security Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018). We thus collectively and unanimously demanded that all the parties to the conflict cease hostilities throughout the country to allow for sustained and unimpeded humanitarian access to civilians in need and for medical evacuations. A month later, what is the situation? Not only has resolution 2401 (2018) not been implemented, but the humanitarian situation in Syria has worsened. The civilian population is living in despair, trapped between bargaining and fighting, particularly in eastern Ghouta. Over the past few weeks, not only has the fighting has not subsided; it has doubled in intensity, with a land offensive launched by the regime, supported by its allies Russia and Iran. The carefully planned offensive was unremitting, using the double strategy of terror and parallel negotiations that was used in Aleppo to obtain the surrender of combatants and the displacement of civilians. For a month there has not been a single day when eastern Ghouta, which has been besieged and starved for years, has not suffered indiscriminate shelling by the regime and its supporters. They have systematically bombed schools and hospitals and killed more than 1,700 civilians, including more than 300 children. Those deaths are the result of a deliberate strategy of the Syrian regime to forcibly bend an entire population, annihilate any form of opposition and remain in power. Nothing should justify breaches of international humanitarian law. Not one humanitarian convoy has been authorized to enter eastern Ghouta since 15 March, and almost no humanitarian assistance has 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 9/21 been delivered in recent weeks. Meanwhile, there are immense needs among those still in eastern Ghouta, the majority of whom are women and children. For several days we have been witnessing forced evacuations of populations from eastern Ghouta, which could constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes. We have demanded humanitarian access to eastern Ghouta in order to provide assistance to people in their own homes, where they wish to stay as long as the ceasefire allows. That was the reason for the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). Instead, we have witnessed just the opposite — an escalation of violence to force a massive displacement of civilians. Bombing has forced civilians, approximately 80,000 people, to flee. The displacement of people from eastern Ghouta is an integral part of the military strategy of the Syrian regime to force the opposition to capitulate. Once again, civilians are the primary victims. As I said, those forced displacements could constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes. Evidence of such crimes will be collected, preserved and used. We were clear on that point during the Arria-formula Council meeting with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights a few days ago. Some 55,000 civilians are now in eight collective camps managed by the Syrian regime around eastern Ghouta, without water or electricity and in disastrous sanitary conditions. Their lot has not improved; their hell has simply moved a few kilometres away. We are extremely concerned about the fate of those civilians who now live in overcrowded conditions, with no assurances of protection or security, with no guarantee that they will return home. How do we protect civilians in the situation I have just described? It is absolutely urgent to protect those who can still be protected. Although the 30-day cessation of hostilities demanded by resolution 2401 (2018) has still not been implemented, that demand remains, more urgent and relevant than ever. The resolution is still the framework for our collective action. In that regard, and in line with the briefing just given by Mark Lowcock, I would like to underscore three vital demands. First, it is indispensable and urgent that humanitarian convoys be allowed to enter eastern Ghouta daily and with adequate security. Although humanitarian needs are great, the regime continues to deliberately block aid. United Nations convoys must be able to enter and make deliveries. Fighting must cease long enough to allow for delivery, unloading and distribution of supplies, including of medical assistance. The second demand concerns civilians who remain in Ghouta, who have the right to emergency humanitarian assistance and to protection. Aid must reach them where they are. To that end, the United Nations and its international and local humanitarian partners must be able to work safely on site to assess the needs of those populations. It is an obligation under international humanitarian law, but it is the minimum required to provide tangible assistance to those concerned. The protection that is due them under international humanitarian law must be unconditionally guaranteed. In that regard I call again on the responsibility of all actors with influence on the Syrian regime. The third demand, which has taken on new importance in recent days, is for assistance to be provided to the displaced civilians in camps outside Ghouta. Very concretely, that means that those populations, who have been forced to leave everything behind in order to survive, must be assured of their safety, access to basic necessities and a chance to return home when they so desire. Care must be taken that they are not threatened with retaliation, threats or persecution of any kind. In order to ensure that they are protected, the United Nations and its partners must be able to escort civilians who have been evacuated from their point of departure to their destination in the collective shelters. The United Nations and its partners must be granted continuous access to civilians living in those camps. We hope that the United Nations can strengthen its support to displaced persons who have fled eastern Ghouta. That would call for an increase in the number of international staff on site. We hope that approval will be granted to that end as soon as possible. It would also call for security guarantees for humanitarian workers. The situation in Afrin is also extremely worrisome. A great many civilians are in a critical situation. More that 180,000 people have been displaced. A single convoy was authorized, yesterday, which is insufficient given the tremendous needs of the population. Ongoing fighting in Afrin has forced the Syrian Democratic Forces to halt operations against Da'esh, whose threat, as we all know, has not dissappeared. Our position on the issue is the same. The legitimate concerns of Turkey with regard to the security of its borders cannot in any way justify a lasting military presence deep inside Syria. S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 10/21 18-08569 More than ever, we need the fighting to end. We call on all parties on the ground to conclude the negotiations under way and respect a cessation of hostilities. We support the efforts of the Special Envoy for Syria, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, and his commitment to resuming the Geneva process and to reaching a lasting political solution in line with resolution 2254 (2015) that starts with the establishment of an inclusive constitutional committee, under the auspices of Mr. De Mistura. It is the only way to end the Syrian crisis. It is absolutely essential to work on both the humanitarian and political fronts. I appeal on behalf of France, first, to those who can make a difference on the ground, starting with Russia. It is never to late to save lives. Let us be well aware that without urgent, decisive action, the worst is undoubtedly yet to come in the form of a worsening and enlargement of the conflict. The time has come for us to learn seriously the lessons of the Syrian tragedy. This tragedy is the illustration of a new global disorder where the rappelling ropes have disappeared due to a lack of strong international governance, a lack of a power of last resort and a lack of convergence among key actors — to which we add the well-known attitude of Russia. In other words, if we want to avoid other tragedies of this type in future, it is essential to structure the multipolar world in which we now find ourselves around a robust multilateralism embodied by a reformed United Nations. It is the only alternative to the fragmentation of the world and the return to the zones of influence — and our history teaches us all the dangers of that — and it is with the settlement of the Syrian crisis, which is our priority today and which is the emergency before us, one of the other challenges of our generation. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I thank you, Mr. President, both for being here today to underscore the vital importance of this topic and, in particular, for your very powerful statement. The United Kingdom supports your call for a referral of the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court. I also wish to express our thanks to the Under- Secretary-General for his continued efforts to keep the Security Council informed of the toll that hostilities are having on civilians in Syria. We also thank him for the heroic efforts of all his teams on the ground. Their efforts are much supported by most of us on the Council. The Under-Secretary-General's briefing eloquently underscores why it is essential that the Council comes together to agree on concrete steps to allow the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to fulfil its mandate to ensure humanitarian assistance and protection for everybody who needs it. Ambassador Haley has laid the situation bare, Ambassador Delattre has set out the regime's intentions, and Ambassador Alotaibi has focused on the need for protection and registration. I support their calls. I will not rehearse a catalogue of suffering that we have heard expressed so eloquently today, but that omission should not be taken as any indication that the United Kingdom is not as horrified as others by what is happening on the ground. Specifically, it is diabolical that access is actually worse in the face of such suffering. Diabolical is a strong word, but there are no others to describe what is happening. The worst destruction and suffering has continued in eastern Ghouta. Those who support Al-Assad have not taken steps to help stop the violence. Instead, Al-Assad and his supporters have violated the strong words of the Security Council in resolution 2401 (2018), making mockery of the Council's authority, as Ambassador Delattre stated. Since 11 March, an estimated 100,000 people have left eastern Ghouta and are in makeshift reception sites in rural Damascus. Thousands more have been bused to Idlib. Because there is no independent monitoring nor provisions for civilian safety, those fleeing and those staying remain vulnerable and at risk of mistreatment and abuse by the regime, including being detained, disappeared or separated from their families. Humanitarians, health workers and first responders on the ground report that the regime is deliberately targeting them. That is illegal, and those who help the Al-Assad regime are complicit in that illegality. The situation continues even for those who are left behind. An estimated 150,000 civilians remain in eastern Ghouta. They suffer from acute food shortages and lack of medical supplies. They are afraid, and above all they remember how the regime punished the civilians who fled from eastern Aleppo in December 2016. That is why Ambassador Alotaibi's call for protection and registration is so urgent. We welcome United Nations plans to scale up support to deal with the dire situations in the internally displaced persons camps and collective shelters. We call on Russia to use its influence with the regime to 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 11/21 ensure that the United Nations and its partners can also provide assistance and protection for those who remain in eastern Ghouta. Whether civilians choose to stay or leave, it is essential that they be protected against attack and have access to the essentials to survive. This is not just a plea on the grounds of humanity; it is a requirement under international humanitarian law. It is the job of the Council and all members of the Council to uphold international humanitarian law. Those who side with the regime in its actions are themselves guilty of violating that law. In concluding, I would like to highlight two further areas. The suffering of the Syrian people continues in Idlib, where civilians have been under attack by regime forces for many years. More than a million internally displaced Syrians live there, including those who have fled eastern Ghouta. In Afrin, we recognize Turkey's legitimate interest in the security of its borders, but at the same time we remain concerned about the impact of operations on the humanitarian situation, and my Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary have raised the need for protection of civilians and access with President Erdoğan and his Ministers. It was good to hear from the Under-Secretary-General that there may at last be signs of progress in Afrin. After seven years of conflict, over 13 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in Syria. The Al-Assad regime has created the situation and is now preventing humanitarian actors from relieving some of the horror it has inflicted. We call on Russia to use its influence to ensure that at a minimum the United Nations can fulfil its mandate to ensure humanitarian assistance and protection for Syrians on the basis of need, regardless of any other considerations. I was at Geneva in 2012. I think we all feel that that was a huge missed opportunity, in the light of events. The situation has escalated every year since that time, and, as the Under-Secretary-General said, the level of access is worse. The Council has a small opportunity to put measures in place to reduce the risk of reprisals. As you said, Mr. President, if the Security Council cannot do it, who can? Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): I join others in thanking Under-Secretary-General Lowcock for his comprehensive briefing. I also wish to welcome the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, His Excellency Mr. Stephanus Abraham Blok, who is presiding over today's meeting. Kazakhstan remains committed to all Security Council resolutions aimed at solving humanitarian issues in Syria. We believe that it is most important to preserve all possible humanitarian-access modalities, including cross-border assistance, which are indispensable in bringing humanitarian aid to millions of people in Syria. Implementing resolution 2401 (2018) is a collective responsibility, with each Council member and State Member of the United Nations playing a significant role. We must all continue to do everything we can to ensure full implementation across Syria. We look forward to continued reporting on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) to the Council through the regular Syria briefings and reports of the Secretary- General, as stipulated in the resolution. Urgent attention must be focused on long-term humanitarian assistance, with the assurance of safe humanitarian access by the United Nations and other aid agencies, and evacuation of the wounded. We commend the sterling contribution of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health Organization and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent for their provision of increased medical supplies and life-saving services, including surgical procedures. In that regard, we welcome the increase in humanitarian convoys gaining access to besieged areas in Syria in March, compared to previous months. It is necessary to take note of the worrisome humanitarian situation in Syria, as fighting in different parts of the country are causing massive displacement. We endorse the appeal of the United Nations to help stem the catastrophic situation for tens of thousands of people, from both eastern Ghouta and Afrin. We look forward to the next round of talks, to be held in mid-May in our capital, Astana, where the stepping up of efforts to ensure observance of the relevant agreements will be addressed. We also believe that the dialogue between Under- Secretary-General Mark Lowcock and the Government of Syria should be ongoing. We reiterate that all obligations under international humanitarian law must be respected by all parties. A further United Nations needs-assessment mission to these troubled areas, similar to that which Under-Secretary-General Lowcock led recently, may be required very soon. The Syrian authorities must cooperate fully with the United Nations and relevant humanitarian organizations in S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 12/21 18-08569 facilitating the unhindered provision of humanitarian assistance and thereby mitigating the suffering. Lastly, we are of the view that the crisis in Syria can be resolved only through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process, based on the Geneva communiqué of 30 June 2012 (S/2012/522, annex), subsequent Security Council resolutions and relevant statements of the International Syria Support Group. Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We appreciate the convening of this meeting and the briefing by Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary- General for Humanitarian Affairs, on the humanitarian situation in Syria. We also welcome your presence here today, Sir, in presiding over our meeting. Peru deeply regrets that violence and human suffering continue to characterize the situation in Syria, 30 days after the humanitarian ceasefire demanded by the Council. Resolution 2401 (2018) remains in full force, and we consider that the Syrian Government and other actors with the capacity to influence developments on the ground are obliged to ensure its full implementation. The ceasefire should be immediate and enable unrestricted access to humanitarian assistance throughout Syrian territory. While there has been some limited progress in that regard, the delivery of humanitarian assistance must be continuous and unrestricted. In view of the Council's responsibilities in line with international law and international humanitarian law, Peru will continue to advocate for the protection of civilians in all conflicts and humanitarian crises. An indeterminate number of Syrian citizens, including thousands of women and children, have been driven out of eastern Ghouta by the violence. We note with concern that the shelters in the vicinity of Damascus cannot cope and that they lack food, clean water and medical supplies. We must remember that international humanitarian law has mandatory provisions for the evacuation of civilians. It is also compulsory to take measures to safeguard private property from looting and destruction. Syrian citizens must be able to return to their homes and businesses when security conditions improve. We must also protect the majority of the remaining population in eastern Ghouta, who are particularly vulnerable to reprisals, forced recruitment and sexual violence. We are also concerned about the humanitarian situation in Afrin, Idlib and Raqqa, among other areas of Syria. The responsibility to protect civilians cannot be conditional or subordinated to political or strategic interests. We highlight the efforts of the United Nations and other humanitarian agencies, such as the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, to assist people in such a difficult situation. They have our full support. Given the intensification of violence in recent weeks and its devastating consequences for the population, we must once again reiterate how urgent it is to make progress towards achieving a political settlement on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). In that regard, we hope that progress will soon be made in the establishment and composition of the constitutional committee agreed on in Sochi. All the Syrian parties, and especially the Government, must engage constructively in this. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We thank Under-Secretary- General Lowcock for his comprehensive briefing. We want to express our appreciation to the United Nations and humanitarian partners for their continued selfless and courageous service in providing assistance to all Syrians in difficult circumstances. We remain concerned about the humanitarian crisis in all the areas of Syria where it is prevalent. As the Under-Secretary-General said, the Syrian war has entered its eighth year, bringing unspeakable suffering to the people of the country. The escalation of violence that we witnessed last month in eastern Ghouta and other parts of the country has been a source of extremely grave concern. According to the statement issued on 21 March by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, shelter, protection, water and sanitation remain the key priority humanitarian needs of the internally displaced. In that regard, we thank the United Nations and its humanitarian partners for providing much-needed assistance. Alleviating the suffering of Syrians requires urgent and coordinated action on the part of all actors, while respecting the relevant resolutions of the Council, particularly resolution 2401 (2018). It was encouraging that the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2401 (2018), demanding a cessation of hostilities throughout Syria for at least 30 days so as to ensure the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and medical evacuations. In that regard, while much remains to be done to fully implement the resolution, compared to the previous month there has been positive 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 13/21 action, including aid delivery to some of the areas that are especially badly affected and difficult to reach. The conflict has also diminished in intensity in some areas, according to the report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/243). However, this does not mean that the action taken has been sufficient. We therefore stress that it is vital to redouble our efforts to do everything possible to fully and comprehensively implement the resolution with a sense of urgency and enhanced political will. We believe that what the people of Syria need is a cessation of hostilities, along with protection and access to basic goods and services. All of those demands are contained and affirmed in resolution 2401 (2018). All Syrian parties should therefore respect and fully implement resolution 2401 (2018), and all States that have influence over the parties should try to bring the maximum pressure to bear on them, with the ultimate objective of helping to fully operationalize the resolution, which was adopted unanimously by the Council. In that regard, we hope that the Astana guarantors, Russia, Turkey and Iran, will play their role in implementing resolution 2401 (2018), strengthening the ceasefire arrangements and improving humanitarian conditions, as stated in their final statement of 16 March. In addition, while we acknowledge that the United Nations and its humanitarian partners have been able to reach millions of Syrians using all modes of aid delivery, the fact remains that humanitarian access, particularly inter-agency convoys, remains a critical challenge. In that connection, it is absolutely vital to ensure safe, sustained and need-based humanitarian access so that life-saving aid can reach all Syrians in need. Let me conclude by reaffirming that only a comprehensive political dialogue, under the auspices of the United Nations, can ultimately end the humanitarian tragedy in Syria. We reiterate our position that the only solution to the Syrian crisis is a political solution based on resolution 2254 (2015). We support the continued efforts of the Special Envoy and encourage all Syrian parties to engage with him constructively and meaningfully in order to revitalize the Geneva intra-Syrian talks and support the establishment of a constitutional committee, in line with the outcome of the Sochi congress. We fully concur with the Secretary- General, who states, in his report of 20 March, "Political efforts to bring the war to an end must be accorded priority and redoubled by all parties to the conflict." (S/2018/243, para. 48) While the primary responsibility for resolving the conflict lies with the Syrians themselves — a principle that is firmly embedded in resolution 2254 (2015) — the Council also has an important role to play in supporting the efforts in a spirit of unity, which we believe can have a positive impact on the ground in alleviating the suffering of all Syrians. That may be a tall order, in the light of the fragmentation that Ambassador Delattre mentioned earlier. However, the effort must be made. Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We welcome your presence, Sir, and the fact that you are presiding over the work of the Security Council today. We would also like to thank Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, for his briefing. We support him in the difficult work with which he is entrusted. We must once again express our regret that this conflict has continued for eight years and that we are still witnessing the ongoing sieges and violence being endured by the Syrian people, particularly women and children. In addition to living with the psychological consequences of the situation, they urgently need humanitarian assistance. We unequivocally condemn the ongoing bombardment of civilian infrastructure such as hospitals and schools, and the military activities in residential areas in the cities of Damascus, Afrin and Idlib, as well as in eastern Ghouta. They have only led to more civilians being killed, wounded and displaced. According to the most recent report of the Secretary General (S/2018/243), between December and February alone, there were 385,000 internally displaced persons and 2.3 million people living in besieged and hard-to-reach areas. We regret that so far there are still obstacles preventing the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). We call on all parties involved to make every effort to ensure the effective implementation of the resolution throughout Syria in order to facilitate the safe, sustained and unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid and services, as well as to enable the medical evacuation of those who are seriously ill or injured. In addition, according to the same report, since October 2017, 86,000 civilians have returned to the city of Raqqa, of whom 20,000 arrived in February alone. Regrettably, 130 civilians have died and 658 have been seriously injured by explosive remnants of war and anti-personnel mines. In that regard, we would like to highlight the visit by the United Nations mission to Raqqa last week. We reiterate that the work of clearing S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 14/21 18-08569 anti-personnel mines and explosive remnants of war is crucial to facilitating the safe return of the displaced. While it does not reflect what has gone on throughout Syrian territory, it is important to highlight the recent delivery of humanitarian aid through convoys, of which the first, on 5 March, was to Douma in eastern Ghouta, bringing food for more than 27,000 people. We also believe that cross-border assistance is an important part of the response to the situation, and we highlight the food assistance to 2 million people and the dispatch by the United Nations to areas of northern and southern Syria of 449 trucks carrying aid for 1 million people. We welcome the efforts of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, all the humanitarian agencies concerned and the Russian Federation that have enabled humanitarian assistance to be delivered to various populations, in particular in eastern Ghouta, which three convoys recently entered. We call for that assistance to continue as safely as possible. In that regard, we believe it is important to strengthen the dialogue and coordination among the humanitarian agencies, the United Nations and the Syrian Government in order to facilitate the entry of convoys and humanitarian aid workers, as well as the safe and dignified return of refugees and internally displaced persons. We emphasize the dangerous work of the personnel of the various agencies and humanitarian assistance bodies, whose staff risk their own lives in carrying out their dangerous work on the ground. We therefore reiterate the importance of full respect for international humanitarian law and international human rights law. We want to take this opportunity to reiterate how important it is to build on the political momentum following the commitments made at the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi. That should be the channel for reinforcing the Geneva process, led by the United Nations in the context of resolution 2254 (2016). We hope for the speedy implementation of the Sochi outcome and, as a result, the establishment of a constitutional committee that can facilitate a viable political transition. In that regard, we support the results of the latest Astana meeting, which enabled the agreements establishing de-escalation zones to be strengthened. We hope they will be reflected on the ground so as to reduce the violence and meet the urgent humanitarian needs. We condemn any attempt to foment fragmentation or sectarianism in Syria and believe that it is the Syrian people who must freely decide their future and their political leadership in the context of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Finally, we reiterate that the only way to resolve the conflict is through an inclusive, negotiated and agreed political process, led by and for the Syrian people, and aimed at achieving sustainable peace on their territory without foreign pressure of any kind. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We would like to welcome you as you preside over the Council today, Sir. We also welcome Ms. Karen Pierce, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, who is now here with us. We thank Mr. Lowcock for his briefing. The difficult humanitarian situation continues in a number of areas in Syria. The Russian Federation has been taking active steps to normalize things, including within the framework of the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). While some here may not like it, it is a fact that we are the only ones who have been making concrete efforts to implement resolution 2401 (2018). Since we first established humanitarian pauses, with the assistance of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic, and the participation and oversight of the United Nations and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, nearly 121,000 people have been evacuated, on a strictly voluntarily basis — let me stress that — from eastern Ghouta. Many of them have talked about how difficult it has been for them to live under the repressive regime established by the armed group militants. Civilians continue to flee eastern Ghouta through the Muhayam-Al-Wafedin humanitarian corridor. There is real-time video of this running on the Russian Defence Ministry's official website. In just the past few days more than 520 civilians have left Douma. Russian agencies have organized the distribution to them of hot food, food kits and individual food rations, as well as bottled drinking water. Yesterday alone, Russian military doctors treated 111 civilians, including 42 children. At the same time, the Russian Centre for Reconciliation continues to organize the return of residents of Saqba and Kafr Batna. On 24 March, as a result of an agreement reached by the Centre with leaders of illegal armed groups, another checkpoint was opened for fighters and their family members to leave from Harasta, Arbin, Zamalka, Ain Terma and Jobar. In the past few days, militias from the Ahrar Al-Sham 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 15/21 and Faylak Al-Rahman groups and their relatives have been evacuated along the corridor and bused to Idlib governorate. In three days, more than 13,000 people were evacuated from Arbin alone. However, many have decided to remain, taking advantage of the presidential amnesty. Incidentally, there have been active efforts to plant stories about detentions and torture and possibly even executions. They are lies. The Syrian police are ensuring that these operations are safe, under the oversight of specialists from the Russian Centre for Reconciliation and representatives of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent. Yesterday 26 Syrian soldiers and civilians who had been taken prisoner by Faylak Al-Rahman were freed. In our view, those facts clearly attest to the difficulty and extent of the work being done by the Russian specialists on the ground, in communication with the Syrian authorities and the leaders of the armed groups. There are some members of the Security Council who prefer wasting their time on inflammatory speeches and letters making groundless claims about our country, probably to conceal their own unwillingness to do anything constructive to implement resolution 2401 (2018) in cooperation with the groups they sponsor. At the same time, yesterday the fighters from Jaysh Al-Islam who remain in Douma detonated four mines yesterday in several districts in Damascus. Six civilians died and another six were wounded. Al-Mazraa, a residential neighbourhood in the capital was shelled earlier. As a result of mine explosions around the Al-Fayhaa sports complex, a 12-year-old boy died and seven children were injured. Hundreds of people have died from mine explosions in Damascus overall. This is apparently the message that the militants are sending every day about the willingness to implement the ceasefire that they loudly proclaimed in their famous letter to the Secretary-General. I want to again point out the importance of clarifying the data used in the Secretary-General's report (S/2018/138), including on possible attacks on civilian infrastructure and the victims of such attacks. Where does that information come from? The February report has a footnote that mentions various United Nations agencies and departments of the Secretariat. The main source cited is the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, which does not have a staff presence on the ground. The big question, and what we are trying to get to the bottom of, is who is providing the United Nations staff with this kind of information? Is it the anti-Government groups and terrorist accomplices like the White Helmets? But they are interested parties. So why is there only a sprinkling of the information provided by the Syrian authorities? We call on the United Nations, humanitarian organizations and States to deliver urgent assistance to help the people who are evacuating eastern Ghouta. It is also essential to strengthen the United Nations presence around the humanitarian corridors. The Syrians need immediate assistance with the infrastructure reconstruction that the Syrian Government has begun in the liberated residential areas of eastern Ghouta. We would like to ask Mr. Lowcock to oversee that issue personally. We also hope that as soon as possible the coalition will create the conditions and provide the necessary security guarantees enabling a United Nations assessment mission to be sent to Raqqa and humanitarian convoys to the Rukban camp. The Syrian authorities gave their official consent to this some time ago, as Mark Lowcock confirmed today. We should note that we were shocked by the recent reports that more than 2,000 civilians may have died during the coalition forces' assault on Raqqa. Let me ask it once again — where were the weeping and wailing and calls for humanitarian aid then? We have noted the statistics in the Secretary-General's report on the numbers of people who have returned to Raqqa, but we would like to see similar information on other parts of Syria and the country as a whole. How many people are returning to their permanent homes? We would like to propose to the United Nations representatives that they designate the areas where those indicators are the highest as a priority for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and monitor how effectively it is being implemented. We also think it would be appropriate to include information on reconstruction assistance in the reports. Resolution 2401 (2018) stipulates that Syrian districts, including those that have been liberated from terrorists, need support in restoring normal functioning and stability. One of the key areas in that regard is mine clearance. We get the feeling that external donors are losing interest in delivering assistance to residents in areas under Syrian Government control. We are seeing signals from some capitals that only opposition-held enclaves should be helped. Such double standards go completely against the core principles of neutrality and impartial humanitarian assistance. We hope that we are wrong about this and that Mr. Lowcock will refute the S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 16/21 18-08569 possibility of such a trend. But if our suspicions are borne out, how does the United Nations intend to deal with the issue? Just the other day a meeting of senior officials was held in Oslo under the auspices of the United Nations and the European Union to address the humanitarian situation in Syria. No representatives of the Syrian authorities were invited. How does Mr. Lowcock view the prospect of another assessment of the humanitarian situation in Syria without the participation of its official representatives? Does he consider that a productive format? That is a very urgent question considering that the forthcoming second donor conference is scheduled for the end of April in Brussels. I would also like to ask Mr. Lowcock what is known at the United Nations about the facts of sexual services being provided in exchange for humanitarian assistance in the context of cross-border operations. There is information about that in the November report of the United Nations Population Fund, and the BBC did a journalistic investigation of the issue. If this issue is known about, why is it avoided in the Secretary- General's reports? And if it is not known about, it should be investigated. We hope that in close cooperation with the Syrian authorities and consideration of their views, the United Nations will agree on an emergency humanitarian response plan for this year as soon as possible, with an emphasis on the delivery of assistance to liberated areas. Ms. Wronecka (Poland): I would like to welcome you here today, Sir, and to commend the presidency's leadership. I would also like to thank Under-Secretary- General Mark Lowcock for his comprehensive but once again alarming update. Like many around this table, we share a sense of urgency on this issue, especially following the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which we adopted unanimously a month ago. Unfortunately, we have to recognize that it has not been implemented in the first 30 days since its adoption. We are meeting again when there has been no substantial change on the ground and the fighting is far from over. The military offensive in Syria continues and the human suffering is growing as a result. Any action, even against terrorists, cannot justify attacks on innocent civilians and civilian infrastructure, including health facilities. That must stop, and the parties to the conflict must strictly comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law. Accountability for serious violations is a requirement under international law and central to achieving sustainable peace in Syria. As indicated in the last report of the United Nations-mandated Commission of Inquiry, there is a need for the international community to take a broader view of accountability and to take urgent steps to ensure that the needs of Syrian conflict victims for justice and accountability are met both immediately and in the long term. We call upon all parties to alleviate the suffering of the civilians, including children, by granting them free and safe access to humanitarian assistance, including voluntary medical evacuation, which should be strictly overseen by the United Nations and the implementing partners in order to ensure the voluntary character of the process. While discussing evacuations, let me underline that people must have the right to return and to a safe location for settlement. Any evacuation negotiations should also include civilians. Humanitarian aid convoys to eastern Ghouta must continue for those who choose to stay. We would like to stress that all actors should use their full influence to immediately improve conditions on the ground. We urgently call for the cessation of hostilities in the whole of Syria. Attacks against civilians, civilian property and medical facilities must stop in order to alleviate the humanitarian suffering of the Syrian people. Some small positive steps have taken place, such as a larger number of humanitarian convoys reaching the besieged areas in March, especially when compared to previous months, when humanitarian access was almost completely blocked. That improvement shows that it is possible to make progress, although much more is needed. In that context, we call on Russia, Iran and Turkey — as the European Union did, and as the High Representatives did through their respective ministers after the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union in February — to fulfil their obligations and responsibilities as Astana guarantors. It is also important to note that the cessation of hostilities may also provide a chance for the peace talks under the auspices of the United Nations in Geneva to gain momentum so that a political solution may finally be reached. Once again, let me underline that we should seek to reach an intra-Syrian framework political agreement, in line with Council resolution 2254 (2015). In that connection, we strongly believe that the conclusions of the Congress of Syrian 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 17/21 National Dialogue in Sochi could and should be used to advance the Geneva process, especially with regard to the creation of a constitutional committee by United Nations Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura. In conclusion, let me stress the necessity of maintaining the unity of the Council on the question of the full implementation of the humanitarian resolution across Syria. The civilian population of Syria has already suffered too much. The adoption of the resolution was just the beginning of the process. We call on all with influence on the ground to take the necessary steps to ensure that the fighting stops, the Syrian people are protected and, finally, our joint humanitarian access and necessary medical evacuations continue. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): We welcome Mr. Stef Blok, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, to New York. We take this opportunity to congratulate him for the commendable presidency of the Netherlands during the month of March. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea is grateful for the holding of this informative meeting, which enables us to once again assess humanitarian resolution 2401 (2018), which we approved one month ago. We thank Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mark Lowcock, who, as he always does, has just given us a very informative and detailed briefing on the developments on the ground in Syria. The 30-day ceasefire throughout Syria, established under resolution 2401 (2018) in order to carry out humanitarian operations, has expired. Despite the diplomatic efforts of the United Nations team in Syria, violence has increased in eastern Ghouta, in Damascus, in Idlib and in Afrin, where there is an ongoing Turkish military offensive. Daily air strikes and bombardments have increased, including in residential areas, among Government forces, opposition forces and non-State armed groups, making it difficult to ensure the protection of all civilians and the immediate, secure and sustained provision of humanitarian aid. That excessive resurgence of violence, orchestrated by the various parties, only serves to exacerbate and aggravate the already grim humanitarian situation in those conflict zones. As we have reiterated, the solution to the humanitarian crisis in Syria is tightly linked with a ceasefire. The prolongation of the conflict can only further aggravate the tragic humanitarian situation, which in turn creates greater instability and negatively affects neighbouring countries that take in the millions of refugees fleeing the war. As the Secretary-General underlines in his 20 March report: "Our common objective" — and one of high priority — "should be to alleviate and end the suffering of the Syrian people. What the Syrian people need immediately has been made abundantly clear and affirmed in resolution 2401 (2018). Civilians need a cessation of hostilities, protection, access to basic goods and services" — and access to humanitarian and sanitary assistance — "and an end to sieges." (S/2018/243, para. 48) All parties involved in the Syrian crisis must accept that none of them can achieve a military victory. Government forces, opposition forces and armed groups must accept that no matter how much death and destruction they cause in their country, there will be no victor but rather one single loser — the Syrian people. Similarly, national parties and international partners that have significant political and geostrategic interests and that have the capacity to exercise their influence on their respective allies must redouble their efforts and political commitments in order to bring sustainable peace and stability to the country. Any party that insists on political red lines that block the necessary commitments must also consider the setback caused by the loss of innocent human lives. It is evident that the Council has not entirely reached its goal by unanimously adopting resolution 2401 (2018). The Republic of Equatorial Guinea will support any humanitarian initiative that seeks to definitively put an end to the suffering of the Syrian people. In conclusion, I renew the tribute of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to Mr. Lowcock and to the entire humanitarian team of the United Nations for their noble and tireless work in Syria to provide relief to the Syrian people living through a humanitarian catastrophe. Mr. Dah (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): Like others, my delegation would like to welcome Mr. Stef Blok to New York and to congratulate him on the holding of the current meeting in the Security Council. My delegation also wishes to thank Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, for his informative briefing on the humanitarian situation in Syria. S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 18/21 18-08569 As we are all aware, the war in Syria has unleashed one of the most serious humanitarian crises in recent history and continues to have a devastating impact on the Syrian people. My country remains particularly concerned about the attacks and bombings, including those against hospitals and civilian infrastructure, that continue to punctuate the daily lives of people subjected to forced displacement in the areas of Afrin, Idlib and eastern Ghouta. Côte d'Ivoire condemns those actions and calls on the parties to take the steps necessary to protect people, civilian infrastructure and humanitarian personnel. More than a month after its unanimous adoption by members of the Security Council, resolution 2401 (2018), on which so much hope was pinned, has fallen woefully short of our expectations, much to our regret. The fact is that the demand for an immediate cessation of hostilities to allow safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid and related services, as well as medical evacuation of the seriously ill and wounded, in accordance with relevant international humanitarian law, has still not been adhered to, despite our joint efforts. The ongoing fighting has forced hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee to camps and makeshift shelters where living conditions are extremely difficult. Côte d'Ivoire calls once again for the effective implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) with a view to resuming the delivery of humanitarian aid, including medical evacuations from besieged areas and camps for internally displaced persons, in order to ease the suffering of people in distress. We urge the Council to overcome its differences and to demonstrate unity in order to ensure the effective implementation of the resolution, which is more relevant than ever. My delegation reiterates its belief that the humanitarian situation will not improve unless significant progress is made at the political level, as the two issues are closely linked. We therefore encourage the parties to prioritize political dialogue and resume peace talks in the framework of the Geneva process, in accordance with the road map established by resolution 2254 (2015). Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): I thank Under-Secretary-General Lowcock for his briefing. China commends the active efforts of the relevant United Nations agencies to alleviate the humanitarian situation in some areas of Syria. The conflict in Syria is in its eighth year and has caused terrible suffering for the people of Syria. The humanitarian situation in parts of the country has recently deteriorated. China calls on all parties in Syria to put its country's future and destiny, as well as its people's safety, security and well-being first, cease hostilities and violence without delay, resolve their differences through dialogue and consultation and ease the humanitarian situation in Syria as soon as possible. United Nations humanitarian convoys have now gained access to eastern Ghouta in order to deliver aid supplies to the people there. China welcomes Russia's establishment of temporary truces in eastern Ghouta, opening up a humanitarian corridor for Syrian civilians. As a result of the efforts of the parties concerned, some ceasefire agreements have been reached and a large number of civilians evacuated through the corridor. In the circumstances, it is important to continue to promote the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) so as to alleviate the humanitarian situation in areas such as eastern Ghouta. China welcomes the meeting between Foreign Ministers held by Russia, Turkey and Iran in Astana, and commends Kazakhstan for hosting the meeting. We hope that the upcoming meeting of the Heads of State of the three countries and the next round of the Astana dialogue will contribute positively to restoring the ceasefire momentum in Syria and supporting the Geneva talks. The international community should continue to support the role of the United Nations as the main mediator, and back Special Envoy de Mistura's diplomatic efforts to relaunch the Syrian political process. Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity must be respected, and all Syrian parties must be encouraged to reach a political solution to the Syrian issue, based on the principle of the Syrian-led and Syrian-owned peace process, and in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015), with a view to fundamentally easing the humanitarian situation in Syria and continuing to advance the counter-terrorism agenda, as mandated by the Council's resolutions. The Council should remain united on the Syrian issue and speak with one voice. China stands ready to work with the international community and to contribute actively and constructively to a political settlement of the Syrian issue. 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 19/21 Mr. Orrenius Skau (Sweden): As the representative of Kuwait has already delivered a joint statement on our behalf, I will make my remarks very brief. One month ago, the Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018) by consensus, in response to the deafening calls for action to address the horrific humanitarian situation in Syria. Today we have heard around this table a continued commitment to moving forward with the implementation of that important resolution. I wanted to speak last in order to identify some points of convergence. From the discussion today, I believe that there are a number of critical areas where there is broad agreement within the Council. First, we all share a deep disappointment and sense of dissatisfaction and frustration with the lack of implementation. While a limited increase in access for humanitarian convoys shows that progress is possible, much more is needed. The resolution remains in force and all parties remain obliged to comply. Secondly, we have heard a common concern about the continuing hostilities throughout the country, particularly the ongoing military offensive in eastern Ghouta. Those who leave the area should do so voluntarily, with the right to return and a choice of safe places to go to. At the same time, humanitarian aid convoys must continue to support those who choose to remain. Thirdly, we agree that efforts to strengthen the protection of civilians must be stepped up by the United Nations and its partners, both inside eastern Ghouta and for those leaving and in the collective shelters. I want to emphasize that preventing sexual and gender-based violence should be an integral part of those efforts. We condemn the attacks in February that affected health facilities. Many colleagues also reiterated today that resolution 2401 (2018) applies across the whole of the country. I just wanted to mention our concern about the Turkish operation in Afrin and the statements that Turkey has made about expanding its military operations in the north, beyond Afrin. We are also concerned about the protection of civilians fleeing Afrin, as well as the difficult conditions for those remaining. We call on all relevant parties, especially Turkey, to ensure the protection of civilians and facilitate cross-border and cross-line humanitarian aid deliveries, as well as freedom of movement, for internally displaced persons. The need for the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) remains as urgent today as when it was adopted. As Ambassador Alotaibi has said, we will spare no effort in making progress on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). We will continue to work actively and tirelessly to that end, be creative in considering possible further steps, and remain ready to reconvene the Council at any time should the situation warrant its renewed action. We are convinced that the unity of the Council, as difficult as it may be, is the only way to effectively make a real difference on the ground and alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people. For our part, even when terribly frustrated, we will never give up trying to achieve that change. The President: I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, I would like to convey the condolences of the Government and people of my country to my colleague on the Russian Federation delegation in the wake of the tragic incident that claimed children's lives in the commercial centre in Kemerovo. A few minutes ago, I was checking the list of the States members of the Security Council and I realized that two — only two — of its 15 members have embassies in Damascus. That is why the statements made by the representatives of those two countries offered the most accurate description of the humanitarian situation in my country. They were able to provide an objective and fair assessment of the situation there. In late 2016, right here in the Chamber (see S/PV.7834), we announced the good news to our people in Syria that the Syrian Government would liberate eastern Aleppo from armed terrorist groups, and as a Government, an army and a responsible State we have done just that. Today we announce to our people the good news that the time has come to liberate all of eastern Ghouta from these armed terrorist groups. We declare that we will liberate the Golan, Afrin, Raqqa, Idlib and the rest of our occupied territory because, as a State, we reject the presence on our territory of any illegal armed group or occupying Power, regardless of the excuses, just like all other States represented in the Council. Such victories would not have been possible if we had no just cause. They would not have been possible without the sacrifices made by the Syrian Arab Army, the support of our people and the support of our allies and friends. S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 20/21 18-08569 Facts that have come to light recently with the liberation of eastern Ghouta from armed terrorist groups again prove what we have always told the Council since the first day of the global terrorist war waged by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Israel, Turkey, the United States, the United Kingdom and France against my country. We said that the suffering of Syrians is the result of the practices of armed terrorist groups against civilians. The testimonies of the tens of thousands of our people leaving eastern Ghouta underscore that those groups have continued to deprive them of their freedom, destroy their livelihoods, disperse their families and prevent them from leaving to areas under State control in order to continue using them as human shields. They have seized control of humanitarian assistance in order to distribute it to their supporters or sell it to civilians at exorbitant prices. They have also targeted the safe corridors allocated by the Government with explosive bullets and mortar shelling, which has led to the death of dozens of people, including some Palestinian brethren. We have borne witness to a state of hysteria in recent days and weeks in the Council as the Syrian Government has sought to exercise its sovereign right, combat terrorist groups and eliminate terrorists in Syria in order to restore security and stability to all Syrians and implement Council resolutions against terrorism. That state of hysteria proves that the States supporting those terrorist groups have never sought to end the suffering of Syrians. They have sought only to perpetuate and prolong their suffering in order to blackmail the Syrian Government, at the political and humanitarian levels, and save terrorists from their certain deaths. I would like to assure the supporters of terrorism, some of whom are present in this Chamber, that the plan that they have promoted for the past seven years has failed. Their plan was to deny that the Islamist takfiri groups were terrorists and instead present them as moderate Syrian opposition. That plan has failed. Eastern Ghouta has not fallen, as my colleague the representative of the United States stated. It was liberated in the same way we liberated eastern Aleppo. It is terrorism that has fallen in eastern Ghouta, not civilians. As the representative of the United States said, today should be a day of shame for the supporters and sponsors of terrorism and terrorist groups. They have supported those terrorist groups for years in order to topple the Syrian Government by force in favour of Islamist takfiri groups. Such actions have led to considerable suffering among the Syrian people, and I have proof of it. Two days ago, at the Senate Armed Forces Committee, led by Senator Lindsey Graham, the Chief of Central Command, General Joseph Votel, stated that "the change of the Government in Syria by force in favour a number of Islamist opposition groups has failed". The Security Council has to date held 49 formal meetings to discuss the so-called humanitarian situation in Syria and a number of informal emergency and Arria Formula meetings. The Council has read reports and heard briefings that were replete with falsehoods that senior officials of the United Nations sought to present in order to serve the policies of some influential Western countries that are members of the Council and to pressure the Syrian Government. Such reports and briefings were completely devoid of professionalism and objectivity. They have failed to take note of the attacks on the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, including the attacks by the international coalition, led by the United States, and those by the Turkish regime and the Israeli occupying force. Those same parties have also sought to provide all kinds of support to terrorist groups associated with Da'esh, the Al-Nusra Front and other militias fabricated in those countries. After 49 reports and hundreds of meetings, briefings and thousands of working hours, some countries continue to refuse to recognize that the humanitarian crisis in Syria is the result of an external investment in terrorism and unilateral coercive measures. Forty-nine reports have been issued, and I say today that my words are falling on deaf ears. People from the Netherlands say that beautiful flowers have thorns. The Netherlands is famous for its flowers. Perhaps that saying reflects the situation on the ground. Mr. Lowcock stated that the Kashkul was targeted by a missile but he did not specify its origin. He said there are eight shelters for those leaving eastern Ghouta. He did not mention the efforts of the Syrian Government to host the 150,000 civilians leaving eastern Ghouta. He does not know who manages those shelters. Perhaps aliens are taking care of the 150,000 civilians. Mr. Lowcock stated that the United Nations, its partners and the Syrian Red Crescent are helping people from Ghouta. He did not mention the Government at all. If the Government has no role to play, why ask it to help the Council? Why does the Council request its approval for the entry of humanitarian convoys? Mr. Lowcock stated that 153,000 people left Afrin and went to Tell 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 21/21 Rifaat because of military operations. Who forced 153,000 people to leave Afrin? Was it not Turkey that forced them to leave? Was it not the Turkish aggression against Afrin that forced these people to leave? Mr. Lowcock mentioned the Syrian Government only once, saying that it approved the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Rukban camp. He did not say that the United States was behind the obstacles preventing the deployment of the humanitarian convoy in question. The United States occupies the Rukban camp and the Tanf area. I will not go into detail now for the sake of time. I will not even go into the details of the forty-ninth report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/243). I will give only one example to prove that the report lacks objectivity and impartiality. The report devotes nine paragraphs to the suffering of civilians in eastern Ghouta and the damage to the infrastructure there as a result of Government military operations, as the report claims — nine paragraphs. As for the situation of the 8 million civilians in Damascus, the targeting by terrorist groups of the capital with more than 2,500 missiles, the killing and injury of thousands, and the destruction of homes, hospitals and clinics, the report dedicates only one sentence to Damascus. The report says, "Attacks on residential neighbourhoods of Damascus also continued from eastern Ghouta, resulting in deaths, injuries and damage to civilian infrastructure." (S/2018/243, para. 8) We hope that the United Nations will not adopt in eastern Ghouta the same approach that it has taken in previous situations by not providing support to the areas liberated or achieving reconciliation. We hope that the United Nations will adopt a new approach in line with the Charter and international law, based on full coordination and cooperation with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, which is the only party concerned with the protection and support of Syrians. We hope that the United Nations will not succumb to the dictates of certain influential Western countries in the Council that run counter to humanitarian action, the Charter and international law. During the past week alone, the Syrian Ministry of Commerce has distributed 4,000 tons of food to civilians leaving eastern Ghouta. I am not sure about the sources mentioned by the representative of France, because France does not have an embassy in Damascus. So its sources of information cannot be credible. In conclusion, the States sponsoring terrorism have instructed armed terrorist groups to use chemical weapons once again in Syria. I ask the Council to pay attention to this information. They asked them to fabricate evidence, as they have in the past, in order to accuse the Syrian Government. We sent this information to the President of the Security Council yesterday. According to that information, this theatrical act will be produced by the intelligence agencies of these countries, and the starring roles will be the White Helmets. The production will be directed by foreign media. This theatrical act will take place this time in the areas close to the separation line in the Syrian occupied Golan. Terrorist groups will use poison gas against civilians in Al-Harra. Afterwards, the injured will be moved to the hospitals of the Israeli enemy for treatment there. Council members can already imagine the testimony that will be offered by doctors of the Israeli occupation forces. The information we submitted also refers to another theatrical act in the villages of Habit and Qalb Lawza in the suburbs of Idlib, where a number of satellite transmitters and foreign experts have been spotted. This time, the cast will include women and children from an internally displaced persons camp on the Syrian-Turkish border. Once again, I provide the Council with this serious information. The President: There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.
The Situation In The Middle East ; United Nations S/PV.8228 Security Council Seventy-third year 8228th meeting Tuesday, 10 April 2018, 3 p.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Meza-Cuadra . (Peru) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Tumysh/Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Poland. . Mr. Radomski Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-10187 (E) *1810187* S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 2/21 18-10187 The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East The President (spoke in Spanish): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Canada, the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council have before them document S/2018/175, S/2018/321 and S/2018/322, which contain the texts of three draft resolutions, respectively. The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/321, submitted by Canada, France, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. I now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): For years, as part of its responsibilities for maintaining international peace and security, the Security Council has been mobilized on the issue of chemical weapons. After the chemical attacks in Ghouta in 2013, the Security Council adopted resolution 2118 (2013), which provided for the complete dismantling of the chemical arsenal of the Syrian regime. Russia, as co-sponsor of that resolution, had guaranteed its implementation. Despite that guarantee, the Damascus regime has never complied with its obligations under resolution 2118 (2013) and has never renounced — as we saw again on 7 April — the use of chemical weapons against its civilian population. Five years after the Council's adoption of resolution 2118 (2013), we note that the general subject of chemical weapons remains tragically topical. The upcoming voting marks our fourth meeting in less than a week on this issue. Yesterday we met in an emergency meeting (see S/PV.8225) following a new chemical-weapons massacre in Douma, Syria, whose appalling images left us shocked. Last month we met to discuss the unacceptable attack in Salisbury (see S/PV.8203). Last year we met day after day after the terrible attack of Khan Shaykhun. That shows the deterioration of the situation and how serious the stakes are today for our security. The use of chemical weapons is so abominable that it has been banned for almost 100 years, and the international community began years ago to eliminate them. As such, the chemical non-proliferation regime, which we have patiently developed and strengthened, is one of the pillars of our collective security architecture, at the heart of our security system. Yet today it is under serious threat. We face the cynical, barbaric and all-out use of chemical weapons against civilian populations. The Douma attacks once again illustrated the abject brutality of the Syrian regime's resolute military strategy. Such acts constitute war crimes or even crimes against humanity. They increase the risk of dangerous normalization — tolerating the return of these agents of fear and death is nothing more than a blank cheque to all those who would like to use them. To allow the normalization of the use of chemical weapons without responding is to let the genie of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — which pose an existential threat to us all — out of the bottle. It would mark a serious and reprehensible setback to the international order that we have all patiently helped to develop. The consequences would be terrible, and we would all pay the price. That is why we cannot accept it. France will do all it can to prevent impunity for the use of chemical weapons. It is in that spirit that we launched an international partnership last January. The demise of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism in November, due to the Russian veto to protect Al-Assad's regime, sent a dangerous signal of impunity. It deprived us of an essential deterrent tool. It left a vacuum that the Syrian regime has rushed to exploit, and which yesterday's atrocities have tragically reminded us of. The American initiative to re-establish an independent mechanism, based on a balanced approach and taking into account the concerns expressed by every member of the Council, enables us to fill that glaring void. Such a mechanism would support the inquiry that has already been launched by the OPCW. It would also respect the essential criteria of independence, 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 3/21 without any interference, and impartiality to which each member of the Council has committed. Such a mechanism would have a mandate to attribute responsibility for the attacks. Only the combination of those two criteria — independence and a mandate to attribute responsibility — will make that mechanism effective, and therefore dissuasive. Let me be clear: in view of the gravity of the 7 April attack, France will not accept any third-rate or sham mechanism whose independence and impartiality would not be genuinely ensured. That is what the Security Council owes today to the Syrian victims of chemical attacks and to the entire international community, whose security is threatened by the chemicals in the hands of the regime of Bashar Al-Assad. Since the threat is of an existential nature for us all, combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction must, more than ever, be among the top priorities of the Security Council. If there is one area in which the Council has a moral and political responsibility to convene and act, it is this one. If there is one domain for which the credibility of the Council is at stake, where tactical games have no place, it is this one. This is one of those moments when we have no choice but to act because what is at stake is essential. We cannot allow the chemical non-proliferation regime, and with it our entire security architecture — along with the principles and values that underpin our action — to crack and disintegrate before our very eyes. Today's vote is one of those key moments, one of those moments of truth. On behalf of France, I therefore call on each member of the Council to properly gauge and assume its responsibilities now and to vote in favour of the American draft resolution (S/2018/321). Mrs. Haley (United States of America): We have reached a decisive moment as the Security Council. On Saturday the first haunting images appeared from Douma, in Syria. We gathered around this table yesterday (see S/PV.8225) to express our collective outrage. We then collectively agreed that the Council needed to take steps to determine exactly what happened in Douma and to put an end to these barbaric attacks. The United States has put forward a draft resolution (S/2018/321) that accomplishes those shared goals. For weeks we have been working with every single delegation on the Council to develop a new attribution mechanism for chemical-weapons attacks in Syria. We held open and transparent negotiations so that every delegation could provide its input. And we went the extra mile for one Council member. We adopted paragraph after paragraph of Russia's proposed draft resolution (S/2018/175). We tried to take every Russian proposal that did not compromise the impartiality, independence or professionalism of a new attribution mechanism. After the Douma attack, we updated our draft resolution with common sense changes. Our proposal condemns the attack. It demands unhindered humanitarian access for the people in Douma. It calls on the parties to give maximum cooperation to the investigation. And it creates the attribution mechanism that we worked so hard with each member to develop. The draft resolution is the bare minimum that the Council can do to respond to the attack. The United States did everything possible to work towards Council unity on this text. Again, we accepted every recommendation that did not compromise the impartiality and independence of the proposed attribution mechanism. I want to say a brief word about Russia's draft resolution, which is also before us for a vote. Our draft resolutions are similar, but there are important differences. The key point is that our draft resolution guarantees that any investigations will truly be independent. Russia's draft resolution gives Russia itself the chance to choose the investigators and then to assess the outcome. There is nothing independent about that. The United States is not asking to choose the investigators, and neither should Russia. The United States is not asking to review the findings of any investigation before they are final, and neither should Russia. All of us say that we want an independent investigation. Our draft resolution achieves that goal. Russia's does not. This is not an issue that more time or more consultations could have resolved. At a certain point, you are either for an independent and impartial investigation or you are not. And now that the Douma attack has happened, this is not a decision that we can delay any longer. The United States calls on all Security Council members to vote in favour of our draft resolution and to abstain or vote against the Russian draft resolution. The Syrian people are counting on us. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Today the delegation of the United States is once again trying to mislead the international S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 4/21 18-10187 community and is taking yet another step towards confrontation by putting to a vote a draft resolution (S/2018/321) that does not enjoy the unanimous support of the members of the Security Council. It is not true that it meets almost all our requirements. The text is nothing more than an attempt to resurrect, unchanged, the former Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM), established to investigate cases of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Russia has always emphasized that it will not support that approach. The JIM became a puppet in the hands of anti-Damascus forces, and it covered itself with shame when it issued a guilty verdict for a sovereign State without credible evidence. The American draft resolution represents an identical reproduction of all of the former Mechanism's flawed working methods. The new mechanism would conduct investigations as it sees fit, with no reference to the standards of the Chemical Weapons Convention. That has nothing to do with independence, which the draft resolution's sponsors and its closest allies only pretend to care about. We know the worth of such independence. It is true anarchy and manipulation. At every stage of our work on the American initiative we have insisted that the Secretary-General should select the staff for the investigative mechanism on the basis of the broadest possible geographic representation, with subsequent approval by the Security Council. Visits to the sites of the incidents and strict adherence to the principle of sequential actions while ensuring the preservation of the material evidence should be not optional but mandatory working principles. In a collective decision, the Security Council would determine who was responsible in any given case of the use of chemical weapons, based on reliable evidence that would leave no room for doubt about the correctness of the conclusions. There is nothing about this in the American draft resolution. The authors know that it goes against the Russian position and will not be adopted. But they are obstinately sticking to their line. It is clear that today's provocative step has nothing to do with a desire to investigate what happened in Douma, Syria, on 7 April. An attributive mechanism is not necessary in order to initially establish the facts. Even if we could conceive of the improbable scenario in which the draft resolution creating the mechanism was adopted today, it would take several months to put the mechanism together and fine-tune its operations. Establishing who is to blame is the final link in a very long chain of actions. Here, in front of everyone, I would once again like to ask the sponsors why they need the mechanism when they have already identified the guilty parties before the investigation. They do not need it. They do not want to hear anything. They do not want to hear that no traces of a chemical attack were found in Douma. They have simply been looking for an excuse the whole time, and the provocateurs among the White Helmets have very kindly provided it. This is all reminiscent of a kind of spring fever. Exactly a year ago, in April 2017, a similar scenario unrolled with the chemical provocation in Khan Shaykhun, followed by a missile strike. The fact is that the authors of the draft resolution are motivated by completely different priorities. They have pinned their hopes on the assumption that the draft resolution will not be adopted. That is what they want, and it is something that they can bank along with the rest of their reasons justifying the use of force against Syria. For several days now, the Administration in Washington, D.C., has been keeping the international community in suspense while discussing the so-called important decisions being prepared. Only yesterday we heard how anxiously Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura spoke about the current escalation extending beyond Syria's borders (see S/PV.8225), and we know that the Secretary-General is also very concerned about that. It is clear that Russia will once again be the target of the propaganda cannons. My American colleague will painstakingly enumerate the Russian vetoes on Syria. It is not impossible that she has taken upon herself a capitalist commitment to using the reckless policies of the United States to achieve some sort of personal record in that regard. We are using the veto to protect international law, peace and security and to ensure that the United States does not to drag the Security Council into its misadventures. The United States representative says that we are covering up for someone. Russia is in Syria at the invitation of its lawful Government in order to combat international terrorism, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, while the United States is covering up for militias and terrorists. If the United States has decided to carry out an illegal military venture — and we still hope that it will think better of it — it must answer for that itself. It wants to dump this draft resolution, which has been sitting on the shelf for a long time, onto the Security Council in order to find a pretext. The United States representative 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 5/21 herself has said repeatedly that if the Council does not make a decision, the United States will make a decision on its own. Why is the suta purposely undermining the Council's authority by promoting a draft resolution that we know will not go through? And a lot of people said that yesterday during consultations. We urge the Americans to give sober consideration to the potential this presents for confrontation, to think better of it and to withdraw its draft resolution from a vote. Russia cannot support it. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall first put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/321, submitted by Canada, France, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America Against: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Russian Federation Abstaining: China The President (spoke in Spanish): The draft resolution received 12 votes in favour, 2 against and 1 abstention. The draft resolution has not been adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): This is a sad day for the Security Council; it is a sad day for the cause of universal norms and standards; and it is a sad day for the non-proliferation regime. But, above all, it is a very sad day for the people of Douma, who now are without the protection that the international system was set up to provide for them. This is the fourth time in six days that the Council has discussed chemical weapons. Yesterday 14 members of the Security Council called for an investigation. Several members called on the permanent five (P-5) to assume their responsibilities to uphold the universal prohibition on weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As a P-5 member, the United Kingdom was ready to do that and was joined by France and the United States. Conversely, by vetoing, Russia has crossed a line in the international order, and worse, if possible, history is repeating itself one year on from Khan Shaykun. Russia helped to create the original independent investigation that attributed Khan Shaykun to the Syrian regime and concluded that sarin, which can be developed only by a State actor, had been used. But last autumn, Russia vetoed renewal of that mechanism on not one but three occasions. The reason is clear: it is because Russia would rather cross the WMD line than risk sanction of its ally Syria. Instead, we are asked to believe that the Russian version of this latest attack should be the one that the Security Council believes. Russia is not authorized by the Security Council to carry out an investigation in Syria. Russia says that there were no traces of a chemical attack. No traces were found by whom? I repeat: Russia is not authorized to carry out an investigation on behalf of the Security Council. We need an independent investigative mechanism for that purpose, and only that sort of mechanism can have the confidence of the Security Council, the confidence of the membership of the United Nations and the confidence of the people of Syria. Sadly, reports of chemical-weapon attacks in Syria have continued since the original Russian veto, in November. It has become very clear that Russia will do what it takes to protect Syria, whatever the compelling evidence of the crimes committed, and to shut down further investigation and discussion of those crimes. This has come at the cost of Russia's own obligations and credibility as a permanent member of the Council, as a State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and as a declared and supposed supporter of peace in Syria. The Security Council has been unable to act solely because Russia has abused the power of veto to protect Syria from international scrutiny for the use of chemical weapons against the Syrian people. Even today open-source investigations have located a chlorine cylinder, the same kind that the Joint Investigative Mechanism has found that the Syrian regime used, atop a house in Douma full of people who had clearly died from respiratory problems. S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 6/21 18-10187 I frankly doubt that in 48 hours Russia has verified all similar reports and can conclude that they are all fake. They are not fake; they need to be looked at and investigated by a proper independent mechanism such as the Council was prepared today to pass. Russia's credibility as a member of the Council is now in question. We will not stand idly by and watch Russia continue to undermine the global norms that have ensured the security of all of us, including Russia, for decades. As a P-5 member, the United Kingdom will stand up for international peace and security; it is our moral duty. It is a matter of shame that Russia has once again blocked a draft resolution. The Russian Ambassador mentioned that it was not a question of counting the number of Russian vetoes. I beg to differ. To quote Lenin, quantity has a quality all of its own. Russia's actions today are a step against the rules and authority of the Security Council and the wider United Nations. They are a step against international peace and security and non-proliferation, and they are a step against humanity. Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): China is deeply concerned at reports that the use of chemical weapons has caused civilian deaths and casualties in Syria. We are firmly opposed to the use of chemical weapons by any country, organization or individual, under any circumstances. This has been China's clear and consistent position. China supports the carrying out of a comprehensive, objective and impartial investigation into the use of chemical weapons in Syria so as to achieve results that are based on substantial evidence and can pass the litmus test of history and truth, bringing the perpetrators and the parties responsible for the use of chemical weapons to justice. There should be no prejudgment of the outcome or arbitrary conclusions. The Security Council has a consensus on condemning the chemical-weapons attacks in Syria, establishing a new investigative mechanism and identifying the perpetrators of the chemical-weapon attack in Syria. All members of the Security Council should remain united and insist that the Council and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons be the main channel for dealing with the Syrian chemical-weapon issue, in an effort to seek an appropriate solution through consultations. The draft resolution that was just put to the vote in the Security Council (S/2018/321) had elements of consensus, including condemning the chemical-weapons attacks in Syria, establishing a new investigative mechanism and urging all parties to cooperate with the investigation. However, on some specific measures, it does not take full consideration of some of the major concerns of certain Security Council members on improving the mechanism's working methods and ensuring an objective and impartial investigation. Against that backdrop and in the light of our long-standing position on the question of chemical weapons in Syria, China abstained in the voting on the draft resolution. The issue of Syria is currently at a critical juncture. China remains firmly seized of the situation and is deeply concerned at the developments on the ground. China has always called for respecting the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria and insists on seeking a peaceful solution to the dispute. We oppose the use or threat of force in international relations and believe that any action taken should be in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The international community and all parties concerned should stand firm on the imperative need to seek a political solution to the question of Syria, step up their support for the United Nations main channel of mediation, and push for all Syrian parties to seek a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political solution to the question of Syria, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015). China is ready to work with all parties in an effort to push for a political solution to the issue of Syria. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution initiated by the United States (S/2018/321) for two main reasons. With regard to the first reason, Côte d'Ivoire believes that the draft resolution conforms to our firm belief that any and all use of chemical weapons in wartime as in peacetime must be condemned and requires investigation to determine those responsible for such acts to hold them accountable. In that regard, the draft resolution submitted by the United States clearly conveys the resolve of the international community to see perpetrators of chemical attacks identified and prosecuted so that they are accountable for their acts. Concerning the second reason, Côte d'Ivoire believes that the text of the draft resolution provides 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 7/21 guarantees with regard to the credibility of the outcome of investigations. The text insulates such investigations from any political influence and clears a path for the experts' professionalism and independence and the impartiality of the mechanism itself. By voting in favour of the draft resolution, the Ivorian delegation wanted to show its solidarity with Syrian victims who are suffering from the consequences of an endless war and to help meaningfully safeguard international peace and security. Sadly, my delegation notes that divisiveness within the Security Council prevented the adoption of the American draft resolution, which Côte d'Ivoire painfully regrets. It is time that efforts be made to unify the Council if we want truly to work to achieve international peace and security. Mr. Radomski (Poland): The use of chemical weapons is a serious atrocity, which may amount to a crime against humanity and a war crime. Accountability for such acts is a requirement under international law — and central to achieving sustainable peace in Syria. Draft resolution S/2018/321, presented by the United States, addressed the most pressing needs related to the use of chemical weapons in Syria, including the role of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its Fact-finding Mission, securing humanitarian access and, last but not least, creating a new, truly independent and impartial accountability mechanism. We thank the American delegation for its ongoing leadership in the negotiations. We appreciate its flexibility and fully understand and share the rationale behind putting this text to the vote today. Because of the use of the veto by the Russian Federation, the Security Council failed once again today to establish an accountability mechanism. By that act, Russia undermined the ability of the Council to fulfil its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations: to maintain international peace and security. We are disappointed that, for some States, political alliances and calculations proved to be more important than the need to end the horrors confronting the civilian population and the unacceptable loss of human life in Syria. Poland supports the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, the Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, and other instruments that might facilitate bringing the perpetrators of chemical attacks to justice. We will join all genuine efforts to achieve that goal. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): Bolivia reiterates in the strongest terms its categorical condemnation of the use of chemical weapons and the weaponization of chemical agents as an unjustifiable and criminal act, wherever, whenever and by whomever they are committed, as such use constitutes a serious crime under international law and a threat to international peace and security. There is no justification for their use regardless of the circumstances and of who uses them. We therefore reaffirm the need to maintain the unity of the Security Council so as to ensure that those who have used chemical weapons are held accountable and brought to justice so that their actions do not go unpunished. In that regard, we reiterate our support for the work being carried out by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its Fact-finding Mission so that, in line with their mandates, they can carry out the work entrusted to them in the most methodical, technical and trustworthy manner possible with the support of an independent, impartial, complete and conclusive investigation. We firmly reiterate that the work of an investigative mechanism is essential to ensuring accountability for such terrible acts. To that end, it must be independent, impartial and representative so that a transparent, impartial, complete, reliable and conclusive investigation can be carried out, and, for that to happen, we face the great challenge and the responsibility of not politicizing or instrumentalizing the Security Council. My delegation voted against the draft resolution (S/2018/321) presented by the United States of America, first of all, because we regret that once again a draft resolution was put to the vote with the knowledge that it would not be adopted by the Security Council, and, moreover, because there has already been a series of threats of the use of force accompanied by threats of unilateral action, which, of course, runs directly counter to the Charter of the United Nations. Bolivia once again makes clear its firm rejection of taking unilateral actions, because any unilateral military action that does not enjoy the approval of the Security Council is entirely illegal and contravenes the principles explicitly set forth in the Charter. In addition, any unilateral S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 8/21 18-10187 military action would violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Arab Republic of Syria, and would affect the stability of the political process and the agreements on which progress has been made under the auspices of the United Nations. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): In my statement yesterday (see S/PV.8225) I urged the Security Council not to stand idly by and watch as a spectator while chemical weapons were being used in Syria. In our opinion, the Council should act, condemn, protect, and hold to account those responsible. Those elements are all reflected in draft resolution (S/2018/321) put forward by the United States, and that is why the Kingdom of the Netherlands voted in favour of that draft resolution. We thank the United States delegation for drafting the text. We appreciate the earlier rounds of negotiations and the flexibility displayed at yesterday's late-night round. Together with others, we are extremely disappointed that an attempt to set up an effective mechanism of attribution on the use of chemical weapons has failed once again. Today we witnessed the twelfth overall Russian use of the veto concerning Syria, including six pertaining to chemical weapons. As I said yesterday, if the Russian representative claims that the chemical-weapons attack in Syria is a fabrication, he should not veto the draft resolution. By vetoing this draft resolution, the Russian Federation assumes a heavy responsibility for continued impunity and the horrible use of chemical weapons in Syria. Because of this permanent member, the Council is not even able to condemn the use of chemical-weapons attacks this past weekend in Douma, during which the White Helmets once again demonstrated their unwavering commitment to their life-saving work in the most difficult circumstances. With regard to the draft resolution proposed by the Russian Federation (S/2018/175), the Netherlands will vote against it. That draft resolution falls short in every possible way. It seems that the Russian Federation is unable to support an independent and impartial investigative mechanism. It seems that it can accept a mechanism only in which itself can decide when, where, how and by whom the investigation would be conducted, while leaving the mandate attributed to the Council subject to its veto. This cannot be the end of the issue. The Security Council cannot remain passive in the face of the atrocities being committed in Syria. We must continue to work for an effective attribution mechanism, inside and outside the Security Council. Impunity must not prevail. The President (spoke in Spanish): The Security Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/175, submitted by the Russian Federation. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Before I speak about the draft resolution before us (S/2018/175), I would like to say that I am very happy that my British colleague is familiar with the classic works of Marxism-Leninism, although that is hardly surprising, because Marx, Engels and Lenin were frequent visitors to London — indeed, Marx is buried there. But I would like to cite another quotation from Lenin, who wrote an article entitled "Better Fewer, but Better". After the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) on the use of chemical weapons in Syria ended, in November of last year, it was Russia that found itself in the forefront of the efforts to fill the resulting gap. We drafted a resolution on the issue that we submitted to our colleagues for their consideration on 23 January. The Western camp immediately gave the draft text a hostile reception, since it eliminated the loopholes that enabled investigations to be manipulated and handed over to the control of the opponents of Damascus, as occurred with the JIM and which was the reason for its premature demise. I want to emphasize that we have not invented anything new in our text, but have merely brought the principles for the work of the new mechanism in line with the standards of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We now have a real opportunity to create a genuinely independent and impartial working mechanism that would help the Security Council to identify those responsible for the use of chemical weapons in the context of the conflict in Syria. All that it needs is for Council members to vote in favour of our draft resolution, and we call on them to do that. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/175, submitted by the Russian Federation. A vote was taken by show of hands. 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 9/21 In favour: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation Against: France, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America Abstaining: Côte d'Ivoire, Kuwait The President (spoke in Spanish): The draft resolution received 6 votes in favour, 7 votes against and 2 abstentions. The draft resolution was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): As I have taken the floor once today already, I will be brief. With regard to Karl Marx, I think he must be turning in his grave to see what the country that was founded on many of his precepts is doing in the name of supporting Syria by condoning the use of chemical weapons on Syrian territory. We voted against the Russian draft resolution (S/2018/175) for a number of reasons. The Russian text is a distraction. It has lain dormant around the Security Council for weeks. There was no attempt to meet other Council members' concerns in its drafting, unlike the United States text (S/2018/321), which had adapted its original preferences precisely to try to meet those of the Russian Federation and others. The Russian text does nothing to bring a political process any closer. Specifically, it moves the parameters on access and imparts a quasi-judicial standard — "beyond a reasonable doubt" — that is inappropriate for the type of investigation that the Council wishes to establish. If the Russians want a criminal investigation, they could always suggest that we refer the matter to the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, there is selective quoting of the Chemical Weapons Convention to undermine the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, and it takes a selective approach to the parameters of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. But, above all, the text is unacceptable because it seeks to assert that sovereign States are above international law and international norms. That is breathtaking both in its arrogance and its ignorance, and for that reason alone, if not the others, we could not support it. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): Yesterday I said that history will record this moment (see S/PV.8225) as one when we as the Security Council either lived up to our responsibilities or showed our complete failure to protect the Syrian people. Today we have our answer. The votes have been cast. The record will show that today some countries decided to stand up for truth, accountability and justice for the Syrian people. Most countries saw the horror that took place in Douma last weekend at the hands of the Al-Assad regime and realize that today was a time for action. Month after month, the Al-Assad regime, with the full support of Russia and Iran, has strung the Security Council along. They ignored our calls for a ceasefire, for political dialogue and for deliveries of humanitarian aid. They ignored our calls to stop using chemical weapons — weapons that are universally banned from war. And then, last weekend, the Al-Assad regime forced a moment of reckoning on all of us by gassing people in Douma. The United States and the countries that joined us today could not allow that attack to go unanswered. The record will not be kind to one permanent member of the Council. Unfortunately, Russia has again chosen the Al-Assad regime over the unity of the Security Council. We have said before that Russia will stop at nothing to shield the Al-Assad regime, and now we have our answer. Russia has trashed the credibility of the Council. It is not interested in unity or compromise. Whenever we propose anything meaningful to Russia, Russia vetoes it. It is a travesty. It has now officially vetoed draft resolutions that would hold Al-Assad accountable for these barbaric chemical attacks six times. Things did not have to turn out this way. For weeks, the United States has led transparent, good-faith negotiations with all Security Council members to establish an attribution mechanism for chemical weapons in Syria. We started from the simple premise that every Council member would want to know who was responsible for using those barbaric and illegal weapons. We did everything to accommodate Russia's views. Russia surprised us with a proposed draft resolution (S/2018/175), calling all of us into the S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 10/21 18-10187 Security Council Chamber and handing out the draft text on the spot. After hearing widespread concerns about its draft resolution, Russia moved ahead anyway, accommodating no one's views. We could have done the same, but instead we tried to take as much as we could from Russia's draft text, while maintaining an impartial and independent process. We negotiated in good faith. Many aspects of our draft resolutions were similar. Russia said that the investigators should have safe access to the places where chemical weapons were used. We agreed. Russia said that it wanted an impartial, independent and professional investigation. We agreed. Russia said that the investigators should be recruited on as wide a geographical basis as possible. We agreed. Russia said that it wanted reports on the activities of non-State actors involving chemical weapons. Although that sounded to us like an attempt to distract from the Al-Assad regime, we included Russia's request. We even gave our mechanism the name that Russia wanted — the United Nations independent mechanism of investigation. There were really only two key differences between our draft resolution and that of Russia, but those differences speak volumes. First, Russia wanted to give itself the opportunity to approve the investigators who were chosen for the task. Secondly, Russia wanted the Security Council to assess the findings of any investigation before any report was released. Does any of that sound independent or impartial? Russia's proposal was not about an independent and impartial investigation at all. It was all about protecting the Al-Assad regime. This is a sad day. The United States takes no pleasure in seeing Russia exercise its sixth veto on the issue of chemical weapons in Syria. Only last week, we had hoped that the one-year anniversary of the Khan Shaykun attack might be the start of a renewed partnership to combat chemical weapons. However, those deadly weapons have been used on Syrian families again. When the people of Douma, along with the rest of the international community, looked to the Council to act, one country stood in the way. History will record that. History will record that, on this day, Russia chose to protect a monster over the lives of the Syrian people. Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): China has stated its principled position on the chemical weapons attack in Syria. The draft resolution on the establishment of a new investigative mechanism submitted by the Russian Federation (S/2018/175) condemns the chemicals weapons attack in Syria and calls for the creation of a new investigative mechanism to establish the facts and the truth. We can all agree on those positive elements. In addition, it proposes improved working methods compared to previous investigative mechanism and set out concrete steps to carry out a robust on-site investigation on the ground and to ensure impartiality in the process of collecting evidence. As a result, the new investigative mechanism would be able to function with greater professionalism and to reach a truly credible conclusion. Those elements are in line with China's principled position. We support Russia's draft resolution. China regrets that the draft resolution was not adopted. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): I am taking the floor following the voting on the two draft resolutions (S/2018/175 and S/2018/321) above all to express our frustration over the fact that the Security Council was not able to adopt either the first or the second draft, which sought to give the Council an independent and professional mechanism with a mandate to attribute responsibility for the use of chemical weapons, despite the fact that all Security Council members expressed their desire in that regard. That is precisely why we voted in favour of both draft resolutions in the hope of having a new monitoring mechanism to attribute responsibility so as to protect people from the terrible and harmful effects of such chemical weapons. Despite the negative outcome of the voting on both draft resolutions, the Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, whose position on the use of chemical weapons we have clearly set out during the debates on the issue, wants the members of the Security Council to seek and to explore other alternative draft texts that could merit the joint agreement or the consensus of the Security Council so that we can establish that new mechanism as soon as possible. That is what the people who are suffering, or in the future may suffer, the terrible effects of chemical weapons hope and expect of the Security Council. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): It is indeed regrettable that the Council could not adopt a resolution to establish a new mechanism that would identify those responsible 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 11/21 for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Establishing such a tool would have sent a quick and unified message regarding the resolve of the Council not to tolerate impunity. That is how we view the defeat of both draft resolutions (S/2018/175 and S/2018/321). However, we were not at all surprised. We voted in favour of both draft resolutions, consistent with our position in reaffirming the importance of setting up an independent, impartial and professional investigative mechanism with a view to ensuring accountability. No doubt, such a mechanism would clearly have addressed the existing institutional gap in that regard, which continues to be a source of major weakness in the fight against impunity. Both draft resolutions sought the establishment of such a mechanism. Clearly, there are differences, among others, concerning some aspects of the accountability mechanism. We believe that we have come some distance in bridging those differences. It would have been a major achievement, both functionally and from the point of view of enhancing trust, which is so greatly needed in order to address the challenge not only of ensuring non-proliferation but also of advancing the cause of international peace and security. That was why we were hoping that we could achieve consensus on the matter and unity within the Council. Frankly speaking, we do not like what we see. At the risk of sounding self-righteous — and the challenge that we face makes taking the risk appropriate — we must say that we are deeply disappointed about the situation that we are in. Since we have no alternative, it remains important that we all persevere in continuing our dialogue and supporting the efforts to ensure unity, without which the Council will not be in a position to discharge its principal responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, in particular repairing the damage to the chemical weapons disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Yesterday, we expressed our concern about the difficult situation we are currently facing (see S/PV.8225). We do not wish to repeat what we said, but allow me to state in closing that we look forward to handling the issue of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma, eastern Damascus, with a greater sense of responsibility. That is how we intend to look at the draft resolution from Russia before us, a draft which, in our view, is relatively similar to the draft resolution informally made available by Sweden yesterday, whenever the Council is ready to handle it. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): I support the statement in explanation of vote on the American draft resolution (S/2018/321) made earlier in the meeting by the representative of the United Kingdom, who said that today is actually a sad day. It is a sad day for the non-proliferation regime, and a sad day for civilians — particularly women, children and the elderly — throughout Syria, and specifically Douma in eastern Ghouta. We ask their forgiveness because we have disappointed them once again. The Council has been unable to establish a mechanism that would hold accountable those who commit crimes by using chemical weapons in Syria. We ask their forgiveness because the Council has been unable to put an end to the serious and gross violations of international humanitarian law, human rights law and many Security Council resolutions condemning the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We ask their forgiveness because the Council has been unable to hold to account the perpetrators of crimes related to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Our position has always been clear. We have called for consensus in the Council on this sensitive issue, which touches on accountability and impunity. We voted in favour of the United States draft resolution because it contains the basic elements that we think are necessary to establish any new accountability mechanism in Syria in order to guarantee its independence, neutrality and professionalism. The mechanism would identify the perpetrators responsible for any chemical attack, and then the Security Council would shoulder its responsibility in terms of sanctions. We abstained in the voting on the draft resolution presented by the Russian Federation (S/2016/175) because it did not include the elements to which I have referred. It would undermine the credibility of the new mechanism by depriving it of its fundamental terms of reference, namely, to determine whoever is responsible in the event of attacks using chemical weapons. We are very concerned about the result of voting today because it will encourage parties to the conflict to continue using chemical weapons in the absence of accountability. Kuwait supported the code of conduct whereby the States members of the Security Council would commit to not opposing draft resolutions dealing with crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. We also S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 12/21 18-10187 supported the French-Mexican initiative on abstention in the use of the veto in cases of human rights violations. As a result of the voting today, and based on our commitment to abiding by the four Geneva Conventions and their two Additional Protocols, international humanitarian law and the final outcome of 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, we call again for crimes against humanity and war crimes, as well as humanitarian issues, to receive due attention. That would include allowing the safe and sustainable delivery of humanitarian assistance and medical evacuations, and preventing the siege of residential areas. These should be treated as procedural issues; they should not be subject to a veto so that such human tragedies and sufferings are never repeated. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): Like everyone else, we deeply regret that today the Council was prevented once again from establishing a responsibility-attribution mechanism for the purpose of impartially identifying the perpetrators and organizers of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. I am sure we all share a sense of very tragic déjà vu as we repeat the scenario the Council faced in November when the renewal of the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism was blocked. However — and I apologize to all of those who are tired of hearing me say this — we will not give up. Efforts to reach an agreement on a responsibility-attribution mechanism must continue, and we support all serious and genuine initiatives that aim to achieve this objective. We stand ready to help facilitatory efforts to find a way forward. Accountability for the use of chemical weapons is crucial. As we have stated before, the Syrian people suffering from more than seven years of conflict deserve no less from us. They want peace and justice, not further military escalation or impunity. A collective response to the most recent alleged chemical weapons attack in Douma therefore remains urgent and critical. The credibility of the Council is at stake. We must now come together to swiftly condemn the use of chemical weapons in Syria and express alarm at the alleged attack in Douma. We must support an immediate and further investigation through the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and we must demand full, free and safe access without any restrictions or impediments to the fact-finding mission in its immediate deployment to Syria. Establishing the facts of what has taken place in Douma remains an essential first step towards confirming the alleged use of chemical weapons and finding the truth, and we need independent, impartial attribution of guilt followed by full accountability. The Council must remain seized and live up to its responsibility. That is why we circulated yesterday a draft text aimed at finding common ground. We stand ready to work tirelessly to find agreement on a robust, swift and immediate response. We need to come back together again after the failure that we have just witnessed. Mr. Tumysh (Kazakhstan): Our position remains unchanged and consistent. Due to well-known historical reasons, Kazakhstan has always taken a firm and resolute stance of uncompromising condemnation of any use of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. We do so as that is an extremely heinous action and an unacceptable war crime. We have also been in support of attaching paramount importance to the creation of a new investigative mechanism. That has been strongly reiterated, and we have pressed for its urgency. Impunity for chemical crimes is not acceptable. It sends the wrong signal to those who continue to use or intend to use such an extremely heinous weapon. However, in order to punish anyone, we must be able to prove guilt completely and irrefutably. In that regard, the creation of a full-fledged, impartial and independent investigative tool is of the utmost necessity for all. We have worked in earnest with the delegations of the United States and the Russian Federation. We must recognize that the use of chemical weapons in Syria continues, along with the persistent threat of chemical terrorism, to present a grave reality. In addition, many allegations of the use of chemical agents in Syria are still undisclosed. Based on the aforementioned circumstances and understanding the need to preserve this mechanism, we supported both draft resolutions intended to create new investigative mechanisms. We urge that we all work together for the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): This meeting is an interesting one from a variety of perspectives. One is that Lenin and Marx, two anti-imperialists, have been invoked more than once. What we have seen today is related to that topic. It is a fact that all empires are under the illusion that they are morally superior to the rest of us, that they believe themselves to be exceptional and indispensable and that they are above the law. In this, as in other cases, they do not seek to advance democracy or 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 13/21 freedom, but rather ultimately to expand their power and domination worldwide. What we have seen today is a sad reflection of what is happening on the battlefield in Syria and of those interests. I would like to echo the words of the Swedish Ambassador in urging the Security Council not to rest until we are united and can reach consensus, if indeed we believe in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It is the Charter, and whether the members of the Council can fulfil it, that is ultimately at stake. One of our responsibilities under it is to refrain from taking unilateral action. We hope that principle will be honoured. The President (spoke in Spanish): The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/322, submitted by the Russian Federation. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We too are sorry that our draft resolution (S/2018/175) was not adopted today, but at the moment neither it nor the United States draft resolution (S/2018/321) would have had any influence on the investigation of the alleged incident in Douma. Right now, that is not what they are about. There is no need to mislead anybody by saying that, or that there were intensive consultations on the American draft resolution but not on ours, or that most of our amendments were supposedly taken into account. Our colleagues will now tell the press that we vetoed their resolution, while modestly remaining silent about the fact that just as with the draft resolutions on the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, they also vetoed ours. Yesterday, during the meeting on threats to international peace and security (see S/PV.8225), there was an emotional discussion of the event, or the alleged event, in Douma on 7 April. Based on the results of the inspection conducted by our specialists, we said that a chemical attack could not be confirmed. Nonetheless, we advocated for the speediest possible investigation of all of the circumstances by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and affirmed our willingness to facilitate its work on the ground. The Government of Syria has sent the OPCW an official request that such a mission be dispatched to Douma as soon as possible. Yesterday, the Swedish delegation put forward a fairly constructive text for a corresponding draft resolution. Unfortunately, their initiative was undeveloped and was trampled down thanks to the confrontational efforts of the United States and its closest allies, which had decided to shift the focus away from the issue of an investigation of what happened on 7 April. That is understandable, because they have already identified the guilty parties. As far as they are concerned, the so-called regime, along with Russia and Iran, is always to blame for everything. The investigation does not interest them. Well, sometimes it does, but only if it is based on so-called exclusive data from the opposition's social networks. For the hundredth time, I would like to ask the same question yet again. Can someone here explain clearly and plainly why Damascus needed this alleged chemical attack in Douma in principle, especially since practically all of the militias had evacuated Douma by then? And the militias who were still being evacuated on 8 April knew nothing about the alleged occurrence of this chemical attack. I will answer my own question. The provocation was desperately needed by the militias who received that very timely support from the United States and other Western countries. We decided to develop the Swedish initiative, and our draft resolution notes the Syrian Government's invitation to the OPCW Fact-finding Mission to visit the site of the alleged event without delay. It welcomes the decision of the Director-General of the OPCW Technical Secretariat to send the Mission to Syria in order to conduct investigative work in line with Chemical Weapons Convention standards. It takes into account the guarantees of safe access provided by the Syrian authorities and Russian military forces. Fifteen days later, the Secretary-General would submit the first report to the Security Council. This is a strictly practical, non-confrontational and depoliticized initiative in support of the OPCW, which would help the specialists in this area determine what did, or rather did not, take place in Douma. And that is the priority now, not the draft resolution on a United Nations independent investigative mechanism, which was hastily submitted for a vote with the obvious aim of seeing both draft resolutions vetoed. We hope that Council members will give this initiative their unanimous support so that the process can begin as soon as possible. According to our information, two S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 14/21 18-10187 expert groups from the OPCW Fact-finding Mission should leave for Syria by the end of this week. Whatever the excuse that may be given, if the experts do not reach Douma because they have been prevented by those who continue to speculate about the chemical issue in order to smear Syria and Russia, that will be yet another piece of evidence showing that behind this thoroughly false story are dirty geopolitical games and, what is worse, aggressive military plans capable of reversing the positive trend in the resolution of Syria's conflict and inflicting a painful blow on a region already tormented by adventurist assaults. We are witnessing all of that literally in real time. We request that you put this draft resolution to a vote, Mr. President. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): We want swift and resolute action today, and we want the Security Council to shoulder its collective responsibility. But I am not sure that we have exhausted all the avenues that could get us there, nor am I sure that voting on this new Russian draft resolution (S/2018/322) will get us there either. We feel that we are at a very fragile stage of Council deliberations right now, and we need to reflect carefully on the way forward to ensure that we do not jump into further paralysis, with consequences that will be difficult to defend or repair. That is why I would like to ask you, Mr. President, to suspend the meeting right here and now so that we can all move into consultations and carefully and collectively reflect on the next step. The President (spoke in Spanish): The representative of the Russian Federation has asked to make a further statement. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We listened carefully to what the Permanent Representative of Sweden has just said. To be candid, we are somewhat puzzled by his statement, because the draft resolution that we submitted (S/2018/322) is, in essence, based on the same idea as the draft submitted yesterday by the Swedish delegation. I do not know what we are going to consult on in consultations. I believe we already consulted on this subject yesterday. However, out of respect for the Swedish delegation and those delegations who would like to hold consultations, we are not against that. But let me say right away that we intend to put this draft resolution to a vote today, after our consultations. We hope that the consultations will be constructive and will not drag on for long, because that is certainly not necessary at this point. We need to adopt this draft resolution in support of the mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in order to establish the facts on the ground as quickly as possible. The President (spoke in Spanish): If there is no objection, I will suspend the meeting. We will continue after our consultations. The meeting was suspended at 4.40 p.m. and resumed at 5.45 p.m. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/2018/322, submitted by the Russian Federation. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation Against: France, Poland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America Abstaining: Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden The President (spoke in Spanish): The result of the voting is as follows: 5 votes in favour, 4 against and 6 abstentions. The draft resolution was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I will be brief. In the Consultations Room just now, Mr. President, you and the representative of Sweden made valiant attempts at a compromise. We all appreciate what is at stake and thank you for your and Sweden's efforts. But, fundamentally, the United Kingdom could not vote for the Russian text (S/2018/322) because it does not establish an investigation into who was responsible for the attack. It only welcomes the Fact-finding Mission, which is already on its way. I repeat what I said in consultations: the Fact-finding Mission determines whether chemical weapons were used and, if they were, which chemical weapons were used. It does not, and cannot, establish who was responsible for 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 15/21 their use — and thus start on the first step on the path to attribution and accountability. For that reason, we are not able to support the text. It would be like watching a fire, identifying that there was a fire, and doing nothing to put it out. The Russians invited us to return to the issue of an investigative mechanism on a separate occasion. I am afraid that the answer to that is 17 November 2017, when Russia vetoed a joint investigative mechanism that it had itself decided to set up. For all those reasons, all it would have taken is a written decision for an investigation set up by the Security Council. Russia could not take that small step, and therefore we were not able to support the draft resolution. I very much regret that, but the answer was in Russia's hands. Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): Recent reports concerning the use of chemical weapons in Douma and the consequent civilian casualties have given rise to serious concern on the part of the international community. China has noted that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has already asked its Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic to investigate the relevant reports. We support the OPCW in sending investigators to Syria so as to establish the truth. We call on all parties concerned to cooperate with the investigation. The draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation (S/2018/322) expresses deep concern about the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma on 7 April, strongly condemns the chemical-weapons attacks that took place in Syria and elsewhere, urges the OPCW Fact-finding Mission to carry out an on-site investigation, and provides that the Syrian Government and other parties will ensure the security of and safe access to investigators. The draft resolution is in keeping with China's principled position. China supports and voted in favour of the Russian draft resolution. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): We deeply regret that we have ended up here following a long day of serious efforts to move forward by some of us — I believe. We abstained in the voting on the Russian draft resolution (S/2018/322) a few moments ago because the attribution and accountability track, which we believe is important, lacked clarity. We called for consultations earlier because we felt that, provided there was political will, an opportunity remained for us to come together and shoulder our responsibility today. We put forward a draft resolution (S/2018/321) to all members that we felt was credible and assertive, and was intended to support the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. It was also very clear in its determination to establish an impartial, independent and professional investigative mechanism, and we had suggested that the Secretary-General help us recommend the best way forward in that area and give him 10 days to come back to the Council. I believe that would have been a much better way forward than where we are right now. I am therefore very disappointed that we have not been able to move forward on this. I thank all those members of the Security Council that were ready to engage, and I just hope that we do not consider this the end with regard to ensuring that the facts will be established and that there will be true accountability and no more impunity for the horrendous use of chemical weapons in Syria and elsewhere. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): I once again express the frustration of our delegation over this afternoon's negative outcome. We abstained in the voting on the third draft resolution (S/2018/322), first of all because it was submitted only very late today and, secondly, because it is lacking compared to the two previous draft resolutions on which we voted in favour (S/2018/175 and S/2018/321). We believe that we should ask the representative of Sweden, Mr. Olof Skoog, not to withdraw his proposal so that following this meeting — perhaps tomorrow afternoon — as was suggested during consultations, we can continue considering and analysing it to see whether we can agree to vote on the draft resolution once we have introduced amendments and reached a consensus on the text that he has presented. Mr. Radomski (Poland): Poland voted against the draft resolution (S/2018/322) presented by Russia. We believe that the draft resolution submitted originally by Sweden was an honest attempt to enable the Security Council to respond promptly to the horrific act of violence that occurred in eastern Ghouta on Saturday. To that end, the Security Council needs to re-establish a professional, truly independent and impartial accountability mechanism. The draft resolution proposed by the Russian Federation is missing that important provision. That is why we had to vote against it. S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 16/21 18-10187 Mrs. Haley (United States): I thank you, Sir, and members of the Security Council for what has been another frustrating day. My parents always said that you should always see the good in everyone and in everything. I have therefore been trying to figure out what the good is in Russia. I believe that it is very good at being consistent, and I believe that it is very good at playing games. We saw that when we took up the issue of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. Russia loved the Joint Investigative Mechanism until we found one side guilty, and then it decided that it did not want it. We then adopted the ceasefire, and Russia loved the idea of the ceasefire until Al-Assad had a problem with it and subsequently violated it. Today Russia vetoed for the sixth time a draft resolution (S/2018/321) condemning Al-Assad for chemical-weapons attacks on his own people. No matter what we do, Russia will be consistent. Russia will continue to play games, and once again it is putting forward yet another surprise draft resolution (S/2018/322). The first time that any of us saw it was today at 11 a.m. The Russians held no negotiations. It took no input, and, when Sweden asked that the Council be allowed to discuss the draft resolution, Russia allowed that but did not want any changes to it. There is a reason for which Russia did not want to discuss its resolution, and that is because it does not accomplish anything. The draft resolution mainly asks for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to send its Fact-finding Mission to Douma, but the Fact-finding Mission is already travelling to Douma. It already has a mandate to investigate and collect samples. What makes it worse is that Russia includes several provisions in its draft resolution that are deeply problematic and once again seeks to compromise the credibility of the international investigation. The draft resolution puts Russia and the Al-Assad regime itself in the driver seat for making arrangements for the Fact-finding Mission investigators. We are just supposed to trust that the same Government that says that everything concerning the Douma attack was fake will work in good faith with the OPCW. This draft resolution also tries to micromanage how the Fact-finding Mission should carry out its investigation, while dictating where the investigators should go. As we have always said, for an investigation to be credible and independent, the investigators must choose where they believe they should go. Members of the Council — least of all Russia — should not be calling the shots. For those reasons, the United States voted against the draft resolution. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We voted in favour of the draft resolution (S/2018/322) because we saw value in its adoption as it offered, we thought, the possibility for the protection of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic. Frankly, we tried to find weaknesses in the text. We could not. It is a matter-of-fact and uncomplicated draft resolution. We could not find any reason not to support it. Undoubtedly, it would not have made achieving attribution possible, but finding out whether chemical weapon were in fact used would have been a great achievement. Of course, so far the Russian position has been that there was no use of chemical weapons in Douma. Establishing the facts surrounding that assertion or position would have been a great achievement. We are not in a position to take advantage of the guarantee offered or the Council's strong support in that regard. We felt that the Fact-finding Mission needed the support. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Frankly speaking, I think all of us have seen everything for ourselves. Unfortunately, the failure to adopt draft resolution S/2018/322 really is a litmus test says a great deal and leaves us extremely apprehensive. We proposed a very innocuous draft resolution, which is moreover virtually a complete repeat of Sweden's draft text from yesterday. I find it difficult to understand which might be the parts where Mrs. Haley read between the lines to discover our scheming and our trickery. Perhaps the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom answered that when she said that they could not adopt the Russian draft resolution — let us say it out loud — because it was a Russian draft resolution. Then everything was clear. The United States representative said that we are very good at playing games. I am not sure about that. What I am sure of is that she is very good at making threats, and the threats that the United States is making with regard to Syria should make us all extremely alarmed, because we may be standing on the threshold of some very sad and terrible events. I would once again like to ask the United States to refrain from executing the plans that it may be incubating for Syria. Unfortunately, the refusal of the United States to adopt the draft resolution speaks to the fact that our 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 17/21 American partners and colleagues do not need any real investigation, which is something that we discussed earlier. We regret the fact that the draft resolution was not adopted, although it is true that the Fact-finding Mission will, I hope, reach Syria soon and be able to get to work on its principal mandate, which is establishing the facts about what really happened in Douma. To repeat what I have said once again, in all innocence, the Russian military and the Syrian Government will provide support to the mission in terms of ensuring its security. I hope that does not raise questions for anyone, because it is simply what must be done. We hope that the Mission will be able to make the trip effectively and without delay. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): I would like to start by thanking Sweden for its efforts and attempts to achieve rapprochement and to smooth over the differences among the members of the Security Council. We are disappointed by the Council's inability to reach consensus on this important matter and by the fact that the divisions among Council members unfortunately continue. We abstained in the voting, despite the fact that the gist of draft resolution S/2018/322 calls for an investigation into what took place in Douma, which is what we called for. The investigation should be undertaken by an international, independent and impartial body, which in this case is the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). However, the OPCW Fact-finding Mission will go to Syria anyway, and the Council welcomed that fact yesterday. There is therefore no need for a draft resolution. What we are looking for is an international, independent, neutral and professional body or mechanism that would investigate the incident and identify the party that has used chemical weapons, if it indeed determines that chemical weapons have been used. That approach will enable the Council to hold the perpetrators accountable, in accordance with resolution 2118 (2013). Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): I thank everybody for today's very difficult and unfortunately unproductive day. We voted for the Russian Federation's draft resolution (S/2018/322) on sending a fact-finding mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as soon as possible because, as we said yesterday in raising this very simple question, we need to know what happened on the ground. Yesterday we were also very clear when we said that there were different and conflicting reports about the number of casualties and even about the very fact that the chemical attack had taken place. We requested and supported the important proposal that a fact-finding mission should go to Douma to establish the facts on the ground. We are not talking right now about who did it, but we are talking about the fact of the event itself. We needed to understand what was there and what had happened there. Sending a fact-finding mission was very important to us and to all the delegations that do not have a presence there to understand the objective reality of the place. Even if the only information obtained is about the kind of substance that was used, that would be very useful for us to understand who the perpetrators might be and at the very least establish the fact that a chemical attack took place. In this kind of understanding, we very much support sending OPCW experts to investigate on the ground in order to give us information on which we can base an objective opinion about the situation. We are not taking sides here, and we were very clear about that yesterday. We would like to receive full, objective, transparent and unbiased information about the facts that we are addressing here. We are therefore glad that the OPCW is sending a group to Douma, regardless of the results of today's voting on draft resolutions. We are hopeful that we can at least get this preliminary information about the situation in Douma. I would like to say once again that we in the Security Council should be objective and base our decisions on the simple facts that may be presented to us by the independent organizations that will determine whether there was a chemical attack or not. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): After having vetoed a draft resolution that sought to shed full light on acts of violence involving chemical weapons (S/2018/175), including those that took place last weekend, Russia persists in a dual strategy of obstruction and diversion on the matter. The only aim of the draft text on which we have just voted (S/2018/322) was clearly to confuse the issue. It is not a question of disputing the importance of an independent investigation by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) into what happened in Douma on 7 April. That is essential, and the investigation has already been launched. However, the Russian draft resolution, which we had to vote against, did not meet the challenges. S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 18/21 18-10187 Let us be clear: what we lack today, and what Russia continues to reject, is a truly independent and impartial mechanism that can attribute responsibility in order to prevent impunity. That was the raison d'être for the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. With the establishment of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, set up with the involvement of Russia, we put in place a tool for the essential deterrence of perpetrators of chemical attacks. That is clearly what we lack today. Let us be clear in saying that statements are not enough and that the Russian draft resolution is only a smokescreen that falls well short of the urgent response that the Council should provide. That is why France voted against the draft resolution and why the draft resolution was not adopted. Today I reiterate that France will spare no effort to ensure that the perpetrators of those chemical horrors are identified and held to account in an independent and impartial way. The stakes are extremely high, and we will not give up. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): We abstained in the voting on the draft resolution (S/2018/322) because we had serious hesitations about the text, as it differed in some crucial aspects from the Swedish text put forward yesterday. First of all, the text makes it insufficiently clear that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic already has the mandate for on-site visits, as States have to comply with it. They do not need the Council's authorization. Secondly, the text is unduly restrictive. Paragraph 3 is not a correct reflection of the decision of the Director-General or of his existing mandate. The necessity of on-site investigations is up to the team to decide. My third point is that the fact-finding mission should be able to perform its mandate in complete independence. Fourthly, we do not want the precedent that Security Council authorization is needed for a fact-finding mission to do its work. We are convinced that those were issues that we could have solved if the draft resolution had been put forward for proper consultations. We received it this morning. We regret that those concerns could not be taken into account. My last point is that one colleague said that the litmus test of this evening, and of today, was the voting on this draft resolution. I disagree. The litmus test of today's meeting was the veto by one permanent member on the establishment of an effective attribution mechanism. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): I shall be very brief. Bolivia voted in favour of the draft resolution (S/2018/322) for several reasons. One of those is that, although the nature of the events that have been condemned is unknown, the highest authorities of the Organization have pointed out that the United Nations is not is a position to verify the reports of such events. It is therefore essential to establish the truth by means of an independent and impartial investigation. Many of those reports come from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and we know who finances those NGOs. Therefore, we must allow doubts with regard to such sources. Analysing the draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation word by word, from the point of view of intellectual integrity, commitment to the Syrian people or international law, we found no reason to vote against the draft resolution. Nevertheless, what concerns us is what is being planned outside the structure of this edifice. While it was said today that Lenin and Marx would probably be turning in their graves, I do not know about that. But what is certain is that Churchill and Roosevelt, for example, are turning in their graves because, as founding fathers of the structure of this world order, they endowed the Security Council with the authority to use force to deal with threats to international peace and security. I am not sure that they would be very happy that the outcome of such events, without a full and conclusive investigation, is that some of its members undertake the unilateral use of force. In any case, we remain hopeful that the Security Council will shoulder its responsibility and that, through unity, it can help to identify the perpetrators of any attack against international peace and security, if that is the case. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Peru. We regret that we were not able to achieve consensus this afternoon on a draft resolution with regard to the delicate situation in Syria. We underscore that the investigation being carried out on the use of chemical weapons must be complemented by an independent, impartial and professional mechanism that attributes 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 19/21 responsibility. That is why we abstained in the voting on this occasion. We reiterate the need for the Security Council to regain its sense of unity on this very delicate subject so that it can fulfil its high responsibilities and thereby alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people. That is why we will continue to explore options on this important matter. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I remind speakers of the content of presidential note S/2017/507 with regard to the length of statements. I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): I will give colleagues who are about to leave the Chamber some of my valuable time. They are afraid that I will beat them in the battle of arguments. They become terrified when they hear any opposing views. Those who just left the Chamber said in their statements that today was a sad day for the non-proliferation regime. I would like to refresh their memories and say that violation of the non-proliferation regime is the speciality of the following Western States. The United States of America used nuclear weapons in Japan. It used chemical and biological weapons in Viet Nam and enriched uranium in Iraq. France used Algerian human beings when it tested its first atomic bomb in the Algerian desert in 1960. In fact, it placed living Algerians in the desert tied to poles, and dropped on them the first French atomic bomb. Britain, of course, conducted all its nuclear tests in its colonies on islands in the oceans. The British Ambassador then says that day was a sad day for the people of Douma. English is not my mother tongue, but I know that there are no people of Douma. There are inhabitants in Douma. There are Syrian people. There are no people of Douma. However, beyond Marx, Engels and Lenin, I would like to quote from Shakespeare as saying: "Lies shame you. Speak the truth or remain silent". My British colleague said that Russia does not have the authority to go to Douma and establish whether or not chemicals were used there, stating that it is not within the jurisdiction of our Russian friends, who are on the ground, to go to Douma and investigate the scene. That is quite strange. Britain should have advised itself in the same manner when it sent intelligence officers to Khan Shaykhoun and conferred upon itself the authority to collect samples with the French. They took the samples to British and French laboratories, as they claimed, without coordinating with the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) or the Fact-finding Mission. That is quite the paradox: giving themselves the very right that they deprive others. Approximately two weeks ago, Britain signed an agreement with the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia for an arms deal worth $100 billion — much bigger than the Al-Yamamah deal — to continue killing people in Yemen, start new wars in the region with Iran and Syria and entrench never-ending wars throughout the entire region. That is what Britain is capable of doing. Mahatma Gandhi knew the British well, and he was right when he said, "If two fish broke out into a fight in the sea, everyone knows it was Britain that started it". The American colleague said that there is only one monster facing the entire world in defiance today. That monster has financed terrorists in Syria for seven years and provided them with arms. I would say that the monster is the United States, Britain and France. They sponsored terrorism in my country for seven years, and before that they did the same in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. They sponsored terrorist organizations starting with Taliban and Da'esh, down to the Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaida, Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and the White Helmets, which British intelligence newly invented. The monster she spoke of unleashed lies in order to destroy, occupy and send troops thousands of miles throughout the world to destabilize international peace and security. The monster is the American who, thus far, refuses to destroy his chemical arsenal, as we know, yet lectures others on destroying chemical weapons. My French colleague said that he was horrified by the pictures he saw. But he was not horrified by the pictures of the hundreds of civilians who were killed in the 2016 French air strikes in Toukhar village in the rural area of Manbij. Two hundred civilians were killed, including entire families, by France's war planes. The French Ambassador must not have seen those pictures, and consequently they were not a source of horror for him. The concept of double standards is an understatement for those people. In response to the web of lies spread by some Western States against my country regarding the S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018 20/21 18-10187 alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma on 7 April, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic sent today, 10 April, an official invitation to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to dispatch a fact-finding mission to Douma in order to investigate the allegations of the use of chemical weapons there and to determine the facts about those allegations. I informed members of the Council of that invitation yesterday in this very Chamber (see S/PV.8225). The Syrian Arab Republic welcomes the visit of the fact-finding mission and stands ready to fully cooperate, provide all forms of assistance to the mission in the discharge of its duties and guarantee the safety of its personnel. It will also facilitate interviewing and sampling in accordance with the terms of reference. Syria looks forward to the fact-finding mission carrying out its work in a full, transparent and professional manner and while relying on credible and tangible evidence. If it does deploy, it will find Douma liberated and it will be granted full access to any location it wishes to visit. The situation is quite clear. The co-sponsors of the American draft resolution (S/2018/321) do not seek the truth, because it will simply expose them and their terrorist proxies on the ground. Instead of waiting for the OPCW fact-finding mission to determine whether or not toxic chemicals were used in Douma, they present draft resolutions that do not enjoy consensus, nor do they seek truth, but rather establish non-objective mechanisms that pre-empt results in support of their political accusations and agendas. They are aware that a clone of the JIM would not be accepted by the States in the Council that are dedicated to the quest for truth regarding who is using toxic chemicals against Syrian civilians. In that regard, I underscore that the United States, Britain and France made the JIM fail by thwarting it through politicizing its work, putting pressure on members of its leadership and blackmailing them. Consequently, the JIM lacked credibility and professionalism, as it fabricated reports that accused the Syrian Government based on the so-called open sources, of course including the White Helmets, and false testimonies and fabricated evidence emanating mostly from terrorist groups, most important of which is the terrorist Al-Nusra Front and the White Helmets, which is the British misleading media arm of the Al-Nusra Front. The scenario that we witness today is exactly similar to what we witnessed a year ago when the United States of America launched a wanton aggression on the Al-Shayrat air base, which was founded on flimsy arguments and fabricated pretexts stating that the Syrian Arab Army used chemical weapons in Khan Shaykhoun. Those allegations were proven false when the United States and its allies prevented the experts of the JIM from visiting Khan Shaykhoun and collecting samples from the Al-Shayrat air base. Things are crystal clear. The aggression of the United States and its accomplices, throughout history, thrives on lies, deceit and hegemony, as well as on the rule of the powerful. It is a brutal approach that will never respect the rule of law and international legitimacy. For seven years, my country, Syria, has been a stark example of what the United States and Britain did when they unleashed lies, misleading information and fabricated stories in this very Chamber in order to destroy and occupy Iraq. Their actions were grounded on the pretext of a significant lie, that is, the existence of the so-called weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. I am compelled each and every time to remind the Council of the position of former Secretary of State Colin Powell when, in this very Chamber (see S/PV.4701) — and I was sitting where the Deputy Permanent Representative of China is seated today — he presented tapes, documents, maps and pictures that were later discovered to have been produced, faked and fabricated by the American intelligence services for the purpose of invading Iraq. The operation was prepared in advance. The same scenario occurred with Libya. The truth must be revealed. For centuries the world has witnessed various instances of occupation and hegemony, whose sole purpose was to loot the wealth of nations, occupy land or impose a geopolitical agenda. However, political immorality has reached a depth today to the extent that Libya has been destroyed and many of its people killed to cover up cases of bribery and financial corruption involving the President of a permanent member of the Council that talks about democracy and freedom. It is so low today to the extent that a permanent State regrettably forces Arab oil-exporting countries to foot the bill for its ongoing aggression and military intervention in my country, Syria. It is a business deal forged between the corrupt with the financial means and a mercenary who has weapons and power. Some permanent members of the Council commit acts of aggression against sovereign 10/04/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8228 18-10187 21/21 countries simply to detract attention from domestic crises and ongoing controversy surrounding their political elite. Following seven years of a dirty terrorist war that was imposed upon us, we in Syria believe that clear options exist — but they pose a major challenge to the majority of Council members. The Council must refute the lies and reverse the political deterioration that the United States, Britain and France are trying to push the Council towards engaging in. It is up to the Council today, and in the future, to make its decision. World public opinion and the people of the free world will judge whether or not the Council has assumed its responsibility to uphold international legitimacy, maintain international peace and security and protect the world against the horrible terrorism that is used and exploited by those three permanent member countries to undermine the stability and self-determination of States. I call upon the members of the Council to uphold a global, ethical and multilateral political system that believes in international law and in the right of peoples to self-determination, and rejects military, political and economic hegemony. In conclusion, my country reiterates its condemnation in the strongest terms of any use of chemical weapons by any party, anywhere and under any circumstances. My country stands ready to cooperate with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to reveal the allegations and lies being promoted by some Western parties so as to justify their aggression and serve their own political agenda. Their fleets are now in the eastern Mediterranean, waiting for the veto in order to start their aggression. I would like to inform those Western parties — and they must pay close attention to what I say — that their threats of aggression, manoeuvres, lies and terrorism will never prevent us — as one of the founding States of the Organization — from exercising our duties and rights under the Charter of the United Nations and our national Constitution to protect our sovereignty and territorial integrity and to fend off aggression from any source. We will not allow anyone — big or small, permanent member or non-permanent member — to treat us the way Iraq and Libya were treated. The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.
Threats To International Peace And Security. The Situation In The Middle East ; United Nations S/PV.8225 Security Council Seventy-third year 8225th meeting Monday, 9 April 2018, 3 p.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Meza-Cuadra . (Peru) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Poland. . Mr. Radomski Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-09955 (E) *1809955* S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 2/26 18-09955 The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East The President (spoke in Spanish): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, and Mr. Thomas Markram, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. Mr. De Mistura is joining today's meeting via video-teleconference from Geneva. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I now give the floor to Mr. De Mistura. Mr. De Mistura: This emergency meeting of the Security Council underscores the gravity of the events in recent days in Syria, of which there are severe consequences for civilians. It takes place at a time of increased international tensions, drawing national, regional and international actors into dangerous situations of potential or actual confrontation. It is an important meeting. There is an urgent need for the Council to address the situation with unity and purpose. How did we reach this point? The month of March saw devastating violence in part of eastern Ghouta, which resulted in at least 1,700 people killed or injured in opposition-controlled areas, dozens and dozens of people killed or injured in Government-controlled areas and, ultimately, the evacuation of 130,000 people, including fighters, family members and other civilians. However, in Douma there was a fragile ceasefire, which continued for most of March. The United Nations good offices played an important role in that regard. Since 31 March, the United Nations has no longer been able to be involved in talks, since, at that time, the Syrian Government did not agree to our presence, although we made efforts to propose concrete ways to address the issues that we understood were arising in the continuing contacts, including the proposal to activate the detainee working group agreed in Astana. However, that proposal was not taken up at the time. From 2 April, the evacuation of some 4,000 fighters, family members and other civilians from Douma to northern Syria took place. However, on 6 April there was a major escalation in violence. There were reports of sustained air strikes and shelling against Douma, the killing of civilians, the destruction of civilian infrastructure and attacks damaging health facilities. There were also reports of shelling on Damascus city, which reportedly again killed or injured civilians. Jaysh Al-Islam requested our involvement in emergency talks in extremis, but there was no positive response to that request when it conveyed the same message to the other side. At approximately 8 p.m. local time on 7 April, reports of an alleged chemical weapons attack in Douma started to emerge. Pictures immediately circulated on social media showing what appeared to be lifeless men, women and children. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on the ground claimed to have received hundreds of cases of civilians with symptoms consistent with exposure to chemical agents. The same NGOs claimed that at least 49 people had been killed and hundreds injured. I wish to recall what the Secretary-General, Mr. António Guterres, noted, namely, that the United Nations "is not in a position to verify these reports". However, he also made it very clear that he cannot ignore them and that he "is particularly alarmed by allegations that chemical weapons have been used against civilian populations in Douma" once again. He further emphasized "that any use of chemical weapons, if confirmed, is abhorrent and requires a thorough investigation". I note that a number of States have strongly alluded to or expressed the suspicion that the Syrian Government was responsible for the alleged chemical attack. I also note that other States, as well as the Government of Syria itself, have strongly questioned the credibility of those allegations, depicting the attacks as a fabrication or/and a provocation. My comment is that this is one more reason for there to be a thorough independent investigation. 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 3/26 The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has said that it has made the preliminary analysis of the reports of the alleged use of chemical weapons and is in the process of gathering further information from all available sources. My colleague Mr. Thomas Markram, Deputy of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, who is with us in the Chamber today, will further address this matter. But I urge the Security Council, in accordance with its own mandate to maintain international peace and security and uphold international law, to, for God's sake, ensure that a mechanism is found to investigate these allegations and assign responsibility.Returning to the narrative of the events, at around midnight on 7 April, hours after the alleged chemical-weapons attack, Jaysh Al-Islam informed the United Nations that it had reached an agreement with the Russian Federation and the Syrian Government. The Russian Federation Ministry for Defence stated that the agreement encompasses a ceasefire and Jaysh Al-Islam fighters laying down their arms or evacuating Douma. The Russian Federation also reported that up to 8,000 Jaysh Al-Islam fighters and 40,000 of their family members were to evacuate.As I brief the Security Council now, we understand that additional evacuations from Douma are already under way. We have also received reports that some detainees — the ones we had heard about before — had begun to be released from Douma today. We note reports that the agreement provides for civilians who decide to stay to remain under Russian Federation guarantees, with the resumption of services in coordination with a local committee of civilians.I urge the Syrian Government and the Russian Federation to ensure the protection of those civilians so that as many civilians as possible can stay in their homes if they choose to, or leave to a place of their own choosing or return as per international law. I urge that there be, for there should be, an immediate refocusing for the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). What we have see is basically an escalation before a de-escalation.Clearly, the dangers of further escalation arise from situations beyond Ghouta as well. We have received reports of missiles targeting the Syrian Government's Tiyas, or T-4, airbase early this morning. No State has claimed responsibility for that reported strike. The United States and France have explicitly denied any involvement. The Syrian Government, the Russian Federation and Iran have suggested that Israel could have carried out the attack, with Iranian State media reporting that over a dozen military personnel were killed or injured, including four Iranian military advisers. The Government of Israel has not commented. The United Nations is unable to independently verify or attribute responsibility for that attack, but we urge all parties to show their utmost restraint and avoid any further escalation or confrontation.We are also concerned about the dynamics in other areas of Syria. Syrians in Dar'a, northern rural Homs, eastern Qalamoun, Hamah and Idlib have all expressed to us their own fears that they may soon face escalations similar to what we have seen in eastern Ghouta. We therefore urge the Security Council and the Astana guarantors and those States involved in the Amman efforts to work towards reinstating de-escalation in those areas and elsewhere in Syria. The indications are the opposite at the moment.Meanwhile, following its operations in Afrin, the Turkish Government has indicated the potential for further operations in other areas of northern Syria if Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat and Kurdish People's Protection Units forces are not removed from those areas. Military operations in such areas have the potential of raising international tensions. We therefore urge all parties concerned to de-escalate, show restraint and find means to implement resolution 2401 (2018) through dialogue and fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria. Let me also highlight the fact that we have recently seen — and this is particularly tragic when we consider the efforts all of us, including all members of the Security Council, have made in the last year — the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant launch new operations within Syria, south of Damascus, in rural Damascus, in remote areas near the Iraqi border.I would like to conclude with some bottom lines, if I may.First, civilians are paying a very heavy price for the military escalation. We are not seeing de-escalation; we are seeing the contrary. Today our first priority must be to protect civilians from the war, from the conflict, from chemical weapons, from hunger. We call on all sides to ensure respect for international humanitarian law and human rights law, including humanitarian access across Syria to all people in need. We urge once S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 4/26 18-09955 more for concrete respect for resolution 2401 (2018) throughout Syria, which is, after all, a resolution of the Security Council.Secondly, continued allegations of the use of chemical agents are of extremely grave concern. Those allegations must be independently and urgently investigated. Any use of chemical weapons is absolutely prohibited and constitutes a very serious violation of international law, the Chemical Weapons Convention and resolution 2118 (2013). Preventing impunity and any further use of chemical weapons and upholding international law must be an utmost priority for all members of the Security Council.Thirdly, I have to say this very slowly because today is the first time, in over four years of briefing the Security Council in person, that I have reached a point in which I have to express a concern about international security, not just regional or national or Syrian security, but international security. Recent developments have more than ever before brought to the surface the dangers that the Secretary-General warned about recently at the Munich Security Conference, when he spoke of "different faultlines" in the Middle East that are interconnected and crossing each other, of conflicting interests of both global and regional Powers, and forms of escalation that can have absolutely devastating consequences that are difficult for us to even imagine. The Council cannot allow a situation of uncontrollable escalation to develop in Syria on any front. Instead, it must find unity and address the concrete threats to international peace and security in Syria today.I am sorry to have been this brief, but I wanted to focus on one specific concern, namely, the threat to international security related to what we are seeing now in Syria and the danger of the alleged chemical-weapons attacks being repeated. Next time I will brief the Council on humanitarian and other issues and on the political process, which I know we are all interested in focusing upon, but today is the day for talking about security — international security — and peace.The President (spoke in Spanish): I thank Mr. De Mistura for his very informative briefing.I now give the floor to Mr. Markram.Mr. Markram: I thank you for the opportunity to address the Council again today, Mr. President. The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu, is away on official travel.It has been less than a week since I last briefed the Council (see S/PV.8221) on the issue of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. In the intervening period, new and deeply disturbing allegations of the use of chemical weapons have come to light. Over the past weekend, there have been reports on the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma, in the Syrian Arab Republic. According to reports that came in yesterday, it is alleged that at least 49 people were killed and hundreds more injured in a chemical-weapon attack. More than 500 other individual cases reportedly presented with symptoms consistent with such an attack. The Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in touch with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the matter. The OPCW, which implements the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Syria is a State party, is gathering information about the incident from all available sources, through its Fact-finding Mission in Syria. After completing its investigation, the Fact-finding Mission will report its findings on the alleged attack to the States parties to the Convention.Sadly, there is little to say today that has not already been said. The use of chemical weapons is unjustifiable. Those responsible must be held to account. That those views have been stated on many previous occasions does not lessen the seriousness with which the Secretary-General regards such allegations. Nor does it lessen the truth behind them, which is that what we are seeing in Syria cannot go unchallenged by anyone who values the decades of effort that have been put in to bring about the disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As the body charged with the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council must unite in the face of this continuing threat and fulfil its responsibilities. To do otherwise, or simply to do nothing, is to accept, tacitly or otherwise, that such a challenge is insurmountable. The use of chemical weapons cannot become the status quo, nor can we continue to fail the victims of such weapons.Just over one year ago, in responding to the attack on Khan Shaykhun, the Secretary-General called for those responsible to be held accountable, stating that there can be no impunity for such horrific acts. Just over one week ago, speaking on behalf of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, I noted that unity in the Security Council on a dedicated mechanism for accountability would provide the best foundation for success in that regard. I reiterate that belief here, as 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 5/26 well as the readiness of the Secretary-General and the Office for Disarmament Affairs to assist.The President (spoke in Spanish): I thank Mr. Markram for his informative briefing.I now give the floor to members of the Security Council who wish to make statements.Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): If you imagine, Mr. President, that I derive pleasure from the subject of my statement today, or from speaking at great length, you are wrong. Unfortunately, however, the situation is such that I have a lot to say today. And you will have to listen to me.We thank Mr. De Mistura and Mr. Markram for their briefings.The Russian Federation asked that this meeting be convened under the agenda item "Threats to international peace and security" because we are deeply alarmed about the fact that a number of capitals — Washington first and foremost, with London and Paris blindly following its lead — are purposely steering a course designed to supercharge international tensions. The leadership of the United States, Britain and France, with no grounds and no thought for the consequences, are taking a confrontational line on Russia and Syria and pushing others towards it too. They have a broad range of weapons in their arsenal — slander, insults, bellicose rhetoric, blackmail, sanctions and threats of the use of force against a sovereign State. Their threats against Russia are brazen, and the tone they take has gone beyond the limits of the permissible. Even during the Cold War their predecessors did not express themselves so crudely about my country. What next?I remember the rhetorical question that President Putin of Russia put to our Western partners, and especially the United States, from the rostrum of the General Assembly in 2015 (see A/70/PV.13), about their careless geopolitical experiments in the Middle East, when he asked them if they at least realized what they had done. At the time, the question went unanswered. But there is an answer, and it is that no, they do not realize what they have done. As they do not realize what they are doing now. It is not only we who are perplexed at their lack of any coherent strategy on any issue. It perplexes most of the people in this Chamber. They just do not want to ask them about it openly. Wherever they go, whatever they touch, they leave behind chaos in their wake in the murky water where they have gone fishing for some kind of fish. But the only fish they catch are mutants. I will ask them another rhetorical question. Do they understand the dangerous place they are dragging the world to?One of the areas where the hostility manifests itself most strongly is Syria. The terrorists and extremists supported by external sponsors are being defeated. Let me remind those responsible that these are the terrorists and extremists whom they equipped, financed and dumped into the country in order to overthrow the lawful Government. Now we can see why this is causing hysteria among those who have invested their political and material capital in such dark forces.In the past few weeks, thanks to Russia's efforts to implement the Security Council's resolutions, a massive operation has been carried out to unblock eastern Ghouta, whose residents have been forced to endure the humiliation of the rebel militias for several years. More than 150 thousand civilians were evacuated from this suburb of Damascus, completely voluntarily and under the necessary security conditions. Tens of thousands of them have already been able to return to liberated areas and many have been taken in by relatives. The changes in their demographic composition that the defenders of the Syrian opposition have been screaming about have not happened. That is a lie. Some extremely complex negotiations were conducted with the leaders of the armed groups, as a result of which many left the neighbourhoods they were occupying, with full guarantees for their security. Incidentally, there were several attempted acts of terrorism during these transport operations when militias tried to bring suicide belts onto the buses and were prevented. Others preferred to regulate their status with the Syrian authorities. Thanks to the presidential amnesty, they will now be able to return to civilian life, and may even eventually be able to join Syria's security forces. That represents the implementation of the United Nations principle of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration.However, not everyone is so keen on such positive dynamics. The outside sponsors — that is, the leading Western countries — were ready to grasp at any straw in order to hang on to any centre of terrorist resistance, however tiny, within striking distance of the Syrian capital, so that the militias could continue to terrorize ordinary residents, taking their food and begging humanitarian aid from the international community. Incidentally, they were not about to S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 6/26 18-09955 share medicines with those ordinary civilians, as an inspection of the strongholds left behind by the fighters revealed. As happened previously in eastern Aleppo, the improvised hospital facilities in basements were full of medicines that thanks to Western sanctions were not to be had for love or money in Damascus and other Government-controlled areas. Mass graves and bodies that showed evidence of torture were also discovered. The dimensions of the tunnels that the jihadists used were astonishing. Some of them could easily accommodate small trucks travelling in both directions. Those impressive underground facilities connected the positions of groups that some view as moderate to the strongholds of Jabhat Al-Nusra.On 6 April, at their sponsors' instructions, Jaysh Al-Islam's new ringleaders prevented the fourth group of militia fighters from evacuating Douma and resumed rocket and mortar fire on residential areas of Damascus, targeting Mezzeh, Mezzeh 86, Ish Al-Warwar, Abu Rummaneh and Umayyad Square. According to official data, eight civilians were killed and 37 were wounded. It is regrettable that we seen no statements from Western capitals condemning the shelling of a historic part of Damascus.The next day, 7 April, militias accused the Syrian authorities of dropping barrel bombs containing a toxic substance. However, they got their versions mixed up, referring to it sometimes as chlorine and sometimes as sarin or a mixture of poison gases. In a familiar pattern, the rumours were immediately seized on by non-governmental organizations financed by Western capitals and White Helmets operating in the guise of rescue workers. These so-called reports were also just as quickly disseminated through media outlets. I should once again point out that many of these dubious opposition entities have an accurate list of the email addresses of the representatives of Security Council members, which leads us to conclude that some of our colleagues, with a reckless attitude to their position, have been leaking sensitive information to those they sponsor. Incidentally, we all should remember the incident in which the White Helmets accidentally posted on the Internet a video showing the preparation stages for filming the next so-called victim of an attack allegedly perpetrated by the Syrian army. The chemical "series" that began in 2013 has continued to run, with each subsequent episode designed to top the impact of the previous one.In Washington, London and Paris, conclusions have immediately been reached as to the guilt of the Syrian authorities, or regime, as they call it. Has no one wondered why Damascus needs this? While the Syrian leadership has received its share of insults, the main burden of responsibility has been laid at the door of Russia and Iran, to no one's surprise, I believe. As is now customary, it has occurred at lightning speed and without any kind of investigation. On 8 April, Syrian troops searching the village of Al-Shifuniya, near Douma, discovered a small, makeshift Jaysh Al-Islam chemical-munitions factory, along with German-produced chlorine reagents and specialized equipment.The Istanbul-based opposition journalist Asaad Hanna posted a video on his Twitter feed that was allegedly from the area of the incident. In it, an unidentified individual in a gas mask, presumably from the White Helmets, is posing against a backdrop of a homemade chemical bomb that allegedly landed in a bedroom in a building in Douma. It is accompanied by commentary about what it calls another of the regime's attacks on civilians. There can be no doubt that this production was staged. The trajectory of the alleged bomb is entirely unnatural. It fell through the roof and landed gently on a wooden bed without damaging it in any way and was clearly placed there before the scene was shot.In an interesting coincidence, the chemical act of provocation in Douma on Saturday, 7 April, occurred immediately after the United States delegation in the Security Council was instructed to call for expert consultations for today, Monday, 9 April, on its draft resolution on a mechanism for investigating incidents involving chemical weapons. Today far-reaching changes were made to the initial text. In such murky circumstances, of course, we have to determine what happened. But we have to do it honestly, objectively and impartially, without sacrificing the principle of the presumption of innocence and certainly not by prejudging the process of an investigation.Despite this provocation, the Russian specialists have continued their efforts to resolve the situation in eastern Ghouta. On Sunday afternoon, 8 April, according to new agreements, the evacuation of Jaysh Al-Islam combatants was resumed. Following Douma's liberation from militants, Russian radiological, chemical and biological protection specialists were sent there to collect evidence. They took soil samples that showed no presence of nerve agents or substances 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 7/26 containing chlorine. Local residents and combatants who were no longer fighting were interviewed. Not one local confirmed the chemical attack. At the local hospital, no one with symptoms of sarin or chlorine poisoning had been admitted. There are no other active medical facilities in Douma. No bodies of people who had died from being poisoned were found, and the medical staff and residents had no information about where they might have been buried. Any use of sarin or chlorine in Douma is therefore unconfirmed. By the way, representatives of the Syrian Red Crescent refuted statements allegedly made on their behalf about providing assistance to victims of toxic gases. I call on those who plan to denounce the regime when they speak after me to assume that there was no chemical-weapon attack.Sweden has drafted a resolution calling for the incident to be investigated. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) does not need a resolution to investigate it, but we are willing to consider it. Today we propose to do what is envisaged in the draft resolution, which is to let the OPCW, which Mr. Üzümcü, Director-General of its Technical Secretariat, has announced is ready to deal with the situation, fly to Damascus immediately, if possible tomorrow. There the Syrian authorities and the Russian military will ensure the necessary conditions so that the OPCW experts can travel to the site of the alleged incident and familiarize themselves with the situation. That, by the way, is what President Trump and other Western leaders have been urging us to do.The Syrians have repeatedly warned that there might be chemical provocations. At the Russian Centre for the Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic they are saying that the equipment needed to film the next purported chemical attack has already been brought in. We have also made statements to that effect in the Security Council. Everyone has heard those warnings, but has deliberately ignored them because they do not correspond to the doctrinal positions espoused by those who dream of seeing the legitimate Government of yet another Arab country destroyed.There has still been no attention given to the discovery in November and December 2017 of a significant quantity of chemical munitions on Syrian territory that had been liberated from militias. In terrorist warehouses in Az-Zahiriya and Al-Hafiya in Hama governorate, 20 one-ton containers and more than 50 pieces of ordnance containing toxic chemicals were discovered. In Tel Adel in Idlib governorate, 24 tons of toxic chemical, presumed to be chlorine, were discovered. At a storage site in Moadamiya, 30 kilometres to the north-east of Damascus, 240- and 160-millimetre-calibre munitions and plastic canisters of organo-phosphorous compounds were found. In the area around As-Suwayda in Idlib governorate, an manufacturing facility for synthesizing various toxic substances was found, along with 54 pieces of chemical ordnance and 44 containers of chemicals that could be used to manufacture toxic substances.Since the beginning of this year alone, four instances of militias using toxic chemicals against Government troop positions have been established in Suruj and Al-Mushairfeh districts, and more than 100 Syrian troops have been hospitalized. On 3 March, during the liberation of Khazram and Aftris in eastern Ghouta, soldiers from a sub-unit of Government troops discovered an auxiliary workshop for homemade chemical munitions. This far from exhaustive list is an indication of the misdeeds of the still unreconciled opposition. And yet we have seen no eagerness to send OPCW expert groups there to collect evidence of these events. We demand that the OPCW verify all of these areas. They are accessible. We are also seeing information that American instructors in the Al-Tanf camp have trained a number of groups of fighters to carry out provocations using chemical weapons in order to create a pretext for a rocket strikes and bombings.It has been clear to us that sooner or later there would be an attempt to bring the jihadists out of harm's way and at the same time to punish the regime that some Western capitals hate. The talking heads on television have thrown themselves into urging a repeat of last year's effort at a military attack on Syria. This morning there were missile strikes on the T-4 airfield in Homs governorate. We are deeply troubled by such actions.The provocations in Douma are reminiscent of last year's incident in Khan Shaykhun, with their shared element being the planned nature of the attacks. Analysis of the operations conducted by the United States in April 2017, on the eve of the incident in Khan Shaykhun and after it, shows that Washington prepared its operation in advance. From 4 to 7 April of last year — in other words, from the day that a toxic substance was used in Khan Shaykhun until the strike on the Al-Shayrat airbase — the USS Porter and Ross naval destroyers S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 8/26 18-09955 were already present in the Mediterranean Sea, where they were engaged in planned operations. They did not call into any ports where an exchange of munitions could have been effected as a way to increase their quantity of cruise missiles.Specifically, from 4 to 5 April, the USS Porter was located south-east of Sicily and the Ross was en route from the Rota naval base to an area south of Sardinia. Later, on 6 April, both ships were observed moving at accelerated speed towards the area of the firing positions to the south-west of Cyprus, from where they launched a massive strike on Al-Shayrat on 7 April. However, the 59 Tomahawk missiles that were launched would have exceeded the two destroyers' total munitions capacity if they had actually been engaged in the anti-missile defence operations that they were assigned to, which required only 48 units. That means, therefore, that even before the chemical incident in Khan Shaykhun, these United States naval vessels undertook a military operation with a strike capability above the number of cruise missiles necessary for their anti-missile defence operations, which could be evidence of advance planning by Washington of an action against Damascus.Among other things, Saturday's fake news from Douma was aimed at diverting the public's attention from the circus that is the Skripal case, in which London has become terminally mired, hurling completely unproven accusations at Russia and accomplishing its basic purpose of extracting solidarity from its allies in order to construct an anti-Russian front. Now the British are shifting away from a transparent investigation and concrete responses to the questions they have been asked while simultaneously covering their tracks.At the Security Council meeting on 5 April on the Skripal case (see S/PV.8224), we warned the Council that the attempt to accuse us, without proof, of involvement in the Salisbury incident was linked to the Syrian chemical issue. There was an interesting new development regarding the issue yesterday. As Britain's Foreign Minister Boris Johnson was continuing his display of rapier wit "exposing" Russia, another gem emerged. The Times informed us that Royal Air Force experts in southern Cyprus had intercepted a message sent from outside Damascus to Moscow on the day of the Skripals' poisoning that contained the phrase "the package has been delivered" and said that two people had "successfully departed". Apparently this formed part of the intelligence that London provided to its allies before expelling our Russian diplomats. Is not it obvious to everyone that there is an irrefutable Syria-Russia-Salisbury connection? I will give the British intelligence services one more huge hint, for free. Why do they not assume that the Novichok they are so thrilled about reached Salisbury directly from Syria? In a package. To cover its tracks. How pathetic.Ambassador Haley recently stated that Russia will never be a friend of the United States. To that, I say that friendship is both reciprocal and voluntary. One cannot force a friendship and we are not begging the United States to be friends. What we want from it is very little — normal, civilized relations, which it arrogantly refuses, disregarding basic courtesy. However, the United States is mistaken if it thinks that it has friends. Its so-called friends are only those who cannot say no to it. And that is the only criterion for friendship that it understands.Russia has friends. And unlike the United States, we do not have adversaries. That is not the prism through which we view the world. It is international terrorism that is our enemy. However, we continue to propose cooperating with the United States. That cooperation should be respectful and mutual, and aimed at resolving genuine problems, not imaginary ones, and it should be just as much in the interests of the United States. Ultimately, as permanent members of the Security Council, we have a special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.Through the relevant channels, we already conveyed to the United States that military action conducted on false pretences against Syria, where Russian troops are deployed at the request of its legitimate Government, could have extremely serious repercussions. We urge Western politicians to temper their hawkish rhetoric, seriously consider the possible repercussions and cease their feeble, foolhardy efforts, which merely produce challenges to global security. We can see very good examples of what becomes of the military misadventures of the West in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Libya. No one has invested Western leaders with the power to take on the roles of the world's policeman and its investigators, prosecutors, judges and executioners as well. We urge them to return to the world of legality, comply with the Charter of the United Nations and work collectively to address the problems that arise rather than attempting to realize its own selfish geopolitical dreams at every step. All our energy should be focused on supporting the political process in Syria, and for that, all stakeholders with influence must unite in a 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 9/26 constructive effort. Russia is always ready for that kind of cooperation.In conclusion, I would like to take this opportunity to request a briefing of the Security Council on the results of the United Nations assessment mission in Raqqa and on the situation in the Rukban camp. We can see how the coalition members are trying to complicate a resolution of the problems resulting from their actions in Syria, particularly the carpet-bombing operation designed to wipe out Raqqa. No chemical provocations will distract our attention from that issue.Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): We thank Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura and Deputy High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Thomas Markram for their briefings.Only five days ago, here in this Chamber (see S/PV.8221), we mourned as we remembered the sarin attack at Khan Shaykhun that occurred a year ago. This weekend another devastating gas attack was carried out in the city of Douma, killing more than 45 civilians and injuring more than 500. It was another in a series of chemical-weapon attacks in Syria. That is unacceptable. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is one of nine Security Council members that requested today's emergency meeting because we all believed that it was critically important to address this horrific attack. We must reinstate the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. We must underscore the basic norms of the international legal order and stop the ongoing tragedy in eastern Ghouta and Douma.We almost met twice today because one permanent member of the Council seemed not to want a focused discussion on the issue at hand, the chemical attack in Douma. That begs the question of whether that particular member State would prefer the international community to stand by and watch like a spectator while it covers for the crimes of its ally, the Syrian regime, some of which amount to serious war crimes. The Council must not stand idly by. It is high time for us to act in three ways, condemning, protecting and holding to account. First, today we should condemn in the strongest possible terms any use of chemical weapons. International law has been trampled on. Silence and impunity are not an option. However, condemnation alone is not enough.Secondly, we must deliver on our responsibility to protect. The protection of civilians must remain an absolute priority. We call on the Astana guarantors to use their influence to prevent any further attacks. They must ensure a cessation of hostilities and a de-escalation of the violence, as per resolution 2401 (2018). An immediate ceasefire is needed in Douma so that humanitarian and medical aid can reach the victims of the attack and so that humanitarian personnel can continue their life-saving work. We owe it to the men, women and children of Douma and of Syria. We owe it to our own citizens.Furthermore, the Kingdom of the Netherlands would also like to point out that the majority of the States Members of the United Nations count on the permanent members of the Council not to use their veto in cases of mass atrocities. The international community should be able to count on the Council to uphold international humanitarian law and the international prohibition on the use of chemical weapons, and to act when international law is trampled. Let me be clear. We support the humanitarian work of the White Helmets. They do extremely important humanitarian work for civilians in Syria in dire circumstances.Thirdly, all members of the Council regularly stress the importance of accountability for perpetrators who use chemical weapons. Yet the Council has not been able to move forward on that issue for months owing to one permanent member's use of the veto. We have been unable to tackle this crisis because one permanent member is a direct party to the conflict and has proved that it will defend the Syrian regime at all costs. We must intensify our efforts to establish a mechanism that can continue the meticulous work of the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) and investigate and identify perpetrators independently of the politics in the Council. The JIM has identified both the Syrian regime and a non-State actor as responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. As I said last week (see S/PV.8221), the discontinuation of the JIM mandate cannot be the end of the story — all the more so because since the JIM ceased to operate, we have received reports that the regime has carried out at least six more chemical-weapon attacks and perhaps even more. For those who claim that chemical-weapon attacks have not taken place or that such accounts have been fabricated, I have a clear message. The establishment of an effective, impartial and independent attribution and accountability mechanism must not be vetoed.Let us not forget that the United Nations is bigger than the Council alone. We have strong leadership at the helm of Organization and a powerful General S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 10/26 18-09955 Assembly. Both must consider all instruments to advance accountability for the use of chemical weapons. The work should build on the important work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-finding Mission and the JIM. We welcome the Fact-finding Mission's immediate investigation of the terrible incident in Douma this weekend. It should be given full access and cooperation by all parties. We reiterate our strong support for, first, the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Those Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011; secondly, the Commission of Inquiry; thirdly, the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, initiated by France; and fourthly, a referral of the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court in The Hague as the most appropriate path to accountability and justice.In conclusion, the Council must act. The OPCW Fact-finding Mission must complete an investigation as soon as possible, and there can be no impunity for the use of chemical weapons. To do otherwise is tantamount to condoning such appalling attacks, failing in our responsibilities and undermining the international architecture that we have collectively designed to stop such attacks. It is time for the Council and the international community as a whole to act.Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I thank Mr. De Mistura and Mr. Markram for their briefings.Almost exactly one year ago, I stood on the floor of the Security Council and held up pictures of dead Syrian children (see S/PV.7915). After that day, I prayed that I would never have to do that again. I could; there are many truly gruesome pictures. Many of us have worked hard to ensure that one day we would not have to see images of babies gassed to death in Syria. However, the day we prayed would never come, has come again. Chemical weapons have once again been used on Syrian men, women and children. And once again, the Security Council is meeting in response.This time I am not going to hold up pictures of victims. I could; there are many, and they are gruesome. Worse are the videos imprinted in our minds that no one should ever have to see. I could hold up pictures of babies lying dead next to their mothers, brothers and sisters — even toddlers and infants still in diapers, all lying together dead. Their skin is the ashen blue that is now tragically familiar from chemical-weapon scenes. Their eyes are open and lifeless, with white foam bubbles at their mouths and noses. They are pictures of dead Syrians who are unarmed, not soldiers and fit the very definition of innocent and non-threatening. Rather, they are women and children who were hiding in basements from a renewed assault by Bashar Al-Assad. They are of families who were hiding underground to escape Al-Assad's conventional bombs and artillery, but the basements that Syrian families thought would shelter them from conventional bombs were the worst place to be when chemical weapons fell from the sky. Saturday evening, the basements of Douma became their tombs.It is impossible to know for certain how many have died, because access to Douma is cut off by Al-Assad's forces. Dozens are dead that we know of, and hundreds are wounded. I could hold up pictures of survivors — children with burning eyes and choking for breath. I could hold up pictures of first responders washing the chemicals off of the victims and putting respirators on children, or of first responders walking through room after room of families lying motionless with babies still in the arms of their mothers and fathers. I could show pictures of a hospital attacked with chemical weapons. I could show pictures of hospitals struck by barrel bombs following the chemical attack. Ambulances and rescue vehicles have been repeatedly attacked, maximizing the number of dead civilians. Civil defence centres have been attacked in order to paralyse the medical response so as to increase the suffering of the survivors. Who does that? Only a monster does that. Only a monster targets civilians, and then ensures that there are no ambulances to transfer the wounded, no hospitals to save their lives and no doctors or medicine to ease their pain.I could hold up pictures of all of that killing and suffering for the Council to see, but what would be the point? The monster who was responsible for those attacks has no conscience, not even to be shocked by pictures of dead children. The Russian regime, whose hands are all covered in the blood of Syrian children, cannot be ashamed by pictures of its victims. We have tried that before. We must not overlook Russia and Iran's roles in enabling the Al-Assad regime's murderous destruction. Russia and Iran have military advisers at Al-Assad's airfields and operation centres. Russian officials are on the ground helping direct the 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 11/26 regime's starve-and-surrender campaign, and Iranian allied forces do much of the dirty work.When the Syrian military pummels civilians, they rely on the military hardware given by Russia. Russia could stop that senseless slaughter if it wanted, but it stands with the Al-Assad regime and supports without any hesitation. What is the point of trying to shame such people? After all, no civilized Government would have anything to do with Al-Assad's murderous regime. Pictures of dead children mean little to Governments like Russia, who expend their own resources to prop up Al-Assad.The Council, which saw the pictures last year, has failed to act because Russia has stood in its way every single time. For a year we have allowed Russia to hold the lives of innocent Syrians hostage to its alliance with the Al-Assad regime. That also allowed Russian to weaken the credibility of the United Nations. We are quick to condemn chemical weapons in the Security Council, but then Russia prevents any action. It vetoed five draft resolutions on this issue alone and used 11 vetoes all together to save Al-Assad. Our lives go on as usual.The Council created the Joint Investigative Mechanism. It found the Syrian regime responsible for the attack at Khan Shaykhun a year ago. Because Russia supported Al-Assad and his actions, Russia killed the Mechanism. We condemned it, and our lives went on as usual. We pushed for a ceasefire. The Council unanimously agreed, but it was immediately ignored by Russia and Al-Assad. We condemned it, and our lives went on as usual. Now here we are, confronted with the consequences of giving Russia a pass in the name of unity — a unity that Russia has shown many times before it does not want. Here we are, in a world where chemical-weapons use is becoming normalized — from an Indonesian airport to an English village to the homes and hospitals of Syria. Since the Al-Assad regime used chemical weapons at Khan Shaykhun one year ago, chemical weapons have been reportedly used dozens of times, and the Council does nothing.What we are dealing with today is not about a spat between the United States and Russia. It is about the inhumane use of chemical agents on innocent civilians. Each and every one of the nations in the Council is on record opposing the use of chemical weapons. There can be no more rationalizations for our failure to act. We have already introduced and circulated to the Council a draft resolution demanding unrestricted humanitarian access to the people of Douma. Al-Assad is doing all he can to assure maximum suffering in Douma. Our priority must be to help the starving, the sick and the injured who have been left behind. We also call on the Council to immediately re-establish a truly professional and impartial mechanism for chemical-weapons attacks in Syria, including the attack this weekend. We hope that our colleagues on the Council will join us, as they have before.That is a very minimum we can do in response to the attack we just witnessed. Russia's obstructionism will not continue to hold us hostage when we are confronted with an attack like that one. The United States is determined to see the monster who dropped chemical weapons on the Syrian people held to account. Those present have heard what the President of the United States has said about that. Meetings are ongoing. Important decisions are being weighed, even as we speak. We are on the edge of a dangerous precipice. The great evil of chemical-weapons use, which once unified the world in opposition, is on the verge of becoming the new normal. The international community must not let that happen. We are beyond showing pictures of dead babies. We are beyond appeals to conscience. We have reached the moment when the world must see justice done. History will record this as the moment when the Security Council either discharged its duty or demonstrated its utter and complete failure to protect the people of Syria. Either way, the United States will respond.Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): I thank the Peruvian presidency for having convened this emergency Security Council meeting, at the request of France, together with eight other Council members. I also wish to thank the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, and the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Thomas Markram, for their insightful briefings.There are times in the lives of nations where what is essential is at stake: life or death; peace or war; civilization or barbarism; the international order or chaos. That is the case today following the dreadful chemical carnage that once again pushed the boundaries of horror on Saturday in Douma. We are aware that two new and particularly serious chemical-weapons attacks took place in Douma on 7 April. The provisional toll of human life is appalling. There are nearly 50 dead, including a number of children, and 1,000 wounded. S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 12/26 18-09955 That toll is likely to be even higher, as assistance cannot reach some areas. Once again, toxic substances have been dropped to asphyxiate, to kill and to terrorize civilians, reaching them even in the basements where they sought refuge. Chlorine gas has the particular characteristic of being a heavy gas, capable of entering basements. For that reason, it is used. That is the level of deadly cynicism that has been reached in Syria.There are no words to describe the horror of the images that surfaced on 7 April, nearly one year after the Khan Shaykhun attack, which killed nearly 80 people. What we see in the thousands of photos and videos that surfaced in the course of several hours after the 7 April attacks reminds us of the images we have seen far too often: children and adults suffocating due to exposure to concentrated chlorine gas. What we also see are people suffering from violent convulsions, excessive salivation and burning eyes, all of which are symptomatic of exposure to a potent neurotoxin mixed with chlorine to heighten the lethal effect. As I mentioned, in total more than 1,000 people were exposed to that deadly chemical compound.The experience and the successive reports of the Joint Investigative Mechanism leave no room for doubt as to the perpetrators of this most recent attack. Only the Syrian armed forces and their agencies have the requisite knowledge to develop such sophisticated toxic substances with such a high degree of lethality. And only the Syrian armed forces and its agencies have a military interest in their use. This attack took place in Douma, an area that has been subjected to relentless shelling by the Syrian armed and air forces for several weeks. Unfortunately, the use of such weapons enables much swifter tactical progress than conventional weapons.We are all aware that the Syrian regime has already been identified by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism as the party responsible for the use, on at least four occasions, of chlorine and sarin gas as a chemical weapon. There are no illusions as to the sincerity of the declaration delivered by Syria on the state of its chemical stockpiles in 2013. Unfortunately, we once again we have proof in the form of empirical evidence. This dovetails with the regime's strategy of terror against civilians. We have already experienced this. At the worst, this is bad faith or, even worse, complicity. The Damascus regime clearly seeks, by sowing terror, to accelerate the capture of other urban areas that it wishes to control. What could be more effective to prompt those who resist the regime to flee than sieges, a tactic worthy of the Middle Ages, in addition to chemical terror. Let us make no mistake: the children frozen in an agonizing death are not so-called collateral victims. They are deliberate targets of these chemical attacks, designed and planned for the purpose of waging terror. The Damascus regime is conducting State terrorism, with its litany of war crimes and even crimes against humanity.The offensive and the shelling conducted by the regime, as well as by its Russian and Iranian allies, over the past 48 hours prove the degree to which they have engaged in a military race without any consideration of the human cost. This latest escalation of violence, punctuated by a new instance of the use of chemical weapons, brings us face to face with the destructive madness of a diehard regime that seeks to destroy its people completely. And that regime's Russian and Iranian allies are either unable or unwilling to stop it. We are aware of the fact, and the Russian authorities have confirmed this on several occasions, that Russian military forces have a presence on the ground and in the air in eastern Ghouta. On 7 April, as the second chemical attack took place in Douma, Russian aircraft were also taking part in air operations in the Damascus region. Russian and Iranian military support is present on the ground and at all levels of the Syrian war machinery. No Syrian aircraft takes off without the Russian ally being informed. These attacks took place either with the tacit or explicit consent of Russia or despite its reluctance and military presence. I do not know which is more alarming when it comes to our collective security.The stakes revolving around this recent attack are extremely grave. This is the latest proof of the normalization of chemical weapons use, which we should attribute not only to a regime that has become uncontrollable and continues to gas civilians with complete impunity, but also to its supporters, including a permanent member of the Security Council. That member failed in its commitment to implement resolution 2118 (2013), which it, itself, co-sponsored. That member's responsibility in the endless tragedy that is the war in Syria is overwhelming.France therefore of course turns towards Russia today in order to put forward two demands. The first demand is a cessation of hostilities and the establishment of an immediate ceasefire in Syria, in line with resolution 2401 (2018), adopted on 24 February, 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 13/26 which to date has never been upheld by the Damascus regime. France deeply deplores the fact that, although it was unanimously adopted, it was not possible to implement that resolution, which provides for a truce and emergency humanitarian access. The second demand is the establishment of a new international investigative mechanism that will be able to document all of the factors of the attack in Douma and ensure that the perpetrators are brought to justice. The end of the Joint Investigative Mechanism last November due to two successive Russian vetoes has stripped us of an essential tool of deterrence. For that reason, we support any initiative to bridge that gap. And in that spirit France has committed to a partnership to combat impunity for the use of chemical weapons. In that same spirit, we endorse the draft resolution that has been put forward today by the United States.With this attack the Al-Assad regime is testing yet again the determination of the international community to ensure compliance with the prohibition against chemica-weapons use. Our response must be united, robust and implacable. That response must make it clear that the use of chemical weapons against civilians will no longer be tolerated, and that those who flout that fundamental rule of our collective security will be held accountable and must face the consequences. The Al-Assad regime needs to hear an international response, and France stands ready to fully shoulder its role alongside its partners.Ultimately, we know that only an inclusive political solution will bring an end to the seven-year conflict, which has claimed the lives of 500,000 people and pushed millions to take the route of exile. That is why France will remain fully committed alongside the United Nations Special Envoy and in line with the Geneva process. However, in the light of this most recent carnage, we can no longer merely repeat words. Without being followed up by deeds, such words would be meaningless. I wish to reiterate here what President Macron has stressed on several occasions: France will assume its full responsibility in the fight against the proliferation of chemical weapons. France's position is clear. It will uphold its commitments and keep its word.Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I thank the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria and Mr. Markram for their briefings. I also thank all the United Nations teams on the ground for the important and incredibly difficult work they do.As Staffan de Mistura said, this is an important Security Council meeting. My Government shares the outrage that other colleagues have eloquently described today. It is truly horrific to think of victims and families sheltered underground when the chlorine found them.This is the third time in five days that the Council has convened to discuss chemical weapons. This is dreadful in the true sense of that word. The Council should dread what we risk happening — for chemical weapons to become a routine part of fighting. As one of the five permanent members of the Council (P-5), the United Kingdom believes that we have a particular responsibility to uphold the worldwide prohibition on the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). We agree with the Netherlands Ambassador that the P-5 has specific responsibilities. I believe that four members of the P-5 do believe that, but there is one that does not. The Russian Ambassador referred to a resurgence of the Cold War. This is not the Cold War. In the Cold War there was not this flagrant disregard for the prohibitions that are universal on the use of WMDs.The Special Representative of the Secretary-General also referred to the risks of escalation, and to international peace and security more broadly. We share his fears, but it is the Syrian Government and its backers, Iran and Russia, who are prolonging the fighting and risking regional and wider instability. There are real questions about what is happening in the T-4 airbase, with its foreign fighters and its mercenaries.We have been challenged today by our Russian colleague to say why we believe the attack was carried out by Syria and why we believe, further, that chemical weapons were used. The reasons are as follows. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism found six uses of chemical weapons between 2014 and 2017. Two it ascribed to Da'esh for the use of mustard gas, three it ascribed to the regime for the use of chlorine and one further use it ascribed to the Syrian regime for the use of sarin. That is the attacks that we talked about in the Council just last week at Khan Sheykhoun, which led to the United States strike — which we support — on Al-Shayrat. In addition, as the French Ambassador has said, we had reports of Russian and Syrian warnings before the chemical-weapon attack took place and of a pattern of Mi-8 Hip helicopters flying overhead. Those reports have come from the ground.S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 14/26 18-09955 I listened carefully to the Russian Ambassador's argument. As I have just set out, we, as the United Kingdom believe that the Syrian regime is responsible for these latest attacks. But there is one way to settle this — to have an independent fact-finding mission followed by an independent investigation — as we all know that fact-finding missions are there to determine whether chemical weapons have been used and, if they have been used, what sort of chemical weapons. But only an investigation can determine who is responsible for their use, and therefore start the path to accountability.I was very interested to hear the Russian offer that an OPCW fact-finding mission could visit and would have the protection of Russian forces. I believe that this is an offer worth pursuing, but it would, of course, be necessary for the OPCW mission to have complete freedom of action and freedom of access. That still leaves us with the question of who committed these atrocities. That is why we support the United States text for a draft resolution and we believe that there is no legitimate reason not to support the call for the Council to set up an independent investigative mechanism. As I said before, we have nothing to hide, but it appears that Russia, Syria and their supporters, Iran, do have something to fear.The Russian Ambassador singled out the United Kingdom, the United States and France for criticism. I would like, if I may, to turn to that. The responsibility for the cruelty in Syria belongs to Syria and its backers — Russia and Iran. The use of chemical weapons is an escalatory and diabolical act. It strikes me that what Russia is trying to do is to turn the debate in the Council away from the discussion of the use of chemical weapons into a dispute between East and West, presenting itself as the victim. It is far too important to play games with the politics between East and West in respect of chemical weapons. Russia's crocodile tears for the people of eastern Ghouta has an easy answer. It is to join us in the non-political attempt to get in humanitarian and protection workers from the United Nations to do their job of looking after and mitigating the risk to civilians. Russia's concern about attribution for the use of chemical weapons also has an easy answer. It is to join us in allowing the United Nations to set up an international investigative mechanism to pursue the responsible parties. I repeat here the two demands of my French colleague, and I hope we will be able to make progress.I had not intended to address the Skripal case in Salisbury, but since my Russian colleague has done so, I will address it today. He asked what the similarities were between Salisbury and Syria. I think it is important that I point out that the cases are different in the following respects. First, there is a thorough investigation under way in Salisbury. As we have heard, there is no investigation under way in Syria. The British Government in Salisbury is seeking to protect its people, as is its duty. The Syrian Government, on the contrary, as we have heard today, attacks and gasses its people. I am sorry to say that what the two do have in common though, is Russia's refusal to assume P-5 responsibilities to prevent the use of WMDs and its reckless support for the use of WMDs by its agents and by its allies.It is not we who want to alienate Russia. It alienates herself by not joining in the vast majority of the Council who wish to find a non-polemical way through and to address the use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria. The Russian Ambassador mentioned friends of the United States. My Government and its people are proud to be a friend of the United States. We stand with everyone on the Council who wants to find a way through the chemical weapons problem, to have a proper fact-finding mission and to have a proper investigation as the first step to bringing this dreadful conflict to a close.Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): China would like to thank Special Envoy de Mistura and the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Markram, for their briefings. China takes note of the reports alleging that chemical weapons were once again used in Syria and caused civilian casualties. That is of great concern to China.China's position on chemical-weapons has been consistent and clear. We are firmly opposed to the use of chemical weapons by any State, organization or individual under any circumstances. Any use of chemical weapons, whenever and wherever, must not be tolerated. China supports a comprehensive, objective and impartial investigation of the incident concerned so that it can reach a conclusion based on substantiated evidence that can stand the test of history and facts so that the perpetrators and responsible parties can be brought to justice.The Syrian chemical-weapons issue is closely linked to to a political settlement of the Syrian situation. China 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 15/26 supports the ongoing important role of the Security Council and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as the main channels for dealing with the Syrian chemical-weapons issue. We hope that the parties concerned will take a constructive approach so as to seek a solution through consultations, establish the facts, prevent any further use of chemical weapons, preserve the unity of the Security Council and cooperate with the efforts by the parties concerned to advance the political process in Syria.The Syrian conflict has entered its eighth year and is inflicting tremendous suffering on the Syrian people. A political settlement is the only solution to the Syrian issue. The international community must remain committed to a political settlement of the question of Syria, while fully respecting its sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity.China has always opposed the use or threat of force in international affairs. We always advocate adherence to the Charter of the United Nations. All parties should increase their support for the United Nations mediation efforts and compel the parties in Syria to seek a political settlement under the principle of Syrian leadership and ownership in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015).The fight against terrorism is an important and urgent issue in the political settlement of the Syrian question. The international community must strengthen its coordination, uphold uniform standards and combat all terrorist groups identified as such by the Security Council.At a recent Security Council meeting, China set out its principled position with regard to the Skripal incident (see S/PV.8224). China believes that the parties concerned should strictly comply with their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and, in line with the relevant provisions of the Convention, carry out a comprehensive, impartial and objective investigation and deal with the issues concerned within the framework of the OPCW. China hopes that the parties concerned will work in accordance with the principles of mutual respect and equality, engage in consultations, cooperate, avoid politicization and measures that might further exacerbate tensions and resolve their differences properly through dialogue.Mr. Skoog (Sweden): I thank Mr. Staffan de Mistura and Mr. Thomas Markram for their briefings this afternoon. I would also like to thank you, Mr. President, for acceding to our request for an emergency meeting.We are dismayed by the general escalation of violence in Syria, as described today by Staffan de Mistura, in clear violation of the various resolutions, including resolution 2401 (2018). In that regard, I want to plea with the Syrian authorities represented in the Chamber and with the Astana guarantors to live up to the Security Council's resolutions.We asked for this meeting today because over the weekend we were yet again faced with horrifying allegations of chemical-weapons attacks in Syria, this time in Douma, just outside Damascus. There are worrying reports of a large number of civilian casualties, including women and children. The graphic material that has been shared is beyond repugnant. We are alarmed by those extremely serious allegations. There must now be an immediate, independent and thorough investigation.Let me reiterate that Sweden supports all international efforts to combat the use and proliferation of chemical weapons by State or non-State actors anywhere in the world. We unequivocally condemn in the strongest terms the use of chemical weapons, including in Syria. It is a serious violation of international law and constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The use of chemical weapons in armed conflict is always prohibited and amounts to a war crime. Those responsible must be held accountable. We cannot accept impunity.Addressing the use of chemical weapons in Syria has become a central test of the credibility of the Council. How we respond to the most recent reports from Douma is therefore decisive. Despite the odds, we must put aside our differences and come together. Now is the time to show unity. In our view, the following needs to happen.First, we must condemn in the strongest terms the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria.Secondly, our immediate priority must be to investigate the worrying reports from Douma. In that context, we welcome the announcement by the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that the Fact-finding Mission for Syria — to which we reiterate our full support — is in the process of gathering information from all available sources. We express our hope that the Fact-finding Mission can be urgently deployed to Syria.S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 16/26 18-09955 Thirdly, all States, as well as the parties to the conflict, including the Syrian authorities, must fully cooperate with the Fact-finding Mission. What is particularly needed is safe and unhindered access to the site in Douma, as well as any information and evidence deemed relevant by the Fact-finding Mission to conduct its independent investigation.Fourthly, we need to urgently redouble our efforts in the Council to agree on a new independent and impartial attributive mechanism to identify those responsible for chemical-weapons use.Finally, if the allegations of chemical-weapons use are indeed confirmed and those responsible are eventually identified, the perpetrators must be held to account.We are ready to work actively and constructively with other members for urgent Council action. To that end, we have circulated elements as input to our discussions. We must immediately engage in consultations in order to break the current deadlock and to shoulder our responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations. We owe that to the many victims of the crimes committed in this conflict.Mr. Radomski (Poland): Allow me to thank Special Envoy Mr. Staffan de Mistura and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Mr. Thomas Markham for their important briefings.We are horrified by the news of another deadly attack in eastern Ghouta, which took place on Saturday evening. Dozens of people perished as a result of a vicious act of violence against civilians in Douma. The available information about the symptoms of the victims affirm that they are consistent with those caused by a chemical agent.Poland condemns that barbaric attack, and expects that it will be possible to hold the perpetrators accountable. No military or political goal can justify the extermination of innocent vulnerable people, especially those seeking help in medical facilities. That atrocious crime seems to be a cynical response to the debates in the Council last week, when we commemorated the first anniversary of the attack in Khan Shaykun (see S/PV.8221).We call on the actors affecting the situation in Syria, especially the Russian Federation and Iran, to take all the necessary actions to prevent any further use of weapons of mass destruction and to achieve the full cessation of hostilities in the whole territory of Syria. We insist that all parties to the conflict comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law.As has been stated many times by members of the Council, as well as United Nations officials and European Union representatives, it is highly regrettable that the renewal of the mandate of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism was vetoed, thereby allowing those responsible for the subsequent chemical attacks to remain unpunished. Today we face the results of that impunity, witnessing further attacks against civilians with the use of chemicals as weapons.We urge all our partners in the Council to engage in a serious discussion in good faith in order to re-establish an accountability mechanism for chemical attacks in Syria. That is the minimum that we owe the victims of Ghouta, Khan Shaykun, Al-Lataminah and the numerous other places where chemical weapons have been used.Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We would like to thank Special Envoy De Mistura and Mr. Thomas Markram for their briefings.Reports of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma on Saturday and the videos and pictures that we saw through media outlets are indeed very worrisome. It is also deeply disturbing that such reports of the use of chemical weapons have continued in the ongoing military activities in Syria. As we have repeatedly stated, we strongly condemn any use of chemical weapons by any actor under any circumstances. There is no justification whatsoever for the use of chemical weapons. Those responsible for these inhuman acts must be identified and held accountable. This is absolutely vital, not only for the sake of the victims of chemical weapons in Syria but also for maintaining international peace and security and for preserving the non-proliferation architecture.As the Secretary-General said in his 8 April statement, cited by the Special Envoy earlier, any use of chemical weapons, if confirmed, is abhorrent and requires a thorough investigation. That includes the need to establish accountability — something on which the Council has yet to achieve consensus. In the meantime, we believe the reported use of chemical weapons in Douma, and in other parts of Syria, should be investigated by the Fact-finding Mission, and all parties should extend full cooperation in that 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 17/26 regard, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.While we all agree that accountability is indispensable for deterring and stopping the use of chemical weapons in Syria and beyond, there is currently, as has already be said, no independent, impartial and professional investigative mechanism that could identify those individuals, entities, State or non-State actors that use chemical weapons in the country. In that regard, the Council should recover its unity and engage in a positive and constructive discussion that could address the existing institutional lacunae.We all know that the threats to international peace and security we face today are becoming increasingly more complex by the day. We are seeing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is posing a real danger and that the international norms on the use of chemical weapons are also being undermined. Since the end of the Cold War, the trust among major Powers has never been so low as it is currently, which has enormous implications not only for global peace and security but also for the transformative agenda that we have set for ourselves in the development sphere. We cannot think of making any meaningful headway towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals without creating the necessary global security environment. At the moment, we really cannot say that this is an environment conducive to making any progress on that account.The Security Council has the primary responsibility for the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. Unfortunately, it has not been able to effectively address the new and emerging threats and challenges to peace and security that we are facing today. It has been all the more apparent that the lack of unity and cohesion among members is undermining the credibility of the Council. Perhaps we, the elected members, have to look for ways and means to have a greater impact, with a view to contributing to increasing the Council's effectiveness. Without dialogue among the major Powers to build the necessary trust and understanding, it will be extremely difficult to address some of the most difficult and complex security challenges we have ever seen, including the situation in Syria.Things are in fact bound to get even worse unless something is done. We cannot afford to bury our heads in the sand. The dangers are very palpable. That is why every opportunity should be seized. That is also why we consider the news about the upcoming summit-level meetings being planned to be encouraging. We can only hope that those meetings will help to defuse tensions and allow for serious discussions to take place with a view to finding a common approach to tackling current threats and challenges. The sooner those discussions happen, the better for preserving global peace and stability, which, as we speak, is becoming a source of extremely great concern. In fact, I am understating the magnitude of the potential danger we are facing.Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): The Ivorian delegation thanks Mr. De Mistura and Mr. Markram for their respective briefings on the latest developments in Syria, after the resumption of fighting in Douma and eastern Ghouta and the bombing of the city of Damascus, following the relative calm of recent weeks. My delegation would like to focus its statement on three main points.First, we remain deeply concerned about recent reports of chemical-weapons attacks against innocent civilian populations, which have reportedly resulted in numerous casualties who have shown symptoms of exposure to a chemical agent. While reaffirming its categorical rejection of any use or resort to chemical weapons, be it in times of peace or in times of war, Côte d'Ivoire strongly condemns such acts and calls for these events to be placed under an intense spotlight, with the contribution of all stakeholders.In the face of allegations of recurrent use of chemical weapons by the warring parties in the Syrian conflict, the Ivorian delegation stresses that it is more important than ever that the international community send a strong signal to show, beyond the usual principled condemnations, its determination to put a definitive end to this infernal cycle.The use of chemical weapons violates the most fundamental norms of international law and poses threats to our collective security. That is why we must engage in a unflagging fight against impunity in the use of chemical weapons and preserving the international chemical non-proliferation regime, which is one of the fundamental pillars of our common security.My second point concerns the need for the international community to put in place a mechanism for accountability and for the fight against impunity for those who use chemical weapons, in order to put an end to the repeated use of these weapons. In that regard, the Ivorian delegation expresses its readiness to work S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 18/26 18-09955 towards the establishment of such a mechanism and calls on the Council to return to the unity it had when it established the Joint Investigative Mechanism, whose mandate unfortunately could not be renewed despite our common efforts.Thirdly, Côte d'Ivoire notes with regret that resolution 2401 (2018), which remains the framework for our joint action, has not been implemented and that the humanitarian situation in Syria has further deteriorated. In the light of the distress of the civilian populations trapped in the fighting, the urgency for a cessation of hostilities remains more relevant than ever. In the face of the deteriorating situation, my country would like once again to call on all parties to the conflict to immediately cease hostilities and to respect international humanitarian law, including unhindered humanitarian access to persons in distress, in accordance with resolution 2401 (2018).In conclusion, Côte d'Ivoire reiterates its conviction that the solution to the crisis in Syria cannot be military. Only an inclusive political process can put a definitive end to this conflict. Such a political solution must be in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015) and imbued with the results of the Geneva negotiations. My country believes that the Geneva talks remain the right framework for achieving a lasting solution to the Syrian conflict.Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): I thank Mr. Staffan de Mistura and Mr. Thomas Markram and their respective teams for their exhaustive briefings.The Republic of Equatorial Guinea expresses its gratitude to the French Republic and to the other members of the Council that called for the convening of this afternoon's meeting. We also thank the President of the Security Council for having decided to hold this afternoon's meeting under the agenda item "Threats to international peace and security: The situation in the Middle East". This is an appropriate topic, since recent events in the Middle East represent a genuine threat to peace and security, not only in that region but at the international level as well. From the protests in the Gaza Strip, with their loss of human lives, to the missile attacks on Syria, as well as the horrendous chemical weapons attack in the Syrian town of Douma, those are all situations of deep concern for the Republic of Equatorial Guinea.This past weekend we awoke to news that added a new low to the saddest and bloodiest episodes of the Syrian conflict. According to reports published in the international media, on 7 April, in the Syrian town of Douma in eastern Ghouta, more than 40 people, mostly women and girls, died from asphyxiation caused by inhaling a poison gas.As we heard in this Chamber on 4 April from the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Thomas Markram (see S/PV.8221), the conclusions and recommendations of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic are not binding and do not attribute responsibilities in the case of evidence of the use of chemical substances prohibited under the relevant international treaties. In the light of that fact, we take this opportunity to recall the obligation of all parties to take essential steps towards the full implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), and we underscore the need to establish an independent investigation mechanism of the United Nations whose task should be focused on preventing impunity, identifying those responsible and preventing future attacks to the best of its abilities.As far as the Republic of Equatorial Guinea is concerned, no use of chemical weapons should go uninvestigated or unpunished. As a result, the alarming information coming out of Syria, especially that pertaining to the use of chemical weapons targeting civilians, both the case of Douma, which we are discussing today, as well as similar events in the past, must be investigated exhaustively, fairly, objectively and independently by international bodies in accordance with OPCW standards. The results of such investigations must be made public and those responsible must answer for their crimes before the implacable face of justice.The fact that chemical substances continue to be used, especially against civilians, is cause for serious concern to the Government of Equatorial Guinea. During the general debate of the seventy-second session of the General Assembly, the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, His Excellency Mr. Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, condemned in the strongest terms the use, manufacture, possession and distribution of chemical weapons in armed conflicts (see A/72/PV.13). It is worth recalling that no member of the Council should be considered exempt from that obligation, which also reflects Chapter I of the Charter of the 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 19/26 United Nations, which enshrines the determination of Member States to build a world of peace and ensure the well-being of humankind.The Security Council now finds itself at a crossroads with respect to its options. It can either strengthen the presence of international forces with a view to future military intervention, as some military Powers have been suggesting, or we can pursue international negotiations, be they in Geneva, Astana, Sochi or Ankara. However, history continues to teach us that military interventionism has never resolved conflicts; rather, it exacerbates and entrenches them, sowing desolation and ruin in its wake.As far as the Republic of Equatorial Guinea is concerned, the only solution to the Syrian conflict is to be found in the words spoken yesterday by Pope Francis in the traditional Sunday mass in Saint Peter's Square in the Vatican:"There is no such thing as a good war and a bad war. Nothing, but nothing, can justify the use of such instruments of extermination on defenseless people and populations . military and political leaders choose another path, that of negotiations, which is the only one that can bring about peace and not death and destruction."In conclusion, we reiterate the appeal made by the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the countries and actors with influence in Syria, as well as in Israel and Palestine, to wield that influence in order to force all parties involved in those conflicts to mitigate the suffering of their people and to sit down to negotiate to put an end to that chronic threat to international peace and security which persists in the Middle East.Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): We thank Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura and Deputy High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Thomas Markram, for their briefings. We express our gratitude to Council members for initiating this emergency meeting, which we hope will lead to the launching of a timely and objective investigation of the incident in Douma.We firmly believe that the Security Council remains the main and sole body authorized to counter threats to international peace and security. Unfortunately, the situation within the Council is becoming increasingly strained. In order to achieve an appropriate solution to these critical issues, it is of utmost importance that the Council act unanimously, in a balanced and pragmatic manner. To that end, we must demonstrate greater flexibility and negotiability, rising above our national interests in order to achieve peace and stability. Any controversy that involves prejudices and mutual accusations and lacks conclusive results and irrefutable evidence will have only a destructive effect and will not lead to the results that the world community expects from us.With regard to the chemical attacks in Syria, we mourn together with the families of those killed and express our solidarity with them in the face of such atrocities, by which innocent civilians become victims of the relentless confrontation of the opposing parties. Kazakhstan has always taken a firm and resolute stand, uncompromisingly condemning any use of chemical weapons as the most heinous action and an unacceptable war crime.With regard to the situation in Douma, we call for an investigation into this alleged incident to be carried out and for all the circumstances to be clarified as soon as possible. The Council has the great responsibility to act on verifiable facts, not only before the world community, but before ourselves. Furthermore, history itself will ultimately be the judge of our decisions. Therefore, we need to verify all the details of the incident. In that regard, we would like to draw attention to the following aspects.First, are there any other reliable sources, in addition to White Helmets' claims, and who can verify the veracity of the assessments and testimonies of those sources? Some claim that the number of victims is 70, while others report that there were more than 150 victims and still others believe there were only 25 victims. Even one victim is too many. However, today, the Russian Federation denied the attack altogether. There are many allegations and assumptions regarding the very facts concerning the use of a toxic chemical substance.Secondly, we consider it important to take into account the fact that the Government of Syria has repeatedly notified us and requested that we check its reports that a number of terrorist groups on the side of the opposition were making attempts to transfer chemical weapons and prepare chemical attacks on the territory of eastern Ghouta. Actually, these allegations have not been given due attention and we have had no opportunity to verify all the facts. We are not advocating for any side in this conflict, but rather demanding a full S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 20/26 18-09955 and objective investigation on the basis of which we can make a thoughtful decision.Thirdly, we believe that it is imperative to conduct an independent investigation. We again recall the urgent need for an investigative mechanism, the establishment of which depends on the permanent members of the Council. They must make every possible effort to find common ground on the issue. We urgently need objective and verifiable information, as well as an immediate, independent, transparent and unbiased investigation before any decision or action, unilateral or otherwise, is taken.We fully support the proposal that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-finding Mission be sent at the earliest. We are certain that the Syrian people are very interested in an objective investigation. Therefore, Damascus and opposing parties should provide all assistance and secure access for the speedy visit of the OPCW inspectors to the incident sites to collect facts on the ground.Finally, we again call for the preservation and strengthening of the unity of the Council to reach a consensus-based decision to preserve peace and stability in the world.Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, we thank you, Mr. President, for the prompt convening of today's meeting. We were one of the countries that requested it.We also thank Mr. Staffan de Mistura, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, and Mr. Thomas Markram, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for their briefings.Since the beginning of this year, the State of Kuwait has occupied the Arab seat in the Security Council. One of our most important priorities, which we made clear before we joined it, is to defend and uphold Arab issues, voice the concerns about them and work to find peaceful solutions. We deeply deplore the lack of any real and genuine progress on any of these issues, in particular that of the Syrian crisis, which regrettably continues to deteriorate. Security Council resolutions on such issues are not implemented. The Council is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security but is unable to shoulder that responsibility. It is divided as it faces those dangers and threats. Therefore the crises continue, along with the suffering of the people in the region.The State of Kuwait condemns in the strongest terms the heinous rocket and barrel bomb attacks against residential areas under siege in eastern Ghouta, including the latest attack on Douma, on 7 April. Five days ago we marked the first anniversary of the Khan Shaykhun incident (see S/PV.8221), in which chemical weapons were used, as confirmed by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. It also identified who used them.Two days ago, scores of civilians, including children and women, were killed or injured in attacks and air strikes against Douma. Many cases of asphyxiation were recorded. Several international reports confirmed that the crimes committed in both incidents were tantamount to crimes against humanity and war crimes, which reminds us once again of the request we all made in the Chamber for the establishment of a new mechanism to determine whether or not and by whom chemical weapons had been used, and to hold the perpetrators in Syria accountable. The mechanism must guarantee impartial, transparent and professional investigations in all chemical attacks in Syria in order to end impunity. For the past five years — specifically, since August 2013 — the perpetrators of chemical attacks in Syria have enjoyed impunity. They have not been punished, even when we witnessed the very first crime of the use of chemical weapons in eastern Ghouta.We do not want to mark the first anniversary of the attack in Douma without a conviction. We call for the Council to establish an accountability mechanism that would determine the perpetrators of the chemical-weapons crimes anywhere in Syria — be they a Government, entity, group or individual — so that they can be held accountable in accordance with the provisions of resolution 2118 (2013). The Council must shoulder its responsibility with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. The use of chemical weapons in Syria is a genuine threat to the non-proliferation regime. The continued attacks against civilians in medical facilities and residential areas, through air strikes or artillery, are all flagrant violations of the international community's will and relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 2401 (2018), which demanded a 30-day ceasefire, at the very least, without delay.09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 21/26 The provisions of resolution 2118 (2013) are clear and definite. They call for accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, which is a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law. However, current events are a clear violation of the provisions of the resolution. As members of the Council, we cannot accept the status quo, which is the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria. It is another disappointment for the Syrian people, whose suffering caused by the use of such weapons in different parts of Syria we have been unable to end.The Council has a collective responsibility. The suffering Syrian people are sick and tired of tuning into meetings of the Council without seeing tangible results on the ground. At several junctures throughout this bloody conflict the Council has been able to find common ground to end the crisis. However, we must overcome our political differences and establish a new accountability mechanism in Syria that is professional, credible and impartial. Such elements are available in the draft resolution under discussion, which has been put forward by the United States. It includes updates on the incident in Douma. We call on all members of the Council to build on that draft as a good basis for negotiations on a future mechanism.We continue to seek a political solution as the only means to end the crisis in all its dimensions. The political road map is clear and agreed, based on the 2012 Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex) and on resolution 2254 (2015). It seeks to maintain the unity, independence and sovereignty of Syria and meet the legitimate aspirations and ambitions of the Syrian people towards living a dignified life.Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We thank Mr. Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, and Mr. Thomas Markram, Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for their briefings.We are deeply concerned about the reported use of chemical weapons in the city of Douma. Bolivia reiterates its condemnation of the use of chemical agents as weapons and considers it to be an unjustifiable criminal act. There can be no justification for their use, regardless of the circumstances or by whom they are used, as it constitutes a serious violation of international law and a grave threat to international peace and security.We believe that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission, in line with its mandate, should verify in the most objective, methodological and technical manner the reported use of chemical weapons. Should their use be verified, it must be investigated in an effective and transparent manner in order to ensure that the perpetrators can be identified and tried by the appropriate bodies so as to prevent impunity. We therefore need an independent, impartial and representative entity that will conduct a comprehensive, credible and conclusive investigation. Our major challenge is to ensure that we do not politicize or exploit the Security Council for our own purposes. We regret that so far there have been obstacles to the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), and we call on all the parties involved to make every effort to effectively implement it throughout Syrian territory. We emphatically reject the ongoing bombardments and indiscriminate attacks, especially those on civilian infrastructure such as health facilities, and we deplore all military activity in residential areas. Such actions only cause more displacements, injuries and deaths. We call on all the parties to respect international humanitarian law and human rights law, including authorizing humanitarian access throughout Syria and to all persons in need, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.We reiterate that there can be no military solution to the Syrian conflict and that the only option is an inclusive, negotiated and coordinated political process, led by the Syrian people for the Syrian people, aimed at enabling sustainable peace to be achieved in the area without any foreign pressure, as provided for in resolution 2254 (2015). We also reject any attempt at fragmentation or sectarianism in Syria.Bolivia wants to once again make clear its firm rejection of the use of force or the threat of use of force. We also reject unilateral actions, which are illegal and contrary to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, and undermine any effort to achieve a political solution.Lastly, with regard to the events in the city of Salisbury, we reiterate the importance of conducting an independent, transparent and depoliticized investigation in accordance with current rules and regulations of international law, especially as set forth by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 22/26 18-09955 We believe that cooperation among the relevant parties will be essential to making progress through the appropriate diplomatic channels in solving the crime and strengthening the non-proliferation regime.The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now make a statement in my national capacity.We thank Mr. De Mistura and Mr. Markram for their briefings. Peru is deeply concerned about the new reports of the use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria, including minors, in the town of Douma. In that regard, we note the urgent need for a thorough investigation. Peru condemns any use of chemical weapons wherever it may take place. We want to point out that it is a heinous crime, a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security and a violation both of the non-proliferation regime and international humanitarian law.In the short term, we believe that the Syrian Government and all parties to the conflict, including countries with influence on the ground, should abide by and implement the humanitarian ceasefire that the Council provided for in resolution 2401 (2018), and to cooperate with the Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. To that end, we once again reiterate the importance of establishing an independent and impartial accountability mechanism. The investigations should result in the prosecution and punishment of those responsible. The members of the Council cannot permit impunity.We must also remember that any response to the conflict in Syria and the atrocities committed there must be conducted in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Peru opposes any use or threat of use of force contrary to international law. We reiterate our deep concern about the serious consequences that the ongoing atrocities in the Syrian conflict may have for the stability of the Middle East and for an international order based on minimum standards of humanity and coexistence. In that regard, I would like to conclude by calling on the members of the Council to restore a sense of unity and the common good to our discharge of our high responsibilities. In the case of Syria, that means implementing the ceasefire and ensuring the effective protection of civilians, investigating and punishing atrocity crimes and resuming a serious process of political dialogue, based on resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex), with a view to promoting the sustainable peace that the Syrian people so badly need.I now resume my functions as President of the Council.The representative of the Russian Federation has asked for the floor to make a further statement.Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Like my Dutch colleague and friend, I too have three points to make.I would first like to respectfully request of my colleague Mrs. Nikki Haley, Permanent Representative of the United States, that from now on she refrain from labelling any legitimate Governments as "regimes". Right now I am referring specifically to Russia. I have made that request once before, but Ambassador Haley was not present, and I asked for it to be conveyed to her by her colleagues. Now I am requesting it personally. If it happens again, I will interrupt the meeting on a point of order.Secondly, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom said that Syria is different from Salisbury in that there no investigation is being conducted in Syria, while one is under way in Salisbury. We would very much like to know more about the details of that investigation and would be grateful if she could communicate them to us. However, for the time being we know nothing other than that all of a sudden the alleged victims of a chemical warfare agent, thankfully, turn out to be alive and, apparently, almost completely well. However, nobody has seen them yet, and we fear for the condition of those important witnesses. At the moment, we have learned from newspaper reports, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has offered to shelter the Skripals in the United States under new identities. The CIA's participation in this is itself revealing. But it also means that we may never see these people, who are key witnesses to what happened, again.What else do we know? We know about the speedy euthanization of the Skripals' pets and the cremation of the cat and dead guinea pigs. We are also aware of the intention to demolish their house and the restaurant and pub they visited. We also know that Yulia Skripal's sister, Viktoria, who wanted to see her, was denied a British visa. Why? That is all we know. I repeat that we would very much like to learn more details about what is going on, and we would be grateful to our British 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 23/26 colleagues if they could keep us regularly informed during the investigation.Thirdly, and lastly, we did not meet here today to address the situation in Douma. The agenda item is entitled "Threats to international peace and security", although, needless to say, it was the situation regarding Douma and the so-called chemical attack that prompted the meeting. In today's meeting, as Mr. De Mistura mentioned and the Secretary-General has previously discussed, we are moving towards a dangerous area. Unfortunately, the people who are playing these dangerous games and spewing irresponsible threats do not understand that. Today we heard once again what we have already heard many times. None of our Western colleagues want to hear or listen to objective information. None of them has expressed any doubts about the one and only version that has been given of what transpired. So what is the point of an investigation? Why bother? They have accused Damascus of a chemical-weapon attack not just before any investigation has been carried out but before the incident was even known about.They are not convinced by the information that we have provided today. They simply do not want to listen. We have already said that there are no witnesses to the use of chemical weapons at all. There are no traces of chemicals, no bodies, no injuries, no poisoning victims. Nobody went to the hospital. The footage was all clearly staged by the White Helmets. We demand that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) mission immediately visit Douma and the area of the alleged chemical weapons attack, interview the residents and medical staff and and collect soil samples. My British colleague said that only an investigation can establish who is to blame. We agree, except that did not stop her from blaming the so-called Syrian regime. Those two things do not really jibe. We insist that the OPCW mission visit Douma immediately. The Syrian authorities and Russian troops are ready to provide the necessary conditions for this to take place.Lastly, we too wish there were an independent investigative mechanism. I would like to remind the Council that our draft resolution, which includes a proposal for establishing such a mechanism, is in blue, and we are ready to adopt it today, if necessary.The President (spoke in Spanish): The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor to make a further statement.Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I apologize for taking the floor again, but I want to clarify something. The Russian Ambassador's English is far too good for him not to have understood me when I spoke on 5 April (see S/PV.8224). The investigation of the Salisbury incident that is under way is an independent police investigation, and the United Kingdom will be very pleased to update the Council as and when we have something to say.If I may, I would like to add one more thing. The other difference between Salisbury and Syria is that the United Kingdom is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention in good standing, and the Syrian Government has not complied with its obligations as certified by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.The President (spoke in Spanish): I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): The American representative said that Russia spends its resources to support what she calls the regime in Syria. My question to her is: What does the United States spend its resources on in Syria? Does it spend its resources providing milk and medicine to Syrian children, or on providing weapons and munitions to its terrorist groups, which have committed the most heinous crimes against the Syrian people? Or is it spending resources on the its alliance's aircraft, which have wreaked destruction in many places in Syria, particularly in the city of Raqqa? What about the continuous threats that are made against my country at nearly every meeting of the Security Council on this issue? Does she acknowledge that her Administration has no respect for the Security Council, this international Organization or the principles of international law?Let us test the credibility of what my colleague the United States Ambassador said. I ask members to note that I do not refer to the American Administration as the "American regime" because that would be legally shameful in this Chamber. Let us test the credibility of what my colleague the American Ambassador said when she asked the Security Council to act in order to achieve justice in Syria. Well, my test is to request that her Administration and her country allow the disclosure of the results of the United Nations Special Commission that investigated the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq for 18 years. The Commission was headed for some time by a Swede, Mr. Hans Blix.S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 24/26 18-09955 As Council members know, after 18 years of investigation the Commission found no chemical weapons in Iraq. Nor did they find Coca-Cola or Pepsi Cola. Nevertheless, in a semi-confidential meeting towards the end of 2008, the Security Council decided to end the Commission's work and bury its archives in iron boxes. I repeat — it decided to bury its archives in iron boxes. Only the Secretary-General knows the code that opens those boxes. There was one condition, which was that the boxes could not be opened for 60 years. What is so shameful in those archives? Why did they have to be buried in boxes that cannot be opened for 60 years? That question is directed to the American Ambassador.The Government of my country condemns in the strongest terms the ruthless Israeli aggression that took place this morning on the T-4 airbase in Homs governorate, in which a number of civilians were killed and injured. It was a flagrant violation of Security Council resolution 350 (1974) and of various Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism, and would not have occurred were it not for the American Administration's unlimited and consistent support for Israel. The American Administration guarantees Israel immunity so that it will not be held accountable in the Council. That allows Israel to continue to practice State terrorism and to threaten peace and security in the region and beyond. Of course, Western countries did not even mention the Israeli aggression in their statements today, which shows that the Governments of their countries are complicit in it and are covering for it. Unfortunately, my dear friend Mr. De Mistura did not hear Netanyahu say this morning that it was Israel that launched the attack. That is why I was surprised when he said that the United Nations has not been able to verify the identity of its perpetrators. If Netanyahu himself says that he launched this aggression, why does Mr. De Mistura not refer to Israel as the aggressor?This Israeli aggression is an indirect response to the successes of the Syrian Arab Army in expelling armed terrorist groups from the suburbs of Damascus, its rural area and other Syrian territory. Those groups have been killing the Syrian people, kidnapping civilians, detaining them and using them as human shields. They targeted Damascus alone with 3,000 missiles over the course of three months, killing 155 martyrs and injuring 865 civilians, most of them women and children. The Syrian Government underscores that the repeated Israeli aggression did not and will not protect Israeli agents operating within terrorist groups, nor will it divert the attention of the Syrian Army from its decisive military achievements in combating terrorism.The American anti-racism activist Martin Luther King Jr. said that "a lie is like a snowball: the further you roll it the bigger it becomes". It would seem that this wise saying holds true at any time and at any place. The Governments of some countries lie incessantly. Fortunately, though, they have not quite perfected the details of their web of lies, much like the famous Baron Munchausen of German literature. How many roosters truly believe that sunrise is the result of crowing?Some permanent members have become professional liars, and that in itself is a weapon of mass destruction. Through their lies, Palestine was stolen. The lies of these countries fuelled the war in the Korean peninsula. Through their lies, they invaded Viet Nam. Through their lies, they invaded Grenada. Through their lies, they destroyed Yugoslavia. Through their lies, they occupied Iraq. Through their lies, they destroyed Libya. Through their lies, they created takfiri terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaida, the Taliban, Da'esh, Al-Nusra Front, Jaysh Al-Islam — and the list goes on and on. Through their lies, the same countries are trying to defeat Syria and prepare the ground for an assault today.It is worth noting that the today's negative statement of the United States representative is in absolute contradiction with a statement made by United States Secretary of Defence General Mattis in an interview with Newsweek two days ago with journalist Ian Wilkie. Mr. Wilkie used the following title for the interview: "Now Mattis Admits There Was No Evidence Assad Used Poison Gas on His People." That was said by the American Defence Secretary, not the Syrian Defence Minister. What a harmonious Administration!On 10 December 2012, some six years ago, we submitted a formal letter to the Council (S/2012/917), before the operators of terrorist groups claimed, for the first time, that sarin gas was used in Khan Al-Assal on 19 March 2013. We informed the Council that the United States, the United Kingdom and France had launched a campaign of allegations claiming that the Syrian Government may have used chemical weapons. Back then, we warned that such allegations would encourage Governments that sponsor terrorists to provide chemical weapons to armed terrorist groups and then claim that the Syrian Government had used such weapons. What happened in the past few years 09/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8225 18-09955 25/26 in Khan Al-Assal, Ghouta, Kafr Zita, Lataminah, Tal Minis, Khan Shaykhun and many other villages and towns in Syria confirms unequivocally what we had warned of five to six years ago, and during all these six years.The United States, the United Kingdom and France have been extremely eager to hold one meeting after another based on fabricated information. That is part of the deep crisis that we are witnessing. They want to involve other Council members in that crisis. Since 2013, those three countries have created a big elephant of lies and deceit in the Security Council. That elephant is living in the Chamber today and is stomping on the credibility of the Council with its huge feet. It seems that these countries called for the holding of today's meeting to support terrorists and to obstruct the agreement reached about Douma.However, those countries were a bit late because the terrorists had hoped this meeting would be held before they were forced to reach an agreement with the Syrian State to leave their strongholds and hand over their weapons. These countries were late in fulfilling their promises to the terrorists. It would have been better not to repeat their nasty story and not to rely on false reports from mercenaries — so-called White Helmets, founded by British intelligence officer James Le Mesurier. He is British, but his name is French. What proves that these countries were lying is that the residents of Douma left the city safely — 170,000 civilians left the city safely. Those terrorists chose to reach an agreement with the Syrian State as a last resort for them and their families. Many buses are transferring them and their families to the city of Jarabulus, after they refused to settle their affairs and chose to go there. However, the vast majority of residents chose to stay in their houses and resort to the Syrian State.It has been proven that the allegations of certain States, including some States members of the Council, on the deteriorating humanitarian situation in eastern Ghouta were lies, just as we saw in Aleppo and other places. As it turned out, terrorist group warehouses were full of medication and food, monopolized by their elements who sold some of those items to civilians at exorbitant prices. At this point, I must ask: Did the three countries call for this meeting in order to legitimize the Israeli aggression that occurred this morning or to impede the implementation of the agreement reached with their terrorist tools?In this context, I must thank the delegation of the Russian Federation for recognizing the true nature of what these countries were preparing for, and aptly called for the meeting to be held under the agenda item "Threats to international peace and security". That is the correct agenda item.We have conveyed to the Security Council, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and what used to be called the Joint Investigative Mechanism 145 letters, the latest on 1 April 2018. I thank the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan for pointing out that the Council members do not read and that the Council does not respond to those letters. The letters contain accurate information. They indicate that armed terrorist groups possess toxic chemical substances, notably chlorine and sarin. We have warned time and again that those groups were preparing to commit crimes involving chemical weapons against innocent Syrians, and were working with the White Helmets to fabricate evidence, photograph locations and film Hollywood-like scenes with everything staged in order to blame the Syrian Government and influence public opinion against Syria and its allies. Those countries call for the holding of meetings such as this in order to create a pretext that would justify any military aggression against Syria.It seems that the directors of that terrorist scene failed to perfect their web of lies. We note that in each of those theatrical scenes on the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Government, the substances never seem to affect the armed elements, but only women and children. These chemical weapons seem to discriminate against women and children and do not affect armed men. It suffices to wash away these chemicals with water in front of the camera. Water appears to heal everything. Rescue workers never need to wear protective masks. The Syrian Arab Army does not use these substances because it does not possess them to begin with. The Americans destroyed them on the vessel MV Cape Ray in the Mediterranean. So, the Syrian Arab Army uses these substances, which it does not possess, only when it is making military progress. How strange that is!This vehement campaign lacks the minimum standards of credibility. It relies on fabricated information on social media by elements of armed terrorist groups and their operators. I announce from this table that the Syrian Government is fully prepared to facilitate an OPCW fact-finding mission to Douma, S/PV.8225 Threats to international peace and security 09/04/2018 26/26 18-09955 where the incident is alleged to have occurred, as soon as possible to investigate and verify these allegations. We endorse the Russian proposal to hear a briefing on the fact-finding mission's report after its visit to Al-Raqqa. We welcome this visit as soon as possible.I hope that this offer does not suffer the same fate as the first offer we made to former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon after the Khan Al-Assal incident of chemical substance use in March 2013. At that time, we asked the Secretary-General to provide assistance to the Syrian Government in immediately investigating what happened in the town of Khan Al-Assal. It took the United Nations four months and 11 days to send Mr. Sellström, as Council members recall. Yes, it took the United Nations four months and 11 days. That is how the United Nations interpreted the term "immediately" — four months and 11 days. When Mr. Sellström arrived in Damascus to investigate what had happened in Khan Al-Assal, terrorists in Ghouta were instructed to use chemical substances again. Mr. Sellström therefore left Khan Al-Assal and moved to Ghouta. Council members should be aware that since March 2013, investigations into what happened in Khan Al-Assal have not taken place.Today, we directly accuse Washington, D.C., Paris, London, Riyadh, Doha and Ankara of providing Da'esh, Al-Nusra Front, Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and scores of other affiliated terrorist groups with toxic chemical substances to be used against Syrian civilians. We accuse them of inciting those massacres and of fabricating evidence to falsely blame the Syrian Government for the use of toxic chemical substances in order to prepare the ground for an aggression against my country, just as the United States and the United Kingdom did in Iraq in 2003.Yes, we say to the United States, the United Kingdom and France that, in Syria and Iraq, we eliminated the vast majority of Da'esh elements within three years — not within 30 years, as President Obama has said. Those States have plans to justify undermining the stability of the region. Yes, we say to Saudi Arabia today that we cut off its terrorist tentacles — the gangs of Jaysh Al-Islam — in eastern Ghouta. Yes, we say to Qatar and Turkey that we cut off their terrorist tentacles — the gangs of the Al-Nusra Front and Faylaq al-Rahman — in eastern Ghouta. I say to all those who sent moderate, armed, genetically modified opposition fighters to our land that we eliminated these toxic exports. We call on those exporters to bear the consequences of their actions, as some surviving elements will return to their original countries.The issue is very simple. Let me just say that on our borders with Turkey and in the separation zone in the Golan with Israel, there are tens of thousands of good, moderate terrorists with their light weapons, long beards, black banners and white helmets. Whoever wants to adopt them should submit an application to their operators. They are ready to go to Europe and the West as refugees.In conclusion, the Syrian Arab Republic stresses once again that it does not possess chemical weapons of any type, including chlorine. We condemn anew the use of chemical weapons at anytime, anywhere and in any circumstances. My country, Syria, reaffirms its readiness to cooperate fully with the OPCW in fulfilling its commitments under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction.The Russian Centre for Reconciliation in Syria announced today that Russian military experts have carried out investigations in Douma and confirmed that they have found no sign of the use of chemical weapons there. While treating the sick in the hospitals of Douma, Russian doctors have proven that these patients have not been subjected to any chemical substance. What we were seeing there was nothing but Hollywood-style scenes.The President (spoke in Spanish): There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.
The Situation In The Middle East Report Of The Secretary-General On The Implementation Of Security Council Resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) And 2393 (2017) ; United Nations S/PV.8201 Security Council Seventy-third year 8201st meeting Monday, 12 March 2018, 11 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Van Oosterom. . (Netherlands) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Allen United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-06756 (E) *1806756* S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018 2/23 18-06756 The meeting was called to order at 11.15 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I would like to warmly welcome the Secretary- General, His Excellency Mr. António Guterres, and to give him the floor. The Secretary-General: I am here to report on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), which the Council adopted unanimously on 24 February. But I am keenly aware that I am doing so just as the bloodletting in Syria enters its eighth year. I would like to highlight just one stark fact on this grimmest of anniversaries, which is that in 2017, more children were killed in Syria than in any other year since the war began. I am deeply saddened by the immense loss and cascading suffering of the Syrian people. And I am deeply disappointed by all those who, year after year, by action or inaction, design or indifference, have allowed this to happen. My grief and frustration are compounded by all that I know of the people of Syria. As United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the aftermath of the Iraq war, I saw the remarkable hospitality of the Syrian people in hosting 1.5 million Iraqi refugees — not in camps, but in their communities across the country. Syria was a place where refugees could live in security as they tried to rebuild their lives and raise their families. Today, so many of those generous Syrians who shared so much have themselves been forced from their homes, becoming refugees or internally displaced. In neighbouring countries — whose enormous hospitality I have also witnessed, but who are burdened by overwhelming needs — the vast majority of Syrian refugees live below the poverty line. Many of the Syrians who journeyed even farther from home in search of safety have found the doors that they once opened to others in need shut in their faces. A country known for its ancient civilization and a people known for their rich diversity have been betrayed, and Syria is bleeding inside and out. There should be one agenda only for all of us — ending the suffering of the Syrian people and finding a political solution to the conflict. And the Council has a particular responsibility in that regard. Let me now turn to the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) and the issue of the compliance of all the relevant parties in Syria. I do so with a caveat. The United Nations is following developments closely, but we do not have the full picture, owing to our limited presence and restricted access on the ground. Resolution 2401 (2018) demands that all parties "cease hostilities without delay, and engage immediately to ensure full and comprehensive implementation . for a durable humanitarian pause for at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria", while still countering Da'esh and other groups designated as terrorists by the Council. It is true that in some areas, such as Deir ez-Zor and Douma, where there has been a recent ceasefire that I will address later, the conflict is diminishing in intensity. Yet there has been no cessation of hostilities. Violence continues in eastern Ghouta and beyond, including in Afrin, parts of Idlib and into Damascus and its suburbs. In eastern Ghouta in particular, the air strikes, shelling and ground offensives have intensified since the resolution's adoption and have claimed hundreds of civilian lives. Some reports even put the toll at more than 1,000. The resolution further demands the enabling of "the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and services". Despite some limited convoy deliveries, the provision of humanitarian aid and services has been neither safe, unimpeded or sustained. The resolution calls on "all parties to immediately lift the sieges of populated areas, including in eastern Ghouta, Yarmouk, Fo'ah and Kafraya". No sieges have been lifted. The resolution demands medical evacuations of the critically sick and wounded. To our knowledge, not one critically sick or wounded person has so far been evacuated. But I will come back to that later in relation to a recent announcement. The resolution reiterates its demand "reminding in particular the Syrian authorities, that all parties immediately comply with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law, as applicable, and international humanitarian law, including the protection of civilians". And I remind all involved that even efforts to combat groups identified as terrorists by the Council do not supersede those obligations. Yet we 12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201 18-06756 3/23 see egregious violations, indiscriminate attacks and a failure to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure. Since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), my Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura and I have been focused on helping to create the conditions for a cessation of hostilities in eastern Ghouta, where, as I said to the Council two weeks ago, people have been living in a hell on Earth (see S/PV.8185). As the Special Envoy told the Council a few days ago, eastern Ghouta is the most urgent situation, because it is where we have the clearest potential to try to support the de-escalation in concrete ways, and because we have been concretely approached. On 26 February, the Russian Federation announced a five-hour daily humanitarian pause in eastern Ghouta. I will speak to that later in my remarks. On 27 February, the President of the Security Council and I received a letter from the Syrian National Committee conveying another letter from the three armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta — Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and Ahrar Al-Sham. They expressed their commitment "to the full implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, especially resolution 2401 (2018)", and to expelling from eastern Ghouta "the armed groups of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, the Al-Nusra Front and Al-Qaida and all of those belonging to them". They also promised to ensure humanitarian access and the facilitation of the work of United Nations agencies. On receiving the letter, the Office of the Special Envoy opened channels with all three groups, inside and outside the enclave. The respective commanders issued further letters, expressing the groups' readiness to negotiate with the Russian Federation in Geneva. In parallel, both I and my Special Envoy engaged with the relevant authorities of the Russian Federation. My team on the ground did likewise, and also engaged with the Government of Syria. We offered the good offices of the United Nations to facilitate and observe any meeting between the representatives of the armed opposition groups, the Syrian Government and the Russian Federation. Despite our best efforts over the course of a few days, it was not possible to schedule any meeting. Meanwhile, on 6 March, the Syrian Government addressed a letter to me and to the President of the Security Council. That letter stated that Syria positively welcomed resolution 2401 (2018), as it "stresses firm commitment to the Syrian State's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and calls for implementing a humanitarian truce across Syria to ensure a safe, sustainable and unhindered access of humanitarian aid." That same day, my Special Envoy informed the Russian Federation of his intention to invite the three armed opposition groups to a meeting with the Russian Federation in Geneva three days later. On 7 March, his interlocutors replied that they did not think a meeting in Geneva was the best option and were pursuing contacts on the ground with the relevant armed opposition groups. As those diplomatic efforts were taking place, fighting went on. The Syrian Government and its allies intensified air strikes and launched a ground offensive, progressively gaining control of parts of eastern Ghouta from about 10 per cent of the enclave on 3 March to more than 60 per cent today. The offensive initially took place in less populated areas, steadily moving to urban centres and forcing large-scale displacement. In the follow up to the efforts I have described, it was possible on 8 and 10 March to convene two meetings between Russian officials and Jaysh Al-Islam in the outskirts of eastern Ghouta, with the United Nations as an observer. In those meetings, progress was made in relation to the removal of a number of members of the Al-Nusra Front, as well as other aspects, including the potential for a ceasefire and improved humanitarian access. The first group of Al-Nusra Front fighters and their families were since evacuated from eastern Ghouta. Nevertheless, it has not been possible to facilitate contact between the Russian authorities and Faylak Al-Rahman. The group insisted that the meeting take place in Geneva. The Russian Federation insisted that the meeting take place on the ground. On 10 March, Government forces intensified their offensive, capturing the city of Misraba in a movement aiming at dividing the enclave into three separate areas. On the evening of that same day, the Russian Federation informed the United Nations that a unilateral ceasefire would take place at midnight, in relation to Jaysh Al-Islam in Douma. It was agreed that a meeting would be held on 11 March with the facilitation of the United Nations. On that day, with the ceasefire between the Government S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018 4/23 18-06756 and Jaysh Al-Islam forces largely holding in Douma, the meeting took place, followed by a meeting today. As I speak to the Council now, I have not yet received a full report on the results of today's meeting. But I was informed by our people in Damascus as I was entering the Chamber that there has been progress with regard to civilian evacuations and humanitarian aid. Furthermore, I take note of a statement issued today by Jaysh Al-Islam: "[i] n the context of Security Council resolutions 2254 (2015) and 2401 (2018), an agreement was reached with the Russian side through the United Nations for a humanitarian medical evacuation of the wounded for treatment outside of eastern Ghouta." We are also hearing reports of tentative initiatives, both by tribal leaders and the Russian Federation, for contact with other groups on the ground. I wish to underscore the urgency of seeing medical evacuations, civilian protection and full, sustained and unimpeded humanitarian access as soon as possible. Meanwhile, attacks on other parts of eastern Ghouta continue, with the enclave now split into three separate pockets. During this whole period, the shelling from eastern Ghouta to Damascus was also ongoing, causing dozens of civilian deaths and injuries, with some reports putting the number close to 100. My Special Envoy and I have remained apprised at each step of the diplomatic engagement, offering support and guidance to ensure the implementation in letter and spirit of the resolution. In short, as my Special Envoy has said to the Council, we are leaving no stone unturned in trying to bring all major stakeholders to the table and contribute in a concrete fashion to find a sustainable solution for the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). As the situation continues to unfold, the Turkish offensive in Afrin — pursued with armed opposition group allies — intensified with air strikes and ground advances against Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat/People's Protection Units fighters, reinforced, in turn, by elements coming from eastern Syria, where they were combating Da'esh. Pro-Syrian Government forces have also deployed inside of Afrin. The fighting resulted in significant civilian displacement, with reports of numerous casualties and damage to infrastructure. With the cooperation of Syrian armed opposition groups, Turkish forces established a so-called buffer zone inside Syrian territory, linking northern rural Aleppo and Idlib, and surrounding Afrin from three sides. The offensive is now pushing ever closer towards the city, with its large civilian population. Allow me to now turn to our efforts to address the humanitarian crisis. When resolution 2401 (2018) was adopted, the United Nations and its humanitarian partners stood ready to deliver. Plans were in place for multiple convoys each week to agreed-upon locations, in response to independently assessed needs. Unfortunately, the actual delivery did not match our plan. Let me describe what it was possible to do in the past two weeks. On 1 March, humanitarian organizations delivered assistance to some 50,000 people in the hard-to-reach areas of Afrin and Tell Rifaat, north of Aleppo. On 4 March, a convoy of 19 trucks organized by the United Nations, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and partners reached Dar Kabira, in northern Homs. It provided assistance to 33,500 people of the requested 40,250. However, the Government of Syria did not allow the delivery of life-saving medicines, such as insulin, nor key items, including solar lamps, syringes and paediatric scales. As I mentioned earlier, in eastern Ghouta, the Russian Federation unilaterally announced a daily five-hour humanitarian pause in the fighting, starting from 27 February, to prevent civilian victims and to enable civilians to leave the enclave. In reality, few civilians left. On the one hand, sufficient protection standards were not in place for voluntary movement. Moreover, armed groups prevented others from leaving. In that context, even though the five-hour window was insufficient to enable the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and services, as demanded in the resolution, on 5 March the United Nations sent an inter-agency convoy of 46 trucks to Douma, in eastern Ghouta, with food for 27,500 people, along with health and nutrition supplies. Yet those 27,500 represented only a third of the requested beneficiaries, all in desperate need. And most of the health supplies were removed by the Syrian authorities, including basic medicines, dialysis treatments and trauma and surgical materials, such as burn dressings and adrenaline, despite the provisions of paragraph 8 of resolution 2401 (2018). According to the World Health Organization, only about 30 per cent of medical supplies in the convoy 12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201 18-06756 5/23 were allowed in. United Nations personnel from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs accompanying the convoy were also denied access to eastern Ghouta. Violence rendered the operation extremely perilous, despite prior assurances from the parties to the conflict. The insecurity forced the team to reluctantly halt unloading and to return to Damascus with a large share of the food aid still on the trucks. On 9 March, a convoy of 13 trucks reached Douma, delivering the remaining food assistance that could not be offloaded four days earlier. Once again, shelling occurred nearby, despite assurances having been provided by all parties. In those difficult circumstances, I commend the valiant humanitarian workers risking their lives to provide assistance and protection to people in need. But we are obviously far from safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid, as demanded in resolution 2401 (2018), as well as other relevant Security Council resolutions. And so the humanitarian and human rights situation is becoming more desperate by the day. In Douma, relief workers who reached the city last week described conditions as shocking and overwhelming. People are sheltering in overcrowded basements. Access to food, water and sanitation is limited. In relation to Douma, we have a convoy ready that I hope will be allowed to proceed in the coming days, especially after the results of today's meeting. As in all conflict settings, the specific needs of women are not receiving sufficient attention, including access to safe spaces, critical health services, medicine and baby formula for their children. In eastern Ghouta, health partners on the ground advise that more than 1,000 people are in urgent need of medical evacuation. The United Nations is ready to support these medical evacuations, in cooperation with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and other partners. A prioritized list of those in greatest need, mostly children, has been shared with the Syrian authorities. I urge a positive response, hoping that today's meeting will allow these actions to take place in the immediate future. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent has announced its intention to send a relief convoy to Afrin as soon as security conditions allows. A United Nations humanitarian mission is awaiting Government authorization to immediately deploy to Raqqa for assessments of security and needs. There are also new disturbing allegations of the use of chlorine gas. Even if we cannot verify them, we cannot ignore them. I continue to urge the Council to find unity on this issue. Having said what I said, I believe that despite all the difficulties, lack of trust, mutual suspicions and cold calculations, it should be possible to implement resolution 2401 (2018). It should be possible to have a cessation of hostilities. It should be possible to deliver aid. It should be possible to evacuate the sick and wounded. It should be possible to lift the sieges. It should be possible to accelerate humanitarian mine action throughout Syria. It should also be possible to remove Security Council-listed terrorist fighters from conflict zones without massive and indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure. We cannot give up, for the sake of the Syrian people. I appeal to all parties to ensure the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) throughout the whole of Syrian territory. The United Nations is ready to assist in any effort to make that happen. I call on all States with influence to exercise it in support of the efforts of the United Nations and the implementation of the resolution. I hope that this week's Astana ministerial meeting, which will gather the guarantors of de-escalation, will concretely restore de-escalation arrangements, and take real steps on detainees, abductees and missing persons. The dramatic situation I have described — the calamity across the country, the rivalries, the cynicism, the cruelty — highlight the need for a political solution. My Special Envoy continues to work towards the full implementation of resolution 2254 (2015). On Thursday, the conflict will enter its eighth year. I refuse to lose my hope to see Syria rising from the ashes. To see a united, democratic Syria able to avoid fragmentation and sectarianism and with its sovereignty and territorial integrity respected, and to see a Syrian people able to freely decide their future and choose their political leadership. The President: I thank the Secretary-General for his briefing. I now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements. Recalling the Security Council's latest note 507 on its working methods (S/2017/507), I wish to encourage all participants, both members and non-members of the Council, to deliver their statements in five minutes or less. S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018 6/23 18-06756 Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): I deliver this speech today on behalf of Kuwait and Sweden. At the outset I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting at the request of the delegations of Kuwait and Sweden, pursuant to resolution 2401 (2018). I also thank Secretary-General António Guterres for his presence here today and for his briefing about the implementation of this resolution. Fifteen days have passed since the Security Council's unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which demands that all parties implement a 30-day ceasefire throughout Syria without delay in order to deliver humanitarian assistance to those in need and to end the siege of residential areas. It is with great regret that we continue to witness a clear failure to implement the resolution's provisions while military operations across Syria continue to prevent humanitarian and medical assistance, particularly in eastern Ghouta and specifically on the part of the Syrian authorities. This has prevented United Nations teams and their humanitarian partners from safely providing humanitarian assistance to eastern Ghouta, which has been a primary locus among Syrian areas in need of assistance ever since its siege began in 2013, and which is home to about 400,000 people. In this regard, we would like to make a number of observations, as follows. First, we have followed with deep concern the inability of the United Nations and its humanitarian partners to enter the besieged areas, and the obstacles and impediments that they have faced during their operations in some areas. In that regard, we would refer to events in Douma, eastern Ghouta, on 5 March, which proved to be the deadliest day since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), with at least 100 people having been killed on that day alone. On that day, the hopes of civilians hinged on receiving lifesaving humanitarian aid, and we looked forward to that first positive initiative reaching 90,000 people in need of assistance in eastern Ghouta. However, what happened was that the number of beneficiaries dropped to less than half due to the Syrian authorities having removed necessary medical supplies from the convoy's load without clear justification, despite the fact that they had been given prior notification, based on standard operating procedures, of the entirety of the humanitarian convoy's content. It is also a matter of deep concern that convoys administered by the United Nations and its partners were compelled to cease their operations before completely unloading their cargo due to continued aerial bombardment on Douma. We demand that the Syrian authorities give immediate permission for two convoys per week to eastern Ghouta and other destinations, at the request of the United Nations. We call on all parties to provide appropriate security guarantees for these convoys and to permit United Nations staff to accompany the convoys. In this regard, we reaffirm the need for all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, to assume their responsibilities to protect all humanitarian workers, including United Nations agencies and their relevant partners. We welcome the entry of the remaining humanitarian convoys provided by the Red Cross and the World Food Program into Douma on 9 March to deliver the remaining food assistance. This was the second time such convoys had been allowed to enter Douma in one week. There is a need to build on this so as to increase the number of weekly convoys to eastern Ghouta in a sustainable manner. Secondly, we reiterate the Council's demand for immediate unconditional medical evacuations based on medical need, starting this week, and we call on the Syrian authorities to give permission and work with the United Nations and its implementing partners to that end. Thirdly, the continued fighting in eastern Ghouta, particularly the incessant air strikes, prompts us to again call specifically on the Syrian authorities to comply with the provisions of the resolution and of international law in order to facilitate humanitarian assistance to reach those in need. We believe that a daily five-hour truce in eastern Ghouta does not support the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). Fourthly, the United Nations has confirmed that the number of combatants associated with terrorist groups designated by the Security Council in eastern Ghouta does not exceed 350. We cannot accept continued military operations under the pretext of combating terrorism when they effectively prevent the delivery of humanitarian assistance, contrary to the requirements of the resolution. Resolution 2401 (2018), which was adopted unanimously, took effect immediately and is applicable to all parties. In that regard, we note the willingness of certain opposition groups in eastern Ghouta to abide by the provisions of the resolution and to expel terrorist groups designated by the Security Council. We express our support for the 12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201 18-06756 7/23 efforts of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, to operationalize this matter without delay. Fifthly, listening to the Secretary-General's briefing today on the status of the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) constitutes one of the monitoring tools included in the resolution. But the main mechanisms remain the existing ceasefire agreements between the parties to the conflict, most notably the Astana accord with Russia, Turkey and Iran as its guarantors, and the agreement supervised by the United States and the Russian Federation that emanated from the International Syria Support Group. The resolution stresses the need to activate those agreements in order to reach a 30- day ceasefire aimed at allowing sustainable access to humanitarian assistance in all regions in Syria. We call again on the parties to those agreements to redouble their efforts in order to implement the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018). The unanimous position that the Security Council conveyed to the Syrian people and to the world by adopting resolution 2401 (2018) on 24 February must be built on in a speedy and effective manner, especially as the resolution is primarily of a humanitarian nature. There is a collective responsibility on us as members of the Security Council, specifically on influential parties, to maintain our credibility before the world and work to implement the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018). We would like here to stress that the provisions of the resolution are valid even after 30 days from the date of its adoption. We affirm our full commitment to continue to closely follow the status of the implementation of the resolution in the Council monthly reports. We will spare no effort to make progress on its implementation. This month marks the beginning of the eighth year of the conflict in Syria. Sadly, there is still a need for the violence to cease, for sustained humanitarian access through weekly cross-line convoys, for medical evacuations, for the protection of civilians and hospitals and for lifting the siege. We cannot let the Syrian people down, and we will continue to strive to implement the joint demands that we have set out. Finally, we recall that the lack of a political settlement to the conflict in Syria based on resolution 2254 (2015) will lead to further deterioration of the humanitarian situation. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I would like to congratulate the Netherlands and your team, Mr. President, on having assumed the presidency of the Security Council for this month. I also want to thank Secretary-General Guterres for his briefing and for all of his efforts on behalf of peace in Syria Sixteen days ago, we sat around the negotiating table with our Security Council colleagues and agreed to a 30-day ceasefire in the brutal bombardment of civilians in Syria. The negotiations were long and difficult. Every minute we delayed meant more innocent people were killed. But the Russian delegation stalled and drew out the talks. They had conditions they insisted on before they would allow the killing to stop. The United States was reluctant to accept those conditions. But, in order to stop the killing in Syria, we accepted them. We attempted to work with Russia in good faith to end the violence in Syria. As a result, 16 days ago we came to an agreement. Russia cast its vote in favour of the agreement (see S/PV.8188). With that vote Russia promised its support for a 30-day cease-fire, as did the rest of the members of the security Council. With that vote Russia said that it too wanted to create the conditions for food and medicine to reach starving Syrian families. With that vote Russia told us it would use its influence with the Syrian regime to silence the guns in Syria. It told us that the Russians would themselves honour the ceasefire they voted to demand. With that vote Russia made a commitment to us, to the Syrian people and to the world — a commitment to stop the killing in Syria. Today we know that the Russians did not keep their commitment. Today we see their actions do not match those commitments, as bombs continue dropping on the children of eastern Ghouta. Today we must ask whether Russia can no longer influence the Al-Assad regime to stop the horrific destruction of hospitals, medical clinics and ambulances and to stop dropping chemical weapons on villages. Has the situation in Syria reversed, and Russia is now the tool of Al-Assad — or worse, Iran? We must ask those questions because we know the Russians themselves have continued their own bombing. In the first four days following the ceasefire, Russian military aircraft conducted at least 20 daily bombing missions in Damascus and eastern Ghouta. The Russians negotiated the wording of the ceasefire down to the commas and the periods. They voted for the S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018 8/23 18-06756 ceasefire. And they immediately disregarded it. In the past 16 days, over 500 civilians have died. Some reports put the death toll even higher. That is unacceptable. Thousands of Syrians are in desperate need of medical care. But none of the United Nations list has been evacuated. We have heard the conversations are ongoing with the regime to medically evacuate 25 people in the coming weeks. While those civilians should be rushed to medical care, we ask why it took so long. When will the more than 1,000 identified medical cases be evacuated? There have been almost no deliveries of medicine or surgical equipment, because the Al-Assad regime remove them from the United Nations humanitarian convoys. The convoy that made it to eastern Ghouta on 5 March had to navigate around constant regime airstrikes. The bombing was so severe that the United Nations could barely unload the food the trucks were carrying. And in the past 16 days, there have been three separate allegations of chlorine-gas attacks. This is no ceasefire. This is the Al-Assad regime, Iran and Russia continuing to wage war against their political opponents. And there is another reason we know the Syrians and Russians never intended to implement the ceasefire: they planned for it. Over the past two weeks, the Russian and Syrian regimes have been busy labelling every opposition group in eastern Ghouta a "terrorist group". Why? So they can exploit a provision in the ceasefire resolution (resolution 2401 (2018)) that allows for military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and Al-Qaida. There are terrorists in Syria, but the Russian and Syrian regimes label anyone as terrorists who resist their absolute control. In the eyes of Russia, Iran and Al-Assad, the neighbourhoods of eastern Ghouta are full of terrorists. The hospitals are full of terrorists. The schools are full of terrorists. The Syrian and Russian regimes insist that they are targeting terrorists, but their bombs and artillery continue to fall on hospitals and schools and on innocent civilians. They have deliberately and with premeditation exploited a loophole they negotiated in the ceasefire to continue starving and pummelling hundreds of thousands of innocent Syrian civilians. They have made a mockery of this process and this institution. For the sake of the Syrian people and the integrity of the Council, we must respond and take action. During the negotiations, the United States put all parties on notice that we needed to act if the ceasefire was not honoured. Members of the Security Council agreed. Now that day has come. The ceasefire has failed. The situation of the civilians in eastern Ghouta is dire. The United States is acting. We have drafted a new ceasefire draft resolution that provides no room for evasion. It is simple, straightforward and binding. It will take effect immediately upon adoption by the Council. It contains no counter-terrorism loopholes for Al-Assad, Iran and the Russians to hide behind. And it focuses on the area the Secretary-General has identified and that the world can see holds the greatest urgency for the lives of innocent civilians, that is, Damascus city and eastern Ghouta. If Russia, Iran and Al-Assad cannot agree to stop the bombing in that limited part of Syria for that limited amount of time, they will not agree to anything that is worthwhile. If they will not keep their word once they have agreed to a ceasefire, then how can we trust them? In the end, that is what makes the work of the Council possible: trust. If we cannot count on the members of the Council to honour their agreements, we cannot accomplish anything. If we cannot act when children are dying, we have no business being here. If we cannot save families that have not seen the sun for weeks because they have been hiding underground to escape barrel bombs, then the Security Council is as impotent as its worst critics say it is. Almost a year ago in the aftermath of the Syrian regime sarin gas attack on Khan Shaykhoun, the United States offered a warning to the Council. We said that when the international community consistently fails to act, there are times when States are compelled to take their own action. The Security Council failed to act, and the United States successfully struck the air base from which Al-Assad had launched his chemical attack. We repeat that warning today. We welcome all nations that will work together to finally provide relief for the Syrian people, and we support the United Nations political process that seeks to end the war in Syria. However, we also warn that any nation that is determined to impose its will through chemical attacks and inflicting human suffering, most especially the outlaw Syrian regime, the United States remains prepared to act if we must. It is not the path we prefer, but it is a path we have demonstrated we will take. We are prepared to take it again. 12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201 18-06756 9/23 Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): I thank the Secretary-General for his briefing and, through him, may I thank all of those trying to supply the desperately needed humanitarian response on the ground. They are indeed valiant. Sixteen days ago, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2401 (2018). We did so because we and the world were sickened by the slaughter of innocents in Syria, particularly in eastern Ghouta. Russia used every tactic in its playbook to weaken the resolution and buy time for its ally, the Al-Assad regime, to bomb indiscriminately. But when it raises its hand in support, we hope that Russia and its clients would keep their word and implement the resolution. Sadly, as the Secretary-General's briefing has made clear, our resolution has not been implemented. What has happened? First, has there been a ceasefire? No. The violence continues and civilian deaths continue to rise. In those 16 days, 607 people have reportedly been killed, including 99 children and 79 women. The opposition armed groups committed to implementing resolution 2401 (2018) in full, but the Al-Assad regime's air strikes continue. Despite voting for a ceasefire, between 24 and 28 February, Russian military aircraft conducted 20 bombing missions in eastern Ghouta and Damascus every day. Russia has failed to confirm that it is only conducting air strikes against groups that are listed as terrorist groups by the Council. During the so-called daily humanitarian pause, over 56 air strikes hit eastern Ghouta between 27 February and 7 March, including at least six air strikes by Russian aircraft, according to monitors on the ground. Let us recall that only last year Russia declared the whole area to be a de-escalation zone. It has claimed that its bombardments are about fighting terrorists. That is manifestly not the case. There is one terrorist group recognized by the Security Council in eastern Ghouta, which accounts for less than not even 1 per cent of the population of the enclave. The other fighters are members of the opposition armed groups, which Russia has itself invited to the Astana meetings. Those groups have written stating their readiness to expel Al-Nusra Front from the enclave. Instead, Russia bombs them, undermining the political process that it is a part of. We are pleased that the members of the High Negotiations Committee of the Syrian opposition will be able to discuss the situation in Syria with Council members later today. I repeat my consistent condemnation of attacks against Damascus. What about our resolution's second demand, that is, safe, unimpeded and sustained access for humanitarian convoys, including medical and surgical supplies? Only one convoy has been able to enter besieged eastern Ghouta in the past 16 days, in two movements following shelling. They delivered supplies for 27,500 people — a fraction of the 400,000 civilians besieged in eastern Ghouta. What is stopping the aid from getting to the people that so desperately need it? Again, it is the regime. The ongoing violence that it perpetrates is an important factor, and its failure to grant access is another. On 5 March, the regime removed nearly 70 per cent of the medical supplies from a humanitarian convoy destined for 90,000 people. That happened at a time when the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is warning that malnutrition and disease are so prevalent that people will soon die from hunger and sickness even more than from air strikes. Finally, have there been any medical evacuations for the approximately 1,000 people who need them? Not a single one. Again, it is the regime that will not permit its civilians to reach urgently needed medical care. Some may point to an aid convoy or an announced pause in air strikes as a sign of improvement, and claim that those actions implement the resolution. They do not. Our resolution was clear: a ceasefire without delay, humanitarian access and medical evacuations. None have happened. Instead, the truth is that the regime will continue to pound eastern Ghouta until it has a complete military victory there, and Russia will continue to protect its ally, whatever the cost to the people of Syria and its own reputation. As we sit here, watching Al-Assad inscribing eastern Ghouta, again, on the roll call of atrocities and war crimes that he has committed over the eight years of the bloody conflict, let me say clearly that there will be future accountability for those crimes, and Russia's role, bombing alongside him and protecting him from accountability, will never be forgotten. There is still time. If Russia is able to announce a five-hour ceasefire, it can announce a full ceasefire. If it can get one aid convoy through, it can get more through. I urge Russia to give its unconditional support to resolution 2401 (2018) and a ceasefire to enable the delivery of humanitarian S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018 10/23 18-06756 assistance, respect international humanitarian law and protect civilians. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): I would first like to thank the Secretary-General for his strong and particularly enlightening briefing, as well as for his personal commitment, in addition to that of the staff of the Secretariat and Mr. Staffan de Mistura, to spare no effort in implementing resolution 2401 (2018). Allow me, on behalf of France, to especially commend the United Nations teams and all the humanitarian actors working under extremely difficult conditions in Syria. Two weeks ago, we unanimously adopted a text calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities of at least 30 days, sustained and unimpeded humanitarian access and medical evacuations in Syria. I would remind those present that those demands apply to the whole of Syria and all parties. We negotiated the text together for several weeks and, I repeat, unanimously adopted it. Each member of the Council around this table has therefore endorsed the content by deciding to assume responsibility. That responsibility fell particularly on Russia, as a permanent member that voted for resolution 2401 (2018), sponsor of the Astana talks and a Power engaged in the Syrian situation, as it claims to be. We had agreed to a clause to meet 15 days later to review its implementation. The Secretary-General has just provided us with a very clear picture of that. Since 24 February, civilian casualties have continued to climb into the hundreds every week. The regime is pursuing, in defiance of its people and the Council, an air and land offensive that it has never intended to halt, with the support of Russia and Iran. However, let us not be deceived that civilians are not the "collateral victims" of those military operations. Rather, they are themselves being targeted by the regime, deliberately and methodically to starve and rape, destroy their health centres, kill and sow terror and death. The hell on Earth experienced by eastern Ghouta is not just the effect of the regime's policy; it is the very purpose of the regime's murderous madness, with its daily tally of war crimes and crimes against humanity, for which the regime will have to answer. Let us call a spade a spade: Who can stop the Syrian regime? Everyone knows that, apart from a military operation, it is Russia that is in the best position to do so today. It is therefore legitimate that today, more than ever before, everyone looks expectantly towards Russia, which has so far been unwilling, or unable, to exert sufficient pressure on the regime. Two weeks after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), we are here in the Chamber to face the facts. First, what has happened since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018)? In the light of the inexorable worsening of the humanitarian situation in eastern Ghouta, the Security Council has rallied around a cessation of hostilities and made every effort to seek consensus, and finally did reach consensus on 24 February. We knew then, and we said so, that this result was only a precondition, and that the longest and most difficult part of the path towards a humanitarian truce was still before us. However, every day since 24 February the fighting has continued. In the days that followed, despite Russia's unilateral announcement of a daily five-hour truce — well below what resolution 2401 (2018) requires — the intensity of the fighting has increased. Since resolution 2401 (2018) was adopted, there has not been a single day when eastern Ghouta, an enclave that has been starved and besieged for months, has not been bombed by the regime and its supporters. The fight against terrorism — and this cannot be repeated enough — cannot be used as a pretext for such a bloodbath of civilians or for such contempt for international humanitarian law. Eastern Ghouta is now a textbook case of war crimes, and even of crimes against humanity. It cannot be ignored: the Syrian regime, with the support of Russia and Iran, is engaged in a war of total submission against its people. Violations of the ceasefire by the Damascus regime, with the support of Russia and Iran, have been massive and ongoing, and I would like to thank the Secretary-General for clearly exposing those violations. Let me briefly review some of these violations. Between 24 and 27 February, 72 attacks by the Syrian regime and its Russian and Iranian allies, from more than 14 locations, were reported. Between 24 and 28 February, Russian military aircraft carried out no fewer than 20 bombing missions in Damascus and eastern Ghouta. Between 27 February and 2 March, field observers documented at least 25 air strikes by the regime and Russia during the five-hour humanitarian breaks declared by Moscow. Since 18 February, more than 29 hospital have been hit, and few health facilities are still in operation. On 8 March, a health care facility in Mesraba was completely destroyed by bombardments. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, as of 11 March, 607 people, including 99 children and 79 women, had been killed since the adoption of resolution 12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201 18-06756 11/23 2401 (2018). I would repeat: 607 people have been killed. In addition to the dead, there are many injured persons, arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, rapes and many other intolerable violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Finally, further credible allegations of the use of chemical weapons have been made since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). As the highest French authorities have pointed out, France will brook no compromise when it comes to the use of those abject weapons. The humanitarian needs are immense, yet the regime deliberately continues to block the entry of aid, despite the presence of Russian soldiers at the crossing points, as what happened to the convoy on 5 March shows. Indeed, the population continues to be deprived of relief and of any possibility of medical evacuation, even if more than 1,000 people need it. Still, we cannot give up. On behalf of France, I would like to make a new and urgent appeal to those who can make a difference on the ground, starting with Russia. France is not posing; it is taking action. My country has been and remains one of the countries most committed to the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). Right after the resolution's adoption, France stepped up its contacts and efforts at the highest level so as to contribute to the resolution's swift implementation, so that the Astana guarantors would assume their responsibilities and so that the commitments made collectively would be respected. President Macron has met with Presidents Putin, Erdoğan and Rouhani, as well as with the Secretary-General on several occasions. Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian visited Moscow and then Tehran. To Russia, we proposed concrete measures for implementing resolution 2401 (2018). Although our efforts aimed at reaching out have been ignored, we stand by our proposals. Let us not deceive ourselves: without an immediate implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), the worst is yet to come. After the regime has conquered the rural zones of eastern Ghouta, the worst would be a conquest — street by street, house by house — in a torrent of fire, for the urban zones of the region, which are by definition the most densely populated areas. It is of the highest urgency, therefore, for us to come together to ensure that the resolution is fully implemented before the street battles promised by the regime's military planners begin. I would like to highlight three essential elements in that regard. The first is implementing a monitoring system to ensure maximum pressure on the parties. The main reason resolution 2401 (2018) has not been not implemented is that the Syrian regime has been engaged in its murderous folly and the regime's supporters have been unable or unwilling to stop it and prevent a worsening of the humanitarian situation. But the failure to implement resolution 2401 (2018) is also the result of our not being able to put in place a sufficiently targeted follow-up mechanism to the resolution in the Council. This must be our priority, and I am convinced that it is our only chance to compel the Syrian regime to comply with its international obligations. France therefore calls for appropriate decisions to be taken in the coming days. It is essential and urgent that humanitarian convoys reach eastern Ghouta in adequate security conditions and carry out their delivery of aid, and that medical evacuations be allowed. For that to happen, the truce must be sustainable and flexible in order to take into account delays in the delivery, discharge and distribution of aid. Medical authorizations must not only be delivered in an expedited manner; they must also come with all the security guarantees needed by patients, their families and the humanitarian actors who assist them. Indeed, the protection due them under international humanitarian law must be unconditionally guaranteed. The second element I would like to highlight is the departure of terrorist fighters from Ghouta as proposed by armed groups. In their letter to the Security Council, the three armed groups in eastern Ghouta, upon the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), indicated their commitment to upholding the resolution, made concrete proposals for a comprehensive cessation of hostilities and committed themselves to taking combatant members of their groups out of Ghouta. The United Nations offered its assistance in those exchanges and carried out important work along those lines, to which the Secretary General just referred. I call on Russia today to conclude and implement the relevant agreements without delay. This is one of the keys to implementing the resolution. The third element is political negotiation. A lasting cessation of hostilities in Syria requires a political process consistent with the terms of resolution 2254 (2015), our shared road map for ending the conflict. Staffan de Mistura has our full support in bringing this mission to a successful conclusion and swiftly convening negotiations in Geneva, which is the only legitimate forum for a credible solution. In order to S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018 12/23 18-06756 achieve results, United Nations mediation requires that necessary pressure be exerted on the parties. We therefore call once again on Russia, as well as Iran, to fulfil their responsibilities, as we are fulfilling our own. Collectively we have the capacity, if we so wish, to stop the endless descent into the abyss that characterizes the Syrian tragedy, and finally create a real political dynamic. On behalf of France, I therefore call once again for all members of the Council to finally rally their words and action in the service of this shared objective, which matches to our interests and responsibilities. It is never too late to save lives, and it is our responsibility — if we accept it — to end the tragedy of Syria, on which our generation, and the credibility of the Security Council, will be judged. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We would like to thank the Secretary-General for his briefing and his detailed information on what we asked for. We particularly appreciated his words when he said that there should be only one agenda for all of us — ending this crisis. Russia supported the Security Council's adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), guided by the priority of improving the humanitarian situation in various parts of Syria. We not only believe that its effective implementation is extremely important, we have also proposed concrete ways of achieving that, something that was discussed in today's briefing. And that is unlike various capitals whose representatives have settled comfortably for doing nothing while vilifying the Syrian regime, as they call it, and making endless accusations about Russia. In out last meeting on the subject (see S/PV.8188), I promised to count the number of times that Ambassador Haley mentioned Russia in the next meeting. The answer is 22. France came second, with 16 mentions, and the United Kingdom was third, with 12. This matters not just for the record but for the context in which it occurs. What is going on is a political policy, and it does not have to do merely — indeed, not much at all — with concern for Syrians' humanitarian needs. It is important that everyone understands that resolution 2401 (2018) is not about an immediate ceasefire, which is a utopian notion, but a preliminary agreement between the parties as a condition for achieving sustainable de-escalation in all the contested areas of Syria, not just eastern Ghouta. That is the only realistic way. The resolution contains an unequivocal demand in that regard, and we are trying to make that happen. The Council has heard about that today and will hear more. The authorities in Damascus have expressed their satisfaction with the resolution and their willingness to implement its provisions. However, they have also rightly demanded an immediate cessation of attacks on the capital and of all infringements on Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The counter-terrorist operation that the Syrian armed forces are conducting does not contradict resolution 2401 (2018). The Government of Syria has every right to work to end threats to its citizens' security. The Damascus suburbs cannot continue to be a breeding ground for terrorists. It is the terrorists' persistent attempts to disrupt the ceasefire that serve to maintain the tensions in Syria, and of course the most problematic area is in eastern Ghouta. The July 2017 Cairo agreements on the eastern Ghouta de-escalation zone gave the militants a chance to be included in the political settlement. They did not take advantage of it and have still not dissociated themselves from the terrorists. Even now the groups' activities are coordinated from the joint headquarters run by Jabhat Al-Nusra. We have reliable information that they are in active radio contact, discussing plans for shelling the humanitarian corridors, among other things. Why are they only now talking about being willing to drive Al-Nusra's members out of eastern Ghouta? And why are we the only ones asking that question? We have answered it a number of times ourselves when we have spoken about suspicions that Al-Nusra is being preserved for particular political purposes, in this case to maintain a dangerous hotbed of armed resistance in the immediate vicinity of Syria's capital. Even now they continue to lull us with fairy stories about how few terrorists there are in eastern Ghouta. And who is going to monitor the armed groups' implementation of the resolution? Who will be responsible for that? Just please do not keep saying the so-called regime, and Russia, and Iran. Such ideological attitudes are simply not serious in the context of the professional discussions that we conduct in the Security Council. What responsibility will the members of the Council take for the implementation of the resolution? How will they implement it? How will they influence the militias they support? 12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201 18-06756 13/23 Following the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), with Russia's participation, daily five-hour humanitarian pauses were established and the Muhayam-Al-Wafedin checkpoint was opened for use by both civilians and militants with families. They were guaranteed security, transportation and protection along the entire route. The Syrian authorities then opened another checkpoint, Jisreen-Mleha, in the southern area of eastern Ghouta. Medical posts have been set up, distribution points organized for hot meals, buses are standing by. However, the insurgents continued to subject the central areas of Damascus and its outskirts to massive shelling. Dozens of mines have been laid for days, resulting in deaths and injuries as well as major damage. Since the day the resolution was adopted more than 100 people have died, and many more been injured, as a result of the shelling in the capital. The Tishrin and Al-Biruni hospitals and a medical centre in Al-Rihan have been hit more than once. These are real hospitals, not the militants' field offices that are frequently disguised as hospitals. They are making active use of snipers. We know this for a fact. It is a tragedy when any civilians die during an armed conflict. But my delegation has always been interested in the origin of the statistical information being used in the United Nations. In a highly politicized situation this subject is extremely important. Frequent assessments are pronounced about civilian losses in eastern Ghouta. We hope that future reports will be required to indicate where their data is from, how reliable it is and who exactly is meant by "reliable sources on the ground". Every day that has passed, the extremists have forbidden civilians to leave the areas they have blocked and have severely suppressed attempts to resist arbitrary action, including through exemplary executions. We have reliable information about that too. Strikes on corridors and exit checkpoints are constant, including during the humanitarian pauses. On 9 March a convoy of refugees was shelled, once again disrupting an evacuation. Tunnels are being used for attacks on the Syrian army, and the exits from underground installations are located in neighbourhoods where there are public institutions, mainly mosques, hospitals and markets. They have inflated food prices and at the same time have been taking away the people's food, water, medicines and mobile phones. They are setting up firing positions in residential buildings and using people as human shields. They are laying mines in neighbourhoods that are adjacent to the line of contact. They are conducting searches and confiscating permit papers distributed by Government forces. The residents are trying to resist this repression, organizing spontaneous rallies and clashing with the militias. On 1 March, in north-eastern Douma, Al-Nusra terrorists shot four people who participated in such a demonstration. Today there was a major protest in Kafr Batna. The first major exodus of civilians took place on the night of 11 March, when 52 people, 26 of them children, left the village of Misraba with the assistance of the Russian Centre for the Reconciliation of Opposing Sides and the Syrian army. There are also militants who want to leave eastern Ghouta, but their field commanders threaten potential defectors with reprisals. For the first time, on 9 March, after long and tense negotiations, with the participation of officers from the Russian Centre for Reconciliation, 13 militants were evacuated from the enclave through the humanitarian corridor at their own request. Talks have been held with Jaysh Al-Islam on reaching an agreement on the withdrawal of a second group of fighters. A meeting was also held with the leaders of Faylaq Al-Rahman, at which it was demanded that they dissociate themselves from Jabhat Al-Nusra immediately. However, according to information received, the militants of the group decided to continue their armed resistance, forcibly recruiting ordinary citizens into their ranks. To turn to the subject of the humanitarian convoy entering Douma on 5 March, the convoy received comprehensive support from the Syrian Government and the Russian military. A humanitarian corridor was established, security ensured for its passage and the situation was monitored. However, there was a great deal of evidence of disorganized activity on the part of the humanitarian actors. According to our information, United Nations staff needlessly delayed the convoy operations, creating real security risks. While the convoy was being put together, they attempted to load it with undeclared medical supplies — and the fact that not all of them were declared was mentioned today — and wasted around two hours in a meeting with the leaders of the so-called local councils. They spread unreliable information about aerial strikes in the trucks' unloading area, and today some delegations seized on that joyfully, although what actually occurred was one instance of mortar fire from the armed groups' positions. They did not respond to local residents' S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018 14/23 18-06756 request to help them leave the enclave. Nonetheless, 13 people, five of them children, were evacuated. Afterwards, it was curious to read a report that one of Ahrar Al-Sham's field commanders had, in a tone of irony, expressed his appreciation for the humanitarian pause on 5 March, which enabled the militias to regroup, recover their strength and a number of lost positions and prepare ambushes for the Syrian military. A 9 March action was successfully carried out with the Russian military providing a truck convoy with safe conduct. However, the scope of resolution 2401 (2018) is not limited to eastern Ghouta. We should note that in the past two weeks, the terrorists of Al-Nusra and associated militia groups have repeatedly shelled villages in Hamah province. As a result of new strikes there are been deaths and injuries in blockaded Fo'ah and Kafraya in Idlib. Armed clashes between illegal groups in that province have led to threats of a number of medical facilities being closed. Al-Nusra has become more active in the southern de-escalation zone, which could be related to the fact that they continue to be supplied with weapons from outside. The situation in Afrin remains very difficult. The Syrian authorities have given permission for humanitarian aid to be delivered to the residents of Rukban camp, in the area illegally held by the Americans around the Al-Tanf military base. We would like to know what the United Nations is doing about that. Needless to say, we assume that the distribution of humanitarian assistance will be undertaken by a trustworthy entity such as the International Committee of the Red Cross or the Syrian Arab Red Crescent. We are also awaiting the speedy dispatch of a United Nations humanitarian needs assessment mission to Raqqa, which was bombed out by the coalition. There should be no pointless delays with this, so I would like to ask the United Nations when that mission will take place. We understand very well the unspoken motives for the current disinformation campaign, whose aim is to create a public perception that the Syrian authorities use toxic substances. In fact, both we and the Syrians have well-founded fears that provocations are being planned with the aim of accusing the Syrian authorities of carrying out chemical attacks. According to information received, Al-Nusra used a chlorine-based substance in eastern Ghouta on 5 March, affecting more than 30 local residents. This is all being done in order to prepare the ground for unilateral acts of force against sovereign Syria. We heard hints of that in the statements made by some delegations today. Essentially, steps are being considered that could deliver yet another heavy blow to regional stability. Meanwhile, on territory formerly controlled by illegal armed groups, there have been more new discoveries of stores of chemicals, but the relevant bodies of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons have been very slow to react to the appeals of the Syrian authorities. Russia will continue its efforts to implement resolution 2401 (2018), but we demand that some of our colleagues do their part and exert genuine pressure on the groups that they support or sponsor, instead of constantly calling on Russia and creating the false impression that the resolution applies only to us. In conclusion, I would like to say that this afternoon four Security Council will be holding an unofficial Arria Formula meeting with the declared intention of making opposition voices heard on the humanitarian issue in Syria. This is going to be widely covered in the media. First and foremost, we want to point out the fact that is unacceptable to use United Nations resources for politicized purposes, and that is certainly not what Arria Formula meetings were conceived for. This event conceals the desire of its organizers to exert informational pressure on the Syrian Government and those who are helping it fight terrorism. In our view, to get the full picture, it would not be a bad idea to listen to the residents of Raqqa and Rukban camp, not to mention eastern Ghouta, where there are quite a few people who would be glad of the opportunity to appeal for their deliverance from the presence of extremists. Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): I should like at the outset to thank Secretary-General António Guterres for his briefing. China appreciates the positive efforts made by the United Nations and the Secretary- General to alleviate the humanitarian situation in the Syrian regions affected. China sympathizes with the suffering of the Syrian people and has consistently been working hard to help them. Last month we channelled assistance through the International Committee of the Red Cross, sending water, food, medical services and shelter to internally displaced persons in Syria. We are extremely concerned at the fact that the people of Syria are suffering from the conflict. No act 12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201 18-06756 15/23 of violence against innocent civilians can be tolerated. This situation must end. On 24 February, the members of the Security Council, leaving aside their differences, unanimously adopted resolution 2401 (2018). This upheld the unity of the Council and provided a rare opportunity for a ceasefire, halting the violence and easing the suffering of the Syrian people. After the resolution was adopted, we saw that United Nations humanitarian relief convoys had overcome difficulties of all kinds and entered eastern Ghouta, delivering much-needed assistance to the people there. With Russia announcing the implementation of the temporary ceasefire, a humanitarian corridor was opened for the Syrian people. We saw that some civilians, including children, had already entered the safe area through the humanitarian corridor and received relief and assistance. It has also come to our attention that the parties to the conflict continue to attack each other and that owing to the shelling the humanitarian corridor has not been able to serve its full purpose. We urge all parties concerned to make joint efforts, exert their influence and ensure that resolution 2401 (2018) is effectively and earnestly implemented. All members of the Security Council should maintain their unity and jointly stay on track to find a political solution to the Syrian issue, support the early resumption of the Geneva peace talks and urge all parties in Syria to achieve a solution acceptable to all as soon as possible, through a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political process, in order to ease the suffering of the Syrian people. China will continue to make unremitting efforts to that end. Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): I join others in thanking Secretary-General António Guterres for his briefing. We welcome the efforts of the United Nations, its system and the International Committee of the Red Cross to render immediate life-saving services, conduct hundreds of medical evacuations and send convoys to the besieged and hard-to-reach areas, especially eastern Ghouta, despite the potential danger to the lives of their personnel. We therefore urge the members of the Security Council to assist the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in operationalizing those emergency programmes and to ensure the protection of medical and humanitarian workers. Likewise, we also urge the parties to support United Nations structures in fulfilling their mandates. We echo the United Nations calls to all parties to facilitate unconditional, unimpeded and sustained access to all people in need throughout the country and to take the necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, including schools and medical facilities, as required by international law and human rights standards. Kazakhstan considers that it is equally important to further promote the Syrian settlement and believes that the Astana process has great potential for guiding intra-Syrian talks towards long-term peace. In that context, we propose that all sides, including stakeholders, provide all-round assistance, making use of the positive developments to improve the humanitarian situation on the ground. Astana continues to support resolution 2254 (2015), as it always has, and repeatedly calls on the International Syria Support Group and other countries to help the conflicting parties to implement the measures stipulated in the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex) and the Vienna statements. We express concern over the existing difficulties in Syria, which seriously impede the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), and we call on the international community to influence the conflicting parties to cooperate with the United Nations. The only way to truly resolve the crisis is through negotiations, predicated on mutual trust and understanding, together with confidence-building measures. In practical terms, we are convinced that expelling terrorist groups from eastern Ghouta may calm the situation in that sector. Let us be frank: removing the Al-Nusra Front and other affiliated terrorist groups from the area, as stated in a letter from three parties, must be pursued in order to end hostilities. The implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) is a collective responsibility, with each Council member playing a significant role. Finally, Kazakhstan supports solutions in Syria on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué, as well as the agreements on the de-escalation zones reached during the Astana process. Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We would like to thank you, Mr. President, for having convened this meeting and to welcome the presence of Secretary-General António Guterres, who reminded us of the responsibilities of the international community, S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018 16/23 18-06756 in particular the Council, given the serious and terrible developments in Syria. Peru follows with great concern the humanitarian situation in that country. We must express our sorrow and solidarity to the victims of the conflict, most of whom are children. We deeply regret that, two weeks after the ceasefire was unanimously adopted by the Council through resolution 2401 (2018), there has not been sufficient progress in its implementation. As the Secretary-General noted, a sustained cessation of hostilities has not materialized. The conflict continues to claim civilian victims. The much-needed humanitarian assistance has been provided in a very limited way. International law and international humanitarian law continue to be violated with impunity. The bleak outlook requires us to redouble our efforts. The Security Council must remain united in its responsibility to protect the Syrian population by promoting all actions conducive to ensuring the full and immediate implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). The responsibility to act is clearly greater for the countries with the greatest capacity for influence in the field, in particular the guarantors of the de-escalation zones agreed in Astana. The situation is particularly serious in eastern Ghouta, where, among other emergencies, more than 1,000 people need to be evacuated for medical reasons. It is also serious in Idlib, Afrin, Rukban and Raqqa, among other places. We need to remember that the ceasefire must cover the entire Syrian territory and allow humanitarian assistance in a sustained, safe and unhindered way. The Syrian Government must comply with the ceasefire immediately and fulfil its responsibility to protect the population and its obligation to cooperate with the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). The fight against terrorism cannot be used as an excuse to violate human rights and international humanitarian law. Peru supports the proposal of Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura to promote dialogue with the opposition groups that have expressed their willingness to comply with the ceasefire and to expel members of terrorist organizations linked to the Al-Nusra Front from eastern Ghouta. Peru remains committed to achieving a political solution to the conflict that ends the ongoing humanitarian disaster, ensures accountability for the atrocious crimes committed in that country, including the use of chemical weapons, supports regional stability and achieves sustainable peace in Syria. We would like to conclude by expressing our support for the Secretary-General in his call for the immediate implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) and for his tireless efforts and those of his team on the ground. We also wish to highlight the professionalism, the courage and the sense of duty of the United Nations humanitarian personnel and of the humanitarian agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, among others deployed in Syria. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): At the outset, I would like to express my gratitude to Secretary-General António Guterres for his informative briefing. I also thank him for his leadership and all his support, in particular his tremendous efforts, as well as those of his Special Envoy, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, and of the entire United Nations team, to achieve the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) and a definitive resolution of the Syrian conflict. Today's meeting should be another milestone in the international response to the humanitarian crisis prevailing in Syria. However, unfortunately, that is not the case. As the Secretary-General underscored in his briefing, in recent weeks, the parties involved at all levels have intensified their fighting in eastern Ghouta despite the humanitarian ceasefire agreed through the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) exactly 16 days ago. Nevertheless, we welcome with satisfaction reports that the United Nations and Syrian Arab Red Crescent convoy was finally able to reach eastern Ghouta last Friday to complete the delivery of food that could not be unloaded on 5 March for security reasons. However, the delivery of all necessary humanitarian supplies, including the medical and health-care supplies that were seized in the first attempt by convoys to the besieged areas, continues to be urgent and must be carried out without delay. We also welcome the news that the Secretary- General has just provided to us with regard to some improvements in the situation on the ground in eastern Ghouta. We hope that today's meeting will lead to greater improvement or a definitive resolution of the situation in that part of Syria. 12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201 18-06756 17/23 We read the letter dated 9 March that the co-penholders — France, the United Kingdom and the United States — addressed to the Secretary-General and the Council. We have also read very carefully the many letters that the Syrian Government has addressed to the members of the Security Council through its Permanent Representative. Basically, we note in those letters the repeated mutual accusations that have been a characteristic of this long conflict since its beginning. We are talking about a 30-day ceasefire, and time is gradually running out. We have had enough of mutual recrimination. The only collective task that we should focus on is finding a coherent peace mechanism to stop this endless and heinous war. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea remains deeply concerned about the developments in the situation in Syria. We reiterate the urgent need for Council members who have influence over the national parties to the conflict to redouble their diplomatic initiatives with a view to reaching a common understanding on how to find a political solution to the tragic crisis in Syria, the effects of which are a threat to the region and the international community, in particular because of the humanitarian implications posed by the millions of Syrians who are currently being displaced within the country or seeking asylum and because of the security risks caused by the expansion of Da'esh, the Al-Nusra Front and other terrorist entities. We also express our deep indignation at the continuing fighting in the province of Idlib, which, for seven consecutive days, has been subject to attacks and rocket fire from Islamic factions in areas of the cities of Kafraya and Fo'ah. Those events, like many others, demonstrate the need for a common front that will expel from Syria the Islamic State, Al-Qaida, the Al-Nusra Front and all other associated entities that threaten peace and security in the region. In conclusion, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea calls on the guarantors of the Astana process — Russia, Iran and Turkey — to ensure that the rounds of negotiations to be held on 15 and 16 March — to which the Special Envoy of the United Nations for Syria, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, was invited — serve not only to plan future actions and strategies, but also to give genuine impetus to finding a solution to the Syrian crisis once and for all. During my statement after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), I said that we had partially spared ourselves from embarrassment (see S/PV.8188). However, since 16 days have passed since the adoption of the resolution without it being implemented. I think we remain completely shamed. Ms. Wronecka (Poland): Let me thank the SecretaryGeneral for his comprehensive, but again very worrying and alarming, update. Like many around this table, we share a sense of urgency, especially following the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). We also see how difficult it is to implement resolution 2401 (2018) on the ground. Small steps, such as sending an aid convoy to eastern Ghouta last Monday, are still mere drops in the ocean of people's needs. Even with a unanimously adopted resolution, we are still lacking any substantial change on the ground and the fighting is far from being over. We therefore call for the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). We understand that the solution is not entirely in our hands, but still we should try to do our utmost to find possible ways to ensure that the life-saving aid convoys might reach those in need and medical evacuations might begin. Unfortunately, the situation in eastern Ghouta, but also in Idlib and Aleppo provinces, does not allow the suffering of ordinary Syrians to be alleviated. Let me once again stress our full support for the Secretary-General, as well as his Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura, in finding a political solution to the Syrian crisis. A political solution to the conflict remains the only viable way to end the suffering of Syrian people. Let me also underline that the role of the Security Council remains crucial, but it is up to the Syrian people to decide their own future. We agree that fighting against terrorist groups designated as such by the Security Council is crucial, but, at the same time, such designations cannot justify the attacks on innocent civilians and civilian infrastructure, including health facilities. Those attacks must stop and parties to the conflict must strictly comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law. In that context, let me once again strongly underline that any response to violence should be proportionate. We need full compliance with the ceasefire agreed in resolution 2401 (2018). The Russian proposal for a daily five-hour pause is simply not enough to allow humanitarian workers to deliver aid and to evacuate those who cannot be treated on the ground. The international community, and especially the Council, S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018 18/23 18-06756 bear a huge responsibility to protect civilians. Allow me to share a couple of concrete ideas, which I hope will be useful, on how to improve the situation on the ground. As the Security Council, we should demand United Nations access in order to monitor designated de-escalation zones to ensure the well-being of civilians. All States Members of the United Nations should fully cooperate with the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism set up last year and facilitate its work. Parties engaged in the conflict must cease enabling the crimes on the ground and withhold all their support to armed groups that target civilians. Parties conducting air strikes against terrorist groups must ensure that all necessary precautionary measures are taken into consideration in order to avoid civilian casualties and that all military operations are fully consistent with international law. All potential violations, including possible war crimes, must be investigated, and the perpetrators must be held accountable. In conclusion, let me underline that, from our perspective, we in New York sometimes lack feedback on our actions. With regard to actions taken at Headquarters, it is for the Syrian people themselves to tell us what would be the most effective way to support them. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): My delegation thanks the Secretary-General for his briefing on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), on the humanitarian situation in Syria. Two weeks after its unanimous adoption by members of the Security Council, resolution 2401 (2018), which had inspired a great deal of hope, has not been implemented as planned, much to our regret. The requirement of an immediate cessation of hostilities for a period of at least 30 days, provided for by resolution 2401 (2018), to enable the safe and unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid and services and medical evacuation of the critically sick and wounded, in accordance with applicable international humanitarian law, has not yet gone into effect. The humanitarian and security situation remains worrisome because it is impossible for humanitarian convoys that endure indiscriminate attacks and bombings perpetrated by various hostile groups to reach besieged areas. In addition, attacks are carried out against medical and humanitarian personnel and health-care infrastructure. According to the World Health Organization, such attacks are on the rise. The deterioration of the humanitarian situation within Syria's borders due to increased fighting makes for dangerous living conditions for thousands of internally displaced persons and obliterates the hope of restoring security and dignity to millions of refugees in neighbouring countries living in extremely difficult conditions. Given the dire situation, Côte d'Ivoire hopes that the second international conference on supporting the future of Syria and the region, to be held in Brussels on 24 and 25 April at the initiative of the European Union, will result in pledges of increased humanitarian aid and development support. In accordance with the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018), Côte d'Ivoire again calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities in order to enable the safe, sustained and unimpeded access of humanitarian convoys delivering basic necessities to hundreds of people in dire need in eastern Ghouta and other areas of the country. My delegation welcomes reports that, for a few days, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent was able once again to enter the city of Douma in eastern Ghouta to deliver the aid necessary, including food and non-food items. My delegation encourages all Syrian stakeholders to create conditions that would allow the United Nations to make scheduled deliveries in eastern Ghouta, throughout the entire country and on Syrian borders. Côte d'Ivoire reiterates its belief that the humanitarian situation will not improve without significant progress on the political landscape because the two issues are inextricably linked. Therefore, it invites hostile groups and all stakeholders to engage in political dialogue in order to achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis in Syria. In that regard, it welcomes the holding of a meeting in Geneva between the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Syria, Mr. De Mistura, and the three Astana guarantors — Iran, the Russian Federation and Turkey — with a view to relaunching the Syrian political process. The delegation of Côte d'Ivoire hopes that the next meeting to be held in Astana, at the initiative of the three guarantors of the Astana process, will enable us to reach a lasting ceasefire in Syria and to calmly resume the intra-Syrian peace talks pursuant to resolution 2254 (2015). 12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201 18-06756 19/23 Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): My delegation would like to thank the Secretary-General for his briefing on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). Once again we take this opportunity to pay tribute to humanitarian workers who risk their lives daily as they carry out their duties. We join other colleagues in congratulating the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Syria, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, on his efforts to find a political solution to the serious situation in Syria, which, as the Secretary-General recalled, is in its eighth year. Bolivia deplores the challenges to the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) that the Secretary-General outlined in his briefing today. We condemn all deliberate attacks on civilians and demand respect for international humanitarian law and international human rights law. We call on the parties involved to focus primarily on protecting hospitals, medical facilities, schools and civilian residences, and the personnel of the various agencies and humanitarian assistance organizations whose employees put their own lives at risk as they carry out their work on the ground. We call on the parties to cooperate and enhance coordination efforts with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, provide unhindered humanitarian access and allow urgent medical evacuations to be carried out, in particular in besieged and hard-to-reach areas. We call upon the parties to work together to achieve the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) throughout Syria as soon as possible and in accordance with agreements reached in the Astana process and on the de-escalation zones. We underscore the importance of unity within the Security Council when implementing resolution 2401 (2018). Such unity must be present if our goal is to fully implement it. We also call on the members of the Council and all parties involved to depoliticize the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and ensure that its actions are in line with international law. We highlight a few forums for dialogue that could assist with reaching consensus on a definitive cessation of hostilities, such as the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi, whose outcome is geared towards strengthening the political process in Geneva. We hope that that forum will allow for the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) as soon as possible. In conclusion, we reiterate that there is no military solution to the crisis. The only solution is through an inclusive political dialogue ordered and led by and for the Syrian people. We extend our best hopes for the outcome of the next meeting to be held in Astana. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We thank the Secretary- General for his comprehensive, up-to-date and very useful briefing on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). Two weeks after the adoption of that resolution, the humanitarian situation in Syria continues to cause serious concern. The United Nations and its humanitarian partners have failed to ensure safe, sufficient, unimpeded and sustained humanitarian access for populations in need of life-saving assistance due ongoing fighting, in particular in eastern Ghouta. Nonetheless, we are mindful of the fact that resolution 2401 (2018) applies to all parts of Syria. We note that the Secretary-General did not overlook that aspect of the resolution in his briefing. We had all emphasized the importance of the effective implementation of the resolution in order to make positive changes on the ground and alleviate the humanitarian tragedy in Syria. Given the increasingly complex situation on the ground, we knew that it would not be an easy task. After the Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018), we recognized that the United Nations and its humanitarian partners could deliver aid to eastern Ghouta and other affected areas. No doubt, there remain serious challenges to ensuring the full implementation of the resolution. Although it demands the cessation of hostilities without delay for at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria, with the immediate engagement of all parties to ensure safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and medical evacuations, there have been ongoing military activities resulting in civilian casualties and the destruction of civilian facilities. Here, one should also not overlook the damage being caused by the shelling of Damascus. Therefore, it is clear that much more remains to be done and all parties should be committed to the full implementation of the resolution. As the United Nations and its humanitarian partners are ready to deliver more aid to all Syrians throughout the country, it is absolutely critical that all the parties provide them safe, unfettered and sustained humanitarian access. In that regard, all those who have influence over the parties S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018 20/23 18-06756 should exert the necessary pressure to contribute to saving lives. It is also imperative to use all existing arrangements to facilitate the implementation of the resolution, particularly the cessation of hostilities. In that connection, we look forward to the Astana meeting, scheduled to take place on 15 and 16 March, which we hope will contribute to the full implementation of the resolution. Finally, as the Secretary-General stated, we are entering into the eighth year since the start of the Syrian crisis. While we look forward to seeing the Syrian people, as a sovereign State, find a comprehensive political solution based on resolution 2254 (2015), the Council also has a responsibility and an indispensable role in resolving the Syrian crisis. Therefore, we hope that the spirit of cooperation and consensus that the Council demonstrated during the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) will be sustained not only to respond to the humanitarian tragedy, but also to ensure progress in the political track with a view to finding a lasting solution to the crisis. Most importantly, the cooperation of relevant countries that have influence is key. Without those countries, there will be no solution in sight. The President: I will now make a statement in my capacity as representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. I would like to thank Secretary-General Guterres for his briefing. Through him, I would also like to thank all United Nations and other humanitarian personnel on the ground. They work under extreme circumstances. Sixteen days ago (see S/PV.8188), the Security Council showed a rare example of unity regarding Syria when it adopted resolution 2401 (2018) . I recall the glimmer of hope that day in the Chamber. All of us agreed that all parties to the Syrian conflict must cease hostilities in order to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the evacuation of the critically sick and wounded. Yet one day after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), the Syrian regime, supported by Russia and Iran, launched a most violent ground offensive to conquer the enclave of eastern Ghouta. That offensive came on top of a relentless air campaign that had started one month ago. Resolution 2401 (2018) calls for a cessation of hostilities, without delay. Unfortunately, it is the military offensive that continues without delay. Elsewhere in Syria, including in Idlib and Afrin, violence continues to threaten the civilian population as well. The Council must do everything in its power to advance the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). In that regard, I would like to stress the importance of humanitarian aid, the monitoring of the cessation of hostilities and accountability. With regard to my first point, the immediate delivery of humanitarian aid, last week we were deeply shocked to hear reports that medical supplies, including surgical supplies, insulin and even trauma kits, had been removed from convoys by the Syrian regime. Medical supplies save lives and provide relief to the inhumane suffering that too many Syrians are going through. Medical supplies cannot be used as weapons by terrorists. There is no justification for denying medicine and medical supplies to the wounded and sick. The first humanitarian convoy that received authorization from the Syrian regime to deliver aid to eastern Ghouta was not able to fully unload because of resumed fighting. The convoy that arrived last Friday was finally able to deliver aid, including medical supplies, for 27,500 people. However, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is still waiting for authorization to complete the delivery to Douma for all 70,000 people, as initially approved by the Syrian authorities. We call on all parties to immediately allow sustained and unimpeded access to deliver supplies to people in desperate need of humanitarian assistance. That applies to eastern Ghouta and to all in need throughout the country. On my second point, the cessation of hostilities and the need for monitoring, resolution 2401 (2018) calls for an immediate nationwide cessation of hostilities. A strong monitoring mechanism is needed urgently in order to ensure implementation. We agree with the French proposal in that regard. Since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), air strikes have continued, even increased, especially on eastern Ghouta. We hear the Russian Federation say that those strikes are targeted at terrorists. However, we underline once more that the exemption to the ceasefire for attacks directed at United Nations-listed terrorist groups does not provide an excuse to ignore the basic principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution. According to the latest report of the Commission of Inquiry, the siege of eastern Ghouta continues to be characterized by the use of prohibited weapons and attacks against civilian and protected objects, which we condemn in the strongest terms. 12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201 18-06756 21/23 We also condemn the shelling of Damascus from eastern Ghouta. We call upon all parties to abide by their obligations under international humanitarian law at all times. Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura should facilitate negotiations between armed opposition groups, the Syrian regime and Russia in order to advance the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). One concrete and helpful step is to evacuate United Nations-listed terrorist groups from eastern Ghouta. A first evacuation of 13 imprisoned terrorist fighters reportedly took place last Friday. It is crucial that any evacuation of armed fighters take place in a safe and orderly fashion. We call on the United Nations to prepare for putting in place the necessary monitoring mechanisms in that regard. We call on Russia to accept the offer of the Special Envoy to facilitate further evacuation of United Nations-listed terrorist groups from eastern Ghouta. Civilians should never be forced to leave against their will. Forced displacement may constitute a war crime. On my third point, the credibility and accountability of the Council, despite the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) we have seen no cessation of hostilities. We have seen no significant improvement in the humanitarian situation on the ground in Syria. This also has a negative impact on the credibility of the Council. It is vital for the functioning of the rules-based international order that decisions of the Council be respected and implemented. As a Council, we have a collective responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. However, we should not forget that the responsibility and, indeed, the obligation to execute its decisions lies with individual Member States. The human suffering in Syria, especially in eastern Ghouta, must end now. We need a full cessation of hostilities in all of Syria, including eastern Ghouta, Idlib and Afrin. And we call on the Russian Federation in particular to use its influence and to do its utmost to achieve that, thereby also upholding the Council's credibility. In conclusion, the siege of eastern Ghouta is entering its fifth year. The war in Syria will enter its eighth year later this week, on 15 March, as others have noted. One wonders how the Syrian regime thinks to ever achieve the legitimacy to govern the people it now pounds into submission or death. As the High Commissioner for Human Rights stated during the thirty-seventh session of the Human Rights Council, "what we are seeing in eastern Ghouta are likely war crimes and potentially crimes against humanity". The perpetrators of these crimes must know they are being identified, that dossiers are being built up with a view to their prosecution, and that they will be held accountable for what they have done. We thank the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic for its important work to date. We recall the resolution of the Human Rights Council of 5 March, which calls on the Commission to investigate the situation in eastern Ghouta. We call on all Council members to support the referral of the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria to the International Criminal Court. We also urge all States to increase their support for the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for the Syrian Arab Republic. For now, however, our common efforts should be directed at securing immediate relief for those millions in Syria in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. For that, we need the cessation of hostilities to be implemented immediately and in a sustained manner. We need a continuous pause in the fighting of 30 days, as demanded by resolution 2401 (2018). If its implementation continues to fail, that will require a response from the Council that goes beyond where we stand now. We thank the Secretary-General for his perseverance and endless efforts to uphold the norms and values of the Charter of the United Nations, international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as well as to promote compliance with resolution 2401 (2018). We call on all Council members to follow his example. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I wish to again remind all speakers to limit their statements to no more than five minutes in order to enable the Council to carry out its work expeditiously. I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): I will not begin by commenting on the procedural point that you have raised, Mr. President, but rather I will focus on the essential issues that S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018 22/23 18-06756 are supposed to be of interest to the members of the Security Council. I welcome the Secretary-General and note the statement at the outset of his briefing that the Secretariat does not have all the necessary information to carefully access the situation on the ground because the United Nations does not have a presence in all areas. The Secretariat humbly and politely said those words, noting that it does not have full, relevant information pertaining to the Syrian situation, although the United Nations has a branch of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Damascus and there are dozens of United Nations agencies operating in Syria, in addition to 13 international non-governmental organizations also operating there. However, some of our colleagues in the Security Council, who have shut down their embassies in Damascus and are now completely disconnected from credible information, instead rely on information from what is known as open sources. They have provided a vast amount of information that would never serve the interests of the Syrian people or of those present in such an important and significant discussion. That information is misleading and could poison the atmosphere and fuel sedition regarding the role of the Security Council, which is mandated to maintain international peace and security. The Syrian Government stands ready to engage seriously with positive international initiatives that serve the interests of the Syrian people, especially in ending the bloodshed throughout Syria, as stated in resolution 2401 (2018). My country has expressed its satisfaction with resolution 2401 (2018), particularly the positive provisions contained therein. In that regard, my country confirms that it has taken all the following procedures to relieve the suffering of our people in eastern Ghouta. First, immediately after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), hostilities were ceased on a daily basis from 9 a.m. until 2 p.m, Damascus local time, and remain so to this very moment, with the aim of delivering humanitarian aid and ensuring the unimpeded and safe exit of civilians from the areas controlled by terrorist groups. Secondly, two safe humanitarian corridors have been opened for civilians wishing to exit the area. Thirdly, two joint United Nations-International Committee of the Red Cross convoys, in collaboration with the Syrian Red Crescent, were sent to eastern Ghouta on 5 and 9 March. Notwithstanding the foregoing, all those procedures have been countered by the terror of armed organizations present in Ghouta. Incited by their masters — some of them, unfortunately, members of the Security Council — these organizations have targeted civilians in Damascus since the beginning of the year, firing more than 2,499 missiles and mortars that have claimed the lives of 70 civilian martyrs and injured 556 people. Those organizations have prevented our people in eastern Ghouta from leaving in order to continue to use them as human shields and material for humanitarian and media blackmail. They have even targeted those who managed to escape towards the two corridors by firing bullets and missiles. The latest incident in Syria occurred on 8 March, when the so-called Faylaq Al-Rahman — one of the terrorist arms of the petty State of Qatar in Syria — targeted a civilian convoy heading towards one of the corridors, leading to high casualties among civilians. By the way, that terrorist organization, Faylaq Al-Rahman, has been hailed by some of those present because of its readiness to implement resolution 2401 (2018). They presented it as a part of the moderate Syrian opposition, and distributed a letter signed by that and other terrorist organizations, addressed to the Secretary-General. That is the modus operandi of the Security Council with terrorist groups. The procedures taken by the Syrian Government are not limited to eastern Ghouta. Over the past few days, the Government has undertaken a number of other procedures. First, we have requested that the United Nations and a number of humanitarian organizations immediately send a mission to investigate the humanitarian situation in Raqqa, which was destroyed by the International Coalition led by the United States of America. Secondly, we have requested approval to send humanitarian convoys to the Rukban camp, provided that the aid is delivered and distributed by the Syrian Red Crescent and the Red Cross exclusively, and not by the United States occupation authorities or the terrorist groups in Rukban camp and Tanaf area. Thirdly, two days ago the Syrian Red Crescent obtained Government approval to send convoys to Ghouta, Raqqa, Afrin and Rukban. To date, it has not sent the convoys to Rukban and Afrin because the United Nations failed to ensure the necessary safeguards from the United States and Turkish occupation forces. That is the reason. 12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201 18-06756 23/23 With every advance by the Syrian Army against terrorist groups in any given area, the States sponsoring terrorism launch heated disinformation campaigns to distract the world from the terrorism, aggression and occupation against Syria. The inference is that those countries have never been keen to protec the lives of civilians, but prefer to protect their investments in terrorism after they have spent billions of dollars on it, as was said by the previous Prime Minister of Qatar, in order to recycle terrorism elsewhere in Syria. The behaviour that I have mentioned is not limited to State-sponsored terrorism, unfortunately. It has even been demonstrated by some senior officials of the Secretariat. We had hoped that the Secretariat, especially in the light of the second preambular paragraph of resolution 2401 (2018), would provide an unequivocal legal description of the crimes committed by the so-called International Coalition led by the United States against our Syrian people in Raqqa and other places, and the procedures to ensure the end of that aggression. We had also hoped that the Secretariat would provide us with an unequivocal legal description of the acts of invasion by Turkish forces of a precious part of our national territory, especially against our civilian people in Afrin, and the procedures to ensure the end of the Turkish aggression. We had also hoped for an unequivocal legal description of the presence of the United States forces on Syrian territory without the approval of the Syrian Government and the procedures to ensure the end of that occupation. The government of my country affirms its right to defend its citizens and combat terrorism in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions, especially the second preambular paragraph of resolution 2401 (2018); fight all those who practice, fund and support terrorism; work towards restoring security stability and peace; and rebuild all that has been destroyed by terrorists and their masters. Finally, I have listened to my colleague the representative of the United States, who levels charges again and again against my country before all who are present and says that her country will take military actions against my country outside the legitimacy of the Council if chemical substances are used, just as its administration in Washington, D.C., did when it bombarded Al-Shayrat air base in my country last year. These irresponsible and provocative statements, which run counter to the Charter of the United Nations, are direct incitement to terrorist groups to use chemical weapons and fabricate anew all the evidence needed to accuse the Syrian Army, as they have done in previous times. I remind the representative of the United States that the former Joint Investigative Mechanism refused to take samples from Al-Shayrat air base because if it had done so it would have been categorically proved that the Syrian Government is not responsible for the incident in Khan Shaykhun. In fact, what the United States perpetrated against that Syrian air base was a full-fledged aggression. I call on the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France to put an end to their violations of Security Council resolutions related to fighting terrorism, and on their Governments to stop supporting the terrorist groups in my country and cease providing them with a political umbrella to pursue their crimes against the Syrian people. It is high time that the United States Administration learn from its mistakes and stop repeating them. Is it not enough what they have done in Viet Nam, Iraq, Libya, Somalia and Yemen, invoking very cheap lies that have already been condemned and denounced by international public opinion? In this regard, I recall the words of Naguib Mahfouz, the Nobel laureate: "They are liars, they know they are liars, and they know that we know that they are liars. However, they still lie, and very loudly so." In conclusion, the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic issued a statement a few minutes ago that street battles have begun in Ghouta, following the demands for the separation of the aforementioned Faylaq Al-Rahman and Jabhat Al-Nusra. This current street fighting impedes the evacuation of civilians who are forced to find safe haven underground in Ghouta. The President: There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.
