Suchergebnisse

On March 8, a Manhattan federal court found Juan Orlando Hernández, president of Honduras from 2014 to 2022, guilty of conspiracy to import large amounts of cocaine into the United States over nearly two decades. Mainstream U.S. media generally framed the ex-president's trial and conviction as a triumph of justice, a service rendered by the impartial U.S. justice system to the people of Honduras.The great majority of such accounts, however, ignored and obscured context crucial for understanding Hernández's rise and rule; in particular, how Washington contributed to both. Though the mainstream narrative around the ex-president rightly connects his tenure in office with massive emigration from Honduras, it has elided the degree to which U.S. influence enabled Hernández's career and thus partially drove the migration that arose in response. For roughly two centuries, Honduras, the original "banana republic," has suffered a deeply unequal relationship with the far more powerful United States. One of the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere, Honduras and its people have endured frequent American military interventions, U.S.-backed coups, and a corrupt, rapacious local oligarchy closely tied to U.S. corporate interests.Despite Hernández's ultimate conviction on U.S. soil, he served Washington for many years as a loyal client. The single most important event in the ex-president's political career was a 2009 coup, which overthrew center-left president Manuel Zelaya (whose wife, Xiomara Castro, won election in 2021 and currently occupies the presidency). Zelaya raised the minimum wage, subsidized small farmers, and authorized the morning-after pill, infuriating the country's business elite and, in the last case, ultra-conservative religious leaders. Moreover, to Washington's consternation, he made overtures toward Hugo Chavez's socialist Venezuela and sought to convert a crucial U.S. airbase entirely to civilian use.Joint action by Honduras' military and judiciary — in a manner the U.S. ambassador called "clearly illegal" and "totally illegitimate" at the time — forced Zelaya to pay for these sins in late June 2009. While the White House's reaction to the coup initially appeared confused, Washington soon recovered its footing. Even as huge protests raged, the Obama administration played a key role in ultimately compelling Honduras' people and the region's governments to acquiesce to the regime change as a fait accompli. Despite widespread repression by the post-coup de facto government, accounts of fraud, and the condemnation of many countries and international organizations (including the normally deferential Organization of American States), U.S.-endorsed elections in November 2009 received Washington's imprimatur. In her memoirs (the passage excised from the book's paperback edition with no explanation), then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton explained that the U.S. sought to "render the question of Zelaya moot and give the Honduran people a chance to choose their own future."It was in this context that Hernández catapulted into power. After Porfirio Lobo won the 2009 presidential race, Hernández became President of the National Congress as a member of Lobo's National Party — an institution historically closely linked to U.S. agribusiness. Lobo was Hernández's mentor and groomed his protege to succeed him. But while Hernández enjoyed success, the coup's consequences constituted disaster for ordinary Hondurans.Political violence and repression became routine. The murder rate, much of it due to cartel-related gang violence, soared — it was the world's highest for three years running. As the economic situation also deteriorated, and Lobo and his son allied with major narcotics syndicates, a huge surge of emigration swelled out of Honduras, with desperate citizens flooding northward. The total number of Hondurans apprehended at the U.S. border exploded — from less than 25,000 in 2009 to nearly 100,000 in 2014 — reaching 250,000 by 2020. In Washington's eyes, however, such concerns took a back seat to longstanding strategic needs: above all, Honduras' openness to foreign investment and its role as a base for American military power. And, as head of the National Congress, Hernandez was seen as particularly amenable to U.S. desires. "The State Department loved Hernandez," according to Dana Frank, an expert on Honduras at UC Santa Cruz. As Lobo's heir apparent, "he was young and could stay in power for a long time." Frank cites a 2010 cable from the U.S. embassy in Tegucigalpa asserting that "He has consistently supported U.S. interests."The depth of American support for Hernández became clear after his 2013 election to the presidency. Despite credible reports of fraud, his National Party's control over the counting process, and a wave of threats and sometimes lethal violence against opposition candidates and activists during the campaign, the State Department commended the election as "transparent, free, and fair." In 2015, a major corruption scandal centered on the misappropriation of funds from Honduras' Social Security Institute exploded, prompting unprecedented popular demonstrations against Hernandez and calling for his resignation, "There was a real sense that Hernández could fall," according to Alexander Main, a Latin America expert at the Washington-based Center for Economic and Policy Research. Fortunately for Hernández, however, the U.S. swooped in, helping to defuse the unrest by prodding the OAS to organize a local anti-corruption body known as MACCIH. In that same year, according to Frank, Washington gave an "official green light" to a "completely criminal" power grab by Hernández whereby his hand-picked Supreme Court ruled that he was eligible to run for a second term in clear violation of Honduras' constitution. Washington's complacent reaction — "It is up to the Honduran people to determine their political future" — stood in remarkable contrast to 2009, when Zelaya's mere suggestion that the constitution might be amended to permit a second term served as the pretext for the coup that the U.S. subsequently legitimized. In Hernández's 2017 reelection bid, the fraud was so blatant and widespread that even the generally conservative OAS declared the incumbent's victory an example of "extreme statistical improbability" and called for new elections. The State Department, however, stood by Hernández, prodding Mexico and other OAS members to recognize the results, even as security forces suppressed massive and prolonged protests with live ammunition.Indeed, U.S. training and funding also proved crucial in the creation of the brutal special operations units Hernández's government used to terrorize opposition and environmental activists. Particularly significant in the military sphere was the role of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the American combatant command responsible for Latin America. Hernández was a particular favorite of John Kelly, SOUTHCOM's head during Obama's second term (and then White House chief of staff for Donald Trump), who, as Dana Frank noted, once referred to the convicted drug trafficker as a "great guy" and "good friend."Considering the U.S. relationship with Hernández, it is perhaps unsurprising that U.S. officials seemingly turned a blind eye to his deep involvement in narcotics trafficking. As both Hernández's recent trial — during which a witness claimed Hernandez had privately vowed to "stuff drugs up the noses of the gringos" — and that of his brother in 2019 showed, the drug trade's reach into the Honduran government was unmistakable, with numerous high-ranking security officials repeatedly implicated. CEPR's Main argues that it was "highly unlikely American officials were unaware" of Hernández's criminality. Indeed, as a document from his brother's trial revealed, the DEA began investigating the ex-president as early as 2013. As noted in Hernández's trial, just weeks after his inauguration in 2014, the agency reportedly obtained video evidence indicating his involvement with major drug traffickers. Even after his brother's 2019 conviction, when it became apparent that millions of dollars in drug money helped underwrite Hernández's political career, President Donald Trump publicly praised him for "working with the United States very closely" and for his help in "stopping drugs at a level that has never happened."Given all this, the U.S. media's failure to probe the influence of American policy on Hernández's career begins to look less like an anomalous oversight and more like a manifestation of structural dynamics that tend to reinforce the notion of American innocence. We can see the same logic apply to the frenzied media accounts detailing "caravans" of Central American migrants headed to the U.S. While mainstream news outlets rightly note the relationship between Hernández's presidency and increased migration from Honduras, they nevertheless fail to connect the two to the impact of U.S. policymaking. Without Washington's complicity and assistance, Hernandez might have spent 2014 to 2022 in prison, rather than the presidency. Unfortunately, it was the Honduran people who paid the price.

У представленій статті охарактеризовано специфіку функціонування політичної опозиції в площині політичної системи сучасної Росії. Унікальність політичного життя визначає наявність політичної опозиції як один із механізмів забезпечення ефективності політичних інституцій всередині будь-якої держави. Можливість критично висловлювати думки на адресу політичних сил що мають законно визнане право на політичну владу в соціумі, це одна з ознак демократичного політичного режиму. Проте останнім часом у політичній системі деяких країн, які позиціонують себе як країни демократії, можна спостерігати за утисканням опозиційних сил або ж створення «керованих» чи «протоопозицій». На нашу думку, одним із прикладів діяльності такого виду опозиції є російська.Встановлено, що існуюча політична опозиція, яка діє в Росії, не є достатньо ефективною, через її сегментарність, внутрішні конфлікти і головне відсутність серед лідерів опозиції консолідуючої мети. Як наслідок, партія влади «Єдина Росія» та визнаний більшістю росіян політичний лідер – Президент РФ В. Путін застосовує всі методи протидії опозиції, зводячи нанівець протестні дії опозиціонерів. У статті виявлено, що сучасно політична опозиція має декілька груп серед яких виділяються «стара» частина так звана пострадянська представлена Г. Зюгановим, В. Жириновським тощо. Тобто ті постаті, які скоріше грають роль опозиції за правилами, які визначає партія влади. Молоде крило опозиціонерів, в якому постійно відбувається суперництво серед лідерів за право очолити рух і мати підтримку більшості електорату. Важливо розуміти, що окремо в опозиції Росії представлені ультраправі та радикальні течії, які позиціонують себе як об'єднувачі земель в єдину «Велику Русь». Але простежуючи організовані і проведені акції непокори з боку опозиційних сил, чітко простежується їх неефективність, діюча при владі політична еліта завжди на крок попереду, навіть коли застосовує силові методи для протидії мирним зібранням. Більш того, політична опозиція неготова до реального приходу до влади, це чітко видно через відсутність конкретних програм економічного реформування Росії виходячи не із закордонного досвіду, а із вітчизняної специфіки. Політичні акції у вигляді проведення проекту «Відкрита Росія» ще раз довели той факт, що опозиція відірвана від потреб потенційного електорату, якому виявилися необхідними не лише нові обличчя при владі, але й гарантії, що ці нові обличчя будуть здатні покращити соціально-економічне життя пересічного росіянина байдуже в якій частині Росії він мешкає. Доведено, що політична опозиція не враховує ментальність росіян, їх потяг не до м'якої демократії, а до лідера-господаря, захисника Вітчизни від зовнішньої загрози. У свою чергу правляча еліта і її лідер вдало й ефективно реалізують цей імідж на практиці і, незважаючи на погіршення економічних показників, утримують підтримку серед населення. Таким чином, російська політична опозиція є незрілою і переважно керованою з боку діючої влади. ; The peculiarities of functioning of opposition parties and movements in the sphere of modern Russian political system have been characterized in the submitted paper. The uniqueness of political life determines the presence of political opposition as one of the facilitating mechanism of political institutеs' effectiveness within the state. The ability to express critical thoughts about political forces, political actors who have received the legal right of political power in society is one of the attributes of democratic political regime. Nevertheless, recently in the political system of some countries which position themselves as democratic countries, one can observe the oppression of opposition forces or creation of «managed» or «proto-oppositions». According to our opinion, one of such countries is Russia.It has been established that the existing political opposition is not sufficiently effective in its actions, due to its segmentation, internal conflicts and general absence of unity among the opposition leaders in aims and means of achieving them. Consequently, the party of power «United Russia» which political leader is recognized by the majority of Russians - the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin, applies all methods of opposition resistance, negating the protest actions of the opposition parties. It has been shown in the article that the modern political opposition has several groups, among which outstands the «old» part, so-called post-Soviet opposition, represented by G. Zyuganov, V. Zhirinovsky and others. They are political figures who rather play the role of the opposition and act clearly according to the rules that are determined by the party of power. The young generation of the opposition is characterized by constant rivalry among the leaders for the right to lead the movement and to have the support of the majority of the electorate. It is important to understand that the ultra-right and radical groups are represented separately in the opposition of Russia, they position themselves as unifiers of the lands in a single «Great Rus».Studying organized and conducted protest movements, which had been organized by opposition forces, one can see their inefficiency. As a result, the powerful political elite is always one-step ahead, even when applying methods of force counter to the peaceful assembly. Moreover, the political opposition is not ready for real rising to power, it is clearly seen because of the absence of specific programs for Russia's economic reforms. Also it is based not on foreign experience, but on native specifics. Political actions in the form of the «Open Russia» project have proved once again the fact that the opposition is separated from the needs of potential electorate. Not only new people in power are needed, but also guarantees are needed that these new people will be able to improve the socio-economic life of the ordinary Russians regardless of region of Russia where he\she lives.It has been proven that the political opposition does not take into account the mentality of Russians, their aspiration not to the mild model of Western democracy but to the host leader, the defender of the Motherland from external threat. Whereas, the ruling elite and its leader successfully and effectively implement this image in practice, and despite the deterioration of economic indicators, they get the support among the population. Consequently, the political opposition of Russia is immature and primary controlled by the current government. ; В представленной статье охарактеризована специфика функционирования политических оппозиционных партий и движений в плоскости политической системы современной России. Уникальность политической жизни определяет наличие политической оппозиции как одного из механизмов обеспечения эффективности политических институций внутри государства. Возможность критически высказывать мысли в адрес политических сил, политических акторов, которые получили законно признанное право на политическую власть в социуме - это один из признаков демократического политического режима. Тем не менее, в последнее время в политической системе некоторых стран которые позиционируют себя как страны демократии, можно наблюдать за притеснением оппозиционных сил или же созданием «управляемых» или «протооппозиций». По нашему мнению, одним из примеров деятельности такого вида оппозиции является действующая в России.Установлено, что существующая политическая оппозиция в своих действиях не является достаточно эффективной, через ее сегментированность, внутренние конфликты и главное - отсутствие среди лидеров оппозиции единства в целях и средствах их достижения. Как следствие, партия власти «Единая Россия» и признанный большинством россиян политический лидер - Президент РФ В. Путин применяет все методы противодействия оппозиции, сводя на нет протестные действия оппозиционеров. В статье показано, что современная политическая оппозиция имеет несколько групп, среди которых выделяются «старая» часть так называемая постсоветская оппозиция, представленная Г. Зюгановым, В. Жириновским и другими. Это те политические фигуры, которые скорее играют роль оппозиции и действуют четко по правилам, которые определяет партия власти. Молодое крыло оппозиционеров, в котором постоянно происходит соперничество среди лидеров за право возглавить движение и иметь поддержку большинства электората. Важно понимать, что отдельно в оппозиции России представлены ультраправые и радикальные течения, которые позиционируют себя как объединители земель в единую «Великую Русь».Прослеживая организованные и проведенные акции протестов оппозиционными силами, видна их неэффективность. Как результат, действующая при власти политическая элита всегда на шаг впереди, даже когда применяет силовые методы для противодействия мирным собраниям. Больше того, политическая оппозиция неготова к реальному приходу к власти, это четко видно из-за отсутствия конкретных программ экономического реформирования России выходя не из заграничного опыта, а из отечественной специфики. Политические акции в виде проведения проекта «Открытая Россия» еще раз доказали тот факт, что оппозиция оторвана от нужд потенциального электората, которому оказались необходимы не только новые лица при власти, но и гарантии, что эти новые лица будут способны улучшить социально-экономическую жизнь обычного россиянина не учитывая в какой части России он живет. Доказано, что политическая оппозиция не учитывает ментальность россиян, их стремление не к мягкой модели западной демократии, а к лидеру-хозяину, защитнику Отчизны от внешней угрозы. В свою очередь правящая элита и ее лидер удачно и эффективно реализуют этот имидж на практике и, несмотря на ухудшение экономических показателей, удерживают поддержку среди населения. Таким образом, российская политическая оппозиция является незрелой и преимущественно управляемой со стороны действующей власти.

The modern age actualized many processes in the language, which could be less visible and smoothed in other circumstances. New situations determine the changes of language, style, appearance of journalism, as well as some of its substantial features. It is natural. Social reality is changing, as well as journalism. To implement the functions of the impact we need other language tools expressive, picturesque. Expression and standard combined organically in the publicistic style. This is the source of some inconsistency of the style. If the official style is remarkable for conservatism and resistance, the publicistic style for conservatism and mobility. According to V.G. Kostomarov, "expression and standard are constructive principle of style". Of course, the expressiveness of speech, its vivid style are a necessary condition for the effectiveness of the word in journalism. At the same time, today the publicistic style is undergoing significant changes, maintaining their traditional specific qualities. Observations on the language of modern mass media display obvious general reduction of the mass media style, loss of literary and stylistic purity that reduces neutrality in the estimation of events. Style and stylistic unscrupulousness, partly appeared as a protest against pathetic, and a show of the past, not only equalizes heterogeneous linguistic facts (lexemes, word-formation models, grammatical forms), but at the same time generates deafness of the style and loss of sense of language. For all that today influence of the media was obvious on the general system of modern speech. Nowadays Russian literary language (and language of press in particular) is experiencing serious pressure of irregular elements, on the one hand. There are dissimilarity of the style, intensification of estimation, activation of the colloquial and slang vocabulary. For example, the newspaper "Moskovsky Komsomolets" (MK, 2005, December 25) in column of information messages published an article entitled «Ай да Лазарев, ай да «Чайкин» сын». Probably, the publication is a note, not an information in its pure form, since the latter must be differ simplicity and restraint. In the published material the editorial "I", evaluative elements, slang vocabulary, colloquial words are presented («биток гостей», «капельдинерша», «заявились на «Чайку» в тирольском прикиде», «художница грохнулась», «нарядился шерстяным животным по костюму медведь, по морде собака»). Speaking about the literary norm before, we focused on the elite type of speech culture and thought that literary language is the exemplary language, now, according to Sirotinina C.B, in the media very fashionable "unceremonious" type of speech culture appeared. As a result, we are dealing with an interesting linguistic phenomenon, which is not confined to the mass media, but goes into general use, becomes neutral. At the same time, such stylistically neutral vocabulary reduces the style of speech (for example, words like «отмазка», «отмывка», «беспредел», «тусовка», «раскрутка», «бомжатник» and others). Argot also became common and got in mass media language. N.S. Valgina notes "now it is not just words, they reflect the essence of really existing social, economic and power relations in the society. That''s why they became common". For example: «Демократы вот-вот расколются, не определив свой выбор» (AIF. 1989, №40) or «Конечно, у нас инфляция выше, чем в «продвинутых» странах»" (Trud, 2000, 3 October. So, the pressure of irregular speech elements on literary language, the language of the media can be considered as the existing fact. It should be noted that at the modern stage of language development journalistic style is characterized by a mixture of informal words with neutral vocabulary, increasing of emotional and expressive means, and the use of social dialects (jargon). At the same time, now the problem of language as a means of communication is a burning issue. The large number of unskilled public speaking does not only lead to the democratization of speech, but also to a sharp reduction of its culture. Stylistically reduced vocabulary, which gets to print pages, have a negative overall effect on writing, simplifies it. Of course, this situation is the result of the overall democratization of mass media language. However, it is known that the means of mass media determine language norms substantially. Therefore, the problem of establishing ethical standards of speech arises, and media have a great responsibility for meeting the requirements of the best cultural traditions. Journalists should remember this ; The modern age actualized many processes in the language, which could be less visible and smoothed in other circumstances. New situations determine the changes of language, style, appearance of journalism, as well as some of its substantial features. It is natural. Social reality is changing, as well as journalism. To implement the functions of the impact we need other language tools expressive, picturesque. Expression and standard combined organically in the publicistic style. This is the source of some inconsistency of the style. If the official style is remarkable for conservatism and resistance, the publicistic style for conservatism and mobility. According to V.G. Kostomarov, "expression and standard are constructive principle of style". Of course, the expressiveness of speech, its vivid style are a necessary condition for the effectiveness of the word in journalism. At the same time, today the publicistic style is undergoing significant changes, maintaining their traditional specific qualities. Observations on the language of modern mass media display obvious general reduction of the mass media style, loss of literary and stylistic purity that reduces neutrality in the estimation of events. Style and stylistic unscrupulousness, partly appeared as a protest against pathetic, and a show of the past, not only equalizes heterogeneous linguistic facts (lexemes, word-formation models, grammatical forms), but at the same time generates deafness of the style and loss of sense of language. For all that today influence of the media was obvious on the general system of modern speech. Nowadays Russian literary language (and language of press in particular) is experiencing serious pressure of irregular elements, on the one hand. There are dissimilarity of the style, intensification of estimation, activation of the colloquial and slang vocabulary. For example, the newspaper "Moskovsky Komsomolets" (MK, 2005, December 25) in column of information messages published an article entitled «Ай да Лазарев, ай да «Чайкин» сын». Probably, the publication is a note, not an information in its pure form, since the latter must be differ simplicity and restraint. In the published material the editorial "I", evaluative elements, slang vocabulary, colloquial words are presented («биток гостей», «капельдинерша», «заявились на «Чайку» в тирольском прикиде», «художница грохнулась», «нарядился шерстяным животным по костюму медведь, по морде собака»). Speaking about the literary norm before, we focused on the elite type of speech culture and thought that literary language is the exemplary language, now, according to Sirotinina C.B, in the media very fashionable "unceremonious" type of speech culture appeared. As a result, we are dealing with an interesting linguistic phenomenon, which is not confined to the mass media, but goes into general use, becomes neutral. At the same time, such stylistically neutral vocabulary reduces the style of speech (for example, words like «отмазка», «отмывка», «беспредел», «тусовка», «раскрутка», «бомжатник» and others). Argot also became common and got in mass media language. N.S. Valgina notes "now it is not just words, they reflect the essence of really existing social, economic and power relations in the society. That''s why they became common". For example: «Демократы вот-вот расколются, не определив свой выбор» (AIF. 1989, №40) or «Конечно, у нас инфляция выше, чем в «продвинутых» странах»" (Trud, 2000, 3 October. So, the pressure of irregular speech elements on literary language, the language of the media can be considered as the existing fact. It should be noted that at the modern stage of language development journalistic style is characterized by a mixture of informal words with neutral vocabulary, increasing of emotional and expressive means, and the use of social dialects (jargon). At the same time, now the problem of language as a means of communication is a burning issue. The large number of unskilled public speaking does not only lead to the democratization of speech, but also to a sharp reduction of its culture. Stylistically reduced vocabulary, which gets to print pages, have a negative overall effect on writing, simplifies it. Of course, this situation is the result of the overall democratization of mass media language. However, it is known that the means of mass media determine language norms substantially. Therefore, the problem of establishing ethical standards of speech arises, and media have a great responsibility for meeting the requirements of the best cultural traditions. Journalists should remember this

« This book examines the ways in which Arab civil society actors have attempted to influence public policies. In particular, the book studies the drive towards a change of policies that affect women and their well-being. It does so through the lens of women civil society activism and through analysis of cases of policy reform in three Arab countries namely: Lebanon, Morocco and Yemen. The book addresses the tension between policy change and state repression; between Islamic traditional/religious values and civil/secular ones; between the formal and the informal channels for policy-making. One of the first books to reflect on the capability of Arab civil society actors to influence change, it traces recent policy evolution from before the Arab Uprisings in 2011 until the present day, and describes the limited ability of civil society actors to induce change and substantiate it over recent decades. The book explores the use of policy theories in the analysis of cases, and reflects on the possibility of applying and "adapting" those concepts, largely applied in the Western world, to encompass policymaking in the Arab world without conceptual 'overstretch'. « (Verlagsbeschreibung)

Shitstorms, Hate Speech oder virale Videos, die zum Klicken, Liken, Teilen bewegen: Die vernetzte Gesellschaft ist von Affekten getrieben.Die Beiträge des Bandes nehmen die medientechnologischen Entwicklungen unserer Zeit in den Blick und untersuchen sie aus der Perspektive einer kritischen Affekt- und Sozialphilosophie. Sie zeigen: Soziale Medien und digitale Plattformen sind nicht nur Räume des Austauschs, sie erschaffen Affektökonomien - und darin liegt auch ihre Macht. Indem sie neue Modalitäten des sozialen Umgangs stiften und damit die Formen der Artikulation bestimmen, verschieben sie auch die politische Topographie.Mit einem Beitrag von Antonio Negri.

Reporting War and Conflict brings together history, theory and practice to explore the issues and obstacles involved in the reporting of contemporary war and conflict. The book examines the radical changes taking place in the working practices and day-to-day routines of war journalists, arguing that managing risk has become central to modern war correspondence. How individual reporters and news organisations organise their coverage of war and conflict is increasingly shaped by a variety of personal, professional and institutional risks. The book provides an historical and theoretical context to risk culture and the work of war correspondents, paying particular attention to the changing nature of technology, organisational structures and the role of witnessing. The conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria are examined to highlight how risk and the calculations of risk vary according to the type of conflict. The focus is on the relationship between propaganda, censorship, the sourcing of information and the challenges of reporting war in the digital world. The authors then move on to discuss the arguments around risk in relation to gender and war reporting and the coverage of death on the battlefield. Reporting War and Conflict is a guide to the contemporary changes in warfare and the media environmentthat have influenced war reporting. It offers students and researchers in journalism and media studies an invaluable overview of the life ofa modern war correspondent.