Money and (Shadow) Banking: A Thought Experiment
In: Review of Banking and Financial Law, Band 31
1861 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Review of Banking and Financial Law, Band 31
SSRN
In: Public choice, Band 38, Heft 1, S. 87-91
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Administrative theory & praxis: ATP ; a quarterly journal of dialogue in public administration theory, Band 33, Heft 4, S. 549-565
ISSN: 1949-0461
In: Administrative theory & praxis: ATP ; a quarterly journal of dialogue in public administration theory, Band 33, Heft 4, S. 549-565
ISSN: 1084-1806
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 192, Heft 7, S. 2183-2222
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Western Political Science Association 2011 Annual Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 46, Heft 2, S. 129-146
ISSN: 1552-7441
Most papers in theoretical economics contain thought experiments. They take the form of more informal bits of reasoning that precede the presentation of the formal, mathematical models these papers are known for. These thought experiments differ from the formal models in various ways. In particular, they do not invoke the same idealized assumptions about the rationality, knowledge, and preferences of agents. The presence of thought experiments in papers that present formal models, and the fact that they differ from the formal models in this way, is often ignored in debates on what, if anything, we can learn from formal models in theoretical economics. I show that paying due attention to thought experiments in theoretical economics has serious implications for this debate. Differences between thought experiments and formal models are especially problematic for Robert Sugden's "credible worlds" account.
In: Voprosy ėkonomiki: ežemesjačnyj žurnal, Heft 2, S. 123-140
The paper considers the analogy of theoretical modeling and thought experiment in economics. The authors provide historical and epistemological analysis of thought experiments and their relations to the material experiments in natural science. They conclude that thought experiments as instruments are used both in physics and in economics, but in radically different ways. In the natural science, a thought experiment is tightly connected to the material experimentation, while in economics it is used in isolation. Material experiments serve as a means to demonstrate the reality, while thought experiments cannot be a full-fledged instrument of studying the reality. Rather, they constitute the instrument of structuring the field of inquiry.
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 198, Heft 4, S. 3675-3698
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractThe aim of this paper is to show that scientific thought experiments and works of science fiction are highly suitable tools for facilitating and increasing understanding of science. After comparing one of Einstein's most famous thought experiments with the science fiction novel "The Forever War", I shall argue that both proceed similarly in making some of the more outlandish consequences of special relativity theory intelligible. However, as I will also point out, understanding in thought experiments and understanding in science fiction differ in one important respect: While the former aim at what I shall call "physical understanding", science fiction novels typically have "existential understanding" as their target.
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 200, Heft 3
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractGood physical experiments conform to the basic methodological standards of experimental design: they are objective, reliable, and valid. But is this also true of thought experiments? Especially problems of personal identity have engendered hypothetical scenarios that are very distant from the actual world. These imagined situations have been conspicuously ineffective at resolving conflicting intuitions and deciding between the different accounts of personal identity. Using prominent examples from the literature, I argue that this is due to many of these thought experiments not adhering to the methodological standards that guide experimental design in nearly all other disciplines. I also show how empirically unwarranted background assumptions about human physiology render some of the hypothetical scenarios that are employed in the debate about personal identity highly misleading.
In: Differences: a journal of feminist cultural studies, Band 27, Heft 1, S. 143-175
ISSN: 1527-1986
This paper is the first part of a two-part attempt to distinguish that repetition that founds a behaviorist notion of habit from another, obscure mechanism of repetition. The argument moves from the discussion of an eleventh-century thought experiment, devised by the Muslim mystic Avicenna, to the piety movement that has in recent decades implanted itself in global capitals of Muslim nations. This improbable trajectory finds its compass in Abbas Kiarostami's feminist film, Ten.
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 200, Heft 3
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractThis paper argues for two interrelated claims. The first is that the most innovative contribution of Timothy Williamson, Herman Cappelen, and Max Deutsch (a.k.a., the intuition deniers) in the debate about the epistemology of thought experiments is not the denial of intuition and the claim of the irrelevance of experimental philosophy but the claim of epistemological continuity and the rejection of philosophical exceptionalism. The second is that a better way of implementing the claim of epistemological continuity is not Deutsch and Cappelen's argument view or Williamson's folk psychological view (i.e., off-line simulation). This is so because while the argument view makes the basis of the relevant classificational judgement evidentially too demanding; the folk psychological view makes it too weak and error-prone to count as an adequate explanation. Drawing from a certain reading of Aristotle'sNichomachean Ethicsthat flowers in Miranda Fricker and John McDowell, I argue for the reason-responsiveness view. Like the extant views, the reason-responsiveness view vindicates the claim of epistemological continuity. But unlike the extant views, it does not share those problematic features. Further, I show that the reason-responsiveness view offers a way for champions of the claim of epistemological continuity to resist Avner Baz's objection to the claim of epistemological continuity and his objection to the philosophical use of thought experiments while taking on board some attractive elements of his view.
In: British journal of political science, Band 48, Heft 4, S. 1119-1141
ISSN: 1469-2112
This article develops a framework for assessing thought experiments in normative political theory. It argues that we should distinguish between relevant and irrelevant hypotheticals according to a criterion of modality. Relevant hypotheticals, while far-fetched, construct imaginary cases that are possible for us, here and now. Irrelevant hypotheticals conjure up imaginary cases that are barely conceivable at all. To establish this claim, the article interrogates, via a discussion of Susan Sontag and Judith Butler's accounts of representations of violence, the frames through which hypotheticals construct possible worlds, and concludes that some frames are better than others at sustaining a link with the world as we know it. Frames that disrupt this link can be charged with failing to offer action-guidance.
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 190, Heft 16, S. 3451-3474
ISSN: 1573-0964
Blog: Reason.com
I've heard some suggest that it's proper for universities to expel students for publicly defending the Hamas murders. (This has included both public universities and private universities that had pledged to protect student free speech.) Others have suggested that faculty members who defended the murders be fired. And there have been calls for nonacademic employers…