Suchergebnisse

The book offers the first treatment in English to provide a thorough examination of the legal duties falling under the principle of loyalty in EU public law. Despite its seemingly innocuous wording, in what is now Article 4 (3) TEU, the principle of sincere cooperation has had a significant impact in deepening the reach of EU law within the Member States. The principle has been central to the development of Union law since the 1960s, and is still being relied on by the European Court of Justice to often-controversial effect. Providing a thorough discussion of the principle of loyalty in EU law, this book introduces a novel classification of the very diverse roles loyalty plays in the EU. It distinguishes between the effects loyalty prescribes for interlocking the legal orders of the Member States with Union law (cohesion), its application in preventing and resolving conflicts between the Union and the Member States (cooperation), and the loyalty principle's role in the shaping of EU law (construction). It addresses important and yet unresolved questions pertaining to loyalty, such as its relation to the principles of solidarity, effectiveness, fidelity, pre-emption, the Union interest, institutional balance, and the unity of international representation. The book explains why the principle of loyalty has been neglected in the prevailing narratives about the constitutionalization of EU law, places it in its international context, examining how it has influenced EU law and the comparisons that can be drawn with national and international principles of law.

Any scientific intercession that has as objective the understanding of the significances of the "principle of law" needs to have an interdisciplinary character, the basis for the approach being the philosophy of law. In this study we fulfill such an analysis with the purpose to underline the multiple theoretical signifi cances due to this concept, but also the relationship between the juridical principles and norms, respectively the normative value of the principle of the law. Thus, extensive references to the philosophical and juridical doctrine in the matter are being materialized. This study is a pleading to refer to the principles in the work for the law's creation and application. Starting with the diff erence between "given" and "constructed", we propose the distinction between the "metaphysical principles" outside the law, which by their contents have philosophical significances, and the "constructed principles" elaborated inside the law. We emphasize the obligation of the law maker, but also of the expert to refer to the principles in the work of legislation, interpretation and applying of the law. Arguments are brought for the updating, in certain limits, the justice – naturalistic concepts in the law.

AbstractThis paper explores subsidiarity as a constitutional principle in international law. Some authors have appealed to a principle of subsidiarity in order to defend the legitimacy of several striking features of international law, such as the centrality of state consent, the leeway in assessing state compliance and weak sanctions in its absence. The article presents such defences of state-centric aspects of international law by appeals to subsidiarity, and finds them wanting. Different interpretations of subsidiarity have strikingly different institutional implications regarding the objectives of the polity, the domain and role of subunits, and the allocation of authority to apply the principle of subsidiarity itself. Five different interpretations are explored, drawn from Althusius, the US federalists, Pope Leo XIII, and others. One upshot is that the principle of subsidiarity cannot provide normative legitimacy to the state-centric aspects of current international law on its own. It stands in need of substantial interpretation. The versions of subsidiarity that match current practices of public international law are questionable. Many crucial aspects of our legal order must be reconsidered – in particular the standing and scope of state sovereignty.

'The principle of transparency in EU law' explores a variety of transparency obligations in European law, and offers a comprehensive framework to classify and understand those obligations. The principle of transparency is ubiquitous and multifaceted. The obligations derived from it range from a duty to allow access to documents held by the EU-institutions to a prohibition to change the terms of a contract concluded after a procurement procedure. But although transparency is a diffuse concept, it has a distinct core: the concept refers to the availability, accessibility and clarity of information. However, the concept of transparency does not in itself determine the target and the timing of transparency obligations, nor does it tell us much about the acceptability of exceptions, and whether information should be provided pro-actively or on request. The author provides a method to determine the exact nature of the transparency obligations that can be derived from the principle of transparency in concrete situations. She explains how the application of the EU principle of transparency is affected by the manner in which transparency contributes to the realisation of a variety of goals, the context in which it is applied, and the presence of conflicting interests. The key to understanding the principle of transparency is appreciating its instrumental value. By being transparent, governments can promote democracy and individual rights, and improve economic performance. These goals are realised by means of two related but distinct mechanisms. First, transparency aids people in decision-making. Second, it allows them to see what is going on inside government. As such it is a precondition for any attempt to affect what is going on inside that government. Understanding how transparency functions is insufficient though: whether there is an obligation to be transparent is determined by the normative framework that governs the relation between the government and its citizens. This framework differs depending on whether this ...

The basic concepts of personal property law -- Transfer of legal title to tangibles -- Nemo dat quod non habet -- Assignment of legal choses in action -- Disposition of subsisting equitable interests -- Negotiation and negotiable instruments -- Defective transfers and payments -- Protection of legal title via tort law -- Protection of equitable title : remedies for misdirected property --Bailment and attornment -- Security interests and quasi-security -- Pledge and liens -- Mortgages and bills of sale -- Equitable charges -- Secured transactions law reform -- Concluding observations

A new edition of this well-established text, reflecting all relevant constitutional changes, new statutory provisions and the latest judicial pronouncements up to the end of December 2010. It continues to provide the complete introduction to Irish law for students coming to the subject for the first time

According to public international law, humanitarian aid must comply with four fundamental principles, one of which being the principle of independence. Duly complying with this principle means that the humanitarian objectives must be autonomous from political, economic, military, or other objectives, and the principle serves to ensure that the sole purpose of humanitarian aid remains to relieve and prevent the suffering of victims of humanitarian crises. This requirement places the European Union—one of the world's largest donors of humanitarian aid—in a dilemma since, arguably, the Union's treaty-bases simultaneously require that it promotes, amongst others, principles of democracy, rule of law, human rights, and free trade when providing humanitarian aid to third countries. This article analyses this dilemma. It points out that whilst conflicts only arise infrequently, there have been occasions where they have indeed arisen, and it is argued that the principle of independence takes precedence over the treaty-based duty to promote 'European values'.