Suchergebnisse

Recent scholarship has underscored the possibility that capital-adequacy regulations may have contributed to the 2008 financial crisis by privileging highly rated asset-backed securities, such as mortgage-backed securities. The same regulations gave an even more privileged position to sovereign debt, leading to the question of whether they helped cause the European sovereign-debt crisis. There is little question that the regulations encouraged European banks to invest in European governments' bonds, but it does not appear that this encouragement led to more government borrowing by significantly reducing the yield governments needed to pay on their debt. However, it does appear that capital-adequacy regulations-along with post-2008 liquidity regulations-concentrated sovereign risk in the European banking system, aggravating the sovereign-debt problem by requiring government bailouts that, in turn, required the issuance of more sovereign debt, further jeopardizing the governments' fiscal position and banks' solvency. Exacerbating the situation, in the midst of a panic, the European Banking Authority imposed new capital requirements on banks and effectively forced them to realize mark-to-market losses on sovereign exposures. Adapted from the source document.

"Athens, Greece May Day 2010. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU) were putting together the final details of a 100-billion Euro rescue package for the country. The Greek Prime Minister, George Papandreou had agreed to a savage package of Austerity Measures involving cuts in public spending and lower salaries and pensions. Outside, riot police were deployed, as protesters gathered to fight the austerity program. A country with a history of revolution and dictatorship hovered on the brink of collapse with the world's financial markets watching to see if the deal cobbled together would be enough to both calm the markets, rescue the Greek economy, and with it the Euro, from oblivion. In Bust: Greece, the Euro, and the Sovereign Debt Crisis leading market commentator Matthew Lynn blends financial history, politics and current affairs to tell the story of how one nation rode the wave of economic prosperity and brought a continent, a currency, and potentially, the global financial system to its knees. Bust: Greece, the Euro, and the Sovereign Debt Crisis is a story of government deceit, unfettered spending, and cheap borrowing. As well as charting Greece's rise, and spectacular fall from grace, it looks at the global repercussions of a financial disaster that shows many of the hallmarks of the Lehman Brother's debacle. It looks at how the Greek contagion has spread like wildfire through Europe, and, as the global financial community looks on in concern, club Med, or PIGGS countries succumb to its influence. And of course, no financial crisis is complete without Goldman Sachs and murky deals, as the author explores how speculators and derivatives traders compounded the problem. Written in a lively and entertaining style, Bust: Greece, the Euro, and the Sovereign Debt Crisis is a lively and engaging account of a country gone wrong, for anyone interested in world events and global economics."--

First signs of a sovereign debt crisis spread among financial players in the late 2009 as a result of the growing private and government debt levels worldwide. Late 2010, Trichet (then President of the ECB) stated that the sovereign debt crisis in Europe had become systemic. In an established crisis context, it was searched for evidence of structural breaks and cointegration between interest rates and stock market prices. A 13 year time-window was used in six European markets under stress. The results identified significant structural breaks at the end of 2010 and consistently rejected the null hypothesis of no cointegration. ; peer-reviewed

Athens, Greece May Day 2010. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU) were putting together the final details of a 100-billion Euro rescue package for the country. The Greek Prime Minister, George Papandreou had agreed to a savage package of Austerity Measures involving cuts in public spending and lower salaries and pensions. Outside, riot police were deployed as protestors gathered to fight the austerity program. A country with a history of revolution and dictatorship hovered on the brink of collapse with the world's financial markets watching to see if the deal cobbled together would be enough to both calm the markets, rescue the Greek economy, and with it the Euro, from oblivion. In Bust: Greece, the Euro, and the Sovereign Debt Crisis leading market commentator Matthew Lynn blends financial history, politics and current affairs to tell the story of how one nation rode the wave of economic prosperity and brought a continent, a currency, and potentially, the global financial system to its knees. Bust: Greece, the Euro, and the Sovereign Debt Crisis is a story of government deceit, unfettered spending, and cheap borrowing. As well as charting Greece?s rise, and spectacular fall from grace, it looks at the global repercussions of a financial disaster that shows many of the hallmarks of the Lehman Brother's debacle. It looks at how the Greek contagion has spread like wildfire through Europe, and, as the global financial community looks on in concern, club Med, or PIGGS countries succumb to its influence. And of course, no financial crisis is complete without Goldman Sachs and murky deals, as the author explores how speculators and derivatives traders compounded the problem. Written in a lively and entertaining style, Bust: Greece, the Euro, and the Sovereign Debt Crisis is a lively and engaging account of a country gone wrong, for anyone interested in world events and global economics. Written in a lively and entertaining style, Bust: Greece, the Euro, and the Sovereign Debt Crisis is a lively and engaging account of a country gone wrong, for anyone interested in world events and global economics.

The ongoing European sovereign debt crisis continues to shake financial markets and the Eurozone. The International Monetary Fund and the European Union (EU) have acted swiftly to diminish panic and uncertainty by providing emergency assistance to Greece, Ireland and Portugal. However, uncertainty remains and queries have arisen over the vigor and effectiveness of multi-lateral institutions like the EU. This paper will establish the origins of the crisis, enumerate European and international responses, bring to light possible alternatives to implemented policies, and finally explore the broader implications for Europe, the United States and the rest of the world.

First signs of a sovereign debt crisis spread among financial players in the late 2009 as a result of the growing private and government debt levels worldwide. Late 2010, Trichet (then President of the ECB) stated that the sovereign debt crisis in Europe had become systemic. In an established crisis context, it was searched for evidence of structural breaks and cointegration between interest rates and stock market prices. A 13 year time-window was used in six European markets under stress. The results identified significant structural breaks at the end of 2010 and consistently rejected the null hypothesis of no cointegration.

The intention for the Italian government to stimulate business activity via large increases in government spending is not in line with the stabilisation of the public debt ratio. Instead, if such policy were implemented, the risk of a sovereign debt crisis would be high. In this article, we analyse the capacity of the Italian economy to shoulder sovereign debt under different scenarios. We conclude that focusing on growth enhancing structural reforms, would allow for moderate increases in public expenditure.

This special issue has two main aims: to examine the contribution of political economy analyses of the sovereign debt crisis and to relate these findings to longstanding debates in the sub-disciplines of comparative political economy, international political economy and European economic governance. This introduction begins by reviewing the comparative political economy literature on national financial systems in order to account for the playing out of the crisis. It then examines the international political economy literature on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and financial (sovereign debt) markets that played such a key role in the unfolding of the sovereign debt crisis. Finally, it outlines longstanding academic debates on the main 'asymmetries'; in European economic governance, and provides a critical overview of the three main policy and institutional reforms adopted by European Union governments in response to the crisis.

Only a decade ago, slow growth and high unemployment plagued Germany, but the "sick man of Europe" has now moved to outperform the Eurozone average growth since the second quarter of 2010. This confirms Germany's recovery and its status as the growth engine of the continent. This surely is a success story. While Germany (also Austria and the Netherlands) is prospering, the peripheral countries in the Eurozone are confronted with a severe sovereign debt crisis. Starting in Greece, it soon spread to countries such as Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. In the course of the debate, Germany was blamed for the imbalances in Europe. In short, German export performance and the sustained pressure for moderate wage increases have provided German exporters with the competitive advantage to dominate trade and capital flows within the Eurozone. Thus, Germany is seen as the main beneficiary of the EURO. This argument, however, is vehemently disputed within Germany. Many economists and political leaders reject this argument and point to the flagrant lack of fiscal discipline in many of the peripheral countries. Some prominent economists, such as Hans-Werner Sinn, even disputes that Germany was the main beneficiary of the Eurozone. The paper analyzes the two sides of the controversy, and asks whether we are witnessing a more inwardlooking and Euroskeptic Germany. These issues will be analyzed by first focusing on the role of Germany in resolving the sovereign debt crisis in Greece, and the European Union negotiations for a permanent rescue mechanism. We conclude by discussing some possible explanations for Germany's more assertive and more Euroskeptic position during these negotiations.