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Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Acknowledgements page -- Introduction -- PART ONE: THE STUDY OF BUREAUCRACY -- I: THE CLASSICAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF BUREAUCRACY -- 1 The Marxist position -- 2 Weber's political sociology -- 3 Bureaucracy and oligarchy -- 4 Some critical remarks -- II: THE IDEAL TYPE OF BUREAUCRACY -- 1 Some comments on the characteristics of bureaucracy -- 2 The mode of construction of the ideal type -- 3 The modern uses of the term 'bureaucracy' -- 4 Final considerations -- III: THE POST-WEBERIAN THEORIES OF BUREAUCRACY -- Introduction -- 1 The conceptual framework -- 2 The 'dialectics' of bureaucracy -- 3 The empirical re-examination of the 'classical' problems -- 4 Critical remarks -- PART TWO: THE MANAGERIAL TRADITION -- IV: TAYLORISM AND FORMAL THEORIES OF ADMINISTRATION -- Introduction -- 1 The main features of Taylorism -- 2 Criticism -- 3 Formal theories of administration -- 4 The general framework of the 'universalist' theories -- 5 Some critical remarks -- 6 Conclusion -- V: THE 'HUMAN RELATIONS' APPROACH TO THE ORGANISATI0N -- Introduction -- 1 Hawthorne and the evolution of empirical research in industry -- 2 The various subschools -- 3 The evolution of the human relations school as a whole -- 4 Criticism -- VI: ORGANISATION THEORY: DECISION-MAKING IN ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXTS -- Introduction -- 1 Decision-making and the rational aspects of behaviour -- 2 The social psychology of organisational decision-making -- 3 Decision-making and organisational structure -- 4 Empirical 'content' and methodology -- 5 Criticism -- PART THREE: CONVERGING TRENDS -- VII: TOWARDS A BROADENING OF SCOPE -- Introduction -- 1 Theoretical convergence -- 2 The organisation as a social system -- 3 The organisation in terms of power and conflict -- 4 Concluding remarks -- CONCLUSION

Weber's ideal typical model of bureaucracy constitutes the starting point for most scholarship on organizations. Much organizational behaviour, however occurs outside this formalized model. It is thus somewhat surprising that behaviours outside the formal-rational model are, more often than not, treated as aberrations. In contrast, the emerging critical literature on 'inhabited institutions' has identified such gaps in our theoretical understanding as foundational, warranting a more agentic conception of organizational life—a conception more fully acknowledging of and sensitive to the dynamics of power in organizational life. In this regard, we highlight four prevalent (though seldom theoretically incorporated) features of contemporary bureaucracies—divergent goals, patrimonialism, unwritten rules and chaos. These features, which we contend are no less critical to organizational functioning than those identified by Weber, constitute an organizational logic more compatible with a Kafkan vision of bureaucracy than with a Weberian one. Theorizing such attributes allows us to explore elements of bureaucratic life that the formal-rational model of bureaucracy renders largely invisible and is conceptually and empirically ill equipped to incorporate. An illustrative analysis, drawing on narrative data drawn from the population of organizational ethnographies ( n = 162) (1) demonstrates the prominence of such dynamics in organizational life; and (2) highlights their implications for rule breaking as a relatively common yet under-theorized occurrence. A core implication of our analysis and critique is that the social sciences need a fundamentally revised theory of bureaucracy capable of understanding bureaucracy's power laden and often dystrophic features.

There has been a series of comprehensive reform initiatives in recent Chinese history aimed at improving bureaucratic efficiency, flexibility and innovation through management and fiscal decentralization. The local government sector in China carries major functional responsibilities from economic development to social welfare provision. It is responsible for over 70 percent of total government expenditure. Now, in the new millennium, the Chinese central government seeks to transform local government as part of its market liberalization strategy. This includes 'privatizing' local enterprises (a process begun during the 1990s) and a rationalization of local bureaucracy. Although still a highly centralized administration, there has been a significant move away from a uniform approach to local government where now differentiation between regions and localities is actively encouraged. Within a still tightly constrained political structure, however, the reforms have done more than improve China's economic output. They have created incentives for local officials to engage in rent seeking and utility-maximizing behaviours. The article explores the reform initiatives and critically assesses results against this background.

The idea that bureaucracy is a 'rational' & 'depoliticized' instrument in the conduct of public affairs, has recently come under severe criticism. Assuming the inevitable trend towards 'politicization', modern bureaucracies can possibly be classified into 4 different categories: 'depoliticized', 'semipoliticized', 'committed', & 'fully-politicized'. Such a classification is based on the operationalization of certain indices on 4 different dimensions viz (1) degree of bureaucracy's influence in decision making, (2) degree of its involvement in political activities, (3) degree of political interference in its work, & (4) its image in the public. The extent of 'politicization' of any bureaucratic system & its actual deviation from the defined categories will, however, depend upon the available pattern of the characteristic indices in that particular society. Notwithstanding certain difficulties in the operationalization of such indices, the model should be helpful in providing a framework for a comparative analysis & measurement of 'politicization' of bureaucracies in different political systems. The concept of a 'politicized' bureaucracy is defined as one which is involved or influences or is influenced to any degree, consciously or unconsciously, by overt or by implicit actions in the stream of the politics of the day whether of the party in power or of the party/parties in opposition. Such an involvement may mean the bureaucratic promotion of special interests of political party at the expense of national objectives. In a more extended form it may also be regarded as a type of bureaucracy which uses political parties in furtherance of their collective or individual objectives. An attempt is made to show that the Indian bureaucracy is fast loosing its neutral character & might show a deviation towards the 'politicized' model. AA.

The idea that bureaucracy is a «rational» and «depoliticized» instrument in the conduct of public affairs, has recently come under severe criticism. Assuming the inevitable trend towards «politicization», modern bureaucracies can possibly be classified info four different categories, i.e. : «De-politicized», «Semi-politicized», «Committed» and «Fully-politicized». Such a classification is based on the operationalization of certain indices on four different dimensions viz. a) Degree of Bureaucracy's Influence in Decision-making; b) Degree of its Involvement in Political Activities; c) Degree of Political Interference in its Work and d) its Image in the Public. The extent of «politicization» of any bureaucratic system and its actual deviation from the defined categories will, however, depend upon the available pattern of the characteristic indices in that particular society. Notwithstanding certain difficulties in the operationalization of such indices, the model should be helpful in providing a framework for a comparative analysis and measurement of «politicization» of bureaucracies in different political systems.

Models of inefficient political failure have been criticized for implicitly assuming the irrationality of voters (Wittman, 1989, 1995, 1999; Coate & Morris, 1995). Building on Caplan's (1999a, 1999b) model of "rational irrationality," the current paper maintains that the assumption of voter irrationality is both theoretically & empirically plausible. It then examines microfoundational criticisms of four classes of political failure models: rent-seeking, pork-barrel politics, bureaucracy, & economic reform. In each of the four cases, incorporating simple forms of privately costless irrationality makes it possible to clearly derive the models' standard conclusions. Moreover, it follows that efforts to mitigate political failures will be socially suboptimal, as most of the literature implicitly assumes. It is a mistake to discount the empirical evidence for these models on theoretical grounds. 3 Diagrams, 62 References. Adapted from the source document.

Despite evolution of management thought, Max Weber's theory of bureaucracy continues to be a classical theory whose prescriptive elements guide the nature of organizations and their structures and processes. In the wake of information, communication and technological revolution which is reshaping the structure and processes in modern day organizations, the paper re-examines the basic premises and constructs of Max Weber's rational bureaucratic organizations and their relevance today. Weber's contribution to social sciences in general and organization studies in particular, is both methodological as well as empirical. The paper discusses the context in which Max Weber originally propounded his theory. In so doing, the paper also draws similarities of his theory with that proposed by other management thinkers of his time. Few examples of modern-day organizations and also different cross-national contexts are examined to discuss the present-day relevance of Weber's postulates. It is suggested that despite the ever-present portents of its demise, bureaucracy will continue to guide the dominant form of organizations in the near future because of its inherent rational character.

AbstractAcademic interest in the administrative aspects of international organizations is on the rise. Yet, an issue that has received little attention is bureaucratic representation—the extent to which international bureaucracies are representative of the polity that they serve. The article theorizes the rationales for and forms of representative bureaucracy in international organizations by combining insights from the representative bureaucracy literature with the 'public service bargains' framework. It argues that bureaucratic representation is highly relevant in international organizations, given the diverse polity these organizations serve and their precarious legitimacy. It distinguishes three types of representational 'bargains' between international organizations and those they serve, centred on power, equal opportunities and diversity, and discusses under which conditions each type of bargain is likely to be struck. The argument contributes to discussions about representative bureaucracy in international organizations and to broader theoretical debates about international public administration.

The 1960s and early 1970s were characterized by planning optimism and major reforms associated with notions of efficiency on the one hand, and a change in political culture on the other. When government bodies in the Federal Republic of Germany initiated in a top-down way a comprehensive territorial reform and intervened into the everyday life of many people this provoked resistance from citizens. Using the example of the municipal territorial reform as carried out in the Federal Republic, the article addresses tensions as well as a governance processes between the representatives of the state, the municipalities and citizens alongside with a fundamental change in political culture during the 1960s and 1970s. The article shows how the local municipalities reacted to territorial and functional reforms elaborated by the federal and state governments and the ministerial bureaucracy of West Germany with a special focus on North Rhine-Westphalia. It sheds light not only on new players in the political arena, municipalities and local citizens' initiatives that were increasingly trying to take an active role in decision-making, but also a general change in political culture. Claims for political and social participation and political transparency, a "vital civic spirit" which opposed state planning optimist approaches ‒ demands that those responsible for the reform had to react on. The article examines the redefinitions of the relationship between state and municipality, and citizens in the course of reform processes and related political debates, and analyses how far decisions-making processes changed.

Foreign aid plays an important role in developing countries, but little is empirically known how it affects incentives of recipient bureaucracies. I provide a model and analytic case study to understand the strategic games that donors and bureaucrats play. My findings are broadly consistent with the theoretical expectations of institutional rational choice: bureaucrats attempt to ensure bureaucratic survival, whereas donors ensure growth of loan portfolio. These findings, however, are not consistent with the Samaritan's Dilemma and the Patron's Dilemma. Adapted from the source document.

Bureaucracy is challenged and examined from almost all quarters in organizational analysis. As part of wide debate over postmodern cultural theorizations there is now much debate over the viability and retention of bureaucratic forms of organization. It is often argued that bureaucracies have been displaced by more rapid-response entrepreneurial and strategic configurations. Yet we can observe examples of bureaucracy that deliberately select, repress, discard or restore elements of bureaucratic norms and values. This article proposes that there is emergent evidence of a raft of new activities occurring in contemporary bureaucratic organizations, which challenge our conceptions of bureaucratic organization. The article draws attention to some unconventional practices, many of which involve the invocation of alternative sources of authority and legitimacy. It raises questions for the implications of an apparently counter-rational, counter-bureaucratic, re-enchantment impulse. The analytic, interpretive exploration of these questions draws bureaucratic organization back into society and social analysis.

Although Weber's ideal typical model of bureaucracy was developed primarily in relation to the state, studies of private sector organizations typically adhere to its formal-rational conceptions with little adjustment. This is unfortunate since bureaucracy in private sector economic organizations has many elements that are poorly captured by and potentially significantly at odds with Weber's thinking. Most notable in this regard is the pervasiveness of particularistic and often informal, emergent arrangements − arrangements well documented for many decades by workplace ethnographers. This has significant implications for the conception of modern private sector organizations and indeed offers a picture that is more Kafkaesque than Weberian. Significant support for this point is provided by an analysis of content coded organizational ethnographies. Weberian dimensions of bureaucracy − most notably coordinated and specialized organization and training − are predominant in public institutions; private sector establishments, in contrast, witness significantly more particularism as well as uncertainty and fear as core organizing principles. Importantly, and as delineated in our over-time comparisons, such Kafkaesque elements of bureaucracy and organization appear to be increasingly prevalent.

How to govern in the face of radical diversity and seemingly intractable conflict? A key question after 9/11, it is also central to dark fantasy literature.The literary answer is a return to legal rational authority, specifically bureaucracy. We examine the novel, Benighted (Kit Whitfield), where the Department for the Ongoing Regulation of Lycanthropic Activity must manage relations between the dominant lycanthropes and the despised underclass of humans. Developing other attempts to theorize the monster in relation to bureaucracy, we suggest that within the novel bureaucrats and the bureau function as ''hopeful monsters,'' sites for the ongoing negotiation of morality.

AbstractThe study of bureaucratic behavior—focusing on control, decision-making, and institutional arrangements—has historically leaned heavily on theories of rational choice and bounded rationality. Notably absent from this research, however, is attention to the growing literature on biological and especially evolutionary human behavior. This article addresses this gap by closely examining the extant economic and psychological frameworks—which we refer to as "Adam Smith's bureaucrat" and "Herbert Simon's bureaucrat"—for their shortcomings in terms of explanatory and predictive theory, and by positing a different framework, which we call "Charles Darwin's bureaucrat." This model incorporates new insights from an expanding multidisciplinary research framework and has the potential to address some of the long-noted weaknesses of classic theories of bureaucratic behavior.