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The traditional research paradigm represents discoveries flowing linearly from basic science conducted in public institutions to applied research and commercialization undertaken largely by private industry. This characterization fails to accurately portray the nonlinear and chaotic nature of research and development (R&D) processes. Recent United States (U.S.) legislation aimed to promote economic growth through supporting research acknowledges the "blurring of lines" between public and private research activities. Moreover, incentive alignments have recently emerged between public and private interests in life science R&D. In this context, the Berkeley/Novartis strategic alliance is shown to be a collaborative public/private relationship that is sourced in such incentive alignments. It is also argued that this alliance is consistent with the fundamental complementary relationships that formed some of the principles structuring the original foundation for Land Grant universities. ; Includes bibliographical references

"Private ordering" is an important concept and commonly-used phrase in legal scholarship. At least three "ordering" activities often performed by governments can be privatized: lawmaking, adjudication, and enforcement of adjudicators' decisions. Distinguishing among these activities and offering lasting lessons on their privatization—but nowadays not often credited for doing so—is Soia Mentschikoff's seminal 1961 article, Commercial Arbitration. This short piece reconsiders Mentschikoff's classic article in light of contemporary scholarship on private ordering and credits Commercial Arbitration with teaching us lasting lessons about commercial arbitration and even about commerce itself. Key to these lessons is Mentschikoff's empirical study of trade association arbitration and her comparison of such industry-specific arbitration with the more general commercial arbitration exemplified by the American Arbitration Association (AAA). This comparison shows arbitration's ability—especially in the "core commercial" context of trade associations—to privatize all three of the aforementioned "ordering" activities: lawmaking, adjudication, and enforcement of adjudicators' decisions. Mentschikoff thus builds impressively from the humble context of routine sales disputes to enduring insights about the role of private ordering in the production, application, and enforcement of law.

This article examines the impact of the principle of effectiveness of EU law on private arbitration. It uses the frame of post-award litigation to demonstrate that the relationship between these two normative orders is transversal and potentially very disruptive. This is evidenced by the alteration of the burden of proof in post-award actions, the irrelevance of the loss of the right to object, the widening of judicial review over awards that violate EU public policy, and the possibility to scrutinize errors of EU mandatory law concerning the merits of the case. The result is the weakening of the finality of awards and the replacement of the principle of procedural autonomy of Member States by European procedural primacy.