Suchergebnisse

What can states expect to receive in return for the military aid they provide to other states? Can military aid buy recipient state compliance with donor objectives? In this study, we systematically investigate the effects of US military assistance on recipient state behavior toward the United States. We build on existing literature by creating three explicit theoretical models, employing a new measure of cooperation generated from events data, and controlling for preference similarity, so that our results capture the influence military aid has on recipient state behavior independent of any dyadic predisposition toward cooperation or conflict. We test seven hypotheses using a combination of simultaneous equation, cross-sectional time series, and Heckman selection models. We find that, with limited exceptions, increasing levels of US military aid significantly reduce cooperative foreign policy behavior with the United States. US reaction to recipient state behavior is also counterintuitive; instead of using a carrot-and-stick approach to military aid allocations, our results show that recipient state cooperation is likely to lead to subsequent reductions in US military assistance. Adapted from the source document.

U.S. deliveries of military equipment may be enough to stabilize the front but will not be enough for victory. Strategically, the war will still be a bloody stalemate, and this constitutes a partial Russian victory. Ukraine needs to articulate how it plans to win.

Based on a chapter from "Arms for the third world: Soviet military aid diplomacy," by Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gibert.

Enforcement of U.S. law concerning weapons exports and the disbursement of military aid are subject to highly politicized interpretations of concepts like ""legitimate self-defense"" and ""safeguarding internal security."" As illustrated by Israel's July 2006 war in Lebanon and its 2008––2009 Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, Washington has essentially allowed Israel to define ""self-defense"" however it chooses. This overview of U.S. military aid to Israel, including weapons sales and related support of its domestic military industrial complex, examines in detail the mechanisms through which aid is funneled, the restrictions on aid that do exist, and the uses to which U.S. military aid has been put——particularly in terms of Israel's military operations and its exports abroad.

Although researchers have recently made some progress in explaining the outputs of the US economic aid decision-making process, their efforts to explain the allocation of US military aid have been rather disappointing. In this article, we follow previous studies that have assumed a two-stage process leading up to the allocation of military aid, while making three significant improvements over those efforts. First we employ a better model, including a variety of political, strategic, economic, and humanitarian variables we hypothesize to be related to the allocation of military aid. Second, we solve the `low n' difficulty that plagued previous research, by employing an extensive dataset that covers a global sample of countries covering the 1983-8 period. And third, unlike previous research where a two-stage process has been assumed, we employ a methodology that solves the difficulties associated with selection bias, which arises when two interrelated decisions are modeled separately. As a result of these improvements our results are much stronger than those of previous studies. We find that strategic, political, and economic interests, as well as human rights concerns and economic development, have been considered in the US military aid decision-making process.

Abstract
Western states have provided billions of dollars of military aid to Ukraine to help it in its war against Russia. Yet, despite numerous discussions of the ethical issues raised by the war, there has been little discussion of the opportunity costs of this military assistance. Is it right that the West has prioritized military assistance to Ukraine, when the conflict in Ukraine is just one of numerous challenges facing the world, from forced displacement to global poverty, preventable disease to climate change? This article offers the first detailed engagement with this issue, taking seriously the nonideal feasibility constraints that states face. It firsts set out the prima facie case against assisting Ukraine militarily due to the opportunity costs. It then explores—and largely rejects—two responses: that military assistance is required to protect Ukrainian self-determination and that it is needed to stop the march of authoritarianism. It argues that the opportunity costs objection has serious force and counts against much of the provision of military assistance to Ukraine (although not all). This argument has broader implications for the extent to which states should prioritize military aid over other means of addressing global challenges.

Over the last thirteen years the United States has provided almost five hundred million dollars in military aid to Latin America. This program has continued undaunted despite the fact that the justification for the undertaking — as shown by testimony of U. S. congressional hearings — has undergone such a wide fluctuation that today's purposes are quite different from yesterday's. To understand the present program it is helpful to explore the peculiar evolution of this program of aid.During World War II there was cooperation between the United States and Latin-American military forces. Two states, Mexico and Brazil, donated forces which saw combat. The chief contribution of Latin America to the war effort, however, was in the realm of economic assistance to the United States war machine.