Suchergebnisse

Since the 1990s, the EU has been gradually transferring to neighbouring countries parts of the burden of securing its internal order from illegal migrants, terrorists, criminal groups and other "threats." It has done so using policy transfers and foreign relations mechanisms. The European Union, seeking to create an "area of freedom, security, and justice" in the region, exports the burden of migration management to its neighbouring countries and thus creates security threats – if not real then perceived – for these countries. The case of Ukraine demonstrates that EU policies of shifting the burden of international migration management to its neighbours can destabilize the societal security of countries that lack the experience and instruments to effectively deal with migration. Rather than shifting the burden of responsibility to the neighbouring states, the EU should prioritize co-operation and assistance to expand the area of freedom, justice and security on the European continent.

Since the 1990s, the EU has been gradually transferring to neighbouring countries parts of the burden of securing its internal order from illegal migrants, terrorists, criminal groups and other "threats." It has done so using policy transfers and foreign relations mechanisms. The European Union, seeking to create an "area of freedom, security, and justice" in the region, exports the burden of migration management to its neighbouring countries and thus creates security threats – if not real then perceived – for these countries. The case of Ukraine demonstrates that EU policies of shifting the burden of international migration management to its neighbours can destabilize the societal security of countries that lack the experience and instruments to effectively deal with migration. Rather than shifting the burden of responsibility to the neighbouring states, the EU should prioritize co-operation and assistance to expand the area of freedom, justice and security on the European continent. Full text available at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v2i2.169

"An economic definition of family ties relevant to migration decisions leads to the exploration of their effects on the probability of migration, on consequent changes in employment and earnings of family members, and on family stability. It is shown that ties represent negative 'personal' externalities which are usually, but not always, internalized by the family. ties tend to deter migration, to reduce the employment and earnings of migrating wives, and to increase the employment and earnings of their husbands. The growth of labor market attachment of women creates an increase in migration ties, which both deters migration and contributes to marital instability. Conversely, growing marital instability stimulates migration and reinforces the upward trends in women's labor force participation." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

English Abstract:
The article focuses on the differences in the impact of urban agglomeration externalities on the development dynamics of different spatial zones of the region of Rostov, the tenth largest city of Russia, namely the agglomerative, contiguous, and remote. We also measure the divergence of the agglomeration itself, segregating the agglomerative municipalities into core, interjacent, and peripheral. We hypothesize that spatial proximity to the agglomeration core favors economic growth with a gradual decrease with the distance. The research results suggest that municipalities with an intermediate location – contiguous type, feature the worst indicator performance. These settlements are located not close enough to the agglomeration core to be attractive for pendulum labor migration and the location of enterprises and not far enough to develop an independent infrastructure system for economic development.Spanish Abstract:
El artículo se centra en las diferencias del impacto de las externalidades de aglomeración urbana en la dinámica de desarrollo de las distintas zonas espaciales de la región de Rostov (la décima ciudad más grande de Rusia): la aglomeración, la contigua y la remota. Medimos la divergencia de la aglomeración, segregando los municipios aglomerados en centrales, inter-contiguos y periféricos. Nuestra hipótesis es que la proximidad espacial al núcleo de aglomeración favorece el crecimiento económico disminuyendo gradualmente con la distancia. Los resultados sugieren que los municipios con una ubicación intermedia —tipo contiguo— presentan el peor rendimiento. Estos asentamientos no están situados lo suficientemente cerca del núcleo de aglomeración como para ser atractivos para la migración laboral pendular y establecimiento de empresas, ni se encuentran suficientemente lejos como para desarrollar un sistema de infraestructura independiente para el desarrollo económico.French Abstract:
Cet article analyse les différences d'impact des externalités des agglomérations urbaines sur la dynamique de développement de différentes zones spatiales de la région de Rostov, la dixième ville de Russie en population : les agglomérations, les contiguës et les éloignées. Nous classons les municipalités agglomérées en trois catégories, centrales, intercalaires et périphériques, et émettons l'hypothèse que la proximité spatiale du noyau de l'agglomération favorise la croissance économique, avec une diminution progressive selon la distance. Nos résultats suggèrent que les municipalités ayant une localisation intermédiaire - de type contigu - présentent les pires performances en termes d'indicateurs. Elles ne sont pas assez proches du coeur de l'agglomération pour être attrayantes pour la migration pendulaire de la main-d'oeuvre et la localisation des entreprises, et pas assez loin pour développer un système d'infrastructure indépendant pour le développement économique.

Standard international trade theory suggests indifference between free trade & free migration, as both can lead to factor price equalization. Rich countries, however, appear to prefer free trade to free migration. This paper explains this preference in terms of the concept of social capital. The movement of people differs from the movement of goods & services, because people create attachments with those with whom they share social capital, including norms, language, customs, values, & culture. Migration affects social capital in both the countries of emigration & immigration. In the paper, four types of externalities associated with migration are identified, & a model is developed to examine trade & migration policy (& changes in migration costs) under alternative assumptions about the internalization of these externalities. Irrespective of the degree of internalization of externalities, the countries that people emigrate from gain from trade liberalization & from preferential trade with richer countries to which immigration takes place, while the latter countries gain from immigration controls. The likelihood that the emigration countries gain from free migration increases with the degree of internalization of the externalities. 1 Figure, 43 References. Adapted from the source document.

This paper compares the decentral organization of unemployment insurance in member states of a state union with the central organization at the upper union' level. In a model of two countries the labor force and the firm owners can migrate between the states. Labor markets exhibit unemployment due to trade union's bargaining about the wage rate. In a decentral scenario the states organize independently unemployment insurance and decide about the rate on wages contributed to the insurance budget. Due to open borders they have to take account of migration effects. However, with perfect mobility between the states each government chooses a socially optimal contribution rate such that workers are fully insured against unemployment. In the central scenario the governments overestimate the costs of insurance when bargaining about the contribution rate and observing the common insurance budget of both countries. This leads to a less than socially optimal contribution rate.

25 pages.-- JEL Classification Number: F22. ; Unilateral migration policies impose externalities on other countries. In order to try to internalize these externalities, countries sign bilateral migration agreements. One element of these agreements is the emphasis on enforcing migration policies: immigrant-receiving countries agree to allow more immigrants from their emigrant-sending partner if they cooperate in enforcing their migration policy at the border. I present a simple theoretical model that justifies this behavior in a two-country setting with welfare maximizing governments. These governments establish migration quotas that need to be enforced at a cost. I prove that uncoordinated migration policies are inefficient. Both countries can improve welfare by exchanging a more "generous" migration quota for expenditure on enforcement policy. Contrary to what could be expected, this result does not depend on the enforcement technology that both countries employ. ; Peer reviewed

Throughout the world, migration is an increasingly important and diverse component of population change, both at national and sub-national levels. Migration impacts on the distribution of knowledge and generates externalities and spillover effects. This book focuses on recent models and methods for analysing and forecasting migration, as well as on the basic trends, driving factors and institutional settings behind migration processes. Migration and Human Capital also looks at many current policy issues regarding migration, such as the creative class in metropolitan areas, the brain drain, regional diversity, population ageing, illegal immigration, ethnic networks and immigrant assimilation. With specific reference to Europe and North America, the book reviews and applies models of internal migration; analyses the spatial concentration of human capital; considers migration in a family context; and addresses the political economy of international migration. This book will be invaluable for researchers and policy makers in the fields of internal and international migration. It provides up-to-date readings for advanced courses that focus on migration and population change in a global context

Previous immigration facilitates future immigration, a phenomenon called network migration. While well recognized, previous research has mainly focused on the implications of immigrant networks on future migrants. In contrast, this paper derives a simple model from the perspective of the incumbent immigrant population by introducing sub‐networks and argues that the incumbent migrants fail to achieve a Pareto optimal network size due to differences in inter‐ and intra‐migrant group externalities and subsequently coordination failures. In short, it stresses the active role incumbents take in the provision of network effects and provides theoretical evidence that self‐perpetuating and sustained immigration is not at odds with rational acting individuals. It also shows that optimally chosen migration quotas may appeal to incumbent migration cohorts and provides an alternative explanation for inter‐ and intra‐migrant group tensions.