Suchergebnisse

In der jüngsten Vergangenheit kam es zu gewalttätigen Vorfällen in Form von Angriffen auf zivile Ziele und zu politischen Attentaten in Ländern, in denen es gewöhnlich nicht erwartet wird. Dies hat es notwendig erscheinen lassen, das Interesse an dem alten Konzept des "kollektiven Bewusstseins" wieder zu beleben. In diesem Artikel werden das Konzept in seiner gegenwärtigen Reformulierung als "kollektiver Geisteszustand" und Versuche individueller Akteure, diesen Zustand zu kontrollieren, zu verändern und anderweitig zu nutzen, diskutiert. Es wird gefolgert, dass die Berücksichtigung "kollektiver Geisteszustände" und deren Effekt auf und Nutzbarkeit durch individuelle Akteure essenziell für Erklärungen in den Sozialwissenschaften ist.

Decades of research conducted in Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, & Democratic (WEIRD) societies have led many scholars to conclude that the use of mental states in moral judgment is a human cognitive universal, perhaps an adaptive strategy for selecting optimal social partners from a large pool of candidates. However, recent work from a more diverse array of societies suggests there may be important variation in how much people rely on mental states, with people in some societies judging accidental harms just as harshly as intentional ones. To explain this variation, we develop and test a novel cultural evolutionary theory proposing that the intensity of kin-based institutions will favor less attention to mental states when judging moral violations. First, to better illuminate the historical distribution of the use of intentions in moral judgment, we code and analyze anthropological observations from the Human Area Relations Files. This analysis shows that notions of strict liability—wherein the role for mental states is reduced—were common across diverse societies around the globe. Then, by expanding an existing vignette-based experimental dataset containing observations from 321 people in a diverse sample of 10 societies, we show that the intensity of a society's kin-based institutions can explain a substantial portion of the population-level variation in people's reliance on intentions in three different kinds of moral judgments. Together, these lines of evidence suggest that people's use of mental states has coevolved culturally to fit their local kin-based institutions. We suggest that although reliance on mental states has likely been a feature of moral judgment in human communities over historical and evolutionary time, the relational fluidity and weak kin ties of today's WEIRD societies position these populations' psychology at the extreme end of the global and historical spectrum.

In daily life, perceivers often need to predict and interpret the behavior of group agents, such as corporations and governments. Although research has investigated how perceivers reason about individual members of particular groups, less is known about how perceivers reason about group agents themselves. The present studies investigate how perceivers understand group agents by investigating the extent to which understanding the 'mind' of the group as a whole shares important properties and processes with understanding the minds of individuals. Experiment 1 demonstrates that perceivers are sometimes willing to attribute a mental state to a group as a whole even when they are not willing to attribute that mental state to any of the individual members of the group, suggesting that perceivers can reason about the beliefs and desires of group agents over and above those of their individual members. Experiment 2 demonstrates that the degree of activation in brain regions associated with attributing mental states to individuals—i.e., brain regions associated with mentalizing or theory-of-mind, including the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and precuneus—does not distinguish individual from group targets, either when reading statements about those targets' mental states (directed) or when attributing mental states implicitly in order to predict their behavior (spontaneous). Together, these results help to illuminate the processes that support understanding group agents themselves. ; John Merck Fund (John Merck Scholars Program)

AbstractThere are two broad views of children's theory of mind. The mentalist view is that it emerges in infancy and is possibly innate. The minimalist view is that it emerges more gradually in childhood and is heavily dependent on learning. According to minimalism, children initially understand behaviors rather than mental states, and they are assisted in doing so by recognizing repeating patterns in behavior. The regularities in behavior allow them to predict future behaviors, succeed on theory‐of‐mind tasks, acquire mental state words, and eventually, understand the mental states underlying behavior. The present study provided the first clear evidence for the plausibility of this view by fitting head cameras to 54 infants aged 6 to 25 months, and recording their view of the world in their daily lives. At 6 and 12 months, infants viewed an average of 146.5 repeated behaviors per hour, a rate consistent with approximately 560,000 repetitions in their first year, and with repetitions correlating with children's acquisition of mental state words, even after controlling for their general vocabulary and a range of variables indexing social interaction. We also recorded infants' view of people searching or searching for and retrieving objects. These were 92 times less common and did not correlate with mental state vocabulary. Overall, the findings indicate that repeated behaviors provide a rich source of information for children that would readily allow them to recognize patterns in behavior and help them acquire mental state words, providing the first clear evidence for this claim of minimalism.Research HighlightsSix‐ to 25‐month‐olds wore head cameras to record home life from infants' point‐of‐view and help adjudicate between nativist and minimalist views of theory‐of‐mind (ToM).Nativists say ToM is too early developing to enable learning, whereas minimalists say infants learn to predict behaviors from behavior patterns in environment.Consistent with minimalism, infants had an incredibly rich exposure (146.5/h, >560,000 in first year) to repeated behaviors (e.g., drinking from a cup repeatedly).Consistent with minimalism, more repeated behaviors correlated with infants' mental state vocabulary, even after controlling for gender, age, searches witnessed and non‐mental state vocabulary.

The authors describe and propose ways to determine the level of school disadaptation. Associated psychological factors are identified: levels of school motivation and adaptation, situational and personal anxiety, indicators and forms of aggression, self-esteem of depression. The obtained experimental data on the tendency to disadaptation are analyzed, as well as the psychological factors that influence the formation of disadaptation of young school children are investigated.

Quantitative and qualitative analysis of mental states and personality characteristics of elementary school children with disadaptation shall be conducted to study their school disadaptation, organization of comprehensive psychological and pedagogical assistance to school children, teachers and parents. Existing research methods are mainly based on self-estimation methodologies.

Experimental data on addiction to disadaptation was obtained, additionally, the psychological factors, which influence on disadaptation formation of elementary school children, were examined. The majority of examined children were found to have a low level of reactive anxiety and a high level of personal anxiety.

AbstractThough there is empirical support for the relation between parents' mental state talk to children and children's social understanding, including false belief understanding (FBU) and emotion understanding (EU), effect sizes range widely. The current meta‐analysis focused on the relation between parents' mental state talk and children's social understanding and moderators of this relation: parents' mental state talk content (e.g., cognitive vs. emotion talk), quality (e.g., appropriate vs. inappropriate), and context (e.g., book vs. reminiscing). Data from 22 studies examining FBU and 18 examining EU were examined. Participants included 2,298 children (<7 years). Analyses yielded a significant effect size for parents' mental state talk and children's FBU and EU. These relations were stronger under certain circumstances, particularly for children's FBU. For example, in terms of content, cognitive state talk was a stronger predictor of FBU and EU compared to talk about desires and emotions. For FBU, the strongest relations were present when parents' mental state talk was: (a) appropriate and explanatory compared to inappropriate and (b) in a book or self‐report context compared to reminiscing. The results of this study further refine the social constructivist view of social understanding and point to future avenues for research aimed at improving children's social understanding.

Systems building and behavioral finance -- Systems building for the three skills of top trading -- Behavioral finance -- The life cycle model of crowd behavior -- Pattern recognition and discretionary spending -- Wyckoff : the man, the method, the mystique -- The basic elements of charting for the Wyckoff method -- The Wyckoff method of technical analysis and speculation -- Anatomy of a trading range; anatomy of a trade -- Mental state management -- Trader psychology and mental discipline -- The composite man -- Putting it all together : ten principles for a trader to live by -- Endnotes -- Recommended reading -- Index