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`Fictitious Loans'
In: The economic history review, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 187
ISSN: 1468-0289
SSRN
COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF LOAN AGREEMENTS AND GRATUITOUS USE – LOANS
The development of the institution of loans and borrowings from the times of the Roman Empire and the present is analyzed. The main features of the agreement, characteristic of Roman law and modern national legislation of Uzbekistan, are considered, that is, the signs of a loan agreement under the Civil Code of the republic.
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Lending Relationships in Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from Corporate Loans
In: ECB Working Paper No. 2021/2553
SSRN
War loans versus subsidies
In: Foreign affairs, Band 9, S. 683-685
ISSN: 0015-7120
Loan Amortization Plans of Building and Loan Associations
In: Journal of Business of the University of Chicago, Band 8, Heft 3, S. 257
Rates for Vehicle Loans: Race and Loan Source
In: American economic review, Band 98, Heft 2, S. 315-320
ISSN: 1944-7981
War Loans Versus Subsidies
In: Foreign affairs, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 683
ISSN: 0015-7120
War Loans or Subsidies
In: Foreign affairs, Band 4, Heft 1, S. 394
ISSN: 0015-7120
Student Loan Forgiveness
Blog: Cato at Liberty
Jeffrey Miron
This article appeared on Substack on June 29, 2023.
Later today, or next week at the latest, the Supreme Court will announce its decision in two cases that challenge the Biden administration's cancellation of $400 billion in federal student loan debt.
The legal issues are beyond my expertise. Regardless of the Court's decision, however, loan forgiveness is deeply misguided as a matter of policy.
Those who took out loans did so willingly. Presidential cancellation, at taxpayer expense, undermines the rule of law and makes a mockery of people who honor their commitments, or accept the consequences of failing to do so, even when that is difficult.
If this forgiveness stands, future borrowers will take out even more debt, believing that future presidents will likely cancel some of it. They will probably be right.
This moral hazard increases the cost of the loan program; more and more is paid out, and less and less is re‐paid.
Worse, subsidizing education loans, and especially forgiving them ex post, discourages potential borrowers from using common sense to decide how much education to acquire and whether borrowing to pay for it is sensible.
Some amount of, and certain kinds of, education are beneficial for almost anyone.
Yet more and more education is almost never the right choice. Any decision to acquire education should balance the benefits against the costs (including explicit costs, like tuition, and the opportunity costs of foregone income). By making costs artificially low, loan forgiveness encourages excessive or poorly chosen kinds of education.
Students loan forgiveness, moreover, mainly helps higher income borrowers, since they take out disproportionately larger loans. Thus Biden's proposal is regressive.
Last, loan forgiveness by executive action is ripe for political abuse; politicians will do so in ways that benefit voters they can "bribe" into staying or becoming their supporters.
In Libertarian Land, governments would not subsidize student loans. Such a policy, however, at least has good intentions. Presidential loan forgiveness is just politically motivated theft.
Complexity in Loan Contracts
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Working paper