Suchergebnisse

Sebagai cabang kekuasaan kehakiman yang memiliki wewenang untuk menguji undang-undang terhadap Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, Mahkamah Konstitusi dinilai sering kali mengeluarkan putusan yang bersifat kontroversial. Sehingga, muncullah berbagai gagasan para pakar hukum untuk membatasi kekuasaan kehakiman, yang salah satunya ialah untuk menerapkan Judicial Restraint. Menurut Posner dalam dalam jurnal Wicaksana Dramanda dikatakan bahwa: "Judicial restraint merupakan upaya hakim atau pengadilan untuk membatasi diri dalam kerangka prinsip pemisahan kekuasaan (separation of powers). Hal ini berarti bahwa judicial restraint adalah upaya dari cabang kekuasaan kehakiman untuk tidak mengadili perkara-perkara yang akan dapat mengganggu cabang kekuasaan yang lain. Posner beranggapan bahwa pengadilan bukanlah "primary custodian" dalam sistem politik sebuah negara yang dapat menentukan kesejahteraan sosial. Oleh karena itu, pengadilan hanya diperkenankan untuk mengadili perkara-perkara yang ditentukan secara limitatif berdasarkan hukum sebagai kewenangannya"

Abstract
The international bailout granted to Portugal between 2011 and 2014 was conditional on the adoption by the Portuguese State of austerity measures included in a memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by the European Commission on behalf of the European Union (EU) and the Member States. The MoU was never published in an official journal or even translated into the Portuguese language. Its implementation caused a significant decrease in the level of protection of social rights.
The compatibility of the MoU with core principles of the rule of law and with the EU's social Constitution was never tested in court. A systemic failure in the jurisdictional system of the EU immunized the MoU to any judicial challenge. At the apex of the system, the Court of Justice of the EU declined to answer preliminary references submitted by Portuguese lower courts that questioned the compatibility with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU of national budgetary measures that implemented the MoU. At the bottom, Portuguese courts either failed to properly identify the EU law acts that were the source of national austerity measures or disregarded their role as common EU law courts of ordinary jurisdiction when they bypassed the opportunity to refer a question for a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice challenging the validity of the MoU.

This Article calls upon the Supreme Court to stay the Judiciary's hand in taxpayer grievances concerning purely executive action. Parts II and III of the Article provide the relevant background material for an understanding of the subject matter. Specifically, Part I recounts the evolution of taxpayer standing, taking the reader from the Supreme Court's decision in Frothingham to its counterpoint decision in Flast. Part III summarizes the Seventh Circuit's unprecedented decision in Freedom. Part IV demonstrates that taxpayer standing as conceived by the Freedom court does not conform to the standing paradigm formulated in Flast, and moreover, directly conflicts with the holdings of seminal post-Flast Supreme Court cases. Parts V and VI posit that even assuming arguendo that Freedom does not directly conflict with Supreme Court precedent, the decision should not be affirmed for two other reasons. First, as discussed in Part V, the Freedom court's conception of taxpayer standing should not be sustained because there is no logical nexus between taxpayer status and a claim challenging executive action that violates the Establishment Clause. Second, as discussed in Part VI, the Freedom court's expansion of taxpayer standing cannot be reconciled with modem standing doctrine and the requirement of a concrete injury. Part VII proposes that through general oversight authority and the power of the purse, the Legislative Branch is more competent to address and remedy taxpayer grievances challenging executive spending abuses. In the concluding remarks, the Article provides the Supreme Court with a roadmap to follow in charting its course through the doctrinal crossroads paved by the Freedom court.

This Article examines the role of courts in controlling state violence in the United States and Israel. The Author considers how U.S. federal courts should respond to illegal state violence by comparing a U.S. Supreme Court case, "City of Los Angeles v. Lyons", with a case decided by the Supreme Court of Israel, Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel. Part II highlights the legal issues that were central to each court in reaching a decision, including standing, the scope of equitable discretion to craft remedies, and baseline attitudes towards illegal government action. Part III examines the doctrines discussed in Part II, and considers whether expanding or altering these doctrines would strengthen the ability of U.S. courts to respond to illegal state violence. In Part IV, the Author examines the differences in the roles and powers of the U.S. and Israeli courts in an effort to address the relationship of U.S. and Israeli courts to state violence. The Author argues that despite the greater formal power enjoyed by the U.S. Supreme Court compared to the Israeli Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court may have less flexibility to enforce civil rights.

Penelitian ini dibuat untuk menganalisa kedudukan wewenang Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia terkait Constitutional Complaint diantara dua disparitas dimensi Judicial Restraint dan Judicial Activism, dimana Constitutional Complaint merupakan wewenang dasar Mahakamah Konstitusi seluruh dunia untuk melindungi hak-hak dasar setiap warga negara (The Protect of Human Right) sebagai upaya preventif akhir (exhousted of justice), namun tidak dengan Indonesia. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa Constitutional Complaint merupakan hal yang sangat penting dalam sebuah negara hukum, dimana konsekuensinya adalah perlindungan atas hak asasi manusia bagi setiap masyarakatnya. Adikara Mahkamah Konstitusi terlimitasi pada konstitusi dan peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku saat ini, sehingga hal ini yang menjadi dasar dan pokok argumentasi dimensi Judicial Restraint, lain halnya dengan gagasan Judicial Activism yang beranggapan penyelesaian sengketa Constitutional Complaint dapat diakomodir oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi tanpa harus menunggu amandemen konstitusi yang syarat akan kepentingan politik.

How does backlash from consolidated democracies affect the behavior of liberal international institutions? We argue that liberal international institutions have incentives to appease their democratic critics. Liberal institutions rely on democratic support for their continued effectiveness and can accommodate democratic critics at a lower legitimacy cost than non-democratic challengers. We examine this theory in the context of the European Court of Human Rights using a new dataset of rulings until 2019 and a coding of government positions during multiple reform conferences. Combining matching and a difference-in-differences design, we find strong evidence that the Court exercises restraint towards consolidated democracies that have criticized the Court in multilateral reform conferences by rendering fewer violation judgments against these states. We find some evidence that governments have also recently appointed more deferential judges. The findings suggest that backlash can affect liberal international institutions even without membership exit.