Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis paper studies a periodic‐review pricing and inventory control problem for a retailer, which faces stochastic price‐sensitive demand, under quite general modeling assumptions. Any unsatisfied demand is lost, and any leftover inventory at the end of the finite selling horizon has a salvage value. The cost component for the retailer includes holding, shortage, and both variable and fixed ordering costs. The retailer's objective is to maximize its discounted expected profit over the selling horizon by dynamically deciding on the optimal pricing and replenishment policy for each period. We show that, under a mild assumption on the additive demand function, at the beginning of each period an (s,S) policy is optimal for replenishment, and the value of the optimal price depends on the inventory level after the replenishment decision has been done. Our numerical study also suggests that for a sufficiently long selling horizon, the optimal policy is almost stationary. Furthermore, the fixed ordering cost (K) plays a significant role in our modeling framework. Specifically, any increase in K results in lower s and higher S. On the other hand, the profit impact of dynamically changing the retail price, contrasted with a single fixed price throughout the selling horizon, also increases with K. We demonstrate that using the optimal policy values from a model with backordering of unmet demands as approximations in our model might result in significant profit penalty. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006

AbstractWe address infinite‐horizon models for oligopolies with competing retailers under demand uncertainty. We characterize the equilibrium behavior which arises under simple wholesale pricing schemes. More specifically, we consider a periodic review, infinite‐horizon model for a two‐echelon system with a single supplier servicing a network of competing retailers. In every period, each retailer faces a random demand volume, the distribution of which depends on his own retail price as well as those charged by possibly all competing retailers. We also derive various comparative statics results regarding the impact several exogenous system parameters (e.g., cost or distributional parameters) have on the equilibrium decisions of the retailers as well as their expected profits. We show that certain monotonicity properties, engrained in folklore as well as in known inventory models for centralized systems, may break down in decentralized chains under retailer competition. Our results can be used to optimize the aggregate profits in the supply chain (i.e., those of the supplier and all retailers) by implementing a specific wholesale pricing scheme. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.

This paper offers a simple approach to the theory of decentralizing inventory and pricing decisions along a supply chain. We consider an upstream manufacturer selling to two outlets, which compete as differentiated duopolists and face uncertain demand. Demand spillovers between the outlets arise in the event of stockouts. The price mechanism, in which each outlet pays a two-part price and chooses price and inventory, virtually never coordinates incentives efficiently. Contracts that can elicit first-best decisions include resale price floors or buy-back policies (retailer-held options to sell inventory back to the manufacturers). (JEL D21, L13, L14, M11)