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Companies like Starbucks and Chick-fil-A are routinely labeled trademark bullies. The term "trademark bully" is typically used to describe a large company that uses aggressive intimidation tactics and threats of prolonged trademark infringement litigation to stop small businesses and individuals from using their own trademarks where the stated claims of infringement are likely spurious or non-existent. Trademark bullying harms competition and chills the free speech interests of those seeking to use trademarks for criticism and parody as permitted by the fair use doctrine. This Article identifies two fundamental causes that interact to encourage the aggressive tactics used by trademark bullies. First, trademark law imposes a vague duty on trademark owners to "police" third party trademark use for potential infringement. This uncertain duty renders trademark owners unable to accurately predict the risk of harm that third parties pose to their trademarks. Secondly, inherent cognitive biases affecting evaluations of such risk lead to systematic judgment errors and overestimation of the risk involved, thereby encouraging aggressive trademark enforcement. This Article uses prospect theory, an empirical social science approach to understanding human decision making, to characterize the psychological phenomena, including loss aversion and overestimation of risk, that motivate trademark bullies. Prospect theory explains apparently irrational decision making by trademark bullies. Recently proposed solutions for trademark bullying mistakenly assume that the trademark bully conducts a rational cost-benefit analysis prior to acting. Better solutions require an understanding of the actual psychological processes that underlie these aggressive tactics.

Judicial control of the Commission's complex economic appraisals in EU competition enforcement has long troubled both academics and practitioners. Despite the commonly shared feeling that the marginal standard of review, as applied by EU Courts, is not as deferential as one might fear, its operation remains shrouded in vagueness, due to difficulties in defining the notion of "complex economic evaluations" as the trigger for a less strict standard of control and due to the lack of a clear understanding as to the errors that may invalidate the Commission's analysis. This article sheds light on the judicial scrutiny of complex economic assessments, and demonstrates that (a) complex economic evaluations may come in different varieties and should not be seen as a uniform group, (b) the manifest error of assessment test is not an intangible formula of judicial scrutiny, contingent on one's subjective perception of "manifestness", but targets four specific defects in the Commission's analysis: failure to correctly assess the material facts of the case, failure to take into account a relevant factor, taking into account an irrelevant factor that distorted the analysis, and failure to satisfy the standard of proof, and (c) EU Courts have three "aces" up their sleeve that may enable them to diminish the Commission's margin of appreciation: economics, evidence review and Article 19(1) TEU.

Published: December 2018 ; The enforcement of competition law in the EU is at historic heights, with numerous cases and high-profile decisions which made it, without any doubt, the "star" of EU law. Due to its perceived success, EU competition law and enforcement became a model followed by an increasing number of emerging and developing economies outside the Union itself—a "beacon" for the enforcement of competition rules across the world. Such an enviable position does not preclude but, on the contrary, warrants more scrutiny of the way the EU competition law is enforced. Is the EU system fully compliant with the requirements of due process, what is the quality of the decisions, and how prone is this system to errors—all these are valid and more meaningful questions than ever. This article aims to sketch out an analysis of the way the EU competition law is enforced, and I intend to delve into this analysis in future contributions. For the time being, this endeavour is limited to outlining certain aspects of the enforcement of the EU competition rules that have been and are raising concerns. Thus, I shall focus this preliminary analysis on cartels, as perhaps the most important part of the competition law, in terms of number of cases and effects on consumer welfare. I consider that this is the appropriate moment to discuss flaws and their possible fixes, given that the European Commission is approaching the end of the legislative process for a new directive aimed at switching the enforcement of the EU competition law into a higher gear, through the empowering of the national competition authorities with the right tools in order to achieve a fully effective enforcement of these rules ("a genuine common competition enforcement area", in the words of the Commission), a process dubbed as ECN+. Whilst I mostly agree with the contemplated changes, I am of the opinion that they do not cover the main concerns raised with regard to the EU competition enforcement. There are early claims in various forums for a reform of the enforcement structure which was established in 1962. Even if the EU competition enforcement structure proved to be mostly effective over time, due to a changing landscape of both the economy, where new challenges arose, especially in the digital economy, and of the legal background, where the fundamental rights have come to prominence in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and of the European Court of Justice, the reform thereof appears to be worth considering at this point. I argue in this article that the need for a reform of the EU competition enforcement became stringent, even if it does not necessarily entail major structural changes, which are more difficult to implement. I am pragmatic and I advocate for, at least, a more careful analysis of the factual circumstances in order to avoid the per-se trap—using the by-object box too frequently and considering too easily that such an infringement exists, based on only a slim layer of facts.

Ratuioning of the content of hazardous substances in soil as an object of environmental protection in the Russian Federation is provided by a set of normative acts establishing the principles of assessment, approaches to the use of soils of varying degrees of anthropogenic transformation, the level of their pollution, at which the responsibility of the land user for violation of legislation on soil protection occurs. The analysis of normative acts shows that the most stringent pollution regulation system has been established in Russia, which is based on determining the compliance of the content of chemical elements and compounds in soils with sanitary and hygienic standards in the territories of settlements and agricultural lands. On other lands, as a standard, the excess of which leads to the onset of economic responsibility for pollution, the value of the concentration of the pollutant in the adjacent territory of a similar purpose and type of use, which is not adversely affected by a specific type of violation, is applied. At the same time, chemical elements and compounds are considered as pollutants, regardless of their origin, degree of danger and biological significance. The application of this approach within the framework of law enforcement practice creates significant problems in establishing the fact of negative impact, calculating the amount of damage from pollution, and developing measures for soil remediation. Thus, the current regulations consider as pollutants substances of natural origin, including those that ensure soil fertility and are applied with mineral and organic fertilizers. The use of the background level of substances as the maximum permissible value does not take into account the natural variability of elements and compounds in soils, as well as the errors of their chemical analysis. The excessive rigidity of the applicable standards is the reason for the increased costs of soil remediation measures. The way out of this situation is to revise the rationing system, taking into account the biological significance of elements and compounds, and the need to introduce a multi-level system of soil quality indicators. There is a need to improve the conceptual framework as part of regulatory documents on soil protection.

I present the following proposal: information revealed during non-cartel investigations by competition law enforcement authorities, such as evaluation of M&As or investigation of monopolization (dominance) conduct, should be directly used to investigate and prosecute cartels. Currently, in several jurisdictions, information acquired in, for example, a M&A investigation typically cannot be directly used for a cartel case due to the underlying statutes and the legal and administrative procedures that govern information use. Reviewing the management and corporate strategy literature, I note that M&As form a vital part of firms' core business strategy, with the longer-run strategic aspects being more important. These longer-run strategies could be jeopardized if the firms were engaging in collusion, as the likelihood of detection and prosecution would increase under the proposed rule change, which would punish bad (collusive) behavior. I argue that irrespective of exactly how many cartels are actually prosecuted via this channel, the proposal has the likelihood of creating a meaningful deterrence effect. I also discuss the potential downsides related to Type 1 errors and administrative costs. Overall, I argue that the proposed rule change could increase the efficiency and effectiveness of cartel enforcement, and open an additional front in the fight against hardcore cartels that operate within jurisdictions as well as internationally.

In this thesis, we consider a class of security enforcement mechanisms we called Hardware-based Security Enforcement (HSE). In such mechanisms, some trusted software components rely on the underlying hardware architecture to constrain the execution of untrusted software components with respect to targeted security policies. For instance, an operating system which configures page tables to isolate userland applications implements a HSE mechanism. For a HSE mechanism to correctly enforce a targeted security policy, it requires both hardware and trusted software components to play their parts. During the past decades, several vulnerability disclosures have defeated HSE mechanisms. We focus on the vulnerabilities that are the result of errors at the specification level, rather than implementation errors. In some critical vulnerabilities, the attacker makes a legitimate use of one hardware component to circumvent the HSE mechanism provided by another one. For instance, cache poisoning attacks leverage inconsistencies between cache and DRAM's access control mechanisms. We call this class of attacks, where an attacker leverages inconsistencies in hardware specifications, compositional attacks. Our goal is to explore approaches to specify and verify HSE mechanisms using formal methods that would benefit both hardware designers and software developers. Firstly, a formal specification of HSE mechanisms can be leveraged as a foundation for a systematic approach to verify hardware specifications, in the hope of uncovering potential compositional attacks ahead of time. Secondly, it provides unambiguous specifications to software developers, in the form of a list of requirements. ; Dans ces travaux de thèse, nous nous intéressons à une classe de stratégies d'application de politiques de sécurité que nous appelons HSE, pour Hardware-based Security Enforcement. Dans ce contexte, un ou plusieurs composants logiciels de confiance contraignent l'exécution du reste de la pile logicielle avec le concours de la plate-forme matérielle ...

In this thesis, we consider a class of security enforcement mechanisms we called Hardware-based Security Enforcement (HSE). In such mechanisms, some trusted software components rely on the underlying hardware architecture to constrain the execution of untrusted software components with respect to targeted security policies. For instance, an operating system which configures page tables to isolate userland applications implements a HSE mechanism. For a HSE mechanism to correctly enforce a targeted security policy, it requires both hardware and trusted software components to play their parts. During the past decades, several vulnerability disclosures have defeated HSE mechanisms. We focus on the vulnerabilities that are the result of errors at the specification level, rather than implementation errors. In some critical vulnerabilities, the attacker makes a legitimate use of one hardware component to circumvent the HSE mechanism provided by another one. For instance, cache poisoning attacks leverage inconsistencies between cache and DRAM's access control mechanisms. We call this class of attacks, where an attacker leverages inconsistencies in hardware specifications, compositional attacks. Our goal is to explore approaches to specify and verify HSE mechanisms using formal methods that would benefit both hardware designers and software developers. Firstly, a formal specification of HSE mechanisms can be leveraged as a foundation for a systematic approach to verify hardware specifications, in the hope of uncovering potential compositional attacks ahead of time. Secondly, it provides unambiguous specifications to software developers, in the form of a list of requirements. ; Dans ces travaux de thèse, nous nous intéressons à une classe de stratégies d'application de politiques de sécurité que nous appelons HSE, pour Hardware-based Security Enforcement. Dans ce contexte, un ou plusieurs composants logiciels de confiance contraignent l'exécution du reste de la pile logicielle avec le concours de la plate-forme matérielle ...

Digital transformation has led to changes in business models of traditional players in the existing markets. What is more, new entrants and new markets appeared, in particular platforms and multisided markets. The emergence and rapid development of platforms are caused primarily by the existence of so called indirect network externalities. Regarding to this, a question arises of whether the existing instruments of competition law enforcement and market analysis are still relevant when analyzing markets with digital platforms? This paper aims at discussing advantages and disadvantages of using various tools to define markets with platforms. In particular, we define the features of the SSNIP test when being applyed to markets with platforms. Furthermore, we analyze adjustment in tests for platform market definition in terms of possible type I and type II errors. All in all, it turns out that to reduce the likelihood of type I and type II errors while applying market definition technique to markets with platforms one should consider the type of platform analyzed: transaction platforms without pass-through and non-transaction matching platforms should be tackled as players in a multisided market, whereas non-transaction platforms should be analyzed as players in several interrelated markets. However, if the platform is allowed to adjust prices, there emerges additional challenge that the regulator and companies may manipulate the results of SSNIP test by applying different models of competition.

The dissertation at hand focuses on the enforcement of accounting standards in Germany. The legal basis of the external enforcement of accounting standards in Germany was created by the "Bilanzkontrollgesetz" (Financial Reporting Enforcement Act) at the end of 2004. An enforcement mechanism was installed to enforce accounting standard compliance by regular reviews of disclosed financial statements. The system was established as implementation of EU guidelines. Since 2005, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) shall be applied for consolidated financial statement of firms listed on a regulated market segment within the European Union (EU) (Regulation EC No. 1606/2002). Simultaneously to the harmonization of accounting standards, the EU fostered the standardization of enforcement systems to ensure compliance with international accounting standards. Par. 16 of the so-called "IAS Regulation" mandates the "Committee of European Securities Regulators" (CESR) to "develop a common approach to enforcement". Germany's unique two-tiered system operates since July 2005; it involves the "Deutsche Pruefstelle fuer Rechnungslegung" (Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel), a newly established private organization primarily assigned to conduct the reviews. As the second tier, the "Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht" (Federal Financial Supervisory Authority) has the sovereign authority to order the publication of errors ("error announcements") and if necessary, to force the cooperation of firms in the review process. The dissertation is structured as follows. A general introduction focuses on the theoretical background and the reasoning for the need of external enforcement mechanisms. The common approach to enforcement in the European Union is described. Building on this, the thesis consists of three individual essays that analyze three specific questions in the context of the enforcement of financial reporting standards in Germany. The first paper focuses on the systematical evaluation of the information contained in 100 selected error announcements (from a total population of 151 evaluable announcements). The study finds that error announcements on average contain 3.64 single errors and 77% affect the reported profit. Relatively small as well as big, highly levered and rather unprofitable firms are overrepresented in the sample of misstatement firms. In a second step, the essay investigates the development of censured firms over time; the pre- and post-misstatement development of the firms in terms of balance sheet data, financial ratios and (real) earnings management are tracked. The analysis detects increasing leverage ratios and a decline in profitability over time. In the year of misstatement firms report large total and discretionary accruals, indicating earnings management. Compared to matched control firms, significant differences in profitability, market valuation, earnings management and real activities manipulations are observable. A major contribution of this first study is the examination of trends in financial data and (real) earnings management over a number of years surrounding misstatements as well as the elaboration of the distinction to non-misstating firms. The results show the meaning of the enforcement of IFRS for the quality of financial reporting to standard setters, policy makers, and investors in Germany. The second paper examines the interrelation of enforcement releases, firm characteristics and earnings quality. Prior literature documents the correlation between underperformance in financial ratios and the probability of erroneous disclosure of financial statements; this study provides evidence for differences in characteristics between firms with enforcement releases and control firms as well as a broad sample of German publicly traded firms (4,730 firm-year observations). Furthermore, research affirms the connection of financial ratios to earnings quality metrics. The accuracy of financial information is considered to be correlated with its quality and therefore the differences in earnings quality between various sub-samples is examined. Overall, the results document the underperformance in important financial ratios as well as indicate an inferior earnings quality of firms subject to enforcement releases vis-a-vis the control groups. These results hold with regard to both different earnings quality specifications and different periods observed. This study appends the earnings quality discussion and contributes to develop a comprehensive picture of accounting quality for the unique institutional settings of Germany. The paper shows that a conjoint two-tier public and private enforcement system is effective and might be an adequate model for other countries. Implications for the regulation of corporate governance, the enforcement panel and the auditor are identified. The third essay additionally considers the role of the auditor. The firms subject to error announcements are used to evaluate the consequences of increasing earnings management over time on enforcement releases and their recognition in audit fees. Prior literature provides evidence on a phenomenon called "balance sheet bloat" that is due to income increasing earnings management and later influences the disclosure of misstated financial statements. The evidence of earnings management recognition in audit fees and findings on the content of future information in audit fees leads to the hypothesis that auditors recognize increasing audit risk in fees before the enforcement process starts. The study extends related earnings management and audit fee literature by modeling the development of earnings management within the misstatement firms and systematically link it to auditor reactions. Significant predictive power of different commonly used accrual measures for enforcement releases in the period prior and up to the misstatement period are found by the study. In the same period of time an increase in audit fees, e.g. the recognition of increased audit risk, can be observed. A possible audit fee effect after the misstatement period is investigated, but no significant relation is obtained. The dissertation closes with a summary of the main findings, a conclusion to the connection of the three essays as well as subsumption of findings in the accounting literature. ; Die vorliegende Dissertation befasst sich mit der Prüfung der Rechnungslegung von deutschen Unternehmen (Enforcement). Die gesetzliche Grundlage des Enforcement-Verfahrens wurde durch das Bilanzkontrollgesetz von 2004 geschaffen; es soll die Einhaltung der Rechnungslegungsstandards (insbesondere der International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)) durch regelmäßige Durchsicht und Prüfung der offengelegten Rechnungslegung durchsetzen. Das System wurde als Umsetzung einer EU-Verordnung eingeführt: Seit 2005 müssen kapitalmarktorientierte Unternehmen mit Sitz in der EU die IFRS bei der Erstellung ihrer Konzernabschlüsse anwenden. (Verordnung EG Nr. 1606/2002). Zeitgleich zur Harmonisierung der anzuwendenden Rechnungslegungsstandards strengte die EU eine Standardisierung der Durchsetzung (Enforcement) dieser Normen an, um deren Einhaltung zu garantieren. Absatz 16 der oben genannten "IAS-Verordnung" beauftragt die europäische Wertpapierregulierungsbehörde (CESR) "ein gemeinsames Konzept für die Durchsetzung zu entwickeln". Das einzigartig ausgestaltete deutsche Enforcement-System ist seit Juli 2005 in Kraft gesetzt. Die neue gegründete, privatrechtlich organisierte Deutsche Prüfstelle für Rechnungslegung (DPR) prüft in erster Instanz die Rechnungslegung der Unternehmen. Auf einer zweiten Stufe ist die, mit hoheitlichen Mitteln ausgestattete, Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) beteiligt. Sie kann die Kooperation der Unternehmen verfügen und die Veröffentlichung von aufgedeckten Verstößen verbindlich anordnen. Die vorliegende Dissertation ist wie folgt strukturiert: Eine allgemeine Einführung zeigt theoretischen Hintergründe auf und legt die Begründung für die Notwendigkeit einer strikten Durchsetzung von Rechnungslegungsstandards dar. Des Weiteren werden die gesetzlichen Grundlagen des Enforcements aus einer europäischen Perspektive aufgezeigt. Hierauf aufbauend werden in drei Studien spezielle Fragestellungen im Kontext des deutschen Enforcement-Verfahrens analysiert. Die erste Studie konzentriert sich zunächst auf die systematische Auswertung der Information, die in den 100 veröffentlichten Fehlermitteilungen aus dem Enforcement-Verfahren (151 Fehlermitteilungen wurden zur Evaluierung herangezogen) enthalten ist. Diese Mitteilungen beinhalten im Durchschnitt 3,64 einzelne Fehler; sowohl relativ kleine als auch sehr große, hoch verschuldete und relativ unprofitable Unternehmen sind in dieser Stichprobe überrepräsentiert. In einem zweiten Schritt wird die zeitliche Entwicklung dieser Unternehmen näher betrachtet. Bilanzielle Daten und Kennzahlen sowie das Ausmaß an realer und buchmäßiger Bilanzpolitik werden von den Jahren vor einer Fehlerveröffentlichung, bis in die Zeit nach der Veröffentlichung ausgewertet. Diese Analyse zeigt ein ansteigendes Maß an Verschuldung und eine Abnahme der Profitabilität der Unternehmen. Im Jahr der fehlerhaften Rechnungslegung zeigt sich ein hohes Maß an totalen sowie diskretionären Periodenabgrenzungen, ein Hinweis auf ausgeprägte Bilanzpolitik. Verglichen mit Kontrollunternehmen werden signifikante Unterschiede bezüglich der Profitabilität, der Bewertung am Kapitalmarkt und der Bilanzpolitik deutlich. Die Studie leistet eine Beitrag zur vorhanden Literatur, da sie erstmals die bilanziellen Daten und das Ausmaß an Bilanzpolitik der zur Veröffentlichung von Fehlern gezwungenen Unternehmen im Zeitablauf betrachtet und systematisch auswertet. Auch werden Unterschiede zu nicht fehlerhaft berichtenden Unternehmen aufgezeigt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen die hohe Bedeutung der konsequenten Durchsetzung der Rechnungslegungsnormen für die Qualität der Finanzberichte. Die Erkenntnisse sind von Interesse für die internationalen Regulierungsbehörden, die national Politik und für Investoren am Kapitalmarkt. Die zweite Studie untersucht das Zusammenspiel des Enforcements, bzw. der Fehlerveröffentlichungen, mit finanziellen Kennzahlen und der Ergebnisqualität (Earnings Quality) der Unternehmen. Die wissenschaftliche Literatur liefert empirische Ergebnisse, dass die Offenlegung von fehlerhafter Rechnungslegung stark mit schlechten Finanzkennzahlen korreliert ist. Dieses zweite Papier liefert dazu Erkenntnisse im deutschen Kontext: Die Kennzahlen der von der DPR beanstandeten Unternehmen werden mit denen von Kontrollfirmen sowie allen am geregelten Markt gehandelten Unternehmen (4.730 Firmenjahre) verglichen und Unterschiede herausgearbeitet. Des Weiteren zeigen vorausgegangene Studien den Zusammenhang zwischen Finanzkennzahlen und der Ergebnisqualität. Folglich wird in dieser Studie der Zusammenhang zwischen Richtigkeit der veröffentlichten Informationen und den akademischen Maßgrößen zu deren Qualität betrachtet. Die Ergebnisse zeigen sowohl das schlechtere Abschneiden der "DPR-Unternehmen" im Sinne der finanziellen Kennzahlen, als auch eine schlechtere Ergebnisqualität der Rechnungslegung im Verglich zu Kontrollunternehmen. Diese Erkenntnisse sind stabil gegenüber Variationen der Messgrößen der Ergebnisqualität sowie gegenüber Veränderungen des Beobachtungszeitraums. Die Resultate tragen zur Diskussion um die Ergebnisqualität bei und ergänzen die wissenschaftliche Forschung hin zu einem umfassenden Bild der Qualität der Rechnungslegung in Deutschland. Die Studie zeigt, dass sich das deutsche Enforcement-Modell, mit privatrechtlich gestalteter DPR und staatlich organisierter BaFin, auch für eine Übertragung auf andere Länder eignen könnte. Die dritte Studie befasst sich mit der Effektivität des deutschen Enforcement-Systems, dem Einfluss von Bilanzpolitik und dessen Antizipation in den Prüfungskosten der Wirtschaftsprüfer. Die Untersuchung analysiert den zeitlichen Aspekt von Bilanzpolitik auf Fehlerveröffentlichungen in späteren Perioden. Es besteht die Möglichkeit die Verschlechterung der wirtschaftlichen Situation eines Unternehmens durch Bilanzpolitik zu verdecken. Ohne Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen Lage des Unternehmens führt dieses Verhalten zu einem Bilanzpolitikausmaß außerhalb des gesetzlichen Rahmens und folglich zu einer hohen Wahrscheinlichkeit der Fehlerentdeckung bei DPR Untersuchungen. Die Entwicklung der Bilanzpolitik eines solchen Unternehmens müsste im zweiten Schritt mit der Risikokomponente in den Prüfungskosten des Wirtschaftsprüfers in Verbindung stehen. Der risikoorientierte Prüfungsansatz und die Antizipation von Bilanzpolitik in den Prüfungskosten sollte demnach vor Fehlerbekanntmachung zu einem Anstieg der Prüfungskosten führen. Zusätzlich ist nach offizieller Fehlerveröffentlichung und somit durch eine objektiv beobachtbare Schwäche im Rechnungslegungssystem oder einem hohen Ausmaß an Bilanzpolitik ein Risikoaufschlag zu vermuten. Im letzten Kapitel werden die wichtigsten Aussagen und Erkenntnisse der Dissertation zusammengefasst sowie in abschließenden Bemerkungen der Zusammenhang der Ergebnisse erläutert.

The paper defines the features of the collective dominance institute in Russia as well as the relation between collective dominance and oligopoly in the spheres of law and economic theory. The article evaluates the grounds and consequences of the collective dominance legal norm application; it suggests an approach to examining the relation between effects and expected results of this legal norm application and outlines the potential ways to harmonize the best international practices of the collective dominance norm application with the existing economic standards of product market analysis for the purpose of competition law enforcement. Results of the oligopoly theory and the Russian version of collective dominance institution key elements comparison show: the collective dominance institution concept is inadequately applied to identify individual abuse of dominant position due to possible law enforcement errors. The Russian version of collective dominance institution reflects one fundamental tendency intrinsic to Russian antitrust: examined more closely, law enforcement, which is de jure aimed at protecting competition, appears to be economic regulation, which de facto can lead to competition restriction. One of the possible structural alternatives for the collective dominance institution reforming is based on presumption of the need to analyze the joint impact exerted by a group of undertakings on the market.

Myriad forms of communication occur within the criminal justice system as judges and attorneys speak to juries, law enforcement officers interact with the public, and the news media presents stories of events in courtrooms. Hindrances abound, however. Law enforcement officers and justice system personnel often encounter challenges that affect their ability to communicate with others, ranging from language barriers, to conflicting accounts of witnessed events, to errors caused by malfunctioning technology. Examining the relevancy of the U.S. Constitution to modern communications, The Foundation

The objective of the study is to provide characteristics to the state of academic discipline "Legal Linguistics" in Ukraine and in the countries of Romano-Germanic law, and its origin. To achieve the objective, the author has solved the following tasks: 1) description of the state of academic discipline "Legal Linguistics" in Ukrainian educational institutions; 2) "Legal Linguistics" as an academic discipline and as a research direction in the educational institutions of Germany and Switzerland and its importance for training a "European lawyer". It has been concluded that "Legal Linguistics" as an interdisciplinary academic discipline must be offered in the curriculum for training a lawyer in the specialty 081 "Jurisprudence" as an academic discipline of choice. The purpose of its study is to get acquainted with the main directions, ideas and problems of the current legal and linguistic science; studying theoretical and methodological principles of legal linguistics; mastering the methodology of drafting, editing and analysis of legal texts, namely normative and legal, various substatutory acts and law-enforcement documents. The tasks of the academic discipline are: students acquire in-depth knowledge, skills and abilities on the role of a language within legal regulation, the basics of legal technique, law-making and law-enforcement errors, specific features of linguistic examination of bills, mastering the methodology of drafting, editing and analysis of legal texts. The training of a modern lawyer in Europe is increasingly directed not at the study of state legislation, but on the formation of a "European lawyer", who thinks globally, is able to work not only with national law, but also with the acquis communautaire and to correctly interpret such acts, based on the provisions and conclusions of legal comparative studies. Training of law students in accordance with the European Credit Transfer System, which facilitates their mobility, assists in such a formation. ; Досліджено місце юридичної лінгвістики в правничій навчальній діяльності. Проаналізовано становище навчальної дисципліни «Юридична лінгвістика» в українських і зарубіжних ВНЗ. Акцентовано на тому, що «юридична (правнича) лінгвістика» як навчальна міждисциплінарна дисципліна має обов'язково пропонуватися в навчальних планах підготовки правника за спеціальністю 081 «Право» як вибіркова навчальна дисципліна.