Suchergebnisse

We incorporate the process of policy diffusion (i.e. the uncoordinated dissemination of policies among countries) into a probabilistic two-country-model of strategic environmental policy. Contrary to the usual setting with simultaneous decision making we consider the impact of sequential decision making: In the first step the domestic government introduces an emission tax, in the second step policy diffusion occurs with a certain probability and in the third step the firms decide on output quantities. Within this framework we analyze how the prospect of policy diffusion, motivated by a higher damage parameter in the domestic country, influences the optimal domestic emission tax. We show that if the damage parameter in the foreign country is sufficiently high policy diffusion will occur which leads to higher tax rates and higher welfare compared to the equilibrium resulting from simultaneous decision making. Moreover, we show that an increase in the domestic tax rate also increases the probability that the foreign country adopts the tax policy.

The European Union fulfills its emissions reductions commitments by means of an emissions trading scheme covering some part of each member state's economy and by national emissions control in the rest of their economies. The member states also levy energy/emissions taxes overlapping with the trading scheme. Restricting our focus on cost-effective policies, this paper investigates the distributive consequences of increasing the overlapping emissions tax that is uniform across countries. For quasi-linear utility functions and for a class of parametric utility and production functions emissions tax increases turn out to be exactly offset by permit price reductions. As a consequence permit-exporting [permit-importing] countries lose [gain] from an increase in the emissions tax. These results are not general, however. By means of a numerical example we show that export-import reversals and welfare reversals are possible.

The European Union fulfills its emissions reductions commitments by means of an emissions trading scheme covering some part of each member state's economy and by national emissions control in the rest of their economies. The member states also levy energy/emissions taxes overlapping with the trading scheme. Restricting our focus on cost-effective policies, this paper investigates the distributive consequences of increasing the overlapping emissions tax that is uniform across countries. For quasi-linear utility functions and for a class of parametric utility and production functions emissions tax increases turn out to be exactly offset by permit price reductions. As a consequence permit-exporting [permit-importing] countries lose [gain] from an increase in the emissions tax. These results are not general, however. By means of a numerical example we show that export-import reversals and welfare reversals are possible.

A set of existing optimization models, which represent the energy systems of the OECD and LDCs (less developed countries excluding centrally planned economies) with a time horizon to 2020, has been applied to derive first-order estimates of the techno-economic potential for emission reduction. The driving force for the introduction of reduction measures is a scheme of taxes levied on the emission of six pollutants, including the greenhouse gases CO2 and methane. The tax levels introduced are based on taxes discussed by the Swedish government: they are the break-even point to test which measures are cost effective and which emission levels can be reached at these costs. The regional models include the following alternatives: (i) reduction of final energy demand by supplying the requested services by other means (i.e., conservation); (ii) substitution of new fuels for polluting fuels; (iii) introduction of clean technologies for the same purposes; (iv) additions of pollution-reduction technologies. Alternative scenarios with emission taxes are compared with a base scenario without taxes related to pollutant emissions. The results indicate that an increase in CO2 emissions in the OECD and LDC regions of 47% over the next 30 yr in the base scenario would be changed to stable levels to 2010 by tax-induced measures. Thereafter, energy-consumption growth in the LDCs reverses this trend.

A set of existing optimization models, which represent the energy systems of the OECD and LDCs (less developed countries excluding centrally planned economies) with a time horizon to 2020, has been applied to derive first-order estimates of the techno-economic potential for emission reduction. The driving force for the introduction of reduction measures is a scheme of taxes levied on the emission of six pollutants, including the greenhouse gases CO2 and methane. The tax levels introduced are based on taxes discussed by the Swedish government: they are the break-even point to test which measures are cost effective and which emission levels can be reached at these costs. The regional models include the following alternatives: (i) reduction of final energy demand by supplying the requested services by other means (i.e., conservation); (ii) substitution of new fuels for polluting fuels; (iii) introduction of clean technologies for the same purposes; (iv) additions of pollution-reduction technologies. Alternative scenarios with emission taxes are compared with a base scenario without taxes related to pollutant emissions. The results indicate that an increase in CO2 emissions in the OECD and LDC regions of 47% over the next 30 yr in the base scenario would be changed to stable levels to 2010 by tax-induced measures. Thereafter, energy-consumption growth in the LDCs reverses this trend.