Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe COVID-19 pandemic of 2021 led to a worldwide health crisis that was accompanied by an infodemic. A group of 12 social media personalities, dubbed the "Disinformation Dozen", were identified as key in spreading disinformation regarding the COVID-19 virus, treatments, and vaccines. This study focuses on the spread of disinformation propagated by this group on Telegram, a mobile messaging and social media platform. After segregating users into three groups—the Disinformation Dozen, bots, and humans, we perform an investigation with a dataset of Telegram messages from January to June 2023, comparatively analyzing temporal, topical, and network features. We observe that the Disinformation Dozen are highly involved in the initial dissemination of disinformation but are not the main drivers of the propagation of disinformation. Bot users are extremely active in conversation threads, while human users are active propagators of information, disseminating posts between Telegram channels through the forwarding mechanism.

This study aims to explore the social and demographic determinants of narrative influence in Romania, with a specific focus on how disinformation campaigns are tailored to different age groups based on their digital behavior. By examining the intersection of social media consumption habits, cultural biases, and socio-economic factors, this paper seeks to contribute to the growing body of literature on developing more effective strategies to combat the spread of disinformation and protect the integrity of societal resilience in Romania's digital landscape.

Disinformation campaigns such as those perpetrated by far-right groups in the United States seek to erode democratic social institutions. Looking to understand these phenomena, previous models of disinformation have emphasized identity-confirmation and misleading presentation of facts to explain why such disinformation is shared. A risk of these accounts, which conjure images of echo chambers and filter bubbles, is portraying people who accept disinformation as relatively passive recipients or conduits. Here we conduct a case study of tactics of disinformation to show how platform design and decentralized communication contribute to advancing the spread of disinformation even when that disinformation is continuously and actively challenged where it appears. Contrary to a view of disinformation flowing within homogeneous echo chambers, in our case study we observe substantial skepticism against disinformation narratives as they form. To examine how disinformation spreads amidst skepticism in this case, we employ a document-driven multi-site trace ethnography to analyze a contested rumor that crossed anonymous message boards, the conservative media ecosystem, and other platforms. We identify two important factors that filtered out skepticism and contested explanations, which facilitated the transformation of this rumor into a disinformation campaign: (1) the aggregation of information into evidence collages—image files that aggregate positive evidence—and (2) platform filtering—the decontextualization of information as these claims crossed platforms. Our findings provide an elucidation of "trading up the chain" dynamics explored by previous researchers and a counterpoint to the relatively mechanistic accounts of passive disinformation propagation that dominate the quantitative literature. We conclude with a discussion of how these factors relate to the communication power available to disparate groups at different times, as well as practical implications for inferring intent from social media traces and practical ...

This study examines the consequences of the increasingly prevalent use of artificial intelligence (AI) disinformation initiatives upon freedom of expression, pluralism and the functioning of a democratic polity. The study examines the trade-offs in using automated technology to limit the spread of disinformation online. It presents options (from self-regulatory to legislative) to regulate automated content recognition (ACR) technologies in this context. Special attention is paid to the opportunities for the European Union as a whole to take the lead in setting the framework for designing these technologies in a way that enhances accountability and transparency and respects free speech. The present project reviews some of the key academic and policy ideas on technology and disinformation and highlights their relevance to European policy. Chapter 1 introduces the background to the study and presents the definitions used. Chapter 2 scopes the policy boundaries of disinformation from economic, societal and technological perspectives, focusing on the media context, behavioural economics and technological regulation. Chapter 3 maps and evaluates existing regulatory and technological responses to disinformation. In Chapter 4, policy options are presented, paying particular attention to interactions between technological solutions, freedom of expression and media pluralism.

Abstract
Geopolitical events, hybrid threats, and political agendas, particularly of a populist nature, are increasingly pervasive in global media, therefore the imperative to understand the intricacies of disinformation extends beyond mere countermeasures. To effectively mitigate the spread and creation of disinformation, an examination of the primary reasons contributing to its emergence is essential, thus the primary objective of the research is to investigate the most common reasons for the emergence of disinformation and assess its impact on society. The methodology used employs a diverse range of methods, including literature analysis, content analysis, historical methods, and legal interpretation where applicable. Furthermore, it utilizes general scientific techniques such as induction, deduction, and synthesis.

Abstract
This article identifies how and why Argentine political rumors were created, spread, and legitimized by government officials, military officers and the press in the interwar years. In that period, the practice of what we now call "fake news"—known as pescado podrido (rotten fish) in Argentina for it poisons the one who hears or repeats it—became more common and took on international proportions. In Argentina, a variety of forces drove the increase in disinformation, including political instability, the rising (and later the banning) of the majoritarian Radical Party, elite anxiety about the threat of communism, and a long-lasting nationalist fear about the integrity of borders. Authorities and right-wing politicians were inclined to see any anti-government actions as linked to international communism and, in some cases, imaginary Jewish conspiracies. The article offers two case studies: One refers to the anti-Radical Party rumors, especially those spread in the days immediately before and after the coup d'état in 1930; and the other to a more generalized atmosphere of anti-communist inspired rumors and fake news in the interwar period. This article is based on research in government archives and newspaper collections in Patagonian cities, Buenos Aires, and Washington, D.C. Argentine official sources included records from the Ministry of the Interior, the Gobernación del Neuquén, President Agustín P. Justo's papers and recently declassified army and navy documents.

In this study, we explore online informational warfare by the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA) against Ukraine during the military conflict in Donbass. Introducing a digital dimension to the long-standing Russian disinformation strategy of reflexive control as a historic and theoretical framework, we investigate how the IRA combined online news and social media platforms to promote propaganda to its growing number of followers. Combining computational and qualitative content analyses with time series modeling, we demonstrate how the IRA blurs distinctions between fact and fiction through interlinks among digital platforms, and we expose its successful strategies for follower growth on Twitter. We conclude with implications for understanding and promptly identifying modern hybrid warfare strategies, with a focus on coordinated multiplatform efforts that spread disinformation through the hybrid media ecosystem.

Disinformation and misinformation about COVID-19 have proliferated, particularly on social media. The purpose of this paper is to show the rhizomic nature of COVID-19-related dis- and misinformation having aspect of conspiracy theories, which are used on social media platforms to counter the official narratives about the origins of the virus. Consisting of 40 news-style articles, the data was used to find out how a conspiracy theory about the virus being a possible man-made bioweapon was presented to the audience. The results indicate that the rhizomatic structure of COVID-19 conspiracy theories makes it possible to vary the narratives based on the platform where it is published and the target audience. Information spreads in unexpected ways, and it is difficult to control or predict the spread of extremist content. This makes it possible for different actors, governments, and organizations to use information for their own purposes as a weapon of information warfare.

Previous research has described how highly personalised paid advertising on social media platforms can be used to influence voter preferences and undermine the integrity of elections. However, less work has examined how search engine optimisation (SEO) strategies are used to target audiences with disinformation or political propaganda. This paper looks at 29 junk news domains and their SEO keyword strategies between January 2016 and March 2019. I find that SEO — rather than paid advertising — is the most important strategy for generating discoverability via Google Search. Following public concern over the spread of disinformation online, Google's algorithmic changes had a significant impact on junk news discoverability. The findings of this research have implications for policymaking, as regulators think through legal remedies to combat the spread of disinformation online.

The polemic of the China produced Sinovac Vaccine issue spreading among the public, is a form of disinformation used by political opposition to the government, to block and mess up the government's effort to accelerate handling of Covid-19 transmission in Indonesia. The polemic results in 4 situations, namely; first, decreasing public trust in the government's commitment in eradicating the Covid-19 pandemic. Second, low level of support from the public of the Covid-19 handling programs. Third, delayed and slow economic recovery which brings down the public's economic ability due to increasing number of layoffs caused by decreases in companies' turnover and affecting the public's purchasing power. Fourth, the national security aspect, especially on the potential aspect regarding disintegration of the nation. Purpose of this research is to reveal the disinformation via China-made Sinovac vaccine polemic. The research applies disinformation and asymmetric warfare concepts to prove the Sinovac vaccine polemic, while also using a qualitative research approach by making the polemic issue as the object of case study. Data collection technique is done by text observation on social media which covers the Sinovac vaccine polemic. The research discovers that the disinformation effort to the Sinovac vaccine issue is a polemic to the government, that the public assess as slow in handling the spread of Covid-19.KEYWORDS: Polemic, Sinovac Vaccine, Disinformation, Asymmetrical Warfare

The Russia-Ukrainian war has led to a large disinformation campaign, largely spread through social media. Canada has been a target of these influence campaigns to affect Canadian public opinions. In this policy brief, we venture to examine the prevalence of pro-Russian narratives on Canadian social media as well as identify major influencers creating and spreading such narratives. Additionally, using artificial intelligence, we seek to examine the reach and nature of pro-Russian disinformation narratives.
Our research team has been collecting more than 6.2 million Tweets globally since January 2022 to monitor and measure Russian influence operations on social media. We find that pro-Russian narratives promoted in the Canadian social media ecosystem on twitter are divided into two large communities:1) accounts influenced by sources from the United States and 2) those largely influenced by sources from international sources from Russia, Europe, and China.
First, pro-Russian discourse on Canadian Twitter blames NATO for the conflict suggesting that Russia's invasion was a result of NATO's expansionism or aggressive intentions toward Russia. In this context, pro-Russian propaganda argues that the West has no moral high ground to condemn the invasion and nations such as Canada, the US, and the UK are trying to force Europe into this conflict to benefit materially. Second, it is suggested that Western nations are propping up fascists in Ukraine, thus justifying Russia's actions. Thirdly, pro-Russian narrative attempts to amplify mistrust of democratic institutions, be it the media, international institutions, or the Liberal government. Faced with the challenges associated with foreign interference, it is important to gain a deeper understanding of the spread of disinformation in Canada.

"The Disinformers uncovers the people and the organizations behind the disinformation campaigns that began on social media with the 2016 U.S. presidential election and reached a violent crescendo with the storming of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Edited by social media researcher Lance Porter, this vital collection of interdisciplinary scholarship analyzes how foreign interference destabilized political conversations, stoked racial tensions, and spread disinformation across social media platforms to produce increasing friction among voters. With a new presidential election cycle in motion, members of the voting public continue questioning both the security of the nation's election systems and the validity of its media networks. The 2016 election thrust the vulnerability of voting technology to the forefront of conversations in the United States and sparked discussions about the use of social media to distribute divisive and false information. While Donald Trump's claims of fraud in the 2016 and 2020 elections were verifiably false, disinformation undoubtedly roiled the nation's media systems and spurred on the insurrection of January 6. Presenting seven essays of original research, The Disinformers focuses on the turning point of 2016 and how disinformation campaigns continued in the following years. The contributors examine organizations such as Russia's Internet Research Agency and its connections with a conservative network across social media, including Facebook and Twitter, that disseminated incendiary content. Essays from political scientists, media scholars, computer scientists, and cybersecurity experts reveal the ways in which disinformation permeates social media, the platform policies and chronic inaction that enable disinformation to circulate, and the effects of disinformation on young people as well as on historically repressed groups. At a critical time in the U.S. political cycle, The Disinformers provides in-depth analysis of issues essential to understanding the role disinformation can play in elections across the world"--

Internet shutdowns authorized by the state are becoming a recurring case in countries under military or authoritarian rule, such as Sudan. This article examines how the military in Sudan shut down the Internet to cover up the June 3 massacre. The shutdown made it difficult for the protestors and civilians to share and document the human rights violations committed by the state from June 3 to July 9, 2019. We also demonstrate how the Internet shutdowns were instrumental in circulating state-sponsored disinformation campaigns delegitimizing the protests. The article expands on existing literature to explain how information vacuums are conducive to the spread of disinformation and the weakening of on-ground protest movements. Despite the crippling effects of the Internet shutdown in Khartoum, our analysis illustrates how protestors challenged designed technical and physical workarounds to circumvent the shutdown.

Disinformation and propaganda are recognized as an equal tool of Russia's foreign policy and hybrid wars as other methods of coercion and intimidation. Ukraine was one of the main objects for the implementation of this method of the Kremlin's foreign policy. At the same time, other Central and Eastern European states also are feeling informational pressure due to the spread of disinformation and narratives that were supposed to justify the actions of the Russian state and its aggression against individual states. Romania, which borders Ukraine and became a neighbor of the Russian Federation after the illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, became one of the important objects of the Kremlin's disinformation and propaganda. The article is devoted to the study of the peculiarities of the Russian disinformation campaign in Romania, which openly demonstrates its anti-Russian sentiments. The existing discourse on the narratives and misinformation of the Kremlin in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe emphasizes that in recent years, Russia has begun to change approaches in each country, using the peculiarities of the regional context and internal situation to achieve its own goals. The purpose of the article is to identify the main messages distributed by Russian resources in the Romanian information space in order to determine the exact goals pursued by the Kremlin in this country. The application of a combination of qualitative methodology methods, such as the case study method, content analysis of documents and scientific works, as well as discourse analysis of information resources, allows us to provide answers to the following search tasks: to reveal the peculiarities of the perception of Russia in Romania; identify the main sources of dissemination of pro Russian theses and information in the Romanian media; to analyze the narratives cultivated in the Romanian information space, with an interpretation of their real tasks and an assessment to what extent they can influence public opinion. The conclusions summarize the results of the study, indicating which are the direct and indirect Kremlin's goals by spreading certain messages and narratives.

In this article, we investigate the socio-technical ecology of Twitter, including the technological affordances of the platform and the user-generated discursive strategies used to create and circulate anti-Muslim disinformation online. During the first wave of Covid-19, right-wing followers claimed that Muslims were spreading the virus to perform Jihad. We analyzed a sample of 7000 tweets using Critical Discourse Analysis to examine how the online disinformation accusing Muslims in India was initiated and sustained. We identify three critical discourse strategies used on Twitter to spread and sustain the anti-Muslim (dis)information: (1) creating mediatized hate solidarities, (2) appropriating instruments of legitimacy, and (3) practicing Internet Hindu vigilantism. Each strategy consists of a subset of discursive toolkits, highlighting the central routes of discursive engagement to produce disinformation online. We argue that understanding how the technical affordances of Social Networking Sites are leveraged in quotidian online practices to produce and sustain the phenomenon of online disinformation will prove to be a novel contribution to the field of disinformation studies and Internet research.