Introduction to the Series on Liability
In: Administration in social work, Band 17, Heft 4, S. 1-9
ISSN: 0364-3107
17642 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Administration in social work, Band 17, Heft 4, S. 1-9
ISSN: 0364-3107
In: Administration in social work: the quarterly journal of human services management, Band 17, Heft 4, S. 1-9
ISSN: 0364-3107
In: Congressional quarterly weekly report, Band 44, S. 903-904
ISSN: 0010-5910, 1521-5997
In: Yearbook of European law, Band 5, Heft 1, S. 233-286
ISSN: 2045-0044
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 11, Heft 4, S. 728
ISSN: 1520-6688
In: Netherlands international law review: NILR ; international law - conflict of laws, Band 10, Heft 2, S. 139
ISSN: 1741-6191
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 36, Heft 1, S. 52-71
ISSN: 1471-6437
Abstract:Strict liability in tort law is thought by some to have a moral counterpart. In this essay I attempt to determine whether there is, in fact, strict liability in the moral domain. I argue that there is, and I critically evaluate several accounts of its normative foundations before suggesting one of my own.
In: Beck , U R & Kruse-Andersen , P K 2018 ' Endogenizing the cap in a cap-and-trade system : Assessing the agreement on EU ETS phase 4 ' De Økonomiske Råd .
In early 2018, a reform of the world's largest functioning greenhouse gas emissions cap-and-trade system, the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), was formally approved. The reform changes the main principles of the system by endogenizing the previously fixed emissions cap. We show that the effective emissions cap is now affected by the allowance demand and therefore not set directly by EU policymakers. One consequence of this is that national policies that reduce allowance demand can reduce long-run cumulative emissions, which is not possible in a standard cap-andtrade system. Using a newly developed dynamic model of the EU ETS, we show that policies reducing allowance demand can have substantial effects on cumulative emissions. Our model simulations also suggest that the reform reduces aggregate emissions in both the short and long run, but the long-run impact is substantially larger. Yet, the reform has a small impact on the currently large allowance surplus. ; In early 2018, a reform of the world's largest functioning greenhouse gas emissions cap-and-trade system, the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), was formally approved. The reform changes the main principles of the system by endogenizing the previously fixed emissions cap. We show that the effective emissions cap is now affected by the allowance demand and therefore not set directly by EU policymakers. One consequence of this is that national policies that reduce allowance demand can reduce long-run cumulative emissions, which is not possible in a standard cap-and-trade system. Using a newly developed dynamic model of the EU ETS, we show that policies reducing allowance demand can have substantial effects on cumulative emissions. Our model simulations also suggest that the reform reduces aggregate emissions in both the short and long run, but the long-run impact is substantially larger. Yet, the reform has a small impact on the currently large allowance surplus.
BASE
In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Band 87, Heft 1, S. 1-14
SSRN
In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Band 87, Heft 1, S. 1-14
SSRN
In: Itinerario: international journal on the history of European expansion and global interaction, Band 19, Heft 2, S. 13-14
ISSN: 2041-2827
In: Development Southern Africa, Band 30, Heft 2, S. 224-237
ISSN: 1470-3637
In: Sociološki pregled: časopis Srpskog sociološkog društva, Band 40, Heft 4, S. 477-516
ISSN: 2560-4880
In: CAP Reform in Agenda 2000. The Transition to Competition: Measure for Rural Development and the Rural Environment. The Select Committee on the European Communities, Session 1997-80, 18th Report, HL Paper 84. London: Parliamentary Copyright House of Lords: 74-177 ISBN 0-10-408498-7
SSRN
Working paper