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Previous research has confirmed the prominent role of group processes in the promotion and endorsement of disinformation. We report three studies on a psychological framework derived from integrated threat theory—a psychological theory which describes how perceived threat leads to group polarization and prejudice—composed of the following constructs: group belongingness, perceived threat, outgroup derogation, and intergroup anxiety. Our pilot study suggested that need to belong and intergroup anxiety predict antiscientific beliefs (pseudoscientific, paranormal, and conspiracy theories), thus justifying the general applicability of integrated threat theory. Study 1 investigates the transition from weak to strong critical thinking regarding pseudoscientific doctrines. Besides greater outgroup derogation and perceived threats among strong critical thinkers, the model does not perform well in this context. Study 2 focuses on the intergroup conflict around anthropogenic global warming, revealing the strong predictive power of the model. These results are discussed in relation to the distinctive psychological profiles of science acceptance and rejection.

In the current paper, we argue that to get a better understanding of the psychological antecedents of COVID-related science skepticism, it is pivotal to review what is known about the (social) psychology of science skepticism. Recent research highlighting the role of ideologies and worldviews in shaping science skepticism can inform research questions as well as pandemic responses to COVID-19. It is likely that the antecedents of general COVID-19-related skepticism substantially overlap with the antecedents of climate change skepticism. Additionally, skepticism about a potential vaccine in particular will likely be fueled by similar worries and misperceptions to those shaping more general antivaccination attitudes, of which conspiracy thinking is particularly worth highlighting. We conclude by reflecting on how the COVID-19 crisis may shape future social-psychological research aimed at understanding trust in science and science skepticism.

It is often claimed that conspiracy theories are endorsed with the same level of intensity across the left‐right ideological spectrum. But do liberals and conservatives in the United States embrace conspiratorial thinking to an equivalent degree? There are important historical, philosophical, and scientific reasons dating back to Richard Hofstadter's bookThe Paranoid Style in American Politicsto doubt this claim. In four large studies of U.S. adults (totalN = 5049)—including national samples—we investigated the relationship between political ideology, measured in both symbolic and operational terms, and conspiratorial thinking in general. Results reveal that conservatives in the United States were not only more likely than liberals to endorse specific conspiracy theories, but they were also more likely to espouse conspiratorial worldviews in general (r = .27, 95% CI: .24, .30). Importantly, extreme conservatives were significantly more likely to engage in conspiratorial thinking than extreme liberals (Hedges'g = .77,SE = .07,p < .001). The relationship between ideology and conspiratorial thinking was mediated by a strong distrust of officialdom and paranoid ideation, both of which were higher among conservatives, consistent with Hofstadter's account of the paranoid style in American politics.

It is well established that conservatives in the United States are substantially less likely than liberals to accept that climate change is happening and is human caused and are less supportive of policies to limit climate change. However, it is likely that ideological differences in climate change beliefs, attitudes, and policy preferences are smaller when people have close friends and family members who care about climate change. Here, we use nine nationally representative survey samples (total N = 16,168) to evaluate this claim and test if perceived social consensus predicts a smaller difference in climate change beliefs between liberals and conservatives. We find that social consensus plays an important role in climate change beliefs, attitudes, and policy preferences for people across the ideological spectrum, but especially among conservatives. These findings provide important insights on how to bridge ideological divides in large social dilemmas such as climate change.

Climate change is an urgent global issue, with demands for personal, collective, and governmental action. Although a large body of research has investigated the influence of communication on public engagement with climate change, few studies have investigated the role of interpersonal discussion. Here we use panel data with 2 time points to investigate the role of climate conversations in shaping beliefs and feelings about global warming. We find evidence of reciprocal causality. That is, discussing global warming with friends and family leads people to learn influential facts, such as the scientific consensus that human-caused global warming is happening. In turn, stronger perceptions of scientific agreement increase beliefs that climate change is happening and human-caused, as well as worry about climate change. When assessing the reverse causal direction, we find that knowing the scientific consensus further leads to increases in global warming discussion. These findings suggest that climate conversations with friends and family enter people into a proclimate social feedback loop.

This paper analyzes key psychological themes in language used by prominent conspiracy theorists and science advocates on Twitter, as well as those of a random sample of their follower base. We conducted a variety of psycholinguistic analyses over a corpus of 16,290 influencer tweets and 160,949 follower tweets in order to evaluate stable intergroup differences in language use among those who subscribe or are exposed to conspiratorial content and those who are focused on scientific content. Our results indicate significant differences in the use of negative emotion (e.g., anger) between the two groups, as well as a focus, especially among conspiracy theorists, on topics such as death, religion, and power. Surprisingly, we found less pronounced differences in cognitive processes (e.g., certainty) and outgroup language. Our results add to a growing literature on the psychological characteristics underlying a "conspiracist worldview."

Prior research has demonstrated that communicating the scientific consensus that human-caused climate change is happening is an effective way to increase public understanding and engagement with the issue. However, less is known about (1) how persuasive this message is to oppositional audiences, (2) how long message effects last over time, and (3) what factors predict whether such effects last. We address these questions in a two-wave longitudinal study and find that consensus messaging leads to updated consensus beliefs across Global Warming's Six Americas. Although consensus treatment effects decay over time, 40% of the original treatment effect remains 26 days later. Additionally, the treatment effect is most durable among people Doubtful or Dismissive of climate change. Our findings address an ongoing debate in the literature and support a Bayesian learning perspective, with little evidence of motivated reasoning.

The global spread of antiscience beliefs, misinformation, fake news, and conspiracy theories is posing a threat to the well-being of individuals and societies worldwide. Accordingly, research on why people increasingly doubt science and endorse "alternative facts" is flourishing. Much of this work has focused on identifying cognitive biases and individual differences. Importantly, however, the reasons that lead people to question mainstream scientific findings and share misinformation are also inherently tied to social processes that emerge out of divisive commitments to group identities and worldviews. In this special issue, we focus on the important and thus far neglected role of group processes in motivating science skepticism. The articles that feature in this special issue cover three core areas: the group-based roots of antiscience attitudes; the intergroup dynamics between science and conspiratorial thinking; and finally, insights about science denial related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Across all articles, we highlight the role of worldviews, identities, norms, religion, and other inter- and intragroup processes that shape antiscientific attitudes. We hope that this collection will inspire future research endeavors that take a group processes approach to the social psychological study of science skepticism.

AbstractThe Internet is gaining relevance as a platform where extremist organizations seek to recruit new members. For this preregistered study, we developed and tested a novel online game, Radicalise, which aims to combat the effectiveness of online recruitment strategies used by extremist organizations, based on the principles of active psychological inoculation. The game "inoculates" players by exposing them to severely weakened doses of the key techniques and methods used to recruit and radicalize individuals via social media platforms: identifying vulnerable individuals, gaining their trust, isolating them from their community and pressuring them into committing a criminal act in the name of the extremist organization. To test the game's effectiveness, we conducted a preregistered 2 × 2 mixed (pre–post) randomized controlled experiment (n = 291) with two outcome measures. The first measured participants' ability and confidence in assessing the manipulativeness of fictitious WhatsApp messages making use of an extremist manipulation technique before and after playing. The second measured participants' ability to identify what factors make an individual vulnerable to extremist recruitment using 10 profile vignettes, also before and after playing. We find that playing Radicalise significantly improves participants' ability and confidence in spotting manipulative messages and the characteristics associated with vulnerability.

Do campaign contributions from oil and gas companies influence legislators to vote against the environment, or do these companies invest in legislators that have a proven antienvironmental voting record? Using 28 y of campaign contribution data, we find that evidence consistently supports the investment hypothesis: The more a given member of Congress votes against environmental policies, the more contributions they receive from oil and gas companies supporting their reelection.

Do campaign contributions from oil and gas companies influence legislators to vote against the environment, or do these companies invest in legislators that have a proven antienvironmental voting record? Using 28 y of campaign contribution data, we find that evidence consistently supports the investment hypothesis: The more a given member of Congress votes against environmental policies, the more contributions they receive from oil and gas companies supporting their reelection.

Do campaign contributions from oil and gas companies influence legislators to vote against the environment, or do these companies invest in legislators that have a proven antienvironmental voting record? Using 28 y of campaign contribution data, we find that evidence consistently supports the investment hypothesis: The more a given member of Congress votes against environmental policies, the more contributions they receive from oil and gas companies supporting their reelection.

Research on the gateway belief model indicates that communicating the scientific consensus on global warming acts as a "gateway" to other beliefs and support for action. We test whether a video conveying the scientific consensus on global warming is more effective than a text transcript with the same information. Results show that the video was significantly more effective than the transcript in increasing people's perception of scientific agreement. Structural equation models indicate indirect increases in the beliefs that global warming is happening and is human-caused, and in worry about global warming, which in turn predict increased global warming issue priority.