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We here use panel data from the COME-HERE survey to track income inequality during COVID-19 in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Relative inequality in equivalent household disposable income among individuals changed in a hump-shaped way between January 2020 and January 2021, with an initial rise from January to May 2020 being more than reversed by September 2020. Absolute inequality also fell over this period. Due to the pandemic some households lost more than others, and government compensation schemes were targeted towards the poorest, implying that on average income differences decreased. Generalized Lorenz domination reveals that these distributive changes reduced welfare in Italy.

We here use panel data from the COME-HERE survey to track income inequality during COVID-19 in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Relative inequality in equivalent household disposable income among individuals changed in a hump-shaped way between January 2020 and January 2021, with an initial rise from January to May 2020 being more than reversed by September 2020. Absolute inequality also fell over this period. Due to the pandemic some households lost more than others, and government compensation schemes were targeted towards the poorest, implying that on average income differences decreased. Generalized Lorenz domination reveals that these distributive changes reduced welfare in Italy.

We here use panel data from the COME-HERE survey to track income inequality during COVID-19 in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Relative inequality in equivalent household disposable income among individuals changed in a hump-shaped way between January 2020 and January 2021, with an initial rise from January to May 2020 being more than reversed by September 2020. Absolute inequality also fell over this period. Due to the pandemic some households lost more than others, and government compensation schemes were targeted towards the poorest, implying that on average income differences decreased. Generalized Lorenz domination reveals that these distributive changes reduced welfare in Italy.

We here use panel data from the COME-HERE survey to track income inequality during COVID-19 in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Relative inequality in equivalent household disposable income among individuals changed in a hump-shaped way between January 2020 and January 2021, with an initial rise from January to May 2020 being more than reversed by September 2020. Absolute inequality also fell over this period. Due to the pandemic some households lost more than others, and government compensation schemes were targeted towards the poorest, implying that on average income differences decreased. Generalized Lorenz domination reveals that these distributive changes reduced welfare in Italy.

We here use panel data from the COME-HERE survey to track income inequality during COVID-19 in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Relative inequality in equivalent household disposable income among individuals changed in a hump-shaped way between January 2020 and January 2021, with an initial rise from January to May 2020 being more than reversed by September 2020. Absolute inequality also fell over this period. Due to the pandemic some households lost more than others, and government compensation schemes were targeted towards the poorest, implying that on average income differences decreased. Generalized Lorenz domination reveals that these distributive changes reduced welfare in Italy. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10888-021-09499-2.

We here use panel data from the COME-HERE survey to track income inequality during COVID-19 in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Relative inequality in equivalent household disposable income among individuals changed in a hump-shaped way between January 2020 and January 2021, with an initial rise from January to May 2020 being more than reversed by September 2020. Absolute inequality also fell over this period. Due to the pandemic some households lost more than others, and government compensation schemes were targeted towards the poorest, implying that on average income differences decreased. Generalized Lorenz domination reveals that these distributive changes reduced welfare in Italy.

Job insecurity is one type of risk that workers face on the labour market. As with any risk, individuals can choose to insure against it. We consider marriage as potential insurance against labour-market risk. The 1999 rise in the French Delalande layoff tax for older workers produced an exogenous rise in job insecurity for younger workers. A difference-in-differences estimation in panel data reveals that this greater job insecurity for the under-50s led to a significant rise in their probability of marriage, and especially with partners who had greater job security, consistent with marriage providing insurance on the labour market.

Job insecurity is one type of risk that workers face on the labour market. As with any risk, individuals can choose to insure against it. We consider marriage as potential insurance against labour-market risk. The 1999 rise in the French Delalande layoff tax for older workers produced an exogenous rise in job insecurity for younger workers. A difference-in-differences estimation in panel data reveals that this greater job insecurity for the under-50s led to a significant rise in their probability of marriage, and especially with partners who had greater job security, consistent with marriage providing insurance on the labour market.

Job insecurity is one type of risk that workers face on the labour market. As with any risk, individuals can choose to insure against it. We consider marriage as potential insurance against labour-market risk. The 1999 rise in the French Delalande layoff tax for older workers produced an exogenous rise in job insecurity for younger workers. A difference-in-differences estimation in panel data reveals that this greater job insecurity for the under-50s led to a significant rise in their probability of marriage, and especially with partners who had greater job security, consistent with marriage providing insurance on the labour market.

Job insecurity is one type of risk that workers face on the labour market. As with any risk, individuals can choose to insure against it. We consider marriage as potential insurance against labour-market risk. The 1999 rise in the French Delalande layoff tax for older workers produced an exogenous rise in job insecurity for younger workers. A difference-in-differences estimation in panel data reveals that this greater job insecurity for the under-50s led to a significant rise in their probability of marriage, and especially with partners who had greater job security, consistent with marriage providing insurance on the labour market.

Job insecurity is one type of risk that workers face on the labour market. As with any risk, individuals can choose to insure against it. We consider marriage as potential insurance against labour-market risk. The 1999 rise in the French Delalande layoff tax for older workers produced an exogenous rise in job insecurity for younger workers. A difference-in-differences estimation in panel data reveals that this greater job insecurity for the under-50s led to a significant rise in their probability of marriage, and especially with partners who had greater job security, consistent with marriage providing insurance on the labour market.