Suchergebnisse

AbstractInterjurisdictional pollution spillovers are a critical issue in U.S. environmental policy. When policy responsibility is decentralized, state governmental agencies have incentives to promote these externalities in order to capture the benefits of economic activity within their borders while compelling neighbors to shoulder the resultant environmental costs. To test this free riding hypothesis, prior studies have relied on crude proxies to delineate a regulated entity's proximity to a neighboring state. In this article, we develop a more refined set of measures using newly available data on facility location to isolate the conditions under which free riding is theoretically more likely to occur. We then assess state enforcement of the federal Clean Water Act directed at major water polluters under these conditions to determine the extent to which U.S. states engage in environmental free riding behavior. Our empirical results are mixed, but in general they fail to support theoretical expectations generated by the free rider argument.

AbstractStudies of environmental policy employ various empirical strategies for measuring state environmental effort. The majority of these strategies can be divided into four categories: indices of state programmatic indicators, government expenditures, pollution abatement costs, and regulatory enforcement actions. In this article, we argue that these measures are empirically distinct, capture different attributes of state environmental policy, and are correlated with different intrastate factors. Thus, the choice among environmental policy measures is substantively important for researchers to consider, and we conclude by providing advice to scholars concerning choosing among these measures.

Interstate compacts are an increasingly important policy tool available to states, one that allows them to tackle regional and national issues. What effect does policy activity at the federal level have on state participation in interstate compacts? Drawing on theories of functional federalism, the authors explore the possibility that a state's response to federal activism varies across policy domains. For economic policy the authors hypothesize that federal activism causes an increase in compact participation, as states attempt to defend themselves against federal intrusion. In other policy areas the authors expect that states are more likely to enter into compacts during periods of relative federal inactivity. Results from a set of event-count models generally support these hypotheses. The study findings suggest that states may sometimes use interstate compacts as a mechanism to resist federal incursion but that this is just one facet of a more complex pattern of intergovernmental policy adjustment.

Political jurisdictions have incentives to promote pollution spillovers to capture the benefits of economic production within their borders while exporting the environmental costs to their neighbors. The authors examine the extent to which U.S. states engage in this type of free-riding behavior. Studying enforcement of the federal Clean Air Act from 1990 through 2000, the authors employ zero-inflated negative binomial regression to predict the number of state-initiated enforcement actions conducted in counties bordering other jurisdictions. They find that states perform fewer enforcement actions in counties adjacent to international borders but no evidence that states conduct less enforcement in counties that border other states. Adapted from the source document.

Political jurisdictions have incentives to promote pollution spillovers to capture the benefits of economic production within their borders while exporting the environmental costs to their neighbors. The authors examine the extent to which U.S. states engage in this type of free-riding behavior. Studying enforcement of the federal Clean Air Act from 1990 through 2000, the authors employ zero-inflated negative binomial regression to predict the number of state-initiated enforcement actions conducted in counties bordering other jurisdictions. They find that states perform fewer enforcement actions in counties adjacent to international borders but no evidence that states conduct less enforcement in counties that border other states.

Interstate compacts hold tremendous promise for resolving tough public problems at the subnational level. They have also been promoted as one way that states can protect their sovereignty vis-a-vis the national government. But the rate at which states participate in such compacts varies widely. Thus, we ask: What explains a state's propensity to join national interstate compacts? Using time-series cross-sectional event count models of state compact participation from 1960-2000, we find that states join compacts to enhance their policymaking capacity and to substitute for policy action by the national government. We also find that the physical connection among states influences their preference for certain types of compacts. Isolated states show a preference for compacts that simply harmonize policies, while more proximate states are more likely to join compacts that effectively open their borders to other states. Contrary to the expectations of some observers, interstate compacts do not appear to be used strategically by states as a means to forestall federal preemption. Adapted from the source document.

Interstate compacts hold tremendous promise for resolving tough public problems at the subnational level. They have also been promoted as one way that states can protect their sovereignty vis-à-vis the national government. But the rate at which states participate in such compacts varies widely. Thus, we ask: What explains a state's propensity to join national interstate compacts? Using time-series cross-sectional event count models of state compact participation from 1960–2000, we find that states join compacts to enhance their policymaking capacity and to substitute for policy action by the national government. We also find that the physical connection among states influences their preference for certain types of compacts. Isolated states show a preference for compacts that simply harmonize policies, while more proximate states are more likely to join compacts that effectively open their borders to other states. Contrary to the expectations of some observers, interstate compacts do not appear to be used strategicallyby states as a means to forestall federal preemption.

AbstractObjectiveWe examine the relationship between clean energy policies and green job growth.MethodsUsing a set of meta‐regression analyses, we assess the green job creation performance of a wide variety of policies in the American states.ResultsOur findings indicate that renewable portfolio standards and public benefit funds are systematically associated with increases in green jobs, although the effects of other policy tools are ambiguous at best. Effect estimates in the existing literature are significantly driven by how the dependent and core independent variables are measured.ConclusionOverall, our findings suggest that some policies may be an effective component of an energy‐based economic development strategy, but that for others a more robust evidence base is needed in order to clarify their effects.

Many scholars have argued that because consumers are poorly organized, regulatory enforcement will tend to be lax and serve the interests of industry. Considering, however, that elections are one of the main mechanisms by which the public exerts control over policy, surprisingly few studies have examined how electoral incentives may spur the government to regulate vigorously on behalf of consumers. We argue that when the threat of electoral accountability is greater, regulatory activities will serve the interests of the public, even if they impose costs on industry. We test this theoretical expectation by analyzing state regulatory activity in the wake of exogenous storms and natural disasters, which provide us with important theoretical and causal leverage. We find that a more "pro-regulation" electorate and elected chief regulators acting in close proximity to elections are associated with pro-consumer regulatory action.