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AbstractPolitical scientists have long been concerned that a popularly elected presidency may destabilize competitive party systems. We develop and test a new theory holding that the impact is more immediate and severe than previously assumed. Coexisting legislative and presidential coalitions first and foremost impede the evolution of predictable party interactions at the executive level, which is the domain of the cabinet. This quality has become accessible for comparative research thanks to the concept of party system closure. Using a new dataset for all European democracies since 1848, we show that presidential elections undermine party system closure in two ways: (1) by confounding patterns of government formation (notably under powerful presidencies) and (2) by disturbing electoral/legislative politics, which in turn affect executive politics. The former, direct effect emerges as dominant from a series of panel analyses and case illustrations. These findings have important implications for current problems of constitutional design and institutional reform.

The recent global financial crisis has been a serious stress test for representative democracies. Voter support has supposedly become more volatile, fragmented, and polarized, leaving elites with an intricate mix of economic and political challenges. However, a closer look at a new data set of European party systems during three major crises (1929, 1973, and 2008) reveals that the reality is less dramatic than the popular impression suggests. We propose a novel theory of party-system change that explains both the impact of economic crises as well as the robustness of party systems to more serious destabilization. Since voters and elites are risk averse, economic crises tend to disturb party systems that are generally "restrained" but, at the same time, help consolidate more complex systems. This explains why party systems rarely fall apart, nor do they reach ultimate stability. We provide quantitative evidence and qualitative illustrations of "restrained change" in various party-system dimensions.

The success of anti-immigration parties (AIPs) in many European democracies poses a strategic problem for established actors: Immediate policy impact of AIPs can be averted by ostracizing them (i.e. refusing any cooperation), but this strategy may sway public opinion further in their favour. A comparative review shows large variation in the electoral trajectories of ostracized parties. We therefore propose a model of the context conditions that shape the repercussions of ostracism in public opinion. Under conditions that suggest substantial policy impact of an AIP were it to join a coalition government, ostracism should decrease the party's electoral support. Vice versa, if context suggests strong "signaling" potential of an AIP if in opposition, ostracism should increase its support. To avoid apparent endogeneity of political context and party competition, the model is tested with a survey-embedded experiment on a representative sample from the Netherlands. Results confirm that ostracism is a double-edged strategy.

Parties in pluralist democracies face numerous contentious issues, but most models of electoral competition assume a simple, often one-dimensional structure. We develop a new, inherently multidimensional model of party strategy in which parties compete by emphasizing policy issues. Issue emphasis is informed by two distinct goals: mobilizing the party's core voters and broadening the support base. Accommodating these goals dissolves the position-valence dichotomy through a focus on policies that unite the party internally while also attracting support from the electorate at large. We define issue yield as the capacity of an issue to reconcile these criteria, and then operationalize it as a simple index. Results of multilevel regressions combining population survey data and party manifesto scores from the 2009 European Election Study demonstrate that issue yield governs party strategy across different political contexts.

Verlagsinfo: Die eleganten, mehrstöckigen Haupttürme japanischer Burgen, umgeben von gewaltigen Festungsanlagen, sind weithin als Symbole der Herrschaft von Samurai bekannt. Tatsächlich aber entstanden die ersten dieser tenshutaku erst ganz am Ende der Sengoku-Zeit. Die meisten Fortifikationen waren aus Holz gebaut, hatten Erdwälle und Gräben, und nutzten geschickt die natürliche Umgebung aus. Der zweite Band der Reihe wird diese älteren Anlagen wie auch Festungen, die von grossen Belagerungen betroffen waren wie Takamatsu 1582, Fushimi und Ueda 1600 und Osaka 1614/15, vorstellen. Das Buch erläutert die ausgeklügelten Belagerungstechniken, Gegenmassnahmen sowie das japanische Artilleriewesen der Zeit. Ein zweiter Schwerpunkt beschäftigt sich mit der komplexen Heraldik führender wie auch weniger bekannter Samuraifamilien der Sengokuzeit, mit vielen farbigen Beispielen. Auch für Heraldiker, aber ebenso für Figurensammler und -bemaler wichtig, geht es im dritten Teil weiterhin um eine Einführung in die Welt traditioneller japanischer Textilmuster und Farben, ihre Verwendung, die Herstellungsweise im vorindustriellen Zeitalter sowie ihre spezielle Symbolik

Administrative reorganization has become widespread practice in modern democracies. Various case studies highlight the relevance of political ideology for bureaucratic contraction, others the role of socioeconomic pressure and institutional constraints. We examine these explanations in a study of the German Länder, which have substantially contracted their bureaucracies since the 1990s. Quantitative analysis of a novel data set of 479 ministerial departments in 13 Länder over two decades suggests that the ideological complexion of governments is a stronger predictor of administrative reform than socioeconomic pressure or institutional constraints. Moreover, interaction models show how socioeconomic and institutional variables condition the effect of ideology.