Suchergebnisse

This Article explores how private governance can reduce the climate effects of global civil aviation. The civil aviation sector is a major contributor to climate change, accounting for emissions comparable to a top ten emitting country. National and international governmental bodies have taken important steps to address civil aviation, but the measures adopted to date are widely acknowledged to be inadequate. Civil aviation poses particularly difficult challenges for government climate mitigation efforts. Many civil aviation firms operate globally, emissions often occur outside of national boundaries, nations differ on their respective responsibilities, and demand is growing rapidly. Although promising new technologies are emerging, they will take time to develop and adopt. This Article argues that private initiatives can overcome many of these barriers. Private initiatives can motivate civil aviation firms to act absent government pressure at the national level and can create pressure for mitigation that transcends national boundaries. The Article argues that it is time to develop a private climate governance agenda for civil aviation and identifies examples of the types of existing and new initiatives that could be included in the effort. If public and private policymakers can overcome the tendency to focus almost exclusively on public governance, private initiatives can yield large and prompt emissions reductions from global civil aviation, buy time for more comprehensive government measures, and complement the government measures when they occur.

Parties frequently seek exemption from regulation on the ground that they contribute only a very small share to a problem. These one percent arguments are not inherently questionable; it can be efficient to exclude relatively small contributors. These arguments for exemption garner broad acceptance in part because they appeal to behavioral biases that induce individuals to discount or ignore small values. But when a regulatory problem can be solved only by regulating small contributors, accepting one percent arguments creates what we call the one percent problem. This Article shows that this general problem for regulation has particularly damaging effects on climate change policy: The global character of the climate change problem renders many sources of carbon emissions candidates for one percent arguments, but the climate problem cannot be solved without attention to these sources. This Article then isolates a gap in U.S. climate policy that is critical to addressing the one percent problem for climate. Unlike many other bodies, Congress currently legislates and appropriates without calculating the emissions consequences of its actions or adhering to an emissions budget. Both are necessary. Congress has long responded to one percent problems in managing the federal budget with disclosure and offsetting requirements. Requiring Congress to disclose the carbon emissions of legislation treats carbon costs on par with financial costs, and brings Congress's emissions disclosure duties in line with those that already apply to federal agencies and many industrial sources. Adopting a budgeting pre-commitment strategy of last resort - a carbon pay-as-you-go rule - directly confronts the analytic slippage exploited by one percent arguments.

Reducing the risk of catastrophic climate change will require leveling off greenhouse gas emissions over the short term and reducing emissions by an estimated 60-80% over the long term. To achieve these reductions, we argue that policymakers and regulators should focus not only on factories and other industrial sources of emissions but also on individuals. We construct a model that demonstrates that individuals contribute roughly one-third of carbon dioxide emissions in the United States. This one-third share accounts for roughly 8% of the world's total, more than the total emissions of any other country except China, and more than several continents. We contend that it is desirable, if not imperative, that governments address emissions from individual behavior. This task will be difficult because individual behaviors, including idling cars and wasting electricity, are resistant to change, even when the change is rational. Mindful of the costs, we propose measures that have a high likelihood of success. We draw on norms theory and empirical studies to demonstrate how legal reforms can tie the widely held abstract norm of personal responsibility to the emerging concrete norm of carbon neutrality. We suggest that these legal reforms could push carbon neutrality past a tipping point, directly influencing many carbon-emitting individual behaviors and building the public support necessary for policymakers to address the remaining sources.

Professors Bressman and Vandenbergh respond to the comments of Sally Katzen on their article presenting and analyzing results from an empirical study of the top political appointees at the Enviromental Protection Agency (EPA) during the William Clinton and George H.W. Bush administrations. In their previous article, Professors Bressman and Vandenbergh examined White House involvement in EPA rulemaking during the relevant periods, concluding that it may be a more complex and less positive phenomenon than previous studies have acknowledged. In this reply, the authors reinforce why the EPA is an important agency to study for information about White House involvement in agency rulemaking, and why it matters that multiple offices and individuals within the White House are involved in agency rulemaking.

From the inception of the administrative state, scholars have proposed various models of agency decision-making to render such decision-making accountable and effective, only to see those models falter when confronted by actual practice. Until now, the presidential control model has been largely impervious to this pattern. That model, which brings agency decision-making under the direction of the President, has strengthened over time, winning broad scholarly endorsement and bipartisan political support. But it, like prior models, relies on abstractions - for example, that the President represents public preferences and resists parochial pressures - that do not hold up as a factual matter. Although recent empirical analyses purport to validate the model, they fall short because they examine how the White House exercises control without considering how agencies experience control. This Article is the first to study the practice of presidential control from inside the administrative state. We interviewed the top political officials at the Environmental Protection Agency from the George H. W. Bush and Clinton Administrations during 1989-2001. Our data, which do not vary substantially between respondents of different presidential administrations, suggest that White House involvement is more complex and less positive than previous accounts acknowledge. But we do not conclude that the presidential control model lacks merit. Indeed, our respondents recognize that the President has a role to play in controlling agency decision-making. We therefore conclude that the presidential control model requires reworking to remain valid in practice as well as in theory. We identify next steps in that direction.