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AbstractThis paper contributes to the growing literature on the links between political regimes and economic development by studying the effects of years in office on economic development. The hypothesis is that dictators who stay in office for a long time period will find it increasingly difficult to carry out sound economic policies. We argue that such economic policies are the result of information asymmetries inherent to dictatorships (known as the 'dictator dilemma') and of changes in the personality of dictators (known as the 'winner effect'). We call the combination of these two terms the 'dictator effect'. We present evidence to suggest that long years in office impacts on economic growth (which is reduced), inflation (which increases) and the quality of institutions (which deteriorates). The negative effect of long years of tenure (i.e. the 'dictator effect') is particularly strong in young states and in Africa and the Near East.

Osamu Saito's pioneering research into the long‐term changes in occupational structure of Japan has inspired scholars to take a fresh look at structural change in other countries. This article offers a case study of Indonesia. We find a rather slow pace of structural transformation until the 1970s – the immediate post‐war period even saw a reversal of trends. After 1970, during a growth spurt, employment growth in manufacturing was not impressive, and services were an even more important source of employment. The role played by by‐employment is also analysed, demonstrating that in 1905 the economy was quite diversified.

This article quantifies the activities of medieval and early modern parliaments. It traces the long‐term evolution of this European institution, and offers a first pass at analysing its impact on long‐term economic development. Starting in Spain in the twelfth century, parliaments gradually spread over the Latin west between 1200 and 1500. In the early modern period, parliaments declined in influence in southern and central Europe and further gained in importance in the Netherlands and Britain, resulting in an institutional 'Little Divergence' between 1500 and 1800. We discuss the background of this phenomenon in detail. Moreover, by analysing the effects of parliamentary activity on city growth we find that these differences in institutional development help to explain the economic divergence between north‐western and southern and central Europe.

Cover Page -- Half-title Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Preface -- Introduction: Institutional Change, Nineteenth-Century Growth, and the Early Modern Legacy -- Chapter One: The End of the Republic: Adam Smith's "Stationary State" and the Enlightened Revolution -- The "Stationary State " and Historiographical Debate -- Technology and Institutions -- The Institutional Deficiency of the Republic -- United and Indivisible: Centralization and Political Reform -- Chapter Two: A Complex Legacy Tossed: The Dutch Economy during War and Revolution, 1780-1813 -- The Legacy: Specialization and Structural Change -- Economic Integration and Regional Price Gaps -- War and Revolution: Between Stability and Decline -- Institutional Rigidities and the Fall of the VOC -- The Financial Sector: Debt Accumulation and Capital Exports -- Conclusion -- Chapter Three: Unification and Secession: The Autocratic Experiment of Willem I, 1813-1840 -- The New Institutional Framework: The Constitutions of 1814-15 -- Precarious Consensus: Trade Policy and Public Finance -- Costly Priorities: Fiscal Policy and Public Debt -- The Activist Experiment: Domestic Economic Policy, 1813-30 -- East Indian Frustration: Colonial Policy, 1813-30 -- Secession and Renewal of the Colonial Nexus, 1830-40 -- Chapter Four: Troubled Recovery: Secession, Policy Adjustment, and the Colonial Nexus, 1813-1840 -- Postwar Instability into Sustained Growth -- The Primary Sector: Agriculture and Fisheries -- Case Study: The Dissolution of the Commons in the Eastern Provinces -- Case Study: Stagnation in the Herring Fishery -- Industrial Development -- Case Study: The Blocked Modernization of the Food Industry -- The Services Sector: Differentiated Dynamics -- Case Study: The Capital Market as a Bottleneck?.

A major feat of research and synthesis, this book presents the first comprehensive history of the Dutch economy in the nineteenth century--an important but poorly understood piece of European economic history. Based on a detailed reconstruction of extensive economic data, the authors account for demise of the Dutch economy's golden age. After showing how institutional factors combined to make the Dutch economy a victim of its own success, the book traces its subsequent emergence as a modern industrial economy. Between 1780 and 1914, the Netherlands went through a double transition. Its economy--which, in the words of Adam Smith, was approaching a "stationary state" in the eighteenth century--entered a process of modern economic growth during the middle decades of the nineteenth. At the same time, the country's sociopolitical structure was undergoing radical transformation as the decentralized polity of the republic gave way to a unitary state. As the authors show, the dramatic transformation of the Dutch political structure was intertwined with equally radical changes in the institutional structure of the economy. The outcome of this dual transition was a rapidly industrializing economy on one side and, on the other, the neocorporatist sociopolitical structure that would characterize the Netherlands in the twentieth century. Analyzing both processes with a focus on institutional change, this book argues that the economic and political development of the Netherlands can be understood only in tandem