Suchergebnisse

While mediation efforts in violent conflicts often fail, the academic literature on mediation has long ignored both this phenomenon and its consequences. This paper aims to fill this significant knowledge gap by examining the conditions under which the failure of mediation leads to an escalation of civil war. Based on the literature on bargaining, we argue that the degree of negotiability of the conflict parties' strategic objectives, as well as the relative weight of hardliners and moderates within those conflict parties, influence the likelihood of escalation after mediation failure. A plausibility test carried out for Norway's failed mediation in the Sri Lankan civil war confirms the usefulness of our model. In particular, the suspension of negotiations in April 2003 led to a shift towards less negotiable strategic objectives for both conflict parties and to a strengthening of hardliners within the government. This contributed to the escalation of the conflict, up to its eventual termination in May 2009.

"Heizt Religion Gewaltkonflikte im subsaharischen Afrika an? Eine neue Datenbank kommt zu dem Befund, dass dies häufiger zutrifft als angenommen: In fast allen Ländern können religiös konnotierte Gewalthandlungen wie Übergriffe auf Gläubige und Gotteshäuser oder Zusammenstöße zwischen Religionsgruppen beobachtet werden. In 15 Fällen verlaufen Gewaltkonflikte entlang religiöser Grenzen. In neun Ländern sind theologische Differenzen Teilursache von Gewaltkonflikten und in 13 Staaten agieren bewaffnete religiöse Gruppen. Für kausale Zusammenhänge deutet sich an, dass religiös konnotierte Gewalt besonders dann auftritt, wenn ethnische und religiöse Grenzen parallel verlaufen, Religion stark politisiert ist und Eliten Gewalt religiös legitimieren." (Autorenreferat)

Religious elites are active for peace in many violent conflicts. Normative explanations often do not suffice to explain their engagement. In this paper we draw on the findings of social-movement research to identify the factors that induce rationally acting religious elites to be active for peace. It is their relationships to the government, other religious elites, and believers that can motivate them to call for peace. However, they will do so only if they anticipate-based on the overall influence of other religious peace (co-)activists, the structure of the religious community, and the frame environment - that they will not be penalized for their engagement. Religious norms are an important motivation behind religious peace activism, but rational decision-making also has to be taken into account if religious engagement for peace is to be explained fully. ; Religiöse Eliten engagieren sich in vielen Gewaltkonflikten für Frieden. Normative Rechtfertigungen für ihr Verhalten können dies oftmals jedoch nur unzureichend erklären. Zur Identifizierung von Faktoren für ein Friedensengagement rationaler religiöser Eliten stützen wir uns auf die Erkenntnisse der Sozialen Bewegungsforschung. Die Beziehung religiöser Eliten zur Regierung, zu anderen religiösen Eliten und den Gläubigen motiviert sie zu Friedensaufrufen, für die sich jedoch nur dann engagieren, wenn sie davon ausgehen können, dass von anderen religiösen Friedensaktivisten, der Struktur ihrer Religionsgemeinschaft und dem Frame-Umfeld keine Gefahren für ihr Engagement zu erwarten sind. Religiöse Normen sind zwar eine bedeutsame Grundlage für religiöses Friedensengagement, zur Erklärung des Zustandekommens von Friedensengagement sollte jedoch die rationale Entscheidungsfindung religiöser Eliten berücksichtigt werden.

Despite ample anecdotal evidence, previous research on violent conflict has found little evidence that religion is an important factor in organized violence. Quantitative work in this area has been largely confined to the interreligious character of conflict and measures of religious diversity, and has strongly neglected the peace aspect of religion. The Religion and Conflict in Developing Countries (RCDC) dataset helps to fill this gap with innovative and fine-grained data for 130 developing countries between 1990 and 2010. RCDC includes four types of religious violence (assaults on religious targets, attacks by religious actors, clashes between religious communities, and clashes with the state). In addition, RCDC contains data on interreligious networks and peace initiatives. This article demonstrates the usefulness of RCDC by applying our data to a preliminary analysis. The results indicate that interreligious networks are a reaction to identity overlaps and previous interreligious conflict. (International Interactions (London)/ FUB)

Anecdotal evidence from many armed conflicts suggests that religion incites violence. Theoretically speaking, several facets of religion can create motives and opportunities to overcome the collective action problems associated with organized violence. However, empirical research has hitherto found no conclusive answer on the extent to which religion is connected to armed conflict onset. Contributing to the filling of this gap, we use a new database that incorporates important religious factors that previous studies left largely untested. The data set covers 130 developing countries for the period 1990 to 2010. Results from logistic regressions confirm our expectation that certain religious factors fuel armed conflict—in particular, the overlap of religious and other identities, religious groups' grievances, and religious leaders' calls for violence. We also find that religious determinants vary in their impact according to whether conflicts are religious or not in origin.